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Safety and security in the marine transport of radioactive
materials: Swedish experience and exercises in 2015
NKS-B NORCOP-
COAST 13 – 14
October 2015
Helmuth Zika
Part 1: Safety
Content
• Legal requirements regarding safety and
security of Class 7 transports
• Swedish Authorities involved in the supervision
and inspection of radioactive material transports
• The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM)
• What type of radioactive materials is
transported along the Swedish coast?
(continued)
• Safety requirements for fissile packages
• INF class vessels
• Experiences from the Swedish marine transport
system
- Safety aspects
- Security aspects (Part II)
- Security exercises (Part II)
Legal requirements
• Act on Nuclear Activities (1984:3)
• Ordinance on Nuclear Activities (1984:14)
• Radiation Protection Act (1988:220)
• Ordinance on Radiation Protection (1988:293)
• Act on Transport of Dangerous Goods
(2006:263)
• Transport of Dangerous Goods Ordinance
(2006:311)
• ADR-S, RID-S, IMDG, ICAO-TI
Swedish Authorities mainly involved in the
supervision and inspection of Class 7 transports
• Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM)
• Swedish Police
• Coast Guard
• Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)
• Swedish Transport Agency
• (Swedish Work Environmental Authority)
• (Swedish Customs)
About the
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
• Independant authority under the Ministry of the
Environment
• DG Mats Persson
• budget approx. 400 million SEK
• about 300 employees
• office in Solna
• Collective responsibility for radiation
protection and nuclear safety
• Competent authority for transports Class 7
Photo: SSM
Main responsibilities of SSM Transport
Group
• Package licensing and validations
• Transport permits according to Act on Nuclear
Activities and Radiation Protection Act
• Handling applications EU-directive 2006/117
• Inspection activities regarding transports
• International co-operation such as
IAEA/TRANSSC, EACA, EU SWG on Transport
etc.
• Point of Contact Denial of Shipment
Joint Road Inspection - SSM and Coast Guard at
Ferry Terminal
Swedish Customs mobile scanning equipment
Mobile Customs unit
IAEA GC Senior Regulators Meeting
Vienna, Austria, 25 September 2014
Johan Anderberg
Ten reactors in operation
Two closed down reactors
Central interim storage facility
for spent fuel (Clab)
Final repository for short-lived
LIL waste (SFR)
Fuel factory (WSE)
Research reactors under
decommissioning (Studsvik)
Waste treatment facilities
(Studsvik)
Closed down uranium
extraction facility (Ranstad)
Photo: SKB
Photo: SKB
Photo: SSM
Nuclear Facilities in Sweden
SG transport in front of Ringhals-2
Photo: SSM
Ringhals SG road transport to NPP harbour
Photo: SSM
Photo: SSM
Photo: SSM
TK-S55 and TK-S5V packages
Photo: SSM
Photo: DMS s.r.o.Photo: DMS s.r.o.
30B cylinders for UF6
Packages for UF6
VPVR/M Type B(U) Package
Photo: DMS s.r.o.
Fissile package for spent fuel
Photo: AREVA
Package TN17/2 for spent fuel
Photo: SKB
CLAB
Photo: SKB
Experiences from the Swedish marine transport
system
- Safety aspects
The Swedish marine transport system for spent
nuclear fuel and nuclear waste has been in
operation for nearly 30 years. No accidents or
significant incidents have happened.
There is a public acceptance for this type of
transports
- Security aspects
Two (2) incidents involving Greenpeace have
occurred in the past, where demonstrators tried to
enter or entered a spent fuel carrying vessel:
• Vessel under French flag carrying MOX fuel
from Germany to CLAB.
• Vessel under British flag carrying natU spent
research reactor fuel from Studsvik to Sellafield
for reprocessing
Part II
PILOT 2015
PILOT 2015
Swedish transport security exercise
at sea with public and private actors
Experience and Challenges
Tommy Nielsen, CPP
PILOT 2015
Committment
Time
Funding
Resources
Dedicated personnel
To support the IAEA in
work on the transport
security exercise guide
Objectives 1(2)
PILOT 2015
To support development
of the Swedish system
for countering malicious
acts against transports
of nuclear material
Objectives 2(2)
PILOT 2015
Forsmark NPP
ClabCentral interim
spent fuel storage
BWR
ASEA Atom
PWR
Westinghouse
Other
Swedish system
PILOT 2015
m/s Sigrid
Evaluation
Swedish PILOT 2015 International
Tabletop exercise
Pre exercise
Experts / Observers
Experts / Observers
Evaluation / Study visit
Field study
Evaluation units
Field exercise
The way forward
conference
Evaluation
Swedish PILOT 2015 International
Tabletop exercise
Pre exercise
Experts / Observers
Experts / Observers
Evaluation / Study visit
Field visit
Evaluation units
Field exercise
The way forward
conference
PILOT 2015Experts/Observers
PILOT 2015
Various exercise sessions within
the framework of PILOT 2015
Red team
Police Coast Guard SSM SKBSituation room Assistance Measurements Crisis
Police Air / Boat Air / Boat Advisory m/s Sigrid
CTU / sea + land Reporting Media
Forsmark NPP
PILOT 2015
TABLETOP EXPERIENCE
Sitting in the same room: networking, common
understanding, sharing knowledge, selling your
message
Get relevant players/participants onboard
Scenarios and scenario leaders – very important
Communication – authorities
-private companies, shippers / carriers
It’s important that the exercises are "no fault“
PILOT 2015
FIELD EXERCISE EXPERIENCE
Tabletop exercise is the foundation
Pre-exercise and/or rehearsal necessary
Exercise manuals very important
A great way to check your planning
Observers - special program
Logistics - a great deal of the exercise
CHALLENGES
A joint management
Each organization have their own sub objectives
Follow-up agreed actions and milestones
Report on a regular basis to your highest level,
keep them up-dated
Plan for your evaluation early
Sell your message, use media
PILOT 2015
PILOT 2015
Thank you