8/12/2019 saim khan

1/46

ASSIGNMENT ON CENTRAL ASIA

UZBEKISTAN

Submitted To:

Prof.Z.A.Qureshi

By

Sayyam Manzoor

MSc-IR 3rd semester

(Morning)

Session: 2012-2014

Date: 22-october-2013

Department of International Relations

National University of Modern Languages

Islamabad

8/12/2019 saim khan

2/46

CENTRAL ASIA:

Central Asiacomprises five independent republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,

Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. From its beginning in 1917, the Soviet state never included

Kazakhstan in Muslim Central Asia, preferring to give it a non-Asian identity by linking it

closely to Russia and Siberia. Today, however, the Kazakhs themselves and the world at large

believe they are very much part of the region.

Central Asia covers an area of 3,994,300 square kilometers which includes some of the most

sparsely populated regions in the world. Its population of only 51 million people includes more

than 100 different ethnic groups, from Germans and Austrians to Tibetans and Koreans. The

largest ethnic group is the Uzbeks. Uzbekistan has a population of 20.5 million, and Uzbeks from

substantial minorities in all other four republics. There were some 10.6 million Russians living in

Central Asia in 1992, but there has been a large-scale exodus of Russians from Tajikistan and

Uzbekistan Because of fears of ethnic violence and Islamic fundamentalism.

Tashkent and Ashkhabad, the capitals of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have long urban

histories but the other three capital cities, Dushanbe in Tajikistan, Alma Ata in Kazakhstan and

Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan, were created by the Bolsheviks to give a sense of ethnic identity to those

nationalities. Uzbekistan contains all the most famous historical cities of Central Asia:Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand.

There were the seats of nomadic empires and settled kingdoms in the past, as well as being

centers in the development of Islam throughout the region. For centuries the hundreds of

madrasahs, or Islamic colleges in Bukhara and Samarkand attracted students from as far away as

Morocco and Indonesia. Bukhara is seen by many Muslims as a place of pilgrimage and the most

important city in Islam after Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. Central Asia was also the birthplace

of Sufism, the mystical trend in Islam which spread rapidly to Africa and Asia.

MAP:

8/12/2019 saim khan

3/46

FLAG: EMBLEM:

8/12/2019 saim khan

4/46

History of Uzbekistan:

The Uzbekistan land was once part of the ancient Persian Empire and was later conquered byAlexander the Great in the 4th century B.C. During the 8th century, the nomadic Turkic tribesliving there were converted to Islam by invading Arab forces who dominated the area. The

Mongols under Ghengis Khan took over the region from the Seljuk Turks in the 13th century,and it later became part of Tamerlane the Great's empire and that of his successors until the 16thcentury. The Uzbeks invaded the territory in the early 16th century and merged with the otherinhabitants in the area. Their empire broke up into separate Uzbek principalities, the khanates ofKhiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. These city-states resisted Russian expansion into the area but wereconquered by the Russian forces in the mid-19th century.

The territory was made into the Uzbek Republic in 1924 and became the independent UzbekistanSoviet Socialist Republic in 1925. Under Soviet rule, Uzbekistan concentrated on growing cottonwith the help of irrigation, mechanization, and chemical fertilizers and pesticides, causingserious environmental damage.

Independent, but with Appalling Conditions:

In June 1990, Uzbekistan was the first central Asian republic to declare that its own laws hadsovereignty over those of the central Soviet government. Uzbekistan became fully independentand joined with ten other former Soviet republics on Dec. 21, 1991, in the Commonwealth ofIndependent States.

Vozrozhdeniye, an island in the Aral Sea, was a secret test site for biological weapons during theSoviet era. In 1988, the Soviets attempted to bury the evidence on the island, a frightening legacythat Uzbekistan inherited upon independence. U.S. scientists have confirmed that the island

contains live anthrax and other deadly poisons.

President Karimov, a former Communist Party boss, is an autocrat who has brutally suppressedpolitical parties and religious freedom and maintained rule with an iron fist. In 1999, after a bushijacking, he declared, "I am prepared to rip off the heads of 200 people, to sacrifice their lives,in order to save peace and calm in the republic." The country's thousands of political andreligious prisoners are subject to appalling conditions and horrific torture, including being boiledalive.

In 1999, the country battled against militant Islamic groups bent on the overthrow of the seculargovernment. Fighting against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) continued for the next

several years.

Foreign relations:

Uzbekistanjoined theCommonwealth of Independent States in December 1991. However, it is

opposed to reintegration and withdrew from the CIS collective security arrangement in 1999.

Since that time, Uzbekistan has participated in the CIS peacekeeping force inTajikistan and in

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzbekistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Independent_Stateshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajikistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajikistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Independent_Stateshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzbekistan

8/12/2019 saim khan

5/46

United Nations-organized groups to help resolve the Tajik andAfghan conflicts, both of which it

sees as posing threats to its own stability. Uzbekistan is an active supporter ofU.S. efforts

against worldwideterrorism and joined the coalitions which have dealt with both Afghanistan

andIraq (although, in 2005, relations with the U.S. were strained after theMay 2005 unrest and

Uzbekistan demanded that the U.S. leaveKarshi-Khanabad). It is a member of the United

Nations, theEuro-Atlantic Partnership Council,Partnership for Peace,and theOrganization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It belongs to theOrganisation of the Islamic

Conference (OIC) and theEconomic Cooperation Organization,which comprises 7Central Asian

countries:Pakistan,Uzbekistan,Kazakhstan,Turkmenistan,Afghanistan,Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan.It is a founding member of and remains involved in the Central Asian Union, formed

withKazakhstan andKyrgyzstan,joined in March 1998 byTajikstan.

In 1999, Uzbekistan joined the GUAM alliance (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova),

which was formed in 1997 (making itGUUAM). Uzbekistan is also a member of theShanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO) and hosts the SCOs Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in

Tashkent. Uzbekistan also joined the newCentral Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) in

2002. The CACO consists of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. It is a founding

member of and remains involved in theCentral Asian Union,formed with Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan, joined in March 1998 by Tajikstan.

UZBEKISTAN:

Geography:Uzbekistan is situated in central Asia between the Amu Darya and SyrDarya Rivers, the Aral Sea, and the slopes of the Tien Shan Mountains. It is bounded byKazakhstan in the north and northwest, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the east and

southeast, Turkmenistan in the southwest, and Afghanistan in the south. The republic also

includes the Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic, with its capital, Nukus. The country

is about one-tenth larger in area than the state of California.

Uzbekistanofficially the Republic of Uzbekistanis a landlocked country in CentralAsia. Before 1991, it was part of the Soviet Union.

Its total area is 447,400 km sq. Its estimated population in 2013 is 30,183,400. Tashkentis the capital and largest city of Uzbekistan. Its official language is Uzbek. Uzbekistan is a country of different ethnic groups. Majority are Uzbeks (81.1%), and

other are Russians (5.4%), Tajik (4.0%), and Kazaks (3.0%), Karakalpak (2.5%), Tatar

(1.5%) and many others (2.5%).

Its government is Unitary Presidential State.

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Stateshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorismhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_2005_unrest_in_Uzbekistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karshi-Khanabadhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro-Atlantic_Partnership_Councilhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partnership_for_Peacehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization_for_Security_and_Cooperation_in_Europehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization_for_Security_and_Cooperation_in_Europehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_of_the_Islamic_Conferencehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_of_the_Islamic_Conferencehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_Cooperation_Organizationhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asiahttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzbekistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkmenistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyrgyzstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajikistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyrgyzstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajikstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUUAMhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organizationhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organizationhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asian_Cooperation_Organizationhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asian_Unionhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asian_Unionhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asian_Cooperation_Organizationhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organizationhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organizationhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/GUUAMhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajikstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyrgyzstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tajikistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyrgyzstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkmenistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzbekistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asiahttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_Cooperation_Organizationhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_of_the_Islamic_Conferencehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organisation_of_the_Islamic_Conferencehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization_for_Security_and_Cooperation_in_Europehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization_for_Security_and_Cooperation_in_Europehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partnership_for_Peacehttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro-Atlantic_Partnership_Councilhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karshi-Khanabadhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_2005_unrest_in_Uzbekistanhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorismhttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Stateshttp://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan

8/12/2019 saim khan

6/46

Its legislature is called Supreme Assembly consisted of Upper house(senate) and Lowerhouse(Legislative Chamber).

Its currency is called Uzbekistan som.

Arrival of Islam in Uzbekistan:The Arabs brought a new religion - Islam. Within that period,

many mosques and madrasahs had been built in Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva. Most of them

had been built during the reign of Samanids. Many cities were totally destroyed during the

invasion of Genghis Khan in 1220. Later, the great conqueror Timur, known in the West under

the name of Tamerlane, revived the destroyed cities using for that those slaves and builders who

had been captured during Timirs successful military campaigns. Tamerlane annexed Persia,

Baghdad; he had campaigns to Anatolia and India. The majority of the architectural buildings

that were located in Samarkand today were built by Tamerlane and his grandson Ulugbek.

The Great Silk Road: Many cities which are located on the territory of modern Uzbekistan, in

ancient times were located on the Silk Road, on which caravans with goods traveled between the

East and the West. The road got its name from silk - the Chinese good that was in great demand

in Europe. The advantageous geographical location of the cities made them attractive for

conquerors. The territory of modern Uzbekistan was conquered many times by various

conquerors, including Alexander the Great. Alexander founded at least 8 cities in Central Asia

between 334 - 323 years BC.As for caravans, they started passing on the Great Silk Road later,

since 138th AC when China opened its borders for trading. During the period from 484 to 1150

the region was invaded by the west tribes: Huns, Turks and Arabs.

Major Cities of Uzbekistan:

Uzbekistan has well preserved relics from the time when Central Asia was the centre ofTamerlanes empire. Cities of todays Uzbekistan, including Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva,

Tashkent and Shakhrisabz live in the imagination of the West as symbols of oriental beauty and

mystery.

8/12/2019 saim khan

7/46

Samarkand:

Samarkand is one of the oldest cities of Uzbekistan and of the world, in the middle of the first

century BC it was known under the name of Marakanda and later known as Afrosiab. It was the

capital of the powerful state Sogd, the center of Amir Timur's great empire. The numerous

monuments of Samarkand and its suburbs impress tourists with their beauty and splendor. The

refined architectural shapes, intricate ornamentation, mosaics, blue-tile domes and facades are

interesting for all who visit theses beautiful buildings.

Bukhara:

The settlement of Bukhara in Uzbekistan dates back to the 8th century and for next 200 years

used to be the center of an expanding Islamic kingdom and prospered as a trade and intellectual

center for Central Asia. During the Mongol invasion, it was destroyed by Genghis Khan in 1219.

Subsequently it was ruled by a succession of regional powers, including descendants of Genghis

Khan, Turks, and Uzbeks. Once, one of Islam's most sacred cities, Bukhara contains many

examples of fine Islamic architecture.

Khiva:

Khiva is known as a museum city under the open sky. It existed as a town for about 900 years,

but was developed into the settlement as it is seen today only by the 19th century, when it was

the last oasis on the northern Russian slave trade rout. Important spiritual and cultural values

came form the large scientific centers of astronomy, mathematics, and medicine that existed in

this area centuries ago. One can wander through the narrow streets of Khiva, peeking into the

small courtyards through the wooden carved doors. The life inside the gardens assures the visitor

that it is not just a museum, but also a living city.

8/12/2019 saim khan

8/46

Tashkent:

Although Tashkent was probably first settled around the 1st century BC, written records date the

city to its Arab occupation in the 8th century AD. The 13th-century defeat to Genghis Khan and

his Mongolian forces threw Tashkent into an era of turmoil. The Mongols lost the city in the 14th

century when the Timurids Empire seized control. The Timurids Empire ruled Tashkent until the

late 15th century, when the Sheibanids swept through the region. Today, Tashkent is the capital

of Uzbekistan.

Ferghana Valley-the Golden Valley:

The city of Fergana, in the south of the Ferghana Valley - is one of the youngest cities in

Uzbekistan. It was founded in 1876, after joining the Kokand Khanate to the Russian Empire.

And a new town called New Margilan was founded 12 km away from the city which became the

center of Ferghana region.

Fergana valley has always ranked high in the history and culture of Central Asia. Today Fergana

valley is one of the prosperous regions of Uzbekistan. Fertile oases enclose the region. Along the

northern boundary of the valley there flows the Syr Darya River, which is formed by the

confluence of two smaller rivers - the Karadarya and the Naryn. Their waters feed three main

canals - the Big Fergana Canal, the Southern Fergana Canal and the Northern Fergana Canal -

the first nation-wide constructions of the twentieth century. The big cities - Fergana, Kokand,

Andijan and Namangan are located in the oases of the valley.

Fergana valley - the vast prosperous oasis with the most fertile lands in Central Asia and the

finest climate - is rightly called Golden Valley.

8/12/2019 saim khan

9/46

1. TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Uzbekistan was one of the 15 republics to be welcomed in the

international fold as a sovereign state. These states were expected to make a rapid transition todemocracy. The conventional view was that democracy had won over tyranny. Francis

Fukuyama even called it the End of History. But the euphoria was misplaced. The political elite

in Uzbekistan and neighboring Central Asian states, who were in power at the time of the Soviet

collapse, have not steered a course towards democracy. On the contrary, the Uzbek leadership

under President Islam Karimov has moved to block prospects of democracy by systematically

eradicating dissidents and keeping a tight control over the media.

First and foremost, the Uzbek leadership has accused its opponents of Islamic fundamentalism

and links with the puritan Wahhabi interpretation of Islam. When neighboring Tajikistan

descended into civil war (1992-1997), President Karimov was quick to point an accusing finger

at Islamist forces. He warned that if the Islamic threat was not dealt with, anarchy and instability

could be the fate of Uzbekistan.

Without doubt the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of the most important developments that

the history recorded. Initially, this dramatic development led to the emergence of a wave of

optimism in the West. Many regarded the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a golden

opportunity for the freedom-thirsty people who had lived under the totalitarian rule to adopt

democratic forms of governance. However, in the course of time it became apparent that the

collapse of the Soviet Union would not lead to the establishment of democratic regimes in

Central Asia in the short run. With the emergence of regimes which have provided the

presidencies with very broad ranges of powers and which have not hesitated to restrain the rights

of individuals for the sake of stability, Central Asia proved to be a region which dashed the

hopes of people who expected that democratic values would be embraced in the region.

The Central Asian States, which were exposed to undemocratic rule thorough their history, did

not rush to engage in democratic reforms. The transition to democracy will apparently prove to

be a much more difficult process than the West initially expected. The collapse of the Soviet

Union has given way to the emergence of very complex challenges for Central Asians. Making

8/12/2019 saim khan

10/46

democratic reforms has not been the only task to accomplish for these newly independent states.

These states had to adapt to the collapse of the all-union economy and take reforms in the way of

free market economy. With the collapse of Soviet Union, the communist ideology that guided

this state has virtually disappeared, and as a result an ideological vacuum emerged. Newly

independent states came to embrace nationalism and engage in nation building to fill this

ideological vacuum and to legitimize themselves in the eyes of their citizens. This proved to be

no easy task and necessitated taking steps like re-writing of their national histories to raise

national consciousness. While taking such steps, the Central Asian States have also tried to keep

the discontent of the minorities living in their countries at a minimum to maintain stability in

their countries. Thus, the post-Soviet democratization, whenever it will take place, will take

place in such a difficult context. The lack of knowledge about this difficult context led to

unrealistic expectations regarding political transition in post Soviet states.

Uzbekistan has the largest population among the Central Asian states. Uzbekistan is located at

the center of Central Asia and it is the only country that shares borders with each of other Central

Asian states. Thus, the developments in this country have the capacity to affect developments in

the other Central Asian states. Uzbekistan does not share borders with powerful states that are

interested in the region such as China and Russia and thus, compared to such states as

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, it is less vulnerable to the pressures of these states.

The incumbent leadership in Uzbekistan has failed to take steps to establish democracy in the

country in post soviet period. The president of the country Islam Karimnov, has aimed at

consolidating his own authority rather than establishing democracy and that his attempts to

realize this aim resulted in the silencing of the opposition forces and curtailment of civil and

political rights of the citizens.

After an assassination attempt in 1999, Karimov even told the legislative assembly that he would

be prepared to personally shoot Islamists. This stance has resonated with US policy makers, even

more so since the September 11 attack.

Following the successful military operation against the Taliban, which involved the stationing of

some 2000 US troops in Uzbekistan, a pact was signed with Washington. The March 2003

8/12/2019 saim khan

11/46

bilateral security treaty upgraded ties between Uzbekistan and the US from an ad hoc

collaboration in the war on terror into a long-term security commitment. The second factor

driving US policy is that the special relationship between Uzbekistan and the US has offered

Washington an important bridgehead into a region, hitherto considered to be Russia's backyard.

Before the September 11 attacks, Washington had tempered its interests in the former Soviet

republics by prioritizing US-Russia relations. But this "Russia first" policy was seen by many

neo-conservatives as making US policy decisions hostage to Moscow's imperial impulses. The

2001 terrorist attack allowed for a shift in US thinking, downgrading concerns about Moscow's

reaction to the presence of US influence and troops in the former Soviet republics. The US-

Uzbek ties offer Washington access to the heartland of Central Asia and the region's political and

economic centre of gravity.

Karimov has, of course, understood the significance of Uzbekistan in Washington's global plans

and has proved happy to play his part by criticizing Moscow for inaction in the face of Islamic

insurgency.

Influential figures in the Bush Administration regard the transition to democracy to be no more

than an overall objective that needs to be tailored to specific conditions. High-ranking officials

spoke at a recent US congressional hearing of Uzbekistan's moderate but steady progress towards

democracy and the need for patience.

Uzbek authorities have adopted the lexicon of parliamentary democracy. But the problem with

the so-called Uzbek path to democracy is that it is seriously flawed. All registered parties

duplicate the political agenda of the ruling party - the old Communist Party - and presidential

elections serve as orchestrated occasions to pledge loyalty to President Karimnov. At the last

Presidential election, in 2000, the challenging candidate gave a TV interview on the eve of the

polls to say that he would be voting for the incumbent.

Karimov served as Communist Party First Secretary in Uzbekistan and inherited the top job after

the Soviet collapse in 1991. Since then he has manipulated the constitution to ensure his rule

until at least 2019, even though the constitution only allows the president to serve a maximum of

two consecutive terms in office.

8/12/2019 saim khan

12/46

2. SWITCHING OVER TO MARKET ECONOMY:

The Government of Uzbekistan is moving cautiously towards a market-based economy for the

Economy of Uzbekistan. Since independence, the government has stated that it is committed to a

gradual transition to a free market economy.

Although the government has significantly narrowed the gap between the black market and

official exchange rate, its restrictive trade regime has crippled the economy.

A free market economy:

A free market is a market structure which is not controlled by a designated authority. A freemarket contrasts with a controlled market or regulated market, in which government policyintervenes in the setting of prices. An economy composed entirely of free markets is referred to

as a free-market economy.

Although free markets are commonly associated with capitalism in contemporary usage andpopular culture, markets have been also advocated by socialists and have been included invarious different proposals for market socialism, co-op businesses, and profit sharing.

Uzbekistan economy at a glance:

Since independence, Uzbekistan has started a gradual transition to a market-based economy. Theprocess of economic reforms was based on a gradual approach, in order to ensure social stabilityalongside with substantial economic growth. This approach resulted in considerable

achievements, recognized by all major international financial institutions.

For instance, the volume of economy for the last six years has grown by 45 percent, industrialproduction 1.6 times, agricultural production 1.5 times, the foreign trade turnover 1.7times, gold and currency reserves3.7 times, growth rate of GDP for last four years is kept at alevel of 7-8 percent, and inflation rate of the last six years has reduced from 26% to 29%.

Uzbekistan is a leading industrial country in Central Asia. It possesses a highly developedautomobile, airplane and machine building, textiles, food processing, metallurgy, natural gas andoil processing, chemical and other industries.

Uzbekistan is a largest agricultural producer of the region. It is leading producer and exporter ofraw cotton, and, more recently, of cotton yarn and textiles. The country also produces andexports significant quantities of silk, fruits and vegetables.

Mining and minerals is a crucial part of the national economy. Uzbekistan is a major producer of gold

with the largest open-pit gold mine in the world and has substantial deposits of such strategic minerals as

copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, and uranium, as well as natural gas and oil.

8/12/2019 saim khan

13/46

The country has a highly developed transport infrastructure, of 6,5 thousands km of railways, over 43,5

thousands km of highways and developed air communication network which connects the most remote

regions and uninhabited areas of the country to major centres, providing access to international transport

systems and basic natural mineral and raw materials resources in the country.

Uzbekistan foreign trade policy is based on import substitution. The countrys traditional trade partners

are the CIS countries, notably Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which in aggregate account for over 40%

of its exports and imports. Non-CIS partners have been increasing in importance in recent years, with

Turkey, China, Iran, South Korea and the EU being the most active.

Uzbekistan is a member of the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development. It has observer status at the World Trade Organization, is a member of

the World Intellectual Property Organization, and is a signatory to the Convention on Settlement of

Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, the Paris Convention for the

Protection of Industrial Property, the Madrid Agreement on Trademarks Protection, and the Patent

Cooperation Treaty.

The concept of transition of the republic of Uzbekistan to the market economy

consists of five principles formulated by its President Islam Karimov:

1. Economy should have priority over politics. Economic reforms should not follow the leadof political processes.

2. The state is the main reformer. The representatives of legally elected authorities have todetermine priorities and pursue balanced policy of no social shocks.

3.

Along with economic reforms it is necessary to create a system of social protection of theRepublic population especially of most vulnerable groups.

4. Superiority of Law and Constitution.5. Stage by stage movement to the market economy. The transitions to next stage only after

the current stage targets have been met.

The investment policy of Uzbekistan:

Priority areas:

1. Gold mining and non-ferrous2. Power engineering.3. Processing of cotton4. Processing of vegetables and fruits5. Transport and communication6. Tourism

8/12/2019 saim khan

14/46

7. Financial and monetary. Create a network of banks and insurance institution.8. Environmental protection.

Guarantees and privileges granted to foreign investors:

1. If subsequent legislation of the republic of Uzbekistan impairs investment conditions,then the legislation which was valid at the time of marking the investment shall apply for

a period of time not exceeding 10 years.

2. Companies profit tax shall be reduced. The purpose here is encourage export orientedmanufactures and producers.

3. Receipts in hard currency earned by a company due to increase in export production shallbe exempt from profit tax.

4. 25% profit tax shall apply to the profits of joints ventures with a foreign capital of above30%.

5. Joint ventures with a foreign capital investing into projects in priority industries includedin the investment program of Uzbekistan shall be exempt from taxation for the first five

years of operations.

6. Joint ventures which specialize in agricultural products and the processing thereof,consumer products, and construction materials, medical equipment, machines andequipment for agriculture, light and food industries, recycling of waste materials are

exempt from taxation from two years from the date of registration.

7. The profit tax base is decrease by 30% of the expenses for environmental protection.8. Dividends on governmental bonds are exempt from taxation.9. Exporting companies are exempt of VAT for materials resources used in the production

of exported goods.

10.Joint ventures in which the foreign investorsshare accounts for at least 505 shaal beexempt of profit tax provided that whole tax amount is re-invested into the development

and expansion of consumer goods.

8/12/2019 saim khan

15/46

11.Beginning July 1994 through December 31, 1997 al commercial banks including thosewith foreign capitals, as well as branches and subsidies of foreign banks operating in

Uzbekistan are exempt from profits, property, and land and vehicle taxes.

Policy makers still remain suspicious of unregulated market mechanisms, although Krimoveofficially commits to a market-oriented reform. Prices were slowly liberalized and the new trade

policies are less harmful toward export it is going to be very difficult for him to explain why

many of the neighboring Central Asian countries are becoming richer through liberalization and

privatization while Uzbekistan continues to stay stable, but poorer than the other nations.

The Government of Uzbekistan has stated that it is committed to a gradual transition to a freemarket economy. Very recently, the government signed an agreement with the IMF to movetoward current account convertibility. If implemented, these steps will move Uzbekistan towarda market economy, although much structural reform is needed, particularly in the area ofimproving the investment climate for foreign investors and in freeing the agricultural sector fromsmothering state control. Until now, continuing restrictions on currency convertibility and othergovernment measures to control economic activity have constrained economic growth and ledinternational lending organizations to suspend or scale back credits.

The government has made some progress in reducing inflation and the budget deficit, butgovernment statistics understate both, while overstating economic growth. There are no reliablestatistics on unemployment, which is believed to be high and growing. The economy is basedprimarily on agriculture and agricultural processing; Uzbekistan is a major producer and exporterof cotton. It also is a major producer of gold with the largest open-pit gold mine in the world andhas substantial deposits of copper, strategic minerals, gas, and oil. The government is takingsome modest steps to reduce the barriers that constrain the nascent private sector.

GDP and Employment:

The government claims that the GDP rose 4.5% in 2001. Unemployment and underemploymentare very high, but reliable figures are difficult to obtain, as no recent credible surveying has beendone. Underemployment in the agricultural sector is particularly high--which is important giventhe fact that 60% of the population is rural-based. Many observers believe that employmentgrowth and real wage growth has been stagnant, given virtually no growth in output.

Labor:Literacy in Uzbekistan is almost universal, and workers are generally well-educated and trained.Most local technical and managerial training does not meet international business standards, but

foreign companies engaged in production report that locally hired workers learn quickly andwork effectively. Foreign firms generally find that younger workers, untainted by the Sovietsystem, work well at all levels. The government emphasizes foreign education and each yearsends about 400 students to the United States, Europe, and Japan for university degrees, afterwhich they have a commitment to work for the government for 5 years. Some Americancompanies offer special training programs in the United States to their local employees.

8/12/2019 saim khan

16/46

With the closure or downsizing of many foreign firms, it is relatively easy to find qualified, well-trained employees, and salaries are very low by Western standards. Salary caps, which thegovernment implements in an apparent attempt to prevent firms from circumventing restrictionson withdrawal of cash from banks, prevent many foreign firms from paying their workers asmuch as they would like. The threshold for the maximum income tax rate of 33% is 245,000

soum ($363) per year. Labor market regulations in Uzbekistan are similar to that of the SovietUnion, with all rights guaranteed but some rights unobserved. The only known case of workersstriking since independence was of Turkish construction workers striking against their Turkishemployer over working conditions.

Prices; Monetary/Fiscal Policy:

Since the fall of 1996, Uzbekistan's national currency, the soum, has not been freely convertible.The government sets three level exchange rates, all highly overvalued, but most businesses andindividuals are unable to buy dollars legally at these rates, so a widespread black market meetsthe unmet demand. President Karimov repeatedly pledged to restore convertibility in 2000, butfailed to do so. As a result the IMF closed its office in Tashkent in the spring of 2001. On

November 1, 2001, the government devalued the official exchange rate to a level nearly equal tothe so-called "commercial" rate of approximately 693 soum/$ and eliminated the use of this"official rate" for all but accounting purposes.

In March 2002, the government devalued the exchange booth rate from approximately 920 toabout 1,300, much closer to the curb market rate. The Staff Monitored Program, signed by theUzbek Government and the IMF, envisions lowering the gap between the so-called official andcommercial rates and the curb rate to no more than 20% by the end of June 2002. Outstandingexternal debt reached $4.5 billion as of end of 2001, and tax collection rates remain high, due tothe use of the banking system by the government as a collection agency. Implementation of theSMP would likely cause tax revenues to fall, however, and the government has few traditionaltools to conduct open market operations in the area of monetary policy. In April, a new decreewas promulgated which allows for the Central Bank to sell bonds, essential to the conduct ofmonetary policy. Technical assistance from the World Bank, Office of Technical Assistance atthe Treasury Department, and from the UNDP is being provided in reforming the Central Bankand Ministry of Finance into institutions which conduct market-oriented fiscal and monetarypolicy.

Agriculture and Natural Resources:Agriculture and the agro industrial sector contribute more than 40% to Uzbekistan's GDP. Cottonis Uzbekistan's dominant crop, accounting for roughly 45% of the country's exports (gold issecond at 22%). It also produces significant amounts of silk, fruits, and vegetables. Virtually allagriculture involves heavy irrigation. Agricultural workers receive very low wages, because thegovernment uses the difference between the world prices of cotton and wheat and what they paythe farmers to subsidize highly inefficient capital intensive industrial concerns, such as factoriesproducing automobiles, airplanes, and tractors.

Consequently, agricultural productivity is low, with many farmers focusing on producing fruitsand vegetables--for which supply and demand determine the price--on small plots of land, as

8/12/2019 saim khan

17/46

well as smuggling cotton and wheat across the border with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in orderto obtain higher prices.

Minerals and mining also are important to Uzbekistan's economy. Gold is most prominent;Uzbekistan is the world's seventh-largest producer, about 80 tons p.a., and holds the fourth-

largest reserves. Uzbekistan has an abundance of natural gas, used both for domesticconsumption and export; oil almost sufficient for domestic needs; and Uzbekistan has significantreserves of copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, and uranium. Inefficiency in energy use is extremelyhigh, given the failure to use realistic price signals (tariffs) to cause users to conserve energy andfailure of domestic producers and the government to reap potential revenues from the energysector.

Trade and Investment:Uzbekistan has adopted a policy of import substitution reflected, for example, in its strong focuson increased wheat and oil and gas production. Given the multiple exchange rate system and thehighly over-regulated trade regime has led to both import and export declines since 1996,

although imports have declined more than exports, as the government squeezed imports tomaintain hard currency reserves. Most "legal" import growth has been in capital equipmentrelated to investment projects. Currency convertibility restrictions have severely constrainedtrade and new investment. Uzbekistan's traditional "trade" partners are NIS states, notablyRussia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the other Central Asian countries. Non-NIS partners have beenincreasing in importance in recent years, with the U.S., Korea, Germany, Japan, and Turkeybeing the most active.

Uzbekistan is a member of the IMF, World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and theEuropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It has observer status at the World TradeOrganization and is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization. It is a signatory

to the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of OtherStates, the Paris Convention on Industrial Property, the Madrid Agreement on TrademarksProtection, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. In 2002, Uzbekistan was again placed on thespecial "301" Watch List for lack of intellectual copyright protection. Although Uzbekistan haspatent, copyright, and trademark laws dating from 1996 and compiled with technical assistancefrom experts, no enforcement has caused the country to again be placed on the Watch List.

Uzbekistan's lack of currency convertibility has caused foreign investment inflows to dwindle toa trickle; in fact Uzbekistan has the lowest level of FDI in the CIS. Since Uzbekistan'sindependence, U.S. firms have invested roughly $500 million in Uzbekistan. Large U.S.investors include Newmont, reprocessing tailings from the Muruntau gold mine, CaseCorporation, manufacturing and servicing cotton harvesters and tractors; Coca Cola, withbottling plants in Tashkent, Namangan and Samarkand; Texaco, producing lubricants for sale inthe Uzbek market; and Baker Hughes, in oil and gas development. No large new investmentshave taken place from the U.S. in the last 5 years.

8/12/2019 saim khan

18/46

3. DILATE ON FORCES OF SOCIALISM AND

ISLAM:

Introduction:

Since Uzbekistan announced its independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991,1 theUzbek government has made little progress in moving away from the Soviet-style repression ofhuman rights, specifically religious freedom.2 With the largest and most devout Muslimpopulation in Central Asia,3 the Islamic religion flourished inUzbekistan as a result of thebreak-up of the Soviet Union.4 Uzbekistans President, Islam Karimov,5 believes that theIslamic religion is an ideological and political threat and warns that Islamic activists orfundamentalists are trying to destabilize his regime.6 In response, Karimov ordered a crackdownagainst unofficial, independent Islamic worship and imposed state-sponsored or official Islamicobservance.7 This suppression and subjugation of independent Islamic adherence to the stateviolates the Uzbek Constitution and international human rights standards protecting religious

freedom, including the right to practice ones religion, the right to a religious education, and

8/12/2019 saim khan

19/46

the right to teach and lead religious worship without unauthorized state interference orinvolvement.8

The disregard for Uzbek constitutional protections raises serious issues concerning the ruleof law in Uzbekistan and its future as a constitutional state.9 Moreover, the February 1999

bombing in the capital of Uzbekistan proves that Karimovs repressive tactics threaten ratherthan ensure peace and stability in Uzbekistan.10 Thus, the question of religious freedom inUzbekistan is foremost for determining the limitations of civil liberties in that country as well asUzbekistans future as a stable, democratic state under the rule of law.11

This paper closely examines Uzbek legislation and official practices towards religiousfreedom in light of the international standards, mentioned above, governing religious freedom.While other major religious groups in Uzbekistan are affected by the religion laws and officialacts, this paper focuses on Islam because it represents the majority religion in Uzbekistan.12 Thefirst part of this paper establishes the role of Islam in Uzbekistan today by examining the culturaland political history of the Islamic religion in Uzbekistan since the Russian invasion in the 19th

century. The second part sets forth the international documents that establish the internationalstandards of freedom of religion. The third part examines the specific provisions of the UzbekConstitution guaranteeing and protecting religious freedom, as well as recent legislation andofficial acts restricting religious freedom in violation of the Uzbek Constitution and internationalstandards. The fourth part suggests protection and promotion of the Uzbek Constitution, therevocation of recent Uzbek legislation, and changes in official practice to bring Uzbekistan intocompliance with its own law and existing and applicable international standards .

I.Islam in Uzbekistan since the 19th Centuryan Overview:

8/12/2019 saim khan

20/46

Some understanding of Uzbekistans more recent religious history is necessary to analyze the

current law and practices and understand their future implications. This brief discussion willprovide both an historical introduction to Uzbekistan since the Russian invasion of Central Asiain the 19th century and a consideration of the role of the Islamic religion in Uzbek history.

In the 19th century,13 Czarist troops invaded Central Asia and what is modern-dayUzbekistan. The Russians, for the most part, ignored Islam and focused on expansion. After theRevolution of 1917, however, the Bolsheviks turned their attention towards Islam because it wasthe antithesis to Marxist ideology. By 1920, Soviet Russia suppressed Islam in Central Asia.In 1924, the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was born. After early concessions to the Muslims,to win support for the Soviet Union, the Soviet government viewed Islam as a political andideological threat and set out to destroy it. Stalin, Secretary General of the Soviet Union from1924 to 1953,14 strictly controlled Islam and regulated Islamic practice through state laws andregulations. Soviet officials confiscated religious property and either placed mullahs under strictgovernment control or forced them out of their religious positions. Soviet policy relaxed duringWorld War II, thus allowing registered clerics to worship within the constraints of state-

sponsored Islam. After World War II, clandestine Islamic practice increased within thegovernment-monitored system. Finally, in the 1980s, under Gorbachevs perestroika,independent Islamic observance emerged, and the question of religious freedom in Uzbekistanwas boldly posited.

On September 1, 1991, Uzbekistan declared its independence from the Soviet Union. IslamKarimov, a former Communist leader, was installed as president of the Republic of Uzbekistan,and instantly found he engaged in a struggle with Uzbekistans Islamic leaders over religiousfreedom. The Islamic leaders, arguing against state-sponsored Islam, attracted the support ofmany Uzbeks. President Karimov viewed the Islamic leaders as ideological rivals and a threat tohis political interests. To suppress Islamic power, Karimov fortified the state-dominated Islamicestablishment and banned independent Islamic practice.

Faced with economic crisis and shortages of basic goods, the majority of Uzbeks areindifferent to Karimovs actions. Islamic leaders and their fervent followers, however, want the

freedom of religion as a basic human right that is protected by international human rights lawand the Uzbek Constitution.

II. International Law and Religious Freedom:Freedom of religion is considered the mostfundamental human right protected by international law, and all states are obligated to respect

8/12/2019 saim khan

21/46

and protect this right. Religious freedom is as important to the sanctity and dignity of the humanperson as it is to the recognition, protection, and maintenance of a free and democratic state.

Since World War II, freedom of religion has earned international recognition in the norms ofinternational law and in international agreements,15 which comprise a primary source of

human rights. The United Nations established freedom of religion as an international standardwith the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights (ICCPR),16 and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms ofIntolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (DRID). These internationalagreements provide the international standard for religious freedom with which Uzbekistans

legislation and official practice must comport.

A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.The United Nations General Assembly adoptedthe UDHR, which gives specific attention to freedom of religion as a fundamental humanright.17 Article 2 of the UDHR establishes that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedomsin the UDHR without respect to religion. Additionally, Article 18 specifically recognizes the

right to freedom of religion.

While the UDHR affirms religious freedom, Article 29 also authorizes a state to restrict suchrights and freedoms to meet the requirements of morality, public order, and the general

welfare in a democratic society.18 The restrictive language of this provision raises difficultinterpretive issues as to the meaning and scope of religious freedom recognized by the UDHR.Restriction of religious freedom based on morality is especially disturbing because it allowsgovernment action based on ascribed superiority and inferiority. Moreover, it is unclear from thelanguage of Article 29 whether such authorized restrictions are subject to procedural safeguards.

Irrespective of the interpretive problems, Uzbek law and practice restricting Islamic adherents

right to teach practice, and worship, on the basis of political fears, without legal justification,does not comport with Article 2919 and the religious freedom standard of the UDHR.20

8/12/2019 saim khan

22/46

B. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights .The ICCPR is a primarysource of international human rights law, and a powerful protector of religious freedom.Article 2 of the ICCPR proscribes religious discrimination in fulfilling any of the rights set out inthe provisions of the ICCPR. In the same vein, Article 26 of the ICCPR prohibits religiousdiscrimination. Article 18(1) specifically guarantees the right to freedom of religion. This article

mandates that the freedom of an individual to have or adopt a religion may not be restricted.Additionally, Article 18(4) of the ICCPR guarantees the right to a religious education.

Article 18(3) of the ICCPR only authorizes limitations to the right to practice ones religion asprescribed by law. Despite the interpretive flexibility found in the language of the derogations,the Uzbek governments officialdistaste for Islam as an ideological rival does not qualify as alegal restriction under Article 18(3). Moreover, by arbitrarily closing Islamic religious schools,without legal justification, Uzbekistans restrictions do not conform to the authorized limitationsset forth in Article 18(3) and violates Article 18(4). Thus, Uzbekistans limitations of the rightto Islamic freedom of religion do not conform to the religious freedom standard of the ICCPR.

C. The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and DiscriminationBased on Religion or Belief: The DRID constitutes an important human rights instrumentrecognizing freedom of religion as a norm of international law and as the cornerstone of allhuman rights. It is specific as to religious rights. Article 1 provides for the right to freedom ofreligion including the right to religious beliefs and to practice ones religious beliefs.Religious education is protected in Article 5 of the DRID, including the right to access to areligious education. Article 6 delineates the religious manifestations protected by the DRID,which are afforded to all people, irrespective of their political affiliations.

Article 1(3) of the DRID authorizes derogation from the freedom to practice ones religion.The limitations provided in Article 1(3) of the DRID raise problems of governmental

interpretation similar to those raised by the restrictions authorized in the UDHR and ICCPR.Restricting the distribution of Islamic religious materials, controlling the training, appointing,and electing of Islamic religious leaders, forcing the religious leaders to pass a political test as aprerequisite for employment, and closing private Islamic religious schools without legaljustification as required by Article 1(3) clearly do not conform with the DRID standards of theright to freedom of religion.

The DRID, however, contains explicit language concerning a govern ments legalobligations in such cases of discrimination or unlawful restrictions. Article 4(2) directs statesto take all appropriate legal measures to prohibit religious discrimination and to combatintolerance, even if it is the state or a state institution perpetratingthe discrimination, includingupholding constitutional protections of religious freedom, revoking unlawful legislation, andprohibiting discriminatory practices.

8/12/2019 saim khan

23/46

To comply with the DRID and the other international standards of religious freedom,Uzbekistan must make changes at the national level. Thus, this paper shifts its focus from theinternational standards of religious freedom to Uzbekistan itself to determine whether Uzbeklegislation and official practices should be revoked, amended, or added to so as to comport withthe international standards of religious freedom as established by the UDHR, the ICCPR, the

DRID, and the Uzbek Constitution.

III. Uzbek Legislation and Policies Regarding Religious Freedom

A. Uzbek Constitutional Provisions. The Uzbek Constitution establishes the limits of Uzbekreligious freedom and human rights in general. The Preamble to the Constitution assertsUzbekistans general devotion to human rights and recognizes the primacy of norms ofinternational law. Article 31 explicitly guarantees freedom of religion, and protects the right tomanifest a religion. Separation of religion and state is mandated in Article 61.

The Uzbek Constitution, however, also restricts the right to freedom of religion in threearticles of the Constitution. First, Article 16 provides that the rights and interests of the Republicof Uzbekistan supersede any provision of the Constitution. The meaning and limitation of thisrestriction is unclear and undermines freedom of religion. Article 16 authorizes thegovernment to limit the right to manifest ones religion in light of anyrights and interests of thestate, which in this case are political interests.

Second, Article 2021 states that ones exercise of rights and freedoms may not violate thelawful interests, rights, and freedoms of the state or society. Like Article 16, the ambiguity ofthe language in Article 20 provides an additional obstacle for religious adherents because Uzbekofficials interpret the words lawful interests, rights, and freedoms to suit their own purposes,

including suppressing perceived ideological and political opponents.

Finally, Article 61, which provides for the separation of religion and state,22 falls prey tothe states rights and interests and lawful freedoms limitations provided in Article 1623 andArticle 20,24 respectively. Thus, Uzbekistan may call itself a secular state, but the state

8/12/2019 saim khan

24/46

maintains control over religious life.25 According to Shireen Hunter, a Central Asian scholar,secularism in Uzbekistan means subordination of religion to the state, rather than separation. Thestate illegitimately subjugates religion to the state apparatus in order to pursue one political goalof eliminating any potential Islamic political power and one personal goal of retaining power atall costs.

Additionally, there is a systemic issue that further impedes fulfillment of the constitutionallyprotected right to freedom of religion in Uzbekistan. There is no true separation of powers andno independent judiciary. Thus, there is an absence of an independent force to protect the rightsof citizens or give independent power to the Uzbek Constitution and its provisions.

Although the Uzbek Constitution clearly provides for freedom of religion,26 the state distortsand abuses constitutional limitations of this human right for questionable purposes.27 State-sponsored Islam violates the Separation of Religion and State article of the UzbekConstitution.28 Moreover, the lack of a true separation of powers and an independentjudiciary undermines the power and meaning of the Uzbek Constitution. The integrity of and

respect for this supreme body of law is reportedly threatened by repeated violations of itsprovisions by the Uzbek government.

B. Decrees and Laws on Religious Freedom. Another source of law concerning the limits ofUzbek religious freedom is recent, restrictive legislation. A brief introduction to the Uzbeklegislative process is necessary to understand recent religious laws and decrees. According tothe Uzbek Constitution, the Parliament exercises legislative power. The Parliament hasexclusive jurisdiction over adopting, amending, and adding to the laws of the Republic as well asto the Constitution. The right to introduce legislation in the Parliament, however, belongs to thePresident. Moreover, the President may issue decrees, resolutions, and orders, which haveobligatory force throughout Uzbekistan without a vote by Parliament. The Constitutional Court

must determine the compatibility of the Uzbek Constitution with the laws of the Republic ofUzbekistan and the decrees of the Uzbek President.

8/12/2019 saim khan

25/46

In practice, however, the President is more powerful than the legislative and judicial branches,and this is often reflected in the Parliaments votes and the judiciarys decisions or lack thereof.President Karimov utilizes his disproportionate authority to enact legislation in Uzbekistan thatrepresses independent Islamic religious belief and practice. According to a 1998 HumanRights Watch report,29 the Uzbek government has increased its official legislative

restrictions against independent Islamic worship since 1996.

Several recently enacted laws, amendments, and decrees are of particular relevance. First, in1997, the government began closing all mosques and Islamic primary and secondary schools notregistered according to the current religious law. The government does not provide any legalexplanation for closing these religious institutions. Further, on January 8, 1998, the MuslimBoard of Uzbekistan, a state-created and controlled institution, banned loudspeakers at allmosques. The Muslim Board cited social order as justification for banning loudspeakers, but itis not clear how this interest is served by the ban or, for that matter, how social order wasviolated or disturbed prior to the ban. Second, on May 1, 1998, the Parliament amended thestate religion law so that religious associations are required to register with the government and

any unregistered religious activity or unofficial religious speech is illegal. Again, thegovernment has not provided any legal justification for imposing these burdensome andarbitrary restrictions, aside from alleged threats of Islamic fanaticism. Third, the governmentimposed, by law, a state test that every religious leader must pass for authorization to leadIslamic worship or to teach. There is no legal justification, in secular law, for this legislativerestriction.

Thus, through its legislation, the Uzbek government imposes state-sponsored Islamicobservance upon Uzbek citizens and prohibits independent Islamic worship or education. Notonly do these legislative acts violate the Uzbek constitutional provision mandating separation ofreligion and state, but they also inhibit the right to freedom of religion in violation ofconstitutional guarantees and international standards of religious freedom established by theUDHR, the ICCPR, and the DRID.

C. Official Regulation of Religious Activity. In addition to recent legislation restrictingindependent Islamic worship, the government limits unofficial Islamic activity through officialdirectives. Many government restrictions and policies have negatively affected differentaspects of religious freedom.

First, the government enforces restrictions against activities and expressions of Islamic faith.For instance, the free exercise of Islam includes the right to wear certain types of clothing and tohave a beard. For Uzbek men, with good authority in Islamic jurisprudence, the wearing of abeard is a sign of piety. Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations report thatUzbek state police are arbitrarily forcing men who wear beards to shave against their will orsuffer severe consequences. In March 1998, several female students alleged that they werepunitively expelled from Tashkent State University for wearing Islamic head scarves. The

8/12/2019 saim khan

26/46

8/12/2019 saim khan

27/46

IV. A Moment of Opportunity:The Advantages for Uzbekistan of Complying with the UzbekConstitution and International Standards concerning the Right to Freedom of Religion

From the standpoint of the currently dominant market-economy world view, Uzbekistan is ata critical point in its progress from authoritarianism to democracy. Stable transition has beenchallenged by human rights violations, disregard for the rule of law, and violence. The February1999 bombing in Uzbekistans capital and the subsequent international manhunt for the allegedsuspects, which led to twenty-two criminal sentences including six death penalties, has dealt aserious blow to the image of stability promoted by the current regime and demonstrates thatviolating the right to freedom of religion provokes the radical and dangerous response that theUzbek government has vowed to prevent. In light of this, the threshold issue confronting theUzbek government and concerned international observers is whether or not the stable transitiontowards democracy and the rule of law (terms used here in the sense generally accepted by theWestern political elite and large segments of the academic establishment) can continue and whatmust be done by all interested parties to ensure this result. To avoid the risk of derailing thetransition and finding itself increasingly likened to the repressive regimes of the world, andperhaps war-torn like neighboring Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and currently Russia, the presentwriter is convinced that Uzbekistan must take advantage of just this moment in its history tocreate a truly law-based state that protects and promotes religious freedom, in accordance withinternational standards and the Uzbek Constitution. The substantial benefits of internationalapprobation could well be exceeded by even more tangible benefits locally.

A. Protection and Promotion of the Right of Freedom of Religion: Freedom of religion has beendeclared a fundamental human right. It is considered to form the basis of a constitutionalgovernment, a limited state, and a free and democratic society. Uzbekistans successfulpromotion and protection of the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of religion can beachieved, in the view of this writer, by implementing a number of specific policies.

First, Uzbekistan can only gain by protecting its citizens right to worship in the man ner theychoose, to dress in the manner they choose, and to associate with whomever they choose. Anystudent expelled from state institutions because of Islamic dress should be readmitted and anyrecord of the expulsion should be removed from the students academic record. 31Additionally, the government should prevent police officials use of harassment to force men toshave their beards. Discrimination based on either of these manifestations of religious beliefshould be punished according to the law. Moreover, the government should lift the ban on theuse of loudspeakers unless it can provide legal or more cogent social justification for the ban.

It can be argued that one way to influence legislative or political change is from the top down,meaning that direct pressure on a government body, be it economic, political, or diplomatic, froman international or regional source, can encourage a particular legislative result. Adopting

8/12/2019 saim khan

28/46

this top-down approach, several international and regional bodies, which have a vested (andadmittedly not always unbiased) interest in Uzbekistan, including the United Nations, theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, and theUnited States Department of State, could conceivably call on the Uzbek government for theimmediate cessation of the above-mentioned practices and the return of any expelled students.

Moreover, international lending organizations such as the World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) might determine to examine non-humanitarian assistance to Uzbekistan. Ifan organization finds that assistance is being used, in any way, to support what it considersabuses, the organization might then choose to suspend non-humanitarian financial assistanceuntil or unless the Uzbek government can demonstrate compliance with the organizationsrequirements.

Second, Uzbekistan should re-examine its laws with the aim of identifying and rescindingrestrictive religious legislation that does not comply with the international standards of freedomof religion outlined above, and the constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, includingseparation of religion and state, unless the state can provide legitimate reasons for the

legislation in question. Such justification must comply with the above-mentioned internationalstandards and the Uzbek Constitution. The UN32 should facilitate legislative reform by furtherclarifying and strengthening the limitation provisions of the UDHR, ICCPR, and the DRID. IfUzbekistan does not move in this direction on its own, it must anticipate that individual statesand regional organizations may attempt to influence reform through statements to PresidentKarimov and the Uzbek Parliament, questioning or condemning restrictive legislation, andcalling for, at a minimum, a report providing legal justification for the legislation that comportswith the Uzbek Constitution and the international standards of religious freedom established bythe UDHR, the ICCPR, and the DRID. Again, applying the top-down approach, international andregional organizations, including lending organizations, might also inform the Uzbekgovernment that any failure to respond to such a request would result in the suspension of non-humanitarian aid.

B. Upholding the Present Uzbek Constitution. In the post-Communist constitutional era, it isclearly in the interest of the Republic of Uzbekistan to acknowledge the importance of aninviolable and honored constitution to a successful, secular, democratic state. Successfullyfunctioning local institutions are the best guarantee against outside interference. In the view ofthis writer, Uzbekistan has failed to institute or to implement policies that could provideessential protection of the Uzbek Constitution.

First, Uzbekistan has failed to enforce strictly the separation of religion and state provision of theConstitution, whereas strict adherence to this provision would result in a more firmly establishedsecular state ruled by law. Uzbekistan could accomplish separation by abolishing any and allstate-sponsored religious activities, information, programs, or institutions, as well as fundingand/or control of the like. A national committee consisting of religious leaders, citizens, amember of the judiciarypreferably the Constitutional Court or the Ministry of Justiceand a

8/12/2019 saim khan

29/46

representative of the office of Ombudsman could support conformity with the Constitution byproviding education and training opportunities and independently monitoring governmentprogress.

Likewise, Uzbekistan has failed to address the language in the limitations provided in Article

16 and Article 20 of its Constitution. The language in these provisions is vague and easilymanipulated. The Constitution should make it clear that any legitimate limits on religiousfreedom may not be exploited for purposes such as the suppression of political competitors.According to the Uzbek Constitution, the Constitutional Court of Uzbekistan must interpret themeaning and limitations of constitutional provisions. The Courts decisions should beconsidered binding upon the Uzbek government, and until a decision is rendered, additionallegislation in the aforementioned area should be held in abeyance.

Moreover, the government has failed to uphold its constitutional obligation to protectindividuals from arbitrary arrest. This obligation includes strict prohibitions against the officialuse of fabricated evidence or unsubstantiated charges to punish individuals based on their

religious beliefs and practices. Any prisoner currently being held on questionable evidence ofthis kind should be released. The Uzbek government, moreover, should actively pursue allclaims by individuals or families against law enforcement officials or other governmentemployees who make illegal arrests or plant incriminating evidence. Further, results ofinvestigations and prosecutions should be made public to the citizens of Uzbekistan andinternationally. To further this goal, international development organizations like the AmericanBar Associations Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA CEELI) could deviseassistance programs in coordination with Uzbek authorities that target criminal law reform issuessuch as police training programs, outside investigations of incarcerated individuals, and humanrights education. Ultimately, if little or no progress in these areas is forthcoming, Uzbekistanmust expect that international lending organizations will be made aware of such efforts andprograms and that non-humanitarian aid may be conditioned on the Uzbek governmentssuccessful participation in them.

Finally, Uzbekistan has yet to address effectively the lack of separation of powers,33 whereasthe Constitution explicitly provides for independent judicial, parliamentary, and executivebranches, and whereas strict implementation of this safeguard would provide the necessarychecks and balances that would curb illegitimate or unlawful legislation or practices.34 Failingsufficient improvement on the Uzbek side in this area, a not unlikely alternative would be forindividual states and regional and international development organizations to develop amonitoring committee to meet with the different branches of the Uzbek government to review

8/12/2019 saim khan

30/46

8/12/2019 saim khan

31/46

8/12/2019 saim khan

32/46

7. Establishment of relations with many countries on the principles of equal rights and mutualunderstanding helps Uzbekistan to be integrated into the world community, and realizeinternational political, economic, scientific and cultural cooperation.

8. Enhancement and development of relations with neighboring countries is one of the most

important foreign policy priorities of Uzbekistan. Further intensification of regional cooperationis a vitally important condition of peace, stability and prosperity in Central Asia. Specialattention is paid to the constructive cooperation within the framework of the Central AsianCooperation Organization.

9. Developing dynamically and gradually its relations with the countries of the West, Asia-Pacific, South-East and South Asia, Uzbekistan aspires to make these relations more substantial.

10.After the proclamation of its independence, Uzbekistan gained an opportunity to establishdirect contacts with Islamic countries of Asia, Near and Middle East, the countries that are closeto Uzbekistan spiritually, culturally and traditionally. Development of political, economic and

cultural relations with these countries has a positive dynamics.

11. The cooperation aimed at preservation of regional and global peace and stability is one of themain priorities of Uzbekistan's foreign policy. Based on the principle of indivisibility of securityUzbekistan came out and will do so in favor of the intensification of the role of internationalinstitutions such as the UN, OSCE, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Central AsianCooperation Organization to ensure stability and security in Central Asia.

12. Recently Central Asia as well as the whole world community has faced the threats andchallenges of international terrorist organizations, drug-traffickers and different extremist forces.Considering this problem Uzbekistan is eager to cooperate on the field of regional and global

security. The Shanghai Organization of Cooperation is a vivid example to this cooperation.

13. Geographic isolation of Central Asia causes serious problems for our countries. In thisrespect Uzbekistan will continue its efforts towards "disenclavization" of Central Asia by meansof creating alternative transport and communication corridors. Trans-afghan route is one of themost prospective projects leading to sea communications of India.

Twists and Turns in Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy:

Stability is cherished by the regime in Uzbekistan, but it does not mean changing foreign policyviews is out of line. Such is the outlook in Tashkent where, on July 31, the lower house of

parliament approved President Islam Karimov's proposal for a new foreign policy concept, whichshuns the country's membership in military and political alliances, bans foreign bases on itsterritory and opposes imposed integration.In the language of Eastern, or rather Central Asian, diplomatic finesse, the bill rejects thecountry's participation in military and political blocks but states that Uzbekistan "reserves theright to make alliances, to enter the communities and other inter-state organizations andwithdraw from them, guided by the best interests of the state

8/12/2019 saim khan

33/46

The bill is yet to be reviewed by the Senate on August 30-31 and then signed by the President,but that likely is a formality. Uzbekistan has reasons to pursue the bill and quite a track record ofindependent will when dealing with Russian- and US-led security engagements in Central Asia.

This past June, Uzbekistan pulled out of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty

Organization (CSTO), just six years after it re-joined the body following Western criticism of themassacre in Andijan where authorities killed a large number of protesters. The Westerncondemnation had prompted Tashkent to evict the United States from its base at Karshi-Khanabad, causing a rupture in US-Uzbekistani relations, which began to improve with theestablishment of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) running supplies to NATO forcesfighting in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan first quit the CSTO in 1999, seven years after its founding inTashkent. If history is any guide, Uzbekistan may again return to the CSTO in six or seven years,perhaps as a way to balance against China.

"I think that the exit of Uzbekistan from the [CSTO] will, of course, have a negative characterbecause Uzbekistan will not participate in collective efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation in

Central Asia. This situation is complex and relates, first and foremost, to what happens inAfghanistan," CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha said on August 1 (www.zakon.kz,August 1). Where those collective efforts were during the 2010 clashes between Kyrgyz andUzbeks in Kyrgyzstan is still debated, but analysts have already noted the body's failures tointervene. Part of the reason for the alleged failure is a wide distrust of alliance members towardeach other and especially Russia, which has relied on the CSTO to further its influence in CentralAsia.

Russia operates an airbase in the northern city of Kant in Kyrgyzstan and has sought to establisha CSTO base in the country's south close to the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan bordera moveTashkent, as well as Beijing, opposes staunchly. When Uzbekistan was a CSTO member, itdeclined to join its Collective Rapid Reaction Forces and also voiced its opposition to the group'sdecision to institute a veto over deployment of foreign forces on the territory of a member state.Tashkent's fear of Russia's alleged imperial advances is as deep-seated as is Moscow's imperialnostalgia, among some elite, for hegemony over the former colonies. Recently, Russia hasstepped up efforts to promote its influence in Eurasia, most notably with the launch of the fullyfunctioning Customs Union comprising Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, as well as the EurasianUnion initiative, in part designed to block China's advance in the broader region. The bill onTashkent's proposed foreign policy concept puts it bluntly: "no integration can be pushed onUzbekistan externally".

The new foreign policy concept sends a strong message that, as a sovereignty entity, Uzbekistanis free to pursue any forms of cooperation with anybody. And if putting this on papercomplements the purpose, all the better. Uzbekistan has consistently and boldly aspired todemonstrate that it would not serve Russia's will, or that of any other powers. The bill, therefore,is as much a message to Washington and Beijing as it is to Moscow, though the latter is sure totake it closer to heart given its historical involvement in the region, now encircled by fournuclear-armed states.

As it distances itself from possibly burdening commitments with great powers, Tashkent seeks to

8/12/2019 saim khan

34/46

rely on Washington, Moscow and Beijing just enough not to fall within their orbits. As it doesso, it seeks to ensure the regime's survival and regional security after NATO forces leaveAfghanistan. This thinking likely resonates in Washington, despite all the talk about USwithdrawal from the Central Asian "backwater." Indeed, at this stage, the United States looks toUzbekistan as a key transit point in the NDN to move supplies in and out of Afghanistan as it

pulls out of the Afghan war theater. In the longer term, however, it may be looking to Uzbekistanto provide basing opportunities in light of the possible closure of the Manas air base inKyrgyzstan around 2014 and the need to maintain a long-term military presence in the region.The same may be the case with Tajikistan, though authorities there deny having any talks withWashington regarding a potential US military base. Recently, Tajikistan and Russia havereportedly come close to approving a deal for another 49-year extension of Russia's military basein the country, despite prolonged talks.

The question is whether Uzbekistan wants to serve the role of a US military outpost. Therivalries between Washington and Moscow over basing rights in Kyrgyzstan and the governmentoverthrow in the country in 2010 provide a strong reason for the Uzbekistani regime to avoid

potentially dangerous military commitments with external actors. Russia's military presence inneighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is also a reminder to Tashkent not to antagonize Russiatoo much by pursuing far-reaching military engagements with Moscow's geopolitical rivals inEurasia. The bill's reference to non-participation in military alliancesits anti-Russianproclivities notwithstandingis therefore designed to also assure Kremlin that Uzbekistan is notup for grabs.

This does not, of course, suggest that Tashkent will necessarily ignore the NDN or other offers ofcollaboration. This August, the United States and Uzbekistan will hold their Annual BilateralConsultations, the outcome of which will shed more light on the evolution of Uzbekistani-USrelations. According to the press release of the US Department of State, "the sides will work []to make progress in creating the necessary business atmosphere to increase US companies'investments in the economy, educational and cultural exchange, to resolve the current problemsin the field of human rights and to strengthen security and cooperation in defense". The timing ofthe consultations, Uzbekistan's decision to pull-out of the CSTO, and the ban on military bases aspart of the national security strategy bill suggests that Tashkent may be bargaining to get themost out of the talks with Washington, which relies heavily on Tashkent's role in the NDN.

Short of declaring neutrality, the proposed foreign policy concept seeks to ensure that Uzbekistanis not constrained by external actors but that it can adapt to changing circumstances. It views thisability as critical in the region, which is experiencing a strong integration push by Russia, agrowing influence of India and China, as well as uncertainty regarding future US militaryinvolvement. The bill also looks to secure the regime of President Karimov, whose age opens thequestion of leadership succession. Finally, it helps authorities to seek order from within whileshunning the one without.

The End of a Multi-vector Foreign Policy; in Uzbekistan:

Recently, bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and the United States have intensified. OnAugust 17, 2012, the official U.S. delegation, led by Assistant Secretary of State for South and

8/12/2019 saim khan

35/46

Central Asia Robert Blake, culminated a three-day visit to the region in Tashkent. Originally,this trip was planned as a regional tour that was to include several Central Asian republics.However, the rules of the diplomatic game changed. Kazakhstans portion of the visit was cut,and the focal point of the diplomatic agenda became the visit to Tashkent. Blake himself publiclystressed the importance of Uzbekistan for regional security. According to the senior U.S.

diplomat, Tashkent has played a significant role in the construction of the railway to Mazar-i-Sharif, a project that is very important for NATO forces in Afghanistan. Washington alsoappreciates Uzbekistans role in providing electricity to Afghanistan. And on the eve of the

withdrawal of the Western coalition in Afghanistan, Tashkents importance for U.S. interests in

the region will certainly continue to increase. Accordingly, on August 17, the two countriesagreed on two dozen joint projects amounting to a total of $2.8 billion. These agreements, whichcover areas such as oil, gas, mining, pharmaceuticals, and defense, boast an impressive list ofcompanies as partners.

Naturally, experts and journalists observing the foreign policy of Uzbekistan could not pass upsuch a story, focusing on an extension of the military partnership between the two countries.

First, for many years the two neighboring countries have been involved in a regional competitionfor leadership in Central Asia. However the competition itself is not reducible to a struggle forcooperation with Moscow. Kazakhstan, despite close ties with Russia and the many projectsinitiated by the Kremlin, will never forget about the West in its diplomacy. It is no coincidencethat Hillary Clinton recently called Kazakhstan a U.S partner for strategic dialogue. Moreover

the foreign policy concept of Uzbekistannot allowing the presence of foreign military bases onits territorywas adopted by the national parliament on August 30, 2012.

Of course, Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan, has proven to be an experienced politicalplayer. He could facilitate, or postpone, the final adoption of the strategically important

document by sending it back for revisions. Indeed while building a relationship with theAmericans, the Uzbek leader has preferred and will continue to prefer to make bargains that arebeneficial to him. However, the strategic interest is not unidirectional, as it goes from Tashkentto Washington and also vice versa. Anyway it will not mean a clear choice between the twopartners in favor of one of them. Even if we assume that Liter is right and that a U.S. militarybase in Uzbekistan will be deployed, Tashkent would not transform into a pliable toy in thehands of Washington.. And it is doubtful that in 2013 or 2014 Islam Karimov will be enthusiasticabout advice from afar on resolving the succession issue or onthe development of domesticpolitics in his country. Lets not forget about the legal nuances and details; the status of apotential military base is not a third-rate question. After all, Russia has offered its territory forthe NATO transit center, and cooperation between Moscow and Washington on Afghanistan isno secret. However, perhaps it is difficult to assess these facts as proof of the pro-NATO andpro-American foreign policy of Russia.

Second, Uzbekistan suspended its participation in the CSTO. Thus, while the door to thisorganization has not been slammed, it was quietly closed. Uzbekistans decision can have bothpositive and negative consequences, not only for Tashkent but for Eurasian political-militaryintegration as well. The CSTO is considered by some experts and politicians to be the narrowCIS. This integration structure doesnt include such challenging partners for Moscow as

8/12/2019 saim khan

36/46

Ukraine, with its set of complex energy issues and the problem of the presence of the Black SeaFleet in Sevastopol, or Azerbaijan, with its claims about Russian foreign policy bias towardArmenia and Moldova and its critical evaluation of Moscows role in the resolution of theTransnistrian conflict. However, even within this narrow CIS, Uzbekistan has practically

always stood apart from the rest. This was reflected in its positions on a range of regional

security issues and on specific conflicts such as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict overNagorno-Karabakh. Uzbekistan, unlike Kazakhstan, does not have a common border withRussia. Therefore it has been traditionally more interested in foreign policy diversification. Inthis regard, Tashkents interest in the integration project of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine,

Azerbaijan, and Moldova), which was created outside of the CIS framework with the support ofthe United States and its allies and which restrained hostility from Moscow, was not accidental.Meanwhile, for the six-year period from 1999 to 2005, during which Uzbekistan maintained itsmembership in this organization, it was called GUUAM.Uzbekistan has already experienced the divorce with the narrow CIS. In 1999, Tashkentrefused to extend the Collective Security Treaty, which was signed in May 1992, and joinedGUAM. Thus, Uzbekistan missed the CSTO at the time of its creation (May 2002). Tashkent

joined the organization later, in August 2006, after relations with the West were spoiled becauseof the tragic events in Andijan. And no one can guarantee that such events will not happen again.

Today, radical Islam is on the rise not only in the Middle East. In Uzbekistan, as in the MiddleEastern countries, there are elements of the disproportionate use of force by the government thataffect not just radicals but moderate opposition movements as well. The United States may turn ablind eye to it, but not always, since the debate among realists and advocates of democracyaround the world and within the United States is not over. The dispute does subside sometimesbut arises other times. And who knows whose arguments will prevail in the coming years.Therefore, Tashkent will keep its door to Moscow slightly open, not closing it completely.

Third, Uzbekistans maneuvers on the international arena should not all be reduced to a game of

choice between the West and Russia. China plays an equally important role in the foreign policyof Tashkent. For Beijing, the one-way intensification of U.S. policy in Central Asia is asdisadvantageous as Russias absolute domination over the region. And the Chinese leadership is

unlikely to be happy about the appearance of U.S. facilities on Uzbek territory. Meanwhile forUzbekistans post-Andijan foreign policy, both economic and political support from China hasbeen substantial. It is unlikely that this has been forgotten by the Uzbek leadership.

In this regard, we should not rush to bury the multi-vector policy of Uzbekistan. Priorities andfocus may change, of that there is no doubt. However the final choice in favor of only one

partner looks problematic. Serious change in the geopolitical configuration cannot cancel thosetectonic shifts that are currently underway in the former Soviet