russia presidential election 2004

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THE 2004 RUSSIAN

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

An Analysis of the Campaign,

the Candidates, their conduct

and the Russian political environment


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RUSSIAN AXIS, 2004

RUSSIAN AXIS | www.russianaxis.org

RUSSIAN AXIS is a Britishbased information andanalytical centre. It is an independent nongovernmentalorganisation, providing experts on Russian affairs (journalists,analysts, researchers and so on) with objective analysisoriginating from Russia and access to first hand information.

10 Greycoat Place

London SW1P 1SB

United Kingdom


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THE 2004 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

CONTENTS

RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2004: RESULTS

THE CANDIDATES

Sergei Yurievich Glazyev

Irina Mutsuovna Khakamada

Nikolai Mikhailovich Kharitonov

Oleg Alexandrovich Malyshkin

Sergei Mikhailovich Mironov

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

Ivan Petrovich Rybkin

THE MEDIA AND THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Summary

OPINION POLLING DATA

Summary

INFRINGEMENTS DURING THE CAMPAIGN

Refusal by most opposition candidates to withdraw their candidature

Summary of electoral infringements in russia

CONCLUSION

METHODOLOGI

QUESTIONNAIRY FOR EXPERTS

LIST OF EXPERTS PARTICIPATING IN THE RESEARCH

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RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2004:RESULTS

THE FINAL RESULTS WERE ANNOUNCEDON 23 MARCH 2004

1 Vladimir Putin: 71,31 % (49,565,238 votes)

2 Nikolai Kharitonov: 13,69 %

3 Sergei Glazyev: 4.1 %

4 Irina Khakamada: 3,84 %

5 'None of the above': 3,45 %

6 Oleg Malyshkin: 2,02 %

7 Sergei Mironov: 0,75 %

Voter turnout 64,39 per cent of the registered voters.

Central Election Commission figures on 23 March 2004

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INTRODUCTION

The victory of Vladimir Putin in the recent Presidential elections has largely turned outto be a nonevent. His triumph was assured since campaigning commenced. Theincumbent operated in a benign political environment with hardly any serious rivals, orchallengers with equal access to resources media or otherwise. Such was the confidencein the final result that many feared this would result in such a low voterturnout leadingto the election being declared void by the Central Election Commission.

'This report analyses the campaign, and examines the environment in which all thepresidential candidates operated. It concludes that the election campaign for the Russianpresidential elections on 14 March did not, in the main, comply with international

standards for free elections. This echos the OSCE Observer Mission to Russia, thiselection cannot be seen as a fundamental test of the Russian democratic system'.

The report includes the results of content analysis from the Russian mass media and thedata from an expert poll, conducted from 16 to 27 February, with twentyfour Russianand foreign experts. It also interviews participants of the election campaign, be theycampaign staff or official observers.

From this it evaluates media conduct, charts levels of support for each candidate and listsinfringements of electoral campaign law. In addition, the report includes polling datacommissioned prior to the election.

This report has been prepared by the Institute for Social Communications (ISC) forRussian Axis. The British information and analytical centre Russian Axis is anindependent nongovernmental organisation, providing experts on Russian affairs(journalists, analysts, researchers and so on) with objective analysis originating fromRussia and access to firsthand information.


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S. GLAZYEV

There were ten candidates for the Presidential campaign, of which, subsequently, theCentral Election Commission (CEC) registered seven:

The CEC refused to register three candidates: A. AxentyevKikalishvili,

V. Bryntsalov, V. Geraschenko.

O. MALYSHKINS. MIRONOV

V. PUTIN I. RYBKIN

I. KHAKAMADA M. KHARITONOV

THE CANDIDATES

OVERVIEW


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THE CANDIDATES

OVERVIEW

1 14 Feb he was expelled from its ranks from the Party of Russian Regions, 4 March was removed from chairman

of group Motherland in Duma.

Name Nominated bySupport: Campaign staff, finance,political backing

Occupation, previously held positions

1. A. AxentyevKikalishvili*

Selfnomination Campaign staff from the AllRussianParty of People and officialsat the city of Kaliningrad

Businessman, Chairman of theAllRussian Party of People

2. V. Bryntsalov Selfnomination250 authorised campaign staff, all of thememployees of Bryntsalov,a jointstock company

Businessman

3. V.GeraschenkoThe Partyof Russian Regions('Motherland' bloc)

Ten authorized campaign staff includingamong them Dmitry Rogozinand Yuri Skokov

Exhead of the Central Bank of theRussian Federation, State Duma Deputy

4. S. Glazyev SelfnominationA group of voters supporting S. Glazyev'sselfnomination

State Duma Deputy, leaderof the 'Motherland' bloc, cochairman

of the Party of Russian Regions 1

5. O. MalyshkinThe LiberalDemocratic Partyof Russia (LDPR)

Authorised campaign staff includingV. Zhirinovsky, I. Lebedev and others

State Duma Deputy, a memberof the LDPR Higher Council,V. Zhirinovsky's exbodyguard

6. S. MironovThe Russian Partyof Life

Authorised campaign staff from the partyThe Chairman of the Federation Council,the Chairman of the Russian Party of Life

7. V. Putin Selfnomination

Highprofile campaign staff led by ViceChancellor of the Moscow State LawAcademy O. Kutafin and includingthe president of the CSKA basketballclub A. Gomelsky, State Duma Deputy

A. Zhukov, Art Director of t eteraTheatre A. Kalyagin, the ViceChancellor of the St.Petersburg Instituteof Mines V. Litvinenko, Director of theState Hermitage Museum M.Piotrovsky, Dr. L. Roshal, SportswomanS. Khorkina, ViceMayor of Moscow V.Shantsev, and the coach of the Russianfootball combined team G. Yartsev

Former career in the KGB/FSB andacting President of the RF

8. I. Rybkin SelfnominationWellfunded campaign staff led by

B. Berezovsky

Exsecretary of the Security Councilof the Russian Federation, the chairman

of the Liberal Russia party

9. I. Khakamada SelfnominationCampaign staff led by P. Petov andmembers of the party Unionof RightWing Forces (URWF)

Cochairperson of the Unionof RightWing Forces (URWF)

10. N. KharitonovThe CommunistParty

Twelve campaign staff from the party,among them G. Zyuganov, S. Reshulsky,V. Vidmanov, V. Ilyukhin

State Duma Deputy, Chairmanof the AgroIndustrial Groupof the Russian Federation

*Not registered by the CEC as presidential candidates.

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THE CANDIDATES

Sergei Yurievich GLAZYEV

Profile

Sergei Glazyev was born in Zaporozie, Ukraine, and came to Moscow State Universityto study economics in 1983. He served less than a year in Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar'sgovernment as international economic relations minister and later, while serving as adeputy in the State Duma, he rebelled against the policies of Gaidar and VicePremierChubais. In 1995, Glazyev again changed allegiances, appearing on the party list for theCommunist Party. In 2000, he was elected to the Duma from the party list of the newly

launched 'Motherland' bloc.

Glazyev political base

The Motherland bloc was established by V. Surkov, before the Duma election campaignin December 2004 in order to pull the electorate away from the Communist Party. Itsprogramme was sympathetic to both nationalist and communist voters. The subsequentcampaign was a great success with the cochairmen of the bloc, S. Glazyev andD. Rogozin, becoming the main beneficiaries.

Riding high on his initial success, Glazyev announced his candidature and thereafter

posed a credible threat to Putin. At some point Glazyev was trailed at a respectablesecond place and was even touted as denying Putin victory in the first round. Prior to hiscandidacy, the Kremlin was favourable to Glazyev and the Motherland bloc.

His cochair, D. Rogozin remained loyal to the Kremlin and publicly supported partyrival V. Geraschenko for presidential candidate. The result was infighting in theMotherland bloc. The People's Will Party, a member of the bloc led by S. Baburin,declared its support for Glazyev's candidature. Whilst a split was brewing, the People'sWill withdrew its support for Glazyev and instead, with Rogozin, purged Glazyev fromhis position as chairman of the Duma grouping of the bloc. He also lost his position asthe State Duma's vicespeaker to S. Baburin. This drama took place throughout the

election campaign, leaving S. Glazyev without a party backer. Glazyev was, however,later supported by Socialist United Party of Russia (Dukhovnoe Nasledie (SpiritualHeritage), SUPR). Meanwhile, the Party of the Russian Regions (PRR), anothermember of the Motherland bloc, voted in support of Vladimir Putin, thus indirectlydeclaring the bloc's support for the current incumbent.

Press Commentary:

"By supporting Glazyev, the congress of S. Baburin's small People's Will Partygave D. Rogozin an unpleasant surprise" (Izvestia.Ru, 02.10.2004).


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THE CANDIDATES


"From Sunday, the coalition that entered the Duma under the 'Motherland' brandname ceased to exist. The series of scandals and disputes that shook the alliance

ended in the total defeat of S. Glazyev and the triumph of Dmitriy Ragozin. OnSunday, at its congress, the most influential of the three parties in the alliance, theParty of the Russian Regions (PRR) expelled S. Glazyev from its ranks and votedin support of Vladimir Putin in the presidential elections" (Izvestia.Ru,02.16.2004).

"The leader of the blocbuilding People's Will party Baburin said, that voluntarywithdrawal from the post of the group chairman had been suggested to Glazyev theday before, but he refused. "Acting by himself, Glazyev was unable to be a groupleader without coordination" Baburin said. The issue on Baburin taking the position of the State Duma vice speaker instead of Rogozin is to be decided by the

chamber. Rogozin said that today's decision is caused by the crisis in the group:"There is direct evidence of collapse in the group, and going on with this conflictwe discredit the Motherland bloc. That is why the decision on Glazyev's resignation was positively accepted by simple majority of voices" (IA Express,03.05.2004).

Glazyev's motives for participating in the elections:

Glazyev in his own words:

"I am counting on the fact that I have truth on my side, as well as a precise

understanding of our national interests. And the programme the country needsmust be implemented. This is why I am participating in the presidential campaign"(TVC, Post Scriptum, 01.07.2004).

Political Commentators on Glazyev's motives:

S. Belkovsky: "If Glazyev is allowed access to the TV channels, he will take votesfrom Putin. If Glazyev is deprived of access to the media, he will get a maximumof 78 per cent. But if the Kremlin starts to help, in order to improve the turnout(and avoid the vote being declared void), he will receive about 15 per cent and theprobability of a second round increases" (Vedomosti, 01.12.2004).

. Przhezdomsky: "Sergei Glazyev is a man with a certain amount of time on hisside for the future, that is, he is younger, he is more dynamic, he has, in a goodsense, clear political ambitions. After all, thanks to Glazyev, the Motherlandalliance surprised everyone in the parliamentary elections" (Echo Moskvy,01.06.2004).

S. Markov: "The fact that he is selfnominated, and not by the Motherland bloc,is a formality. All the same, the Motherland bloc is Glazyev. Besides, thecollection of signatures (which was undertaken independently and was nessecary todeclare one's candidacy) is actually the start of the election campaign, and this canonly strengthen Glazyev's position" (Interfax, 12.30.2003).

"S. Glazyev also joined the elections in order to propup Putin's legitimacy"(Interfax, 12.30.2003).


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THE CANDIDATES


S. Glazyev's Campaign Finance

As Glazyev lost the support of the Motherland bloc, which benefited from the patronage

of V. Surkov (deputy head of Putin's Presidential Administration), he also lost thefinancial support of the Kremlin.

Thereafter, as Glazyev announced, he was obliged to finance his own election campaignhimself.

It is necessary to mention, that the observers note a number of contradictions here:Glazyev's budget was approximately $0.4 million, despite his protestations that big business would be afraid to donate money to his cause.

"Unfortunately, I have no sponsors at the moment. I have to gather signatures (forregistration as a presidential candidate) using my own savings. The business

community is paralysed thanks to unfounded fears about me, for all their sympathywith the Motherland alliance, many feel they will undertake a considerable politicalrisk" (Vedomosti, 01.20.2004).

"The funds of the cochairman of the Motherland alliance, Sergei Glazyev, who set upthe fund mainly using his personal savings (2.9 million roubles), were supplemented on11 February by an additional 40 thousand roubles from the MSOOI 'Shield and Sword'(an interregional union of nonprofit association for the disabled, founded by the lawenforcement and secret service agencies of the Krasnodar Region)" (Commersant,02.18.2004).

There is much speculation as to the source and the real level of Glazyev's budget. Central

to this speculation is his ability to garner two million signatures in less than a month:"Not long ago, Glazyev complained about a shortage of money for the election

campaign, but money has now appeared and apparently in considerable amounts.How did he gather, in such a short time, two million signatures in support of him,the renting of premises for holding congresses? Speculations varies as to who thesource may be. They range from factions within the President's Administration, andmillionaire benefactors of the Communist Party, and even the omnipresent BorisBerezovsky, acting on the principle of 'my enemy's enemy is my friend" (MirNovostei, 02.03.2004).

Political Commentators on Glazyev's campaign finance:

E. Kiselev: "It is quite possible that he found some partners even among the currentauthorities. I do not believe that Mr Glazyev did not know how his electioncampaign to the Duma was organised or how his campaign was financed; I havedifficulty believing that this was done without the active participation of the socalledKremlin operators" (Echo Moskvy, 01.07.2004).

S. Belkovsky (Polician): "There are many vested interests in the country with lotsof money who wish to see a second round in the elections. Glazyev is one of themany beneficiaries of this wish." (NTV Personal Contribution, 01.17.2004).

D. Orlov (Academician): "I can guess who provides most of Glazyev's finances.

It is obviously the company Norilsk Nickel" (NTV Personal Contribution,01.31.2004).


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THE CANDIDATES

Irina Mutsuovna KHAKAMADA

Profile

Irina Khakamada was born in Moscow in 1955. She has an economics degree fromPatrice Lumumba University in Moscow and taught economics at the Moscow StateUniversity. In 1989 she became cochairman of the S+P cooperative, which turned outto be a highly successful venture. In 1989, together with Konstantin Borovoi, the cooperative's chairman, she worked on creating a Russian stock and commodities exchange.In 1992, she and Borovoi created the Party for Economic Freedom. In 1993, sheentered the State Duma on the party list for the bloc Avgust. She won three consecutive terms in the Duma, winding up in 1999 with the Union of RightWing Forces(URWF) faction with a position as deputy speaker. In the parliamentary elections in2003, Irina Khakamada stood for the 209th singlemandate district, where she lost toher main opponent, leader of the party for the Revival of Russia, Gennady Seleznyov.

However, she was among the top three on the electoral list of the Union of Right WingForces (URWF), which also failed to overcome the 5 per cent barrier and so to gainany seats in the State Duma.

Khakamada's motives for participating in the elections

Khakamada's stated objectives were to provide a credible opposition to the currentincumbent. In the process, as the following excerpts demonstrate, Khakamada hoped toshore up the URWF's political base into a new united democratic party. Both objectives would ultimately bolster Khakamada's standing as a prominent political figure.

I. Khakamada in her own words:

"There must be a candidate from the democrats, as a politically constructive opposition to the President and the authorities."

"Considering that the boycott didn't work out and the leftwing opposition putforward a candidate, I believe that the democrats, too, must nominate their owncandidate. I was prepared to support Vladimir Ryzhkov and Yavlinsky andNemtsov they all refused. Then I decided to put myself forward. If we want toadmit our mistakes, want a renewal and to create a unified, democratic, seriousparty that would constitute a politically constructive opposition to the President and

the party in power, we need to start today. Let us start with the presidentialelections" (Interfax, 01.01.2004).

Political Commentators' Views:

V. Fyodorov: "Irina Khakamada's statement concerning her entry into thepresidential race is quite an interesting move that may add substantial drama andintrigue to the campaign" (Mayak, 12.30.2003).

M. Urnov: "The nominations of GlazyevGeraschenko and Khakamada, whichhappened literally today, show that the presidential elections are gradually turninginto not just the election of Putin as President, but into 'primaries' for political fig

ures of other directions" (Mayak, 12.30.2003).


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THE CANDIDATES


S. Markov: "If she had decided to stand a month ago, it would have been achallenge to the Kremlin, but now it is rather working for the Kremlin, where therewas growing concern that, owing to the lack of strong opponents, the legitimacy ofVladimir Putin's election would be undermined" (Interfax, 12.30.2003).

. Przhezdomsky: "It seems to me that Irina Khakamada's campaign is simplymotivated to place the URWF on the political map and maintain its positionthereafter" (Echo Moskvy, 01.06.2004).

Khakamada's Party and Public support

Party support: Despite Khakamada's high position in the party, the leadership of theUnion of RightWing Forces and Yabloko declined to support her candidacy. But many

regional organisations connected to these parties gathered signatures in her support, inspite of the ban by the federal leadership.

"The Congress of the URWF last weekend split, with a minority, in support ofKhakamada, and the majority supporting the President (headed by AnatolyChubais) or calling for a boycott of the elections. Yabloko decided not to participatein the elections at all and prohibited its organisations from even helping Khakamadacollect signatures in support of her candidacy" (Trud, 01.31.2004).

"A committee was set up within the Union of RightWing Forces to support IrinaKhakamada in the presidential elections, including forty regional organisations, for

mer deputies of the URWF faction, political scientists and journalists. The decision by some of the members of the URWF to set up the committee was supported by the former leader Boris Nemtsov" (Gazeta.Ru, 01.31.2004).

"V. Khomyakov [a member of the URWF political council] noted that, according to his information, up to ten different political organisations were actively participating in collecting signatures in support of I. Khakamada's selfnomination.'About eighty regional divisions of the URWF and up to 70 per cent of Yablokoand number of other parties are fully engaged in this', he said". (Interfax ,01.31.2004)

Public support: Cultural and public figures, nongovernmental organisations.

"the public committee of supporters of I. Khakamada includes the writer FazilIskander, the actors Inna Churikova, Lyubov Polishchuk, Oleg Basilashvili, NataliaAndreichenko, the director Mark Rozovsky, as well as Andrei Makarevich, LolitaMilyavskaya, Irina Ponarovskaya, Leon Oganezov, Andrei Bilzho, organisations inprotection of rights" (Urna.ru, 02.16.2004).

"forty regional organisations legally registered their membership of the committee. Though there are actually sixtynine as some organisations have not yet hadtime to formally hold their conferences and vote for this The committee includesState Duma deputies: Elena Mizulina, Andrei Vulf, Alexander Barannikov, and

Artur Myaki. In addition one of the leaders of the Union of Journalists, formerMinister of the Press, Mikhail Fedotov, the political scientists Valery Khomyakovand Alla Gerber and many others" (Russky Courier, 02.02.2004)


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THE CANDIDATES


Comments on Kharamada's support

Opinions differ in the media on the support for Khakamada. Many consider thelaunch of her candidature was as a result of the Kremlin support; later the supportwas withdrawn, and the campaign was controlled by big opposition businessmen inexile.

"Khakamada did, after all, find support. Having started her campaign quitewithin the system, she went astray with her manifesto in Commersant, by whichshe set both the Kremlin and the Moscow authorities against her. Observers havecalled this the Khakamada gambit: sacrifice of support at the start of the game inorder to gain an active position. The Kremlin let this project get out of hand, butit was immediately picked up by the opposition in exile: Berezovsky, Gusinsky andNevzlin. There are rumours that a team of American political spindoctors havebecome involved in the project.

"It seems that only declared support for Khakamada emanates from abroad.Notable support have come from three tycoons who, in spite of knowing fully wellof the unlikelihood of her victory, continue to do so as a means to provoke theKremlin" (Expert, 02.02.2004).

Khakamada's Campaign Finance

L. Nevzlin [a major shareholder of YUKOS Oil Company], V. Sirotinsky (businessman, Khakamada's husband), a number of businessmen and private individuals, whowanted to remain anonymous, financed I. Khakamada's campaign. After L. Nevzlinannounced his financial support for I. Khakamada's campaign, he was placed on theinternational wantedpersons list.

I. Khakamada: "I cannot get support from big business. Modest funds are coming infrom individuals. But even they ask that we do not give out their names and addresses."(Versiya, 02.09.2004)

M. Litvinovich (the head of Khakamada's campaign staff): "A number of the foundersand associates of Open Russia [ a nonprofit organisation founded by Nevzlin, a majorshareholder of YUKOS Company] decided to support Irina Mutsuovna (Khakamada)organisationally, ideologically and financially." (Vedomosti, 01.14.2004)

"Khakamada told journalists about a sponsor of hers some 82yearold woman whocollected 30,000 roubles amongst her acquaintances and sent them to supportKhakamada." (Vremya Novostei, 01.15.2004)

L. Nevzlin: "I am retiring from the post of deputy chairman of the board of ROC OpenRussia, since participation in politics does not comply with the nature of this charitableorganisation's activities. I have taken the decision to give my support in the comingRussian presidential elections to the only representative of the democratic forces of ourcountry Irina Khakamada." (Interfax, 01.30.2004)

"Irina Khakamada's husband became the first to sponsor her as presidential candidate.

As Khakamada admitted in a Gazeta interview, his contribution was the first into herelection fund." (Gazeta, 02.10.2004)


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THE CANDIDATES

Nikolai Mikhailovich KHARITONOV

Profile

Nikolai Kharitonov was born in Novosibirsk in 1948, the region from which he waselected to serve in the State Duma last December. A former sovkhoz director, he hasserved in the State Duma since 1993 and, in the previous Duma, was the leader of theAgroIndustrial group. In the Duma elections of 2003, he was elected deputy to theState Duma on the Communist Party list and was part of a tripartite leadership in thefederal elections, together with Gennady Zyuganov and Nikolai Kondratenko. On 29

December 2003, Nikolai Kharitonov was elected as the Russian Communist Partycandidate to run in the presidential elections.

Kharitonov's Motives for Participating in the Presidential Elections

The media has charted a number of benefits for N. Kharitonov's participation in the presidential elections, although they were primarily to salvage the faltering fortunes of theCommunist Party. His participation demonstrated the Party's intention to continue to bea political force, bolster the Party's position as an opposition force and preventCommunist party leader G. Zyuganov from losing the elections.

Kharitonov in his own words:

"Yes, I believed previously that the leftwing forces shouldn't take part [in theelections]. After the disgraceful events of the parliamentary election campaign,I thought we should say 'no' to such dishonest elections, but my comrades in theleftwing opposition held a different view, and finally I agreed with them weneeded to take part in the elections, if only to let the electorate know of our position;you can't let a chance like that slip by" (IA Interfax, 01.20.2004).

"I could be a uniting force for those who are trying to help from within, to make thechairman leave and get the presidium dissolved, and in the interests of Russia. It is

for this reason our electoral alliance is called Communists, patriots and agrarian"(RIA Novosti, 01.21.2004).

Views of Political Commentators and Politicians:

V. Ilyukhin: "Our party comrade will have a difficult time of it. By putting forwardKharitonov, Zyuganov was saved from political death: for an experienced politicianto win 7 per cent against Putin means a situation reminiscent of the 'Menshikov inBerezovka' ('unsuccessful end of an extremely successful career', referring to thefriend of Tsar Peter I, A. Menshikov, who was sent into exile), so both Zyuganovand Berezovsky are prepared to withdraw their candidates in the course of the campaign, making a fuss in the media about boycotting the elections" (MoskovskayaPravda, 12.31.2003).


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THE CANDIDATES

Nikolai Mikhailovich KHARITONOV

M. Lapshin: "This is a significant event, it is the Communists running away fromthe election marathon, it is evidence of a serious crisis of cadres within theCommunist Party. N. Kharitonov has made an attempt to halt the decline of theCommunist Party, by taking on a burden that is too great for him" (Interfax,12.30.2003).

V. Ryzhkov: "It seems to me that the Communist Party has made a mistake in this,because Nikolai Kharitonov has never been associated with the Communist Party.He is more associated with the agrarian movement."

S. Markov: "The nomination of Nikolai Kharitonov as the Communist Partycandidate is a semiboycott, or a cowardly boycott of the presidential elections"

(Interfax, 12.29.2003).Kharitonov's Party and Public support

Communist Party Support

"The Central Election Commission registered Nikolai Kharitonov as a candidatefor the Presidentcy, nominated by the CPRF. Since the Communists overcamethe 5 per cent barrier in the Duma elections, Kharitonov did not have to gather voters' signatures" (Vedomosti, 01.16.2004).

Public support

N. Kharitonov: "Come to me and I will show you sacks of mail arriving from thepeople" (Izvestiya, 01.21.2004).

Campaign Finance

The Communist Party lost out on $600,000 after failing to endorse rival candidateSemigin:

"The Communist Party decided not to support Semigin (the other CommunistParty candidate). This refusal, as the newspaper explained, would cost theCommunist Party 600,000 dollars" (Gazeta, 01.26.2004).

Nevertheless,, Khartinov and the party did receive funding from elsewhere, though their

financial position remained precarious:"So far, candidate Kharitonov's election fund is the most modest, only 50,000roubles out of the permitted 250 million. And if he doesn't manage to win morethan 2 per cent of the votes, the Communist Party will have to pay back the moneyfor the free TV airtime and printed publications in the media. In the current situation, when the leadership has had an argument with one of its main sponsors, thismeans virtual bankruptcy. As a result, there is a real possibility that Kharitonovmay withdraw his candidature" (Rossiskaya Gazeta, 02.05.2004).

Party funds to the sum of one million roubles have also been received by State Dumadeputy Nikolai Kharitonov, put forward by the Communist Party: he now has

1,225,000 roubles" (Commersant, 02.18.2004).


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THE CANDIDATES

Oleg Alexandrovich MALYSHKIN

Profile

Oleg Malyshkin was born in 1951 in the RostovonDon Region. After a career insports, he joined the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in 1991. Since thenOleg Malyshkin's public and labour activities have been closely linked with the LiberalDemocratic Party of Russia. In 1997, he was elected Head of the Administration of theTatsinsk District of the Rostov Region. He is also reputed to have been a onetime

bodyguard of LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. From 2001, he has been the Headof the Central Headquarters of the LDPR faction. On 9 January 2004, he wasregistered as the candidate of the LDPR party for the post of President of Russia.

Malyshkin's Motives

Many agree that Malyshkin's candidature was propped up by LDPR leader Zhirinovsky

only to bolster his own image. Malyshkin was practically unknown in the LDPR, byplacing him as a candidate, the subsequent rout at the polls (which was predictedregardless of leader) would have little adverse effect on Zhirinovsky's own image.

By placing Malyshkin as a candidate, V. Zhirinovsky also sought to dispel a widely heldbelief that the LDPR was a oneman party led by him.

O. Malyshkin: "We need an authoritarian regime, where all powers are concentrated in the hands of the President", says Mr. Malyshkin, after which he explains thatVladimir Zhirinovsky, the simple dictator of the LDPR party, made way for him"in order to demonstrate the collegial nature of our party" (Financial Times,01.17.2004).

V. Zhirinovsky: "The purpose of putting forward O. Malyshkin as the presidentialcandidate for the LDPR is also to show that there are other people in our party,apart from its leader; especially so as journalists have stuck the label of 'onemanparty' on the LDPR" (Interfax, 12.27.2003).

"Question: There are two versions explaining why Malyshkin is going to the elections instead of you. Some say, the Kremlin asked you not to participate and not totake too many votes away from Putin. According to another version, this is how youdemonstrate that the current elections are a fiction, meaningless ritual." [Answer:V. Zhirinovsky] "Here is the third version, ours, the LDPR's. Firstly, we put

forward Malyshkin, because we work as a team. Secondly, I want to unchain myhands regarding media representation. My role is to be the spokesman on TV andradio." (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, an interview with V. Zhirinovsky, 02.17.2004).

Despite Zhirinovsky's best attempts, Malyshkin candidature has not been taken seriously:

"In the list of the seven candidates, Oleg Malyshkin appears to be an absolutelymarginal one. But the idea with putting forward his candidature is not so primitiveand farcical, as it seems to be. Zhirinovsky never does anything for no reason(though this may be said about all teams and individuals participating in thepolitical process). The LDPR leader must have decided, that it is unreasonable toburn himself in the uncontested elections of 2004. His success would be a result as

good as (or not too much worse than) the result of the past December, but this washardly possible competing with Putin" (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 02.18.2004).


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THE CANDIDATES

Oleg Alexandrovich MALYSHKIN

Malyshkin's Party and Public Support

Despite the veneer of a united party behind Malyshkin, his campaign was constantly

overshadowed by the stronger personality of Zhirinovsky. In the end, this discreditedany attempt to prop up an image of an independent, Zhirinovsky free campaign:

O. Malyshkin: "There will not be any great division between V. Zhirinovsky andmyself. We will do everything together" (O. Malyshkin to RenTV, programme24, 12.27.2003).

"The free air time allocated for the LDPR presidential candidate will mostly beused by me, to call on the electorate to vote for Oleg Malyshkin," VladimirZhirinovsky, leader of the LDPR party stated. "I know better than anyone elsemy party's stand on all issues. Let Malyshkin talk on TV, too, if they invite himto" (Noviye Izvestiya, 01.14.2004).

"On 8 January, at the Central Election Commission, the LDPR candidate, OlegMalyshkin, known only within the party itself, thanked the head of the CEC,Veshnyakov, and promised to 'fulfil the party programme with honour'. The factthat he was the first to receive a candidate's pass, Malyshkin sees as the 'result ofprecise and rapid work by the party' [NOTE: This demonstrates an attempt bythe party organisation (though not necessarily Zhrinovsky) of rallying behindMalyshkin]. (Izvestiya, 01.09.2004).

V. Zhirinovsky: "You give us votes, and then we will decide who will be president.Just give us the votes. Malyshkin as President. He will appoint me Prime Ministerand a month later resign his post. That's all. And I will become President andPrime Minister" (NTV Today, 02.15.2004).

A. Morozov, the first deputy head of the election team: "At lot of people are sarcastic about him. Yet he is the closest to the people out of the whole bunch of candidates. Our ace is Malyshkin himself" (Gazeta, 02.17.2004).

Malyshkin's Campaign Finance

Due to the antioligarch rhetoric of the LDPR the Malyshkin's campaign has foundfinancing difficult. Only late in the campaign did it receive funding from businessmenfrom medium sized firms:

"The LPDR in general has long been sponsored by Pskov businessman Eduard

Vaschuk. But Oleg Malyshkin election campaign has been funded by a multitudeof mediumsize businessmen, each supporting certain aspects of the campaign.So in the case of Vaschuk, there is an emphasis on his economic policies. Victoryfor his candidate in the presidential elections is not all that important for him"(NTV Personal Contribution, 01.31. 2004).

"There is no money at all in the election fund of the LDPR candidate OlegMalyshkin. This is not a violation of the rules: the main thing is for money to startflowing into the election fund" (Gazeta, 02.04.2004).

"Oleg Malyshkin has the secondbiggest electoral war chest. In January he didn't havea single kopeck, but on 2 and 9 February, the LDPR transferred 25 million roublesinto its candidate's account. This money for Malyshkin was paid partly by PremierIntervideo Ltd. (13.8 thousand roubles) and the advertising and lawyers' agency AdaService Consulting (about 17 million roubles)" (Commersant, 02.18.2004).


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THE CANDIDATES

Sergei Mikhailovich MIRONOV

Profile

Sergei Mironov was born in 1953 in Pushkin, near the city ofLeningrad, where he studied and worked until he was appointedto the Federation Council to represent St. Petersburg inDecember 2000. In 1980, he graduated from the PlekhanovMining University in Leningrad. In 1998, he received a lawdegree from St. Petersburg State University. Mironov has had

a long association with the current President. Both were involved in the municipal politics of St. Petersburg. Since being elected Federation Council chairman in December2001, Mironov has shown his loyalty to Putin on several occasions. Within six monthsof holding the position, he proposed Putin's term from four to seven years and also suggested that Putin be elected three times. He heads the 'Russian Party of Life'.

Mironov's Motives for Participation

The main motive for S. Mironov's participation in the election campaign was a desire toprovide a genuine electoral contest in order for Putin's assured secondterm to becomelegitimate.

He announced this quite openly, and this once again confirmed speculation that theKremlin feared lowvoter turnout and subsequent criticism from international opinion.Adversely however, Mironov's declared intention only fuelled cynicism as many saw anabsence of a genuine contest, and no real conviction from the Putin challengers.

S. Mironov's in his own words:

"Noone doubts that V. Putin will be the next President, and we all want this. Butif the party shows confidence in me and, at the congress on 4 January, puts me forward as a presidential candidate, I will agree to campaign for this post in order forthe Party of Life to become a real political force and, at the next presidential elections, not be concerned about the 7 per cent barrier (to enter into legislative politics)" (Interfax, 12.23.2003).

"We must show that the President is not alone, that he is not fighting in the shades"(Vedomosti, 01.12.2004).

"Participation in the political process is the duty of political parties and politicians.

They declare themselves precisely for this purpose" (Versiya, 02.09.2004).

"I want to give the President a shoulder to lean on" (Trud, 02.10.2004).

Many in the media believe that Mironov's candidature is a means to launch a seriouspolitical career, perhaps, even as a successor to Putin:

"He [Mironov] called the presidential election campaign 'the highest tribune fromwhich one can express one's views' and Mironov stated the hope that he would beheard 'by both the President and the Government" (ITARTASS, 12.30.2003).

"Some analysts believe that the chairman of the Federal Council (Mironov) isattempting to draw the spotlight on himself in preparation for his declaration of hisambitions in 2008. After all, Putin will not campaign for a third term" (Trud,02.10.2004).


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THE CANDIDATES

Sergei Mikhailovich MIRONOV

Experts' Comments:

. Przhezdomsky: "I believe that S. Mironov is motivated here by moral and ethical qualities, in support of his comrade and friend, a person whom he respects V. Putin" (Radio Svoboda, 12.23.2003).

I. Bunin: "Mironov is fulfilling the task, set by the authorities, of filling a sort ofvacuum that appeared at the beginning of the presidential campaign. Now he iscreating the impression of some sort of contest in the presidential elections; forWestern consumption. But if a liberal does, after all, emerge among the candidates,then S. Mironov's candidature will be superfluous and he may withdraw"(Interfax, 12.24.2003).

Mironov's Party support

"The Speaker of the Federal Council, S. Mironov, has been put forward as a candidate for the post of President of Russia. This decision was taken by the delegatesto the 3rd Congress of the Russian Party of Life, of which Mironov is the leader"(Agency RIA Novosti, 01.04.2004).

Mironov's Campaign Finance

"One of the biggest election purses turned out to be that of S. Mironov. TheRussian Party of Life, which he heads, has become the only financial source for hiselection campaign. It transferred 5 million roubles to the leader of that party.Moreover, S. Mironov is spending the money in his election fund quite carefully.At the first stage of gathering signatures, the Party of Life leader spent only1,534,188 roubles". (Rossiya, 02.12.04.)

According to the information provided by the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation,on the 5th of March, 2004, S. Mironov's election fund contained 52,149 thousand roubles (see the combined table with the information on the candidates).


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THE CANDIDATES

Vladimir Vladimirovich PUTIN

Profile

The current incumbent was born in Leningrad in 1952. He was recruited to theKGB while studying at Leningrad State University's law school. He worked in the

agency's foreign intelligence unit, serving in Leningrad and Dresden. In 1990, heswitched to politics and became an assistant to Anatolii Sobchak, who was then chairmanof the Leningrad Soviet. From 199196 he served in the Administration ofSt. Petersburg Mayor Sobchak, rising to the position of first deputy mayor. In 1996, hemoved to Moscow to work in the presidential administration, of which he was named firstdeputy head in May 1998. In the same year he moved to become Director of the Federal

Security Service, the successor organization of the KGB. In August 1999 he was namedprime minister, and became acting president in late December of that year whenPresident Boris Yeltsin abruptly resigned, naming Putin as his successor.

Putin's Motives for Participation

Unlike the other candidates, the same questions of V. Putin's motives do not applyentirely. Observers instead examine his many actions, or that of his administration. All ofwhich serve to bolster his position and assure a secondterm and even a further term foran anointed successor:

V. Putin: "I am not going to stand on behalf of a political party, but will collect thesignatures (in support of my own candidacy), two and a half million signatures."(TV Channel Rossiya, Vesti Nedeli, 12.21.2003).

Yu. Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow: "If Putin stands as an independent candidate, not from a party, this means that his main aim is to put the interests of the citizens, the interests of the Russian people first" (TV Channel Rossiya, Vesti Nedeli,12.21.2003).

V. Putin: "I believe that it is a stupid and harmful thing to boycott any elections.Because this might cause the breakdown of normal political life in the country, bedetrimental to the economy. It is a cowardly position. It would be much more cor

rect, even for those that believe they have no chance I believe there is alwaysa chance it would be much more honest and correct to stand in the elections andfight, using the election campaign tribune to stand up for your convictions"(Argumenty i Fakty, 12.24.2003).

I. Ponomaryev, the head of the Communist party information centre: "(Bybeing a declared independent) Putin wants to retain room for manoeuvre. He is stillsurrounded by various groups in the Administration. The United Russia is but oneof these groups. If he decided not to be an independent and stands on behalf ofUnited Russia, he would limit his room for manoeuvre in the eyes of the public andwithin the competing factions in the Administration" (Radio Svoboda,12.25.2003).


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THE CANDIDATES


G.Pavlovsky,political scientist: "The fouryear presidential term was sufficient forPutin to create a new Russian state: it has been greatly consolidated. But Putin is

having to cope with a very complex reality. He must act in such a way as to avoidundermining society's expectations, but at the same time he cannot become theplaything of the blind majority" (Interfax, 01.02.2004).

A. Dakhin, head of Nizhny Novgorod departament of the Russian Foundation

for free elections: "The impending election campaign will not be the most interesting, since there are no candidates equal in weight to Putin. On the other hand,Putin is the symbol of the majority" (IA Nizhegorodskaya sluzhba novostei,02.09.2004).

Putin's Party and Public Support

V. Putin was supported by the parties: United Russia, Pensioners' Party of Russia, the

Party of Russian Regions, actually Mironov's Russian Party of Life, and a part of theURWF controlled by A. Chubais. In addition, he was supported by many public andcultural figures, unions and public organisations.

Party support: United Russia, Pensioners' Party of Russia, the People's Will Partyformed as a result of a conflict with S. Glazyev, support from the Russian Party of Life.

Business community support: Chamber of Trade and Industry (E. Primakov), support from a 'Cooperative' a noncommercial partnership of the heads of the biggestindustrial enterprises in the Perm Region, 15 per cent of the members of the Guild ofRussian Advocates, the Union of Russian Pensioners, Vladivostok city, sixty regional

sports federations of the Primorye region and so on.Eminent public and cultural figures: M. Gorbachev (former USSR president), Yu.Antonov (singer), L. Roshal (doctor who helped the hostages at the seized by theterrorists theatre in Moscow in 2002), etc.

The Press noted the fact that, as the date of the elections draws closer, more and morevaried associations, public organisations, and famous people were rushing to declare theirsupport for V. Putin's candidature.

"The closer the elections get, the more public organisations swear their loyalty tothe current President. In Primorye, representatives of over sixty regional sports federation got together specially to declare their support for Vladimir Putin" (Russkiy

Courier, 02.10.2004).However, Members of the RUIB (Russian Union of Industrialists and Businessmen)evaded supporting Putin's candidature. The episode demonstrates divisiveness it causedin such associations:

"At the beginning of January, a number of members of the RUIB (Russian Unionof Industrialists and Businessmen) bureau proposed discussing the question asto what the members of the Union might do to support V. Putin in thepresidential elections. A corresponding item was even introduced into the initialdraft agenda of yesterday's meeting of the RUIB bureau. But then it was crossedout. The majority of the members of the bureau considered the matter ofexpressing loyalty to the President as 'overthetop' and tasteless. If the Presidentneeded an endorsement, there were more elegant ways for this to happen"(Commersant, 02.17.2004)


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THE CANDIDATES


Putin's Campaign Finance

The campaign of presidential candidate V. Putin has the longest list of sponsors: sevennonprofit nongovernmental organisations, thirtythree commercial organisations andtwentyone individuals supported him.

"the GUTA group, which also owns Rot Front and Krasniy Octyabr...throughits subsidiary TKK GUTA, also joined the support group for the 'main candidate'(two million roubles were transferred to his fund by TKK). All made small contributions to the election 'assets' of the current president from large financial institutions such as CB Sodbusinessbank to constructions such as DIAT2000, winetrading (OAO Tsimlyanskiye Vina), tourist and other businesses, including theSedmoi Kontinent retail store network and the Millerovsky Oilextraction Plant giving the impression of a wide base of support, from all types of industry. This wasbolstered by donations from ordinary citizens having contributed a total of 100,00hardearned roubles for their favourite candidate" (RBCdaily, 02.05.2004).

"Putin's sponsors include regional funds for support for the United Russia party (inall, the Smolensk, Moscow Region, Magadan and Vologda regional party fundshave contributed 1,330,000 roubles). The President is also supported materially byDorstroitrestM Ltd, (250,000 roubles), Food Sale Ltd. (800,000 roubles),DIAT2000, the cruise company Orthodox (700,000 roubles) and OJSCSedmoi Kontinent (777 thousand roubles). The biggest contribution to Putin'selection fund was made by the company Rot Front (4 million roubles)"

(Novorossiisky Rabochy

, 02.07.2004)."CJSC Inteko and Rotor House Ltd. contributed one million roubles each to theelection fund of the current President; the companies Yavastroi and Yuventastroi three million roubles each" (Commersant, 02.18.2004).


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THE CANDIDATES

Ivan Petrovich RYBKIN

Profile

Ivan Rybkin was born in Voronezh Oblast in 1946. He was educated at the

Volgograd Agricultural Institute, where he graduated in 1968. At 24 he joined theCommunist Party and taught at the Institute for 13 years. He entered local politics, serving on the Volgograd City Council. Rybkin was elected to the StateDuma in 1993 and became the lower chamber's speaker. He was reelected to theDuma in 1995 from a singlemandate district in Voronezh. In October 1996, heleft the Duma to become secretary of the Security Council where he helped negotiate the controversial RussianChechen treaty that was signed in May 1997. Itwas also during his time at the council that he forged an alliance with oligarch Boris

Berezovsky. In July 2003, Rybkin was named leader of the proBerezovsky wing of theLiberal Russia party. Later the same year, Rybkin declared his candidacy for the pres

idency with financial support from Berezovsky. In 24 December 2003, announced hisintention to stand for the post of President as an independent candidate. He was put forward by a group from his Liberal Russia party. On 5 March he withdrew from the presidential race, after a series of claims of kidnapping and attempts to silence his positionfrom mysterious quarters.

Rybkin's Motives for Participation

Rybkin's candidature was initially assessed as a means for providing B. Berezovsky amouthpiece in the coming elections. As a result, I. Rybkin's chances were originallyestimated as zero.

B. Berezovsky: "Failure in the elections allows the authorities to continue the arbitrary use of power that is prevalent in the country. I am convinced that Rybkin is

the one that can put a stop to this" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.25.2003).

I. Rybkin: "I am standing in order to set out my views and to win. I am notplaying games" (Russian Information Agency (St.Petersburg), 01.15.2004).

Views from Political Commentators:

A. Dukaev, Press secretary of Rybkin's election team: "Everything will work out;after all, Berezovsky has already made two presidents. First he created BorisYeltsin for us, and then Vladimir Vladimirovich (Putin). Now it is Rybkin's turn"(Gazeta.Ru, 12.23.2004).

V. Nikonov, President of Politics Foundation: "Rybkin, whom the businessmanB. Berezovsky intends to assist in this, can participate in the elections, but theresult will be at the level of 0.1 %. I doubt that Rybkin will manage to collect thenecessary two million signatures in his support" (Interfax, 12.23.2003).

B. Nemtsov, politician, former cochairman of the URWF: "It is clear to methat Rybkin's candidature is a Berezovsky project and I think that Rybkin willagree to stand for President and that he will express the views that BorisBerezovsky holds" (Interfax, 12.24.2003).

D. Orlov, deputy director of the Centre for political technologies: "Rybkin has

no chance of winning the coming presidential elections. He may achieve theabsolute minimum of votes, but nowhere near enough to make any difference.Rybkin is not charismatic" (Gazeta, 12.24.2003).


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THE CANDIDATES

Ivan Petrovich RYBKIN

Rybkin's Party and Public Support

Party support: Liberal Russia, URWF Astrakhan, supporters of conservative andinternational parties, as well as supporters of the Union of Realists, affiliated with theMotherland bloc.

"750,000 fully selected signatures, ready for submission, have already been collected. It is mainly the Liberal Russia party activists that are gathering them, irrespective of their split in support of Pokhmelkin and Berezovsky" (Noviye Izvestiya,01.16.2004).

"Rybkin announced to journalists that, in addition to paid signature collectors, 'anunexpected number of people have turned up who were prepared to give their support free of charge'. They included members of his own party Liberal Russia, sup

porters of Conservative and international Parties and even the Union of Realists,affiliated to the Motherland alliance" (Gazeta, 01.28.2004).

Public organisations: Protectors of Rights (Astrakhan)

"We have support at grassroots level. We were supported by the Astrakhan defenders of rights, as well as the Astrakhan division of the Union of RightWing Forces.You know, of course, that Berezovsky is a member of the Astrakhan cell of LiberalRussia" (Press secretary of Rybkin Election Headquarter, Alexander Dukaev toGazeta, 12.23.2004).

B. Berezovsky: "I head I. Rybkin's 'initiative group'. And this is not by chance,

since I have known Ivan Petrovich for a very long time. We spent a year together inChechnya, trying to bring peace there. And I truly believe he will be exactly thePresident Russia needs" (TVC Moment of Truth, 01.11.2004).

Rybkin's Campaign Finance

Rybkin is a beneficiary of Berezovsky's declaration to provide funds to candidates infavour of 'rightwing reformism'. Other beneficiaries include including G. Zyuganov,I. Khakamada, B. Nemtsov.

B. Berezovsky: "I am financing Ivan Petrovich Rybkin's campaign. I am doing soquite openly"(Echo Moskvy, 01.23.2004).

I. Rybkin: "I want to stress once more that Berezovsky has financed and isfinancing Liberal Russia. But Liberal Russia is not the only source of my support"(Noviye Izvestiya,01.16.2004).

"In the whole country, judging from the official documents, only two people havecome forward to sponsor the candidates. The 'citizens' (in one person) havesacrificed 3.5 million for Ivan Rybkin" (Rossiskaya Gazeta, 01.21.2004).


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THE CANDIDATES

CAMPAIGN FINANCE & SUPPORT

Source: Savings Bank of the Russian Federation, March 5, 2004.

Candidate Public/party support Who financesBudget of thecampaign,roubles

Budget of thecampaign, $

Spentbudget,per cent

I. Rybkin

The Liberal Russia party,URWF (Astrakhan), supportersfrom the Conservative andInternational parties, supportersfrom the Union of Realists, affiliated with the Motherland bloc

20 individuals (B.Berezovsky/ PlatonElenin)

44,618,080(Information onFebruary 20)

1,576,611

I.Khakamada A part of the URWF1 commercial organisation,30 individuals (L. Nevzlin)

96,214,000 3,399,788 87 per cent

V. Putin

The United Russia party, thePensioners' Party of Russia, theParty of Russian Regions, supportfrom the Russian Party of Life,a part of the URWF

7 nongovernmental organisations, 33 commercialorganisations,21 individuals

42,592,000 1,505,018 85 per cent

S. Mironov The Russian Party of Life (RPL)RPL, 1 commercialorganisation

52,149,000 1,842,721 90 per cent

O. Malyshkin LDPR LDPR 25,000,000 883,392 80 per cent

S. Glazyev Dukhovnoe Nasledie

1 nongovernmental organisation, 113 individuals +the candidate's personalfunds (95%)

11,433,000 403,993 100 per cent

N. Kharitonov The Communist partyThe Communist party, 5commercial organisations,50 individuals

9,834,620 347,513 56 per cent

Total (excluding I. Rybkin's budget) 237,222,620 8,382,425


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THE FEATURES OF THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Survey

We canvass experts, commentators and officials for their assessments on the Russian

Presidential Election. What were its captivating features? How did the candidates'compare, and how were the campaigning conditions? The survey was commissioned

during the election campaign.

Institutions Putin Mironov Kharitonov Malyshkin Khakamada Glazyev Rybkin

Administration of the

President of the RussianFederation

5. 0 2. 5 0. 2 0. 2 1. 2 2. 5 3. 5

Special Service 4. 4 1. 9 0. 9 0. 6 1. 6 1. 3 2. 1

Law enforcement bodies 4. 2 1. 5 0. 2 0. 3 0. 9 1. 6 2. 3

Regional administrations 4. 9 2. 3 0. 2 0. 1 1. 3 1. 2 2. 3

The State federal TVchannels ('First'. 'Russia','TVC')

5. 0 1. 8 0. 1 0. 2 0. 4 2. 2 1. 9

Nonstate massmedia 3. 5 0. 7 0. 4 0. 1 1. 3 0. 5 0. 9

Russian Orthodox Church 3. 9 1. 0 0. 0 0. 1 0. 7 1. 0 0. 7

Natural monopolies(Gazprom, RAO 'UESof Russia', Russian OpenSociety RZHD)

4. 3 1. 1 0. 6 0. 0 0. 8 0. 6 0. 8

Businessmen declaring theloyalty to theKremlin(Gazprom, RAO'UES of Russia', Russian

Open Society RZHD)

3. 9 1. 8 0. 6 0. 7 0. 5 0. 1 1. 4

Question: On a scale of 1 to 10, please mark which institutions have been helpful or detrimental to the presidentialcandidates (+5 a maximum level of assistance, 0 absence of influence, and 5 no assistance at all, verging onobstruction).

Experts' assessments, on average.


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THE FEATURES OF THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Question: Do you think that the reelection of Vladimir Putin, the current incumbent, is assured inthe upcoming elections on March 14, 2004? If so, what will be the dynamics and issues governing the

election campaign?The experts' answers:

I. Bunin, Director of the Political Technologies Centre: "Aside from Putin, thiselection will serve other objectives for candidates. Many will watch carefully if Glazyev will achieve 10%, allowing him a fighting chance to do better and even be a serious presidential candidate in the 2008elections. For other candidates, the elections will serve as an opportunity to shore up their own position within their political subcultures. Thus for Kharitonov, it will be an opportunity to bolster thecore Communist Party support; for Khakamada, the elections will unite liberal voters opposed toPutin."

I. Dzyaloshinsky, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Independent Institute forCommunicavistics, the programme director of the Institute for Press Development: "The point abouthis election campaign is that people have confidence and have made a longterm investment in Putin."

V. Rimsky, Head of the INDEM Foundation Sociology Department: "In these elections, citizensdo not see any dynamism at all. The majority of voters see the elections results already determined.Moreover, many feel that the president and his sponsors have determined the issues governing the election campaign. It is a widely held belief that this Administration has unrivalled access to resourceswhich will assure their position and be detrimental to opposition candidates. As a result, there is anabsence of an electoral contest, vigorous or otherwise. "

I. Ponomarev, Head of the Communist Party information centre: "The main issue during this campaign will be how legitimate the poll will become. Will there be a low turn out [thus nullifying the firstround]? Will false votes be cast in favour of Putin's rivals do provide the illusion of an electoral contest? In the main, how can these elections be considered democratic if leaders of the major parties donot, or cannot participate?".

A. Ryabov, a member of the Moscow Carnegie Foundation Research Council, cochairman of theRussian Internal Politics and Political Institutions programme: "This election has been controversialfrom the start when, in early February, Glazyev began to exploit nationalistic sentiment after the terrorattacks in the Moscow Underground. Controversy persisted when Rybkin disappeared and reappeared in London. Yet, Glazyev's campaign ultimately fails thanks to lack of money and poorturnout during his election rallies. Rybkin, after his mysterious disappearing, was no longer a seriouscandidate in the eyes of most people."

I. Mintusov, Chairman of the board of NikkoloM group of companies: "Whilst the victory of Putinis a given, it is more important to observe the other candidates and who will achieve second, third andfourth place. It is also important what is the combined percentage of the vote of all the other candidates.Finally, in relation to this, it will be important to note what the percentage will be for the victor. "

A. Morozov, the First Deputy Head of O. Malyshkin's election campaign: "In my opinion, the mainissue of the campaign is whether the elections will be declared valid or not. As you know, according tothe current legislature, the elections may be admitted valid if the turnout is more than 50%, that is whyI very much doubt that people will participate in these election, and this turnout will be achieved."

Source: the Institute of Social Communications, survey conducted between February 1224, 2004.


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THE MEDIA AND THE RUSSIANPRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

In many respects, the media played a critical role in governing the dynamics of the election. This particularly the case for the broadcast media, whose influence now far outweighs that once wielded by the print media.

COVERAGE OF CANDIDATES

In Russia, 98 per cent of the population watch television and 95 per cent do so regularly.Source: FOM. AllRussia Study, June 2003. Sample: 1500: Error 3,6%

Over the election campaign, V. Putin has appeared and mentioned on the federal TV

channels more than all his rivals put together. He has had a coverage totalling 60 hoursand 24 minutes whereas other competitors in almost six times it is less.

4.7 times more than S. Glazyev

5.7 times more than I. Khakamada

7.5 times more than N. Kharitonov

Candidates on Federal TVchannelsPeriod: 6/01/0413/03/04,

Source: ISC TVMonitoring

2151 20091676

1272 970 1075

9518

13,8

7,8 6,2 6,1

11,910,6

61,4

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

V. Putin I. Rybkin S. Glazyev I. Khakamada N. Kharitonov S. Mironov O. Malyshkin

num.o

fappers/mentions

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

hours

num. of appears/mentions

duration

TV


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THE COVERAGE FOR THE CANDIDATESFROM TVCHANNELS WAS DIFFERENT

All the TV channels have focused most on the current President

1st Channel 63 per cent of all topics about the candidates were given over to V. Putin;5per cent to I. Khakamada and 6per cent to S. Glazyev.

Russia 45 per cent to V. Putin, 11per cent to I. Khakamada and and 10 per cent toS. Glazyev.

1st Channel and Russia devoted more attention than the other channels toN. Kharitonov 10 per cent and 12 per cent.

The nonstatecontrolled TV channels broadcast somewhat more topics about thePresident's rivals than the others do: NTV and RenTV took an interest in theRybkin's drama and the scandals over S. Glazyev, and 12 per cent( NTV) and 14 per cent (RenTV), 12 per cent of RenTV's spots, 10 per centNTV's spots mentioned I. Khakamada.

Glazyev election headquarters. Ya. Dubeikovskaya. Head of the election campaign

"Infringements these are mainly of the candidates' equal rights to campaign in themedia. There has been no factual coverage at all of Glazyev's activities. Here, infront of me, I have the results of monitoring of the mass media for February 18.All the candidates, apart from the incumbent, use only their free TV slots.

O. Malyshkin and N. Kharitonov appeared in the news, too. According to themonitoring data, about 30 different forms of indirect campaigning for Putin werenot paid for out of the election fund." (ISC, expert polls, Feb 1624 )

Share of coverage for the candidates from TV channels% of total coverage of all candidates appearingPeriod 6.01.0413.03.04, TV channels: 1st, Rossia, NTV, TVC, RenTVSource: ISC, TVMonitoring

63%

45%

49%

51%

40%

4%

8%

11%

17%

20%

6%

10%

12%

13%

14%

5%

11%

10%

8%

12%

12%

4%

4%

5%

10%

3%

4%

7%

6%

6% 6%

8%

6%

4%

5%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

1st

Rossia

NTV

TVC

RENTV

Share of total coverage for all candidates by channel

V. Putin I. Rybkyn S. Glazyev I. Khakamada N. Kharitonov S. Mironov O. Malyshkin


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29



CANDIDATE COVERAGE

How television channels covered each candidate by reporting:

V. Putin

Television focused considerable attention on his registration first with the CEC, hismeeting with his election team and refusal to participate in debates. These were part offactual reporting.

Complaints to the CEC against V. Putin (broadcast of his meeting with his electionteam) and meeting with supporters by I. Khakamada and N. Haritonov were not covered by the statecontrolled channels.

,

no. of topics

TV

Refusal to participate in TV debates

Meeting with the election team

with his authorised election team

Appeal to Russian voters to turn up and vote

Introduction


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30



CANDIDATE COVERAGE

S. Glazyev

Federal channels presented coverage of the candidate's campaign by reporting on themost important events of S. Glazyev's campaign:

S. Glazyev's purge from the post of the chairman of the Motherland (Rodina)Duma faction, under the initiative of D. Rogozin and S. Baburin.

Struggle for nomination for president by the Motherland alliance ending in hisdefeat.

S. Glazyev's attempt to create a party under the Motherland brand withoutD. Rogozin.

S. Glazyev's displacement from the post of the Motherland cochairman andhis exclusion exception from the Party of the Russian Regions.

Gathering of signatures for his nomination, culminating in a scandal overfraudulent signatures.

The 1st Channel and Rossia did not report on the People's Will congress,which supported S.Glazyev at the beginning of his campaign.

,

no. of topics

TV

representation

Attempt to reconstitute Motherland

(Rodina) party without D. Rogozin


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31



CANDIDATE COVERAGE

Khakamada

I. Khakamada's campaign was presented in the following way:

the constant background for Khakamada has been the collection of signatureswith all sorts of infringements

the Congress of the URWF not supporting Khakamada's candidature

L. Nevzlin, was placed on the international wanted list

S.Glazyev's refusal to support I. Khakamada in boycott of elections

Statecontrolled TVchannels practically held back facts about:

I. Khakamada's statement concerning the NordOst terrorist attack

Complaint to the CEC against V. Putin (broadcast of his meeting withhis election team) and meeting with supporters

I. Khakamada's meeting with her supporters.

,

no. of topics

TV

Violations

The URWF not supporting Khakamada's candidature

I. Khakamada's statement concerningthe NordOst terrorist attack


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32



CANDIDATE COVERAGE

I. Rybkin

The only coverage Rybkin seemed to receive was the drama surrounding his disappearance, sightings of him in Kiev, his appearance in London and his subsequent departurefrom the presidential race. During this, there was also TV coverage of allegations of falsenomination papers and the identity of his financial backer, Boris Bezeovsky. Underthese circumstances, the 1st Channel and Russia, which are usually indifferent to

Rybkin, were willing devote time to him, though the coverage was ultimately detrimental to his campaign.

,

no. of topics

TV


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33



CANDIDATE COVERAGE

O. Malyshkin

Malyshkin's campaign was distinguished by the refusal of the CEC to allowV. Zhirinovsky to represent Malyshkin in TV debates.

N. Kharitonov

TV coverage focused on Kharitonov's programme presentation on the anniversary ofLenin's death and preelection trip to Tula (town near Moscow). This took place without the backdrop of his election campaign.

,

Zyuganov's declaration about possible rejection of N. Kharitonovbecause of V. Putin's nonparticipation in the debates

N. Kharitonov. Lodging a complaint to the CEC(report on V. Putin's meeting with his election team)

N. Kharitonov and I. Khakamada. The CEC's refusal(Putin's meeting with supporters)

O. Malyshkin. The CEC refuses to admit V. Zhirinovskyan authorised representative

S. Mironov. Registration with the CEC of the RF

no. of topics

TV

N.


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34



INTONATION COVERAGE OF THE CANDIDATES'CAMPAIGNS IN THE MEDIA

Coverage of the candidates and their activities has differed considerably not only interms of volume, but also the tone in which the events were interpreted and the attitudetowards the candidate.

In the main, coverage of V. Putin has been positive. Accusations of cowardice for notparticipating in TV debates were muted in contrast to constant coverage of his dynamic activities as president. The implication and image being of a president more interested in action rather than conversation.

Negative information affected S. Glazyev and I. Khakamada most of all.

no. of topics

TV0

TV0p

in


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35




O. Malyshkin and N. Kharitonov were of no interest to the TV and the press and theywere allowed airtime only for rare appearances and brief coverage of the candidates' activities.

The editorial policy of the central press looks more democratic and balanced. But withonly 15 per cent of the population reading newspapers even sometimes (Fund of PublicOpinion 's data) their impact is only marginal.

TV

,

no. of topics

TV


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36




Readership of national newspapers

Edition AIR, 000's 16+ AIR, %

Izvestiya 370.3 0,7

Commersant 270.8 0,5

Komsomolskaya pravda 1781.1 3,4

Moskovsky Komsomolets 1207.2 2,3

Rossiskaya Gazeta 334.3 0,6

Other Below of the measurement error, level

Source: TNS Gallup Media, National Readership Survey, MayOctober 2003, 16+

AIR (Average Issue Readership) average amount of readers of one issue in 000's or per sent.


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37



SUMMARY

From the moment when the first independent elections were held in Russia, the media particularly theelectronic media has played an exclusive role in the buildup to polling day. So much so that expertsspeak of a new 'media dynamic' to Russian politics.

In this sense, the 2004 elections are exceptional.

On the one hand, an unprecedented situation has taken shape during Putin's first term of office: all themain TV channels are now statecontrolled. The state control also extends to editorial control, leading topolitical censorship, which naturally leaves a certain imprint on the coverage of the presidential candidates.

A certain style of reporting has developed. The federal TV channels give positive coverage to all ofPresident Vladimir Putin's actions and policies. They are presented as factual and get more airtime inrelation to other news stories. This explained the violation of election legislation when reporting ofPresident Vladimir Putin became reporting of candidate Putin, meeting his election team. This broadcast, in effect, started the election campaign and allowed the incumbent to set the tone and tempo of thecampaign. It was broadcast live by two federal TV channels and repeated over and over by many regional channels. In contrast the campaign of his opponents are hardly reported, and when they are, it is doneso in a certain, disdainful style. Their image is downgraded and their activities covered not so much in anegative, as in an ironic light. Some experts apply the expression "clowns" to Putin's opponents and thisgoes unchallenged.

For example, in a typical news bulletin, the first half reports on President Putin whereby he makesdecisions to increase the pension, open construction projects and allocate grants.

The second half hardly reports the activities of candidate Putin, but gives shorter slots to candidates.The implication, cemented throughout the campaign, is that the current incumbent is a 'doer' andhis opponents are simply 'talkers'.

The situation in the press is different many central newspapers and magazines permit themselves bothnegative and ironical comments on the current president and, on the contrary, devote quite considerablespace to covering the activities of the other candidates. The press does not, however, have any substantialelectoral significance: the central newspapers are distributed mainly in the capital and have an impact onthe political elite, while the overwhelming majority of voters form their opinion of the political situation onthe basis of corresponding broadcasts on the statecontrolled TV channels. Thus, freedom of speech (inthe press) and unequal access for the candidates to airtime and a clear bias in the TV coverage of their

actions all exist, side by side.It should also be noted that an important role is played in the electoral process by the regional press.Owing to the specifics of the political situation in the regions, however, only on extremely rare occasionsare the owners of these media are willing to come into conflict with the local authorities, while the latterwilling to enter into conflict with the federal authorities even more rarely. So bias in the coverage of theelection campaign is inevitable here, too.

In the final analysis, Putin's subsequent victory was as a result of a monopoly of the airwaves. Many havepointed to the fact that this had been achieved in the years running up to the campaign. Others have alsopointed out to the ineptitude of his opponents, whose activities or policies were hardly worth reporting.


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39


OPINION POLLING DATA

Opinion polling and market research has come of age in Russia and played an importantpart in these elections. The results of polling told of an unprecedented approval ratingfor V. Putin.

Perhaps detrimentally, the results also led to a sense of resignation and the absence ofelectioneering in the subsequent campaign.

MAIN RAITING INSTITUTIONSAND CANDIDATES RATINGS

Russian institutions specialising in commissioning polls/ratings

(Kariera, No. 2, February 2004).

Information on polling centres from open sources

The media and the expert community hold the opinion that the biggest polling centresare affiliated to different political/power interests: VCIOM and FOM thePresidential Administration, ROMIR Monitoring the military and lawenforcementagencies, Levada Centre YUKOS/ RAO "UES" Rossia".

"Each centre for public opinion research is backed by certain interests. VCIOM isknown to be a governmental organisation. VCIOMA is financed by YUKOS. Asthe newspaper Vremya Novostei reports, FOM is closely connected with thePresidential Administration, and ARPR/Romir Monitoring is close to the lawenforcement bodies of St.Petersburg" (Vremya Novostei, 11.25.03).

"Though it is impossible to conceal some facts. For example, proKremlinorientation of Public Opinion Foundation. Or demonstrative isolation fromauthorities of VCIOMA that publishes high ratings of the Communist party, thusarousing suspicion that they cooperate with communists" (Politcom.ru, 06.04.03).

Organisation Director SpecialtyPattern

of ownershipWebSite

OJSC AllRussian Centre for PublicOpinion Research (VCIOM)

ValeryFyodorov

Opinion polls Governmental www.wciom.com

FOM (Public Opinion Foundation)Alexander

OslonPolitics/Elections Private www.fom.ru

ARPR (Agency for Regional PoliticalResearches)/ ROMIR Monitoring

AndreiMilekhin

Politics/Marketing

Private www.romir.ru

TNS Gallup Media

Vladimir

Grodsky Media business Private www.tnsglobal.ruYuri Levada's analytical centre

(VCIOMA)Yuri Levada Politics/Elections Private www.vcioma.ru


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40OPINION POLLING DATA


FOM

"As proof of the pure intentions of his bosses, a subordinate of A. Veshnyakov (Headof the CEC) promised to publish the party ratings of the Public Opinion Foundation(FOM) daily on the CEC website. The head of FOM itself, A. Oslon, consideredas being a Kremlin lackey, did not appear for the discussion with his colleagues(S.Skatskoy, Vremya MN, 12.07.03).

"According to certain information, Alexander Oslon, head of the Public OpinionFoundation (FOM) and known for his part in a number of projects of thePresidential Administration, did his best to become head of VCIOM. The Kremlin'sfinal choice, however, rested with a more neutral candidate" (APN.RU, 09.09.03).

The Candidates' Ratings: election, trust, information

Time Period: 02. 20.0402.21.04, respondents 18+Source: FOM (Public Opinion Foundation)

8,56,6

2,80,1

0,41,32,23,5

5,4

69,3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

V.Puti

n

N.Khar

itono

v

S.Gl

azyev

I.K

hakam

ada

O

.Maly

shkin

S.M

irono

v

I.Rybkin

agains

tall

willn

otvot

e

can

nota

nswer

electionratings

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

%r

espon

dents,

trust,in

formation

election ratings

information ratings

rating of trust

Rating of trust answer to the openended question: "Please name several contemporary Russianpoliticians, to whom you personally have a positive attitude, whom you trust."

Information rating answer to the openended question: "Please name several politicians, whosestatements within the last week and were memorable for you".

Election rating answer to the specific question: "March 14 of this year, the presidential electionswill take place, the listed politicians will participate in them. If you took part in the elections, whomof these politicians would you vote for?" (options presented on a card with a list of politicians thecandidates for the Russian presidency, registered by the CEC; information in percent)


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VCIOM VCIOMA (Levada's centre)

At the height of the Duma election campaign, there was a change of leadership at theVCIOM Survey Centre and V. Fyodorov took the reins. The whole team lefttogether with the former VCIOM head, Yu. Levada. Levada then founded his owncompany the Yu. Levada Analytical Centre.

"In 1972, the IKSI team, headed by the liberal academic Rumyantsev, was finallydispersed and the institute itself renamed the Institute for Sociological Research ofthe Academy of Sciences of the USSR. And now, thirty years later, 'national sociology' or opinion polling is undergoing a second purely political rout: on the pretextof gaining control of the AllRussia Centre for Public Opinion Research(VCIOM), with the status of a state unitary enterprise, the most powerful team of

Russian sociologists and pollsters are being destroyed, while the trademark is beingtaken over by the council of directors, consisting of representatives of the Ministry ofLabour, the Ministry of Property and naturally! the Administration of thePresident" (A.Kolesnikov, Vremya MN, 07.08.03).

Opinion PollingCentres

FOM**February 1217

FOM**March 67

ARPR/ROMIR***Monitoring

February 1217

VCIOM****February 12

Levada AnalyticalCentre

February1316

V. Putin 71,1 62,5% 77% 70% 80%

N. Kharitonov 1,8 6,8% 2% * 5%

S. Glazyev 2,7 2,9% 3% 10% 4%

I. Khakamada 1,3 2,9% 2% * 2%

S. Mironov 0,3 0,8% *

O. Malyshkin 0,3 1,9% * I. Rybkin

(rejected6 March 2004)

0,1 0,2% *

Turnout 62% 63,3% ~ 67% 5765% ~ 60%

* no information available** FOM (Public Opinion Foundation), unlike other opinion polling centres, provides election ratings among the wholepopulation, while others include only active voters, who have expressed intention to take part in the voting on March 14,2002.*** Agency for Regional Political Researches**** AllRussian Centre for Public Opinion Research

The candidates' election ratings according to the polling data


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VCIOM VCIOMA (Levada's centre)

The 29 yearold political scientist and sociologist Valery Fyodorov, a member of theNational Security Council (NSC), was appointed general director of VCIOM. 73yearold Yuri Levada, former head of the Centre, now transformed from a state unitary enterprise into a jointstock company, left VCIOM to head the new structureVCIOMA, set up with financial support from circles close to the head of RAO"UES of Rossia", Anatoly Chubais. It is believed that Levada, a professional withmany years' experience, will be able to play a substantial positive role in the electioncampaign of the Union of RightWing Forces (URWF).

Valery Fyodorov, from 1999, worked for the Centre for the Political Situation andfrom 2000 became its director. Last year, he published the collection Mechanismsof Power and in August, his book The Putin Era. In 1999 he worked as an analyston the Unity alliance election team (Gazeta, 11.09.2004).

ARPR/Romirmonitoring

There is no additional information on institutions that support ARPR/Romirmonitoring in open sources. This is in large part due to the personality of its' chairman, AndreiMilekhin. His years of working for Secret Services has gained him a general suspicionfrom industry for his company and its subsequent research findings.

Andrei Milekhin is Chairman of the council of directors and General Director of themonitoring.ru. Group of companies. He has graduated from Leningrad StateUniversity (the same as V. Putin), faculty of psychology and the Higher School ofthe KGB USSR (State Security Committee), after that reaching to become a professor at MPSU. Author of over 40 books, brochures and scientific works on sociology,psychology and the media.

SUMMARY

Not withstanding this, in 2003 the heads of VTsIOM were replaced by people totally

loyal to the President, which gave rise to a mass of presumptions concerning an end toobjective polling in Russia.

The entrenched belief that pollsters are not objective does not bode well for the profession. Nor does it help in the belief strong consensus that Vladimir Putin's rating is highenough to win in the first round (that is, gain over fifty per cent of the votes), and thatthe ratings of all his rivals are negligible.


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EXPERTS' SURVEY ON THE DATA PRESENTEDBY OPINION POLLING CENTRES

Source: Institute of Social Communications, Experts' poll

conducted in February 1224, 2004.

A. Ryabov, a member of the Moscow Carnegie Foundation research council, cochairman of the programme: Russian Internal Politics and Political Instititions: "I most trustthe data provided by the Levada Centre. I least trust FOM, as they are politicallyembroiled with the Kremlin, and VCIOM (director V. Fyodorov). The information ofLevada Centre reflects a more accurate picture of the real situa

russia presidential election 2004

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