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STRENGTHENING THE WORLD BANK’S RAPID RESPONSE AND LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT

IN FRAGILE STATES

OPERATIONS POLICY AND COUNTRY SERVICES FRAGILE STATES GROUP

March 30, 2007

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFR Africa Region CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDD Community-Driven Development CM Country Manager CMU Country Management Unit CODE Committee on Development

Effectiveness CPC Country Program Coordinator CPIA Country Policy and Institutional

Assessment CPR Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction

Unit CS Country Services DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration DEC Development Economics DFID Department for International

Development (U.K.) DGF Development Grant Facility DPO Development Policy Operation ECA Europe and Central Asia ETC Extended Term Consultant EXT External Affairs Department FM Financial Management FRM Resource Mobilization Department FPD Financial and Private Sector

Development Department FTE Full Time Equivalent GSD General Services Department HD Human Development Network HR Human Resources HRSRC Strategic Staffing Resource Center IDA International Development Association IEG Independent Evaluation Group IMF International Monetary Fund IRS Internationally Recruited Staff ISG Information Solutions Group ISN Interim Strategy Note LEG Legal Vice Presidency

LICUS Low-Income Countries Under Stress LRS Locally Recruited Staff MD Managing Director MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund MNA Middle East and North Africa OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation

and Development OECD-DAC

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee

OPCFS Operations Policy and Country Services Fragile States Group

OPCS Operations Policy and Country Services OPE Overall Performance Evaluation OS Operational Services OVP Operational Vice President PCF Post-Conflict Fund PR Procurement PREM Poverty Reduction and Economic

Management PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper QAG Quality Assurance Group R&R Rest and Recreation RSU Regional Sector Unit RVP Regional Vice President SDN Sustainable Development Network SFR Strategy, Finance and Risk Management

Department SLM Senior Level Meeting SSUP Strategic Staffing Update Paper TFO Trust Fund Operations TTL Task Team Leader UN United Nations UNDG/DP United Nations Development

Group/Development Programme VPU Vice Presidential Unit WBI World Bank Institute YP Young Professional

STRENGTHENING THE WORLD BANK’S RAPID RESPONSE AND LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES

CONTENTS

Executive Summary..................................................................................................................... iii

I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

II. Enhanced Staffing and Organizational Support for Fragile States .....................................3 A. Field Presence .................................................................................................................3 B. Callable Surge Capacity ..................................................................................................7 C. Institutional Back-up.....................................................................................................11

III. Incentives for Staff Working in Fragile States ...................................................................14 A. Results of the Survey, Interviews, and Data Analysis ..................................................15 B. Management Priority.....................................................................................................16 C. Recruitment ...................................................................................................................17 D. Career Development .....................................................................................................19

IV. Implementation, Reporting, and Costs................................................................................22

V. Conclusion: The Benefits of a Strengthened Organizational Response.............................23

Boxes Box 1. Differentiated HR Approaches across the Fragile States Spectrum.................................... 5 Box 2. Potential Menu Items ........................................................................................................ 19

Figures Figure 1. First Line Support: Increased Field Presence.................................................................. 3 Figure 2. Second Line Support: Callable Surge Capacity .............................................................. 7 Figure 3. Third Line Support: Institutional Back Up.................................................................... 11 Figure 4. Improved Incentives for Staff........................................................................................ 14

Tables Table 1. Average Staffing Levels in LICUS and Other IDA Countries (September 7, 2006) .......... 4 Table 2. IRS in Selected Major Recovery Operations...................................................................... 4 Table 3. Average Staffing Levels in LICUS and Other Part II Countries ...................................... 6 Table 4. Staff Concerns................................................................................................................. 15 Table 5. Costs................................................................................................................................ 23

Annexes Annex A. Draft Operational Statement Submitted to OECD-DAC Senior Level Meeting –

December, 2006 ............................................................................................................25 Annex B. Results Framework for Implementing Proposed Reforms to Strengthen Organizations

Response to Fragile States ............................................................................................33 Annex C. Institutional Back-up System.........................................................................................35 Annex D. Cost Estimations and Explanation.................................................................................37


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In recent years, the World Bank has been giving increased priority to fragile states,1 which account for almost half of International Development Association (IDA)-eligible countries. These countries contain a significant number of the world’s poor people; create negative spillovers such as conflict, instability, and refugee flows for their neighbors; and ceteris paribus will represent an increased proportion of IDA’s clients over the next two decades as stronger performers graduate. Improving our response in these countries is a key priority.

2. Addressing Organizational Capacity. In January 2006 the Board endorsed a new framework for Country Assistance Strategies in fragile states, covering four planning scenarios: post-conflict or political transition, gradual improvement, deterioration, and prolonged crisis or impasse. A significant part of the Board discussion focused on the need to ensure that organizational capacity is adequate to support implementation of this framework. The January Board discussion was followed by the completion of an Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluation of the Bank’s Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) initiative, which identifies organizational capacity as a major constraint to implementation. The need for a strengthened organization and staffing response has been recognized by other donors as well as the Bank as a crucial issue for improved outcomes in fragile states.2 In response, this report addresses institutional reforms to improve organizational capacity. It deals with two major issues for fragile states: the need to provide more, and better-organized, staff support through increased field presence, callable sector capacity, effective institutional back-up, and cross-country sharing of lessons; and incentives to attract top-performing staff to work in these difficult environments. It also recognizes the need for a strong focus on harmonization and results, strengthening coordination with other partners to achieve progress on the ground.

3. Links with Rapid Response. Fragile states span IDA post-conflict situations, countries emerging from weak governance and internal strife, and situations of sharply deteriorating governance. International policy statements recognize that both speed and long-term engagement are needed in these situations.3 The paper therefore addresses both long-term issues of field presence and staff incentives; and challenges relating to the speed of the Bank’s organization and staffing response in crises and post-conflict transition situations. In the sections dealing with callable capacity and institutional back-up, links are drawn out where relevant with response to natural disasters, where similar approaches may be used. Rapid response will also be dependent 1 For purposes of monitoring human resources, lending, and administrative budget issues, the Bank defines

fragile states, or LICUS, as countries with 3.2 or below on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) exercise. Analysis tables in the paper cover this LICUS group only. Because consideration of field presence and incentives cannot in practice draw a sharp dividing line between LICUS and other countries facing similar issues, study actions cover both the LICUS group and other under staffed fragile countries identified by the regions.

2 See Annex A, Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Draft, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

3 Ibid.

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on a supporting policy and procedural framework to enable the Bank to move quickly in close coordination with other partners. This paper is therefore accompanied by a new OP/BP on Rapid Response to Emergencies.

Organizational Support to Fragile States

Organizational Support Incentives

First line support: increased field presence

Second line support: callable capacity

Third line support: institutional back-up, lessons learned and partnerships

Improved incentives and

career development

for staff working on fragile states

A. First-Line Support: Increased Field Presence

4. The Bank’s current field staffing does not adequately reflect lessons learned regarding the importance of field presence in fragile states. In these difficult environments, effective field presence and detailed knowledge of country circumstances are especially important to enable strong dialogue, capacity building, and donor coordination, and to mitigate fiduciary and reputational risk. Consultations with country directors and country managers (CMs) indicate considerable limitations to the “mission model” of working in fragile states: periodic visits from Washington or Regional offices do not substitute for a robust, ongoing presence on the ground. In addition, recent research finds that in fragile states the amount of supervision is critical to the achievement of development results.4 However, the World Bank undertakes less, not more, supervision in these high-risk environments. In addition, staff in the field working on fragile states require a specialized skill set: strong political sensitivity; diplomatic and communications skills; knowledge of strategy, operational design, and partnerships specific to fragile states; and resilience, energy, and operational creativity.

5. Staffing Needs. Among fragile states, 68 percent have either no Internationally Recruited Staff (IRS) or only one IRS in the field. Not all fragile states need increased field presence. For example, countries in prolonged crisis require minimal but consistent coverage, not necessarily involving a resident IRS. However, most other fragile states can benefit from stronger support in the field; and for countries with major post-conflict recovery operations, this support needs to be significantly increased. Following comprehensive consultations with the Regions to identify needs for additional field postings, the conclusion is that there is a strong business rationale for placing around 30 additional staff in LICUS or near-LICUS field offices, that currently have very low staffing. Regions would make judgments on individual field postings during the course of each year, depending on evolving business needs. Assessment and identification of requirements for further increased field presence will occur in subsequent years by the Regions.

4 See, for example, Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier, Andreas Fuster, 2006: Supervision and Project Performance:

A Principal-Agent Approach, mimeo available from authors.

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B. Second-Line Support: Callable Sector, Country, and Operational Services Capacity

6. Teams working in fragile states also face difficulties in mobilizing the right type of specialized capacity to provide regular or extended mission support at the right time. This is particularly critical in periods of post-conflict and political transition or deteriorating governance, when rapid assistance is needed to restructure existing assistance or launch new programs. This paper proposes the establishment of a callable roster of staff and consultants with appropriate expertise to act as sector task team leaders and advisers, as well as staff available to serve at short notice in general country strategy and operational support positions in fragile states, pending regular appointments or to supplement staff in the field. Staff would be identified for their experience in fragile states and would be provided additional training on cross-country experiences and tools. Regions and country teams would access the roster according to their needs, and a Rapid Response Committee operating under the Managing Directors (MDs) would be established to facilitate the redeployment of staff in cases of major emergencies and particular staffing difficulties.

C. Third-Line Support: Institutional Back-up, Lessons Learned, and Partnerships

7. The IEG report on fragile states points to the need to intensify development of lessons learned, external partnerships, good practice, and staff guidelines for work in fragile states. Consultations with country teams also identify the need to better organize support from corporate departments to avoid corporate “churning”, rapidly unblock specific problems arising at the country level, and access precedents from other countries that relate to policy and strategy, legal issues, fiduciary problems, or partnership issues. In response, Management will strengthen the Bank’s capacity to provide institutional back-up to fragile states by strengthening Network work programs, establishing rapid response teams in legal and fiduciary functions and developing stronger capacity, for strategy and operational support, in the dedicated central and Regional units.

D. Incentives for Field Postings

8. Changes in the incentive system to recognize and reward good performance are needed in order to attract high quality staff to work in these challenging environments. Although Bank staff serving in fragile states tend to be both competent and dedicated, a broad staff survey, numerous interviews, and analysis of applications data have confirmed that it is often difficult to attract top performers to these challenging environments. Family and career development issues were the strongest concerns staff expressed. The paper recommends a set of actions to improve incentives for staff.

• Management priority: sustained priority by Senior Management to fragile states and to attracting strong performers to work on them.

• Proactive recruitment: intensified case-by-case recruitment, including customizing offers through an agreed flexible menu of incentives to meet individual and family needs; and piloting occasional use of senior staff for high-level urgent response.

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• Career development: Grading CMs in fragile states consistent with country program coordinators and CMs in non-fragile states environments; revisiting promotion criteria with Networks to better recognize the skills acquired in fragile states posts and making service on both fragile and non-fragile states mandatory for promotion; and strengthening the reentry process, including through guaranteed shortlisting for appropriate posts upon successful completion of the field assignment.

E. Costs, Implementation, and Reporting

9. Some of the actions in this report are Management actions that can be implemented quickly without additional cost, but others have budget implications which would be addressed through the Bank’s regular budget cycle. 5 The October 2006 Board paper entitled “Key Priorities—Taking Stock after the Annual Meetings”6 noted the priority, and potential budget implications, of efforts to improve the Bank's “Rapid Response Capacity”, including fragile states emerging from conflict, poor governance and internal strife. The table below shows the total costs of implementing the actions to strengthen the organizational response in fragile states. A detailed breakdown is provided at Annex D. These numbers are in the process of being validated at the corporate level.

10. Implementation will be overseen through an annual review under the auspices of the Managing Directors, with a report provided to Board as part of the FY08 Fragile States update. Annex B provides a results framework and action plan.

Estimated Total Costs of Strengthening the Bank’s Rapid Response and Long-Term engagement Estimated cost (US$ ’000)

Cost item FY07 FY08 FY09 Increase in field presence a/ 4,400 9,500 10,700 Callable roster; cross-country lessons learned;

strengthened institutional back-up b/ 600b/ 2,000-3,000 2,000-3,000

Incentives 150 2,000 2,000 LICUS/PCF Trust Fund Secretariat 150 500 500 Total 5,300 14,000-15,000 15,200-16,200 Source: Regional and non-regional estimates and Human Resources modeling. a/ Of which approximately 40% will be redeployed from Regional budgets in total over the three year period, 55% redeployment in Africa.

b/ Incremental costs in FY07 to establish the callable roster and institutional back up system; and to plan and cost future work program and staff redeployments. This work will

establish full costs for FY08 onwards, which will be determined during the normal budget process and are likely to include significant redeployments.

11. With regard to incentives, further work is needed on the approach to implementing the incentive framework in this paper including the requirement for Fragile States experience in promotions. HR and OPCS will work on parameters for this, including addressing questions of the applicability to different work streams, timing of introduction of the mandatory requirement and the definition of work on fragile states. The Bank will draw for these purposes on the introductions of the requirement of experience in at least two world regions, and will return to the Personnel Committee for a discussion of these implementation parameters, with a view to finalizing the approach by the time of the discussion of the Strategy Staffing paper.

5 For FY07, budget requirements would be managed through the central contingency allocation process. 6 See “Key priorities—Taking Stock after the Annual Meetings” (SecM2006-0435), October 20, 2006.


I. INTRODUCTION

1. In recent years, the World Bank has been giving increased emphasis to work in fragile states1 On January 17, 2006, the Board of Executive Directors discussed an update on Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Initiative and an accompanying paper: Fragile States: Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies.2 The Board strongly endorsed the paper’s key proposal for developing differentiated approaches and instruments for different types of fragile states and for supporting institutional reforms, but it recognized that more needs to be done to ensure implementation.

2. Addressing Organizational Capacity. A significant part of the Board discussion focused on the need to ensure that the Bank has the right organizational capacity to support implementation of this framework. This is a challenge faced by many other donors, as highlighted in the draft operational statement submitted to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Senior Level Meeting (SLM) in December, 2006,3 which is presented at Annex A. The January Board discussion was followed by the completion of an Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluation of the Bank’s LICUS initiative that identified staff incentives and organizational capacity as a major constraint to implementation. In reviewing the IEG study, the Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) requested Bank Management to give priority to the Human Resources (HR) and organizational support needed to support implementation of the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) framework and proposed work program on fragile states.4 As the IEG evaluation noted:

1 This paper generally uses the term fragile states, a concept used by the Organization for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD) and adopted by the Bank in January 2006 to harmonize with other donors. There is not yet a common international definition of fragility, although the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) is considering developing a common framework. The Bank’s definition of LICUS covers low-income countries with ratings of 3.2 or below on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), as well as nonmember territories and countries without CPIA ratings. Analysis tables in the paper cover this LICUS group only. Because consideration of field presence and incentives cannot in practice draw a sharp dividing line between LICUS and other countries facing similar issues, study actions cover both the LICUS group and other under staffed fragile countries identified by the Regions. The paper’s recommendations will also be of relevance to the three further types of situation identified in the January 2006 Board papers as ‘fragile’: higher income conflict-affected countries; sub-national conflicts; and strongly performing countries facing an increase in conflict-related or political fragility.

2 Low-Income Countries Under Stress: Update (IDA/R2005-0251), December 22, 2005; Fragile States – Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies (IDA/R2005-0252), December 22, 2005

3 Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, 2006 Draft, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

4 Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress, 2006.

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“Staffing numbers, skills and incentives for working on LICUS need to be prioritized… Signaling the importance of LICUS throughout the management hierarchy will also be required. Field presence alone is insufficient for effective country strategy implementation. It needs to be complemented by adequate communications between field and headquarters donor agency staff, as well as by an adequate number of field staff with the appropriate authority and skills.”5

3. Purpose and Scope of Paper. This report provides an update on the Bank’s action plan to improve its organizational response in fragile states, consistent with the priority set by Executive Directors and with a strong focus on harmonization in support of achieving concrete results on the ground. It draws on a broad survey of staff views (over 200 respondents), interviews with about 30 Bank managers and staff, and a range of statistical data (for example, job applications and allowances). Section II focuses on strengthening organizational support to fragile states, through increased field presence, a callable staff roster and more robust institutional back-up; Section III addresses the changes in incentives that could ensure that staff are rewarded for work on fragile states and that highly competent staff are attracted to fragile states postings; Section IV discusses costs and implementation, and Section V presents conclusions. Annex A presents the draft OECD-DAC operational statement; Annex B provides a results framework and action plan for implementation of proposed reforms; Annex C presents a structure to strengthen organizational response to Fragile States and Annex D presents a breakdown of the cost estimations required to implement the proposed reforms. The paper does not involve any policy decisions, and is presented to Executive Directors for information and discussion.

4. Links with Rapid Response. The October 2006 Board paper entitled “Key Priorities—Taking Stock after the Annual Meetings”6 noted the need to improve the Bank's “Rapid Response Capacity”. Fragile states span post-conflict situations, countries emerging from weak governance and internal strife, and those facing deteriorating governance. International policy statements recognize that both speed and long-term engagement are needed in these situations. 7 The paper addresses both long-term issues of field presence and staff incentives and challenges relating to the speed of the Bank’s organizational and staffing response. In the section dealing with the callable capacity and institutional back-up needed to provide a rapid response, links are drawn where relevant with natural disasters. Rapid response will also be dependent on an appropriate policy and procedural framework to enable the Bank to move quickly in close coordination with other partners. This paper is therefore accompanied by a new policy and procedural paper on Rapid Response to Emergencies. Finally, while the paper focuses primarily on emergency operations funded through the Bank’s own resources, it draws on the results of a recent evaluation of the use of Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) in emergencies, which identified similar organizational, procedural and staffing issues as critical in fostering effective performance of Bank-administered MDTFs.8

5 Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress, 2006. 6 See “Key priorities—Taking Stock after the Annual Meetings” (SecM2006-0435), October 20, 2006. 7 See Annex A, Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in

Fragile States and Situations, 2006 Draft, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 8 Review, Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds, draft report, Scanteam, Oslo November 2006.

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II. ENHANCED STAFFING AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT FOR FRAGILE STATES

5. A central part of the January 2006 Board discussion of the update of the LICUS Initiative and of the IEG evaluation focused on the need to strengthen field presence and organizational support in the most fragile countries.9 This report proposes three tiers of staffing and organizational support to improve both the speed of response and long-term engagement:

• Increased field presence, providing front-line support for analysis of the situation on the ground, government dialogue and capacity building, donor coordination, and program management and monitoring;

• Callable surge capacity in the sectors and for general strategy and operational support, to provide country programs with the right specialized skills at the right time; and

• Dedicated institutional support for sharing lessons and developing good practice, providing rapid institutional turnaround of country problems in Washington, promoting corporate strategy and policy reform, and facilitating external partnerships.

A. Field Presence

Figure 1. First Line Support: Increased Field Presence






career development

for staff working on

fragile states

6. In situations of low capacity and high political volatility, an effective field presence is particularly important: it can enable continuous dialogue and capacity building with government counterparts, strong donor coordination, and close oversight of the Bank’s portfolio to mitigate fiduciary risk. The importance of contact on the ground is buttressed by recent research that finds that in fragile states the amount of supervision is critical to the achievement of development results, but that the World Bank undertakes less, not more, supervision in these high-risk environments.10 Although the Bank has made considerable progress in developing differentiated tools and approaches for fragile states, implementation of these approaches on the ground is constrained by low field presence. Consultations with country directors and country managers (CMs) indicate limitations to the “mission model” of working in fragile states: where periodic visits from Washington or Regional offices cannot substitute for a robust, ongoing presence on the ground. 9 For example, the update noted: “A stronger strategic and partnership framework will only be effective if the

Bank is able to improve its own organizational response. The Bank will review the measures necessary to increase field presence and incentives and central or regional organizational capacity.”

10 Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier, Andreas Fuster, 2006: Supervision and Project Performance: A Principal-Agent Approach, mimeo available from authors.

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7. Current Field Presence. Analysis of staffing patterns shows that 68 percent of LICUS have one or fewer Internationally Recruited Staff (IRS) in the field. The average number of IRS in LICUS (including countries like Afghanistan and Nigeria, which have a significant field presence) is 1.7, while non-LICUS Part II Countries have an average of 4 staff in the field (see Table 1). The ratio of higher-level (GF+) Locally Recruited Staff (LRS) to IRS in LICUS countries is much lower (1.2) than in non-LICUS countries (2.1).11 In addition, a significant number of other International Development Association (IDA) countries (31 percent of countries with a population greater than 1.5 million) have fewer than two IRS in the field. Because many of these countries share some conditions with the fragile states group—in particular low capacity and, in some cases, risks of conflict or political instability—this report includes the special staffing needs of other fragile IDA countries in the staffing strategy for fragile states.

8. Post-Conflict Recovery. Within the fragile states group, there has been a significant increase in post-conflict recovery situations in recent years, but with a substantial variation in patterns of IRS in their field offices, as shown in Table 2. African post conflict recovery situations have typically had lower numbers of staff in the field than major post conflict operations in other regions.

9. Toward a Stronger Field Presence Based on Business Needs. An appropriate staffing strategy should be geared to the differentiated business models for fragile states that the Board endorsed in its January discussion. At one end of the spectrum, in major post-conflict recovery operations where the Bank is playing a central role, a significant field presence is essential, depending on the size of the country, the size of the Bank’s program, and the role of the Bank in donor coordination: Afghanistan, for example, has 13 IRS. Not all fragile countries need increased field presence, however. At the other end of the spectrum, countries in prolonged crisis require minimal but consistent coverage; where there are reasonable chances of change, it may be important to have a resident IRS, but in other cases, IRS support could be provided part-time from a nearby country. However, most other fragile states—countries entering post-conflict recovery, countries struggling to initiate or maintain gradual reform processes, or countries in which there is a prospect of mitigating deteriorating governance through enhanced dialogue—can benefit from stronger support in the field. In these situations, it is

11 Both local and international staff in the field play a critical role: however interviews indicate that IRS and LRS

tend to act as complements rather than substitutes in these environments. This is for several reasons: (a) difficult operational environments require substantial experience in Bank corporate policy and procedures; (b) where capacity in national institutions is low (which it is by definition in fragile states), hiring experienced professionals to work directly for the Bank draws capacity away from national institutions. National counterparts generally express a preference for the Bank to hire less experienced LRS and provide them with development opportunities, but this in turn requires sufficient IRS presence to mentor local staff. For these reasons, this paper focuses on IRS field presence.

Table 1. Average Staffing Levels in LICUS and Other IDA Countries (September 7, 2006)

Country Ave. IRS per field office

LICUS 1.69 LICUS, excluding Afghanistan,

Nigeria, and Cambodia 0.97

Other IDA 3.96 Other IDA, excluding India (29) and Indonesia (26)

2.91

Source: Strategic Staffing Resource Center.

Table 2. IRS in Selected Major Recovery Operations

Population Population (millions)

IRS 9/7/06

Afghanistan 29.9 13 Congo, Dem. Rep. 54.8 2 Haiti 8.6 1 Kosovo 1.9 2 Liberia 3.5 2 Sudan 34.3 2 West Bank & Gaza 3.5 6 Source: Strategic Staffing Resource Centre.

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estimated that a nucleus of two IRS is necessary to ensure effective monitoring, dialogue, donor coordination, portfolio management/fiduciary responsibilities, and capacity development. This core IRS capacity needs to be complemented, where appropriate, by additional IRS with sectoral or fiduciary responsibilities. The IRS also serve as a core to mentor and develop local staff and to attract trust-funded staff and secondments from other donors. Box 1 lays out staffing approaches by business model.

Box 1. Differentiated HR Approaches across the Fragile States Spectrum Post-conflict or political transition Context and skills • Characterized by high fluidity in the policy environment,

opportunities for rapid reform, and potential to scale up financial assistance. Results often depend heavily on cooperation with other international actors, including peace-keeping and humanitarian

• Diplomatic, communications, and political management skills and energy and resilience needed for client dialogue and donor coordination; strong operational management and client capacity-building skills, often including fiduciary expertise, needed to manage portfolio. Previous experience of post-conflict environments is important

Size • In major recovery operations, substantial field presence is

needed, supplemented by seconded, trust-funded, or extended term consultant capacity

• The phasing down of high initial capacity must be carefully managed as performance improves, to guard against risk of reversal

Gradual improvement Context and skills • Characterized by the presence of some government

reform leadership, but facing entrenched systems where change is difficult, slow, or liable to periodic setbacks. Gradual improvement situations may arise in post-post-conflict countries, or after a period of impasse or deterioration

• CMs require an ability to maintain a strong strategic overview and close relationships with clients and donors, together with resilience, energy, creativity, and sound operational management skills. The country office also needs strong operational and client capacity-building skills, often including fiduciary expertise, and may need a technical presence in key sectors where the Bank is heavily engaged

Size • In most cases, a nucleus of at least two Bank IRS is

needed, supplemented by seconded, trust-funded, or extended term consultant capacity

Deterioration Context and skills • Characterized by sharp deterioration in governance or

rising conflict risk • Early stages: the country office may need to engage in

sensitive policy dialogue with government and with other international actors. In later stages, continued deteriorating may result in the need to restructure the portfolio (changing aid modality, or halting new lending and restructuring)

• At both stages, experienced diplomatic, political management, and communication skills are needed, with strong awareness of Bank corporate strategy and operational policies and processes in order to judge how it is (or is not) possible for the Bank to adjust

Size • Before deterioration, country offices are of differing size.

The early stages of deterioration may require maintained presence in the field and surge capacity through missions from headquarters as efforts to prevent a country from slipping into all-out crisis are undertaken. If deterioration persists, field staffing will need to be reduced: since reductions send significant signals of disengagement, judgments about the appropriate level of field presence need to be part of a coherent approach

Prolonged crisis or impasse Context and skills • Characterized by prolonged conflict or domestic

political impasse, often with the presence of arrears. Generally no new lending operations, although small grant-based programs may exist

• More important than technical or sectoral skills are the strong networking skills needed to build relationships with varied national stakeholders and provide sound basic input on economic and development issues

Size • Given the limited operations, these countries require

only a minimal Bank presence, either in the field or in a neighboring office

• Where the crisis involves levels of conflict, security issues are important in determining the level and style of field presence

• In the early stage of turnaround, as a peace process gets under way or a country moves toward international engagement, increasing IRS field presence becomes important

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10. Small States. Small and fragile states also benefit from close staffing presence, but it is expensive to maintain field offices in all small states. Nonetheless, there is a good argument for investing in field presence in cases of particularly strong government reform or international engagement, or where there is a need for intensive dialogue on issues such as natural resource revenue management.

11. Skills Mix and Staff Balance. The skills mix and balance between IRS and national staff vary by country. For example, countries with high natural resource revenues but weak governance may benefit from IRS with experience in economic governance; in some countries pressing sectoral issues may require resident sectoral IRS; and countries of high portfolio and reputational risk may need fiduciary IRS in the field. On the other hand, in some cases, particularly where the need for a full-time CM remains uncertain, an initial IRS field presence can be established through an extended mission or other flexible arrangements. In countries where a larger number of qualified local staff is available, this factor should also be considered in determining an appropriate IRS complement.12

12. Regional Priorities. For the purposes of this paper, Regions were asked to make an initial identification of possible field postings. Consultations with Regions indicate that posting around 30 new IRS to fragile and near-fragile states by the end of FY08 would have a strong impact on the Bank’s program. This would include deploying around 10 staff to major recovery operations, and establishing or reviving an estimated two country offices that currently have no IRS field presence.13 Implementing these recommendations would increase the number of LICUS countries with two or more IRS in the field from 31 percent to 46 percent (or from 42 percent to 62 percent if small states are excluded). It would also start to close the average staffing gap between LICUS and non-LICUS (see Table 3). Annual reviews and identification of field presence needs would be carried out by the Regions.

Table 3. Average Staffing Levels in LICUS and Other Part II Countries Average IRS per Field Office Country Currenta Projected LICUS 1.69 2.23 LICUS, excluding Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Cambodia 0.97 1.56 Other IDA 3.96 4.14 Other IDA, excluding India (29) and Indonesia (26) 2.91 3.11 a Based on the number of IRS staff on September 7, 2006.

12 See footnote 11 for a discussion of constraints on the use of LRS in fragile environments. 13 One possible IRS posting to a country office that currently has none, and the opening of one country office.

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B. Callable Surge Capacity

Figure 2. Second Line Support: Callable Surge Capacity






career development


fragile states

13. The Need for Surge Capacity. The strengthened field presence is only part of the equation for strengthening the Bank’s response in fragile states. In addition, country teams need to be able to call on surge capacity to meet specific needs: assistance with emergency needs assessments, or with strategy and portfolio management; experienced Task Team Leaders (TTLs) and advisers for sector programs; the External Affairs Department (EXT) and legal and fiduciary staff; and assistance from the General Services Department (GSD)/Information Solutions Group (ISG) in establishing new offices. Getting the right skills in place quickly is particularly critical for major recovery operations, but also applies to fragile states with deteriorating governance that need help in restructuring assistance, and to countries in prolonged crisis or gradual improvement that may need help with particular activities.

14. Skills. While some of the knowledge and skills needed to perform effectively in a fragile environment are specific to fragile states, others (good political judgment, exceptional communication skills, the ability to build relationships, energy, resilience, and practical operational management skills) are skills the Bank needs in management positions outside the fragile states area. The intention is therefore not to create a separate silo within the organization for staff working in fragile states, but to recognize that the aptitudes needed to achieve results in these environments are of value to the institution. The following types of skills and qualities are needed:

• Knowledge of strategy, policy, and project design issues specific to situations with low capacity and difficult political dynamics: for example, rebuilding the public administration after collapse, defining an appropriate role for the Bank in relation to national priorities to implement a peace or national reconciliation process, introducing accountability and transparency in a closed environment, private sector recovery after conflict or international isolation, or managing a transition from nongovernment humanitarian services to government services.

• Knowledge of partners who play a more prominent role in fragile states settings: for example, peace-keeping operations and humanitarian agencies.

• Knowledge of processes specific to fragile situations: for example, debates in the Security Council or the Peace-Building Commission, or European Union Article 96 processes.

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• Strong skills in political analysis, mature judgment, communication skills, and ability to build relationships with counterparts who may have little previous experience in policy dialogue with international institutions.

• Energy, resilience and creativity, practical operational management skills, and the willingness to serve in fragile states in field postings or extended missions.

15. Skill Availability. The challenge is to mobilize experienced staff with these skills to specific fragile situations at the right time. Different Regions are already looking at ways to address this issue—for example; the Africa Region (AFR) has established the Collaborating Country Clusters initiative, which strengthens the grouping of sectoral staff in Regional hubs.

16. Role of Networks and RSUs. The main responsibility for responding to fragile states’ sector/thematic needs (and the majority of Bank budget resources for each country program) lies at the RSU level, which is supported by the central Network. Management proposes to establish a roster of “callable” surge capacity to identify and deploy staff with in-depth experience and expertise in working in fragile states. These staff could be requested as TTLs for operations with particularly high corporate risk outside their usual countries or Regions, or could act as advisers for shorter time periods. Creating such a mechanism would require that the Sector Units in each Region and Network Anchor identify staff with relevant in-depth experience and expertise. The Network vice presidents and Regional sector directors (with input from Regional operations directors, country directors, and Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS)) would be responsible for defining the skill sets needed to work on fragile states. Networks would take the initial responsibility for identifying qualified staff (with input from fragile state country directors, HR, and OPCS on profiles).14

17. Callable Roster and Training. To ensure that the callable roster attracts appropriate staff and is seen as recognizing specific experience and skills, the relatively small number of staff on the roster—generally existing staff, rather than new recruits—will be specifically registered on the basis of their experience. Initial nominations will be made by the Networks identifying well qualified staff in each functional area, assessing the skill profile of that staff member and then using this as the benchmark for nomination of other staff to the roster and training and development needs for staff. Networks will be responsible for updating the register as staff move on to new positions, or as new staff with the appropriate skills are recruited or trained. OPCS will be responsible for consolidating the Sector/Networks registers and for developing a core training curriculum available to staff working on fragile states. The training will be a country-case based course jointly developed with the United Nations (UN) and a group of bilateral donors15.

18. Scale of Callable Roster. It is not feasible at this stage to make detailed estimates of staff years for callable capacity, which will vary from year to year with country needs. However, it is feasible to provide rough estimates of the size of the pools of “expert” TTLs and advisers needed. Estimates here have been set low in order to place only the most qualified staff on the

14 Some sectoral surge capacity within the Region may also be located in Regional hubs, as is the case in Europe

and Central Asia (ECA) and planned in AFR; not all of this capacity, however, will have specific prior experience in fragile state or emergency programs.

15 The training programme will make use of country case materials used for the UN Senior Mission Leaders Course and will be discussed with the donor group involved in the Fragile States Knowledge Trust Fund.

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roster; numbers can be increased over time as more staff gain relevant experience and training. A small proportion of these staff will spend all their time working on fragile and conflict-affected states (for example, “callable” specialists on needs assessments and country strategy based in the Operations Policy and Country Services Fragile States Group (OPCFS) or the AFR Regional unit); the others will cover both fragile and non fragile states, depending on changing business needs. Some staff are likely to be based in Regional hubs, and thus easily deployed within the Region; however, there will also be an effort to make better use of opportunities for cross-Regional deployments.

• Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM). The IEG report on Fragile States noted that governance and public administration were areas of weakness in the Bank’s Fragile States work. As part of a stronger effort for PREM work on economic governance and public administration reform in fragile states, some 15 staff would be identified over two years, of which at least seven should be available to be TTLs in other Regions.

• Country Services (CS). CS “generalist” staff are needed to help coordinate emergency needs assessments, advise on strategy and donor coordination, and fill in as country representatives in high-demand periods when recruitment is pending. A minimum of five staff would be identified in the first year, moving to 10 over time.

• Other sectors. Surge capacity is needed in a range of sectors where there is intensive client demand in fragile states. This does not involve every sector (for example, there is little demand for assistance in complex reform of financial systems) but at a minimum it should cover: health and education within the Human Development Network (HD); Infrastructure, Agriculture, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), and Community-Driven Development (CDD) within the Sustainable Development Network (SDN); and Basic Private Sector Recovery within the Financial and Private Sector Development Department (FPD). The target would be to identify five staff in each sector at first, moving towards 10 over time, of whom at least half should be available to be TTLs on high-priority operations in other Regions.

• Operational services (OS). Generalist OS staff are needed at a senior level for short-term field postings to establish new portfolios, help resolve portfolio problems, or supervise large-scale restructuring; and at a more junior level, to supplement CMU capacity in Washington during periods of high processing demand, or for short- and medium-term postings in the field to support difficult portfolio implementation challenges. The target would be to identify at least 10 staff initially, moving to 20 over time.

• Procurement and Financial Management. To ensure rapid project start-up and to inform efforts to build capacity and diminish fiduciary risk, it would be helpful to identify at least 10 specialized staff with in-depth experience of fragile states work initially, moving to 20 over time.

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• Safeguards. To ensure safeguard requirements are met it would be useful to identify at least 5 registered staff to assist teams to meet safeguard requirements in an emergency context.

• World Bank Institute: at least five staff with experience of leadership training and other capacity-building initiatives.

• Legal: at least 10 staff to bring senior policy advice and knowledge of country precedents to countries facing time-dependent and complex legal issues.

• External relations: at least five staff with experience in crisis management able to provide advice to country teams and undertake extended missions.

• General Services Department: capacity to support rapid new or scaled up office establishment in at least three major recovery programs per year.

19. Links with Natural Disaster Response. The Hazard Risk Management Team has also started to establish a Quick Reaction Team of staff with assessment, coordination and task management experience for natural disaster emergencies. While some surge capacity needs are particular to fragile states (for example, strategy support, rebuilding public administration systems or dealing with governance crises, fiduciary capacity building, and legal assistance in support of peace-building), others (rapid infrastructure rehabilitation and transition from relief to development in health and education services) have commonalities with disaster response assistance. It is therefore envisaged that the callable roster would be of use, in these sectors in particular, in improving the response to natural disasters. In view of this, OPCS and the Hazard Risk Management Team plan to support the callable roster together and explore joint training for staff.

20. Consultants. Not all needs for country support and surge capacity can or should be met by Bank staff. The Bank should also draw on consultants with expertise in fragile states. Rapid response requires that OPCFS create and maintain a comprehensive refereed roster of such consultants on the basis of information provided by Networks and Regions, and make it available to country teams16. Registered consultants on this roster would have relevant management and sector experience in fragile states and in emergency response operations. Since in some cases they will be substituting in part for Bank staff, proven success in working with the Bank is another important criterion. Roughly 100 consultants providing relevant combinations of regional and sectoral expertise would be a one-year target for a consultancy register, expanding to 200 over time.

21. Use of the Callable Roster of Sector Staff. Country directors and country teams for fragile states should have access to the accredited staff, from inside or outside their Region, for work in fragile states, including needs arising from sudden emergencies. To operate effectively, this should function as follows: (a) under normal circumstances, the Country Department would consult with RSUs and Networks to identify specialized staff with relevant expertise on the callable roster and request their redeployment to the team facing a new need, and (b) in response to crises designated

16 “Consultants” is used here to include other staff available to the Bank, for example from other donors—this is

an area where joint work with other donors could usefully be explored. The database will also draw on the HR database.

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as corporate emergencies (such as the Tsunami and major recovery operations in countries such as Afghanistan or Sudan), a Bank-wide Rapid Response Committee will operate under the auspices of the Managing Directors (MDs)17, with secretariat provided by OPCS18; it would have the ability to agree on the deployment of experienced staff from Regional or Network units from their existing responsibilities, and to provide back-up for the depleted units.

22. Actions. The following actions will be necessary to establish a strong, professional callable surge capacity:

• Networks and OPCS will develop profiles for sector-specific skills needed in fragile states and agree on a process to identify staff. Networks will identify staff, and establish a system to update the staff roster;

• OPCS, in conjunction with the Networks and the Regions, will develop and implement a core curriculum of training for staff; and

• Where needed in the case of corporate emergencies, MDs will coordinate the Rapid Response Committee mechanism specified in OP/BP 8.00 Rapid Response to Emergencies.

• OPCS works with the HR anchor to identify the overlaps for surge capacity needs and jointly develop the profiles, identify staff, and develop training.

C. Institutional Back-up

Figure 3. Third Line Support: Institutional Back Up






career development


fragile states

23. Demand-Side Perspectives. Across the Bank, there is growing demand for a stronger corporate approach to support fragile states country teams:

• Central unit. It is important to have a central unit to carry out corporate strategy and policy functions; provide supplementary support and surge capacity in emergencies to countries on country strategy, policy, and operational services (CS/OS) issues; and act as a corporate entry point for external partnerships.

17 See Rapid Response on Emergences, Procedural Guidelines. 18 For natural disasters, working in close coordination with Hazard Risk Management Team in SDN.

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• Corporate processes. A stronger corporate process is needed to avoid delays in the provision of advice and corporate clearances. Fragile situations are characterized by difficult political dynamics, low client capacity, partners (such as peace-keeping operations) that are relatively new to the Bank, and the need for a rapid reaction. Thus they often pose policy, financing, and partnership questions that require senior Management guidance; and rapid turnaround of institutional advice and clearance on policy, legal, fiduciary, and financing issues. Stronger institutional back-up also applies to the capacity of HR to service the needs of staff in fragile states.

• Research and guidance. Greater sharing of cross-country lessons learned and guidance on fragile states is needed, particularly in the area of economic governance, public administration reform, and fiduciary support, but also in effective program design with respect to service delivery, infrastructure, private sector recovery, and EXT/communications assistance in managing external political dynamics around fragile states engagement. For example, lessons on the design of effective transitions from humanitarian relief to government provision of services in key sectors (such as health, education, and water) are not yet adequately captured at the institutional level. There is also strong demand from external partners to work together on developing consensus approaches to sector-specific activities and to continue Development Economics (DEC’s) program of research on fragile states and conflict-related issues.

24. Current Dedicated Support. OPCFS was established in 2002 to provide corporate strategy, policy guidance, country support, and lessons learned on LICUS/fragile states, as well as to coordinate relevant external partnerships and institutional reforms.19 OPCFS is small, with five Bank-funded higher-level positions. OPCFS works closely with SDN’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPR), which was established in 1997.20 CPR has a total of 8.5 higher-level staff, including three Bank-funded higher-level positions, secondments, and Development Grant Facility (DGF)-funded positions. In addition, one higher-level staff each in the SDN Regional units of AFR and Middle East and North Africa (MNA) liaises with OPCFS and the CPR, and works on analysis, strategy, and donor partnership issues relating to fragile (including conflict-affected) states. No other sectors or corporate departments have staff or budgeted work program activities specifically designed to support fragile states engagement.

25. Comparative Analysis. These levels are low by comparison with those of other donor agencies. Discussions with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Canada, the UK, and the US, and supporting material on their websites, indicate that they all have over 50 staff working on policy planning, cross-country lessons, and dedicated country operations

19 OPCFS country support work includes post-conflict needs assessments and recovery planning; support to

CAS and Interim Strategy Note (ISN) development and to multi-sectoral DPOs; short-term deployment of staff to bridge CS/OS personnel gaps in field offices and CMUs; advice on application of conflict, emergency and other related policies; liaison with regions and other corporate departments to address policy, legal or resourcing problems. OPCFS also develops corporate strategy and policy on fragile states and related areas such as peace and development linkages, institutional reforms and external partnerships with the OECD; UN Peace-Building Commission; UNDG/DP; UN-DPKO and various bilateral donors.

20 The role of CPR includes the initial development of OP 2.30 on conflict; conflict issues in country strategies, including post-conflict needs assessments; specialized social development support (e.g., demobilization and reintegration, CDD); research on conflict (e.g., corruption, violence, legal systems, gender, environment); and external partnerships on conflict.

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support. The Bank’s levels of dedicated support are a legacy of the relatively recent nature of the Bank’s focus on fragile states as a client segment. As the IEG evaluation noted:

“Staff capacity within the LICUS unit is a potential concern, especially with regard to the provision of substantial support. With a very small staff, the amount of substantive support that the LICUS unit can provide is inevitably constrained. While the unit’s staff work hard to respond and to be consistent across Regions and country teams—and this is appreciated by field level staff—gaps and inconsistencies arise because of the sheer breadth and complexity of the agenda.”21

26. To establish a more efficient system for both rapid response and long-term engagement in fragile states, Management proposes to take the following actions to strengthen institutional back-up for fragile states work (see also Annex C which summarizes responsibilities under this system):

• Corporate focal points for rapid response. Management will designate teams of staff for callable roster with experience on fragile states and emergency issues from the relevant regional and central units, aiming to bring stronger knowledge of cross-country and cross-regional precedents and meet accelerated service standards for emergencies.22

• Good practice and guidance. To inform the design of ESW, project and programs in fragile states, Management will, within the normal budget process, ensure that modest but specific work programs are in place within the Network Anchors and the corporate departments identified above to evaluate cross-country and cross-regional experiences, and develop tools and good practice. As described in the previous section, Network Anchors and RSUs will also be responsible for identifying and updating staff on the callable roster.

• Regional capacity to support lessons learned on strategy, operational approaches, and partnerships. Regions that have a large concentration of fragile states may in some cases benefit from establishing a dedicated Regional unit. The Africa region is considering a pilot initiative to establish a strengthened unit during FY07, to deal with Africa-specific partnerships, strategy, and analysis. Regions will also maintain responsibility for field offices, country strategy and management, and determining access to the callable roster for all emergency operations which are not designated as corporate emergencies.

• MD coordination. As with the current system, the MDs will continue to chair quarterly meetings with regions, country directors, Network Anchors and relevant corporate departments. One of these meetings each year will address progress in implementing this organization and staffing strategy. In addition, the office of the MD with relevant regional responsibilities will chair meetings on rapid response to

21 See Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under

Stress, 2006. 22 This institutional back-up system will apply both fragile states and natural disaster emergencies under

OP/BP 8.00.

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situations designated as corporate emergencies, discussing Bank role and strategy with affected regions and country departments, and ensuring that resources can be deployed as necessary across regions and appropriate back-up provided.

• Role of OPCFS and the CPR. Management has reviewed the roles of OPCFS and the CPR in the SDN and decided that the effectiveness of these units will be maximized where OPCFS provides country strategy and general operational (CS/OS) support and surge capacity to regions, and acts as a secretariat to the MD-chaired Rapid Response Committee; while the CPR acts as a centre of technical excellence for the social, infrastructure and environmental programs which make up a central component of the Bank’s response to fragile states. Similarly, OPCFS will lead corporate strategy and institutional reforms on fragile states and act as the corporate entry point for partnerships, while the CPR leads external partnerships on related social, environmental and infrastructure issues in fragile and conflict-affected states.

27. Actions. The following actions will be necessary to strengthen institutional back-up:

• HR, LEG, PR, FM, and TFO will designate rapid response teams for emergency operations (see Annex C).

• OPCS will establish the capacity necessary to provide adequate targeted country strategy and operational (CS/OS) surge capacity to regions, act as the secretariat for the MD-chaired Rapid Response Committee in fragile state emergencies and consolidate and support use of the callable roster, while handing over work on sectoral issues to the relevant Network Anchors.

• The MDs will request relevant networks and corporate departments to submit budgeted work programs for FY08 on lessons learned and staff guidance in fragile states, as part of the normal budget process. OPCS will discuss with these units the use of the MDTF for knowledge activities in fragile states to support Network work programs, subject to endorsement from the MDTF donor council.

III. INCENTIVES FOR STAFF WORKING IN FRAGILE STATES

Figure 4. Improved Incentives for Staff






career development


fragile states

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A. Results of the Survey, Interviews, and Data Analysis

28. There are many Bank staff—IRS and country nationals—who are working hard in adverse conditions in fragile states, displaying competence, professionalism, and dedication. As part of the research for this paper, HR surveyed fragile states staff and reported the initial results in the Strategic Staffing Update Paper (SSUP) in May 2006.23 The survey shows that, while some problems are common to all field postings, staff perceptions are that family and career development constraints are considerably higher in relation to work in, and on, fragile states. The survey results point to the importance of effective leadership by the CM and other senior sector staff in leading government dialogue and donor coordination, and in attracting and mentoring strong IRS and local staff. However, the survey, interviews, and data analysis confirm that in many cases it is difficult to attract high performers to serve in fragile state country offices, particularly in the key position of CM.

29. Staff Concerns. Table 4 summarizes key results from the staff survey. It shows, in order of importance, respondents’ strongest concerns—those rated above 2 on a scale of 1-3—about serving in a LICUS country office; it also shows the strongest recommendations—also those rated above 2 on the scale of 1-3—for changes that would make these positions more attractive.

Table 4. Staff Concerns Greatest concerns Rating a/ Making LICUS more attractive Rating b/

Separation from family 2.66 Appropriate benefits 2.63 Access to medical services 2.45 Targeted personal career mgmt 2.60 Low priority to low profile/small countries 2.38 Guaranteed next job 2.56 Opportunity for cutting-edge economic and sector work

2.36 Special recruitment effort 2.47

Country security 2.33 Frequent trips to DC for networking, etc. 2.43 Opportunity to manage large loans 2.33 Special provisions for family 2.42 TIE: Impact of country office post on reentry to Washington and low priority to weak governance/economic management countries

2.22 Strong support from top 2.40

Allowances 2.15 TIE: Adequacy of hardship allowance and long-term career development

2.29

TIE: general living conditions; schooling; budget adequacy; Bank support re living conditions; health risks

2.14 LICUS work as prerequisite for director-level position

2.22

Lack of priority by vice presidents and Senior Management

2.05 Promotion prospects 2.14

Source: Staff survey. a/ Rating 1-3 with 3 = Greatest Concern b/ Rating 1-3 with 3 = Most effective mitigating action 30. Analysis. Differences in scores among items were small and should not be overemphasized. In summary, responses show that personal (family, health, and security) and career development (including opportunities to acquire skills valued in the Bank) are the strongest staff concerns. An important finding is that 23 percent of staff were willing to consider

23 The survey covered a random sample of operational staff, with systematic coverage of country and operations

directors and of CMs. It focused on LICUS, rather than the broader group of countries used generally in this report. See Strategic Staffing Update Paper, May 2006

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service in a LICUS country office within one year and 41 percent within three years. While this is well below comparable figures for non-LICUS countries (40 percent and 58 percent, respectively), the potential pool of applicants for fragile state country offices is substantial.

31. Actions. The following actions focus on feasible steps to attract strong performers to fragile states. The remainder of this section discusses these actions in more detail, with their rationale. The payoff for these actions is potentially great: as Figure 4 illustrates, improving incentives for staff would benefit all levels of support for fragile states.

• Management priority: continuing to demonstrate attention by senior management to fragile states and to attracting top performers to work on them.

• Proactive recruitment: intensified case-by-case recruitment, including customizing offers to meet individual and family needs, through an agreed flexible menu of incentives; and piloting occasional use of senior staff on time-limited appointments for high-level urgent response.

• Career development: grading CMs in LICUS consistent with Country Program Coordinators (CPCs) and CMs in non-LICUS countries; revising promotion criteria to recognize the skills acquired in fragile states posts; specific attention to reentry, including guaranteed shortlisting for positions at an appropriate level on return; and making experience on both fragile and non-fragile states a criterion for promotion in operational departments.

32. Scope. This section focuses primarily on incentives for CMs and senior sector staff. High-performing staff at a more junior level also play a critical role in fragile states; it is expected that as the Bank’s HR systems systematically recognize fragile states experience and the skills gained in low-capacity, politically difficult environments, high-potential staff will be attracted to more junior and entry-level positions.

33. HR would have lead responsibility in monitoring and coordinating implementation of this process, working in close collaboration with the Regions and OPCS.

B. Management Priority

34. Although Bank Management has clearly given increased attention to fragile states in the past few years, survey results show that staff continue to think that fragile states needs to rank higher among Management priorities.

35. Actions. The following actions are needed to strengthen the importance of this work within the Bank:

• Quarterly meetings with the MDs will continue, and be broadened to ensure appropriate representation from Networks and Sector Departments. One meeting each year will review progress in implementing the agreed actions of this report, based on a progress report prepared jointly by HR and OPCS.

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• Actions relating to improving responses to fragile states will form part of the performance contracts with all Operational Vice Presidents (OVPs) for FY08.24

• A working group composed of HR, EXT, and OPCS will develop and monitor an action plan to recognize and “celebrate” work done in fragile states.

C. Recruitment

36. Each fragile country situation is different in terms of its attractiveness to strong potential candidates, and, given issues of family and living conditions, there are major differences among candidates on what it would take to attract them to such service. So efforts to increase the recruitment pool of qualified staff for fragile states country offices, particularly in the CM function, must be customized both by country and by candidate.

1. Proactive Recruitment

37. Staffing efforts should include proactive upstream identification of suitable candidates, based on a profile of key characteristics and skills that meet the needs of the given country. A few country posts in fragile states receive a large number of applications from highly experienced staff: in the majority, however, there is a need to increase the pool of candidates with the right skills profile and experience. There is a need to think “outside the box” as well. For example, while the ideal preferred candidates should have extensive Bank experience and proven judgment under pressure, the record shows that in exceptional instances individuals with limited Bank experience have been successfully appointed to these levels. Similarly, there may be excellent candidates who become interested at the end of their career in serving as a LICUS CM. And extra attention should be paid to those who have already served in a country office—fragile state or not—because of their experience and because the survey results showed them to be more likely to be interested in such service. Finally, experience has also shown that there are some staff who may not stand out in Washington but who flourish in challenging situations where they must deal with high levels of frustration and ambiguity.

38. Encouraging Likely Candidates. Those who relish these assignments usually make their interest known. Those who appear likely to be high performers as fragile state CMs should be encouraged by HR and their managers to apply, and their concerns on issues discussed above should be discussed with them frankly at that time. They should be kept on an HR prospects lists even if they are not immediately available. In addition, interest in and capacity for serving in fragile states should be considered as a criterion for selection in recruitment, including for the Young Professionals (YP) program.

39. Actions. An intensified recruiting process would involve the following:

• A coordinating committee chaired by the Director of Human Resource Operations and composed of operations directors from all Regions and the OPCFS Manager would help implement and monitor an intensified recruiting process. HR and OPCS

24 Performance contracts with the Regions, and subsequent performance contracts between the Region and CMUs

and sectors, will include a clear recognition that the goals of Bank assistance strategies in situations of prolonged crisis, deteriorating governance, or gradual improvement (not only the more “visible” early post-conflict operations) are a valid basis for evaluating success in the Bank’s response.

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would take the lead, in consultation with the Regions, in suggesting a profile for fragile states CM posts, working with the Regions to draw from an agreed set of profiles linked to the different fragile states business models. Members would pool knowledge and would maintain a list of suitable candidates over the next two to three years, review the general job profiles, monitor recruitment for fragile states, and make suggestions on how it can be further improved.

• Lead responsibility and accountability for each recruitment exercise would rest with the Regional Vice President (RVP). The Regional operations director or country director would chair an ad-hoc committee for upstream identification of strong candidates. The committee would include representation at the managerial level from HR and OPCFS.

• On a case-by-case basis to meet critical business needs, HR will consider more flexible arrangements for staff working in fragile states that are facing or recovering from an emergency situation

• HR and the YP office would make interest in and capacity for serving in fragile states one of the criteria for external recruitment at level GF and above.

40. Selective Use of Senior Staff. On occasion where there is a major change—for example in some high-priority post-conflict or political transition country, or a country with deteriorating conditions where there is a chance to avert an escalation into crisis—there is likely to be an urgent need for a high-level experienced manager to ensure speed and quality of response. These assignments would be flexible and relatively short-term—from a few months up to a year. They would draw on a more senior and broader pool than those who would normally apply for CM posts. These senior staff would report to the country director and, in some cases, jointly to the RVP for the duration of their limited tenure. They should be used opportunistically but sparingly, to avoid undermining regular management structures and to avoid a short-term response when a longer-term one is needed. This approach has been used in AFR during the last year.

41. Action. Pilot the use of senior staff on a time-limited basis in one or two additional instances of transition over the next year.

2. Customizing Offers

42. The Need for a Menu of Options. Staff perceptions of disincentives to being posted to fragile states vary with their circumstances, as do the inducements that might overcome the disincentives. It is important to make a distinction between benefits: (a) those that address specific economic, hardship, and security-related concerns at each post, and (b) family- and career-related benefits that can be varied to meet individual candidate circumstances. The first group includes cost-of-living allowance, hardship premiums, and hazard pay; they vary with the conditions in each duty station and are not negotiable. The second group includes pre-assignment benefits, relocation benefits, shipping benefits, Rest and Recreation (R&R), family travel provisions, home country travel, education benefits, spouse relocation and housing provisions, and all career-related incentives. These benefits can be included in a menu of options that hiring managers can negotiate with candidates according to need and interest. In each recruitment scenario, once the top candidate has been identified, HR and the Region will tailor the compensation package to address the

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candidate’s concerns in these areas. Such an approach would show potential candidates that the Bank is prepared to be responsive to the individual’s personal and family situation.

43. Action. Customized offers have already been used in some countries, such as Afghanistan, and customized packages have recently been worked out for some other fragile states. A Coordinating Committee, chaired by HR and including OPCS and Regional operations directors will formalize the menu of options that can be offered to strong candidates for CM and other senior positions in fragile states, within a reasonable but flexible budget envelope, and that can be tailored to meet the needs of the best candidates (see Box 2). The process will address such issues as equity among staff groups and individuals, as well as differentiation among groups of fragile states.

Box 2. Potential Menu Items Some benefits that could be considered in a menu of options for candidates considering work in a fragile state: • Special allowances for families to live in an appropriate third country.a • Larger than usual allowance for travel to visit family (including children not living with the spouse). • More generous and flexible “R & R” allowance for the staff member and family. • Allowance for non-family posts that is higher than the current level of about $600 per month. • Proactive career planning and offers of a guaranteed shortlisting for appropriate posts on reentry. • Provision at the end of assignment for a funded development assignment, to add to or demonstrate technical skills

important to career advancement. This would have to be, at least in part, additional to the budget envelope mentioned above, and so could only be done on a limited basis.

• Shorter than usual tours of duty, such as other donors provide in the most difficult and dangerous situations; while this would be less applicable to CMs, for whom continuity is important, in extreme circumstances an assignment might be limited to 12-18 months of residency.

__________ a This would be subject to residency visa requirements.

D. Career Development

44. This section discusses ways to address concerns about career development.

1. Performance Evaluations

45. Interviews with staff and OVP comments indicate that some staff are deterred from working in fragile states because of these countries’ high risk: despite the best efforts of staff, a deteriorating country situation may affect country program and individual project outcomes. Even successful programs may yield only modest improvements or changes that occur over time, beyond the time of a staff assignment. The actions described above on including fragile states approaches in performance contracts may assist in recognizing effective performance even in the most difficult country environments. Beyond the evaluation of organizational performance, it is important that individual staff performance evaluations recognize effective work in fragile situations.

46. Actions. The following actions respond to this challenge:

• RVPs and sector directors will ensure that reasonable performance benchmarks and results are agreed with fragile states country directors, country managers and senior sector staff;

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• HR will ensure that the OPE guidelines for evaluating results take into account the country environment. For example, staff demonstrating excellent performance from the corporate rapid response teams or callable roster, as judged by the relevant client units, should have this recognized in their OPEs.

2. Grading

47. There are currently some anomalies in the grading of CMs in fragile states. LICUS CMs are less likely (54 percent) to be at level GH than other CMs (75 percent)25 or country program coordinators (84 percent). The issue here is recognizing the institutional value and difficulty of the role of a fragile state CM by grading the CM posts in fragile states consistently with non-LICUS CMs and CPCs.

48. Action. The following action responds to these challenges: CM grading in LICUS should be made consistent with the grading of corresponding non-LICUS positions.

3. Re-entry Policy

49. The survey results emphasize the importance of the re-entry issue. As noted, the perception of fewer opportunities to develop cutting edge technical skills while working in fragile state assignments, can accentuate these problems. Addressing re-entry issues for these staff requires a relatively time-intensive process at a senior level. At present, responsibility for reentry tends to be split among the country department for the relevant fragile state (which, being very small, rarely will have suitable vacancies) and the Regional sector department. It would be preferable for the Regional sector department to have the primary responsibility for placement upon re-entry, with up front involvement of the relevant Sector Board. Involving Sector Boards up front in the process helps address the issue that they tend to undervalue LICUS experience

50. Balancing Considerations. One contentious issue is the balance between a market-based and mandatory placement system. Striking the right balance is difficult.26 A reasonable balance for staff returning from field assignments, particularly from fragile states, would be the offer of guaranteed eligibility for shortlists – and therefore a guaranteed opportunity to be interviewed - for three posts at an appropriate level for staff with good and superior performance, and periodic use of strategic reassignment to management positions as part of career development for staff in the CS stream with exceptional potential. These provisions should be accompanied by steps to improve the functioning of the internal employment market, including a stronger role by HR in providing career counseling and information on upcoming vacancies (in Washington and in the field) well in advance of reentry.

25 LICUS here includes “marginal” LICUS countries. 26 The Bank’s essentially market-based system has helped it attract and retain high-quality of staff in an increasingly

competitive international labor market in which family issues—education of children and employment of spouses—figure heavily, and it also has advantages in acquiring the best person for an individual job. However, the difficulties in attracting the best staff to work in fragile states and then placing them on return to Washington points to the need for a somewhat more interventionist approach, as recommended here: frequent strategic reassignment; more emphasis in recruitment on willingness to serve on fragile states; and putting service in a fragile state on the path to director-level positions.

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51. Actions. The following package of actions responds to these challenges:

• The country director, the relevant sector director, the RVP and HR will discuss with each departing staff member the possibilities for subsequent assignments and will review this discussion in each OPE round. Subject to superior performance, each staff member will be guaranteed shortlisting for three positions at an appropriate level. For staff members with outstanding performance, strategic reassignment will also be used as appropriate, in accordance with Bank policy. Re-entry guarantees would generally be provided by the Regional sector departments, with upfront involvement of the relevant Sector Board.

• Each year HR will provide career counseling and information on upcoming vacancies to CMs and other senior staff.

• For staff who have been recently promoted in the field, the re-entry department supported by the relevant Network would be charged with preparing a work program and arranging mentoring and training for returning staff, as appropriate, to help them to reintegrate into their technical stream as smoothly as possible.

• The MDs and RVPs will review the placement of returning CMs and other senior staff annually.

4. Promotion to Level GH and Above

52. Survey respondents indicated a perception that Networks and Sector Boards think that staff posted in the field have depleted rather than accumulated professional skills—and that this is particularly so in fragile states where it is less feasible to undertake cutting-edge analytical work. Ensuring that service in fragile states is recognized in promotion to GH level and above is one of the most concrete signals the Bank can give that such service is valued. Promotions to GH level and, eventually, to the director level, are highly sought-after. Making service on fragile states highly valued for promotion has the potential to make a major difference over the medium term in attracting high-performing staff to work on fragile states.

53. Actions. The following actions respond to these challenges:

• Management will review the GH promotion criteria and will phase in plans to make experience in fragile states mandatory as soon as practical. Demonstrating that experience in both fragile and non-fragile states is an important part of a successful operational career, will address many career related concerns expressed by staff

• Network Councils and HR will review promotion criteria to ensure that management of difficult processes of politically sensitive reform, client dialogue, and donor coordination in fragile countries are recognized. As part of this effort, Network Councils will invite representatives with previous fragile states managerial experience to advise on promotions.

• For manager and director-level positions covering primarily fragile states, fragile states experience will be weighted more heavily than non fragile states experience.

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• Network Councils and HR will ensure that knowledge of the Bank’s corporate policy and approach to fragile states becomes a routine part of the questions asked in the interview for positions at GH level and above.27

54. With regard to incentives, further work is needed on the approach to implementing the incentive framework in this paper including the requirement for Fragile States experience in promotions. HR and OPCS will work on parameters for this, including addressing questions of the applicability to different work streams, timing of introduction of the mandatory requirement and the definition of work on fragile states. The Bank will draw for these purposes on the introductions of the requirement of experience in at least two world regions, and will return to the Personnel Committee for a discussion of these implementation parameters, with a view to finalizing the approach by the time of the discussion of the Strategy Staffing paper.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION, REPORTING, AND COSTS

55. As part of their regular quarterly meeting process for Fragile States, the MDs will review progress on implementation of the actions set out in this paper, with a report provided to Board as part of the Fragile States/LICUS update. Annex B lays out a results based action plan to implement the actions in this report, together with responsibilities.

56. Costs. Some of the actions in this report are Management actions that can be implemented quickly without additional cost, but others have budget implications. If these actions are adopted, they could significantly increase the Bank’s effectiveness in fragile states. The October 2006 Board paper entitled “Key priorities—Taking Stock after the Annual Meetings” 28 noted the need to improve the Bank's “Rapid Response Capacity”, including countries emerging from poor governance or internal strife (i.e. part of the fragile states). Table 5 shows the approximate costs of implementing a strengthened organizational response in fragile states, and a more detailed breakdown is provided at Annex D. Our commitment to stay the course on zero real budget growth within a three-year framework means that shifting resources toward strategic priorities requires diverting them from another source. Cost implications of the initiative are described below:

• Field presence. The estimated cost for increased field presence includes: salary and regular benefits, field benefits, indirect costs, and relocation costs. AFR will redeploy all salary and benefits for these positions with the other Regions redeploying 50% of salary and benefits, resulting in budget tradeoffs and redeployments of approximately $10 million (40%) from the total projected costs, 55% redeployment in Africa. Budget allocation for Regional VPUs would be during the normal budget cycle for FY08 and FY09 and through the central contingency allocation process for FY07.

• Sectoral roster and strengthened institutional back-up. The incremental costs estimated include increases in staff and consultants and a small amount of travel to operate the sectoral roster, workprograms on lessons learned and institutional back-up

27 For example, DFID requires a question on the importance of fragile states and approaches towards them to be

asked in all interviews. 28 See “Key priorities—Taking Stock after the Annual Meetings” (SecM2006-0435), October 20, 2006.

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system. Activities in FY07 will focus on establishing the callable roster and institutional back up systems; and planning and costing the future workprogram and staff redeployments. These are incremental and would be funded from the central contingency fund. Full costs for running these activities from FY08 onwards will be refined in the normal budget process and are expected to be in the range of $2 million to $3 million. There is likely to be significant redeployment within units but this would need to finalized during the FY08 and subsequent budget processes.

• Incentives. The LICUS unit and HR identified approximately 12 potential eligible countries for increased incentives due to the conditions on the ground and/or demonstrated recruitment difficulties in the past. The incentive component of the cost estimations includes shortened assignment periods, increased R&R and Third Country family allowances. Budget would be allocated to Regional VPUs during the normal budget cycle for FY08 and FY09 and through the central contingency allocation process for FY07.

• LICUS/PCF Trust Fund Secretariat. The cost estimations for the funding for the LICUS/PCF Trust Fund secretariat were provided by SDN, and comprise a 50 percent cost sharing of five Full Time Equivalent (FTE) staff. This request reflects the DGF councils’ review of the PCF budget for FY07 that mandated DGF funds no longer be used for secretariat services for the LICUS TF. This increase in Bank Budget funds would imply a decrease in DGF funding.

Table 5. Costs Estimated cost (US$ ’000)

Cost item FY07 FY08 FY09 Increase in field presence a/ 4,400 9,500 10,700 Callable roster; cross-country lessons learned;

strengthened institutional back-up b/ 600b/ 2,000-3,0000 2,000-3,000

Incentives 150 2,000 2,000 LICUS/PCF Trust Fund Secretariat 150 500 500 Total 5,300 14,000-15,000 15,200-16,200 Source: Regional and non-regional estimates and Human Resources modeling. a/ Of which approximately 40% will be redeployed from Regional budgets in total over the three year period, 55%

redeployment in Africa. b/ Incremental costs in FY07 to establish the callable roster and institutional back up system; and to plan and cost

future work program and staff redeployments. This work will establish full costs for FY08 onwards, which will be determined during the normal budget process and are likely to include significant redeployments.

V. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF A STRENGTHENED ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE

57. Engagement with fragile states is by its nature risky: these are environments that require the highest level of staff energy, creativity, and judgment. Yet it is a strategic priority for the Bank: we need to find a way to effectively support these countries’ leaders and people in achieving successful peace-building and state-building. And as stronger performers graduate from the Bank, fragile states are likely to make up an increasing proportion of IDA’s clients.

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58. Need for Stronger Organizational Response. Neither the Bank nor any other actor has all the answers to successful development programs in fragile states. But we do know that a stronger organizational response makes a difference. Recent empirical evidence demonstrates a strong correlation between supervision and project performance in LICUS. Using IEG data from more than 2000 projects, Collier, Chauvet, and Fuster found that an increase in supervision is significantly more effective in increasing project performance in fragile states than a commensurate increase in non-LICUS countries—but that the Bank’s supervision effort is actually lower in fragile states.29 We also know from country evaluations and staff interviews that staff in the field are best placed to conduct a large proportion of the supervision effort, along with capacity building and dialogue and that experienced TTLs and advisers based in the field or elsewhere are critical in improving performance. Last, we know that many of our strongest staff are unable to provide this support unless they have the institutional back-up and human resource incentives to deliver results. The action plan in this report will not solve all the problems of implementing effective assistance strategies in fragile states; but it will help ensure that our resources are increasingly devoted to the situations where increased field supervision has a disproportionate benefit to improving performance, and that we reward and recognize staff working in the most challenging development environments.

29 Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier, Andreas Fuster, 2006: Supervision and Project Performance: A Principal-Agent

Approach, mimeo available from authors.

ANNEX A. DRAFT OPERATIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED TO OECD-DAC SENIOR LEVEL MEETING – DECEMBER, 2006

26 Annex A

27 Annex A

28 Annex A

29 Annex A

30 Annex A

31 Annex A

ANNEX B. RESULTS FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING PROPOSED REFORMS TO STRENGTHEN ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSE TO FRAGILE STATES

Results Framework Indicators Targets Overall • Development of a guidance note on results in Fragile States • 1 Note by Q4 FY08 Field Presence

• Number of CAS/ISN demonstrating strong harmonsiation and shared results frameworks.

• Sustained improvements of portfolio performance (IEG, QAG ratings from 2002 levels)

• At least 50% within 3 years • Retained at average 2004/05 levels

Incentives • Number of applicants for Fragile States country positions • Number of qualified applicants identified by interview panel

• Baseline survey increase 50% over 3 years • Average of 4 per position by FY09

Institutional Back up system

• Average time from concept to effectiveness • Lessons learned/operational guidance provided

• Reduced from 8.6 months to 4 months by end FY09 • 5 notes per annum

Action Plan Action Timing Responsibility

Objective: Ensure effective communication, implementation and monitoring of reforms Send internal communication on budget, performance contracts and incentives to Networks, Regions and Sectors

Q3 FY07 MDs

Finalize monitoring framework and develop annual report Q4, annually HR, OPCS Review annual report and ensure corrective action taken Q4, annually MDOs Include improved organizational response to fragile states in MOUs with Regions and CMUs/RSUs

FY08 and ongoing MDOs, RVPs

Objective: Increase field presence Appropriate budget allocations agreed for new and newly centralized posts Q3 FY07 SFR Recruitment and deployment completed Q3 FY07 - end FY08 Regions Objective: Establish callable roster and strengthened institutional back-up Appropriate budget allocations agreed for strengthened institutional back-up Q3 FY07 SFR Designate staff in networks responsible for callable registry and other reforms related to Network Council or Sector Board decisions

Q3 FY07 Networks, Sectors

Develop agreed profiles for staff and process for establishment of roster/registration Q4 FY07 Networks, OPCFS and HR support

Agree mechanism to deploy staff across countries and regions in major global emergencies

Q4 FY07 MDOs (OPCS secretariat)

Accredit initial staff in Sectors and Networks Q4 FY07 Networks, OPCFS and HR support

Consolidate and maintain registry FY08 OPCFS Develop training for staff (pilot, then bi-annually) Q1 FY08 OPCFS Designate rapid response teams Q4 FY07 LEG, PR, FM, TFO, HR Establish clearinghouse for country problems Q1 FY08 OPCFS Objective: Improve incentives for staff Establish coordinating committee for upstream recruitment and customization of offers Q4 FY07 HR Agree use of flexible menu approach with Regions Q4 FY07 HR Review promotion criteria to include: (i) service in fragile and non-fragile states; (ii) skills relevant to fragile states

Q4 FY07 Network Councils, Sector Boards, HR

Issue communique on including a question on fragile states in interviews for GH positions in operations

Q4 FY07 HR/Sector Boards

Include approach to performance and results in fragile states in OPE guidelines 2008 OPE guidelines

HR

Establish agreed re-entry/shortlisting process and career counseling system for CMs and senior sector staff in field

Q4 FY07 HR, Regions, Sector boards

Monitor the placement of returning CMs, CDs and senior sector staff FY08 CD/CM network, HR secretariat

Establish action plan to celebrate work of staff in fragile states Q4 FY07 EXT Achieve CM grading in fragile states consistent with non-fragile states/CPCs FY09 HR

ANNEX C. INSTITUTIONAL BACK-UP SYSTEM

OPCS/OPCFS• Corporate strategy and

institutional reforms • Corporate focal point for

external partnerships• CS/OS country support

and coordination of fragile state rapid response

Sectors:• Regular projects and ESW, and

callable surge capacity for situations requiring a rapid response

• Cross-country learning and staff guidance on sectoral issues

Corporate departments (LEG, PR, FM, TFO, safeguards, ACTTF)

• Rapid response teams able to provide fast advice, cross-country precedents and clearances

• Cross-country learning and staff guidelines

Regions:• Field offices• Country strategy and management

of country programs• Regional partnerships on fragility

and conflict

MDs• Oversight (through quarterly meetings) of fragile states response

• Chair of Bank-wide mechanism for corporate emergencies

OPCS/OPCFS• Corporate strategy and

institutional reforms • Corporate focal point for

external partnerships• CS/OS country support

and coordination of fragile state rapid response

Sectors:• Regular projects and ESW, and

callable surge capacity for situations requiring a rapid response

• Cross-country learning and staff guidance on sectoral issues

Corporate departments (LEG, PR, FM, TFO, safeguards, ACTTF)

• Rapid response teams able to provide fast advice, cross-country precedents and clearances

• Cross-country learning and staff guidelines

Regions:• Field offices• Country strategy and management

of country programs• Regional partnerships on fragility

and conflict

MDs• Oversight (through quarterly meetings) of fragile states response

• Chair of Bank-wide mechanism for corporate emergencies

Example of Legal Rapid Response Team

Designated legal team in centre• Steps in only when needed to

resolve legal policy issues or bring cross-regional precedents to bear

• Copies communication to OPCS• Where issues arise repeatedly,

develops staff guidance/training

Designated lawyer(s) in regions for emergencies

• Works to accelerated processing steps and service standards and with knowledge of precedents

• Where clearance/query can be resolved by regional lawyer within time required, regional lawyer does so

Country team• Refers 8.50 legal clearances

and queries to designated regional lawyer for emergencies (not regular country lawyer), cc to team in centre

OPCS• Steps in only when needed to

resolves issues requiring operational policy advice/clearance

• Supports legal in identifying issues with relevance for operational policy and developing staff guidance/training Always occurs

Occurs only when needed

Designated legal team in centre• Steps in only when needed to

resolve legal policy issues or bring cross-regional precedents to bear

• Copies communication to OPCS• Where issues arise repeatedly,

develops staff guidance/training

Designated lawyer(s) in regions for emergencies

• Works to accelerated processing steps and service standards and with knowledge of precedents

• Where clearance/query can be resolved by regional lawyer within time required, regional lawyer does so

Country team• Refers 8.50 legal clearances

and queries to designated regional lawyer for emergencies (not regular country lawyer), cc to team in centre

OPCS• Steps in only when needed to

resolves issues requiring operational policy advice/clearance

• Supports legal in identifying issues with relevance for operational policy and developing staff guidance/training Always occurs


Always occurs


ANNEX D. COST ESTIMATIONS AND EXPLANATION

Estimated Cost (US$ ’000)

Cost Item FY07 FY08 FY09

Increase in Field Presence a/of which: Salary and Benefits b/ Relocation Costs c/

Field Benefits d/

Indirects e/

4,400f/

1,380 1,650

950 420

9,500 f 5,270 520

2,980 730

10,700 f 5,460 1,590 2,970

680 Network Anchors, Corporate Units and FACs of which: Increase in FTE g/ and travel

600

600

2,000-3,000

2,000-3,000

2,000-3,000

2,000-3,000 Incentives h/ of which: Shortened assignments Increased R&R Third country family allowances costed in

Regional budget

150

150

2,000 1,000 1,000

2,000 1,000 1,000

LICUS/PCF Trust Fund Secretariat i/ of which: 5 FTE (50 percent share)

150

150

500

500

500

500 Totalj/ 5,300 14,000-15,000 15,200-16,200

Source: Regional and non-regional estimates and Human Resources modeling. a/ Increase in field presence IRS numbers were identified by individual regions in collaboration with OPCFS. Trades offs and

redeployments identified by the Regions total approximately 40% over the three year period, 55%redeployment in Africa. b/ Salary and Benefits at 100% for all new IRS identified. c/ Relocation in and out (where applicable) over the three year period, as provided by regions. d/ Recurring field benefits, as provided by regions ie COLA, locality premium, etc. e/ Incremental indirects i.e office costs, communications/IT, vehicle maintenance, increase LRS as a result of increase in IRS f/ Evacuation costs not included by the regions in their incremental projections. There may be an impact on evacuation costs, but

this would normally be dealt with as a contingency rather than as part of Regional base budget. Advice received from GSD security that small increases in numbers across regions should be manageable as huge incremental costs are not anticipated as a result of the IRS increases. Office security costs are not included as the IRS increases will not impact current expenditures - note Iraq is not included in these costs.

g/ Most Network Anchors, Central Units and FACs identified the requirement for increased personnel in order to achieve the objectives outlined in the paper - this included sharing the FTE across sectors in Network Anchors and using consultants to ‘backfill’.

h/ Incremental value at $52,500 per staff for relocation and shipping benefits based on shortened assignment periods and enhanced R&R. HR and the LICUS unit identified approximately 12 countries where increased incentives could potentially be applied, based on the conditions on the ground and/or demonstrated recruitment difficulties in the past. This would be applied to all staff in these countries.

i/ Based on projections provided by SDN of five FTE. At the time of the establishment of the LICUS TF, it was decided that the TF would be administered by the PCF Secretariat, using the same processes and procedures as for PCF grants. The underlying rationale was the PCF Secretariat’s established financing mechanism, well-functioning quality control systems, and successful partnership with international organizations, in particular the UN; in addition, combining the two Secretariats would achieve economies of scale. However, the Development Grant Facility (DGF) Council, in its review of the PCF budget for FY07, mandated that DGF funds no longer be used to cross subsidize secretariat services for the LICUS TF. Consequently it was agreed that a cost sharing arrangement of 50-50 between DGF and OPCS would be appropriate reflecting a fair division of labor between the two programs. This would imply a decrease in DGF funding.

j/ Cost of security and facilities will need continued review in light of changing local circumstances.

s w b l -t e in f s - world banksiteresources.worldbank.org/intlicus/resources/388758...cpr conflict...

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