s. gülden ayman turkey’s foreign policy role: conceptions ... · s. gÜlden ayman is associate...

Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali n. 14 Maggio 201142

dossier I nuovi poli regionali

Turkey’s increasing economic, political and diplomatic activism in the Mid-dle East in recent years has drawn the attention of the international communi-ty. While Turkey is greeted as a rising regional power by some, its increasing in-volvement in the region also triggered a debate on whether Turkey has loosenedits ties with the West and turned its attention to the East instead.

This article aims at delineating major drivers and core components ofTurkey’s activism in the region, analyzing the mind-set of the key decision-mak-ers and discussing the factors that might impede Turkey’s foreign policy per-formance in the Middle East. The article argues that what characterizes Turkey’scurrent activism is far broader in its content than a simple change of attitude. Itinvolves an alteration of perception of the Middle East in close relationship withthe self-comprehension of the Turkish state that paves the way to a different ap-proach to Turkey’s relations with the Middle East as well bringing a new under-standing of its relations with the West.

External Stimulus

The American invasion of Iraq prompted Turkey’s new focus on the Middle East. Although Turkish leaders had no sympathy for Saddam Hussein,they feared that his removal would lead to the fragmentation of Iraq, encour-age Kurdish nationalism and reinforce separatist pressures among Turkey’sown Kurdish population. Indeed, after the American invasion the Kurdishdrive for autonomy govined momentum. Moreover, the reluctance of theUnited States to assist Turkey militarily to eliminate the terrorist threat posedby the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) not only caused a growing sense offrustration and bitterness in Ankara, but it also increased skepticism about theintentions of the US in the region. It was not easy at all for Turkey to adapt tolive with a super power stationed in its neighborhood. The power imbalancebetween the two states limited Turkish options. Nevertheless, Turkey exploredall diplomatic means at its disposal to persuade the US not to disregardTurkish concerns. However, that did not prevent Turkey from taking someprecautions against a possible spill over of separatist pressures that poses athreat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. Turkish desire to improve bilateral rela-tions with regional actors was welcomed in Syria and in Iran, and offered these

Turkey’s Foreign Policy Role: Conceptions and Performance in the Middle EastS. GÜLDEN AYMAN is Associate Professor of International Relations,Marmara University,Department of PoliticalScience and InternationalRelations, Istanbul

S. Gülden Ayman

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Turkey’s Foreign Policy Role: Conceptions and Performance in the Middle East

states the opportunity to break their isolation and empower themselves vis-à-vis the US.

Turkey’s Strengthening Ties with Syria and Iran

Until the late 1990’s, the relations between Turkey and Syria were strained asa result of Syrian support for the PKK, the water dispute over Euphrates River,and Syrian territorial claims in Hatay. The normalization of Turkish-Syrian re-lations began in 1998, after Syria expelled PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The twocountries relations improved significantly after 2002 and, two years later, for thefirst time a Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, paid visit to Turkey after morethan half a century. Turkish-Syrian military cooperation was further strength-ened by officers’ exchange visits and a joint exercise in 2009. Turkey also agreedto provide training for the Syrian army following a high-level bilateral militarydialogue held in Damascus in December 20101.

Turkey not only provided Damascus with an opening to the outside world, italso facilitated indirect talks between Israel and Syria. As a consequence of Is-rael’s offensive against Hamas in Gaza in late 2008, talks collapsed and Turkeyfelt betrayed by Israel2. Ankara’s relations with Jerusalem soured; Turkish PrimeMinister Tayyip Erdogan became Israel’s most vocal critic, while Turkey’s rela-tions with Syria and Iran continued to improve. In 2009, the Ankara-DamascusCooperation Council met twice, in Aleppo and Gaziantep, on the same day asthe two countries symbolically abolished the border and lifted visa requirementsfor their respective citizens. During the second ministerial-level meeting of theHigh-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2010 in the Syrian port city ofLatakia, the two countries agreed to enhance the existing framework of their se-curity cooperation arrangement3. The latest meeting between Erdogan and As-sad on February 2011, in the Northern Syrian city of Aleppo, focused largely onthe inauguration of the “friendship dam”, straddling the Syria-Turkey border, tobe built jointly. Turkey and Syria continue to co-operate on projects like thebuilding of a high-speed rail line between the two countries, establishing a jointTurkish-Syrian bank, and linking the countries’ natural gas networks4.

In the last decade, relations between Turkey and Iran – which also used tosupport PKK – have also improved dramatically. On the security field, the twocountries have agreed to cooperate against terrorist organizations in the region,started sharing intelligence and coordinating military operations against thePKK and its Iranian affiliate, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). Turkey and

1 Turkey-Syria-Turkish Army to Train Syrian Army, in «The Journal of Turkish Weekly», January 31, 2011,http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/111461/turkey-syria-turkish-army-to-train-syrian-army.html.

2 A. BEN-MEIR, Turkey Felt Betrayed by Israel, in «Jerusalem Post», December 31, 2010.3 Turkey, Syria Vow Cooperation Will Repel Terrorism, in «Today’s Zaman», October 4, 2010, http://www.to-

dayszaman.com/news-223399-102-turkey-syria-vow-cooperation-will-repel-terrorism-in-the-region.html.

4 Turkey Starts Building “Friendship Dam” with Syria, «Dünya Online», February 2, 2011, http://www.dun-ya.com/turkey-starts-building-friendship-dam-with-syria_113560_haber.html.



Iran first signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security cooper-ation on July 29, 2004. This agreement was reinforced on April 17, 2008, by anew MOU which foresaw the broadening and deepening of security cooperationframework between the two countries5.

Over the past years, Turkey and Iran have gradually increased their coopera-tion in economic and energy fields, deepening their relationship through grow-ing trade and bilateral investment. Despite the economic sanctions wanted bythe United States and the UN – intended to halt international investment inIran’s energy sector – Turkey considered the possibility of building a pipelinethat would deliver Iranian gas across Turkey to Europe (Nabucco Project). Dur-ing Ahmadinejad’s official visit to Turkey in 2008, the two countries signed fivememorandums of understanding on security cooperation, combating organizedcrime, economic cooperation, and education6. In 2009, Iran and Turkey alsosigned a memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation on air, land,and sea transportation as part of an effort to raise the two countries’ bilateraltrade. Turkey now aims at increasing trade exchange with Iran from $10,6 bil-lion to $30 billion7.

New Foreign Policy Vision

Undoubtedly, the American invasion of Iraq forced Turkey to focus primarilyon the Middle East. However, the substantial changes in the Turkish foreign pol-icy agenda, especially those that became more visible in the post 2007 period,could not be easily understood without examining the new foreign policy visionof the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: AKP). Thisnew vision does not only include the rapprochement with Iran and Syria, it alsocomprises an attempt re-conceptualize the region, its people, its past and future.

Turkey’s Place in the WorldTurkey’s new activism in the Middle East represents an important departure

from the traditional foreign policy attitude that preached non-involvement inregional affairs as long as national interests were not at stake. Turkish foreignpolicy elite assumed that a deeper involvement into the Middle East could even-tually drag Turkey into regional conflicts, or provoke negative reactions from thestates of the region either because of historical sensitivities or as a result of re-gional rivalries. It was also presupposed that Western allies would not like to seeTurkey having its own autonomous political agenda in the Middle East. Lastly,it was not believed that Turkey had enough resources to influence Middle East-ern politics.

5 G. JENKINS, Turkey and Iran Expected to Boost Security Cooperation, in «Eurasia Daily Monitor», April14, 2008, 5, 70, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33547.

6 N. GÜNGÖR, Ahmedinejad’s Visit to Turkey, «SETA Policy Brief», n. 23, September 2008,www.setav.org/Ups/dosya/7428.pdf.

7 Iran trade woes internal, says Turkish President Abdullah Gül, in «Hurriyet Daily News», February 14, 2011,http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n= gul-iranian-policy-biggest-obstacle-to-strengthen-eco-nomic-ties-2011-02-14.




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The two concepts, which are fre-quently stressed by current Turkishleadership to demonstrate how theirpractices differ from foreign policybehavior of previous governments,are “multidimensional” and “pro-ac-tive foreign policy”. In fact, a multidimensional, pro-active foreign policy was al-so defended by the Foreign Minister of the 1999-2002 Coalition Government,I.smail Cem. However, this new foreign policy vision did not involve a dramatic

change in Turkish self-perception and aspirations in international affairs8.The well-known academic and architect of the new Turkish foreign policy vi-

sion, Professor Ahmet Davutoglu defines Turkey as «a central country that oc-cupies a unique geographical space with multiple regional identities that en-hances its influence in the neighboring regions»9. The uniqueness of his analysisdoes not stem from the emphasis on the geo-strategic importance of Turkey, butfrom his understanding of Turkey’s historical background and cultural potentialand how these are taken into consideration as the most important sources tocomplement its geographic advantages. What is striking is his definition of theTurkish state as the «successor state of the Ottoman Empire that has responsi-bilities toward neighboring regions». As opposed to the conventional view,which sees the Ottoman Era as a period of obscurantism and stagnation, hestresses the Empire’s extraordinary capacity to embrace diverse peoples, whileshowing respect for distinct cultures and religions which constitute a solid basefor Turkey to become a major player in regional and global affairs10.

Quest for a Just World Order through Regional Orders

In Davutoglu’s perspective, today the need to design a “just” and “inclusive”global order cannot be separated from the question on how to reform and re-structure regional orders, considering that without regional or sub-regional or-ders there cannot be a global order11. In his view, Turkey should be «among thecountries that will lay the foundations of this order». The concept of “rhythmicdiplomacy”, which was introduced by Davutoglu, implies assuming more activeroles in international organizations on all issues of global and international im-portance. Whenever conditions are ripe, it is suggested to go beyond mere mem-bership, and work toward the redefinition of the global economic and financialinstitutions or the very basis of the international order. In this vein, Turkey’s

8 I.. CEM, Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya: Strateji, Yunanistan, Kıbrıs (Turkey, Europe, Eurasia: Strategy, Greece and

Cyprus) I.stanbul 2005 and Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya: Avrupa’nın “Birligi” ve Türkiye (Turkey, Europe,

Eurasia: “Union” of Europe and Turkey), I.stanbul 2005.

9 A. DAVUTOGLU, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Vision, in «Insight Turkey», 10, 1, 2008, p. 78.10 A. DAVUTOGLU, Turkish Vision of Regional and Global Order: Theoretical Background and Practical Im-

plications, in «Political Reflection», 1, 2, 2010, pp. 36-51.11 New FM Davutoglu to build order-instituting role for Turkey, in «Today’s Zaman», May 4, 2009,

http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=174284.

Turkey’s new activism in the Middle East represents an important departure from the traditional foreignpolicy attitude that preached non-involvement in regional affairs as long as national interests were not at stake



non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council as well as in many in-ternational and European institutions has been regarded as an important asset12.

When Turkey assumes a role in the remaking of the global order, it is ex-pected to distinguish itself from other powers by emphasizing moral and ethicalconcerns13. In Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan words:

We considered the pain of the people of Iraq, of the Afghan people and Pak-istan as the pain of ourselves. When any organ of a body feels pain, the wholebody feels pain. Likewise, when children in Gaza were massacred, we felt theirpain as if our own children went through a massacre. Jerusalem’s problem isour problem. Gaza’s problem is our problem. We defend justice for all regard-less of their language, religion or skin color14.

Turkey’s engagement with Africa and underdeveloped countries is an impor-tant aspect of this approach. The Turkish government declared 2005 the “Africa’sYear”, and nearly 50 African leaders attended to the Turkey-sponsored Africasummit in 2008. Turkey is becoming more active in Africa by opening new em-bassies, increasing economic visits and signing new agreements with Africancountries15. Turkey is opening new embassies in Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad,Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea, Cameroon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozam-bique, Niger, Uganda, Zambia as well as a consulate general in Sudan16.

In dealing with regional order and responding to several regional questions,Davutoglu underlines four principles that guide Turkish foreign policy. The firstone is the need to secure Turkey’s neighborhood. As he explains, Turkey shouldre-engage all neighboring areas and look at neighboring regions through a com-mon security perspective. Secondly, in order to solve regional problems, alldiplomatic means should be employed. Thirdly, economic interdependency isconsidered as the best instrument of peace. And fourthly, multi-cultural, multi-sectarian coexistence not only perceived as an accomplishable goal, but also aprerequisite to establish peace17.

12 For Davutoglu, these developments show a new perspective of Turkey, one that is based on vision, softpower, a universal language, and implementation of consistent foreign policies in different parts of theworld. A. DAVUTOGLU, Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, in «Foreign Policy», May 20, 2010,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy.

13 Address by H.E. Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, at the Open-ing of the Conference of Ambassadors, January 3, 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-hmet-davutoglu_nun-3_-buyukelciler-konferansi_nun-acilisinda-yaptigi-konusma_-03-ocak-2011.tr.mfa.

14 Erdogan: Stronger Turk-Arab ties needed for stability, in «TrDefense», January 11, 2011, http://www.trde-fence.com/2011/01/11/erdogan-stronger-turk-arab-ties-needed-for-stability/.

15 M. ÖZKAN, Turkey Discovers Africa: Implications and Prospects, «SETA Policy Brief», n. 22, September2008, http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/7417.pdf.

16 Turkey to open 14 new embassies in Africa continent, in «Today’s Zaman», July 22, 2009, http://www.to-dayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=60FF534B4D67CAC0FEF C2E16CBB191B5?newsId=181682.

17 A. DAVUTOGLU, Turkish Vision of Regional and Global Order, cit.




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Common Destiny, Common History, Common Future

Turkey’s quest and efforts to contribute to regional orders include all neigh-boring regions, but the Middle East has a particular emotional relevance for his-torical, cultural and religious reasons. In Turkey’s new foreign policy vision,what is underlined in regards to Turkey and other Muslim countries – beyondtheir historical, cultural affinities – is how they share the same fate and the samefuture: “they come from the very same civilization” and “they had fought warsagainst the same enemies”. This vision includes all Muslim nations, but it givesparticular emphasis on Turks and Arabs “who were obliged to get separated”. Er-dogan describes Turkey’s bonds with the Arab world by stating that «A Turkcannot live without an Arab. An Arab is the Turk’s left eye, his right eye»18.

Turkish leaders’ rhetoric, while itcarefully avoids a detailed explanationof the history of Turkish-Arab rela-tions, often highlights external actors’discomfort caused by the strengthen-ing of the relations between Turks and Arabs. Erdogan warns both peoplesagainst being separated again and falling into discords, to leave aside «artificialdiscussions of the past and a history based on lies».

For a century, Turkey and the Arab world have been far from each other dueto such ill-intentioned propaganda. France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and theUnited States all make investments in the Arab world and vice versa. Yet, whenit comes to Turkey’s investments in the Arab world and this world’s invest-ments in Turkey, certain dirty hands try to hurt the process by a dirty propa-ganda19.

Within the context of the “zero problems policy”, Turkey aimed at achievingmaximum cooperation and minimum problems with its neighbors. This policyis motivated by a desire to reproduce the historical integration of the region. Toease possible Arab anxiety, Turkish leaders feel the necessity to stress that Turkeyis not pursuing imperial, or what some call “neo-Ottoman”, policies. Instead, itrespects the sovereignty of nation-states and has no desire to reign over othernations.

The regional integration efforts launched by Turkey involve growing numberof high-level visits and cooperation pacts being signed on a variety of issuesranging from culture to security, in such a way that reminds of those that tookplace in Europe in the post-World War II era and that ultimately laid the foun-dations of today’s European Union. In fact, lifting visa obligations facilitating

18 Y.P. DOGAN, Arab Academics: Turks’ Return to Middle East Anticipated Development, in «Today’s Za-man», June 20, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load= detay&link=213639.

19 Turkish Premier Delivers a Speech at Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum, in «Turkishpress.com», October6, 2010, www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352749.

Turkey’s quest and efforts to contribute to regionalorders include all neighboring regions, but the MiddleEast has a particular emotional relevance for historical,cultural and religious reasons



the flow of people across borders and expanding communication constitute im-portant parts of Turkish policy20.

Turkey has taken important steps to develop and diversify multilateral andbilateral relations with the Arab world. Within this framework, Turkish ForeignMinistry established consultation mechanisms with a number of Arab coun-tries, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Oman,Qatar and Bahrain. Turkey has also made great efforts to increase its stature inthe Persian Gulf, by developing better economic relations with hydrocarbons-rich countries like Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain21.

Turkey’s zero problems with neighbors policy and its positive expectations toassume constructive roles in both the global and the regional arena display an in-creased self-confidence, especially in the economic field. Despite the challengesfaced by the West and the EU as a result of the global financial crisis, Turkey’seconomic power soared to an extent that enabled it to act more assertively in theforeign policy area and to take several initiatives in the Middle East. In fact, thecrisis became a turning point for small and medium-sized enterprises in Anato-lia that found alternative markets and sectors despite the difficult times22.

In 2002, the European Union’s share of total exports from Turkey was 56.5percent. This figure fell to 46.3 percent in 2010. Africa’s share, including someMuslim North African countries, was 4.7 percent in 2002, and it rose up to 8.2percent in 2010. Also Middle Eastern countries’ share rose from 9.6 percent in2002 to 20.3 percent. According to Turkish Statistics Institute data, the countriesthat increased the amount of goods they purchase from Turkey in 2010 com-pared to 2008 included Egypt (83.6 percent), Libya (67.5 percent), Iraq (30.8percent), Syria (27.8 percent), Algeria (10.4 percent), Senegal (6 percent) andPakistan (5.2 percent)23.

The New Approach to Turkey’s Relations with Iraq

AKP government also developed a new approach to its relations with Iraqwhich has long been viewed through the lens of the Kurdish question. Believingthat crisis and militarized conflicts do not stem from ethnic and cultural differ-ences per se, it attempted to strengthen mutual ties and interests with all Iraqigroups. The most noteworthy efforts were those made towards the Kurdish Re-

20 Turkey currently has visa exemption agreements with a total of 61 countries and special administrativeregions.

21 M.E. BIRESSELIOGLU, Turkey’s Trasforming Relations with the Arab World: The Impact of Recent Turk-ish High-Level Visit to the Gulf Region, in «Balkananalysis.com», January 27, 2011, www.balkanalysis.com/turkey/.../turkey’s-transforming-relations-with-the-arab-world-the-impact-of-recent-turkish-high-lev-el-visits-to-the-g.

22 M.E. YILMAZ, Global Economic Crisis Transforms Turkey’s Socioeconomic Fabric, in «Today`s Zaman»,July 18, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-216376-105-global-economic-crisis-transforms-turkeys-socioeconomic-fabric.html.

23 Increasing trade with Muslim countries becomes Turkey’s economic “oxygen”, in «Today’s Zaman», Janu-ary 30, 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=233904.




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gional Government (KRG). Turkish leaders wanted to strengthen their bordersecurity by working with Iraqi-Kurdish authorities to contain the PKK. They al-so believed that creating and expanding common areas of interest with the KRGespecially in the economic field they could better cope with ethnic separatisttendencies at home. Turkey increased economic activities, in particular tradeand investments, in the area. At the time of writing, Turkish firms account formore than half foreign investors operating in Iraqi Kurdistan. But Turkish busi-ness activities are also developed in other parts of Iraq. For example, Turkishconstruction firms are very active in Basra. Furthermore, two Turkish shipsdocked at Basra supply the city each day with 250 megawatts of electricity, anda major oil pipeline runs from Kirkuk in Iraq to Ceyhan in Turkey carrying onequarter of Iraq’s oil exports24.

New Understanding Regarding Turkey’s Relations with the “West”

Turkey’s re-definition of its place in the world and the roles it aspires to as-sume has brought a new understanding of its relations with the “West”. ForAnkara, it is not a matter of changing Turkey’s pro-Western orientation. As Er-dogan puts it, «Turkey has one face to the west and one to the east». Yet Turkey’sdesire to evaluate its interests and concerns independently can be seen in Turkishforeign policy. According to the Turkish Prime Minister, «Turkey could not desig-nate its foreign policy in line with someone else’s directives but on its own»25.

In the same vein, Turkey is seen as“a dynamic force in trans-Atlantic al-liance”, rather than just a “passive fol-lower”, by Davutoglu. He further clar-ifies Turkey’s approach, by saying that «Turkey has its own capability of settingits own unique position, only after doing so it could sit down with its allies todevelop a common position»26. Moreover, Turkish desire to determine its prior-ities more independently does not presuppose ruling out Turkey’s continuedcommitment to its relations with the West. On the contrary Turkey is expectedto further develop the strategic alliances with the US and Europe. HoweverTurkey’s aspirations are not limited to NATO and EU, Turkey also wishes to ex-tend its relations with other powers like the Russian Federation and to becomeactive also in the Islamic Conference Organization27 and in the Arab League28.

24 R. WEI.TZ, Turkey’s Influence in Iraq Surges, in «Turkey Analyst», Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk

Road Studies Joint Center, 4, 2, January 24, 2011, www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2011/110124B.html.

25 Turkey’s PM in Syria defends “independent” foreign policy, in «World Bulletin», December 23, 2009,http://www.worldbulletin.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=51712.

26 E. GEHRMAN, The Way Forward. Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs Elaborates on Future, in «HarvardGazette», September 29, 2010, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/09/the-way-forward/.

27 C. ARISOY, What is Happening Between Turkey and Darfur, Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies,March 26, 2010, http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=256:what-is-happening-between-turkey-and-darfur&catid=80:analizler-afrika&Itemid=138.

28 Turkey, Arab League launch institutional phase in ties, in «Today’s Zaman», October 13, 2008,http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=155736.

Turkey’s re-definition of its place in the world and the roles it aspires to assume has brought a new understanding of its relations with the “West”



The most striking examples of Ankara’s attempt to voice its own under-standing and concerns in Western circles and in the United Nations regards Is-rael’s policies in Palestinian territories, Iranian nuclear program developmentsand NATO missile defense system. Turkish government raised intensive critics ofthe Israeli offensive in Gaza in 2008. In 2009, Erdogan stormed out of a heateddebate on the Gaza conflict at the World Economic Forum in Davos, after ac-cusing Israel of “barbarism” and telling President Peres: «you know well how tokill people»29. Turkey’s determination to break Israel’s siege of Gaza after Hamaswas elected in 2007 gained a new dimension when the lead vessel of a flotilla ofaid-carrying ships, the Mavi Marmara, was attacked by Israeli forces. The Israeliraid – which highlighted a broader reality about the three-year-old blockade ofGaza and forced Israel and Egypt to temporary ease the blockade30 – not onlystrained Turkish-Israeli relations further, but it also highlighted Turkish-Amer-ican differences on the issue31. The Turkish government also expressed its ownapproach over Iran’s nuclear program declaring that there are no nuclearweapons in Iran and questioned Israel about its nuclear weapons. Erdogan asks:«Is it the law of the eminent, or is it the rule of law? The humanity and the in-ternational community will eventually make a preference»32.

Another development that revealed differences of perspectives betweenTurkey and NATO member states was related to NATO’s decision to deploy acomprehensive ballistic missile defense to cover territory, population and mili-tary forces of the European allies as an alliance-wide responsibility. Turkey dis-agreed with French President Nicolas Sarkozy who claimed at the Lisbon sum-mit in November 2010 that Iran would be the main threat of the “rogue attack”that NATO’s planned missile shield is designed to foil, preferring instead not tomention any country specifically. Turkish officials made clear what Turkey waswilling to accept. The first of Turkey’s “red lines” was that any decision takenshould not worsen its relations with its neighboring countries. In particular,Turkish officials demanded Iran and Syria not to be cited as “threats” in NATO’sofficial documents on the planned defensive shield and stressed that «the de-ployment of the shield should cover the territory of all NATO allies, as well asthe entire territory of Turkey»33.

29 G. BACIK, Turkish-Israeli Relations after Davos: a View from Turkey, in «Insight Turkey», 11, 2, 2009, pp.31-41.

30 J. FEDERMAN, Gaza Blockade Eased after Raid, in «Kennebec Journal», June 2, 2010, http://www.kjon-line.com/news/gaza-blockade-eased-after-raid_2010-06-01.html.

31 US Backs Israel in probe into Mavi Marmara assault, in «Hurriyet Daily News», January 25, 2011,http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=israeli-probe-of-flotilla-raid-impartial-us-2011-01-25.

32 Erdogan calls for just stance on Iran over nuclear program, in «Today’s Zaman», January 14, 2010, http://to-dayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=E90DE80EB5F70E0F8DAFD31B55E24EE3?newsId=198480.

33 G.H. JENKINS, Turkey at Lisbon; The Missile Defense Compromise, in «The Turkey Analyst», 3, 20, No-vember 22, 2010, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/101122a.html.




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Third Party Role

One of the important responsibility that is ascribed to Turkey is the “wisecountry role” that further reinforces Turkey’s intention to pursue a proactive andpre-emptive peace diplomacy, which entails preventing crises from emergingand escalating to a critical level and devises alternative solutions to disputes34.

The mediation role offered by Turkey primarily derives from its commitmentto resolve conflicts whose continuance may adversely affect Turkey’s interestsand well-being, which are strongly linked with the stability of the region. In fact,if Turkey manages to de-escalate crisis and/or find out alternative ways to resolveconflicts, it will elevate its status and extend its influence in the region.

Within this context, Turkey attached critical emphasis to Israeli-Syrian talksbecause for Ankara, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, among other fac-tors, depends on the resolution of Israel’s problems with the Palestinians andSyria, and the integration of Damascus within the international community. InAnkara’s view, given Damascus’s deep rooted connections and leverage in the re-gion, Syria holds a key role for developing stability in the Middle East, especial-ly in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. Moreover, after Hamas gained political powerin the 2006 elections in the Palestinian territories, Turkey tried to encourage Is-rael to treat Hamas as a political actor, and declared its intention to establish, atfirst unilaterally, a ceasefire. Another set of Turkish initiatives focused on US-Iran tensions. Turkey’s tentative mediation efforts not only covered the nuclearissue, it also tried to ease the normalization of the relations between the US andIran, whose mutual hostility is a threat to Turkey’s economic and trade relationsand security.

Most of Turkey’s interventions could be defined more as “relationship-ori-ented mediation”, rather than “resolution-oriented mediation”. In this regard,Turkey acted as “catalyst”, “a message carrier”, “a security provider”35. One exam-ple in this context was the “go-between role” played by Turkey in order to set thepreliminary stages of talks between Israel and Syria. The process started whenErdogan forwarded a message to Assad from Israeli Prime Minister EhudOlmert, offering to withdraw from the Golan Heights in return for a compre-hensive peace settlement36. At the same time, the decision to send 1,000 troopsto participate in the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon37 reveals Turkey’s readi-ness to play a much more active “security provider” role in the Middle Eastwhenever certain conditions are satisfied.

Parties in conflict accept Turkey’sfacilitation role first of all because itreduces the risk of escalation andcreates opportunities to buy time.

34 Turkish FM Envisions Turkey As “Wise Country”, in «Anatolian Agency», January 3, 2011.35 For these concepts see, J.B. STULBERG, Taking Charge/Managing Conflict, Lexington 1987.36 Assad confirms Turkish mediation with Israel, in «The Guardian», April 24, 2008, http://www.guardian.

co.uk/world/2008/apr/24/syria.israelandthepalestinians/print.37 A.N. ÖZKAYA, The Turkish UNIFIL Troops Set off for Lebanon, in «Turkish Weekly», October 19, 2006,

http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/40268/the-turkish-unifil-troops-set-off-for-lebanon.html.

Most of Turkey’s interventions could be defined more as “relationship-oriented mediation”, rather than“resolution-oriented mediation”



They also see it as an expression of their commitment to an international normof peaceful conflict management. Turkey’s facilitation of indirect talks betweenIsrael and Syria gave these countries an opportunity to re-consider on theirstrategy to achieve a peaceful resolution considering that the last peace negoti-ations were held in 2000.

Turkish policy has been successful, to a certain extent, in easing tensionsand facilitating dialogue between Iran and the West. However, Turkey’s friend-lier approach is appreciated by Iran not only because it helps to prevent ten-sions from escalating, but also because it provides Iran with the opportunity tobuy time and defy pressure from the international community. What Turkeyhas been doing is rather a “go-between” to assist the start of dialogue when allparties desire but hesitate to take the first step. However, it is not possible to as-sert that Turkish intervention is always well received by the conflicting parties.Indeed, Iranian leadership has once objected the idea of a Turkish “media-tion”38 claiming that «Iranian stance in the nuclear dispute is quite transparent,therefore it doesn’t require any interpretation from third parties»39. Turkey al-so wanted to be a broker between the US and Iran. Such desire, however, didnot create much enthusiasm in Iran since it aspires to engage in direct talkswith the US. Nonetheless, Iran said it would not hinder any Turkish bid to me-diate between the Islamic Republic and the new US administration. Instead, itcautioned that its differences with Washington were deep-rooted40.

Broadly speaking, two types of strategies can be identified in Turkey’s poli-cies in the Middle East. One of them is “orchestration”41, which aims at manag-ing the interaction, and the other is “integration”42, which includes initiatives in-tended to look for a common ground between parties. In 2009, Turkey togetherwith Qatar helped to broker the Doha agreement, which gave Hezbollah and itsallies a role in the Lebanese government even though they held a minority in theparliament. Turkey’s efforts to ensure Sunni participation in the Iraqi nationalelections before the elections constitute another example of Turkey’s applicationof integration strategy43. As Davutoglu puts it: «Turkey is a country in a tornworld trying to unite broken pieces»44.

38 Ahmadinejad says Turkey engaged in friendly effort, in «Turkish Daily News», August 15, 2008.39 Iran Rejects Turkish Role In Nuclear Talks, in «Asbarez Armenian News», December 8, 2009, http://as-

barez.com/74449/iran-rejects-turkish-role-in-nuclear-talks/.40 Iran says won’t hinder Turkish mediation with U.S., in «Reuters», November 17, 2008,

www.reuters.com/.../us-iran-usa-turkey-idUSTRE4AG1V220081117.41 D. KOLB, Strategy and Tactics of Mediation, in «Human Relations», 36, 1983, pp. 247-268.42 P.J. CARNEVALE, Strategic Choice in Mediation, in «Negotiation Journal», 2, 1, January 1986, pp. 41-56.43 S. KOHEN, Ankara’nin Irak Stratejisi (Ankara’s Iraq Strategy), in «Milliyet», March 4, 2006,

http://www.milliyet.com/2006/03/04/yazar/kohen.html.44 Davutoglu hails Turkish role in 21st century as “wise country”, in «Dünya», http://www.dunya.com/davu-

toglu-hails-turkish-role-in-21st-century-as-wise-country_110539_haber.html.




n. 14 Maggio 201153


Turkey as a “Model”

Crises first in Tunisia and then in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen have re-inforced the perception in the eyes of the West that Turkey is an attractive andunprecedented model for the Middle East.

Western commentators when defining the Turkish model point to Turkey’smembership in Western organizations and alliances, dynamic economic growth,functioning democracy and a political class known for its strong Islamic identi-ty. In this respect, as Turkish columnist Sedat Ergin argues, «One may reach tothe conclusion that in fact masses in the Middle East [are] inspired by the Westsince neither secularism nor democracy is an invention of the Turks … In short,regardless of the wind’s direction in Egypt, all roads lead to Turkey for theWest»45.

Although the AKP government suggests that Turkey does not want to be amodel for anyone, Turkey has long been stressing the fact that the Muslim worldneeds freedom, democracy, good governance, and transparency, accountabilityand gender equality. One example of Turkey’s call for democracy in front of Is-lamic countries was the then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s speech duringMay 28, 2003, Islamic Conference in Tehran46.

In the midst of the wave of protest that has swept the region, Turkish gov-ernment’s calls for democracy in the entire Islamic World are reinforced. Turk-ish leaders reiterate that if they demand democracy, prosperity, justice and free-dom for their own people, they want the same for their brothers as well. The dif-ference in the messages conveyed is that Turkish leadership declarations now re-fer to concrete claims rather than mere wishes. Turkey called Mubarak regime tonot prolong the pain and risk further chaos, but to opt for a new constitutionalsetup, with a new law on elections and political parties that will turn the regimein Egypt into a truly representative polity that respects rights and freedoms47.

Impacts, Constraints and Challenges

As the expanded scale of cooperation and interaction between Turkey andthe Muslim countries reveals, AKP’s policies received positive responses. Thesepolicies also enjoyed broad public support from Turkish people who become in-creasingly frustrated with the slow progress of EU negotiations by creating apowerful and capable image of Turkey.

Among all these multi-faceted diplomatic efforts the Palestinian issue de-serves special attention since Erdogan gained much prestige, especially at home,as a result of his personal stance against Israel’s actions. His championing of the

45 S. ERGIN, All roads lead to Turkey for the West, in «Hürriyet Daily News», February 9, 2011.46 Presidency of The Republic of Turkey, Speeches made during Gül’s Term as the Deputy Prime Minister

and Minister of Foreign Affairs, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/konusma_aciklama_mesajlar/kitap /79.pdf.47 S. IDIZ, Erdogan I

.srail’e Sert Çıktı: Mısır’a Karıs,ma! (Erdogan warns Israel: Don’t interfere to Egypt), in

«Milliyet», February 8, 2011.



Palestine cause and criticism of the atrocities of the Gaza war also created anemotional bridge between Turkish people and Muslims in the Middle East.

When we evaluate Turkey’s mediation efforts we see that they have con-tributed to the de-escalation of crisis and the opening of dialogue between theparties but it proved to be less effective in terms of achieving a formal and bind-ing agreement to resolve the conflicts. Reasons vary in each case. For example,during the Israeli-Syrian talks while Syria considered Israeli withdrawal fromthe Golan Heights as a precondition for any future talks, Israel was unwilling tocommit to an agreement on the borders. Moreover, the Israeli side constantlyemphasized that until Damascus will provide support for Iran, Hamas andHezbollah, Israel will have difficulties to start negotiations with Syria. The cam-paign against withdrawal from the Golan launched by the Israeli right-wing cre-ated the most important obstacle to the negotiations. Eventually, the indirecttalks came to a premature end following Israel’s offensive against Hamas inGaza, damaging Turkish-Israeli relations.

Moreover, it can also be argued that Turkey found favorable environment forassuming a third party role due to the absence of global players taking similarinitiatives. However, Turkey is not in a position to press its own preferences, of-fer benefits or compensation to parties in conflict in the same way as the US inIsraeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, when a Middle-Eastern country isin conflict with a super power, as in the case of the US-Iran rivalry, the room forTurkish mediation role is much more restricted.

Today the most important chal-lenges to Turkey’s performance in theMiddle East derive from the prolifera-tion of the political turmoil in the

Arab world. Until now while taking initiatives in line with a new approach to theMiddle East, Turkey has sought to maintain a very delicate balance between itsvision of democracy and its interests, which dictate cooperation with the au-thoritarian regimes in the region. As a matter of fact, despite AKP’s stress ontodemocracy and freedom, Erdogan was among the first to congratulate Ah-madinejad for his victory in the unfair presidential elections held in 2009.However, Turkey started gradually to feel the pressure and, if not to behave, atleast to talk more consistently. Gül’s first official visit to Iran offered a test toTurkish diplomacy during the protests against the regime. While Gül was care-ful to avoid any reference to Iran, his call for domestic reform was an undeni-able message to Iranian leadership: «When leaders and heads of countries donot pay attention to the demands of their nations, the people themselves takeaction to achieve their demands»48. Erdogan also felt obliged to remark that«Assad has a positive approach to democracy and wished to see how AKP works

48 Protests put Gül in tight spot during Iran visit, in «Today`s Zaman», February 16, 2011, http://us.zaman.com.tr/us-tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=46018.


It can also be argued that Turkey found favorableenvironment for assuming a third party role due to the absence of global players taking similar initiatives



n. 14 Maggio 201155


and considered the possibility to collaborate with the organization of theAKP»49.

The Middle East nowadays is undergoing a transformation process that isvery complex, and crisis prone. As the fragile situation in Libya demonstrates,billions of dollars of Turkish investment and trade links can be easily put at risk.The Libyan case also revealed the vulnerabilities of becoming dependent on theMiddle East and Africa for Turkey’s economy. Turkish concerns led Erdogan tourge the UN Security Council not to impose sanctions, warning that the Libyanpeople, rather than Gaddafi’s government, would suffer most. Arguing that amilitary intervention to Libya would be both useless and dangerous, Turkey ini-tially opposed NATO involvment50. Nonetheless, after French air attacks onLibyan ground forces Turkey was forced to change its position. Now five shipsand a submarine of the Turkish Navy have been dispatched to help enforce thearms embargo against Lybia51. Moreover, Turkish parliament has approved thedeployment of a bigger force including the dispatchment of land troops, if nec-essary. All of these show that Turkey’s determination to follow an independentstance as well as its capabilities is undergoing a serious test by the rapid courseof events.

Certainly the risks and challenges Turkey faces would be much higher if au-thority collapsed in its immediate neighborhood in Syria and in Iran. That couldnot only threaten the prevailing Turkish policy and lead to a marked deteriora-tion of the strategic environment on Turkey’s borders, but could also furthercomplicate Turkey’s relations with its transatlantic partners.

49 I.srail’e Sert Uyarı: Mısır’a Karıs,ma! (Harsh Warning to Israel: Don’t Interfere to Egypt!), in «Haber-

turk/Milliyet», February 8, 2011.50 Turkish Premier Rejects NATO Helm for Libya, Anatolian Agency, March 23, 2011.51 Turkey will make largest contribution to NATO mission, in «Anatolian Agency», March 28, 2011,

http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey-will-make-largest-contribution-to-nato-mission-to-enforce-arms-em-bargo-off.html.


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