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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45510 May 27, 1986

BERNARDO B. LEGASPI, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LEONARDO B. SALCEDO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 53947-R and from the resolution denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On February 8, 197 1, the plaintiff now petitioner filed a complaint with the Court of FirstInstance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. N-1595 for reconveyance to enforce his right torepurchase two parcels of land, Lots Nos. 3962 and 3963 of the Imus Estate covered by TCT

Nos. T-4388 and T-4389, respectively, which he sold to the defendant, now private respondent, pursuant to a sale with pacto de retro as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with the Right toRepurchase dated October 15, 1965 and marked as Exhibit "A".

The complaint alleged, among others, that Bernardo B. Legaspi is the registered owner of the

aforementioned two parcels of land which he sold to his son-in-law, Leonardo B. Salcedo, onOctober 15, 1965 for the sum of P25,000.00 with the right to repurchase the same within fiveyears from the execution of the deed of sale; that before the expiry date of the repurchase periodwhich was on October 15, 1970, Legaspi offered and tendered to Salcedo the sum of P25,000.00for the repurchase of the two parcels of land; that the tender of payment was refused by Salcedowithout justifiable or legal cause; that Salcedo refused to convey the properties to Legaspi asrequested by the latter; that on October 15, 1970, Legaspi deposited in the Office of the Clerk ofCourt of First Instance of Cavite City the amount of P25,125.00 as evidenced by Official Receipt

No. 2698797-k marked as Exhibit "B"; that despite earnest efforts towards a compromise afterconsignation of the repurchase money had been made, Salcedo refused to reconvey the propertiesin question.

In his answer with compulsory counterclaim, Salcedo alleged, among others, that he denies thatLegaspi ever offered and tendered to him the sum of P25,000.00 or requested the execution ofthe corresponding deed of reconveyance; that what actually transpired on October 15, 1970 wasthat Legaspi asked for an extension of one year within which to repurchase the two parcels ofland bringing with him a document entitled "Extension Period to Repurchase" marked as Exhibit"1" which Salcedo declined to sign; and that Salcedo also denies that earnest efforts towards acompromise were pursued by Legaspi for the latter merely proposed for an extension of one year

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of the right to repurchase. By way of special defense, Salcedo claimed that Legaspi was nolonger entitled to repurchase the properties in question for failure to exercise his right within thestipulated period in accordance with Article 1250 of the Civil Code under which Salcedomaintained he was entitled to the payment of P42,250.00 instead of only P25,000.00. Article1250 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated shouldsupervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of theobligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to thecontrary.

The lower court, after trial, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is for the plaintiff who retains ownership of Lots Nos.3962 and 3963 of the Imus Estate covered by TCT Nos. T-3488 and T-3489,respectively, of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite by automatic

operation of law when payment of the obligation has been effected by depositingthe whole amount with the Clerk of Court in spite of the refusal to receive thesame under the allegation that the plaintiff must be obliged to pay P17,250.00 byway of interest or devaluation where in a case of this nature, sale with right torepurchase, interest has no place in its scheme; and the defendant is herebyordered to deliver these two lots immediately upon receipt of this decision to the

plaintiff as they should have done on October 15, 1970 which in bad faith theyhave been avoiding using all kinds of tricks to frustrate the payment of the saidobligation and for which they should be made to answer for damages asconsequences of bad faith; the defendant to pay unto the plaintiff the sum ofP10,500.00 yearly from October 15, 1970 until the delivery of these two lots to

the plaintiff value of the produce of the said two lots which have been retained bythe defendant, yearly, from October 15, 1970 when they should have made physical delivery of these two lots by reason of the payment of the price of thesaid two lots appearing in the deed of sale with right to repurchase; defendantfurther to pay to the plaintiff by way of moral, punitive, exemplary, and correctivedamages in the amount of P20,000.00; P2,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus the costsof this proceedings. The counterclaim is hereby dismissed; and the Register ofDeeds, Cavite Province is hereby ordered to cancel the annotation of the sale with

pacto de retro dated October 1, 1965 upon the ground that the repurchase thereinmentioned was effected legally on October 15, 1970, inspite of defendant's refusalto allow plaintiff to exercise his right to repurchase reserved to plaintiff in thedocument.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint holding that:

... [T]he appellee never made a valid tender of payment that amounted to a lawfulexercise of the right to repurchase the property involved in the instant case.

Neither was a valid consignation made seasonably in court of the amount ofP25,000.00 with which to make the repurchase.

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A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

The petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals first, on the ground that therespondent court departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings contrary tothe well-settled rule that as to the matter of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court cannot

substitute its own discretion with that of the lower court for the latter court is in a better positionto gauge such credibility of witnesses; and secondly on the ground that the respondent courtcommitted a patent error in law and jurisprudence by virtue of its conclusion that "no validconsignation was seasonably made of the amount of P25,000.00 with which to make therepurchase" despite the Official Receipt of the Clerk of Court evidencing the deposit of saidamount on the last day of the repurchase period, that is, on October 15, 1970.

The only issue crucial to the present appeal is whether or not the petitioner validly exercised hisright to repurchase the properties within the five-year period as stipulated in the sale with pactode retro entered into between the petitioner as vendor a retro and private respondent as vendee aretro . To resolve this issue, we determine whether it was correct for the respondent court to

disturb the findings of fact made by the trial court in its conclusion that there was tender of payment within the redemption period.

Tender of payment is the manifestation made by the debtor to the creditor of his desire to complywith his obligation, with the offer of immediate performance. (Tolentino, Civil Code of thePhil....ippines, Vol. IV [1985]). Generally, it is an act preparatory to consignation as an attemptto make a private settlement before proceeding to the solemnities of consignation. (8 Manresa325). Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authoritieswhenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a priortender of payment. (Limkako v. Teodoro, 74 Phil..... 313). In instances where no debt is due andowing, consignation is not proper. (Asturias Sugar Central vs. Pure Cane Molasses Co., 60

Phil..... 255) We have early held that:Consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase as a mere tenderof payment is enough if made on time as a basis for an action to compel thevendee a retro to resell the property. (Villegas vs. Capistrano, 9 Phil..... 416;Resales vs. Reyes, et al. 25 Phil..... 495; Paez, et al., vs. Magno, 46 O.G. p. 5425).

Since the case at bar involves the exercise of the right to repurchase, a showing that petitionermade a valid tender of payment is sufficient. It is enough that a sincere or genuine tender of

payment and not a mock or deceptive one was made. The fact that he deposited the amount ofthe repurchase money with the Clerk of Court was simply an additional security for the

petitioner. It was not an essential act that had to be performed after tender of payment wasrefused by the private respondent although it may serve to indicate the veracity of the desire tocomply with the obligation.

On the issue of whether or not the tender of payment in the manner described by the petitionerresulted in the exercise of the right to repurchase, we rule that it was erroneous on the part of therespondent court to reverse the factual finding of the trial court that a valid tender of payment

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was made seasonably. The records do not show that this finding is grounded entirely onspeculation, surmises, or conjectures.

One reason emphasized by the respondent for reversing the factual findings of the trial court wasa discrepancy regarding the time the consignation was made. Was it made at 10:00 o'clock in the

morning or 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon? The discrepancy is not substantial. It is plausible thateither the petitioner or the court employee could not correctly recall the exact time, about oneyear later, when an official transaction was performed on a given day. There is no discrepancy inthe date that consignation was effected. Moreover, there is an official receipt evidencing thetransaction. We apply the following:

Sec. 20. Public and private writing The following writings are public:

(a) The written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals, and of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive,whether of the Phil....ippines, or of a foreign country;

xxx xxx xxx

(Rule 132, Rules of Court.)

xxx xxx xxx

... [A]ny instrument authorized by a competent official with the solemnitiesrequired by law is a public document.... [A]n official receipt printed in accordancewith the standard forms required by the government is a public document. (U.S.vs. Asensi 34 Phil..... 750, 757, 758, citing Cacnio v. Baens 5 Phil.... 742; and

U.S. vs. Vy Guico, 12 Phil..... 209).

The evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence ofstrong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. (Martin, Rules ofCourt, with Notes and Comments, Vol. V, [1974], citing Robinson vs. Villafuerte,18 Phil.... 171; Sy Tiangco vs. Pablo, 59 Phil..... 119; De Jesus v. Grey, 59 Phil.....834; El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga 60 Phil..... 17).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes theywill discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore,whatever acts they do in the discharge of their public duty may be given in

evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the natureand circumstances of each case may appear to require. (Antillon vs. Barcelona, 37Phil.... 148,152).

The alleged correction in the official receipt was not made by the petitioner but by the cashier ofthe Court of First Instance who received the money. The wife of the private respondent alsotestified that on October 12, 1970 or three days before the expiry date, the petitioner and his sonwent to the respondent's house to repurchase the lots. The respondent's letter to the petitioner's

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lawyer on November 3, 1970 shows that the offer to repurchase the property was rejected because the petitioner could not pay an additional P17,250.00 on top of the repurchase price.Paragraph 6 of the respondent's answer to the complaint states as an Affirmative and SpecialDefense, the following:

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if at all plaintiff would be entitled to repurchase the said properties, heshould pay the defendant the sum of P42,250.00 in accordance with Art. 1250 ofthe New Civil Code and upon failure to do so, defendant is entitled to an order ofthis Honorable Court to have his ownership over the said properties consolidatedand the said properties registered in his name in accordance with Art. 1607 of the

New Civil Code.

The records, therefore, show that the right of repurchase was seasonably exercised. The recordsclearly manifest that the petitioner was able to make a valid tender of payment on the 14th of

October 1970 by offering personally the amount of P25,000.00 to the private respondent whorefused to accept it claiming that the money was devalued. Thereafter, the petitioner informedthe private respondent that he would be depositing the same amount with the proper court. (tsn.,

pp. 6 & 9, February 8, 1972 hearing). The trial court correctly ruled that there was properexercise of the right to repurchase within the five-year period not for the reason that the depositof the repurchase money amounted to a tender of payment but for what the evidence submitted

before it proved. The appellate court erred when it did not apply the well-accepted doctrine that:

Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight onappeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons becausethe trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to

observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. (Chase vs.Buencamino, Sr., 130 SCRA 365)

As regards the award of moral, punitive, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount ofP20,000.00 made by the trial court, the award is deleted for want of sufficient proof to justify it.The mere refusal to accept the repurchase money on the ground that the value of the peso haddevalued did not amount to bad faith which would warrant the payment of these damages by the

private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the former Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, 7th Judicial District, Branch III isREINSTATED but MODIFIED by the deletion of the award of P20,000.00 for moral, punitive,exemplary and corrective damages. In all other respects, the trial court's decision is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ. concur.

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The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

epublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

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CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.

Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are acourt of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer

justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we doneither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is

our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'thename of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964,Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrumentdenominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3

By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding

to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequentlyenclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and hiswife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. 4

On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold tothe spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an Americancitizen . 5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaintinvoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. 6

The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, nothaving been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although

there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirssatisfied the requirement of the law. 7

In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters,including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, wasstaying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption

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petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and neighborswhose children went to school together. 10

It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought, asthey alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino

and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know thatthe area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the other. co-heirs.Especially significant was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the

petitioners' son, which was done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.

The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the privaterespondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the

purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so withinthe period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale bythe vendor.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the saidarticle was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the samecase of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court heldthat that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written noticealthough no particular form was required.

Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-

heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy therequirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) isinformed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days forredemption start running. "

In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY , 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist,emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees,conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercisedexcept within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or

by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in theRegistry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he hasgiven written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.

As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held

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that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no

written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day periodfor redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the lawshould never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within thelegislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motivesof the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Lawand justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its

peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature andfunctions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we doinstead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the lawis obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it isworded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence."Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice

Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While weadmittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a wayas to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is notthere, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, wedefer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker's will.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, astatute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit iswithin the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which iswithin the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stateddifferently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much withinthe statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of thestatute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 14

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the startingtime of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period,it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed

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to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only aday or two.

The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invokednot days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla

Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. Thedelay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that therewas a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would suchnotice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not inwriting. would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long

before the complaint was filed in 1977?

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that theywere unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring

written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfiedthat in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, ofthe sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint forredemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the

30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time duringthe interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the propertiessold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption hadalready been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.

The following doctrine is also worth noting:

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of analleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon whichhe bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have inducedinquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available uponinquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, thesame as if he had known the facts. 15

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who werenot among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strongmaterials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. Thiscertainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirssaw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all

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of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it wasalready too late.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of thelaw, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The

said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by thisCourt in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are notabandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting anexception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing wasgiven them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977,without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for thisexception.

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish torender every one his due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses thefacts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredientof its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render

justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law bedispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED andthat of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,

Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 5.

2 Ibid , p. 6.

3 Id, p. 64,

5 Id . p. 21

6 Id , p. 21.

* Presided by Judge Cezar D. Francisco.

7 Id, p. 65.

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8 Id, p. 5.

9 Id, p. 64.

10 Id , p. 26.

** Gaviola, Jr., P.J., ponente, Caguioa, Quetulio-Losa & Luciano, JJ.

11 16 SCRA 775.

12 4 SCRA 527.

13 Dissenting in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438.

14 Statutory Construction, Ruben E. Agpalo, pp. 64-65, 1986, citing Manila RaceHorse Trainers' Assn. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60; Go Chi v. Go Cho, 96 Phil.

622; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 105; Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil.315; Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, 26 SCRA 578: People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA542; US v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128.

15 Ater v. Smith 245 111. 57, 19 Am. Cases 105.

16 Institutes 1, 1, pr. as cited in Handbook for Roman Law, Miravite, Lorenzo F., p. 39, 1981,

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150060. August 19, 2003]

PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. represented herein by its President ENGR. WILLIAMC. LIU, petitioner , vs . SPS. ANTHONY S. VALENCIA and SUSAN T.VALENCIA, respondents .

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J .:

On appeal is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59960, promulgatedon 13 February 2001, which has affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court ofCebu City dismissing the complaint of petitioners for legal redemption over certain rural lotssold to respondents.

Petitioner is a private corporation based in Cebu City and the registered owner of Lot 4523situated in Liloan, Cebu, with an area of 22,214 square meters. Adjacent to the lot of petitionerare parcels of land, identified to be Lot 4527, Lot 4528, and Lot 4529 with a total combined areaof 3,751 square meters. The three lots, aforenumbered, have been sold by Hermogenes Mendozato respondent spouses sometime in December 1994. Petitioner learned of the sale of the lotsonly in January, 1996, when Hermogenes Mendoza sold to petitioner Lot No. 4820, a parcel alsoadjacent to Lot 4523 belonging to the latter. Forthwith, it sent a letter to respondents, on 30January 1996, signifying its intention to redeem the three lots. On 30 May 1996, petitioner sent

another letter to respondents tendering payment of the price paid to Mendoza by respondents forthe lots. Respondents, in response, informed petitioner that they had no intention of selling the

parcels. Thereupon, invoking the provisions of Articles 1621 and 1623, petitioner filed an actionagainst respondents to compel the latter to allow the legal redemption. Petitioner claimed thatneither Mendoza, the previous owner, nor respondents gave formal or even just a verbal notice ofthe sale of the lots as so required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu dismisse d petitioners complaint andrespondents' counterclaim; both parties appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court ofAppeals. The appellate court affirmed the assailed decision.

Basically, the issues posed for resolution by the Court in the instant petition focus on the

application of Article 1621 and Article 1623 of the Civil Code, which read:

ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a pieceof rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated unless the grantee doesnot own any rural land.

This right is not applicable to adjacent lands which are separated by brooks, drains, ravines,roads and other apparent servitudes for the benefit of other estates.

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If two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise the right of redemption at the same time, theowner of the adjoining land of smaller area shall be preferred; and should both lands have thesame area, the one who first requested the redemption.

ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within

thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the casemay be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possibleredemptioners.

The right of redemption of co -owners excludes that of adjoining owners.

Whenever a piece of rural land not exceeding one hectare is alienated, the law grants to theadjoining owners a right of redemption except when the grantee or buyer does not own any otherrural land .[1] In order that the right may arise, the land sought to be redeemed and the adjacent

property belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption must both be rural lands. If

one or both are urban lands, the right cannot be invoked .[2]

The trial court found the lots involved to be rural lands. Unlike the case of Fabia vs.

Intermediate Appellate Cour t [3] (which ruled, on the issue of whether a piece of land was rural ornot, that the use of the property for agricultural purpose would be essential in order that the landmight be characterized as rural land for purposes of legal redemption), respondents in the instantcase, however, did not dispute before the Court of Appeals the holding of the trial court that thelots in question are rural lands. In failing to assail this factual finding on appeal, respondentswould be hardput to now belatedly question such finding and to ask the Court to still entertainthat issue.

Article 1621 of the Civil Code expresses that the right of redemption it grants to an

adjoining owner of the property conveyed may be defeated if it can be shown that the buyer orgrantee does not own any other rural land. The appellate court, sustaining the trial court, has saidthat there has been no evidence proffered to show that respondents are not themselves owners ofrural lands for the exclusionary clause of the law to apply.

With respect to the second issue, Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides that the right oflegal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from notice inwriting by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. In stressing themandatory character of the requirement, the law states that the deed of sale shall not be recordedin the Registry of Property unless the same is accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that hehas given notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The Court of Appeals has equated the statement in the deed of sale to the effect that thevendors have complied with the provisions of Article 1623 of the Civil Code, as being thewritten affirmation under oath, as well as the evidence, that the required written notice to

petitioner under Article 1623 has been met. Respondents, like the appellate court, overlook thefact that petitioner is not a party to the deed of sale between respondents and Mendoza and hashad no hand in the preparation and execution of the deed of sale. It could not thus be considereda binding equivalent of the obligatory written notice prescribed by the Code.

In Verdad vs. Court of Appeal s[4] this court ruled:

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We hold that the right of re demption was timely exercised by private respondents. Concededly,no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners requiredunder Article 1623 of the Civil Code -

x x x x x

x x x x

Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when private respondentRosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discoveredthe sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on16 October 1987, before the trial court.

The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule thatnotwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written noticefrom the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms andconditions, as well as its efficacy and status.

Even in Alonzo vs . Intermediate Appellate Court (150 SCRA 259), relied upon by petitioner incontending that actual knowledge should be an equivalent to a written notice of sale, the Courtmade it clear that it was not reversing the prevailing jurisprudence; said the Court:

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of thelaw, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Thesaid court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by thisCourt in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are notabandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting anexception to the general rule , in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was invoked several years, not just days or months,after the consummation of the contracts of sale. The complaint for legal redemption itself wasthere filed more than thirteen years after the sales were concluded. [5]

WHEREFORE , the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court ofAppeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby given a period of thirty days fromfinality of this decision within which to exercise its right of legal redemption. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur .

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on leave .

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46001 March 25, 1982

LUZ CARO , petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BASILIA LAHORRA VDA. DE BENITO, ASADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARIO BENITO , respondents.

GUERRERO, J .:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking a review of thedecision of the Court of Appeals, 1 promulgated on February 11, 1977, in CA-G.R. No. 52570-Rentitled "Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito vs.Luz Caro", as well as the resolution of the respondent Court, dated May 13, 1977, denyingpetitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two parcels of landcovered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 of the Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon.Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, SaturninoBenito, were subsequently appointed in Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance ofSorsogon as joint administrators of Mario's estate.

On August 26, 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, executed a deed of absolute sale of hisone-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz Caro, for thesum of P10,000.00. This was registered on September 29, 1959. Subsequently, with the consent ofSaturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito as shown in their affidavits both dated September 15, 1960,Exhibits G and F respectively, a subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over Lot I-C,under T.C.T. No. T-4978.

Sometime in the month of May, 1966, private respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito learnedfrom an allegation in a pleading presented by petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 508 that the latteracquired by purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-third undivided share in each of thetwo parcels of land. After further verification, she sent to petitioner thru her counsel, a written offer toredeem the said one-third undivided share dated August 25, 1966. Inasmuch as petitioner ignoredsaid offer, private respondent sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 2105 entitled "Rosa Amador Vda.de Benito vs. Luz Caro" for annulment of sale and mortgage and cancellation of the annotation of thesale and mortgage involving the same parcels of land, but did not succeed as the principal case wasdismissed on a technicality, that is, for failure to prosecute and the proposed intervenor failed to paythe docketing fees. Private respondent, thus, filed the present case as an independent one and inthe trial sought to prove that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, she had not beennotified of the sale as required by Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.

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On the other hand, petitioner presented during the hearing of the case secondary evidence of theservice of written notice of the intended sale to possible redemptioners in as much as the bestthereof, the written notices itself sent to and Saturnino Benito, could not be presented for the reasonthat said notices were sent to persons who were already dead when the complaint for legalredemption was brought. Instead, the affidavit of Benjamin Benito, executed ante litemmotam, attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were formally notified in writing of his

intention to sell his undivided share, was presented in evidence. The deposition of Saturnino's widowwas likewise taken and introduced in evidence, wherein she testified that she received and gave toher husband the written notice of the intended sale but that the latter expressed disinterest in buyingthe property.

After hearing the evidence, the trial judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that: (a) privaterespondent, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not have the power toexercise the right of legal redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito substantially complied with hisobligation of furnishing written notice of the sale of his one-third undivided portion to possibleredemptioners.

Private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision having been denied, sheappealed to the respondent Court of Appeals contending that the trial Judge erred in

I. . . not inhibiting himself from trying and deciding the case because his son is anassociate or member of the law office of Atty. Rodolfo A. Madrid, the attorney ofrecord of defendant-appellee in the instant case;

II. . contending that Benjamin Benito complied with the provisions of Article 1623 ofthe Revised Civil Code that before a co-owner could sell his share of the propertyowned in common with the other co-heirs, he must first give written notice of hisdesire to his co-heirs; (p. 49, R.A.)

III. concluding that the fact that one of the administrators who was actively managingthe estate was furnished a written notice by the co-owner of his desire to sell hisshare was enough compliance of the provisions of Article 1623 of the Civil Code forthe reason that the intention of the law is only to give a chance to the new co-ownerto buy the share intended to be sold if he desires to buy the same; (p. 50, R.A.)

IV. . refusing to allow plaintiff to redeem the subject property upon authority of Buttevs. Manuel Uy & Sons, L-15499, Feb. 28, 1962 (p. 51, R.A.) and in consequentlydismissing the complaint (p. 52, R.A.).

In disposing of the aforesaid errors, the Court of Appeals finding for plaintiff (herein privaterespondent) held:

1. That it is not clear that Atty. Arcangel, son of the trial Judge, was legally associated as practitionerwith counsel for Luz Caro; that it is not shown at any rate that plaintiff had asked for Judge

Arcangel's disqualification and that at any rate also, in such factual situation, an optional ground fordisqualification is addressed to his sound discretion with which it would not be correct for appellatecourt to interfere or overrule.

2. That since the right of the co-owner to redeem in case his share be sold to a stranger arose afterthe death of Mario Benito, such right did not form part of the hereditary estate of Mario but insteadwas the personal right of the heirs, one of whom is Mario's widow. Thus, it behooved either the

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vendor, Benjamin, or his vendee, Luz Caro, to have made a written notice of the intended orconsummated sale under Article 1620 of the Civil Code.

3. That the recital in the deed of sale that the vendor notified his co-owners of his desire to disposeof his share, who all declined to buy, was but a unilateral statement and could not be proof of thenotice required by the law.

4. That the registration of the deed of sale did not erase that right.

5. That the affidavit of notice executed on January 20, 1960 of Benjamin Benito declaring that writtennotices of the sale as required by law were duly sent to Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito, thelatter in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, as well as the sworn statement ofSaturnino Benito's widow dated November 18, 1968 confirming that her husband received thewritten notice of the sale referred to in Benjamin Benito's affidavit of notice would not satisfy thatthere was clear notice in writing of the specific term of the intended sale. Worse, Saturnino was onlya co-administrator and hence, his unilateral act could not bind the principal because there was noless than a renunciation of a right pertaining to the heirs, under Article 1818, NCC, apart from thefact that the right of redemption is not within their administration.

6. That the further claim of defendant that offer to redeem was filed out of time and that there was noactual tender loses all importance, there being no date from which to count the 30-day period toredeem because there was no notice given.

The dispositive part of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads as follows:

IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court is constrained to reverse, as it now reverses, judgment appealed from, upon payment by plaintiff or deposit in Court, within 30days after this judgment should have become final, of the sum of P10,000.00,defendant is ordered to execute a deed of redemption over the one-third share ofBENJAMIN BENITO in favor of plaintiff for herself and as representative of thechildren of Mario Benito and therefrom, to deliver said one-third share of BENJAMINBENITO, costs against defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED.

Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner brought this petition for review raising thefollowing errors:

1. Respondent Court erred in allowing the exercise of the right of legal redemption with respect tothe lots in question.

2. Respondent Court erred when it made the finding that there was no notice in law from which tocount the tolling of the period of redemption and that the sale was not made known at all to privaterespondent.

The alleged first error of respondent Court is premised on the fact that the lot in question sought tobe redeemed is no longer owned in common. Petitioner contends that the right sought to beexercised by private respondent in the case assumes that the land in question is under co-ownership, the action being based on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code which provides:

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A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of allthe other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price ofalienation is grossly excessive, the petitioner shall pay only a reasonable price.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they mayonly do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned

in common.

However, the fact is that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land covered by TransferCertificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 was terminated when Alfredo Benito, Luz Caro and theIntestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by administrators Saturnino Benito, as trustee andrepresentative of the heirs of Mario Benito, agreed to subdivide the property.

An agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and consequently binding upon theparties. (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196)

A petition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose. This was accompanied by the affidavits of Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito, both dated September 15, 1960 to the effect that they agree to

the segregation of the land formerly owned in common by Mario Benito, Alfredo Benito andBenjamin Benito. A subdivision plan was made and by common agreement Lot I-C thereof, with anarea of 163 hectares, more or less, was ceded to petitioner. Thereafter, the co-owners took actualand exclusive possession of the specific portions respectively assigned to them. A subdivision titlewas subsequently issued on the lot assigned to petitioner, to wit, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4978.

In Caram, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil. 315, a case squarely in point, this Court held:

Inasmuch as the purpose of the law in establishing the right of legal redemptionbetween co-owners is to reduce the number of participants until the community isdone away with (Viola vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 808), once the property is subdivided anddistributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is noreason to sustain any right of legal redemption.

Although the foregoing pronouncement has reference to the sale made after partition , this Courttherein saw no difference with respect to a conveyance which took place before the

partition agreement and approval by the court. Thus, it held:

Nevertheless, the result is the same, because We held in Saturnino vs. Paulino, 97Phil. 50, that the right of redemption under Article 1067 may be exercised only before

partition . In this case the right was asserted not only after partition but after theproperty inherited had actually been subdivided into several parcels which wereassigned by lot to the several heirs.

In refutation, private respondent argues that petitioner Luz Caro acted in bad faith and in fraud of therights of the heirs of a deceased Mario Benito in obtaining a subdivision title over a one-third portionof the land in question which she brought from Benjamin Benito, and for this reason, she is deemedto hold said property in trust for said heirs. The rule, however, is it fraud in securing the registrationof titles to the land should be supported by clear and convincing evidence. (Jaramil vs. Court of

Appeals, 78 SCRA 420). As private respondent has not shown and proved the circumstancesconstituting fraud, it cannot be held to exist in this case.

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As aforesaid, a subdivision title has been issued in the name petitioner on the lot ceded to her. Uponthe expiration of the term of one year from the date of the entry of the subdivision title, the Certificateof Title shall be incontrovertible (Section 38, Act 496). Since the title of petitioner is now indefeasible,private respondent cannot, by means of the present action, directly attack the validity thereof.

Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right of legal

redemption exists, private respondent as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right forand in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-administratorSaturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent to the sale of the one-third portion to petitionercannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that the right of redemption was notwithin the powers of administration, in the same manner, private respondent as co-administrator hasno power exercise the right of redemption the very power which the Court of Appeals ruled to benot within the powers of administration.

While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to thepossession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for thepayment of the expenses of administration, and the administrator may bring anddefend action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the deceased(Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not include the rightof legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-ownersafter the death of another, because in such case, the right of legal redemption onlycame into existence when the sale to the stranger was perfected and formed no partof the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to theheir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526).

Private respondent cannot be considered to have brought this action in her behalf and in behalf ofthe heirs of Mario Benito because the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint specifically statedthat she brought the action in her capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito.

It is petitioner's contention that, assuming that private respondent may exercise the right ofredemption, there was no compliance with the conditions precedent for the valid exercise thereof.

In Conejero et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 775, this Court explained the nature of theright of redemption in this wise:

While the co-owner's right of legal redemption is a substantive right, it is exceptionalin nature, limited in its duration and subject to strict compliance with the legalrequirements. One of these is that the redemptioner should tender payment of theredemption money within thirty (30) days from written notice of the sale by the co-owner.

It has been held that this thirty-day period is peremptory because the policy of the law is not to leavethe purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period. (Butte vs. Manuel Uy and

Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526). It is not a prescriptive period but is more a requisite or condition precedentto the exercise of the right of legal redemption.

In the case at bar, private respondent alleged in her complaint that she learned of the sale sometimein May, 1966 upon receipt of a pleading in Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instanceof Sorsogon. She likewise alleged that she gave a letter informing petitioner of her desire to redeemthe land on August 25, 1966. Clearly, three months have elapsed since the notice of the sale.Hence, petitioner claims that the thirty-day period of redemption has already expired. In addition,petitioner makes capital of the admission of private respondent that she already knew of the said

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transaction even before receipt of the said pleading (t.s.n., p. 16) as well as of the evidencepresented that Saturnino Benito, the admittedly active administrator until 1966, duly received awritten notice of the intended sale of Benjamin Benito's share. Said evidence consists of the affidavitof the vendor stating that the required notice had been duly given to possible redemptioners, thestatement in the deed of sale itself and the deposition of Saturnino Benito's widow with respect toher receipt of the written notice. Finally, petitioner points to the records which disclose that private

respondent knew of the subdivision (t.s.n., p. 25) and hence, rationalized that private respondentshould have known also of the previous sale.

Since We have ruled that the right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this case becauseadmittedly a subdivision title (T.C.T. No. T-4978) has already been issued in the name of thepetitioner on Lot I-C sold to her, it becomes moot and academic, if not unnecessary to decidewhether private respondent complied with the notice requirements for the exercise of the right oflegal redemption under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., took no part.

Plana, J., concur in the result.

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T H I R D D I V I S I O N

SENEN B. AGUILAR, Petitioner,

- versus -

VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR andANGEL B. AGUILAR,

Respondents,

x-----------------------------------------------x

ALEJANDRO C. SANGALANG, Intervenor-Respondent.

G.R. No. 141613

Present:

PANGANIBAN, J ., Chairman, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, and GARCIA, JJ .

Promulgated:

December 16, 2005

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision [1] and

Resolution [2] of the Court of Appeals, dated June 11, 1999 and January 11,

2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 55750.

The parties in this case are brothers, except Alejandro Sangalang, herein

intervenor-respondent. As will be subsequently discussed, this is the second

time that the brothers Aguilar seek the intervention of this Court regarding the

same facts and the same subject matter. The first was in Aguilar v. Court of

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Appeals, G.R. No. 76351 decided on October 29, 1993 against Senen B.

Aguilar .[3] It is time to writ finis to this family wrangling.

On October 28, 1993, Senen and Virgilio purchased a house and lot

located in Paraaque City, Metro Manila for the benefit of their father,

Maximiano Aguilar (now deceased). The brothers wanted their father to

enjoy his retirement in a quiet neighborhood. On February 23, 1970, they

executed a written agreement stipulating that their shares in the house and lot

would be equal; and that Senen would live with their father on condition that

he would pay the Social Security System (SSS) the remaining loan obligationof the former owners.

In 1974, their father died. Virgilio then demanded that Senen vacate the

house and that the property be sold, the proceeds to be divided between

them. Senen refused to comply with Virgilios demand.

On January 12, 1979, Virgilio filed a complaint with the Court of First

Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal at Pasay City for specific

performance. Virgilio prayed that Senen be compelled to sell the property so

that the proceeds could be divided between them.

However, during the pre-trial, neither Senen nor his counsel

appeared. Thus, Senen was declared as in default by the trial court and

Virgilio was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.

On July 26, 1979, the trial court rendered its Decision, declaring the

brothers co-owners of the house and lot and are entitled to equal shares; and

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ordering that the property be sold, the proceeds to be divided equally between

them. The trial court also ordered Senen to vacate the property and to pay

Virgilio rentals with interests corresponding to the period from January 1975

until he leaves the premises.

On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 03933, the Court of Appeals

reversed t he trial courts Decision.

Virgilio then filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari ,

docketed as G.R. No. 76351.

On October 29, 1993, this Court rendered its Decision, the dispositive

portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailedDecision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 1986 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court in

Civil Case No. 6912-P dated 26 July 1971 is REINSTATED, withthe modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is ordered tovacate the premises in question within ninety (90) days fromreceipt of this decision, and to pay petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar, amonthly rental of P1,200.00 with interest at the legal rate from thetime he received the decision of the trial court directing him tovacate until he effectively leaves the premises.

The trial court is further directed to take immediate stepsto implement this decision, conformably with Art. 498 of the CivilCode and the Rules of Court. This decision is final andexecutory.

SO ORDERED.

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On March 27, 1995, Senen filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch

260, Paraaque City, an action for legal redemption against Virgilio and

another brother, Angel, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-039. In his complaint,

Senen alleged that while he knows that Virgilio sold his share of the

property to Angel in January 1989, however, he (Senen) was not furnished any

written notice of the sale. Consequently, as a co-owner, he has the right to

redeem the property.

Meanwhile, on November 27, 1995, pursuant to this Courts Decision in

G.R. No. 76351, the property was sold at public auction to Alejandro C.Sangalang, intervenor-respondent herein. Virgilio then received his share of the

proceeds as well as the rental payments due from Senen.

By then, Virgilio had moved to California, USA. It was only on

January 25, 1997 that he was served, through the Philippine Consulate in San

Francisco, a copy of Senen s complaint in Civil Case No. 95 -039.

On February 24, 1997, Virgilio filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

for lack of cause of action and forum shopping.

In an Order dated June 27, 1997, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No.

05-039 on the ground of laches, holding that Senen incurred a delay of seven

(7) years before asserting his right to redeem the property in question.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed Order of the trial

court.

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Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari .

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in

holding that Senens complaint for legal redemption in Civil Case No. 05 -039

is barred by laches.

Legal redemption ( retracto legal de comuneros ) is a privilege created by law,

partly by reason of public policy and partly for the benefit of the redemptioner

to afford him a way out of a disagreeable or inconvenient association into

which he has been thrust .[4]

With respect to redemption by co-owners, in case the share of a co-

owner is sold to a third person, the governing law is Article 1620 of the Civil

Code which provides:

ART. 1620. A co -owner of a thing may exercise the right of

redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of anyof them are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation isgrossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonablerate.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the rightof redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share theymay respectively have in the thing owned in common.

The purpose behind Article 1620 is to provide a method for terminating

the co-ownership and consolidating the dominion in one sole owner . [5]

Article 1623 of the same Code also provides:

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ART. 1623. The right of legal pre -emption or redemptionshall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice inwriting by the prospective vendee, or by the vendor, as the casemay be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry ofProperty, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendee that hehas given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that ofadjoining owners.

From the above provisions, the following are the requisites for the

exercise of legal redemption: (1) There must be a co-ownership; (2) one of the

co-owners sold his right to a stranger; (3) the sale was made before thepartition of the co-owned property; (4) the right of redemption must be

exercised by one or more co-owners within a period of thirty days to be

counted from the time that he or they were notified in writing by the vendee or

by the co-owner vendor; and (5) the vendee must be reimbursed for the price of

the sale.

In this case, the sale took place in January 1989. Petitioner admits that

he has actual knowledge of the sale. However, he only asserted his right to

redeem the property in March 1995 by filing the instant complaint. Both the

trial court and the Appellate Court ruled that this was seven (7) years late.

Petitioner, however, now contends that there being no written notice to

him of the sale by the vendee or vendor, the thirty-day redemption period has

not prescribed.

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Petitioners contention lacks merit. The old rule is that a written notice

of the sale by the vendor to his co-owners is indispensable for the latter to

exercise their retracto legal de comuneros .[6] More recently, however, we have

relaxed the written notice requirement. Thus, in Si v. Court of Appeals , [7] we

ruled that a co-owner with actual notice of the sale is not entitled to a written

notice for such would be superfluous. The law does not demand what is

unnecessary.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do that which could or should have been done earlierthrough the exercise of due diligence .[8] Otherwise stated, laches is the

negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a

presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or

declined to assert it .[9] Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the

defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation for

which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the co mplainants

rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants

conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of

knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would

assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the

defendant in the event, relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not

held barred .[10]

Petitioner has actual knowledge of the sale of Virgilios share to Angel in

1989. As provided by Article 1623, he has thirty days from such actual

knowledge within which to exercise his right to redeem the

property. Inexplicably, petitioner did not take any action. He waited for

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seven (7) years before filing his complaint. Definitely, such an unexplained

delay is tantamount to laches. To be sure, to uphold his right would unduly

cause injury to respondent-intervenor, a purchaser in good faith and for value.

Moreover, by the time Senen filed Civil Case No. 95-039 for legal

redemption, his right was no longer available to him. We have held that after

a property has been subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the

community has terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of pre-

emption or redemption .[11]

WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The Decision and Resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55750 are AFFIRMED . Costs

against petitioner.

SO ORDERED .

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate J ustice

WE CONCUR:

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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Associate J ustice

Chairman

RENATO C. CORONA Associate J ustice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate J ustice

CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate J ustice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached inconsultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court'sDivision.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Associate J ustice

Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the DivisionChairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the aboveDecision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer ofthe opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief J ustice

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