russia iran relations in the context of the tehran declaration

8/2/2019 Russia Iran Relations in the Context of the Tehran Declaration

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IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.

Russian-Iranian Relations in the

Context of the Tehran Declaration

Ghoncheh Tazmini*

Abstract

There has been a marked volte face in Russia’s position toward the IslamicRepublic. This was made clear when at a critical political juncture – namely the

watershed agreement on fuel swapping between Brazil, Turkey and Iran – Russiaexpressed support for the US-led UNSC resolution to impose a fourth round of sanctions against Iran. This paper argues that Russia, a country that has traditionally shielded Iran and weighed down on the US from pressuring her, obstructed theinitiative out of economic and geopolitical considerations. Prompted by the eternalquest to restore Russia’s former status as a great power, the Kremlin has had to re-evaluate its relationship with Tehran. Moscow in is in dire need of foreigninvestment, advanced technology, and even markets, which requires thawedrelations with the US. Moscow is ostensibly dissatisfied with the NATO’s eastwardencroachment and also needs the US to turn a blind eye to it geopolitical aspirationsin the former Soviet space. These considerations require that Russia warm up to the

West in general and the US in particular. Incidentally, Obama is offering Russia a

carrot – a diplomatic reset – and Moscow is biting the bait. Today, it appears thatRussia needs the US more and the Islamic Republic less. However, Russia’s aboutturn suggests that Moscow is conscious that if the nuclear impasse is resolved, Iran

would be on its way to becoming a genuine regional power. Furthermore, the Iran- Turkey cooperation axis could also suggest diversification of energy supply routes,breaking Russia’s monopoly on gas. With geopolitical considerations and energy politics in the balance, the stakes are higher, explaining why Russia has acted in anincreasingly unfriendly manner than Iranians seem to have expected.

Keywords: Russian-Iran Relations, Tehran Declaration, Nuclear FuelSwap, Relations with West/US, Security Council Resolutions, Energy Politics

* Ghoncheh Tazmini, holds a Masters degree in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (London School of Economics) and a PhD in International Relations (University of Kent at Canterbury). She has worked with research institutes in Iran and Europe. Her major publications include Khatami's Ira n: the Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform (2009) and Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran:Modernisation and Politics in Revolutionary States (January 2011). She is the founder of StellaOrientis: Centre for Inter-civilisational Research and Dialogue, based in Portugal.



Russian-Irani

8 IRANIAN

Introduction

Historically, relations wavering between c

accurate fix on Russi

and “natural ally” ha

two countries. Perha

relations. However, r

Tehran and Mosco

Security Council san

historians have grap

watershed agreemen

the underlying driver

question: where are

This paper wil

Russian-Iranian rela

Nations Security Co

Iran allows us to

turnabout in Russia’

contention by explor

we will provide a bri

claim that there has

Second, we wi

President Barack

favourably to this in

backing the UNSC r

this apparent thaw in

an Relations in the Context...

REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.

between Russia and Iran have been multifaceted and collaboration and rivalry. Observers find it difficult to

ia-Iran relations. Terms like “strategic partner”, “healt

e been used by observers to qualify the dynamism bet

s, “ambivalence” is the most suitable term to describe

ecent unexpectedly critical and even harsh exchanges

following the May Tehran Declaration and the sub

ctions resolution cast new light on a question that anal

led with: Is Russia a friend or a foe? Moscow’s reactio

t and full-fledged support for the Council resolution

s that motivate Russia in dealing with Iran. This then

ussia-Iran relations going?

l make the case that there has been a significant down

tions. Moscow’s support for the United States-led

ncil resolution to impose a fourth round of sanctions

lean an important development: there has been a

s position vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic. We will sup

ing factors that have prompted this sharp turn. Howev

ief survey of Russian-Iranian relations in order to sup

een more change than continuity in bilateral relations.(1)

ll examine the implications of the “reset” policy initiate

bama in dealing with Russia. Why has Russia res

itiative? Certainly the Kremlin has warmed up to the

esolution. We will examine the principles and priorities

Russia-US relations.

omplex,get an

y rival”

een the

bilateral

etween

sequent

sts and

to this

ighlight

egs the

rade in

United

against

marked

ort this

er, first,

ort the

by US

ponded

est by

behind



IRANIAN

Third, we will

The breakthrough re

relations between th

far-reaching implicat

market that supplies

regional energy hub

of energy supply ro

fossil fuels: natural g

this new geopolitic

competition in energ

We will explo

Declaration. By wea

substantive underst

Moscow. The premi

calculations and con

unravel why.

Tehran Declara

The joint declaratio

historic turning poin

Tayyip Erdogan and

transfer to Turkish c

uranium within a mo

Agency (IAEA). Ira

material used in me

myth of an Iranian

control of the master

The response

American Secretary

agreement with the

China, on a draft pr

While sending a mes

a counterproductive

IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs


consider the implications of an Iran-Turkey cooperati

ached by Turkey, Brazil and Iran suggests paradigmatic

e three countries. The nuclear fuel swap could have

ions, threatening, inter alia , Russia’s dominance in th

Europe. The rapidly shifting landscape suggests tha

could potentially emerge. This would allow for diversi

utes, thereby breaking Russia’s monopoly on the kin

s. Russia’s motives towards Iran are overwhelmingly gu

al calculus, one in which Moscow faces unprec

y politics.

e these themes against the backdrop of the May 2010

ving together these two perspectives we will achieve

nding of why relations have soured between Tehr

se of this argument is based on the assumption that

uct has instigated this downgrade. In this study we att

ion

by Iran, Turkey and Brazil on nuclear fuel swappin

t. The agreement, brokered by Turkish Prime Minister

Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva, would

ustody a large proportion of Iranian stockpile of low e

nth, subject to monitoring by the International Atomic

, in return, would be supplied with the more highly-e

ical isotopes in no more than a year’s time. In this

bomb would be dispensed, and Iran would retain

y of the nuclear fuel cycle.

to the deal by the US was hasty and uncompr

f State, Hilary Clinton, announced that the US had rea

other four permanent UNSC members, including Ru

oposal for the imposition of new, harsher sanctions

sage to Tehran that it cannot escape sanctions, the US a

message to Turkey and Brazil: their independent dipl

9

on axis.

shift in

otential

energy

a new

ification

gpin of

ided by

edented

Tehran

a more

an and

Russia’s

empt to

was a

, Recep

see the

nriched

Energy

nriched

ay, the

its own

mising:

ched an

sia and

n Iran.

lso sent

macy –



Russian-Irani

10 IRANIAN

even if purportedly

to Lula] – was un

definitely hasty reac

the three Tehran De

US and the 5+1 wou

and see” attitude.

appeared to be a f

Iranian ally (albeit a

quite strong and e

enrichment program

Between friend

When Vladimir Puti

as President in 200

predecessor Boris Y

bilateral relations, fo

Middle East, both u

Iranian nuclear dos

UNSC, Russia active

pressure. For exampl

and 2008, Russia bl

even after the IAE

participate in a 5+1

Iran. Moscow public

helped supply materi

In March 200

cooperate with Oba

discussed negotiatin

nuclear power plant.(

July 2009, arguing t

significantly differen

that Iran’s progra

whereas Iran is com



rodded on if not outright prompted by the US [Obam

elcome interference and would be ignored. Wash

ion to the fuel swap was somewhat unexpected – asi

claration signatories, the general expectation had been

ld give it at least the benefit of doubt and assume a “l

owever an interesting twist occurred in this tale. Aft

reign policy watershed, Russia, traditionally regarde

ercurial one) consented to a UNSC draft resolution ca

xpanded sanctions to force Tehran to halt the

e.

and foe

took office first as Russian Prime Minister in 1999 a

, he inherited a strong Russian-Iranian relationship f

eltsin. While there have been a number of ups and d

Tehran, Moscow has been the closest thing to an “all

der Yeltsin and under Putin. In particular, since 2003

ier became an issue at the IAEA and subsequentl

ly fostered the impression that it would guard Iran ag

e, despite voting in favour of UNSC resolutions in 20

cked further punitive action against Iran in Septemb

alleged that Iran failed to cooperate. Russia also re

eeting in 2008 to discuss levelling additional sanctions

ly supported Tehran’s right to peaceful nuclear technol

als and expertise to build the Bushehr nuclear plant.

9 Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev claimed that h

a on the Iranian nuclear issue, yet a month earlier he

a 10-year fuel supply deal with Iran to fuel the2) Medvedev defended Iran in an interview with Italian

at problems associated with Iran’s nuclear program

from those caused by North Korea’s programme. He

me was less disconcerting than North Korea’s “

unicating with the international community, North K

’s letter

ington’s

e from

that the

t’s wait

er what

as an

lling for

ranium

nd then

rom his

wns in

” in the

hen the

at the

inst US

6, 2007

r 2008,

used to

against

ogy and

would

ad also

ushehr

edia in

e were

asserted

ecause,

rea has



IRANIAN

now virtually cut all

Echoing Med

in July 2009 that it is

power plants” in or

Shmatko went on to

market” for Russia.(

Russian Foreign Mi

that Russia would co

Clinton argued “we

this time, because

Lavrov responded th

Also in Marc

Russian and Chinese

on uranium enrich

consider supporting

though it is certainl

proliferation but at

explained its reluctan

the two countries; n

neighbours on the C

In late March

Britain, the US, Fra

for a new round of s

US-led push to imp

this.”(10) In April, th

against Iran. Russia

there would be more

agreement regardin

sanctions – endorsed

swap deal with Iran.

Russia turned its bac

Tehran’s rea

Medvedev asserting:



f its contacts.”(3)

edev’s views, Russian Energy Minister, Sergei Shmatk

“much better to cooperate with Iran in construction of

der to ensure the transparency of Iran’s nuclear pro

say that Iran’s nuclear energy sector represented a “si4) In March 2010, while Clinton visited Russia, Clin

ister, Sergey Lavrov clashed publicly after Lavrov an

mplete a nuclear power plant in Iran by the summer o

think it would be premature to go forward with any pr

e want to send an unequivocal message to the Ira

at the project would definitely be completed.

h, a top Russian Foreign Ministry official announc

envoys pressed the Iranian government to accept a

ent in Tehran in early March. He added, “Russia

sanctions tailored to prevent the spread of nuclear

against any paralyzing sanctions that are aimed not

unishing Iran or, God forbid, regime change.”(7) Ru

ce to impose sanctions on Iran due to the historic ties

mely that they are “economic and cultural partners, as

spian Sea.”(8)

2010 the climate began to change as senior diploma

ce, Germany, China and Russia agreed that they shou

anctions against Tehran.(9) Medvedev expressed suppor

se sanctions on Iran stating, “We cannot turn a blin

5+1 held a second round of talks concerning new s

and Chinese United Nations ambassadors both no

talks in the near future. Finally in May, the 5+1 reache

sanctions against Iran. Remarkably, the new ro

by Russia – came after Turkey and Brazil brokered the

. Rather than support the nuclear fuel exchange pro

k on Iran.

tion was swift: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quickly

“Today, explaining the behaviour of Medvedev to

11

o stated

nuclear

ramme.

nificant

on and

ounced

2010.(5)

oject at

ians.”(6)

ed that

N plan

would

eapons,

at non-

sia also

etween

well as

ts from

ld press

for the

eye to

nctions

ed that

d a new

und of

nuclear

osition,

ebuked

ard the



Russian-Irani

12 IRANIAN

nation of Iran is ve

Russians are our fri

speak with more cau

Iran.” He went on

“historic opportunit

opportunity to begin

and inhumane polici

The comments rapi

International Affairs

said he was “disapp

Mahmud Ahmadine

foreign policy advis

Executive that “politi

Russia’s reacti

director of the Centr

in modern history h

and Iran.”(14)

Russia’s balancSince the end of th

Republic has system

Soviet Russia that ha

“strategic” partnershi

historical baggage

Nevertheless, from

balance to America

strategic consideratio

From a Russia

weaponry and civil n

Russia on regional s

described as “pro-R

days of the post-Col

In addition, R



ry difficult for us... the people of Iran do not kno

ends or are against us.” He advised President Medv

tion and forethought about “such a large and capable n

to warn Obama that the Tehran Declaration repres

for him” should he genuinely want “change” –

respecting the rights of other nations and to abando

es, treating other countries instead with justice and fai

ly generated condemnation from Moscow. Chairman

Committee in the Russian Parliament, Konstantin K

ointed by today’s quite harsh statement by Iranian P

jad about the Russian and US presidents.”(12) Me

or Sergei Prikhodko witheringly scolded the Irania

ical demagoguery” never worked.(13)

ion to the watershed deal was unexpected. Rajab

e for Contemporary Iranian Studies in Moscow argues:

as there been such an aggravation in relations betwee

ng actCold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the

atically cultivated an increasingly close partnership wi

s been characterized in many quarters, in Iran and else

ip or even alliance. Of course, for many Iranians, there i

ttached to relations with Russia and the Soviet

an Iranian perspective, Russia would provide the

n hegemony in the post-Cold War world – an i

n given ongoing US antagonism toward the Islamic Re

n perspective, Iran has been a market for sales of conv

uclear technology. Iran has also been a constructive par

curity issues in Central and South Asia, taking what c

ssian” stance on a number of regional conflicts since t

War period.

ussia has worked had to present itself as a potential pa

if the

edev to

ation as

ented a

and an

wrong

rness.(11)

of the

sachev,

resident

vedev’s

Chief

afarov,

“Never

Russia

Islamic

h post-

here, as

is heavy

Union.

ounter-

portant

ublic.

entional

tner for

ould be

he early

rtner in



IRANIAN

the development of

company, Gazprom,

the development of

Petronas). After Vla

2001, Gazprom and

committee to coordi

provided early politi

India, while Gazpro

to help finance the p

Just a few yea

even closer strategic

in 2007 Putin beca

received by the Isla

since Dmitry Medve

2008 (with Putin bec

in strategic partner

apparent.

As we shall e

Moscow’s willingnes

conditioned by Russi

of natural gas – a p

strong interest in

exports to European

foreign gas supplier.

More broadly,

ties to Tehran again

with Washington – h

and economic gains

has been willing on

exchange for conces

Russia stepped bac

uranium enrichment

the June 2009 presi



Iran’s energy resources. In 1997, Russia’s state-owne

became one of the first foreign energy companies to i

the South Pars gas field (in a joint venture with T

dimir Putin became President of the Russian Feder

the Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Petroleum formed

nate Iranian gas exports with Russia. The Russian gov

al support for a planned gas pipeline from Iran to Paki

offered technical support and even indicated its wil

roject.

rs ago, Russian-Iranian relations seemed to be headed

cooperation. For instance, in an important symbolic st

e the first non-Muslim head of state or governmen

ic Republic’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khame

dev replaced Putin as President of the Russian Feder

oming Prime Minister), the limits on Russia’s willingne

ship with the Islamic Republic have become incr

plain later in the paper, it has become clear, for exam

s to support Iran’s emergence as a gas exporter is ul

ia’s own position as the world’s leading producer and

osition which, among other things, gives Russia an e

orestalling direct competition with prospective Iran

energy markets, where Gazprom is established as the

Moscow’s still compelling need to balance its interest i

t other important foreign policy interests – including r

as regularly frustrated Iranian efforts to maximize the

from cooperation with Russia. Over the last 20 years

a number of occasions to curtail its arms exports to

ions from the US. Likewise, in response to American p

from commitments to provide the Islamic Republ

and reprocessing technologies. Political developmen

dential elections appear to point in the direction of

13

energy

vest in

tal and

tion in

a joint

rnment

tan and

lingness

toward

tement,

t to be

ei. Yet,

ation in

s to act

easingly

le, that

timately

xporter

pecially

ian gas

leading

n closer

elations

trategic

, Russia

Iran in

ressure,

ic with

ts since

rowing



Russian-Irani

14 IRANIAN

weariness among var

with Russia’s antics.

popular demonstrati

sentiments in Iran,

Moscow has taken o

in Tehran.

Russia’s toing

nuclear issue. Since

on constraining a uni

the US or Israel. To

nuclear issue in th

considerable influe

independently throu

would almost certai

prepared to use its

sanctions. Instead, o

sanctions on Iran ov

water down the mea

with specific negativ

ensure that nothing

authorizing the use

recent Council reso

diluting sanction me

indicate that Russia

paragraph in the re

military force!

This begs th

resolution to Iran’s

progress is achieved

measure of US-Irani

military strikes aga

Washington to offe

incentives that coul



ious Iranian political currents (including much of the p

The public’s chants of “Death to Russia” in the c

ions during the past year are a clear reflection

which could perhaps explain why – amongst other t

bvious steps to distance itself from the current admini

and froing is most apparent in its approach to the

the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Russian leaders have bee

ilateral resort to military force against Iranian nuclear ta

this end, Moscow has a strong interest in keeping the

e UNSC – where Russia, as a permanent memb

ce – rather than having the US deal with th

gh something like an ad hoc “coalition of the willi

nly not include Russia. Therefore, Moscow has nev

veto to give Iran wholesale protection from Security

n four occasions, Russia has supported resolutions i

er its nuclear programme, while also working diplomat

sures actually authorized – that is, the language and

e repercussions for Russian economy and enterprises

in these resolutions could be construed by Washin

f force. Myriad reports and analyses since the adoptio

lution indicate that the Russians have been quite a

sures affecting them directly. Paradoxically, the same

authorities have been instrumental in crafting a p

olution with dubious implications for possible future

question: does Russia genuinely want to see a di

nuclear issue? Another point to note is that if di

, it would most probably go hand in hand with a su

n rapprochement. While Russia clearly opposes US (or

inst Iranian nuclear targets, Moscow has never

r Tehran substantive security guarantees or other

facilitate productive nuclear discussions. Washington’

pulace)

urse of

f such

hings –

stration

Iranian

intent

rgets by

Iranian

er, has

e issue

g” that

er been

Council

posing

ically to

easures

and to

gton as

of the

ctive in

analyses

reamble

use of

lomatic

lomatic

stantial

Israeli)

pushed

trategic

failure



IRANIAN

to pursue effective d

Interestingly enough

choosing not to talk

tight corner with lim

exclusively on Mosc

enough to forestall a

to achieve real rap

Moscow’s exclusivit

compete directly wit

To the extent

issue since 2003,

multilateral fuel-cycl

Russia. In October

fuel deal with Iran s

per cent low-enriche

the Tehran Research

it into fuel rods. Th

turn into weapons-

serving: the arrang

simultaneously circu

capabilities. Followin

meeting, headed by

in Iran which ap

considerations and

pronouncements por

sorts failed to receiv

late November 200

reporters that altho

uranium abroad for

there would be a si

soil.(16) Emphasis on

other pronounceme

the deal with Turkey



iplomacy with Tehran creates a workable paradigm for

, Tehran’s consistent policy during the past three dec

to – let alone deal – with Washington has in fact put it

ited options and the inevitable, undesirable position o

w, and to a lesser degree, on Beijing. The US may en

destabilizing military confrontation with Iran, but not

rochement – which could, among other things, un

and strategic value to Tehran and unleash Iranian

Russian gas exports.

that Moscow has proposed specific solutions to the

these solutions have emphasized Iranian participa

centres, centres that would be based, conveniently en

009, the US, France and Russia struck a multilateral

tipulating that Iran would export more than 1,200kg o

d uranium to Russia for refining to 20 per cent purit

Reactor that makes medical isotopes. France would t

fissile material would be in a form that would be dif

rade uranium.(15) Russia’s support for the proposal

ment would have given Russia an enhanced rol

mscribing the development of Iran’s indigenous fu

g a general consent by the Iranian team attending the

aeed Jalili, Iran’s Chief Nuclear Negotiator, doubts ab

eared to be mostly emanating from domestic

rivalries, and the deal fell through. Subsequent

tending a softer line with a possible compromising for

any meaningful response from the other side. For exa

9, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanpar

ugh Tehran was not opposed to sending its low-e

further enrichment, Iran wanted a 100 percent guaran

ultaneous exchange for fuel for its nuclear reactor on

the “Iranian venue” – even Kish Island, as was indi

ts – seemed to forestall any progress on the original d

and Brazil could be put together in May.

15

Russia.

ades of

self in a

relying

age just

enough

ermine

gas to

nuclear

tion in

ugh, in

nuclear

f its 3.5

to fuel

en turn

ficult to

as self-

while

el-cycle

Geneva

ounded

political

Iranian

mula of

ple, in

st told

nriched

tee that

Iranian

ated in

al, until



Russian-Irani

16 IRANIAN

The new Russia

Moscow’s willingnes

Islamic Republic eve

in Tehran should pr

understand that the

ever existed as such

past. In the view of

as “conditional”. Rus

dictum goes or as by

pursuing. This cons

defend this claim, w

Russia’s changing b

orientation is very m

Let us glean throu

insights.

Just three yea

“the one single mas

Russia’s borders.” H

glorify the role of St

of the Soviet dictato

April 2010 Putin ad

with Poland’s prime

officers in 1940.

Putin’s softne

to restore Russia’s gr

a decade the world i

to 2008, Putin foug

influence. Poland w

the Ukraine and Ge

Russian troops out o

Now the Ob

defence batteries in



profile

s to move ahead with a fourth round of UN sanctions

after Brazil and Turkey had brokered a similar fuel-s

ompt re-evaluation of Iran’s posture toward Russia. Ir

so-called “strategic partnership” – if as indicated previ

– with Russia is highly constrained, and perhaps a thin

his author, it would best to describe Russia’s allegiance

sia has no friends or enemies, only interests – as the ol

conventional wisdom any state or country would or sh

itutes the foundation of Russia’s foreign policy. In

need to determine the drivers, priorities and incentives

haviour toward the Islamic Republic. Russia’s new

uch dictated by new geopolitical and economic consid

h recent developments in order to draw more sub

rs ago, Putin was warning that the US was trying to

ter” of the world as he blasted NATO for “creepin

e also commissioned a revision of Russia history textb

lin, alarming the world with the suggestion that a rehab

r was imminent. These days, he sings a very different

itted the brutality of Stalin’s regime as he stood side

minister at Katyn, where Soviet troops executed 20, 00

s of tone does not reflect any softening of his overridi

eat power status. What has changed is that for the first

s finally going Putin’s way. In his term as president, fro

ht to defend what he regarded as Russia’s rightful sp

s seeking to become a base for US anti-missile defen

rgia were determined to join NATO. Georgia sought t

f its breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Osseti

ama administration has backed off plans to station

oland and the Czech Republic; NATO membership is

against

ap deal

n must

iously it

of the

to Iran

British

ould be

rder to

behind

political

rations.

stantive

become

up to

ooks to

ilitation

tune: in

by side

Polish

ng goal:

time in

m 2000

here of

ces and

o throw

.

missile-

off the



IRANIAN

table in Ukraine, ow

effectively annexed

invasion. NATO ha

plans. Only last mon

in Sevastopol, Ukrai

Putin has also str

agreements and deal

to Bulgaria and Cent

Against this

interests. Thus, Put

Obama’s offer to

Rogozin, Russia’s a

worked to defuse Ru

through colour revo

under the bridge.

However, Ru

factor: foreign cash

maintaining power i

closer relations with

accept at least some

Moscow, including

Russia hopes to exte

Igor Sechin,

Rosneft, and a leadi

and intelligence offi

influence during Put

the vulnerabilities of

materials. This cann

boom was founded

cheap capital borro

now dried up. In

calculated that betw

to implement plans



ing to the victory of a pro-Moscow president; and Ru

the northern territories of Georgia as a result of i

even offered to include Russia in European missile-

th Putin signed a deal extending Russia’s lease on its na

ne, long the home of Russia’s controversial Black S

engthened Russia’s energy dominance of Europe,

s on the South Stream pipeline, delivering Russian gas

ral Europe.

ackdrop, the US no longer looks so threatening to

in, Medvedev and the Russian elite can afford to

reset” bilateral relations. Obama, in the words of

bassador to NATO, is “a young, modern thinker”

ssian fears that the US wants to lure away Russia’s for

lutions. Thus, the geopolitical tug of war seems to b

ssia’s new friendliness is also driven by another i

. The Russian elite believe that an essential condi

the success of Russia’s economy. Today, this transla

the US and Europe, which encourages Russian le

of the demands that Washington and its allies have

Iran’s nuclear programme. By drawing closer to th

d the country’s economic and strategic reach.

utin’s former right-hand man at the Kremlin, chair

ng figure among the siloviki (former Soviet military,

ers who assumed a dominant role in the reassertion

in’s leadership) explains “the [global economic] crisis

the Russian economy in its dependence on certain type

t help but concern us.”(17) The fact is that Russia’s P

on oil money, but most Russian companies actually

ed from the West amounting to $450 billion. That

early 2010, Russia’s Ministry of Economic Devel

en now and 2013 Russia will require about $1 trillion i

o restore infrastructure (roads, railways, schools and h

17

ssia has

ts 2008

defence

val base

a fleet.

inking

directly

Russian

accept

Dmitry

ho has

er allies

e water

portant

ion for

tes into

ders to

put to

e West,

man of

security

of state

xposed

s of raw

utin-era

rew on

ell has

opment

n order

spitals)



Russian-Irani

18 IRANIAN

and the budget can

stabilization fund set

the Kremlin has reali

investment.

Let us not for

levels, and the Kre

Moscow Carnegie C

marked the end of t

modernize, you are

your own … then

developed countries

Russia seems

foreign investment.

Putin’s team for mor

is because Russia ca

The other 10 percen

threat of radical Isla

of ongoing insurgen

Asia.(19)

In the wake o

Iran a little bit less.

Russia for psycholog

Russia’s independen

embarrassing failure

demonstrated just h

and the pro-wester

December 2004, indi

underscored the wea

demonstrate Russia’

alliance with Iran w

does not need to pro

However, Ru

Even after supportin



not cover more than a third of that sum. A $150

up during boom years will run out by the end of 2011.

zed that Russia cannot develop and modernise without

et that in 2008 the price of oil hit $146 a barrel, double

mlin was inundated with a windfall. Dmitri Trenin

nter states, “The economic crisis has eliminated the hu

he Putin presidency.” He adds “If you accept that unl

marginalized, and if you accept that you can’t moder

our foreign policy is quite clear. You need to reach

that can become resources for your modernization.”(18)

to be taking this advice, devoting much energy to

ccording to Duma Deputy, Sergei Markov, a close me

e than a decade, “90 percent of Putin’s démarche to t

not modernize without Western specialists and techn

t is driven by the fact that “Putin needs the West to f

that Russia is facing” both inside its own borders in t

cies in the North Caucasus and Islamist radicals in

f these developments, Russia seems to need the US m

In the recent past, collaboration with Iran was impo

ical reasons. Partnership and cooperation with Iran repr

e from the West. Back in 2004, Putin suffered a nu

s, both internally and externally. The debacle in

w far Putin was from neutralising the situation in C

n ‘Orange Revolution’ in the Ukraine in Novem

cating the defection of Russia’s most important CIS nei

knesses of Russian foreign policy. Putin realised that h

continuing importance in world affairs and reinfor

s his version of an ‘I did it my way’ scenario. Today

ve its independent national strategy.

sia does have a significant interest in preserving ties

g the fourth draft resolution, Putin and other Russian

billion

Clearly,

foreign

today’s

of the

ris that

ess you

nize on

out to

rallying

ber of

e West

logies.”

ight the

e form

Central

ore and

rtant to

esented

ber of

Beslan

echnya,

er and

ghbour,

had to

ing his

, Russia

to Iran.

officials



IRANIAN

publicly reaffirmed

on line. Nevertheless

space” that Russia w

gain opportunities f

obtained had they h

This brings us to an

from US-Iranian hos

Caspian Basin oil an

gas from Iran. As a r

oil and gas flowing

reap transit revenue

Iranian routes been

rapprochement occu

These are the

triumph of the Ma

considered, Russia

substantive reasons

emergence as a regi

Russia identifies the

position. Russia and

not concede their

Beyond this, Russia

becoming the medi

potential Turkish-Ira

Russia’s monopoly

further in the study.

Russian reset o

It has become transp

shift in Russia’s posi

identified above. Th

stance toward Russia

Is this a genuine tre



ussia’s commitment to bring the Bushehr nuclear pow

, this has little to do with loyalty. Rather, Iran is an “ec

ants to dominate. Russian business interests have been

r trade with and investment in Iran that they might n

d to compete with the American and other Western b

other important consideration: Russia has gained eno

tility. The US has blocked Iran from serving as a corri

gas, and has discouraged Europe from developing an

esult, Russia has benefited from more Azeri and Centr

through pipelines into Russia (thus allowing Moscow

and exercise political leverage) than would have occur

vailable. These advantages would be lost if an Iranian-

rs.(20)

considerations that motivated Russia to distance itself f

Tehran Declaration. In the view of this author, al

was uncomfortable with the Tehran Declaration

but because Moscow was fundamentally uneasy abou

nal power – on its borders. On the greater internation

new Iran-Turkey-Brazil axis as a potential problem for

China, like the other permanent Security Council memb

onopoly on supervising unconventional weapons s

wants to prevent Turkey from assuming Russia’s r

tor vis-à-vis Iran. In fact, Russia feels highly threat

nian cooperation on energy transport, which would je

on supplying Europe with gas. We shall explore thi

roulette?

arent that during the past few months there has been a

tion toward Iran owing to a series of considerations

is repositioning has a lot to do with Obama’s less

. The question is how real is this thaw in US-Russian r

nd? Will there really be a long-term qualitative shift a

19

er plant

onomic

able to

ot have

usiness.

rmously

idor for

buying

al Asian

to both

red had

merica

rom the

l things

ot for

t Iran’s

al level,

its own

ers, will

easily.

ole and

ned by

pardize

is angle

marked

e have

hawkish

lations?

nd how



Russian-Irani

20 IRANIAN

does Iran feature i

arguing that Russia’

readiness to work co

willing to support

consent with and ac

of Obama’s reset di

volte-face has little t

experience such dipl

the West. Russia is

cruel imperatives of

By taking a cl

clear that Russia has

did to the administra

fact, Moscow has be

times but the only di

knows, the more

administration has p

of issues and situatio

As we menti

planned missile defe

more, Obama has o

parts of Georgia is

recent deal between

base through 2042

Putin’s suggestions f

undermine Ukrainia

wave of insecurity t

people are starting to

an expansive Russia.

As the story

apparent that the

Washington Post re

key proposals it ha



this equation? Optimists in Washington seem to t

s gesture on the nuclear dossier was evidence of M

nstructively with the US. The Kremlin, they maintain, i

Obama’s administration. Russia’s seemingly not-so-r

ive support of the resolution is being trumpeted as a

lomacy. In the view of this author, the reason behind

o do with patience or support. It is not in Russian char

omatic epiphanies. Russia is neither a friend of the Eas

nly Russia’s friend – as reason, conventional wisdom

ealpolitik would dictate.

oser look at Russia’s behaviour in the recent past it

responded to the Obama administration in the same

tion of George W. Bush. That is, before the so-called

en playing this game for years. It has sold the same ru

fference is the price.(21) As anyone who ever shopped f

ou pay for it, the more valuable it seems. The

id a lot in exchange for Russian cooperation on a wid

s, including the Iranian nuclear dossier.

ned above, Obama has eradicated the Bush adminis

nce installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.

ficially declared that Russia’s continued military occup

no obstacle to US-Russian civilian nuclear cooperati

Russia and Ukraine granting Russia control of a Crime

as shrugged off by Obama officials, as have been

or merging Russian and Ukrainian industries in a blatan

sovereignty. The effect of this reset has been to pr

roughout Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltic

fear they can no longer count on the US to protect the

of Russia’s consent to the draft resolution broke, it

S had thrown in some last-minute deal sweetene

orted: “The Obama administration failed to win appr

sought, including restrictions on Iran’s lucrative oil

ink so,

oscow’s

s finally

eluctant

triumph

Russia’s

acter to

t nor of

, or the

ecomes

ways it

eset . In

g many

or a rug

Obama

e gamut

tration’s

hat is

ation of

n. The

n naval

ladimir

t bid to

duce a

s where

m from

became

rs . The

val for

trade, a



IRANIAN

comprehensive ban

proposal to halt ne

Obama administrati

involved in weapons

draft included a lo

hundreds of million

systems capable of

particularly valuable i

originally contradic

presented a confusin

defensive system is

resolution, and the

however, while dra

Foreign Minister, Se

system, which tends

has proved reassuri

Russia issued a state

Medvedev’s stateme

June 2010 (from whi

membership because

the substance of the

The list goes

the entities, one of

sanctioned for its d

were also lifted on t

military technology t

of Russia, sanctione

Instrument Design

equipment to Syria.

secured Russian sup

end to the sanctions

This was an e

what? History is b



on financial dealings with the Guard Corps and a US

investment in the Iranian energy sector.” (22) In addit

n revealed it had ended sanctions against four Russian

trade with Iran and Syria since 1999. It also emerged

phole that would exempt a 2005 Russian deal, v

s of dollars, to sell Tehran five S300 surface-to-air

intercepting ballistic missiles and aircraft, makin

in the event of an Israeli air attack. Notwithstanding, a

ory pronouncements with regard to the missile

g picture of where Moscow stood on the case. Appare

not included in the list of the sanctions enlisted

early statements by Moscow officials highlighted this

ing attention to this aspect, Russian authorities (incl

gey Lavrov), made it clear that Moscow would not del

to reflect the efficacy of the Israeli lobby with the Russi

g both to Washington and Tel Aviv.(23) In late Sep

ent firmly ruling out the sale of S300’s to Iran. Furth

t at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Su

ch Ahmadinejad shied away) against the Iranian applica

Iran is under Security Council sanctions is clearly refle

Russian volte face .(24)

n. Russian officials had complained about the sanctions

which (Russia’s state arms exporter, Rosoboronexp

alings with the Islamic Republic in 2006 and 2008. S

e Moscow Aviation Institute, sanctioned in 1999 for pr

o Iran; the D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Tec

d in 1999 for aiding Iran’s missile programme; and t

Bureau, sanctioned the same year for supplying

Though US officials for weeks had confidently said t

ort for action against Iran, Moscow raised its demand

only a few days after agreeing to the draft resolution.(25)

pensive deal for the US, but it begs the question: in re

ound to repeat itself: Moscow’s approach to the

21

-backed

ion, the

entities

that the

lued at

missile

them

eries of

system

ntly the

in the

. Later,

sive of

iver the

ans and

tember,

ermore,

mmit in

tion for

ctive of

against

rt) was

nctions

oviding

hnology

he Tula

antitank

ey had

s for an

turn for

UNSC



Russian-Irani

22 IRANIAN

resolutions of the p

behaviour. In 2007 a

consent to a resoluti

strong statements a

make. The Russian

enrichment. In the e

this 2007 “breakthro

of negotiations with

Both were fol

administration conv

negotiations. All of

Bush declared that h

in winning genuine

few accomplishment

success in getting Ru

UNSC resolution. It

meaning than the pr

anything in the past

except that they wer

as contrasted with t

Iranians – seem to h

The reality is

of the US. To Russi

facto ally when it c

Middle East and to

united by a shared

Moscow and Tehran

multipolar world. T

relations, regardless

expect only token as

nuclear threat”.(26) A

longue durée : recl

positioning the pawn



ast can shed light on the essence of Russia’s charac

fter months of negotiation, the US finally convinced R

on tightening sanctions on Iran. Senior Russian officia

out Iran’s nuclear programme that they had long re

mbassador to the UN declared that Iran was obliged

yes of the Americans, this was considered a triumph.

ugh” came after a similar ‘breakthrough’ in 2006, when

oscow had produced the first watered-down resolutio

lowed in 2008 by yet another “breakthrough” when t

inced Moscow to agree to a third resolution afte

this vacillation failed to yield substantive results, an

e had seen into Putin’s soul, there was much left to be

ussian support in the UNSC against Iran. Given this

s have been more oversold than the Obama adminis

ssia to agree – for the fourth time in five years – to yet

remains to be seen whether this latest agreement has

vious three. The fact is that the Russians have not said

months that they did not do or say during the Bus

much more circumspect in divulging the essence of th

he recent episode when the Russians – and for that

ve left the gloves off.

that by nature Russian interests will always diverge fro

a, Iran may not be a real “partner”, however it has be

mes to Moscow’s plans to reshape the power balanc

ilute US influence in the region. Russia and Iran will al

national interest - limiting US hegemony in world

share, and will continue to share, the goal of fostering

is objective will always constitute the main pillar of

f diplomatic resets or global economic crises. The US

sistance from Russia in countering what the so-called

gain what is important to note are Russia’s interest

iming Russia’s status in the global strategic calcul

s on the chessboard to that effect.

ter and

ussia to

ls made

used to

o cease

In fact,

months

.

e Bush

r more

whilst

desired

history,

tration’s

another

greater

or done

h years,

e policy

matter,

those

en a de

in the

ways be

affairs.

a more

bilateral

should

Iranian

in the

us and



IRANIAN

Energy rivalry:

Russia may view Ira

the Kremlin is categ

the gas market. This

fuel swap agreemen

promote Iran’s inter

energy market. The

inherent competitor

both Europe and

assiduously courting

between the two cou

slow. Russia’s ambiti

shown itself to be

fourth draft resoluti

hampering Iran as a r

The China N

South Pars gas fiel

developments. The $

Western energy gia

reveals the main arte

With the inva

others, on gaining c

oil. However, the C

more pivotal to th

westwards and eastw

importance of natur

many years. All ener

natural gas are the M

Information Admini

and seven times tho

world’s top sources f

Within the Mi



atural gas

as an ally when it comes to curbing US world domina

orically ill at ease with Iran’s role in the regional dyna

factor can explain why Russia tried to indirectly obst

t. It is not in Russia’s interest to back processes tha

national integration. Russia does not want competitio

fact is that with its vast reserves of natural gas, Ira

to Russia. Arguably less well positioned than Iran to

hina, Russia is nevertheless a major player and h

China with an export deal since 2006. However, neg

ntries have been on and off and pipeline construction

ions to expand its natural gas exports can explain wh

uch a fair-weather friend to Iran. Moscow’s reaction

n suggests all too clearly that Russia has its own age

egional energy rival.

ational Petroleum Company’s (CNPC) involvement i

d can serve as an explanation of much wider geo

5 billion project - signed in 2009 after years of foot dra

ts Total and Shell under the shadow of US-led san

rial system for future world energy supply and demand.

sions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US had set sights,

ntrol of the Central Asian energy corridor. The focus

PC-Iranian partnership reveals that natural gas will

e world economy: specifically, the dual flow of t

ards from Central Asia to Europe and China. In fact, t

l gas as an energy source has been steady and inexora

gy industry agencies agree that the premier sources o

iddle East and Eurasia, including Russia. The US-based

stration puts the natural gas reserves in these regions

se of North America’s total - the latter itself being on

or that fuel.

ddle East, Iran is one of the main holders of gas rese

23

ce, but

mics of

ruct the

t would

in the

n is an

supply

s been

tiations

as been

y it has

to the

nda for

Iran’s

political

ging by

tions –

among

was on

e even

is fuel

e rising

le over

f future

Energy

as nine

of the

ves. Its



Russian-Irani

24 IRANIAN

South Pars gas field

Iran’s South Pars wo

The latter is the wo

Ghawar has effectiv

imminent era of nat

world’s nucleus for e

Both Europe

Asian gas generally.

Nabucco pipeline is

and Bulgaria all the

from the US – has

particular has reitera

through the pipelin

monopoly as Europe

In addition, I

Armenia and it is als

including the United

so-called “Peace Pip

its extremely long a

buts, the Peace Pipel

region’s most popul

the area, the pernici

underestimated.

Even more i

natural gas from Tur

to operate in 2012.

south and already h

Pars gas field devel

pipelines, Iran woul

primary energy sour

country that EIA pr

natural gas consump

In this contex



is the world’s largest. If converted to barrel-of-oil equi

uld dwarf the reserves of Saudi Arabia’s giant Ghawar

rld’s largest oilfield and since it came into operation i

ly been the world’s beating heart for raw energy suppl

ral gas dominance over oil, Iran will oust Saudi Arabi

nergy.

and China stand to be arterial routes for Iranian and

he infrastructure reflects this: the 3,300-kilometre (2,0

planned to supply gas from Iran (and Azerbaijan) via

ay to Western Europe. While outside pressure – pre

revented Iran from joining the Nabucco pipeline, T

ted its support for the idea of delivering Iran’s gas to

. Nabucco, once operational, will effectively break

’s sole gas supplier and put an end to Russian dominan

ran also exports gas via pipelines separately to Tur

o following up export deals with other Persian Gulf c

Arab Emirates and Oman. Another major arterial rou

eline” from Iran to Pakistan and on to India. Notwith

d roller-coaster period of gestation and the persisting

ine could give Iran the potentiality to export gas to tw

us countries. However, as in other energy-related pip

ious element of outside politics and pressure can h

portant for Iran is the 1,865-kilometre pipeline that

kmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into Ch

Turkmenistan shares a 300-kilometre border with Ira

s a gas export deal with Tehran. If the Iranian-Chines

opment can be incorporated into the above trans-

d become the hub of a world economy in which ga

ce. This is amplified further by China’s rising dem

dicts could be dependent on imports for over one thi

ion by 2030.

t of a major realignment in the world’s energy econo

ivalents,

oilfield.

n 1948,

. In the

a as the

Central

0 mile)

Turkey

umably

rkey in

Europe

Russia’s

e.

ey and

untries,

e is the

tanding

ifs and

of the

lines in

rdly be

supplies

ina, due

n to its

e South

ational

s is the

nd – a

d of its

y there



IRANIAN

will be a diminished

energy market is co

resolution can be see

in the energy mark

undermine the Tehr

energy arteries of a

longer be able to do

All the evid

initiatives that wou

integration. Howeve

acting as such towar

Washington’s. Russi

Moscow to endear

Europe. Concession

repeated delays in c

fissures in Iran on

systems to Iran – w

has used to capture

political currents –

Bushehr plant will n

in its entirety, a vie

kept announcing kep

latest of which is se

amid much Iranian f

represents part of an

a major turnabout i

that Russia may app

interest is to keep W

more room Russia h

keep Europe’s ener

understanding with

issues in the Islamic

the pressing geopoliti



role for the US and also for Russia. In so far as th

cerned, Russia’s ostensible blessing for the US-driven

n as an attempt to conceal its fear of facing greater com

t. Pressuring Iran with further sanctions, and attem

an Declaration are part of a last-minute effort to cut

orld economy that Russia, and for that matter, the US,

inate.

nce suggests that Russia has little interest in su

ld improve Tehran’s international image and sub

r, as we underscored above, it is important to note

d Tehran does not suggest that Moscow is being a fr

a’s love-hate relationship with Iran is convenient: i

erself to Tehran and in the process manipulate the

such as building the Bushehr nuclear power plant

ompletion has irked Iranians and even created open

he matter – or threatening to sell S300 surface-to-air

ich is now practically off the table – have been tactic

Washington’s attention. It may of interest to note tha

mostly of critical/reform tendency – have argued

t be completed until and unless the nuclear dossier is r

strongly challenged by the government authorities w

t announcing specific dates for the plant to come on li

for late summer 2010. Given the recent fuelling of t

anfare, one would wonder whether the promised full o

international [read US-Russian] agreement paving the

the dossier or not. This notwithstanding, there is littl

ar willing to grant small concessions to Iran, but its ov

ashington’s focus on Tehran. The more distracted the

as to cement its dominance in the former Soviet spac

gy needs under its thumb. If the US were to r

ehran and rely more heavily on an ally like Turkey to

world (as it has with Tehran Declaration), then it can

ical issue of how to undermine Russian leverage in Eur

25

future

UNSC

petition

ting to

up the

will no

porting

sequent

that by

iend of

allows

US and

whose

political

missile

Russia

certain

hat the

esolved

o have

e – the

e plant

eration

way for

e doubt

erriding

US, the

and to

ach an

tend to

turn to

sia.



Russian-Irani

26 IRANIAN

Turkey: rival an

Russia’s reaction to

through support fo

Moscow’s perceptio

apprehension over A

strategy to become

that Turkey is situat

of the total oil and

assume that Turkey

energy strategy. The

affinity, otherwise k

to establish itself as

energy users. There

Iran’s nuclear stan

geopolitical equation.

For one, Tur

domestic demand an

its main energy sup

third of Turkey’s oil

from Russia. The Bl

fastened this link be

Turkey with an annu

exist in Iran, Iraq,

keen to explore the

to accommodate Tu

the existence of the

for the short-term fu

Turkey’s relati

Turkey’s domestic re

needs to ensure no

international level, t

which also becomes



d regional soft-power broker?

the Tehran Declaration and its effort to hamper the i

the US-led draft resolution is very much conditi

ns of Turkey’s objectives in the region. Russia ha

nkara’s role as a broker, which it interprets as Turkey’s

n energy corridor between the East and the West. Th

d at a pivotal geographic intersection possessing three

atural gas reserves in the world. Many Russians are b

has used the Iran deal as a platform for Ankara’s lo

argument is that using geography and non-European/

own as “soft-power”, Turkey has used geostrategic a

the gateway between the energy-rich countries and

may be some truth to this reading of Turkey’s brok

off with the West, but there are other variables

.

key needs to diversify its energy imports in order

d to maximise its energy security. Turkey is reliant on R

lier and constitutes a very lucrative market for Russ

needs and more than 70 per cent of its gas currentl

e Stream project in particular, which runs across the Bl

tween both countries. Completed in 2005, it transport

al capacity of 16 billion cubic metres. Whilst secondary

zerbaijan and Turkmenistan (and the Turkish govern

), it will take a couple of years until they have been de

key’s domestic energy requirements. Marc Herzog arg

ully functional Blue Stream pipeline has allowed Russia,

ture, to corner the Turkish market.(27)

onship with Russia at the international level is conditi

liance on Russian energy exports. Thus, Turkey’s foreig

t to be out of line with Russian interests. Howeve

here is the potential for bilateral competition or div

intertwined with the energy interests of the EU, which

nitiative

ned by

s much

broader

e fact is

-fourths

und to

ng-term

cultural

vantage

primary

rage in

in this

o meet

ussia as

ia. One

y come

ack Sea,

s gas to

sources

ment is

veloped

ues that

at least

ned by

policy

, at an

rgence,

itself, is



IRANIAN

anxiously attempting

note, Turkey has ma

become a broker be

This was well illust

pipeline connecting

regional energy play

Russia. With the N

desperate to diversi

Russia that has beco

is also one of the

Nabucco project des

Russia, howev

for the near future a

alternative sources.

into Italy and Austr

when Putin met his

projects like the Ba

binding itself solely t

potential for future

could be kept out o

“cheap tactics.” An

plan to source gas fr

“political situation.”

reached this decision

Turkey’s forei

able to juggle and r

actors such as Syria

much demand in or

becoming a major re

flotilla incident clea

Turkey’s involvemen

to ignore Turkey.

On this subje



to diversify the sources of its domestic energy. On

e no secret of its ambitions to make the most of its loc

tween the Caspian region and consumer markets in

rated with the completion in 2005 of the Baku-Ce

zerbaijan and Turkey. Turkey’s long-term plans to eme

r are caught between the opposing objectives of the

orth Sea oil and gas deposits in definite decline, th

y its energy sources in an effort to weaken its relian

me increasingly more assertive on the international sta

major motives behind the EU’s determination to b

ite its huge financial cost.

er, is intent on keeping the EU reliant on its energy

nd is betting on rival projects to counter EU attempts

outh Stream, a pipeline project that would bring Rus

ia over Bulgaria, met with Turkish approval in Augu

Turkish counterpart in Ankara on a state visit. Neve

ku-Ceyhan pipeline and Nabucco reveal that Turke

o Russia on the plane of energy politics and that there i

ompetition in this crucial field – if, interestingly enou

f them, for one reason or another and through never

xample would be the decision, in late August 2010, to

om Iran to Europe via the Nabucco gas pipeline give

he European-backed Nabucco consortium cited that t

owing to “international laws and regulations.”(28)

n policy has become increasingly adept in recent years i

econcile relations between seemingly adversarial inter

and Israel or the US and Iran. This new-found skill w

der for Turkey to manage its bigger strategic political

gional player as well as an energy transit hub. The rece

rly underscores Turkey’s effort to assert itself more

t in the affair sent out a clear message: the West canno

t, Con Coughlin writes, “Certainly the West cannot a

27

this last

ation to

urope.

han oil

rge as a

U and

EU is

ce on a

e. This

ild the

reserves

to find

sian gas

st 2010

rtheless,

is not

s ample

h, Iran

-ending

shelve a

n Iran’s

hey had

in being

ational

ill be in

goal of

t Gaza

boldly.

t afford

ford to



IRANIAN

steps back. What ha

with Iran is based sq

The argumen

the Islamic Republi

paradigmatic or con

Iranian relations. Rat

light on a relationshi

transparent is that th

at the very most, bila

2007 I was of the vi

lucrative dividends o

retrospect, that se

considerations and

substantive downgra

case. The famous 1

wrote: “To Europe

we come as lords an

to deal with Russia

former superpower

including in areas adj

own part, with wide-

policy and bigger m

belong to a distant, b



s become patently clear is that Russia’s political man

arely on the former’s self-interest.

here, while openly critical of the Russian behaviour

c as of late, does not, however, intend to suggest

eptual shift of an irreversible nature has occurred in

her, the focus has been on this particular chapter to sh

dynamic that has been difficult to describe. What has

e Moscow has placed a ceiling on relations with Tehra

teral relations can be described as conditional . Back in

ew that “For all intents and purposes, Russia may suc

r benefits in the future, and turn its back on the Iranian

ems to have been corroborated. Now with ec

energy politics in the balance, the stakes are higher

de of relations is much more probable than previously

9th century Russia novelist-poet Fyodor Dostoyevs

e have come as beggars for a slice of bread; to Asia, h

d masters.” The Islamic Republic, which will continue

– a permanent member of the Security Council an

aspiring to regain part of its lost empire and he

acent to and of great bearing for Iran – must work har

open eyes and a much more nuanced and even-handed

anoeuvring space, to prove that the 19th century illusi

ygone past.

29

euvring

towards

that a

ussian-

d more

become

. Thus,

January

umb to

s.”(31) In

onomic

, and a

was the

y once

owever,

to have

also a

gemony

d on its

foreign

ons just



Russian-Irani

30 IRANIAN

Notes

1. Ghoncheh TazminiPaper , No.1, 20

19,2010).

2. “Russia Denies US ‘

http://www.shan

m>).

3. “Iran, North Korea

4. “Russian Minister: B

July 2009.

5. “Rift on Iran Emer

<http://www.ny

&st=cse>).

6. Ibid.

7. Ellen Barry and An

New York Tim

middleeast/25ira

8. David Greene, “Hist

March 2010, <h

(accessed 17 June

9. Brown Merkel, “B

<http://www.go

rrwCZmRAgD9

10. Ibid.

11. “Ahmadinejad Cen

<http://www.teh

2010).12. Juan Cole, “Ahm

(available at: h

unsc-sanctions-by

13. Kremlin Tells I

<http://www.reu



, “Russian and Iranian Relations in Perspective;”, Ravan07, http://www.ravandinstitute.com/policypapers/ (Access

Trade-Off’ On Iran,” Shanghai Daily , 4 March 2009. (Ava

ghaidaily.com/sp/article/2009/200903/20090304/article_39

wo Different Nuclear Problems - Medvedev,” Interfax, 6 Jul

ushehr Reactor To Go Online By Year-End,” Fars News Ag

ges as Clinton Visits Moscow” BBC , 18 March 2010, (Ava

imes.com/2010/03/19/world/europe/19diplo.html?scp=2&

rew Kramer, “China and Russia Pressed Iran to Accept U.

s , 24 March 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25

.html?scp=2&sq=iran&st=cse> (accessed 17 June 2010).

ory, Profit Drive Russia, Iran Ties”, National Public Radio(

ttp://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1251

2010).

ck New Sanctions Against Iran”, Associated Press , 1 Ap

gle.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hi1UnBNcgFa9lv

QBKD80>, (accessed 21 June 2010).

ures Russia for Opposing Tehran Deal,” Tehran Times, 27 M

rantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=220199>, (accessed

dinejad Blasts Medvedev Over UNSC Sanctions”, May 3

ttp://www.zcommunications.org/ahmadinejad-blasts-medved

-juan-cole).

ran to Stop Political Demagoguery,” Reuters, 26 M

ters.com/article/idUSTRE64P35K20100526> (accessed 1

Policy ed June

ilable at:

036.ht

y 2009.

ency , 23

ilable at:

sq=iran

. Deal,”

/world/

PR) , 25

54888>,

ril 2010,

wL_-

ay 2010,

11 June

0, 2010,

ev-over-

y 2010,

1 June



IRANIAN

2010).

14. “Russian Academic

June 2010, <http

(accessed 16 June

15. “Iran Demands Ch

30 October 2009

6896257.ece> (ac

16. “Iran Seeks

<http://www1.v

Nuclear-Deal-725

17. Charles Clover,Financial Times ,

a0f5-00144feabdc

18. Owen Mathews a

2010, p. 26.

19. Ibid.

20. Mark N. Katz, “R

No.12, 2010, pp.

21. “Security Council S

Times , 6 June

(accessed 8 June

22. Robert Kagan,“A

http://www.washyn/content/articl

23. “Russia: Sanctio

http://www.jpos

August 2010).

24. Ironically enough,

300 surface-to-air

despite Russia’s d

25. Ibid.

26. Ariel Cohen,“Ru

http://www.herit

Curveball-for-Ob

27. Marc Herzog, “Fro

last Decade”,For

(accessed June 8

28. “Nabucco Group

2010, <http://o

August 2010).

29. Con Coughlin, “Tu



Deplores Moscow’s Support for UN Resolution on Iran,” I

://www.irna.ir/View/FullStory/?NewsId=1179973&IdLang

2010).

anges to Deal with the West on Nuclear Ambitions,” Time

, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_ea

cessed 25 June 2010).

uarantees on Nuclear Deal,” VOA, 24 Novembe

anews.com/english/news/middle-east/Iran-Seeks-Guarante

57637.html> (accessed 25 June 2010).

avid Gardner and Catherine Belton, “Russia, the Thir21 June 2010, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3123c7a4-7d

0.html> (accessed 22 June 2010).

d Anna Nemtsova, “The New Putin Profile,” Newsweek ,

ussian-Iranian Relations in the Obama Era,” Middle Eas

62-3.

anctions on Iran - Russia Making the Best of Both Worlds,”

2010, http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?m=home&newsi

010).

Hollow Reset with Russia”,Washington Post, 25 M

ingtonpost.com/wp-e/2010/05/24/AR2010052403073.html (accessed 8 June 201

s Ban S-300 Missiles,” Associated Press , 11 June

.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=178178> (acce

ars News Agency announced that Iran had actually obtaine

missiles (two from Belarus and two from another unspecifie

eclared refusal to deliver them. 4 August 2010.

sia’s Iran Policy: A Curveball for Obama,” 15 Janua

age.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/Russias-Iran-Policy-A-

ama> (accessed 8 June 2010).

Foe to Friend, t he Volte-face in Turkish-Russian Relations

eign Policy Centre Briefing ,< http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/11

010).

craps Plan for Iranian Gas Supply,” Wall Street Journal, 2

nline.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100823-705024.html> (acce

rkey’s Role in the Flotilla Affair Should Worry Us All in th

31

RNA, 15

age=3>

Online,

st/article

r 2009,

s-on-

Man,”68-11df-

21 June

Policy ,

eorgian

=21797

y 2010,

).

010, <

ssed 2

d four S

source)

y 2010,

over the

74.pdf>

August

ssed 27

e West,”



Russian-Irani

32 IRANIAN

Daily Telegraph,

=3108067> (acce

30. “EU to Reaffirm

<http://europa.e

August 2010)

31. Ghoncheh Tazmi

Paper , No.1, 200



3 June 2010, <http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/stor

ssed 2 August 2010).

Commitment to Turkey,” Europa Press Release, 12 M

u/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/920> (ac

i, “Russian and Iranian Relations in Perspective;”, Ravan

7, p.19.

.html?id

ay 2010,

essed 2

Policy

russia iran relations in the context of the tehran declaration

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