s government memor andum tennessee valley authority · storial itos syst am letdim u to the reprimj...

TVAi4 (S-945) (C

UNITED STATEi

Memor

FROM:

20: :rich .

S DATE

.SUBJECT:

P.WP-5.85)

S GOVERNMENT

andum TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

E. R. Ennis, Plant Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review StaffR-E3A8 C-c

DEC 9 g NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. 1-85-437-WBN

Subject CONCRETE ANCHOR INSTALLATIONS. UNIT 1 & UNIT 2

SConcern No. 11-85-845-001

S and associated recommendations for your action/disposition.

It is requested that you respond to this report and the attached

recommendations by January 2. 1986 . Should you have any questions,

please contact P. K. Howard at telephone 3738-BN .

SRecommend Reportability Determination: Yes Z No

igned

Director, 8NRS/Designee

PKH:JTH Attacment cc (Attachment):

R. P. Denise. LP6135A-C D . . ichols, 310A14--K QTC/BRT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Bric 81Sier, LP6N48A-C U. F. Willis, 112B16 C-K (4)

eeeeee----------------------------------------------------------------------------

To .

Froae

Date:

I

-Copy and Return-

K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, 13A8 C-K

Z hbreby acknowledge receipt of N8R8 Report No. 1-85-437-nll subject COECaETi AUCHOR LI8TALLATIOMS. UNITS 1&2 for aetion/disposition.

I r* i' ' n . I. n . e.-.. .... ,.- naiutbUm ... a4.. Date

&~

TENNESSEE VAL~.LEY AU THO.IATY

NUCLHKR.F S.".F=T Y FEV I EW ST.AFF

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7

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1NVEST T GAT T Ofj PEPOFT NO; -5~-47 -WBN

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L2ONC5ETEe W.H.$ I-~LTCS U~r,4T 1 "'N'D I

V.., Howard

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UNTED IATES GOVERNMENT

-Memorandum TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

o : I. L. sbuaer.ob1i, St r etor, se Dt•sb hIlelr Plant

Mg : K. LU. tt. Dir••or of telser Safety Review Staff, 33A C-K

S m ODEC 10 1985

Trunitted hbwer is us seort go. z-4s-sin-m

Scotnsmo. us s-co mi-t -i

c-egg. : Sa.-.

o wpoI or eorrestive actioa is required for tis reort. It is

being trtn •tte to uI for intorati purposes ely. SIeUl you sm

w questleom. please cstest 3. nc 1 ar_ at eephta meh mtt

-e•mme bity Dte.Wimsties: Te - ...

Attadment a. (ttamtAMM:

o. P. eas. Ls r. J. GriffIn, s 8-10 e. . Kiek, s *. a. siabelos, I Al qewin atts Ien aelaW Plast a. 6. SWai. 3 wIs3 0-K a"e StIer, W6M-84 J. 5. saltrivem a" V. V. Vllis. 33u4 C-9 (4)

SaW

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Mr UnGSTM AIMPM Wniu. 1-454-90-a

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A Ueleer Iafety s viaw Staff (33) nwestiation was conucted to dterala the validity of o- mpresse eaploye eoncern as reselve4 by quality Tehnalegy Caoml (Q•EC)AItplyse suonm Team (W). fTh ereera of reoerW as sUmerit on te ptloyee Concsrn ASlmeSM et equest l'or free QtC adi idRetifled as X8--03M-00. statsd:

"SIoqyI Slectrical senral Forema (k•br) wr roeriamm for intag moQ -astrials Ln Q system, but contiMed to toll his workcl

to do this. Costrucetlo departaat consen. C/I hs no forther nefornMtiol."

urther inforimtiom Ms rlequest from the n follotmp iroup to idmtify Uthe aproexist tim frme to btich the eonserMed itVidual re ferriMa. lTe Lt follemp group itdieated Umt the evaen oteerred semetim

ettmen February 1964 and the present.

Xi. sooP

A. The sCope of this intvstigatio wse 4detrnMia fees the stat ed aowra of rweord to be that of a sitale pseifie tlas rpegarin iWanstilStiton

* An *oletrical geerar for•nea, evn after bein rarimede for dotl so, is co•tinmina to direct his me8nrs to Woe SoAasteriat tol systems.

a. To aeeoplishL tLi invtwtisattlo, l iaterviwed eletrial maitomo persne d miresid m s1 ýmorserts me plnt preet4ure to detoeram the e irwstaftes surrousi the use of sem-QA storial itos syst am letdim u to the reprimJ of I eloetri 8erwal forem, and ether or et this general foesns is entiains to lastrmut th ereft to violat plant prece6u ir to t*s ae.

iRt. IIU 013 F•t3MI I. " Ioonirooto rl mmtimtl A. 0* UlPtremmnts Comitaemst

1. •OCFSO Appe-dll . Criteria VIII. l"Idstitfieoetls M Cotrol of toeritals, Parts ad Compaesat."

3. tOr"O Appeindlta Criteria w, " -Aseeorel usterials. Parts, or Compsnts."

S. WA Tepical • eport WA-1PIS-1. ovilesie .o stN l 11.1.1. "Ientitfetis aM Costrol of IsterIals. Parts, Md a ont."

4. WA Toepeal rapet WA-WI .I1. eslel . Setim 11.3.15 "00o-oafrosM• lterials. Parto, or Coy-mtoi.

* I

I. . adtin s

1. On mIy 9. IM, daurig ma- tnae o solemoid valve 2-WV1-1 U electrical genmral foreme in the Sequoyh Slectrical

eiantamee Section instrueted craft peTomel to use a QA evel pert (diode) wbich did not wve reuired doeumnatioe . thi work ws betag perfoned under mintumee request W A-30061. Solesid valve 2-SV-I-l183- is a critical sttrcture, system, or capeonent as defined by Sequoyab tandard Practice S134, Appndix A. pert III (red. 8).

2. A-300161 stiulated the specific se of tai nasce Instructios 14-.20 (ref. 3) and Nodificatioa md Addittio Instruetise MtI-S (ref. 4). The procedure required. nes othr thiss. that QA p t p i the crispia of the diode. Contrary to these reqirem ts, the general freme istructed crft peremI l t t install the diode without Q inspectitn.

3. WI A-291M vs w ubdmtted ad and wotd ea My 10. 1985 to replace the sea-QA part with a diode havln proper doeimettiom.

4. a Iray 16 195, the subject electrical general fterm given a writt.e forml reprimad tor failina to follow plant

roseedure. It indicated that t r further *etion of this asture ould result in disciplinary actioa up to and i~ludis suspem

stim m oer tertmitlem.

5. Oi or about ry 16 IM5. the *leetriael -inm- se etlee upervisr disCeased the Iraity of tOhe femi' failtr to

fellow procedures and is responsibility to do o. *"d an thi di4seueiom ad the eforal reprirs , the secttio supervisr

se of the opies tha t the foreas eloealy umdrsteed the Sisaificease of his ectio es d amt is apelatd I the future. Ie ectio~ umerviser is set ame of any additimnl lIstance dem tis or amn other eletrical smnerr feoe m bes intrsvted eraft to use nes-q parts i QA systs.

6. Ioe eleetritcl mitomeM se eesti eraft itt supeeiser direetly superie the setioa's electrial genra foreme. 1%r uit superviser en- ded the dissetpl ey ctuon to t)h eetite supervie r fellowin the y .o IM incident. to the

best of the v~. mupervi•sr's Iha edge. he is et mrm of ald does set believeo the eletrical general forem me repriMedd has eeotlmed to nstuct the craft to violate plant

y. t eleotril maiteanoI ce etls to staffed with I eletrical erew form ad apprei•itely 42 jouewnyen eleetricias. laterviea wM ere ndtedt with t of t rew forem fre day

shft, the eveaia shift crw fores, a dwal rate, and the day shift sareal faoem. In addition three eltctrtcitas ere interviemwd froe the day shift sad four eletrieiasM fraM the

evln t shift. These inadvidtls wore selectod at tredes. oeo of the ladividoul intrviewed abd ever beer tinsreted to use soe-Q parts in QA systems nor wee they mar of ray electrieal geeral forema eurretly doiua so.

IV. COgCLUSIONS AID -- IMS

Ieem theoub it u established that a situatiln oaccurre ia •hich craft perseml bad bMn iMatructed to install a QA leel prt without proper domeMntiom sad to proceed with its aistallation to violation of appreed plant proedurem, setiona M taken Imed lately t replace the part and strone action ww taken to discipline the responsible *lectrieal genrsl fornem. Tb diseiplinary setioe appers to bhve bee effective in thit no ridetne of similar falutr to follow plant proceeure by this individual could be found. ihe comern of recrd is not, toreors, substantisted.

MOcuN s mum is IW?"1440 z-05-s1.-s

1. lGU5@, AppoSix 9, rewind as of Juma 7 1, INS*

S. IMA qftUty A..uWumc Topical legalt TWWW2-S-I, Sswition I

S. ~y $00107"a. lustnwties sm24.20. "coat Iivrstles Custel. swim mists

inc Activities-#1 ftvsvioa , 4" a Usoverb 26. 1904

2- mlmstiams -Insaulatio 4am"Oectliou.i Wsovsle0. dated Aest 1. 1*5

51 I 4.2m49 "90 Ity ss~wane, UmuIrems~s. for Oha Distu of below

6. 4.4. WA3 1AM-91476, 11Amisisat eive Cestrete m4 goality £Assuve. for the

Oremtumal Phase of owleow Fewer pmaits.,' dew ed V.um to, 1916

1. B-OUI part u. ""aion 2.1 -via vs~aue. dISe I't11.

S. ftwool@ Balser Plt stmdert Pratle. :j' 1, "Critical sttuw*t. systsms, WA COuORMntes CuC)Lst*, Sevisos 1. detod kost 12, lIm

T VA 440644

,UNI TU STATES GOVERNM¢NT

SMemiorandum L-° "

&'- T_7 *_ ~ "T "

OM :

DATE

SUBIECT:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Craven Crowell, Director of Information, E12A4 C-K

K. V. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

*DEC 12 85 REPORTS SUBNITTAL FOR "NUCEAR SAFET UPDATE"

Attached is one copy each of the following final reports of investigation or evaluation of employee concerns for your use, sumarization, and publication in Nuclear Safety Update. All have been reviewed and accepted by NSRS.

Concern No.

IN-85-018-004

IN-85-189-002

IN-85-281-001

IN-85-373-001

IN-85-615-001

- IN-85-845-0094

IN-86-102-002

IN-86-122-001

Investigation Performed by

NSRS

NSRS

ERT

NSRS

NSRS

NSRS

NSRS

NSRS

Concern No.Investigation Performed by

=^

Attachments

Please acknowledge receipt by signing, copying, and returning this transmittal form to J. T. Huffstetler at E3B37 C-K.

cc: R. P. Denise, LP6N35A-C D. R. Nichols, E1OA14 C-K qrC /ERT, CONST-WBN L. K. Sliger, LP6N48A-C E. R. Ennis, WBN

rn *t * . P n I p

Name

e. - n.. .. IP p.. ".. I n»..I__

*

EMPLOYEE CONCERN DISPOSITION REPORT

CONCERN NO. IN-85-018-004 PAGE 1 OF 2

DATE OF PREPARATION: 12-6-85

CONCERN: SUPERVISION (KNOWN) WOULD NOT FOLLOW CABLE PULLING PROCEDURE. THE WORK PROCEEDED WITHOUT BREACHING PERMITS REQUIRED BY PROCEDURE.

SUMMER 1984.

INVESTIGATION PERFORMED BY: TVA NSRS/ERT

FINDING(S)t CONSTRUCTION AND NUC. POWER WERE PERFORMING BREACHING UTILIZING TWO DIFFERENT TYPE CONTROLLING WORK DOCUMENTS. ONE REQUIRED

BREACHING PERMITS (ATTACHMENT D FORMS) AND THE OTHER ONE (MATERIAL RELEASE) DID NOT. CONSTRUCTION WAS INSTRUCTED IN OCTOBER 1984 TO

PERFORM BREACHING UTILIZING NUC. POWER PROCEDURE PHYSI-2. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INSTRUCTION RESULTED IN NCR NO. W-235-P R/O, AND CAR

WB-CAR-85-24, DATED 4/29/85. BEING ISSUED. CORRECTIVE ACTION TO THE AFOREMENTIONED DOCUMENTS INCLUDES, BOTH NUC PR AND CONSTRUCTION USING

THE SAME BREACHING PROCEDURES, REPAIRING BREACHES, INSPECTION OF ADDITIONAL BREACHES IN VARIOUS BUILDINGS, AND INSTITUTING A CENTRAL TRACKING GROUP.

ALTHOUGH THE CORRECTIVE ACTION TO CAR WB-CAR-S8i-24 STATES THAT:

MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE IS REVISITING ASSEMBLIES, IDENTIFYING DEFICIENCIES, GENERATING CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE REQUESTS, AND REPAIRING AS NECESSARY ALL ASSEMBLIES IDENTIFIED BY THE SI WALKDOWN! ERT COULD NOT VERIFY THE STATUS OF ALL PREVIOUS AND PRESENT BREACHING ACTIVITIES WITHOUT PERFORMING INSPECTIONS TO INCLUDE EACH ELEVATION OF EACH

BUILDING THROUGHOUT THE PLANT. THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE

THAT BREALHING WAS PERFORMED WITH NO TIE IN TO A CONTROLLING WORK DOCUMLNT.

CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)i ALL CONSTRUCTION BREACHING PERMITS ARE NOW BEING HANDLED BY OC»S NUCLEAR SERVICES BRANCH UNDER STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 42 WHICH WAS SPECIFICALLY WRITTEN TO CONTROL THIS PROBLEM.

IN ADDITION, ALl PERSONNEL INVOLVED WITH THE REQUEST AND PREPARATION OF WORK RELEASES, MAINTENANCE REQUESTS, AND ATTACHMENT Da HAVE BEEN

INSTRUCTED IN THE USE OF THESE FORMS, THE IMPORTANCE OF PREPLANNING MODIFICATION ACTIVITY, AND THE LIMITATIONS ON OPEN BREACHES.

ERT Form 0



-DATE OF PREPARATION: 12-6-85

CORRECTIVE ACTION(S): CONT.

FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER PERMITS, ALL BREACHINGS WILL BE PERFORMED BY THE MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE SECTION.

IN ADDITION, NUC PR WILL REVIEW NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS SUCH AS CONTROL BUILDING AND INTERIM ABSCE BOUNDARIES, AND DETERMINE IF RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BREACHES ALLOWED AT ANY ONE TIME AND IMPLEMENT THIS RESTRAINT.

NUC PR HAS SCHEDULED ADDITIONAL SI WALKDOWNS TO DETECT AND RESEAL UNDOCUMENTED BREACHES. IN ADDITION, CLOSE COORDINATION WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR SERVICES BRANCH AND THE MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE SECTION TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF DUPLICATE BREACHES.

CLOSURE STATEMENT: THIS CONCERN WAS SUBSTANTIATED.

ERT Form 0


CONCERN NO. IN-85-189-002


CONCERN: Valves located in WBN No. 2 South Valve Room are very congested and inaccessible. Only a small person would be able to get to them. CI stated one examole is drain valve on main steam system in South Valve Room No. 2. CI would not provide any additional details.

INVESTIGATION PERFORMED BY: TVA NSRS

FINDING(S):

Based on the documentation reviewed, examination of the Units 1 and 2 South Valve Rooms and interviews with OE and NUC PR personnel, the following specific findings were identified.

A. No OE procedure specifically addressed equipment placement for maintenance and operational accessibility requirements.

B. Hazard Control Instruction - HCI-613 - was issued by the WBN site organization on October 19, 1981 to identify and correct access problems regarding the following.

1. "Areas of equipment where access could riot gained without creating an unsafe condition such as valves located ire overhead, on top of tanks, etc."

2. "Equipment that did not have sufficient clearance for operating or performing maintenance such as valves, motors, pumps, etc."

Plant representatives from each section identified and located plant equipment requiring access modifications. These survey sheets were then forwarded to OE personnel who sent review teams to the WBN site for evaluation and corrective action.

C. The OE review-team effort for equipment accessibility evaluation was an ongoing process from 1980 to 1983 but appeared to have been halted from 1983 until mid-1985 when it was revived by OE. NUC PR initial evaluation had been completed for all areas of the plant (which included the Units I and 2 South Valve Rooms); however, the EN DES review-team effort had not been c:rpleted.

ERT Form Q

EMPLOYEE CONCERN DISPOSITION 1EPORT

CONCERN NO. IN-85-189-002 Page 2 of 2


D. An inspection of the Units 1 and 2 South Valve Rooms was performed by NSAS. Various electrical control panels and valve operators were observed for congestion and accessibility. No v-ilves were found to be totally inaccessible; however, several local electrical control panels required climbing over structural-steel members in place for access. Manual handwheels for steam generator wet layup valves (System 41) were also difficult to reach; however, both the panel controls and manual valves would be operated infrequently with the steam generator wet layuo valves normally being operated only during unit shutdown conditions. Controls required for operation during emergency operations (e.g., main-steam atmospheric relief valves and auxiliary feedwater valves) appeared to be adequately accessible from permanent ladders and catwalks.

CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

An assessment program was in place and being implemented by OE and the

WBN site organizations to identify and correct access problems. Although the assessments had not been completed by OE for Unit 2, the Unit 1 equipment had been evaluated previously, and the accessibility reviews were a ongoing process for Unit 2 equipment.

CLOSURE STATEMENT:

The concern is true; however, although the areas referenced by the concern were congested with equipment, the safety-related components observed by NSRS did not appear to bw functionally impaired by their locations. Several nonsafety-related electrical panels 4nd valves were extremely hard to access; however, this equipment would be operated locally on an infrequent basis, and the manual valves (System 41) would be operated locally during shutdown conditions only.

ERT Form Q




CONCERN: Instrumentation to monitor H20 from the diffuser (holding pond) to river is poorly located and inoperable. Affects both units.

INVESTIGATION PERFORMED BY: ERT

FINDING(S):

1. A review of drawings 47W831-1 and 17W303-4 show the location of flow element FE-27-98 in a 66" fiberglass Fipe which is surrounded by a 72" corrugated metal pipe.

2. The transmitter for the flow element FT-27-98 is located 48" aoove the annubar in the manhole A.

3. Manhole A has been flooded with water several times. The flow transmitter FT-27-98 and RTD TT-27-99 are not designed to function when submerged.

ZORRECTIVE ACTION(S) NCRs W-250-P Lnd W-251-P were issued to correct these problems.

CLOSURE STATEMENT: This concern was substantiated.

ERT Form 0

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Page 1 of 2

DAtE OF PREPARATION: 11-22-85

LCNCERNs D&eaged cable in Reactor Building II Rod Drive Control Calinet. Cable size is A.W.G. 1/0 or 2/0 located in Auxiliary Build.ng elevation 772' about 3' from E.nd of cable.


FINDING(S): NSRS inspected the cabling internal to the Rod Drive Control Cabinets in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 for signs of damage. The following conditions were identified:

Unit 1 Rod Drive Control Cabinet Internal Cabling - In panels 1-PNL-85-L118 and 1-PNL-85-L119 the outer sheath o'e the cable which enters into the rear upper left of the cabiret is wrinkled. It appears that this is due to excessive cable bend. Cable is a 3 conductor, 440 Volt, AC power cable.

Unit 2 Rod Drive Control Cabinet I.ternal fabling - The same conditions and cable as described in A above in ..nel 2-PNL-85-L118 appears to liave excessive bend. In addi4' ., janel 2-PNL-85-L120 has two cables which have ctts in their outer sheaths approximately 3' from the end. These cables are AWS 1/0, they enter the top center of the cabinets and are routed down the left side of the cabinet to the NEUTRAL bus.

Upon reqvest by NSRS, the OC Electrical QC unit inspected each specific problem that was identified. Results of the inspections are as follower

For p;nels 1-PNL-85-L118 and 1-PNL-L119, the cables in question appear to be manufacturer's supplied internal wiring. There are no TVA identification tags on either the cables or the conduits through which they ar, routed. The actual measured, installed bend radius is greater than th' minimum "training radius" required for a 6 AWG conductor, the size of tiv individual conductors.

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ICERN NO. IN-85-373-001


SCONCERN NO. IN-85-373-001 Page 2 of 2

DATL OF PREPARATION: 11-22-85

FINDING(S): cont. A 3- and 4-inch radius (6- and 8-inch circle) was measured, while the minimum: requirement is a 2-inch radius (4-inch circle). The outer

jacket on this caole is wrinkled, however it is the QC unit's opinion that no corrective action is required.

For panel 2-PNL-85-L118, tte wiring is again manufacturer's installed internal cabling which do not have excessive bend radii. The inspectors also- looked very carefully at the 1/0 AWG cable in panel 2-PN"85-L120.- The "cuts" were scraoed areas on the outer jacket but were not aQp9p enough to penetrate the jacket. There is no danger of moisture penetrat ing and no evidence of internal conductor damage. Therefore, OC feels that jacket repair is not necessary or advised.

CORRECTIVE ACTION(S) None required

CLOSURE STATEMENT: This concern was substantiated in that scraoes were found in cable outer jackets of two cables, however, the scraped areas were cornidered acceptable.

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CONCERNs Access to some valves and electrical control panels is obstructed by the congestion of other equipment (e.g., Soulth Valve Room Unit 2).


FINDING(S): Based on the documentation reviewed, examination of the Units 1 and 2 South Valve Rooms and interviews with OE and NUC PR personnel, th2 followi.ig specific findings were identified.

A. No OE procedure specifically addressed equipment placement for maintenance and operational accessibility requirements.

B. Hazard Control Instruction - HCI-G13 - was issued by the WBN site organization on October 19, 1981 to identify and correct access problems regarding the following.

1. "Areas of equipment where access could not gained without creating an unsafe condition such as valves located in overhead, on top of tanks, etc."

2. "Equipment that did not have sufficient clearance for operating or performing maintenance such as valves, motors, pumps, etc."

Plant representatives from each section identified and located plant equipment requiring access modifications. These survey sheets were then forwarded to OE personnel who sent review teams to the WBN site for evaluation and corrective action.

C. The OE review-team effort for equipment accessibility evaluation

was an ongoing process from 1980 to 1983 but appeared to have beer

halted from 1983 until mid-19R5 when it was revived hy OE. NUC PR

initial evaluation had been completed for all areas of the plant ;which included the Units 1 and 2 'outh Valve Rooms); however, the EN DES review-team effort had not been completed.

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D. An inspection of the Units 1 and 2 Soutr Valve Rooms was performed by NSRS. Various electrical c6ntrol panels and valve operators were observed for congestion and accessibility. No valves were found to be totally inaccessible; however, several local electrical control panels required climbing over structural-steel members in place for access. Manual handwheels for steam generator wet layup valves (System 4i) were also difficult to reach; however, both the panel controls and mnanual valves woula be operated infrequently with the steam generator wet layup valves normally being operated only during unit shutdown conditions. Controls required for operation during -emergency operations (e.g., main-steam atmospheric relief valves and auxiliary feedwater" valves) appeared to be adequately accessible from permanent ladders and catwalks.

CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

An assessment program was in place and being implemented by OE and the WSN site organizations to identify and correct access problems. Although the assessments had not been completed by OE for Unit 2, the Unit 1 equipment had been evaluated previously, and the accessibility reviews were an ongoing process for Unit 2 equipment.

CLOSURE STATEMENT:

The concern is true; however, although the areas referenced by the concern were congested with equipment, the safety-related components observed by NSRS old not appear to be functionally impaired by their locations. Several Aonsafety-related electrical panels and valves were extremely hard to access; however, this equipment would be operated locally on an on an infrequent basis, and the manual valvet (System 41) would be operated local'y duing shutdown conditions only.

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CONCERN: WELDING OF DISSIMILAR METALS. SAMPLING SYSTEM (43) CONTAINS STAINLESS STEEL TO ALUMINUM WELDS. NO DI-ELECTRIC TEFLON COATED UNION INSTALLED. UNIT 1. LOCATION: HOT SAMPLE ROOMS. ELEVATION 713' -0"

A6&W LINE.


FINDING(S): A VISUAL INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED ON ALL TUBING/PIPING OF THE SAMPLING SYSTEM (43) LOCATED IN THE HOT SAMPLING ROOM. 9SSFNTIALLY ALL CONNECTIONS WERE ACCOMPLISHED UTILIZING COMPRESSION FITTINGS IN LIEU OF WELDING. THE FEW WELDED CONNECTIONS WERE CONFIRMED TO BE STAINLESS STEEL TO STAINLESS STEEL BY PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND THROUGH WELD RECORD REVIEW. REVIEW OF GENERAL CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATION G-29H REVEALED THAT NO PROCESSES WERE IDENTIFIED WHICH INVOLVED THE _USE OF DI-ELECTRIC COUPLINGS. A REVIEW OF THE PROCEDURE HANDBOOK OF ARC WELDING, IN ADDITION TO INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONNEL KNOULEDGEABLE IN METALLURGICAL PROCESS, INDICATED THAT THE THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY AND MELTING POINT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISSIMILAR METALS WOULD PREVENT THE SUCCESSFUL FUSION OF THE METALS TO ACCOMPLISH A WELD THAT WOULD REMAIN INTACT.

REVIEW OF THE TVA CONTRACT SPECIFICATION 83574 INDICATED THAT ALL TUBING SUPPLIED FOR USE IN VENDOR-SUPPLIED COMPONENTS LOCATED IN THE SYSTEM (43) IN THE HOT SAMPLE ROOM WOULD BE A3ME SA-213, TYPE 316, STAINLESS STEEL. NSRS COULD FIND NO INDICATION THAT ANY ALUMINUM MATERIAL WAS UTILIZED IN THE AREA.

CORRECTIVE ACTION(S): NONE REQUIRED

CLOSURE STATEMENT: THIS CONCERN WAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED.

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CONCERN: CRACKS WERE NOTED IN WF 33 BEAM. CI IS UNSURE IF THESE

CRACKS WERE EVER FIXED. BEAN LOCATION IS BETWEEN 0 DEGREES AND 337

DEGREES 30' AT ELEVATION 723', UNIT 1 REACTOR BUILDING. (APPROXIMATELY

37' RADIUS). STANDING AT 0 DEGREES RADIAL AND LOOKING TOWARD STEAM

GENERATOR *4, ONE WOULD BE LOOKING AT THE WF IN QUESTION.


FINDING(S): AN NCR (2257R) DATED APRIL 14, 1980, WAS ISSUED TO ADDRESS

CRACKS IN OUTER FLANGES OF W33X240 STEAM GENERATOR LOWER SUPPORTS.

DISPOSITZON WAS INVESTIGATED, REPAIRS MADE, AND THE NCR WAS RELEASED

FROM NONCONFORMING DISPOSITION ON FEBRUARY 26, 1981.

THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS GENERATED BY NCR 2257R, IT WAS

DETERMINED BY ENGINEERING DESIGN (EN DES) THAT THE MAXIMUM DEPTH OF THE

INDICATIONS WAS 1/8" TO 3/16" AND EN DES FOUND THEM TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO

USE AS IS (REFERENCE MEMO SWP 810107 060).

SUBSEQUENTLY ECN 3255 WAS ISSUED TO REQUIRE ADDITIONAL STIFFENER PLATES TO BE ADDED TO THE BEAMS. MAGNETIC PARTICLE INSPECTION IDENTIFIED LAPS

-AND SEAMS IN THE WELD AREA WHERE THE ADDED STIFFENER PLATES WERE TO BE INSTALLED. THE AREA EXTENDING TWO TIMES (2X) THE WELD SIZE IN ALL

DIRECTIONS FROM THE EDGE OF THE STIFFENER PLATE WELD WAS INSPECTED,AND ALL INDICATIONS UP TO 1/16" WERE REMOVED AND REWELDED. INDICATIONS

FOUND OUTSIDE OF THE WELD AREA REQUIRED NO REMEDIAL ACTION AND WERE

DISPOSITIONED USE AS IS.

THE NSRS INVESTIGATOR AND THE CONSTRUCTION QUALITY CONTROL MANAGER

OBSERVED THE NO. 4 STEAM GENERATOR LATERAL SUPPORTS ON UNIT I AND SAW

NO OBVIOUS INDICATION OF CRACKING ON THE WF 33 BEAM. ADJACENT WF 33

BRANS ON THE NK3SA LOOP 4 SUPPORTS WERE ALSO OBSERVED WITH THE SAME

RESULT. HOWEVER. THESE OBSERVATIONS WERE NOT CONSIDERED CONCLUSIVE

BECAUSE ALL OF THESE BEAMS WERE PAINTED.

*

CORRECTIVE ACTION(S): NONE REQUIRED

CLOSURE STATEMENT: THIS CONCERN WAS SUBSTANTIATED BY EVIDENCE OF

CRACKING IN THE WF 33 WEB AREAS AS IDENTIFIED IN NCR 2257R. HOWEVER, VERIFICATION WAS MADE THAT THESE CRACKS WERE REMOVED, REWELDED, AND

INSPECTED BY VISUAL AND NDE METHODS.

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CONCERN: CONDUIT MC 846A IS RUN INTO OPEN J.B. 1220 AND HAS NO PHYSI-2, ATTACHMENT D FORM FILLED OUT. LOCATION ELEVATION 737 BETWEEN A14&R AND A9&Q. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. UNIT 1, NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN, TIME FRAME CURRENT.


FINDING(S):

A. JUNCTION BOX 1220 AND CONDUIT MC 846A WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED BY NSRS. THE JUNCTION BOX NETAL COVER WAS FOUND TO BE INSTALLED WITH NO FIRE BARRIER INSULATION COVERING. THE CONDUIT EAS FIRE WRAPPED ALONG ITS ENTIRE LENGTH WITH THE WRAP TERNINATING AT THE JUNCTION BOX.

B. NSRS REVIEWED APPLICABLE CONDUIT AND GROUNDING DRAWINGS (45W826 SERIES), WHICH WERE ANNOTATED WITH NOTES INDICATING WHERa FIRE WRAP WAS REQUIRED. REVIEW OF THESE DRAWINGS INDICATED THAT CONDUIT 846A REQUIRED FIRE WRAP UP TO J.B. 1220. NO REQUIREMENTS FOR J.B. 1220 TO BE FIRE WRAPPED WERE FOUND.

C. WBN SITE PERSONNEL CONTACTED STATED THAT NO REQUIREMENTS TO INSULATE J.B. 1220 WITH FIRE INSULATION WERE INDICATED FROM THEIR EXAMINATION OF THE CONDUIT AND GROUNDING DRAUINGS.

D. OE PERSONNEL CONTACTED PROVIDED THE FOLLOWYNG INFOPMATION.

1. J.B. 1220 AND ASSOCIATED CONDUITS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED BY OE FOR CABLE SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS.

2. CONDUITS ROUTED TO J.B. 1220 EITHER MET THE 20-FOOT SEPARATION CRITERION FOR INTERDIVISIONAL INTERACTIONS OR THE REDUNDANT COMPONENTS HAD BEEN FIRE WRAPPED TO MEET REQUIREMENTS.

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1 * *

. .. *


PAGE 2 OF 2CONCERN NO. IN-86-102-002

DATE OF PREPARATIONs 12-6-85

FINDING(S)s CONT.

3. J.B. 1220 WAS NOT AN I1TERCONNECTING JUNCTION BOX WHICH WOULD

HAVE REQUIRED 3-M FIRE BARRIER MATERIAL TO BE INSTALLED OVER

THE BOX.

E. NSRS REVIEWED WBN - PHYSICAL SECURITY INSTRUCTION 2 (PHYSIC-C), "FIRE PROTECTION PLka," SECTION III, WHTCH SPECIFIED THE CONTROL OF

COMBUSTIBLES INCLUDING BREACHING OF FIRE BARRIERS. THIS PROCEDURE

APPLIED TO FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES CONSISTING OF CABLE-PENETRATION

BARRIERS, FIRE DOORS, FIRE DAMPERS, PIPING RUNS, AND FIRE-RESISTANT

CABLE WRAPS. IT DID NOT ADDRESS CONDUITS WHICH WERE NOT REQUIRED TO BE

FIRE WRAPPED. NO PROVISIONS WERE FOUND TO EXIST WHICH WOULD HAVE

REQUIRED A PHYSI-2, ATTACHMENT D, FOR J.B. 1220.

CORRECTIVE ACTION(S) NONE REQUIRED

CLOSURE STATEMENTs THIS CONCERN WAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED.

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