• It was not predestined that Russia should end up in confrontation with the EU; the beginning of the relationship promised something very different. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997 laid out lines for cooperation that seemed to indicate a rosy future. But as Russia’s domestic situation changed, the two sides grew fur-ther apart. Russia’s permanent insistence on being treated as “an equal” implied a growing, though hidden, disagreement regarding the values upon which EU enlar-gement is based.

• The war in Georgia in 2008 see-med at the time like a mere “dip” in relations between Europe and Russia, but in fact, it presaged the decisive split that we see today. Medvedev’s presidency warmed relations, but also made the EU overlook the signs that should have sowed alarm. Then Putin’s third term changed things fundamen-tally. The Kremlin began to actively try to stop the efforts of the EU’s Eastern Partners to move closer to Europe. Now Russia has chan-ged from a “strategic partner” to a “strategic problem”. Russia wants “new rules” and threatens that the alternative is “no rules at all”. The problems that we are facing are deep and multi-layered, and will be here for a long time. But even so, what happens to Ukraine now will play an important and possi-bly decisive role not just in Russia’s relationship with Europe but in the future of the continent itself.

AyearandahalfafterthedramaticEasternPartnership(EaP)summitinVilniuslaunchedachainofeventsthatalso led to thefirstviolentchangeofborders inEuropesincetheSecondWorldWar,theEuropeanUnionisstilltrying to extract the lessons of what happened. If theEU’sfuturepoliciesaretobewelldevisedandeffective,itisundoubtedlyessentialthatEuropelearnsthecorrectlessonsfromthepast.

But for all the soul-searching that has gone on in thedebate, a closer examination of the history of theEU-Russia relationship is likely to lead to somewhatsurprising conclusions. While European policies haveremained more or less the same over years and evendecades,Russia’sviewoftheEUhaswobbled,repeatedlychanged, and ultimately crystallised into an aggressiveandconfrontationalstance.Itisamatterfordebateastowhetherthiscouldhavebeenpredicted,butitisnotlikelythatmuchcouldhavebeendonetopreventit.

But it was not predestined that Russia should end upin confrontation with the EU. The beginning of therelationship – at which I happened to be present –promised something very different. On midsummer’seve, 1994, on the island of Corfu in Greece, we signedthe treaties of accession of Sweden, Finland, Austria,andNorway to the EU. At the very same occasion, thefar-reaching Partnership and Cooperation Agreement(PCA)betweenRussia and theEUwas signed. I vividlyremember the dinner that evening with the 16 leadersoftheEUandtheaccessioncountriesaswellasRussianPresidentBorisYeltsin.Theatmospherewaswarm,open,andtrulyforward-looking.PresidentYeltsinwasveryclearinhisvisionofaRussiathatwouldreform,democratise,and integrate with the rest of Europe. There was noreasontodoubthisseriousnesswhenhepromisedtodo“everything possible to support European integration”.1AndtheEUleadersresponded.IrememberthatFrance’sPresidentFrançoisMitterrandwentsofarinholdingout

1-ExcerptsofYeltsin’sspeechonthatoccasioncanbefoundat“AthensNewsAgencyBulletin”,HellenicResourcesNetwork,25June1994,availa-bleathttp://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1994/94-06-25.ana.txt.

ECFR Riga Series Carl Bildt

Russia, the European Union, and the Eastern Partnership

2-See“AgreementonpartnershipandcooperationestablishingapartnershipbetweentheEuropeanCommunitiesandtheirMemberStates,ofonepart,andtheRussianFederation,oftheotherpart-Protocol1ontheestablishmentofacoalandsteelcon-tactgroup-Protocol2onmutualadministrativeassistanceforthecorrectapplicationofcustomslegislation-FinalAct-Exchangesofletters-Minutesofsigning”,EuropeanCommissionDGTrade,availableathttp://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/no-vember/tradoc_114138.pdf.

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theprospectthatRussiacouldbecomeamemberoftheEUthatGermany’sChancellorHelmutKohl,whohadanevenstrongerbelief in the necessity of embracing Russia, had to somewhatrestrainhisFrenchcounterpart.

Under the PCA, an elaborate structure of cooperation andintegration was set up – much more extensive than the EUhad originally envisaged, becauseMoscowwanted to bemoreambitious.2 At thehighest level, therewere tobe twosummitmeetings every year between Russia and the EU – today, noothercountryorentityintheworldholdsmorethanoneofthesesummitswiththeEUeveryyear,althoughasimilararrangementdidpreviouslyexistwiththeUnitedStates.Andatlowerlevels,anetworkofdifferentcommitteesandcouncilswasforeseentocoverdifferentareas.

Things did notwork out entirely as intended. The two annualsummitscontinueduntil themostrecentandquitetense32ndsummitwasheldmorethanayearago.Thesemeetingsprovidedthe opportunity for comprehensive dialogue at the highestlevel.Butmanyof the otherworking structuresnever actuallymaterialised; the Russian side insisted on dealing with allissuesatthehighest level.However, inthoseearlydays, itwasprobablymostlyMoscow’sownhabits,experiences,andinternalinstitutionalarrangementsthatmadeithardforittoengagefully.Moscowhadbeenadominantpower inadifferentworld,so itwasinexperiencedwhenitcametohorizontalrelationshipsandtodealingwithmultilateralstructuresascomplexastheEU.Butitdidnotdisputeeitherthestructure,or,moreimportantly,thevalues-relatedfoundationsoftherelationshipthatweredetailedinthePCA.

To cooperate “as equals”

ThePCAenteredintoforcein1997.Thenextformalstepintherelationshipwastakenintheearlyyearsofthenewcentury,bywhichtimetheYeltsinerahadgivenwaytoVladimirPutin’sfirstpresidency,andatatimewhentheupcomingenlargementoftheEUtotakeinthecountriesofCentralEuropemadeitnecessarytorevisittheseissues.

The answer was the launch of the European NeighbourhoodPolicy (ENP) by the Prodi Commission led by former ItalianPrimeMinisterRomanoProdi.Thepolicy’saimwasambitious.

3-SeeStephenSestanovich,“Couldithavebeenotherwise?”,TheAmeri-canInterest,14April2015,availableathttp://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/14/could-it-have-been-otherwise/. 3

Byofferingthecountriesintheneighbourhoodtheopportunitytoparticipatein“everythingbutinstitutions”,itsoughttofacilitatethedevelopmentofa“ringoffriends”aroundtheEU.Anotherkeyobjectivewas topreventanewdividing line fromopeningup between the new members of the EU and countries withwhichtheyhadpreviouslycloselycooperated.Russiawasmostcertainlyalsomadethisofferatthetime,butearlyon,itdeclaredthatitdidnotwanttobepartofthisapproach.Itsrejectionwaslessaboutrefusingthedetailsofcooperationandintegration,butmoreaboutnotwantingtobetreatedinthesameframeworkaswhatitconsideredlessernations,andaboutawishtoestablishmoredirectandequalrelationswiththeEU.

This stance is more important than it may seem. Instead ofmerely representing a big country’s demand for red-carpettreatment,itquietlybutclearlyquestionsthefundamentalvaluesuponwhichEUenlargementisbased.WhenMoscowaskstobetreatedas“anequal”,iteffectivelymeansthatitdoesnotwanttojoinEuropebyacceptingEUprinciplesofbehaviour,butthatitwantstobeanequalpartnerwithwhomEuropeshouldnegotiatethese principles in the first instance. At the time, Russia hadnotyet clearly spelled thisout,but theattitudewasevermorepresentinRussia’svisionoftheworldandbegantocomplicateits attitudes towards Western organisations. As described byStephenSestanovich inhis analysis ofRussia-NATOrelations,thesamedilemmasalsopreventedNATOmembershipfromeverbecoming a realistic prospect for Russia: “How one felt aboutRussia being amember depended on how it became one. […]Wasmembershipamatterofgeopoliticalentitlement,orwasitsomethingtobeearned?WasRussiatobeaskedtojoinbecauseofitspowerorbecauseithonestlyembracedNATO’sgoals?”3

Inreality,theWestoftentriedtobendoverbackwardstointegrateits former adversary alongwith its former allies intoWesternnetworksof institutions.Butit isalsotruethattheWestneverconsidereddoingthisonthebasisofprinciplesotherthanthoseofliberaldemocracy.Itcannotbeblamedforthat:afterall,whatwouldthoseotherprincipleshavelookedlike?Thus,contrarytoMoscow’sclaims,theWestdidtrytotreatMoscowasanequal,asamemberoftheWesternfamily,sharingthesameworldview.And it is regrettable that Russia’s domestic developmentsgradually laid the foundations foranautocraticregime,which,as it was consolidated, took Russia further and further awayfromanychanceoftrulyqualifyingformembershipofWesterninstitutions,andthusfurtherfromactuallybecomingamemberoftheWesternfamily.Andthefrustrationofapermanentunder-qualifierslowlystartedtotarnishRussia’swholeviewoftheWest.

4-Fordetailsofthese“roadmaps,”see“15thEUSummit:RoadMapsforFourCommonSpaces”,EuropeanCommission,availableathttp://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/russia_eu_four_common_spaces-%20roadmap_en.pdf.

For details of these “road maps,” see “15th EU Summit: Road Maps for Four Common Spaces”, European Com-mission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/russia_eu_four_common_spaces-%20road-map_en.pdf.

For details of these “road maps,” see “15th EU Summit: Road Maps for Four Common Spaces”, European Com-mission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/russia_eu_four_common_spaces-%20road-map_en.pdf.

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Gearing up to 2008

TheEUneverexcludedorneglectedRussia.ItwasRussiathat,foritsownreasons,optedoutofEUneighbourhoodpoliciesastheybegantodevelop.Still,theEUwentalongwithRussia’swishtobetreatedasaseparatecaseandfocusedrelationsbetweenthetwoonthedevelopmentofwhatcametobecalledfourcommonspaces,as laiddownata summit inStPetersburg in2003. InMoscow in 2005, agreement was reached on very ambitious“roadmaps”forthecommoneconomicspace,thecommonspaceoffreedom,security,andjustice,thecommonspaceforexternalsecurity,andthecommonspaceofresearchandeducation.4

Thesewere indeed ambitious roadmaps, but in essence,whattheyoutlinedwasverysimilartotheareasidentifiedintheActionPlansforthedifferentcountriesinvolvedintheneighbourhoodpolicies.However, divergences soon started to emerge, due todevelopments in the policies of the neighbourhood countries.AftertheOrangeRevolutionin2004,UkraineexpresseditswishtomoveforwardwithcloserrelationswiththeEU,notablyintheareasoffreetrade.ButtheprocessofhavingRussiajoineventheWorldTradeOrganisationturnedouttobefarmoreprolongedanddifficultthanhadbeenanticipated.

Within Russia, the years 2004-2008 were marked by deepsuspicionoftheWest.Moscowgrudginglyacceptedtheoutcomeof Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, but nevertheless, itconsidered it to have been aWestern-inspired regime changeanditsuspectedthatsomethingsimilarmightbeonthecardsforRussia. Itwas during those years that “counter-revolutionary”youthmovementswerecreatedinRussiaandgrewtoenormoussize, and information campaigns – although modest by morerecentstandards–werelaunchedagainstdemocraticneighboursandagainstWesterninstitutions.Theagendachangedonlyafter2008,whenacontrolledhandoverofpowertothenewpresident,DmitryMedvedev,calmeddownsomeoftherevolution-relatedparanoia, and economic crises combined with a slump in oilpricesbrought theneed foreconomicmodernisation forcefullyontotheagenda.

Ofcourse,themostimportanteventof2008wasnotMedvedev’sassumptionofthepresidency.TherecognitionoftheindependenceofKosovo inFebruary and thequestionof the enlargementofNATOattheBucharestsummitinAprilledtosharpdivergencesof views between the Kremlin and the West. At an informalmeetinginBucharest,PresidentPutinexpressedhimselfinawaythatwasinterpretedasquestioningtheverystatehoodofUkraine,andsharprhetoricoverKosovoledtoRussianhintsatsomesort

For details of these “road maps,” see “15th EU Summit: Road Maps for Four Common Spaces”, European Com-mission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/russia_eu_four_common_spaces-%20road-map_en.pdf.

For details of these “road maps,” see “15th EU Summit: Road Maps for Four Common Spaces”, European Com-mission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/russia_eu_four_common_spaces-%20road-map_en.pdf.

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ofretaliationdirectedagainstGeorgia.Oneafteranother,stepsweretakenthateventuallyledtotheoutbreakofthewarbetweenRussiaandGeorgiainAugust.

Theoutcomeofthatwarwasimportantinseveralrespects.First,it demonstrated that Russia had a lower threshold thanmosthadpreviouslybelievedforusingmilitaryforceinitsimmediateneighbourhood. Secondly, Russia had begun to establish adoctrine of the right to intervene militarily on the pretext ofprotectingRussiannationalsorotherinterests.Thirdly,Russiademonstrated a blatant disregard for international law inproceeding quickly to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhaziaas independentnations.Sofar, itshouldbenoted,virtuallynooneelsehasfollowedRussiainextendingrecognitiontothetwobreakawayregions–notevenascloseaKremlinallyasBelarus.Andfinally,fromtheRussianpointofview,italsodemonstratedproblemsinitsarmedforces,andservedasafurtherinspirationforthemilitaryreformsthatreallygotunderwayin2008.

Russia’s war with Georgia caused a distinct dip in relationsbetween Russia and the EU. The PCA of 1994 had expired in2007, and after the events in Georgia, the launch of talks toreplaceitwithamoreambitiousandlegallybindingagreementwaspostponed.However, thepause lastedonly a fewmonths,andin2009,mostthingswereontrackagain.Negotiationsonthe so-called New Agreement were begun, and at the summitinStockholminNovember2009,talksstartedontheso-calledPartnershipforModernisation,whichwasofficiallylaunchedatthesummitinRostovinJune2010.

All this was undoubtedly helped byMedvedev’s presidency inRussia.ThediscourseinsideRussiaduringthisperiodwasverymuch focused on the need for economic modernisation, andrelationswiththeEUwereseenasimportantinthisregard,sincetheEUwas,ineverysingleway,byfarRussia’smostimportanteconomic partner. In spite of serious differences on someinternationalissues,notablyKosovo,progresswasmadeinotherareas. The period even saw somebreakthroughs on emotionaland contested historical issues, such as Moscow’s admissionof the 1940 Katyn massacre and the subsequent warming ofrelationswithPoland.

However,theMedvedevpresidencyandtheprospectsitseemedtooffermayalsohavebeenoneofthereasonsthattheWestatthetimedidnotproperlyunderstandthelessonsoftheGeorgiawar.Thewarwasconsideredtobeanaberration.Fewwerewillingtoexaminethepatternsofthoughtandstrategicaimsbehinditortoaskwhetherandhowthesecouldpossiblymanifestthemselvesagain.

5-ForthefulltextofAssociationAgreement,see“AssociationAgreementbetweentheEuropeanUnionanditsMemberStates,oftheonepart,andUkraine,oftheotherpart”,EuropeanExternalActionService,availableathttp://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/as-sociation_agreement_ukraine_2014_en.pdf.6-“PressConferenceFollowingTalkswithSpanishPrimeMinisterJoseLuisRodriguezZapatero”,OfficialwebsiteofthePresidentofRussia,10December2004,availableathttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22742.

6

In retrospect, this might well be seen as one of the mistakesEUmadeinitsrelationshipwithRussia.Inadvertently,Europemighthavesentthesignalthatitwaspreparedtotolerateamoreaggressive Russian stance in what Russia considers its “nearabroad”.ThismighthaveledPresidentPutinin2014tobelievethathisactionsagainstUkrainewouldcauseonlya“dip”ofthesortthathappenedafterthewarwithGeorgia.

The second coming of Putin

Meanwhile, for the EU, 2008 was also the year in which theEastern Partnership was launched, at the initiative of PolandandSweden.ItaddressedEurope’srelationswiththesixEasternEuropean and Southern Caucasus countries of the ENP andsoughtalsotofurtherregionalcooperationbetweenthesestates.

AnsweringtothewishesofUkraine,talkswithKyivwerelaunchedinMarch2007.AfterUkrainealsojoinedtheWTO,negotiationsaimedatconcludinganassociationagreement,and,aspartofit,institutingadeepandcomprehensivefreetradearea(DCFTA).Theagreementwassaidtobe“deepandcomprehensive”becauseittriedtotackledifferentnon-tariffbarrierstotrade,alongthelinesoftheEuropeAgreementsmadewiththeCentralEuropeanstatesbeforetheiraccessiontotheEU.InMarch2012thetalkswereconcludedandthe2,000-pageagreementwasinitialled.5

There negotiations were highly public, and Russia raised noquestionsorissuesrelatedtothemeitherinitsfrequentsummitsandothermeetingswiththeEUnorbilaterallywithUkraine.Ingeneral,upuntil2012/2013,theRussianattitudetowardstheEUwasessentiallyquitepositive.TheEaPwasanon-issue; itwasmost likely seen as another fairly irrelevant Brussels exercise.Furthermore, in late 2004, in the immediate aftermath of theOrangerevolution,PresidentPutinevensaidthatRussiacouldlookfavourablyonUkrainebecomingamemberoftheEU.6

Modernisation still dominated the agenda in Moscow, andcooperation and integration with Europe were seen as animportantinstrumentinachievingthisend.Buttheneverythingchanged,inadramaticway.

In2012VladimirPutinreturnedtotakeathirdtermaspresidentofRussia,andhispoliticalplatformnowincludedtheaimtomovefromthecustomsunionwithKazakhstanandBelaruslaunchedsuddenly inJune2009 toa fullyfledgedEurasianUnionwithKazakhstan, Belarus, and other countries willing to join. The

7-ForthetextoftheCISfreetradeagreement,see“Dogovorozonesvobodnoitorgovli”,OfficialportaloftheCIS,18October2011,availableathttp://www.e-cis.info/page.php?id=20062. 7

suddenmove to a customs union effectively brought to a halttheNewAgreementtalkswiththeEU.InsteadofmovingstepbysteptowardstheoftendiscussedfreetradeareafromLisbontoVladivostok,Russianpolicynowsought toestablisha customsunionwithininternationalperspectivefairlyhightariffbarriersand numerous restrictive practices. This sudden change alsocame after a joint report by the thenEuropeanCommissionerfor Trade and the RussianMinister of Economywasmade in2008 concerning informal negotiations on establishing a freetrade area.The change inRussianpolicywasnot precededbyanyconsultationsorinformaltalks.

IrememberanumberofofficialmeetingsatwhichEUeffortstomoveforwardthefreetradeagendaweremetwiththeresponsethat this was not Russia’s agenda at the moment. Referencewasmadetotheneedto focusonthe implementationofWTOmembership,finallysecuredin2012–although,fromtheEU’spointofview,thisimplementationleftmuchtobedesired.

Inlatesummer2013,theKremlinlaunchedanaggressiveefforttostopUkraine,Armenia,andGeorgiafromsigningtheDCFTAandAssociationAgreementsattheEasternPartnershipSummit,whichwastobeheldinVilniusinNovember.First,inanall-nightsession,Armeniawasconvincedtochangetrackandtoapplytojoin theCustomsUnion and the forthcomingEurasianUnion.Total gas dependency onRussia, Russianmilitary presence inArmenia, and the conflict with Azerbaijan provided extremelyconvincing arguments. It should be noted that, althougheyebrowswereraised,theEUinnowayobjectedtoorcriticisedthisverysuddenU-turninYerevan.Everycountryshouldhavethesovereignrighttochooseitsowndirection.

ButUkrainewasobviouslykey.Russia’sabsoluteprioritybecamethestruggletoturnUkraineawayfromitsEuropeanpathandtohave it included in theEurasianUnion.All conceivablemeansweretobeemployedforthispurpose.TradeembargoesagainstUkrainestartedearly,followedbywhatcanonlybedescribedasopeninformationwarfare.Therest,astheysay,ishistory.

Thiscrisishasnowbroughtus toopenwarbetween twogreatEuropeannationsandtoadramaticchangeintheentiresecurityoutlook for our continent, and every step has been driven byaction taken by the Kremlin. It was Russia, not the EU, thatpresentedUkrainewithazero-sumchoiceandtried to force itintoarrangementsthatthecountrywassimplynotpreparedtoaccept. The DCFTA agreement was perfectly compatible withexistingfreetradeagreementsbetweenUkraineandRussia,andtheEUhadinnowayquestionedthesearrangements.7Onthe

8

contrary,theagreementwasseenasabuildingblockinamoreambitious wider future arrangement and thus something thatwasfundamentallyinRussia’sinterestsaswell.

Independentstudiessuggestthatthesimpleimplementationofthe agreementwould bring benefits of 6 percent of additionalGDPoverthemediumtermand12percentintermsofincreasedwelfare for the Ukrainian people. And much more can beexpectedifUkrainegenuinelyimplementsthereformsforeseenbytheAgreement,sincethereformswouldimprovethebusinessclimateandhelptoattract foreigninvestmentsandtechnologytransfers.

This should objectively be in the interest of Russia as well.We all benefitmore fromhaving prosperous rather than poorneighbours, andabetter economy inUkrainewouldobviouslytranslate also into better economic prospects for Russia. Butthiseconomicandtradelogic,soimportantforanEUinwhicheconomicintegrationhasalwaysbeenthefundamentalbasisforpolitical cooperation and integration, was obviously alien to aKremlinthathadstartedtothinkinoldergeopoliticalterms.

The perspective in Kyiv remains different. It should berememberedthatevenViktorYanukovych’sregime,upuntilitsvery end, insisted that it intended to sign theAssociation andDCFTAAgreementwithEUand rejected the optionof joiningtheRussian-centricEurasianUnion.

Thetradeandpropagandawarsoflate2013triggeredapoliticalcrisis insideUkraine in early 2014 and then, suddenly,movedintoamilitaryconflictbetweenRussiaandUkraine.Theinvasion,occupation, andannexationofCrimea from27February to 18Marchwent relatively smoothly inmilitary terms and led to asurge of heavily promoted nationalist feelings in Russia. In aconcerted propaganda offensive, this was all portrayed as anecessarycounter-strikeagainstfascistsinKyiv,whoincohortwithNATOwantedtotakeoverthecountry,persecuteRussianspeakers, and prepare for military aggression against Russiaitself.Of course, therewasno factualbasis for this.Amissionby the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities toCrimeacouldfindnotraceofanydiscriminationagainstRussianspeakers.

IfCrimeawentrelativelysmoothlyfromtheKremlin’spointofview,thefollow-onoperationlaunchedintheDonbasfrommid-April,explicitlyaimedatestablishingaNovorossyiamini-stateall the way to Odessa, soon turned out to bemore difficult –althoughitusedverymuchthesamemethodsastheinvasionofCrimea.Heavysupportwithweapons,propaganda,andspecial

8-Forthetextoftheso-calledMinskIIagreement,see“FulltextoftheMinskagreement”,FinancialTimes,12February2015,availableathttp://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de.html. 9

forceswassimplynotenough;thepopulationturnedouttobereluctant to go along with the Russian agenda. And by then,RussianpolicyhadmadeoftherestofUkraineafarmoreunitedanddeterminednationthanitperhapseverhadbeen.Invadingcountriesis,historicallyspeaking,notagoodwaytomakefriends.

As the inflows of heavy weapons and special units increased,catastrophe was bound to happen, and it came with theshooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 on 17 July.TheexhaustiveDutch investigationwill report itsfindings,butan independent investigationpublishedby, amongothers,DerSpiegelinGermanyhastracedtheresponsibleunitbacktothe53rdAirDefenceBrigadeinKursksouthofMoscow.

In August, there was a real risk that the entire separatisteffort would collapse under pressure fromUkrainian counter-operations,inspiteofallthesupportithadbeengivenbyMoscow.Then, Russia chose open intervention. A number of battalionbattlegroupsofregularRussianforceshadtobesentintorescuethesituationandmakeitclearthatdefeatfortheseparatistswassimplynotgoingtobeacceptedbytheKremlin.

Since then, Ukraine has seen first the Minsk agreement inSeptember, then the resurgence of offensive operations inwinter, followed by newMinsk negotiations and the so-calledMinsk II agreement, officially a “package ofmeasures” for theimplementationoftheoriginaldocument.8Thesedevelopmentsclearlydemonstratethatalastingpoliticalsolutionisalongwayoff. The basic Russian objectives of destabilising Ukraine andpreventing its European orientation remain unchanged, andmilitary,diplomatic,and informationwarfaremeansarebeingdeployedtoachievetheseends.

What now?

Becauseofallthese,weareinafundamentallydifferentsituationontherelationshipbetweenRussiaandtheEUthanthatwhichwehadsoughttoachieveintheyearsupto2012/2013.Previouslylabelleda“strategicpartner”totheEU,Russiaisnowobviouslyastrategicproblem.Insomeimportantrespects,itcouldevenbecalledastrategicadversary.TheformaldialoguebetweentheEUand Russia has effectively been suspended, although certainlythere are no lack of diplomatic channels,with high-level talkson the Russian aggression against Ukraine being held almoston a weekly basis. Brussels policy discussions, notably on theissueofsanctions,areofgreatimportance,althoughoperationaldiplomacythesedaysisprimarilycomingoutofBerlin.AndthecohesionoftheEUhasbeenbetterthanitisgivencreditfor.

9-Forthetext,see“AddressbyPresidentoftheRussianFederation”,OfficialwebsiteofthePresidentofRussia,18March2014,availableathttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/presi-dent/news/20603.10-“MeetingoftheValdaiInternationalDiscussionClub”,OfficialwebsiteofthePre-sidentofRussia,24October2014,availableathttp://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860.10

It goes without saying that the perspective on Russia differsbetweenTallinnandLisbon–andthesedaysbetweenWarsawand Athens, too. But Europe’s internal discussions have sofar resulted in theEUmakingaunifiedandstrong stand.Thememberstatessharearecognitionofthegravityofthesituationaswellasacommondetermination tosupportUkraineandtoopposeRussia’saggression,eveniftherearedifferentdegreesofoptimismastothechancesofgettingRussiatochangecourse.ObserversintheWestingeneral–withinaswellasoutsidetheEU–failedtoseethemagnitudeofthechangeinRussianpolicythathasbeenwitnessedsince thebeginningof the thirdPutinterm.And it isclear that, inviewof thischange,wemustalsoreconsiderourlong-termassessmentsofRussia.Russiahascomefullcircle:eagerintheearly1990stobecomepartoftheWesterndemocraticcommunity, it soonstarted to fakedemocracy,andthen,afterPutin’scomeback,itbegantoopenlychallengeit.

Whatwearenowfacedwithisnotjust“adip”,aswe–mistakenly,asitturnedout–consideredthe2008warwithGeorgiatobe.Andweshouldbeawarethat,undertheConstitutionofRussia,Vladimir Putinmight well be president until 2024 – into thepossiblesecondtermofthenextpresidentoftheUnitedStates.Therefore,wehaveamplereasontolistentowhathehastosay.The triumphalist 18March speechmarked theemergenceof aRussiaintentonreuniting“theRussianlands”,eventhosethatwere divided during Soviet times, as had been the case withCrimea.9ThiscauseddistinctuneasenotonlyinthethreeBalticcountries–whichwerepartofRussiafora longerperiodthanCrimeawas–butalso inKazakhstanandBelarus.There isaninherentconflictbetweenthisGreatRussianapproachandthewider,butnolesspower-oriented,Eurasianone.

OfevengreatersignificancewastheValdaiClubspeechdeliveredby President Putin on 21 September. In it, a clear policy ofRussianrevisionismwaspresentedtotheoutsideworld.Undertheheadingof“NewRulesoraGamewithoutRules”,Putinsaidthat“thisformulaaccuratelydescribesthehistoricturningpointwe have reached today and the choicewe all face.” Continuedadherence to the agreed and existing ruleswasnot an option.Andhewentontosaythat“history’slessons”showed“firstofall”that“changesintheworldorder–andwhatweareseeingtodayareeventsonthisscale–haveusuallybeenaccompaniedbyifnotglobalwarandconflict,thenbychainsofintensivelocal-levelconflicts.”10

Themessageisstark.Newrules–oragamewithoutrules.And

11

the likelihoodofa chainof intense local-level conflicts.Russiahascastasidefirstanyeffortandthenanypretenceofadaptingto theEuropeanorderbasedon liberal democracy andOSCE-basedrules.WeareconfrontedwithaRussia that inwordsaswellasdeedshasdemonstratedadistinctdeparturefromwhatwehave seenbefore aswell as from thebasic principlesuponwhichthesecurityandstabilityofEuropehavebeenbuiltinthepastfewdecades.

Asforthefuture,itismybeliefthatmuchwillbedecidedbywhathappenstoUkraine.Toputitsimply:thefutureofUkraineisthefutureofRussia,whichisthefutureofEurope.IfUkrainesinksintodivisionanddecay,itwilldevelopintoazoneofcontinuousconfrontation that is likely to drive further militarisation andauthoritariandevelopmentinthepoliticsofRussia.Ifthisshouldhappen,wecanbynomeansexcludethepossibilitythatRussia’srevisionistambitionsmayacquirewidergeographicdimensionsintheyearsahead.Adesperateregimemightresorttodesperatepolicies.AwiderwarinEuropesuddenlyseemspossible.

On the other hand, if the democracy of Ukraine should beconsolidated, and strong reform policies turn the economicfuture of the country around, also anchoring it in integrationwiththeEuropeanUnion,thenthismightwellovertimeserveasaninspirationforamoredemocraticandreform-orientederain thedevelopmentofRussia. In thiseventuality,wemight,atsometimeinthefuture,returntothestrategicpartnershipwesoclearlyhavebeenseekingwiththecountryandpickuptheeffortstocreatefreetradeandintegrationfromLisbontoVladivostok.

However,weneed tobeaware thatarrivingat sucha result islikely to take a long time and will require significant efforts.TheEUwill need todo its best to boost the sovereignty of itseasternneighboursandgrantthemarealopportunitytochoosetheirownfuture.Europealsoneedstoaddresstheoutstandingvulnerabilities of existing EU members – whether they beloopholes related todefenceorother issues.WewillalsoneedtomakeRussia’saggressivebehaviourcostly,andthereforelessappealing.Bydoingallthis,wehavethechanceofseeingRussiaonedaychangeitswaysandmeans–grudginglyornot.

Butweneedtogiveuphopeoffindingaquickfix,amiracledealthatcanactasasilverbullettofixthesituationovernight.Mostlikely,therewillbenoquickfixes–andinsistingonfindingonemight verywell lead tobadmistakes.Wemust clearly see thebothfundamentalandlong-termnatureofthechallengethatthisdevelopmentrepresents.Onlythencanwesucceedinaddressingit.

Carl Bildtisco-chairoftheECFRboard.Hewasprime-ministerofSwedenfrom1991to1994andSweden’sministerforforeignaffairsfrom2006-2014.

We would like to thank the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Latvia to the European Union for the production of

these EaP summit papers.