russia vs the west_ the consequences of putin’s invasion of ukraine

3/25/2015 Russiavsthewest:theconsequencesofPutinsinvasionofUkraine

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Russiavsthewest:theconsequencesofPutinsinvasionofUkraineRussias invasionofUkrainehasdestroyed thepeace inEurope forageneration.

I llustration byAndr Carrilho

A year sinceVladimir Putin shockedEurope by annexingCrimea and fomenting rebellion inUkraines previously quietDonbas region, hisundeclaredwar on theRussians east Slav brothers has become the newold normal on the continent. I t has displaced the sevendecadeinterlude inwhichEuropeans thought they had established a postmodern order of peace in their heartland. I t has induced a loss of hopethat Europes embodiment of the liberal peace first envisioned by ImmanuelKant can be restoredwithin less than one or two generationsif at all. I t has confronted thewestwith a stark choice between appeasement of a regional bully orwarwith nomutually understoodrestraints in a nucleararmedworld.

Already the truce hammered out by theUkrainian,Russian,German and French leaders on 12 February in allnight negotiations held inMinsk, Belarus, has collapsed in reality, if not in name. Separatists in easternUkraine and their alliedRussian paid volunteers neverhalted their saturation shelling of the town ofDebaltseve at oneminute pastmidnight on 15 February, as had been agreed, but kept up thebarrage for three and a halfmore days until the thousands ofUkrainian soldiers surrounded there died, orwere captured, ormanaged to

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BY ELIZABETH POND PUBLISHED5MARCH,2015 12:12

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retreat under blistering fire to contiguousUkrainian territory.

Only a few of the heavyweapons thatwere supposed to begin beingwithdrawn from the designated buffer zone on 16 February have beenpulled back on either side. The rebels have not allowed internationalmonitors to take up their designated posts in the ceasefire zone and ontheRussiancontrolledUkrainian border.

The truce thatwas patched up again after the destruction ofDebaltsevewill probably provide nomore than a briefwinter respite before aspring offensive by rebels andRussian professional soldiers in easternUkraine.Moscow still denies that any of its troops andmodern heavyweapons are there, despite all the direct photographic, electronic and eyewitness evidence of their presence and the indirect evidence ofartillery andmultiplerocketshell targeting onDebaltsevewith a precision that onlywelltrainedRussian crews could provide. Since fightingbegan last April, nearly 5,700 people have died and 1.5million have fled their homes, according to theUnitedNations.

Even before the ceasefire that neverwas, theGerman chancellor, AngelaMerkel, provided the epitaph for European peace bywarning thatshe could see no realistic scenario inwhich any arms thewestmight giveUkrainewould significantly change the balance of power in theconflict. Russia caresmore about the fortunes ofUkraine than any other outside country, and possesses themilitary strength, resources andcapability to counter any newweapons thatUkrainemay be gifted. The only hopeMerkel could offerwas that,with strategic patience, thewestmight eventually triumph, just as it ended the coldwar in tandemwith the unmentioned Soviet statesmanMikhailGorbachevwith the bloodless fall of the 28yearoldBerlinWall in 1989.

This dark prognosis has been reached only in recentweeks. Throughout 2014, Europeans still hoped that their accustomed order could berestored soon. AsRussian special forces in unmarked uniforms andmasks abruptly ended the quartercentury of amicable coexistence of theRussian andUkrainian fleets in their Crimean port and deposed the peninsulas regional government at gunpoint lastMarch, theUSpresident, BarackObama, dismissed postsuperpowerRussia as littlemore than a regional nuisance.

ChancellorMerkel took Putins irredentist threat farmore seriously. Shewarned theUS president that hisRussian counterpartwas living inanotherworld of tsaristera nationalism that, she implied, precluded any costbenefit rationality or compromise.Obama, preoccupiedwithpullback fromAmericas overstretch in theMiddle East andAfghanistan and his socalled pivot toAsia, in effect outsourced secondrankdiplomacy aboutUkraine to Berlin. For the first time since 1945,Germany had thrust upon it a geopolitical leadership of Europecommensuratewith the countrys economic clout. And for the first timeMerkel,whose hallmark had been leading frombehind, stepped outin front.

As Putin raced towards annexingCrimea,Merkel told theBundestag on 13March 2014 that the previous 69 years of reconciliation, peaceand freedom that had been created by an integratingEurope and the transatlantic democratic alliancewere a feat that can still beconsidered amiracle. Russias theft ofUkrainian territorywas unacceptable in 21stcenturyEurope and represented a reversion to the lawof the jungle and to the law of the strong against the strength of the law,Merkel said.

She reprimandedRussia for violating international law and specific treaties towhichMoscowwas a party, including the 1975Helsinki banon changingEuropean borders by force andRussias 1994 assurance ofUkrainian independence, sovereignty and borders in return forKyivssurrender of its huge arsenal of inherited Soviet nuclearweapons toMoscow.

In dozens of phone calls shewarned a disbelieving Putin that Europes hardwon peace trumped commercial interests and that this time hecould not count onGermanys proRussian business lobby to veto economic retaliation for his provocation. Europe and theUS announcedthat theywould not intervenemilitarily to defendUkraine, a nonmember ofNato, butwould gamble instead on counteringRussiawithslowimpact financial sanctions on his entourage.



Roses on an army tank inHrashevatoe, easternUkraine, abandoned byUkrainian troops fleeing theRussian onslaught. Photo: LarryTowell/MagnumPhotos

Merkelwas thewests logical interfacewith theRussian president. Shewas the ultimatePutinVersteher, or Putin understander, not inlinewith the original coinage of this euphemism to describeGerman apologists for Putin, but in the sense of someonewho grew up inCommunist EastGermany, spokeRussian and sensed theRussianmindset intuitively.

She understoodPutins paranoia about being encircled byNato, even if that alliance has expanded not by armed seizure of neighboursterritory but by responding to the clamour formembership by central Europeans fearingRussian recidivism to Sovietstyle forcedhegemony. She comprehended the threat to his own rule that Putin feared from street protests inKyiv he had served as aKGB recruiter ofspies inEastGermany in the 1980s andwatched theBerlinWall fall to people power.

Merkel also grasped his resentment at the subsequent Soviet collapse that he calls the 20th centurys greatest geopolitical catastrophe and at the independentUkraine that emerged from the SovietUnion and illicitly tempted its people, in his view, to betray their elder brotherRussians by no longer obeying them as tradition required. The humiliation he felt over the cumulative shrinkage of his influence inUkrainewaswell known inBerlin.

Putin first lost all ofUkrainewhen his protgViktor Y anukovych, then president ofUkraine, allowed police snipers tomurder scores ofproEuropean, prodemocracyEuromaidan protesters a year ago. The violence alienated evenY anukovychs own party and left himno choice but to abscond to exile inRussia, thus ensuring thatUkrainewould not add its Slavicweight to Putins pet EurasianEconomicUnion project. Putins insistence thatKyiv join the newbornUnion, sometimes called the SovietUnion lite,was the original spark for theEuromaidan demonstrations in late2013.



Putin next lostNovorossiya, as he anachronistically called the eastern third of todaysUkraine that he suddenly claimed forRussia. (Thetermdates back to the time of Catherine theGreat,who seized NewRussia from theOttoman empire in the 1780s.)He seemed to believehis own propaganda that discontentedRussian speakers in the regionwould rise up if Russian special forces ignited a rebellion there.

Y et themasses failed to revolt.Only in the rust belt of theDonbas couldRussian proxiesmobilise illpaid retirees and buy or coerce enoughadditional support to set up the selfproclaimedPeoplesRepublics ofDonetsk and Luhansk. Indeed, in the east ofUkraine as awhole,wheremanymade no clear distinction betweenRussian andUkrainian ethnicity, opinion polls showed thatmost people favoured stayingwithin theUkrainian state.

Merkel understood thatMoscows costfree takeover of Crimea in the name of restoringRussias lost greatness the greatly outgunnedUkrainian army on the peninsula did not resist the regional coup, and noRussian bloodwas shedwas boosting Putins popularity ratingstomore than 80 per cent. This gave him renewed domestic legitimation even as his decadeold social contract of restoring order andoffering a better life to a new, urbanmiddle class in postSovietRussiawas becoming ineffectual at a time of economic slowdown.

Merkel therefore did not expect theRussian leader to budge fromhis zerosum view of international relations.Nor did she expect to deflecthim fromhis reversion toRussias historic sense of victimhood and need for a security so absolute thatMoscow required the insecurity ofneighbours in its sphere of influence.

She did, however, see Putin as an improvising tactician rather than a singleminded strategist. Thismade himunpredictable, but it alsoallowed formovement.

At the first stage of theUkraine crisisMerkel repeatedly offered to help Putin save face if hewould cease his depredations, to the point ofsuggestingEuropeanUnionEurasianUnion talks about creating a common economic space. She hoped to keep him talking rather thanshooting for as long as possible and to nudge him towards amore realistic perception of the advantages hewas losing and the tactical coststhat hewas incurring in his drive to punish both theUkrainians and thewest for its treatment ofRussia as a secondclass power.

Merkel first prepared the domestic foundation to support her diplomacy. She forged a close policy partnershipwith her SocialDemocraticforeignminister, FrankWalter Steinmeier.He and others in his SPDparliamentary caucusweaned the SocialDemocrats from theirromantic nostalgia for the oldOstpolitik days of ChancellorWilly Brandt. Together, the grand coalition between the SPD and her ownconservatives gaveMerkel an 80 per centmajority in theBundestag in support of targeted sanctions againstRussia.

The chancellor then ralliedGerman business to the cause of sanctionswell before the shooting down of aMalaysian passenger airlinerover rebelUkrainian territory last July, an event that is commonly creditedwith causing a change of heart amongGermanys proRussianelite.

Finally,Merkel took the sacrifices thatGerman importers and exporterswere ready tomake (the huge trade betweenRussia andGermanyshrank by onefifth between 2013 and 2014) to her EUpartners. She argued that the French shouldmake their own sacrifices by notdelivering twoMistralclass helicopter carriers they had contracted to sell to theRussians, and that theBritish should enforce theirmoneylaundering laws in dealingwith themanyRussian tycoonswho havemade a second home in London.

In the end,Merkel delivered the unanimous vote of all 28EUmembers thatwas required to approve sanctions and she saw to it that theauthorisationwaswrittenwith enough flexibility to add names to the target list and subtract otherswithoutmaking every shift subject to anew vote of unanimity. I twas a quiet tour de force.

However, one task the chancellor did not take onwas persuading the generallyRussophileGerman public that Putins behaviourwasunacceptable. That did notmatter, because foreign policy remains an elite exercise inGermany and because theMalaysiaAirlines tragedydid alter popular perceptions of theRussians and yield 70 per cent public approval of sanctions.

InmidApril last year,Merkel initiated a briefGeneva agreement that put on paper a basicwishlist: stopping the violence, disarming illegalarmed groups, returning seized buildings to their rightful owners and giving international observers from theOrganisation for Security andCooperation inEurope amonitoring role in easternUkraine. By bringing theRussian foreignminister, Sergey Lavrov, and hisUkrainiancounterpart together at the same table, theGeneva accord also finessedMoscows tacit recognition of the legitimacy of the interimUkrainian government (appointed by parliament after Y anukovych fled),whichRussian propagandawas presenting as the illegitimate resultof a fascist coup.

Ironically, thewestwas aided by theweakness of the provisionalUkrainian government.Over fiveweeks inApril andMay, Putinmountedmenacingwar games by placing up to 80,000Russian troops on high alert onUkraines northern, eastern and southern borders. But he didnot need to invade in order to extend his influence. Localmercenaries, criminal gangs and other proxies under the command of specialRussian forceswere occupying administrative buildings in a string ofmediumsized towns in easternUkraine. Putin presumably thought hecould controlwhichever leading politicians emerged inKyivwithout having to shedRussian blood. In this decision he displayed tacticalcaution, preferring theweapon of intimidation to that ofmilitary occupation,with its risks of quagmire and even guerrilla resistance.

The next phase of theUkraine crisis began in lateMaywith the unexpected landslide election as president of Petro Poroshenko, thechocolate king oligarchwhobuilt his confectionery empire in the 1990s after the collapse of the SovietUnion, andwho also has construction andmedia businesses.Poroshenko had served in several crony governments andwas briefly trademinister under Y anukovych. But he had been a strong backer oftheOrangeRevolution,which began in 2004, sparked by elections rigged in favour of Y anukovych.He also supported theEuromaidandemonstrations from the beginning.

Poroshenko quickly sent theUkrainian army andmilitias on an antiterror counteroffensive to recover territory lost to the rebels and theirRussian special forces allies. InApril the longneglected and underfunded army had failedmiserably in the samemission, in part becausehardly any soldiers had such simple protection asKevlar vests or nightvision goggles, and also because theUkrainians couldnt believe that



theymust shoot at brotherRussianswhowere shooting at them. Therewere defections to the proRussian side.

By the summer, however, olderUkrainian soldierswho had once served in the Soviet army helped the ragtagUkrainian forces and thebetterequippedmilitias to get their act together. They gradually recoveredmost of the territory held by the rebels and bymidJulywerebesieging the remaining rebel strongholds in the cities ofDonetsk and Luhansk. InKyiv, hopes rose that theUkrainians could preventfurther dismemberment of their country.

On the rebel side, Colonel Igor Strelkov, the designatedRussianmilitary intelligence commander of the local proxies andmercenarieswhowere being pushed back, complained bitterly that theywere being deserted by the leadership inMoscow and asked formore heavyweapons.TheRussians obliged by rolling over the border into theDonbasmoremultiple rocket launchers, antiaircraftmissile systems, plentifulammunition and the powerful groundtoair Bukmissile system,which can reach an altitude of 10,000metres.

In lateAugust the first knowndirect invasion of easternUkraine byRussian paratrooper units followed, rolling back theUkrainian siegesand delivering Putins clearmessage that hewould not let his proxies in theDonbas be defeated. Some, perhaps all, of theRussian airbornetroops returned to their home bases after their punitive raid.

Poroshenko understoodPutins line in the sand instantly and, on 5 September, he agreed through an envoy to a trucewith rebel leaders thatmade the half of theDonetsk and Luhansk regions then under rebel control a nogo zone forUkrainian troops. The ceasefirewas neverfully observed but it deescalated the fighting to lowintensity shelling, and the front line remained relatively stable for fourmonths.

German diplomacy in this interlude consisted of trying to freeze the conflict by converting the September truce and subsequent protocol intoa permanent, comprehensive ceasefire, or at least into an acceptance of common constraints on escalation. The fearwas that if that couldnot be agreed on, Europewould enter an era of acuteRussianwestern hostilitywithout even themutual restraints that the twosuperpowers settled on at the height of the coldwar.

Menacingly, Putin boasted that his troops could be inKyivwithin two days if he so ordered and could reach the capitals of Estonia, Latvia,Lithuania, Poland andRomania, allNatomember states, just as fast. Indeed, he has been illustrating the point graphically by aggressivelytestingNato defences of theBaltic andAtlantic states daily on the seas and in the air and endangering passenger flights by sendingbomberswith their transponders turned off into airspace that civilian liners use.On 18 February,RAF jetswere scrambled after twoRussianmilitary aircraftwere spotted off the coast of Cornwall.

The debacle of thismonths attempt to secure a truce has killed the last residual hope of a swift peace. Clearly, the end of the neocoldwarwill not occur theway its superpower original did a quartercentury ago,whenWashington ostentatiously outspent and outinnovatedMoscow inweapons aswell as general prosperity just as the Soviet economy and society reached a dead end,makingMikhailGorbachevdecide to trade in empire and feud in return for soft power and animal spirits.

Norwill it come alone fromAngelaMerkels strategic patience,which Philip Stephens of theFinancial Times parses as long on patience butshort on strategy. And it is unlikely to stem fromVladimir Putins progressive foreclosure of his own options by doubling downmilitarilyafter every failure to persuade nonRussians of the splendours ofGreatRussian hegemony. The only certainty is that thewar betweenRussia andUkrainewill go on.

Elizabeth Pond is a journalist based inBerlin and the author of several books aboutGermany, Europe and theBalkans. They includeBeyond theWall:GermanysRoad toUnification (Brookings Institution)

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