AngeloSegrillo

RUSSIA:EUROPEORASIA?

1stedition

FFLCH/USP

SãoPaulo(Brazil)

2020

RUSSIA: EUROPE OR ASIA? The Question of Russia’s Identity in the Discussions between Westernizers, Slavophiles and Eurasianists and an Analysis of

the Consequences in Present-Day Russia

Abooksponsoredby: LaboratóriodeEstudosdaÁsia(LEA)

(Coords.AngeloSegrillo/PeterDemant)

DepartmentofHistory

(Head:JoãoPauloGarridoPimenta)

FFLCH

(Dir.MariaArmindadoNascimentoArruda

Vice­Dir.PauloMartins)

UniversityofSãoPaulo

(Rector:VahanAgopyan

Vice­Rector:AntonioCarlosHernandes)

SãoPaulo–Brazil 2020

Copyright©2020byAngeloSegrillo Allrightsreserved. PrintedinBrazil

CatalogaçãonaPublicação(CIP) ServiçodeBibliotecaeDocumentação

FaculdadedeFilosofia,LetraseCiênciasHumanasdaUniversidadedeSãoPauloMariaImaculadadaConceição–CRB­8/6409

S455Segrillo,Angelo.

Russia:EuropeorAsia?/AngeloSegrillo.­­SãoPaulo:FFLCH/USP,2020.369p.ISBN78­85­7506­373­61.Politicsandgovernment–Russia.2.HistoryofRussia.3.Nationalidentity.I.Title.

CDD320.947 Textdesignandedition:LaboratóriodeEstudosdaÁsia(USP) Cover:LaboratóriodeEstudosdaÁsia(USP). LaboratóriodeEstudosdaÁsia(LEA) DepartamentodeHistória­FFLCH UniversidadedeSãoPaulo Av.ProfessorLineuPrestes,338 CEP:05508­900SãoPaulo–SP Tel:(55)(11)30913760 e­mail:laboratoriodeestudosdaasia@usp.br Brasil

CONTENTS

1.Introduction 9

2.ThedebatebetweenWesternizersandSlavophilesinthenineteenthcentury

11

3.TheEurasianists 125

4.InfluenceofthedebatesincurrentRussia:thecasesofYeltsinandPutin

319

5.Conclusion 334

6.Annex1(Table1) 347

7.References 348

Foreword

“Probably the most detailed Western account of the formation of the three Russian schools of thought (Westernism, Slavophilism and Eurasianism) as a whole.” (Yurii Korgunyuk, Russian political scientist)

hisisthefifthbookpublishedundertheauspicesoftheCenterforAsian Studies (Laboratório de Estudos da Ásia ­ LEA) of theUniversity of São Paulo; the second one in English for an

internationalaudience. The text isbasedon thepostdoctoraldissertation (“Tesede livredocência”)defendedbyAngeloSegrilloat theUniversityofSãoPaulo in2016.Theoriginaldissertationcanbereadonline(inPortuguese)athttp://lea.vitis.uspnet.usp.br/arquivos/angelosegrillotesedelivredocencia.pdf

Wehopeyouenjoythereading.

T

9

1.INTRODUCTION Russia is the largest country in Europe. Russia is the largestcountryinAsia.Afterall,aretheRussiansEuropean,Asian,amixtureofbothorneither?ThisisaquestionthathasspirituallyhauntedRussiansfor a long time. The issue of the true Russian identity has crossed thecenturies and intrigued not only foreigners but also the nativesthemselves. Much of this question crystallized in the Westernizer­versus­Slavophiledebate thatarose in thenineteenth century, closely linked totheproblematicheritageofPetertheGreat.Attheturnoftheeighteenthcentury, this monarch undertook radical Westernizing modernizationreformsthatscandalizedsupportersofthetraditionalRussianwayoflife.From then on amalaise hung over defenders and detractors of Peter’sreforms; between thosewho felt thatRussia should follow the path ofWesternmodernizationtoraisehereconomic,cultural,andpoliticallevelandthosewhopreachedthecontinuationofawayoflifeofherown,notguided by the “morally decadent” Western values. The publication ofChaadaev’s first Philosophical Letter in 1836 detonated the debatebetween Westernizers and Slavophiles. And the discussions betweenWesternizers (such as V.G. Belinskii, T.N. Granovskii, A.I. Herzen) andSlavophiles (e.g., A.S. Khomyakov, the Aksakov brothers, the Kireevskiibrothers, Yu.F. Samarin) ignited the imagination of Russians for oragainstRussiaasEuropean. At thebeginningof the twentieth century, there arose aparalleldiscussionwiththeemergenceoftheEurasianists,whoemphasizedtheEurasian roots ofRussia, seeing aspositive—not negative— variousAsian aspects of the country’s historical formation. The Eurasianistschool appeared in the 1920s among Russian émigrés, such as N.S.Trubetskoi,P.N.Savitskii,P.P.Suvchinskii,K.A.ChkheidzeandD.Mirskii.ItsufferedaneclipseaftertheStalinistrepressionofthe1930s,butwouldresurfaceduring perestroika through the theories of Soviet ethnologistLev Gumilev, which in turn would set off the current neo­Eurasianistmovement, whose main exponent is the controversial philosopherAleksandrDugin. Thesediscussionsaboutthe“true”Russianidentityhavenotonlyintellectually divided Russian society to this day but have also broughtaboutpoliticalconsequences.Forexample,afterVladimirPutincame topoweraspresident, thecountry tookaseriesof internationalmeasuresthatoftenputitonacollisioncoursewiththe“West.”1Thiswasseenasa

1 Forgoing the Yeltsin-era pattern of rapprochement with the West, Putin's Russia has

10

major turnaround from themuchmore pro­Western course of formerPresidentBorisYeltsin.Someanalysts(e.g.,Shlapentokh,2005;Nikolsky,2007) see the reason for this shift in the fact that Putin (unlike hispredecessor,Yeltsin) isanti­Western. Inotherwords,Putin’ssupposedlySlavophile—orEurasianist,according tosome—positionwouldbe inthebackgroundofthisradicalchangeofstanceinRussia’sforeignpolicy.Otheranalysts(e.g.,Rivera&Rivera,2003)considerPutinaWesternizerbecause of his links to the so­called “St. Petersburg clan,” originallyformed around Anatolii Sobchak,mayor of that “Western”metropolisbuiltbyPetertheGreat. Whoisright?IsPutinaWesternizer,aSlavophileoraEurasianist?DoesthisphilosophicalWeltanschauungaffecthispoliticalpositions? Wewill provideadetailedviewoftheemergenceanddevelopmentof these crucial polemics between Westernizers, Slavophiles andEurasianists regarding the Russian identity between Europe and Asiasince the 19th century. In addition, we will investigate the currentpolitical implicationsof thesediscussions,analyzinghow theactionsofpost­SovietRussianpresidentsare related to theirpersonal inclinationswithin the spectrum of Westernizer, Slavophile and Eurasianistperspectives.Studydivisions Our analysis is divided into threeparts, in addition to this briefintroduction. In thenext section,wewillpresent the Slavophile­versus­Westernizerdebateof the19thcentury. In the followingsectionwewillhighlight the appearance of the Eurasianists as of the 1920s,with theresulting formation of neo­Eurasianism in the last quarter of the 20thcentury.Andfinallywewillseetheimplicationofallthesedebatesinthepolitical life of the post­Soviet Russian Federation, taking as symbolicfiguresYeltsinandPutin,especiallythelatter.

clashed head-on with the USA on several occasions: the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the question of recognition of Kosovo’s independence, the tensions over the NATO anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic, the joint naval maneuvers of Russia and Venezuela in the Caribbean, the South Ossetia-Georgia conflict and especially the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.

11

2. THE DEBATE BETWEENWESTERNIZERS AND SLAVOPHILES INTHENINETEENTHCENTURY Is Russia a European and/or Asian country? This question hasdivided opinions among Russians for centuries. As mentioned in theIntroduction,theradicalWesternizingreformsofPeter theGreatservedas catalysts for thedebates thatdividedRussianson the issue.The factthat this catalysis happened around the eighteenth century is not onlydue toPeter’sreformsbutalsoto the fact thattheconceptsof“Europe”and“Asia”asweknowthemtodayarecontroversialandwereformedinalonghistoricalprocessthatwascompletedonlyafterthebeginningoftheModernAge,with theRenaissanceand theGreatNavigations. Indeed, it wasonlyaftertheSwedishgeographerPhilipJohanvonStrahlenberg,inhis book Das Nord­ und Ostlich Theil von Europa und Asia (1730),proposed tomake theUralMountains the border betweenEurope andAsia that the geographical conception of these two continents wasconstitutedasitistoday. Objectively, Europe and Asia form a contiguous territorialensemble.Thatiswhythedivisionintotwocontinentshasnotanaturalbutratheracontingentcharacter.Ingeographicalterms,HerodotusnotedthattheGreeksmostlyplacedthePhasisRiver(today’sRioniRiver)intheCaucasus mountain region as the border between Europe and Asia,althoughsomeconsideredtheTanaisRiver(thepresent­dayDon)assuchaborder.TheRomansfavoredtheTanais(Don)astheboundarybetweenthe two continents. This convention held sway until von Strahlenberghelped change it in favor of the Ural mountain range. And thismodificationhaddirectlytodowithPetertheGreat.VonStrahlenberg,aSwedishofficerthen,wascapturedbythearmiesofPetertheGreatattheBattle of Poltava (1709).He ended up living in Russia formany years.Therehe conducted the geographical research thatwould result in thebook— published on his return to Sweden— which established theEurope­Asiaborder in the Urals, to thesatisfactionof theRussianswhosaw in it a Europeanizing legitimation ofmuch of their new imperialconquests. Butgeographicargumentsarenot theonlyactivevectors in thisquestion.Inculturalterms,fromthetimeoftheCarolingianEmpireintheninthcenturyonward,gainingstrengthwiththecrusadesandcontinuinguntiltheendoftheMiddleAges,EuropecametobeidentifiedwithLatinChristianity, in opposition mainly to Islam but also to the OrthodoxChristianityofByzantium.AsRussiaadoptedtheOrthodoxfaith,shecametobeconsidered“outofEurope”culturally.

12

Agrowing“Westernization”ofEuropewouldtakeplacethereafter.The earlyModernperiod—markedby theRenaissance and theGreatNavigations—consolidatedthisChristianEurope(“heirtoRome”),withprominencethengiven tothesouthernLatincountries(Spain,Portugal).Later,asweapproachedtheageoftheIndustrialRevolution,thenotionof“Western Europe” began to acquire strength, featuring itswestern andnorthernparts (England,etc.)as thedynamicmotorof thiscomplex.Atthat time, Eastern Europe and Russia were relegated to another“Orientalizing”dimension.AsortofEuropean “FarWest”wouldalsobeinstalled in the United States, seen as heir andmaintainer ofWesternEuropean traditions in the NewWorld. (Trenin 2003, pp. 80; Gvosdev,2007,p.134). Thusweseethattheconceptsof“Europe”and“Asia,”“West”and“East” have a contingent character and have undergone variationsthroughout the different epochs. These variations directly affectedRussia,whichgrewexactlyatthecrossroadsofalltheseworlds,causinginherthesymptomofanidentitycrisisthat,fromtimetotime,becomesmoreorlessacute.InRussiaherself Aswehaveseen,theconstructionof“Europe”andthe“West”asgeographical and ideological concepts (uncontested locus ofmodernityandadvancement)wasagradualprocessthatwascompletedpracticallyinthelateModernAge.Inthesameway,thequestionwhetherRussiawasEuropeanorAsian,WesternorEastern,wasnotputinthecurrenttermsfromitsbeginningsandwasaconstructionthatevolvedovertime. TheoriginoftheRussiancivilizationisnotlocatedinpresent­dayRussia, but in theUkraine: itwas the so­called Kievan state (or Rus'),whichexistedfromtheninthtothethirteenthcentury.Atthattimetherewas still no distinction between Great Russians (the present­dayRussians), Little Russians (Ukrainians) and White Russians (belyi =“white”inByelorussian);togethertheyformedonegroupoftheso­calledEasternSlavs.Rus'wasaflourishingconfederationofcity­states,vassaloftheGrandPrince ofKiev (current capital ofUkraine).However, largelyduetothelackofcentralizationandunitybetweenitsconstituentparts,itwasnotable to resist the invasionof thedescendantsofGenghisKhan,and these landswere then underMongol control from the 13th to the15th centuries. The so­called Mongol yoke, by destroying the centralauthority of Kiev and dispersing these Slavs, paved the way for theemergence of Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians as separatepeoples.Aroundthefifteenthcentury,thecityofMoscowledtherebellion

13

againsttheMongols,unifiedmostoftheEasternSlavsandlaterformedahighlycentralizedexpansionistempirewhichwasverydifferentfromtheloose,decentralizedconfederationoftheKievanstate. Itwas exactly in the process of formation of the tsarist empirebased inMoscow from the sixteenth century onward (in chronologicalcoincidence with the beginning of the Great Navigations in WesternEurope)thatthequestionofRussiaasEuropeorAsia,WestorEastbeganto takeshapeasavitaldebatesurroundingRussian identity.Aswehaveseen,theboundariesbetweenEuropeandAsiavariedthroughtimeuntilthey reached theconsensusof theUrals in thenineteenthcentury.TheKievan state (Rus’) was formed around the city of Kiev in the ninthcentury,extendingasfarastheDonRiver,whichwasoneofthefrontiersofEuropeatthetime(i.e.,composingtheeasternmostlimitsof“Europe”).Meanwhile,Rus',at itsheight,extended to theVolgaRiver,whichwouldalreadyplacedher (assuming theDonRiverasEurope­Asia frontier)ashavingafootinAsia.Butatthetimethis“Europe­or­Asia”discussionwasnot important, fornotonlywere the frontiersuncertainbutalso in the9thand10thcenturiesWesternEuropewasstillavictimoftheturmoiland remnants of the “barbarianmigrations,” being nomore advancedthan the “East” (rather the opposite). Thus, the Eastern Slavs of theKievan state did not see the land to theirwest asmore advanced andtheir preoccupations (withmilitary invasions and economic pressures)turned tobothsides.They feltthreatenedasmuchtothewestastotheeastby invadingpeoplesand itwasnotanurgentdiscussion towhichside they “belonged.”Theancestorsof theEasternSlavsoriginallycamefromsomepartofpresent­dayCentralEuropeandsettledfurthereastonthelandaroundtheDnieperRiveraroundthesixthcentury. It was only after the Muscovite princes expelled the Mongolinvaders from their land in the fifteenth centuryandbeganbuildinganempire eastward in Asia from the sixteenth century onward that thequestionofthebordersbetweenEuropeandAsiaandtowhichparttheRussiansbelongedacquired importance.Afterall,with theRenaissanceand the Great Navigations began a process inwhichWestern Europecametobeseenasamodelofadvancementandmodernityasopposedtoa decaying Asia. As a booming and expanding imperial power on theborderbetweenthetwo,towhichworlddidRussiabelong? In short, the concept of empire is intrinsically linked to thequestionof“EuropeorAsia?”inRussia,bothontheWestEuropeansidewith itsoverseas empires, andon theRussian side,with its contiguousintercontinental empire. And that question became urgentwhen Peterthe Great radicalized the situation and sought to define Russia as adefinitely European country by imposing on it a “forced”Westernizingmodernizationprocess.

14

PeterI(theGreat) Peterwasanatypicaltsar.Sincechildhoodhehadbeeninterestedinmilitaryandtechnologymatters,especiallythoserelatedtothenavy.Asayoungman,heoftenwentthenemetskayasloboda,thedistrictorghettoof foreigners in Moscow. There he became familiar with aspects ofWestern European life and was extremely curious about technicalinnovations.Hewon apower strugglewithhis sister and ruledRussiafrom1682to1725.In1697,heundertookan18­monthjourneyaccrossEurope insearchofalliancesagainst theOttomanTurks.Thisgoalwasnot achieved, but Peter took the opportunity to learn about the latestWestern technologies and organizational models — he even workedincognitoinaDutchshipyard! ConvincedofthesuperiorityofWesterntechniques,heundertookaprogramofradicalWesternizingmodernizingreformsonhisreturntoRussia.Thebeginninghadevenfunnymoments.Peterimposeda“beardtax”oneveryoneexceptpeasantsormembersoftheclergy.AnyoneintheupperclasseswhowantedtokeepthetraditionalRussianbeard(asignofbackwardnessforPeter)hadtoliterallypaydearforthat. But the reforms went deeper and affected the society andeconomyof the country.Peteradoptedmercantilistmeasuresandusedstatesupport tocreateaseriesofnew industriesandmanufactures.HerecruitedcraftsmenandtechniciansinEuropeandsentRussianstheretolearn.Hechanged thewaysofRussianstateadministration.Hereplacedthe BoyarDuma (the Russian nobility assembly that traditionally tookcare of various internal administrative aspects of the country) with aSenateappointedbyhim. In1707,hedividedRussia intoeight regionscalled guberniya (headedby governors appointedby him),whichweresubdivided into provintsii (provinces), in turn subdivided into uezdy(districts).Thegovernorswereaidedbylandraty(provincialdirectoratesof the Swedish type). An attorney general (aided by a network ofprosecutors) oversaw the functioning of the senate and the actions ofgovernorsinsearchofsignsofcorruption. He undertook a census of the country’s nobility and, in 1722,introduced a revolutionarymeasure: the Table of Ranks (a hierarchicalclassification of civilian andmilitary government posts).2 Theoreticallynow all noblemen (and commoners in state service) should have their

2 The first complete translation of Peter the Great’s original Table of Ranks into English can be seen in Segrillo (2016a), available online at: http://lea.vitis.uspnet.usp.br/arquivos/arttableofrankslea.pdf

15

importancevis­à­visthefatherlandestablishedbyservice,notbyheredity.Thus, regardless of birth, noblemen would have to work in variouspositionsofgovernmentserviceandgoupalongthelevelsoftheTableofRanks. In 1714, Peter abolished the difference between votchina(hereditary“fief,”withoutobligationofservicetothemonarchandwiththe right tobe soldoralienated)and pomestie (service “fief,”bywhichnoblemen received, on a temporary basis, the land in exchange forservicestothestate):henceforthalllandsshouldbehereditaryandwouldimply service to the state. The purpose of the reformswas that thereshouldbeno idlenobility inRussiaand thatall thenoblesshouldservethestate. Bymeansofa seriesof longand costlywars,Petermanaged tomakelandlockedRussiaacquireawayouttotheseas.In1696­97,hehadinitialsuccessconqueringthefortressofAzovandotherTurkishportsintheBlackSea,tothesouth,whichallowedhimtobegintheconstructionof a Russian navy. But he would lose those ports later in 1710. ThedefinitiveexittotheseawouldbeobtainedintheBalticseatothenorthin1721 by means of the Great Northern War: Russia conquered theprovincesofLivonia,Estonia,IngriaandpartofKareliafromSweden. Itwas near the Baltic Sea that Peter built his “Window on theWest.” Inacostlyendeavor,heerected the futurecapitalof thecountry,thecityofSt.Petersburg—cunninglynamedafterSaintPeter.TherepercussionsofPeter’sreformsinRussia Peter’sreformsweresoradicallywesternizingthatafterhisdeathin 1725 the country was divided between those who supported thedirection of these reforms and those who accused him of havingabandoned the traditionalwaysofMotherRussia.From the eighteenthcentury onward — and especially after the French and Industrialrevolutions crystallized a conception ofWesternEurope as the locusofindustrial modernity — the question of what role Russia had in therelationshipbetweenEastandWest,EuropeandAsia,acquiredclearanddefined contours.Throughout the eighteenth century thisdebatehad afragmentarycharacterwitheachthinkerorpoliticalactordemonstratinghis/her preferences individually. From the nineteenth century onward,however,thisdebatebecameinstitutionalizedwiththeformationofthreemajorschoolsofthought:Slavophilism,WesternismandEurasianism.Thedebate between Westernizers and Slavophiles began in the mid­nineteenthcenturyandthecurrentofEurasianismwouldemergeinthe1920s.

16

Chaadaev’s first "PhilosophicalLetter": the trigger of thedebatebetweenWesternizersandSlavophiles Peter Chaadaev (1794­1856) was a Russian philosopher whoparticipated in theNapoleonicwars and toured Europe from 1823 to1826.Hewroteeight“philosophicalletters”inFrenchbetween1829and1831. They circulated in Russia only inmanuscript form in restrictedcirclesduetotheirextremelycriticalcontent.WhenthefirstPhilosophicalLetterwaspublishedintheRussianjournalTelescopein1836,inHerzen’swords,“itwasashotthunderinginthedarknight[...]Itwasnecessarytowakeup.”(Herzen,1954­1965,vol.9,p.139) Chaadaev had been in the Russian army and had fought in theNapoleonicwars.ThesewarswereaturningpointinRussianhistory.Ontheonehand,Russia’svictoryoverNapoleoninParisraisedtheprestigeof the country abroad to its heyday as the winner and savior ofmonarchicalEurope.Ontheotherhand,manyofficersandsoldiers,uponreturntoRussiaafterthevictoryinEurope,broughtwiththemideasandimpressions that contradicted theabsolutistandobscurantist characterof tsarism. A number of these officerswere in the origin of the 1925Decembrist Revolt, which aimed at transforming Russia into aconstitutionalmonarchy. In1823­1826,Chaadaevmadea triptoEuropefromwhich he returned deeply influenced by Catholicism, the Germanidealistphilosophyand theFrenchconservative thought.Between1829and1831hewroteeightphilosophicallettersinFrench,whichcirculateddiscreetly inmanuscript form in small circles of Russian intellectuals.(Chaadaev,2009a)When theTelescopepublishedtheFirstPhilosophicalLetter in 1836, a furor was raised in the country. The governmentconfiscated the journal,exiled itseditoranddeclaredChaadaevofficiallymad. The reason for the reaction was the nihilistic character of theessayand the extremelynegativeportraitChaadaevdrew fromRussianhistory.Herearesomeexcerpts:

[...]Positionedbetweentwomainpartsoftheworld,Eastand West, leaning one shoulder on China and the other onGermany, we should merge into ourselves the two greatprinciplesofspiritualnature— imaginationand reason—andcombine, inourcivilization, thehistoryof thewholeworld.ButsucharolewasnotgiventousbyProvidence[...]Solitaryintheworld,wegavenothingtotheworld,wetaughtnothingtoit.Wedidnotintroduceanyideaintothemassofideasofhumanity,wehavenotcontributedtotheprogressofhumanreason[...]Oneof

17

themostdeplorable traitsofourpeculiar civilization is thatwearestilldiscoveringtruthsalreadyassumedbyotherpeoples[...]Thereasonisthatwenevermarchtogetherwithotherpeoples.Wedonotbelongtoanyofthegreatfamiliesofthehumanrace.WeareneitherWestnorEastandwedonothavethe traditionsofanyofthem.Placedasifoutoftime,thegeneraleducationofmankindhasnotreachedus.(Chaadaev,2009,pp.3and7)3

FromtheparagraphabovewecanunderstandtheshockcausedbyChaadaev’s essay. But why would Russia have been so intellectuallybarrenwhenherneighbors,bothonthewesternandeasternsides,hadmanaged to reach high levels of civilization? Chaadaev explains thatRussiahadfollowedOrthodoxChristianity,notRomanCatholicism.

[...] Impelled by a fatal destiny,we sought inwretchedByzantium,objectofdeepderisionofseveral peoples,themoralcode thatshouldguideoureducation. Inanearliermoment,anambitious spirit had alienated this family from universalfraternity: itwasthe ideathusdisfiguredbythehumanpassionthat we have gathered. In Europe the vital principle of unityanimated everything. Everything emanated from it andconvergedonit.Thewhole intellectualmovementofthisperiodwas directed toward the unity of human thought, and allprogress came from this powerful necessity of arriving at auniversal idea, which is the creative genius of modern times.Alienated from thiswonderfulprinciple,webecame thevictimsof conquest. And when, liberated from the foreign [Mongol]yoke, we could (if we were not separated from the commonfamily)havetakenadvantageoftheideasstoredupduringthosetimes by our brethren of theWest, it was in an even harderservitude (sanctified by our independence) that we fell. Howmany living lights had already swept away the darkness inEurope!Muchoftheknowledgethatthehumanspiritisproudoftodayhadalreadybeenenvisionedby thespirits.Thecharacterof modern society had already been fixed. Bathing in paganantiquity[duringtheRenaissance],theChristianworldacquiredtheformsofBeautyitlacked.RelegatedtoourSchism,nothingofwhatwashappeninginEuropecametous.Wehadnothingtodowiththegreatsubjectoftheworld[...]Whilethewholeworldwasrebuildingeverything,nothinghappened tous [...]Althoughwe

3 Unless otherwise indicated, the Russian quotes were translated by the current author.

18

areChristians,thefruitsofChristianitydidnotmatureamongus.(Chaadaev,2009,pp.7­8)

Chaadaev thus saw in Catholicism and in the greattransformations of the Renaissance — which fertilized the Christianworld with what was best in Greco­Roman pagan antiquity — thedifferentia specifica of Europe in relation to Russia. Without this,according tohim,evenafterbeing liberated from theMongolyoke thatdominateditbetweenthethirteenthand fifteenthcenturies,thecountryfellintothe“greater”bondageofabsolutistandobscurantisttsarism. WhatabouttheradicalmodernizingandWesternizingreformsofPeter theGreat?Howdid theFirstPhilosophicalLetter view them?AsMcNally (1964, p. 32) observed, Chaadaev saw them as an abortedattemptattransformationbecauseitwastooartificial,verydifferentfromtheEuropeanorganicdevelopment: theyrepresented formsrather thancontent.

[...]OnceagreatmanwantedtocivilizeusandgiveusanearlyvisionoftheLights.Hethrewusthemantleofcivilization.We grabbed the mantle, but we did not touch civilization.(Chaadaev,2009,p.7)

Bythedevastatinglynihilisticcharacterofthepassagesabove,onecan understand why the publication of the first Philosophical Lettershocked thepublic.The fact thathewasdeclaredofficially insane, andplacedundermedicalcarebythetsar,ledChaadaevtowrite,in1837,ananswer symptomatically titled Apology of aMadman. (Chaadaev, 2010)Heretheauthortriedtodefendhimselfvis­à­visthepublicopinionofthecountry;atthesametime,henuancedsomeofhispositions. He begins by defending himself against the accusation of notlovinghishomeland.

[...]Itisabeautifulthingtoloveone’scountry,butthereissomethingevenmoresublime:theloveoftruth.Loveofone’scountry creates heroes; Love of truth generates wise men,benefactors of humanity. Love for one’s country divides thepeoples,feedsnationalhatredsandsometimesdressesthelandinmourning;the loveoftruthdisseminatesthe lightofknowledge,generates spiritualpleasure,bringspeople closer to theDivine.Notloveforthecountry,buttheloveoftruthleadstoheaven[...]Believeme,more thananyofyou I lovemycountry, Iwishherglory, Ivalue thehighqualitiesofmypeople,but [.. .] Ididnotlearntolovethecountrywithclosedeyes[...]Ithinkthataperson

19

isusefultohiscountryonlyifheisseeingit[...]Ithinkthetimeofblind lovehaspassed, thatwehave theobligationof truth tothemotherland. I lovemy countryasPeter theGreat taughtmehowtoloveit.Ihavenothingtodowiththeblissfulpatriotismoflaziness,whichseeseverythingrosyandcirculatesillusions[...]Ithinkwehavecomelater[thanotherpeoples]sothatwecandobetter than them,not fall into theirmistakes. (Chaadaev,2010,pp.1and7)

Wemaynotethat,inApologyofaMadman,thereisaninflectioninrelation to the Philosophical Letter. The general idea of Russia’sbackwardnessvis­à­visothercountriesismaintained,butsomenuancesofoptimistictoneareevident.Yes,Russiaisbehindothersandhasnotyetmadeherowncontributiontotheuniversalgenius.Butitdoesnothavetobesointhefuture.IftheyfollowPeter’spathconsistently,Russiansmayeven surpass their Europeanmasters. How is this possible? Here, asWalicki (1989, p. 107) and Aizlewood (2000, p. 30) have pointed out,Chaadaevresorts to theLockean imageof the tabularasa toexplain thepotential“advantageof(Russian)backwardness.”Yes,Russiahasnothadahistory(withuniversalmeaning),butpreciselythis“nothing”opensupthepossibilityof “everything”, includingavanguardposition,especiallygiventheopen,receptivecharacterofthe“virgin”Russianpeople.Indeed,this was the reason why Peter’s sudden and surprisingWesternizingreforms were possible in the country: in a nation with deeperdevelopmentand traditions,amanwouldnothavebeenable to changethefaceofthecountryovernight.

[...]PetertheGreatfoundablanksheetofpaperathomeandwithhisstronghandwroteonitthewordsEuropeandWest.Butwemust not deceive ourselves. Nomatter how great thegeniusofthatpersonwasandhowextraordinaryhiswillpower.Whathedidwaspossibleonly in anationwhosepastdidnotpowerfully indicatethepathbywhich itshouldadvance,whosetraditionswereimpotenttogenerateitsfuture,whosememoriesthe courageous legislator could extinguishwith impunity. Ifwerevealedourselvessoobedienttothesovereign’s voicecallingustothenewlife,itwasbecauseinourpasttherewasnothingthatcould create resistance. The most profound feature of ourhistorical image is the absence of free initiative in our socialdevelopment. Observe carefully and you will see that everyimportant factofourhistorycame fromoutside,everynew ideawas always borrowed.But in this observation there isnothingoffensivetonationalfeelings.Ifitistrue,justacceptit:that’sall.

20

Therearegreatpeoples—andgreathistoricalpersonalities—which cannotbe explainedby theordinary lawsofour reason,butwhich are determined by the superior logic of Providence:suchisourpeople.And,Irepeat,thisdoesnothurtthenationalhonor[...](Chaadaev,2010,p.3)

Thischaracteroftabularasa,of“blanksheet”opensthepossibilityfor Russia to write a new history that may even surpass Europe,especiallyinviewofthecontradictionsthatthemodernwayoftheWesthasshowninitsstilltriumphalpassage.

Infact,lookatwhathappensincountriesthatImayhaveoverly exalted, butwhich are themost developed examples ofcivilizationinallitsforms.ThereassoonasanewideaseesthelightofGodallkindsofnarrowselfishness,allchildishvanity,allstubbornpartisanship—whichhadaccumulatedonthesurfaceof society— is thrownover it,overpowering it,overturning it,distorting it. Aminute later it, crushed by all these factors, isspawned in abstract spheres where the most barren dustdisappears. We do not have these passionate interests, theseformedopinions, theseestablishedprejudices.Ourvirginmindreceiveseverynewidea[...]Idonotknow.Perhapsitwouldhavebeen better to go through all the trials and tribulations of theother Christian peoples and to receive from them, like thesepeoples, new forces, new energies and new methods. Andperhaps our special position kept us from the miseries thataccompanied the long and arduous learning of these peoples.However,weshouldnottalkaboutitnow.Nowwemustonlytryto understand the present character of our country in thedefinitiveformwhichtheverynatureofthingshasimputedtoitandderiveeveryadvantagetherefrom.Itistruethathistoryisnolongerinourpower,butsciencebelongstous.Wearenotabletodoalltheworkofthehumanspiritagain,butwecanparticipateinitsadditionalworks.Wehavenopoweroverthepast,butthefuturedependsonus.(Chaadaev,2010,pp.7and8)

And how can this great future progress be achieved, leavingbehind a barren past? In presenting the practical solutions, Chaadaevmakes clear the elitist character ofhis project,which consists not in ademocraticdevelopmentfrombelowbutintheenlightenmentoftheelitepolitical actors, especially of enlightened sovereigns such as Peter theGreat, takingadvantageof the receptive tabula rasa representedby theRussianpeople.

21

Wehaveneverlived[liketheEuropeans]underthefatal

pressure of the logicof the times.Wewerenot thrown by theAlmighty force into theabyss that forcenturieswereopened tootherpeoples.Letusthentakethegreatadvantageofhavingonlytoobeythevoiceofenlightenedreason,theconsciouswill.Letusunderstandthatforusthereisnoabsolutenecessity;that,thankstoheavens,wearenot facingan inclinedslope, like thatwhichunitessomanyotherpeoplestotheirunfamiliardestinies;thatitisinourpowertomeasureeverystepwetake,toreflectoneveryidea that visits our consciousness; thatwe can expect an evengreaterprosperitythanthatwithwhichthemostferventagentsofprogressdream;andthatinordertoachievethesefinalresultsweneedonlyanactofpowerofthesupremewill,whichcontainswithin itself the whole will of the nation, expressing all itsaspirations andwhich,more than once, has shown the nationnew paths, opened new horizons and given minds a neweducation.(Chaadaev,2010,p.8)

Chaadaevsuggeststhat,freefromtheburdenofthepast,Russia,ifguided by enlightened monarchs like Peter the Great, could surpassEurope later, since Europe, although advanced, was divided bypartisanship into opposing interests. Here it should be noted thatChaadaev is not a liberal. On the contrary, he is deeply influenced byFrenchconservativethinking(e.g.,JosephdeMaistre,LouisdeBonald).Hedoes not want to overthrow the Russian monarchy, but to haveenlightened monarchs. The elitist and conservative character of histhoughtbecomesclearinthefollowingpassagesofApologyofa Madman.

Ihaveneversoughtpopular applause.Ihavenotseekedthe favorsof thecrowd. Ihavealways felt that mankindshouldfollowonly itsnatural leadersanointedbyGod; that it canonlyadvanceonthepathof trueprogresswhen itplaces itselfundertheleadershipofthosewhohavereceivedfromtheheavensthetask of leading it; that general opinion is not identical withabsolute reason, as a greatwriter of our time put it; that theinstinctsofthemassesare infinitelymorepassionate,narrower,andselfishthantheinstinctsofanindividualperson;thattheso­called folkwisdom is absolutely notwisdom; that truth is notborn of the multitude and is impossible to be expressed bynumbers; finally, that in all its power and brilliance humanconsciousness is found only in the individual mind [...].(Chaadaev,2010,pp.1and2)

22

Thusweseethat,inApologyofaMadman,Chaadaev,maintaininghis verdict of the first Philosophical Letter about the impoverishedcharacter of the Russian past, now opens the possibility of Russiaregeneratingandfindingherplaceintheworldhistoricalgenius.Itmustbe remembered that, although published in Russia in 1836, the firstPhilosophical Letterhad beenwritten in1829.Over time— especiallyafter the scare of the 1848 revolutions in Western Europe, whichdispleased the author — Chaadaev’s conservative character becomesmoreaccentuatedandadislikeoftherevolutionaryand/oranti­RussianpathofEuropebuildsinhisstilllargelypro­Westernmind.RepercussionsofChaadaev’sPhilosophicalLetter As Herzen put it, Chaadaev’s first Philosophical Letterwas the“shot in the dark” that woke everyone up. The debate about Russia’srelationship with Europe — until then unsystematic — becameinstitutionalized in twoseparategroups,eachhaving theirown journalsandpublications todefend their ideas.Westernizers (AleksandrHerzen,VissarionBelinskii,TimofeiGranovskiiandothers)regardedRussiaasaEuropeancountryanddefendedthereformsofPetertheGreatwiththeirwesternizingmodernization.TheSlavophiles(e.g.,AlekseiKhomyakov,thebrothers Konstantin and Ivan Aksakov, the brothers Ivan and PeterKireevskii,YuriiSamarin)notonlydeniedChaadaev’ssomberdiagnosisoftheRussianpastbutalsoconsideredEuropetobeamorallydecadentcivilizationandthatRussiashouldfollowherownpath,accordingtohertraditions. Hereweneed tomakesomesuggestions tonuance the termsofthedebatebetweenthetwoschoolsofthought,oftenseenintheWestasamereoppositionbetweenprogressiveandreactionarycamps. In the first place, the issue is usually posed as a clash betweenmore liberalandpro­Westerncurrentsagainstconservative,reactionaryorevenxenophobicSlavophiles.This image isanoversimplificationthatdoesnotaccountforthenuancesinthetwofields.ManyoftheSlavophiles,whileadvocating thetraditionalRussianwayof life,adoptedprogressivepositions inregard tovariousaspectsof thecountry’ssocialreality.Forexample, several of them (e.g., Yurii Samarin, Alexandr Koshelev andVladimir Cherkasskii) actively participated in the struggle for theemancipation of the serfs.4 Virtually all of them were against the

4 Wortman (1962) even posited the existence of a liberal current within Slavophilism, formed by people like Samarin, Koshelev and Cherkasskii.

23

censorshipthatexistedinthecountry. On the other hand, not allWesternizerswere liberal.We havealreadyseenhowChaadaevwas,in fact,aromanticconservativeheavilyinfluencedbyBonaldanddeMaistre.On theotherhand,Herzenevadesliberalism from the left:he isasocialistwhowants togobeyond liberalrevolutions—infact,HerzenhasambiguousrelationswiththeWestanditsmainstreamideas,beingakindof“slippery”Westernizer. Chaadaev’s ownposition in theWesternizer­Slavophile debate isnotsoclear.HeisoftenclassifiedasaWesternizer.But,aswehaveseenevenfromthepassagesabove,hehaspeculiar,heterodoxpositionswithinthetwocamps.UnlikemostWesternizers,suchasHerzenandBelinskii,whowantedradicalchangeaway fromtheRussianabsolutistmonarchy(towardarepublicor,atleast,aconstitutionalmonarchy),Chaadaevstoodbytheprincipleofoneman’srule,aswehaveseenabove.Enemyoftheidea of democracy, or of revolutions from below, hewas in favor of areform from above, by an enlightened monarch. In his thinking, thiswouldbe facilitatedbythepassiveandreceptivecharacter(tabularasa)of theRussianpeopleandby thecentralizedpoliticalsystemofasinglemanprevailing in thecountry. In thePhilosophicalLetter,healsostatedthatRussiawasoriginally“neitherWestnorEast.”(Chaadaev,2009,p.3)On the otherhand,he sawRussia’sdevelopmentpath linked to thatofEurope.FirstRussiahad to learneverything thatwaspositive from theWest:onlythencouldshemoveontoherowndevelopment,whichcouldthenevencomeouttobesuperiortothatofherneighborstothewest.Untilthen,shewouldstillbeapupil.Chaadaev’sambiguouscharacterininitiating the institutionalized debate between Westernizers andSlavophilesisreflectedinthepersonalrelationshiphehadwithmembersofboth camps:hewascertainlynotamemberoftheSlavophiles,buthewas not an unequivocal member of the group of Westernizers, withwhomhehaddiscussionsandcontroversies,especiallyinrelationtothequestionofliberalismandsocialismversusconservatism.Chaadaevhadaveinof conservatism in commonwith theSlavophileswhereas thevastmajority of Westernizers adopted progressive, liberal, or even socialistattitudes.TheseminalcharacterofChaadaev’sworkstandsoutmore inthe role of catalyst for debate that the exaggerated nihilism andpessimism of the first Philosophical Letter had than in the defense ofaspectsofWesterncivilizationwhichwefindinhiswritings.AndtheSlavophilecampisformed ThefirstgrouptobeformedwasthatoftheSlavophiles,asakindof “nationalist” response to the challenge posed by the nihilism of

24

Chaadaev’sfirstPhilosophicalLetter.SoonafterwardtherewouldhappenthecrystallizationofaheterogeneousgroupofWesternizerswhowouldcriticize the anti­European excesses of the Slavophiles.We shall beginwiththeSlavophiles. Beforeweget into theSlavophilesproper, it is interesting to seethenationalistandconservativecurrentsthatprecededthem.Aswehavementioned, itwouldbeanoversimplification tocharacterizeSlavophilessimplyasnationalistandconservative.Thiswillbecomeclearerwhenweexamine the nationalist and conservative currents that preceded themandnotehowtheSlavophilesdisagreedwiththemindifferentaspects.Nationalismandconservatisminpre­SlavophileRussia Wementioned that the question of “Europe orAsia?” inRussiaemergedaccompanying thequestionof “empire” ingeneral,both in thecountryandintheworld.ThatiswhythegovernmentofPetertheGreatattheturnoftheseventeenthtotheeighteenthcenturyhadsuchastrongcatalyticrole,anditwasnotacoincidencethatpreciselyinthenineteenthcentury, at the apex of imperialism in theworld, this question becameinstitutionalized in Russia in the debate between Westernizers andSlavophiles.BetweenthegovernmentofPeterIandChaadaev’sletter,thegermsof thisdebatewerebrewing.Theembryonicnatureofthedebatethen canbe seen in thedifferent visions that themainnationalist andpre­SlavophileconservativeshadofEurope,Asiaand thegovernmentofPeter. Let us see below some of these seminal authors of RussianconservativeandnationalistthoughtwhoprecededSlavophilism.MikhailShcherbatov(1733­1790) MikhailShcherbatovwas fromoneof theoldestnoble families inRussia,whose originwas traced to theHouse ofRurik, the founder of(Kievan) Rus'. He was one of the most distinguished conservativerepresentatives of the so­called 18th­century Russian EnlightenmentheadedbyMikhailLomonosov.Ashewaspoliticallyandculturallyactiveduring the timeofCatherine theGreat,hehadanexcellentobservationpoint for the evaluation of theperiodunderPeter theGreat. Inworkssuch as History of Russia from the Earliest Times (7 volumes), On theCorruptionofMoralsinRussiaandinhisessayConsiderationsoftheViceandAbsolutePowersofPetertheGreat,hecriticallyanalyzednotonlyhisagebutalsojudgedtheimpactofPeter’sreformsinRussiansociety. Shcherbatov(2001and2011)wasadefenderofaristocracyasa

25

supportandcounterpointtothemonarchtoavoidthetyrannyofasingleman. From this point of view, he heavily criticized Peter’s reforms,especially his creation of the Table of Ranks. Shcherbatov said that inancienttimestheRussianmonarchsruledwiththesupportoftheBoyarDuma(acouncilofnobles).Atthispoint,heseverelycriticizedPeterforcreatingtheTableofRanks.Peter,inordertosubjecttheRussiannoblestohisservice,determinedthatallpossessionoflandbythenobleswouldimplytheirservicetothestateandcreatedatablecomposedof14gradesinwhichall thenobilitywouldbeclassified.The risealong thesegradeswouldbebymeritocracy,andnotbybirth.Thiscreatedacommotion inthealreadygreatlyweakenedaristocracy.AfterPeter’sdeath,CatherinetheGreatsoftenedtherigoroftheTableofRanksby,amongotherthings,making the ascension in it, from a certain point, automatic by time ofservice. Shcherbatov argued that without a respectful and functionalinteractionwiththearistocracy,monarchywoulddegenerateintotyranny.Forhim,theTableofRanksencouragedcareerism. HedidnothaveaunilaterallynegativeviewofPeter theGreat’sreign. He acknowledged that Peter’s reforms had advanced Russiaculturally by two centuries. (Shcherbatov, 2011) His final conclusion:“The reformswere necessary, but perhaps taken too far.” (Scherbatov,2001)Excesses,by alienating the aristocracy from its “coprotagonism,”opened the door to despotism on the part of the monarch and tocareerism on the part of bureaucrats. A time of “voluptuousness”wasinauguratedinRussianhistory,accordingtohim. Shcherbatovwas a representative of the aristocraticworldviewand his conservative Enlightenmentwasmore related toMontesquieuthantoVoltaireorRousseau. The Russian thinker Aleksandr Herzen would later say thatShcherbatovhadaworldviewthathadmuchincommonwiththatofthenineteenth­century Slavophiles.Hehad inview Shcherbatov’s rescueofthe virtues of the Russian political and social system of ancient timescomparedtosomeoftheforeignmannersintroducedbyPetertheGreat.Butitis importanttonotesubtledifferences.Slavophilesidealizedthemir(rural commune)andpeasantsas themainstaysof themost importantRussian values and were against slavery. Shcherbatov idealized theoriginal Russian rural aristocracy (the boyars) and was a defender ofserfdom.Moreover, Shcherbatov’s defense of pre­PetrineRussian timesdid not necessarily imply an attack on Western Europe itself. Hecontrasted Russia’s “old” and “modern” timesmore than “Russia” and“Europe.”

26

NikolaiKaramzin(1766­1826) Karamzinwas a giant thatmarked Russian culture in differentfields.Hewrote importantbooksofproseandpoetry.His famousshortstory Poor Liza (1792) opened the epoch of sentimentality in Russianliterature,withanemphasisonemotionsandtheinnerworld,ratherthanon reason and the outsideworld.Karamzinwas also the author of themonumentalHistoryoftheRussianState(11volumescompleted),oneofthemostinfluentialhistoriographicalworksofalltimeinthecountry.HeisconsideredbymanythepatriarchofRussianconservativethinking. In terms of the Russia­Europe relationship, the formation ofKaramzin’s worldview was influenced by his long voyage to Germany,France,Switzerland,andEngland in1789.Uponhisreturn toRussia,heexpoundedhisimpressionsinLettersofaRussianTraveler(1791­1792). The title ofhismajorhistoriographicalwork is indicative ofhispolitical philosophy: he wrote a history of the Russian state. ForKaramzin, themain engine of the development ofRussian society as awholewashistoricallythestate.HeshowsthatKievanRus',whichexistedfrom the9th to the13th centuries andwhich grouped all theEasternSlavs,was flourishingandadvanced inrelation totherestofEuropebuthadaweakanddecentralizedstateandwas thereforedominatedbytheMongolsinthe13th­15thcenturies.(Karamzin,1861)ItwasonlywiththestrongandcentralizedMuscovitestatefromthesixteenthcenturyonwardthatRussianswereable todefinitively impose themselveson theworld.Karamzinwasthenachampionofthe tsaristautocracy.Atthispointhediffered from Shcherbatov. While the latter defended the role ofaristocracyasacomplementandcounterweighttothemonarchytoavoidthe tyranny of a singleman, the former,while defending that the idealwouldbeafriendlyandproductiverelationshipbetweenthemonarchandthenobles, incaseofconflictbetweennobilityandmonarchwasclearlyonthesideofautocracy. IntheearlyyearsofTsarAlexanderI(r.1801­1825),whothenhadliberal leanings and was thinking of introducing elements of the(bourgeois)Napoleoniccivilcode inRussia,Karamzin (1861)wrotehisMemoironAncientandModernRussiaasametaphoricalwayofopposingthisimitationofforeignstandards. Russia’s victory over Napoleon in 1815 gave great impetus tonationalist thinking in Russia. Karamzin (and his History…) wasinformallyadoptedas thegreatbannerof thisnewconservativepowerthat imprinted its mark on Europe, saving her from the Napoleonicheresies.At thatmoment, thependulumbetweenEuropeandRussia intheinternalideologicaldebatesinthecountryswungtowardthelatter. ItisinterestingtonotethatKaramzin,likeShcherbatov,inspiteof

27

affirming traditional Russian values — Shcherbatov emphasizing thevirtues of theKievan state and its boyar aristocracy andKaramzin theMuscovite autocracy— did not have an a priori anti­Western Europeposition. It was more a statement of Russian national values in aconservativeway than a purely antagonistic contrast to the Europeanvaluesinthemselves.Explicitanti­europeanismmakesitsappearance From what we have seen in the previous paragraph, themainstreamof conservatismandnationalism inRussiahadmoreofanelement of national assertion than necessarily an a priori anti­Europeanism or anti­Asianism. But therewere exceptions. One of theearliest voices in which the assertion of Russian national values wasaccompaniedbycertainanti­EuropeanismwasthatofthefamoussatiristDenis Fonvizin (1744­1792), considered by some to be the RussianMolière. In his comedy The Brigadier­General (1766), he satirized theimitation of French manners by Russian nobles — which sometimesincludedspeakingFrenchathome.In1777­1788,hevisitedFranceand,basedonthisexperience,wrotehisLettersfromFrancecriticizingvariousaspectsoflifeinEuropeandstatedthatinsomecasestheRussianwayoflife was more advanced. Since he shared many of the generalEnlightenment values of the time — for example, defending aconstitutional monarchy against what he considered to be tsaristdespotism— his comparison of Russia as superior to Europe withinthese commonEnlightenment valueswas amilestone in thehistory ofRussia­Europecomparisons.Before,EuropeantravelersdescribedRussiaasbeingmorebarbaric;nowaRussiantravelerdescribedEuropeherselfinsimilarterms.However,weshouldnotgosofarasconsideringFonvizinasimplexenophobe,sinceeveninhisLettersfromFrance(nottomentionotherwritings ofhis)he alsopraised the positive aspects ofEuropeancountries and even of his bête noire, France, especially in the areas oftradeandindustry. The struggle against the French influence increased with thefoundingof theRussianMessengerbySergeyGlinka in1808(published,with interruptions, until 1825). In it, Glinka attacked the imitation offoreignwaysanddefendednationalistRussia.Hiscomparisonstendedtoimply the superiorityofRussianmannersoverEuropeans.He attackedthe imitationofEuropeanmodelsbypost­PetrineRussiansandglorifiedpre­PetrineRussia.Like the admiral andphilologist Aleksandr Shishkov(1754­1841),Glinka said that the increasinguse of foreign loanwordswasimpoverishingtheRussianlanguage.

28

ItisinterestingtonotethatGlinka,likethefutureSlavophiles,andunlikeShcherbatovorKaramzin,hadaverypositiveand favorableviewoftheRussianpeasantsandconsideredthemtobethebearersofthebestvalues in the country. This did not prevent him (like Shcherbatov andKaramzin and unlike the Slavophiles) from defending serfdom.He saidthattheRussianpeasantswerelikepurechildren,whoweretobeguidedbythenoblesactingasbenevolentandresponsibletutors.Itisimportanttonotethatallthreementionedauthorsadvocatedabenevolentserfdom,inwhichtheserfswouldbetreatedwellbytheirlords. It isalso interesting tonote that inmanyofthese forerunnersofRussian conservatism and nationalism — notably in Shcherbatov,FonvizinandGlinkaand less inKaramzin— thedefenseof thenationalelement(ofteninoppositiontotheEuropeanforeigner)camenotwithanunreserveddefenseofthethencurrentRussianmonarchyoraristocracybut rather with a reprobation of the country’s currentmonarchy/aristocracy in favor of the idyllic ideal of anobility engagedandresponsibleto itsdutiesasvirtuous tutorsofthenation.ThiswouldchangewiththeemergenceofthedoctrineofOfficialNationality,whoseadvocatestendedtoacceptandcanonizetheRussianmonarchyandthestatusquoofRussiansocietyasitactuallyexisted.ThedoctrineofOfficialNationality(TeoriyaOfitsial’noiNarodnosti) The victory over Napoleon in 1815 magnified the prestige ofRussia in the world and propelled a wave of nationalism within thecountry itself.But in the long run the campaign of theRussian armiesacrossEuropetoFrancebroughtanothercontradictorymovement.Someofficers and soldierswho had been in Europe came infectedwith thevirusofseveralliberal,radicaloranti­absolutistEuropeandoctrines.Thereturn to Russia, with her absolutist and repressivemonarchy, was acultureshock formany. Inashorttime,secretsocietiescroppedupandproposedtheendofunlimitedautocracyinRussiaandtheadoptionofaconstitutional monarchy (in the British style) or even more radicalsolutions.AnuproareruptedintheyearofthedeathofTsarAlexanderI—whohaddefeatedNapoleon—takingtheformofamilitaryuprisingtoinfluence the dynastic succession: the so­called Decembrist Revolt(because it happened inDecember 1825). Itwas an uprising of armyofficers,togetherwithcivilianelements,whosoughttopreventtherisetopower of Alexander’s son, Nicholas (considered to have despotictendencies)ratherthanhismoreliberalbrother,Constantine.Therebelsweredividedbetween thosewhowouldbe satisfiedwith constitutionalmonarchy and abolition of serfdom and thosewhowanted a republic.

29

Eitherway,theuprisingfailedandthenewTsarNicholasI(r.1825­1855)begananextremelyrepressivereign.And itwas inthisrepressivereignthathisministerofeducation,SergeyUvarov,madeexplicit in1833 thedoctrinenow calledOfficialNationality.Thisdoctrinewasbasedon thefamoustriad“Orthodoxy,AutocracyandNationality”(PravoslavnayaVera,Samoderzhavie, Narodnost’), as Uvarov put programmatically in hiscircularofMarch21,1833, todistrict schooladministrators, soon afterhis appointment asMinister of Education of theRussian Empire: “Ourcommonobligation is tobring theeducationof thepeople,according tothe supreme will of our Augustus Monarch, into the joint spirit ofOrthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality.”5 He explained the philosophicalprinciplesofthisnewdoctrineinhisreport“OnSomeGeneralPrinciplesThatMayGuide theAdministration of theMinistry of Education of thePeople”toTsarNicholasIofNovember19,1833.Initheemphasizedthat

Delving into thesubjectandseeking theprinciples thatcharacterize Russia (and every land, every people has such apalladium),itisclearthatamongtheseprinciples,withoutwhichRussia cannot live, flourish and strengthen herself, there arethree main ones: 1) Orthodoxy; 2) Autocracy; 3) Nationality.(Uvarov,2012,p.70)

TsarNicholasIenthusiasticallyadoptedthedoctrineastheofficialpositionoftheRussiangovernment.Init,thefirsttwoelementsarequiteclear:theOrthodoxChristianreligionasthecementthatunitesRussiansspiritually(areligiouspeoplebynature)and theautocratmonarch(i.e.,withunlimitedpowers) tomaintain thesecularorder.The third term iscomplicatedsemantically.TheoriginalRussiantermisnarodnost’,whichroughlycorrespondstotheGermanwordVolkstumlichkeitbecausenarod,in Russian, means “people.” That is, it had not only the (ethnic)connotationofnationalitybutalso theemotional,Herderianconnotationof“people.”Uvarov’sinitialideaseemstohavebeentocreateanamalgambetweenthemonarch,thechurchandthepeople.Buttheconnotationof“nationality,”asagroupofethnicRussians,becameincreasinglystronginthis thirdmemberof the triad,especiallywhenNicholas I tightenedhispoliciesofRussificationofnon­Russianprovinces,requiring,forexample,thecompulsoryuseof theRussian languageasameansofbureaucratic

5 The circular was published in the Journal of the Ministry of Popular Education (Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniya), January 1834, pp. XLIX-L. It is important to note that this famous triad of Uvarov did not come out of nowhere: in fact, it (symptomatically) is a modified version of the old military war cry Za Veru, Tsarya i otchestvo! (“For the Faith, for the Tsar, for the Fatherland!”).

30

communication and teaching and suppressing non­Russian nationalistmanifestations. It is interesting to note Uvarov’s complex relationship withEurope.On theonehand,hewants toavoidcontagionof thedangerousrevolutionaryideasfromthere.Ontheotherhand,heknowsthatRussiacannotdowithout theadvancements from theEuropeanculturalworld.This is clear from the following passage of his report to the tsar onNovember19,1833 (i.e.,beforehisstatementof the triad), inwhichheexplainedwhatmadehimseekaspecialsolutionfortheeducationoftheRussians:

In the midst of the decline of civil and religiousinstitutions in Europe, despite the spread of destructive forces,fortunately Russiamaintains a warm faith in certain political,moralandreligiousconceptsthatareuniquetoher[...]Willwebeabletoincludetheminasystemofgeneraleducationthatlinksthebenefitsofour timewith the traditionsof thepastand thehopes of the future?Howdowe establish a national educationthat isnotalienated from theEuropeanspirit?Howshouldweact inrelation toEuropeaneducation,withoutwhichwecannolongerpass,butthat—withoutskillfulprecautions—threatensuswithimminentdestruction?(Uvarov,2012,p.70)

In other words, in this passage it is clear that Uvarov sailedbetween two opposing poles (later to be called “Westernizer” and“Slavophile”):atthesame timehewantedto ignitethe flameofnationalsentimentinRussia(albeitwarilyofEuropean“dangerousideas”)healsoknewthatRussiacouldnotdowithouttheadvancesofEuropeancultureingeneral.6 The distance between these two poles that tearedUvarov apartcanbeseenwhenwecontrastthetwomainOfficialNationalityauthors:Mikhail Pogodin and Stepan Shevyrev. Shevyrev was openly anti­Europeanand in favorofRussiansuperioritywhilePogodinexalted theRussians, butwithout having an anti­European position a priori. Let’sstartwithShevyrev.

6 This dilemma or contradiction in some of these central authors of official Nationality makes heterodox observers come to regard Uvarov (2012, pp. 68-69) as a kind of “Westernizer” (in the sense that his training and the education proposed by him were based on European models and, in the end, he sought an ideal similar to that of several European conservative thinkers). In the same vein, Walicki (1989, p.54) reminds us that Tsar “Nicholas I considered himself to be the heir of Peter the Great and would not countenance any criticism of his reign.”

31

StepanShevyrev(1806­1864) StepanShevyrevwasapoetandhistorianofRussianliterature.Hewas one of those that Pushkin called the “archive youths,” a group ofbrilliant and promising admirers of the German romantic thinkerSchelling whoworked ormet in theMoscow archives of the ForeignMinistry.Over time,hisconservatismgrewstronger.Due tohisvirulentanti­Europe opinions, he is apocryphally named as the creator of theexpression “putrid West” (gniyushchii Zapad), which became popularamong themost xenophobic nationalist circles. TogetherwithMikhailPogodin,he created and edited the conservative journal TheMuscovite(Moskvityanin),publishedbetween1841and1856andwhichadvocatedthedoctrineofOfficialNationality. In the first issueof theTheMuscovite in1841,Shevyrev (2012)publishedhisessayARussian’sViewsontheModernEducationinEurope[Vzglyad Russkogo na Sovremennoe Obrazovanie Evropy], whichrepresentedthethinkingofthemostanti­EuropeanwingwithinOfficialNationality.Inthistext,undertheguiseofanalyzingeducationandcultureinEurope,theauthoranalyzedtheEuropeancivilizationasawhole.Let’slookatsomeofitsparts.Inthefirstfewparagraphs,ShevyrevdescribedthesituationofRussiaandtheWestasopposingpoles.

Thedramaofcontemporaryhistory isexpressedintwonames [...]:West and Russia. Russia and theWest: this is theresultof all that came before, the lastwordofhistory [...]TheWestandRussiameet face to face.Will the formerdrawus toherself within her worldwide expansionist efforts? Will sherestrainherself? [...]Doweconstituteaworldofourown,withpeculiarandnon­Europeanprinciples? [...]This is thequestion,thegreatquestionthatisaskednotonlyamongusbutwhichalsoresonatesintheWest.Allthosewhoarecalledtosomeserviceofimportanceinourhomelandmustbeginwiththesolutionofthisquestion.(Shevyrev,2012,p.150)

Shevyrev played akey role in framingRussia’s relationshipwith“theWest”asadirectconfrontationoftwoessentiallydifferentelements.Hediagnosed,inalmostmedicalterms,Europeasspirituallysick.

FranceandGermanywerethesceneoftwomajorevents— or rather two related critical illnesses— which the wholehistory ofmodern Europe is passing through. These diseaseswerethe[Protestant]ReformationinGermanyandthe[French]

32

Revolution inFrance.Thediseasewasone,but in twodifferentforms. Both have proved to be inevitable consequences ofWesterndevelopment[...]Yes,inourclose,friendlyandforthrightrelationswith theWestwe do not notice that it is like amancarrying inhimselfa terriblecontagiousdisease,surroundedbyexhalationsof apoisonousmiasma.Wekisshim, embracehim[...] we do not perceive the poison hidden in this carelessexchange,andallowthedelightsofthebanquettomasktheodorofputrefactionhealreadyemits.(Shevyrev,2012,pp.149­150)

ItwasbecauseofpassagesliketheoneabovethatShevyrevwasconsidered the originator of the expression “putridWest” (gniyushchiiZapad),which became popular in xenophobic nationalist circles at thetime—althoughhehimselfhadneverliterallyusedsuchanexpression. In his essay, Shevyrev hinted that countries like Russia couldsucceedEuropeinherprominentpositionintheworld.Heexpressedthisbyciting inhisessaytheanalysisofthesituation inEuropeprovidedbyFrenchwriterPhilarètChasles:

[...] From the height of his observatory [...,] thephilosopher [...] is obliged to repeat his sinister cry: “Europedies” [...]But are there not on Earth younger countries […] toconserve (and already conserve!) our heritage, as when ourancestors tookup theheritageofRomewhenRomecompletedand ended her destiny? Are not America and Russia there?(Shevyrev,2012,pp.163­164)

Inthefinalpartofhisessay,Shevyrevsummedup,intheveinofOfficialNationality, the three great characteristics of Russia that couldmakeher the regenerator of the spiritual illness that affectedWesternEurope.

[...]wekeepwithinourselvesthreerootedfeelingsthatconstitutetheseedsandtheguaranteeofourfuturedevelopment[...Firstly]wemaintainouroldreligious feeling[...]Thesecondfeeling, inwhich Russia is strong and that ensures our futurewell­being, is the feeling of her state unity, originated in ourhistory.CertainlythereisnocountryinEuropethatcanboastofsuchharmony in itspoliticalexistenceasourhomeland. In theWest,discord is takenas the lawof lifeand theexistenceofallpeoplesgoesthroughconstantstruggles.Inourcountry, the tsarandthepeopleconstitutea single,indivisiblewhole,notallowingseparation between them. [...] The third rooted feeling is the

33

consciousness of our narodnost’ [“national­popular sentiment”...].TheWest, forsomereason,doesnot likeour feelings [...] Inthe fatefultimesofrupturesanddestruction thatarepresent inthehistoryofhumanity,Providencesends, in the formofothernations,forcesofsafeguardandmaintenance:yes,Russiawillbethatkindof force in relation to theWest! (Shevyrev,2012,pp.172­174)

Let us now look at the other great intellectual pillar of OfficialNationality,MikhailPogodin,andobserve thenuancesofhis thought inrelationtoShevyrev,althoughtheybelongtothesameschoolofthought.MikhailPogodin(1800­1857) Pogodin, the son of a serf, excelled inRussian academic life.Hebecame an historian and a professor at the University of Moscow.PogodinandShevyrevwerethetwogreatest intellectualsofthedoctrineofOfficialNationalityduringthereignofNicholasI.Together,from1841onward, theybegan topublish the journalMoskvityanin, inwhichweretherewereessaysbytheoristsofOfficialNationalityandofSlavophilism. Pogodin’sviewof the relationshipbetweenRussiaand theWestdiffered in some respects from Shevyrev’s. The differences betweenRussia and Western Europe were made explicit in the essay ParallelbetweenRussianHistoryandtheHistoryofEuropeanStatesinRelationtotheir Origins. There Pogodin provided a synthesis between FrenchhistorianAugustinThierry’s idea (inhisbookHistoirede laConquêtedel'Anglaterre par les Normands) that the history of Europe is markedmainly by forceful conquest andNikolai Karamanzin’sNorman theorywhich, following the accounts of Nestor’s chronicle, stated that theoriginalnative Slavs voluntarily invited theNormanVarangian (Viking)nobility of theHouse of Rurik to rule over them. These very differentoriginswouldmarktheirfurtherdevelopments:WesternEuropemarkedbydisunity(rebellion,rupture,revolutionandclassstruggle)andRussiabyunity(harmonybetweenrulersandruled).(Pogodin,2012a) However,PogodindidnotrejectEuropeenbloc.Onthecontrary,he considered Russia part of Europe: itwas Eastern Europe, differentfromWesternEurope(EnglandandFrance),butEuropeanyway.AndsoRussiahadtofollowherownpath,differentfromthatofWesternEurope,buttakingadvantageofwhatwasgoodinit.HispositiononthisquestionwasmadeclearintheessayPetertheGreat,firstpublishedin1841.Init,Pogodin asked the question about Peter's importance in history andwhetherhisreformswereuseful.AboutPeter’simportance,hisresponse

34

washyperbolic:

Wherever we look, we see his colossal figureeverywhere [...]Wewake up?What date? First of January [...]PetermadeuscountthemonthsfromJanuary[...]Timetodress:our clothes aremade in themanner given to us by Peter [...]Bookscometooursight?Peterintroducedtheprintedletters[...]They bringnewspapers: Peter began them. [...] Let’s go to theUniversity.Peterinauguratedthefirstsecularinstitutions[...]Doyougetagovernmentpost?Peter instituted theTableofRanks[...] Place in the system of European states, governmentadministration, judicial procedures, civil law, Table of Ranks,army, navy, factories, roads, [...] the Academies [...] all this is amonument tohis tirelessworkandhisgenius.(Pogodin,2012d[1846],pp.335,340­343)

The excerpts above seem to have been written by a hardenedWesternizer,especiallywhenfollowedbythepassagesinwhichPogodinemphasizedthatRussiacouldnotavoidaccompanyingtheprogressmadeinEuropeandbroughttoRussiabyPeter.

Russia is part of Europe; [Russia] forms a geographicwhole with her and, consequently, by physical necessity,mustshare fatewith her, and participate inhermovements [...]CanRussia separate from Europe?Whetherwewant it or not,wewill be influenced by Europe [...] Can we now refuse to usemachines, railways and steamships? [...] Yes, Peter’s reformswerenecessarybecauseof thenaturaldevelopmentof things inRussia and in the neighboring states of Europe [...] (Pogodin,2012d[1846],pp.344­345,349)

Buthowdowereconciletheseseemingly“Westernizing”positionswithPogodin’sprofilewithin thedoctrineofOfficialNationality?At theend of the essay, Pogodin explained his position. Peter opened the“European” era in Russia. But that erawas over, having completed itstaskswiththevictoryofTsarAlexanderIoverNapoleon.Now,withTsarNicholas I, began the “national” phase of Russia, in which she woulddevelop autonomously, based on her own material and spiritualcharacteristics,inordertocreate,inherinteractionwithWesternEurope,ahighersynthesis,acivilizationthatwouldbesuperiortotheunilateralWesternEuropeancivilizationofthetime.

Therewere two [great]states in theAncientworld: the

35

Romanand theGreek.From the ruinsof theRomanscame thestates of Western Europe; from the Greek, Russia. WesternEuropean states adopted Christianity from Rome; Russia, fromConstantinople [...]Western education isalsodifferent from theEastern one. It brings agitation, movement; the latter, calm,permanence. The former leads to dissatisfaction andextroversion;the latter, to patienceand introversion.Centrifugalforceandcentripetalforce,WesternandEasternman.Boththeseformations, takenseparately,areunilateral, incomplete[...]Theyshould unite, complete and produce a new Western­Eastern,European and Russian formation [...] Here is where Peter’shistoricalrolecomesinasthefounderoftheunificationofthesetwo universal formations, as initiator of a new epoch in thehistoryofmankind[...]Europeaneducation,broughtbyPetertheGreat,acquiredapositionofpriorityinourdomesticformation;and this was natural. The youngest state in Europe, as theyoungestchildreninfamilies,alwayssufferstheinfluenceoftheirelders.ButnowwehavebeguntofreeourselvesfromthisviolentEuropean yoke. We begin to think for ourselves, using theexperience, science and art of Europe [...We begin] to refusewhatisnotnecessaryforus.Webegintoexpressournationalityin words, in thoughts, in life [...] Emperor Alexander, enteringvictorious in Paris, placed the last brick in the buildingwhosefoundation Peter had laid [...] The period between Peter andAlexander should be called the Europeanperiod.WithEmperorNicholas,who in his early days on the throne decreed that allteacherssenttotheprovincesshouldexactlybeethnicRussians,whoseministerhasinhistriad,apartfromtheOrthodoxreligionandautocracy,nationality,[...]beginsaperiodinRussianhistory,thenationalperiodwhich,insofarasitreachesitsupperstages,may have the glory of becoming a turning point in the jointhistoryofEuropeandhumanity.(Pogodin,2012d,p.359)

We see, therefore, that even within the theory of OfficialNationality therewere nuances, including the very appreciation of theWest.Whatwas commonwas the affirmation of the national element(always remembering that the term narodnost’, in addition tomeaning“nationality”, derives from narod [“people”], having therefore “folksy”undertones).TheappreciationofwhatEuroperepresentswillvaryfromauthor toauthor,withShevyrevcloser to thenegativepoleandPogodinclosertothepositiveone.Shevyrevseemedtoforeseea future inwhichRussiawouldovertakeEurope,whilePogodinpredictedthatfutureRussiawould represent a superior synthesis of what was previously best in

36

EuropeandRussia.ThetransitiontoSlavophilismproper Inresponse to the “shot in thedark”ofChaadaev’sPhilosophicalLetter, a new, rather peculiar form of conservatism and nationalismwouldemergeindebatewiththeWesternizers,withfeaturesthatdidnotexist in the forms of conservatism and nationalism described earlier:Slavophilism. It would be a very peculiar form, since, unlike OfficialNationality,itdidnotintendto“preserve”thestatusquoofRussiaatthattime—on thecontrary, itwouldsuffercensorshipandevenrepressionbythemostreactionarytsars—anditsconceptofnarodnost'emphasizedthepopularelement(thepeople,ornarod,itself)ratherthanthenational­ethnicelement.Slavophileswouldhavestrongclasheswiththedefendersof Official Nationality due to the latter’s emphasis on autocracy (andserfdom)asanessentialconstituentofRussia.Slavophilesrejectedbothdespoticautocracyandserfdom,seekingtheir inspiration inthepopularforms ofRussian narod, especially the peasants,with their communityinstitutions,suchasthemir(ruralcommune). AftertheappearanceofSlavophilismandWesternisminresponsetoChaadaev’s letter, two great “generations”or “waves”of Slavophilismsurfaced,followedbyaperiodinwhichtheremainingSlavophilesmingledwith new currents, especially Pan­Slavism. According to Riasanovsky(1965,pp.28and187),IvanKireevskii,KonstantinAksakovandAlexkseiKhomyakov laidthebasicframeworkofSlavophilismbetween1845and1860.After theirdeathsaround1860,Yurii Samarinand IvanAksakovcontinuedtheirworkinthenewpost­Emancipation(ofserfs)Russiauntiltheirdeath, respectively, in1876and1886.At that time themovementwas already thinning out andmixingwith new trends, especially Pan­Slavism(IvanAksakovplayingalargeroletherein). The central nucleus of the Slavophileswas relatively small. ThemainSlavophileswere: theAksakovbrothers(Konstantinand Ivan), theKireevskiibrothers (IvanandPeter),AlekseiKhomyakov,YuriiSamarinandAleksandrKoshelev.Thisisthemainnucleusofthemovement.SomeauthorsaddasSlavophilesthinkersfromothercurrents,suchasPogodin(from the theory ofOfficialNationality),NikolaiDanilevskii (from Pan­Slavism)andevenDostoevskii(fromthepochvennichestvo[“returntothesoil”] movement). In this work we will maintain a stricto sensuclassificationof thegroupofSlavophiles, soas tohighlight thenuancesanddifferencesofthoughtbetweentheSlavophilesand othergroupsthatalsocontainelementsofconservatismand/ornationalism.

37

GeneralcharacteristicsofSlavophilism StrictosensuSlavophilismcanonlybeconsideredexistentafterthepublication of Chaadaev’s First Philosophical Letter in the journalTelescope in 1836. In fact, the institutionalization of the currents ofSlavophilesandWesternizersdidnothappen immediately,butgraduallyin the late 1830s and early 1840s.With them, the discussion on theidentity of Russia, especially her relation with Europe, acquired aqualitativelydifferentandmoresophisticated level.Hithertodiscussionsof Russia’s relationship with Western Europe were fragmentary andbasically depended on the peculiarities of each thinker. With theformation of the Slavophile andWesternizer schools of thought, theyacquired a more organized, institutionalized and socially rootedcharacter. Theremarksintheaboveparagraphalsoserveascautionthattheattempts by some scholars to classify previous authors (e.g., SergeyAksakov, fatherof theSlavophilebrothersKonstantinand Ivan)orevenSlavophilesthemselvesinperiodspriortoChaadaev’s“shotinthedark”asalready part of the Slavophile school of thought is to commitanachronism. In thepre­“shot in thedark”period, the thoughtof futureSlavophiles was in fluid formation: some experimented with variousphilosophies(especiallyWesternromanticones)andprecociousauthorslike SergeyAksakovhadonly scattered andpeculiarnotions about thetopics that would later be adopted in a systematical way by theSlavophiles. Andwhatare thegeneralcharacteristicsoftheSlavophiles?Firstof all,within Chaadaev’s challenge that Russia was “neitherWest norEast”and“hadmadenocontributiontotheworld,”theytookastancethatdifferedfromthatofWesternizers.WhereasthelatterarguedthatRussiawaspartofEuropeandshould follow thepathofmodernity,Slavophilesclaimed thatRussiadoesnotbelong toeitherEuropeorAsiabutratherconstitutesauniquecivilizationthatshouldgoherownway.Theytendedtoconsider thatWesternEuropewasembarkingonanexcessivelyone­sided path paved with materialism and rationalism and that RussiashouldmaintainheroriginalspiritualityasacorrectivetothoseEuropeanexcesses. Unlike previous conservative thinkers, Slavophileswere againstsefdom and regarded peasants as the primary guardians of Russiantraditional values in their simplicity and spirituality. They tended toidealizethemir(ruralcommune)asoneofthegreatpillarsofthefeelingof sobornost’ [organic communal solidarity] in Russia. Slavophilesconsideredsobornost’oneofthemaindistinguishingfeaturesofRussians

38

(inoppositiontotheselfishindividualismreigningintheWest). Theywerealsoagainstcensorshipandinfavoroftherightoffreeopinion.Theirrelation toautocracywascomplicated: they tended tobeagainstdespotism,butinfavorofapaternalisticmonarchy. ThegeneralcharacteristicsaboveshouldnotobscurethefactthattheSlavophiles, thoughrelativelyhomogeneous in ideological terms,alsohad original thinkers with peculiarities, as we shall see later in ourindividualanalyzesoftheirmajorwriters. Theoverwhelmingmajorityof the leadingSlavophilescame fromnoble and cultured families in Moscow and not from the capital St.Petersburg.Thishadacertainlogic.Moscowwastheoldercity,theformercapital(beforePetertheGreat),withherancienttraditionsandthegreatnoble families.St.PetersburghadbeenbuiltrelativelyrecentlybyPetertheGreattobethe“WindowontheWest”nearthesea.Withoutthetiesof somanyancient traditions,St.Petersburg tended tobe the stage forinnovators, whileMoscow formed an environmentmore conducive toconservatives.SlavophilesinMoscowandWesternizersfeelingathomeinSt. Petersburg is an image that makes logical sense and has largelymaterialized, at least as far as the main actors in this drama areconcerned.The fact that theSlavophilesareall from traditionalornoblefamiliesalsogivesaclearclassorigintothisphilosophicalmovement. Most of these cultured Slavophile nobles traveled in WesternEurope.Severalof themmet inpersonorcorrespondedwithEuropeanphilosophersandauthorswhose theories theydebated. IvanKireevskii,for example, on his visit to Germany, attended Hegel’s lectures anddiscussed with him and Schelling personally. The fact that they werenationalists and against the excessive influence ofWestern Europe onRussiadidnotobviatethefactthattheystudiedandappreciatedaspectstheyconsideredadvancedinEuropeanculture. TounderstandtheSlavophiles’aversiontoWesterninfluenceoverRussia, one must consider the context of the time. Ever since theWesternizingmodernizationpromotedbyPetertheGreat,insomepartsof Russian society there was an exaggeration in the adoption of“Europeanisms.”TheclearestexampleofthiswasthefactthatmanynoblefamiliesstartedtospeakFrenchathomeinsteadofRussian!Takingsuchexcesses into account, the defensive posture of the Slavophiles issomewhatmoreintelligibleinthefaceofthefloodof“Europeanisms”thatplaguedthecountry. ThefactthatthemostthreateningEuropeaninfluencecamefromFrance— her language invading Russian homes, the enlightened andrevolutionarydoctrinescomingfromthere—partlyexplainssomeoftheintellectualpreferencesoftheSlavophiles.ThemajorityoftheSlavophiles(especially the older ones), in their previous “apprenticeship,” went

39

through a period of influence by German romanticism (notablySchellling).FavoringGermanphilosophywasawayofcounterbalancingthemainEuropean influence inRussia,whichwas theFrenchone.TheGermans, divided into several small states and not united in a singlehomeland, also sought a way to unite culturally and resist centrifugaltendencies. German Romanticism and Herderian philosophies certainlyhadsomethinguseful to teachSlavophileswho felt that theirhomelandwasculturallyindanger. TheGermanphilosopherSchellingwasespeciallyinfluentialintheformationoffutureSlavophilesbecausehisemphasisonspirituality—asopposed to mere materialistic rationalism — according to theseSlavophileswasinlinewiththecharacteristicsoftheRussianpeople(alsomore spiritualand communal).Schellingdidnotpostulateadichotomybetweenmaterialandspiritualbutrather that therewasan integrationbetween the material and the spiritual. Being and nature formed anorganicwhole.Theovercomingofthismaterial/spiritualdichotomywasvery attractive to the Slavophiles, especiallywhen Schelling, inhis laterphase, began to emphasize the role of art as revelation, as theway ofreaching deeper and less unilateral knowledge. Schelling’sNaturphilosophie(philosophyofnature)seemedtogivefutureSlavophilesthebasisforalatercritiqueoftheexcessivematerialismandrationalismprevailing in theWestern Europe of the Industrial Revolution. On thespiritual side, by valuing the ideal, itwas also possible to reach a deepknowledgeofnatureandthesocialworld.Thisromanticrevaluationofthespiritual and aesthetic side was the philosophical basis that futureSlavophiles needed for a consistent critique of Western materialisticrationalism. It is interesting to note the important role of one of themostfamous “discussion circles” so frequent in the history ofRussia of thenineteenth century: the Society of Lovers of Wisdom (ObshchestvoLyubomudriya).Thiscirclewas formed in1823, initiallycenteredontheso­called“archiveyouths”oftheForeignMinistryinMoscow,andbroughttogether several brilliant anti­Enlightenment romantic conservatives:poet D.V. Venevitinov, Prince Vladimir Odoevskii and future Slavophilessuchas IvanKireevskiiandAleksandrKoshelev.TheGerman romanticswere studied there,with special emphasis on Schelling. Although this(secret)Societywasdissolved in the repression that followed the1825Decembristrevolt, itwasan importantplatform in the formationof thethinkingoffutureSlavophiles. Later,whenSchelling’s influencebegan tobeeclipsedby thatoftheGermanphilosopherHegel,abifurcationoccurred.ManyWesternizers(suchasHerzenandGranovskii)adoptedHegelandremainedinfluencedby his philosophy. Several of the future Slavophiles were also initially

40

influencedbyhimandwentthrougha“Hegelian”phase,butmanydeniedHegel later, either because they already had their own “Russian”philosophy formed — and thus could be independent of Westernphilosophies— or just as a show of opposition to theWesternizers’embraceofHegel. Although the Slavophiles generally favored a paternalisticmonarchyorevenautocracy,duetothepeculiaritiesoftheirpro­peasantthinking and their criticism of the excessive Westernization of theRussianupperclasses,theyhadmanydifficultieswithtsaristcensorship.Initially theSlavophilesdidnothave theirownpressorgans,butwhenthey came to have them in the mid­1850s, these organs were oftencensoredandrepressed.Among the journalseditedbySlavophileswerethe journalsRusskayaBeseda (“RussianConversation,” 1856­1860) andSel'skoe Blagoustroistvo (“Rural Improvement”) and the newspapersMolva(“Rumor,”1856),Parus(“Sail,”1859),Den’(“TheDay,”1861­1865),Moskva(“Moscow,”1867­1868),Moskvich(“TheMuscovite,”1867­1868)andRus’(“Russia,”1880­1885). This description of themain characteristics of the Slavophiles isonlyageneralpicture.Letusnow lookat someof themost influentialSlavophilesindividuallysothatwecanseethenuanceswithinthisfield.KonstantinSergeevichAksakov(1817­1860) ThedescriptionsoftheSlavophilesintheliteraturegenerallybeginwith the two oldest ones, Ivan Kireevskii (1806­1856) and AlekseiKhomyakov (1804­1860), who are usually considered the foundingfathers of Slavophilism. Going against the grain, we shall begin ourdescriptionofthemaintheoristsofSlavophilismwithKonstantinAksakov.The reason is that K. Aksakov, in addition to having given importanttheoretical contributions to the movement, seems to have been theSlavophilethat,inpractice,bestincarnatedthepositionstheyadvocated.This sometimes assumed funny contours.As part ofhis idealization ofRussiantraditionalmanners,Konstantinsometimeswentoutinthestreetdressed inold­fashioned folklorishclothes.Herzen(1954­1965,vol.9,p.148) wrote about that in his memoirs: “In all of Russia, except forSlavophiles,noonewearsmurmolka[traditionalRussianheadgear].AndK.AksakovdressedsonationallythatpeopleonthestreetstookhimforaPersian,asChaadaevjokinglynoted.” AnotherreasonweconsiderKonstantinagoodintroductiontotheheart of the movement is that he was the author of a now famousmemorandum to the newTsarAlexander II inwhich he gave practicalsuggestions on how to adjust Russia’s internal order according to

41

Slavophileprecepts.That is, throughhim,wecanhaveaprivilegedviewnotonlyofthemoregeneraltheoreticalaspectsofthatschoolofthoughtbutalsoaformulationforapracticalapplicationofthesepreceptstothe“actuallyexisting”tsarismofthattime. KonstantinandhisyoungerbrotherIvan(alsoaSlavophile)wereborn, likemostmajor Slavophiles, into a familyof educatednobles.Hisfather,Sergey,authored idyllicworksabouteveryday rural lifeandwasanadmirerof thenationalistdoctrinesofAdmiralA.Shishkov, refusing,forexample,tospeakFrenchathome.Thus,theAksakovbrotherswereraisedinanenvironmentcriticalofexaggeratedforeigninfluences. However,Konstantin’sentry intoSlavophilismwasnotmade inastraightline.InattendingtheUniversityofMoscow,unlikeKireevskiiandotherfutureSlavophileswhoweremembersoftheconservativeSocietyofLovers ofWisdom, K.Aksakov joined theHegelian circle of discussionfrom which would emerge several of the future Westernizers: theStankevichCircle (1831­1839).This is further evidence thatone shouldnotspeakofSlavophilismbeforethe“shotinthedark”ofthepublicationof Chaadaev’s Philosophical Letter in 1836. Hitherto, individualities intheir intellectual pursuits flowed and intertwined,mixing members offutureWesternizers and Slavophiles. In the Stankevich Circle, Aksakovconversed with Belinskii, Bakunin and others. The end of the circlearound1839wasaccompaniedbyAksakov’sseparation from theothermemberswhofollowedtheWesternizerpath.KonstantinapproachedtheolderSlavophiles(IvanKireevskiiandAlekseiKhomyakov)andgraduallyabandonedHegelianism.Hismaster'sthesisLomonosov intheHistoryofRussian Language and Literature (1841) was a final attempt to uniteHegelianismandthenewvisionsofthetwoolderSlavophiles.Afterthat,heplungedintoapurelySlavophileWeltanschauung. Hewroteinseveralgenres.Hewasalinguist,literarycritic,poet,playwright,wroteabouthistoryandphilosophy.AmonghismaintextsareOntheFundamentalPrinciplesofRussianHistory,thememorandumtotheTsar on the Internal Situation of Russia, the language treatise RussianGrammar Experience, and the dramas Prince Lipovitskii and MoscowLiberated,aswellasagooddealofpoetry. IntermsofRussia’srelationshipwiththeWestandhisphilosophyof history in general,we can use some key texts inwhich K. Aksakovexpounded his ideas. Two texts (along with their subsequentsupplements) are illustrativeofAksakov’s typeofphilosophicalhistory:On the Fundamental Principles of Russian History (1849) and On theInternal Situation of Russia (amemorandum addressed to the Tsar in1855). Let’sstartwith the first text. In it,Aksakov initiallypresentshisgeneral philosophy of history and introduces some idiosyncratic

42

fundamental concepts, such as the question of “internal truth” versus“externaltruth”andthedichotomy“land”(i.e.,people)/state.

Themoralrealizationoflifeischaracteristicnotonlyofeach individual but also of each nation. And each person andeachpeopledo it theirownway, choosing thisor thatway [...]Moralactivitymustbeandiscarriedoutinamoralway,withoutthehelpofexternal,coerciveforces[...]theDivineSavioropenedthispathus[...]Itisthewayoftheinnertruth[...However]thereisanotherway,apparentlymuchmorecomfortableandeasy.Theinternal structure is transferred outwards. Spiritual freedom isunderstood only as a mechanism of order. The primordialprinciples of life are understood only as rules and regulations.Everythingisputintoformulas.Thisisthewaynotofinnertruth,butofexternaltruth;notofconscience,butofcoercive law.Butthispathhas countless disadvantages. First of all, this formula,whatever it may be, cannot encompass life. In addition,superimposedfromoutsideandbeingcoercive,itlosesthemainforce, the forceof internal conviction [...]Thispathof externaltruthisthepathofthestate.TheWesternmanfollowedthispath.(Aksakov,1889b,pp.11­13)

In thepassageabovewehavesome initialelementsofAksakov’sphilosophyofhistory.Firstly,hedoesnotviewhistoryasameresequenceof random events. He considers history’s flow to be based on someprinciples. These principles are moral. And the origin of these moralprinciples lies in Christ. Secondly, in general and specifically todifferentiate thewaysofRussiaandWesternEurope,he introduces theconceptofinternaltruthversusexternaltruth.Hebelievesthatthepathofinnertruth(ofinnerconvictionorself­conquering)isthebestway.TheWesthasfollowedthepathofexternalformulas,externalrules,legalandrational legalism thatmakespeopleconform tostandards imposed fromoutsidebyrulers. Wheredoes this innerconviction thatAksakovsaysexistamongtheRussianscome from?Aksakov (1889a,p.14) tellsus: “ThusbeginsRussianhistory:twoforcesserveasthebasis,twoenginesandconditionsthroughout Russian history: Land and State.” By “Land,” AksakovunderstandstheRussianpeople.Andthisrelationshipbetweenthepeopleandtheirgovernmentdifferedfromtherelationshipbetweenpeopleandstate inWestern Europe. To reach this conclusion, Aksakov uses theNormantheory—bywhichtheEasternSlavs invitedtheVikingsoftheHouseofRuriktobecometheirrulers—originallydescribedinNestor’sChronicle and perpetuated by Karamzin, Pogodin and other Russian

43

historians.

Russia is a totally original land, nothing like theEuropean countries and states. Those who want to applyEuropeanstandardstoherandjudgeherbythemarewrong[...]All European states are based on conquest. Hostility is theirprinciple. Power there turned out to be hostile, armed andforcefullyassertedamongtheconqueredpopulation.[Thus ...]astate is formed based on hostility and this condition does notabandonitthroughouthistory.TheRussianstate,onthecontrary,wasnot formedon thebasisof conquest,buton thevoluntaryinvitation to authority. Therefore, not hostility, but peace andharmonyare itsprinciples [...] In thisway, theservilesentimentof theconquered isat thebaseof theWesternstateswhile thefreefeelingofvoluntaryinvitationtopowerisinthefoundationsof Russia. The slave rebels against the power he does notunderstand [...]The freepersondoesnot rebelagainstapowerthat he understands and voluntarily invited. Thus, in thefoundations of Western states: violence, servility, hostility; inthoseofRussia, voluntariness, freedom,peace.Theseprinciplesconstitute an important anddecisivedifference betweenRussiaandWesternEurope,anddeterminethehistoryofboth[...]TheWest, from this slave situation, goes on to rebellion, confusesrebellionandfreedom,welcomes thisandseesslaveryinRussia.Russia,ontheotherhand,alwayskeepswithinitselfthepoweritrecognizes;andvoluntarilymaintainsit,freely.(Aksakov,1889b,pp.16­17)

Aswenoticeabove,Aksakov,whoobserveshistorymovingbasedon “principles,” sees the early principle of violent conquest in ancientEuropetransformingitselfintotherebellionsandrevolutionsofWesternEurope. Meanwhile, Russia remained unshakable in its autocraticformation. HowdoweunderstandAksakov’sparadoxofseeing“freedom”inacountrywheretherewasstillserfdom?(serfdomwouldonlybeabolishedin Russia in 1861 while the main debates between Slavophiles andWesternizerswereinthe1840sand1850s). First of all, itmust be said that the Slavophiles in generalwereagainst serfdom, so part of the paradox pointed out in the previousparagraphisresolved. TobetterunderstandhowAksakovsawtherelationshipbetween“land” (Zemlya) and “state” (i.e., between people and government),weshouldanalyzethetextinwhichhedescribesthismatter.Itwaswhenhe

44

wroteamemo(OntheInternalSituationofRussia)in1855tothenewlycrownedTsarAlexanderII(themonarchwhowouldlaterdecreetheendofserfdom).Init,hecriticizedtheconditionsinRussia,WesternizedsincePetertheGreat,andwithagreatgapbetweentheelitesandthepeople. Heproposedwaystoremedythesituation. He began by stating the specific characteristics of the Russianpeopleintheirrelationshipwiththestate.

TheRussianpeopleareanon­statepeople, that is, theydo notwant state power, they do notwant political rights forthemselves,nothavingwithinthemagrainofloveofpower.Thefirstproofofthatisthebeginningsofourhistory:thevoluntaryinvitationtoanalienstatepowerinthepersonoftheVarangians,Rurikandhisbrothers[...]Thus,thefirstanddistinctconclusionfromthehistoryandcharacteristicsoftheRussianpeopleisthatit is a non­state people, it does not seek to participate ingovernment,itdoesnotwishtoconditionallylimitgovernmentalpower, ithasnopoliticalelementwithinitandtherefore itdoesnot have within itself the grain of revolution or of theconstitutional foundation [...]This specificity of the soul of theRussianpeopleisundoubted.Somemaybedisturbedandcallthisspirit servile; others rejoice and call it the spirit of theestablished order. But these and those aremistaken, for theywouldbe judgingRussiawith theWesternvisionsof liberalismandconservatism.(Aksakov,1889c,pp.602­604)

Thus,accordingtoAksakov,theRussianpeoplewouldbeapoliticaland would leave the state functions to the government. Here it isimportant to recover thatdivisionalreadypresentedbyAksakov in thetext On the Fundamental Principles of Russian History: the divisionbetween“land”(zemlya,thatis,thepeople)and“state”.

[...] the formerdivisionofallRussia into stateand land(government and people) and the derived expressions of stateaffairsandland(people’s)affairs.Bystateaffairsoneunderstoodalltheaffairsofthestateadministration[...]Byaffairsofthelandoneunderstoodall thewayof lifeof thepeople,all theactivityandwell­beingofthepeople[...]Thatiswhythosewhoworkedfor the statewere called state servitorsor statesmen.Landmenwere those who did not work for the state butmade up thefoundations of the state: the peasants, the burghers, themerchants [...] But what do the Russian people want forthemselves?[...]Notseekingpoliticalfreedoms,theyseekmoral

45

freedoms, freedomsof thespirit,social freedoms[...]Theywantto leave forthemselvestheirnon­political innersocial life,theirhabits,theirwayoflife:thelifeofthepeacefulsoul[...]Ifpeoplewereholy,thentherewouldbenoneedforastate,foritwouldbethe kingdom ofGod on earth.But people are not like that [...]Assassins, who have no inner law in their souls and are notobedient to external laws, can kill a good person and do evil.Therefore, because of people’s weaknesses and mistakes, weneedanexternal law,weneedthestate,whichmaintainspeace.But thevocationofman remains thesame,moral, internal: thestateservesonlyasameanstothatend[...]Russiahastwofaces:stateand land.[...]What is therelationshipbetweenthem?Firstofall,thepeopledonotinterfereinthegovernment,intheorderoftheadministration.Andthestatedoesnotinterfereinthelivesand habits of the people [...] It would be strange if the statedemanded thatpeoplewokeup at7:00 a.m.,had lunch at2:00p.m.andsoon.Nolessstrangeifitdemandedthatpeopledressorcombinacertainway.Therelationshipbetweengovernmentandpeople isoneofmutualnoninterference.But such involvement(noninterference) is only negative, incomplete. It must becompletedwith a positive relationship between state and land.Thepositiveobligationofthestatetowardthepeopleistodefendandpreservethelifeofthepeople,topromotethemeansoftheirwell­beingandflourishing[...]Thereisnodoubtthatgovernmentexists for the people, not the people for the government.(Aksakov,1889c,pp.605­612)

Aksakov defends the absolutistmonarchy forRussia as the bestway tomaintain the government taking care of statematters and thepeople,freeoftheloadofexternalpoliticaltasks,dedicatingthemselvestoinnerspiritualdevelopment.

Of course society cannot be government. Outside thepeople,outsideofsociallife,therecanonlybetheindividual.Onlyan individualcanconstituteanabsolute,unlimitedgovernment.Only this individual can rid the people of any interference ingovernment.Sohere it takesamonarch.Only thepowerof themonarchisunlimited.Onlyunderanabsolutistmonarchycanthepeopleremovethestate,getridofanygovernmentalorpoliticalparticipation,anddevotethemselvestosocialandmorallife[...].(Aksakov,1889c,p.610)

Althoughthemonarchisabsoluteinitsstatepower,thepeopleare

46

reservedaninalienableright,therightofopinion.

What is the autonomous relationship of the apoliticalpeople to the government? [...]Theautonomous relationof thepowerlesspeopletothestatethatholdspowerisonlyone:publicopinion.Inpublicopinion(naturallyexpressed inatransparentandfreemanner)thestateseeswhatthecountrywants[...]Themaintenanceoftherighttopublicopinion,asamoralactivityofthecountry, is thusoneof theobligationsof thestate. Insomeimportantmomentsinthelifeofthestateandthepeoplethereisa need for the government to summon the opinion of thecountry, but only the opinion, which the government can ofcourseacceptornot...Thewisetsarsunderstoodthis[...]Andsothey convoked the Assembly of the Land [Zemskii Sobor],composed of members of all the estates of Russia [...] ThepurposeoftheseAssemblieswasonlytheopinion,ofcourse.Theanswersbeganasfollows:“HowtoproceedinthiscasedependsonYou,Monarch.Doasyouwish,butourthinkingisasfollows...”Thus,actionwas therightof theState;opinion, therightof thepeople [...] The connection between the government and thepeoplenotonlydidnotworsenbutalsobecamestronger.Thosewere friendly, trustworthy relations between government andpeople.(Aksakov,1889c,p.613)

Inthepassageabove,Aksakovreferredtoancienttimes,inwhichthe tsars summoned, in times of extraordinary decision­making, theAssembly of the Land (Zemskii Sobor) composed of members of allclassesofRussia,frompeasantstonobles(similartotheEstatesGeneralinpre­revolutionary France). Aksakov suggested, then, that originally therelationship between land (people) and state was one of mutualunderstandingandrespect.Accordingtohim,thischangedwiththereignofPetertheGreat.

NowImusttellyouaboutthetimewhen,onthesideof

thestate,notofthepeople,theprinciplesofthecivilconstitutionofRussiaweredestroyed,whentheRussianpathwasabandoned[...]Peter’sreforms,despitetheirexternalbrilliance,testifytotheinnerevil thatcancauseeven thegreatestgeniuswhenheactsalone,separateshimself from thepeopleand looksat them likeanarchitectlooksatbricks.UnderPeterbeganthatevilwhichisthe evil of our time [...] In theWest, there is this permanenthostility and tension between the state and the people [...] In

47

Russia,thishostilityandtensiondidnotexist.Thepeopleandthegovernment, noninterferingly, lived in a blessed union [...] TheRussian people remained faithful to their role and did notinterfere with the state. But the state, in the person of Peter,interferedwiththepeople,interferedintheirlife,intheirhabits.Heforcedchangesintheircustoms,intheirvalues,evenintheirclothes. He exiled to Siberia even tailors who sewed Russianclothes [...]. The peasants could not leave their villageswith abeard;heevencreatedabeardtax!Itwasnolongerpossibleforthepeople towalk and live as before [...]The statesmen,nobleservants, the upper classes, abandoned Russian principles [...]theybegantospeakinaforeignlanguage.Moscowwasnolongercomfortable for the monarch and hemoved the capital to St.Petersburg,towhichhegaveaGermanname.InSt.Petersburg,around the monarch, a circle of people not fully educated asRussianswasformed:bureaucrats[...]Thusthegapbetweenthetsarandhispeoplewascreated.Insteadofthepreviousunion,astateyokeoverthepeople.[...]ThustheRussiantsargotintothewaysofadespotandthepeople,ofslaves,banishedintheirownland[...]ScornofRussiaand theRussianpeoplesoonbecameamarkof theeducatedRussianswhose aimwas the imitationofWesternEurope[...]AndthissystembyPeterisalreadyacenturyand a half old [...] The danger forRussia is one: to stop beingRussia.(Aksakov,1889c,pp.616­619)

The abovewords easily showwhy Slavophiles, despite being infavorofmonarchyandautocracy,wereoftenvictimsoftsaristcensorship.The picture they painted of Russia at the time was negative, as thefollowingwordsdescribingthevicesthatprevailedinthecountry denote:

Russia’s current situation is one of internal discord,disguised by shameful lies. The government, and with it theupperclasses,separated from thepeopleandbecamestrangerstoit.Thepeopleandthegovernmentareondifferentpathsnowandwith diverse principles.Not only is not the opinion of thepeople asked, but every honest citizen is afraid to speak hisopinion.Thepeopledonotactconsciouslyinthefaceofthestate.Thestatedoesnotactwithconscience inthe faceofthepeople.Thepeople,ineveryactionofthegovernment,arereadytosee anew oppression. The government all the time fears revolutionandineachautonomousexpressionofopinionseesrebellion[...]The government and the people do not understand each otherand therelationshipbetween them isnot friendly[...]Universal

48

perversion and weakening of moral principles in society hasreachedenormousproportions.Corruptionand theftorganizedby public servantshave reachedhorrible levels [...]All this evilcomesmainly from the oppressive system of our government,which represses vital freedoms, freedom of opinion, moralfreedoms[...](Aksakov,1889c,pp.620­621)

Andhowcanyougetoutof thishorriblesituation?According toAksakov,(1989c,p.619)“itisnecessarytoraisethespiritofRussiaandto rely onRussianprinciples, abandoned since Peter’s time.”The basictasktoachievethis,revivingahealthymoralatmosphere,wouldbetoendthelackoffreedomofopinionandexpression.

[The solution] to the present evil that has arisen inRussia is tounderstandRussiaand togiveback to theRussiansthefoundationsthatareinharmonywiththeirspirit[...]Peopledesireforthemselvesonlyonething:freedomofspirituallifeandof theword.Without intruding on state power, theywant thestatenottomeddleintheirindependentspiritualeverydaylifeashasbeenthecaseforthepastcenturyandahalf,comingdowntotrivialdetails,suchasorderingthetypeofclothingtobeused[...]Bygivingfreedomoflifeandfreedomofspirittothepeople,thegovernment gives freedom of public opinion. How can oneexpress public opinion? Bymeans of the written and spokenword. It is thereforenecessary to remove the repressionof thewritten and oral word. If the state returns to the land whatbelongstoit(thoughtandword),thelandwillreturntothe statewhat belongs to it: its trust and energy. The human beingwascreatedbyGod toberationalandvocal.Theactivityof rationalthought,of freedomofspirit, isavocationof the humanbeing.Aboveall,freedomofspiritanddignityareshowninfreedomofexpression. For this reason, freedom of expression is afundamental right of the human being [...]Does thismean theextinction of censorship? No, censorship must continue, tosafeguard thepersonalityof thehumanperson.Butcensorshipshould be as free as possible in relation to thought and to allopinions in everything thatdoesnot concern thepersonality. Iwillnotgointothe detailsoftheconstraintsofthatfreedom,butIsaythatthebroaderitis,thebetter.Iftherearemaliciouspeoplewho want to spread harmful thoughts, we also find well­intentioned people who compensate for them, destroy thedamage done, perform new creations, and restore the force oftruth.Thetruth,acting freely, isalwaysstrongenoughtodefend

49

itselfandendanylies.Andiftruthdoesnothavethestrengthtodefenditselfthennoonecandefendit.Notbelievinginthepowerof truthwouldbe tonotbelieve the truth.Andnotbelieving inthevictoriouspowerof truthwouldbe tonotbelieve the truth,which isakindofheresy, forGod is true. (Aksakov,1889c,pp.623­626)

Aksakov sums up the essence of the measures that this longmemorandumproposesinordertosolvethemainproblemsofRussiaatthattime,which,accordingtohim, stemfromPeter’sreforms.

Tothegovernment,unlimitedfreedomofadministration,somethingthatbelongstoit;tothepeople,totalfreedomofinnerandexternallife,whichthegovernmentpreservesandguards.Tothegovernment, rightofactionandconsequentlyof law; to thepeople, rightofopinionand consequentlyofexpression.This istheconstitutionofRussiancivillife!Thisistheonlyconstitutionoftruecivillife.(Aksakov,1889c,p.627)

Aswe see in the passages above, Aksakov proposes a peculiarblend of freedom and absolutism. He believes it is possible to giveabsolutepower to thestateand,at thesame time,complete freedom totheRussianpeople in their respectivespheresofaction.Fromasecular“Western”rationalpointofview thiswouldbehopelesslycontradictory.ButAksakovrationalizesotherassumptions.Hebelievesthathistoryandlifeingeneralareanchoredinconnectionwiththedivine.Anditisonthebasis of this firm divine foundation that it is possible to make aconnection between the freedom of the people and the freedom of theabsolutemonarch in their respective spheres. This development is notconsidered possible in the West, since its development is based onhistoricalprinciples(violentconquest,hostility)differentlyfromRussiandevelopment,whichwas based from the outset on voluntary invitationandvoluntarysubmissiontothemonarchwhocame fromabroadtorule.Using“Western”terminology,wecouldsaythatthiswouldbetheoriginoftheRussian“socialcontract.”IvanVasil’evichKireevskii(1806­1856) IvanKireevskiiandAlekseiKhomyakov,thetwooldestSlavophiles,vie for the honor of having been the founder, or main figure, ofSlavophilism.Thespecialistsaredividedon thismatter. Inageneralandperhapsoverlyschematicway,itmaybesuggestedthatKireevskiiseems

50

tohavebeenthemostseminalinintroducingthefirstgeneralformativeideasof themovement,whereasKhomyakov,besidesalsobeingseminalinspecificareas,deepenedthesegeneralideasandexpoundedtheminamoresystematicway.Thecharacterandpersonalityof thetwogiantsofSlavophilism also differed. Kireevskii was a serious (even gloomy)religious person, while Khomyakov was relatively more “secular,”exuberantanddaring. Kireevskii, like virtually allmajor Slavophiles, was born into aculturednoble family.He studiedat theUniversityofMoscowand laterbecamepartofthegroupofbrilliant“archiveyouths”,whoworkedintheMoscowarchiveof theForeignMinistry.Heactivelyparticipated in theSociety of Lovers of Wisdom, where he became initially attracted toGerman romantic philosophy. He entered public service but, likemostSlavophiles,didnotstaythereforalongtime.Hereturnedtotakecareofthe family lands inDolbino.He livedtherestofhis lifebetweenDolbinoandMoscow. Ivan’sfather,Vasilii,wasacultured,conservativeandpiousnoble.Fluent inseveral languages,hewasananglophileandhated theFrenchEnlightenment. He died of typhus when Ivan was six. Ivan’s mother,extremely cultured and vivacious,would latermarryA.A.Elagin,oneofthe propagators of German culture in Russia.When the couplemovedfromDolbinotoMoscow,theirhomebecameknownasthe“Elaginsalon,”wheretheypromotedsoiréesinwhichtheculturalissuesofthetimewerediscussed. Unlike his brother Peter, who from the beginning defendednationalist,almostproto­Slavophilepositions, Ivan followeda lessdirectroutuntilreachingapurelySlavophileWeltanschauung.Ananalysisofthedevelopmentof thebrothers’ ideologicalpositions is instructive toshowthedifferencebetweennationaliststancesinthegeneralsenseandinthespecificSlavophilepositioning.Fromtheoutset,Ivandefendednationalistpositions,inthesenseofbeingagainsttheslavishimitationofEuropeanmodels and favoring the creation of Russian cultural standards of theirown.But in the firststagehedidnotdeny thepowerandhighvalueofEuropean culture and even seemed to suggest that the creation of aRussianculturalstandardof itsownwouldabsorb thebestofEuropeanculture. In addition, he initially had a basically secularworldview: onlylaterwouldheemphasize(Orthodox)religionascentral.Onlyinhismorematurephase,hewouldassumethedefiningprincipleofSlavophilismandoppose indigenous Russian culture to Western European culture byvaluing the formermore than the latterandplacingreligious themesatthecoreofhisphilosophy. These specificities of Ivan Kireevskii’s intellectual development,when analyzed chronologically from his earlyworks, alsohighlight the

51

argumentthatonecannotspeakofSlavophilismproperinthepre­“shotin the dark” era (i.e., before the publication of Chaadaev’s FirstPhilosophical Letter in 1836). An analysis of Kireevskii’s early textsshowsthatonlyafterthe“shotinthedark”willIvanbeforcedtobetterdefinehispositionsinpurelySlavophileformat.Andthiswillbearesultbothof thedebateswith theWesternizersandof theexchangeof ideaswith other Slavophiles (especially Aleksei Khomyakov, whom heinfluencedandbywhomhewasinfluenced). Amongthetextsofthis early“formative”phasebyIvanKireevskii,wecannotesomeveryrepresentativeofhispositionsatthetime:hisfirstarticle Something About the Character of Pushkin’s Poetry (1828) plusReviewofRussianLiteraturein1829(1829)andThe19thCentury(1832).Ananalysisofthemainideasbehindthesetextsdenotes the specificitiesof Kireevskii’s thought at the time: nationalist, but not yet completelySlavophilestrictosensu. In his debut article (SomethingAbout the Character of Pushkin’sPoetry,1828),Kireevskii (1911e) argued that the greatpoetAleksandrPushkinrepresentedanewerainRussianliterature.Itwasthenationalpoet,who“reflectsinhimselfthelifeofhispeople”(Kireevskii,1911e,p.13) while maintaining the best features and influences of Europeanculture.That is to say,at this stage, even thoughKireevskii is trying toaffirmtheelementofnationality(narodnost’)ascentralandfundamental,he does not yet see this emphasis as necessarily contradictory toEuropeaninfluence,acceptingthatthelattercontainspositiveelements. This foothold inEuropeanculture (in themidstofan intellectualenterpriseofanationalistcharacter)becomesmoreexplicit inhisnextgreattext,theReviewofRussianLiteraturein1829.Init,KireevskiiclearlyadmitsthatRussiaisa“childinherfirststeps”thatneededandstillneedsthe positive cultural energy brought from Europe for her development.Fromthispositionsomewhatsimilartothatofthefuture“Westernizers,”hemovesontohis“nationalist”side.Thisphaseoflearningiscomingtoanend,WesternEuropeisexhaustinghercreativecapacities,andRussia,asa“youngcountry,”haseverything tobe the futurebeaconofEurope,furtherdevelopingthecultural levelonthecontinentandtheworld.It isworthwhiletoreadhowhesumsuptheconclusionsofthisreviewofthestateofRussianliterature(and,byextension,ofherculture)in1829.

Butifwefacethestateofourliteraturecomparedtotheliterature of other countries, if an enlightened European,brandishing beforeus all the treasures ofhis country, asksus:“Where is your literature?What works can you be proud ofbeforeEurope?”Whatwillweanswerhim?

Wewillshowhimthe“HistoryoftheRussianState”[by

52

Karamzin]. We will present some odes by Derzhavin, somepoemsbyZhukovskiiandPushkin,some fablesbyKrylov,somescenesbyFonvizinandGriboedovand[...]whereelsecanwefindworksofEuropeanmerit?

Ifwe are impartial,wewill realize thatwe do not yethaveacompleteexpressionof the intellectual lifeofourpeople,wedonotyethavealiterature.Butwecancomfortourselves.Wepossessgoodsandblessingsaboveothers.Wehaveahopeandasenseofthegreattaskofourhomeland!

ThecrownofEuropeancivilizationservedasacradleforour education. It was born when other states were alreadyending the cycle of their intellectual development; where theystopped, we will continue. As the younger sister in a largewelcomingfamily,Russia,beforeherbirth,wasalreadyrichwiththeexperienceofheroldersiblings.

NowlookatalltheotherEuropeanpeoples.Eachoneofthem has already accomplished its task. Each expressed itscharacter,livedthepeculiaritiesofitsdirection.Andnownoneofthemlivesalifeoftheirown:thelifeofallEuropehasswalloweduptheindependenceofeachindividualstate.

But forthewholeofEuropeto formanorganic,slenderbody,sheneedsaspecialfocus,apeoplethatdominatesothersbywayofitspoliticalandculturalpreponderance.Thewholehistoryofmodern civilizationpresents the need for such hegemony: astatehasalwaysrepresented,asitwere,thecapitalofothers,theheart to which all blood, all the vital forces of enlightenedpeoples,returns.

Italy, Spain, Germany (at the time of the ProtestantReformation),EnglandandFrancealternatelydirectedthefateofEuropean culture. The development of internal forceswas thereason forsuchdomination;and thedeclineof these forces, thereasonfortheirdownfall.

England andGermany arenow at the topofEuropeancivilization.Buttheirinfluenceisnotlively,fortheirinnerlifehasfinished itsdevelopment,hasaged,andacquired thatone­sidedmaturity which makes their culture respectable only forthemselves.

ThatiswhyEuropenowisinakindoftorpor.Moralandpoliticaladvancementstagnatedinher[...]

Of all enlightened humanity, two peoples do notparticipate in this universal torpor. Two young, fresh peopleradiatehopes:theUnitedStatesofAmericaandRussia.

However,becauseoftheremotecharacteringeographic

53

andpoliticaltermsandespeciallytheEnglishunilateralismoftheeducationoftheUnitedStates,allhopeistransferredtoRussia.

The joint action of the leading European statesparticipated in the formation of the beginning of ourcivilizational enlightenment and infused in it a pan­Europeancharacter,thusgiving ittheopportunityofa future influenceonthewholeofEurope.

To this end also contribute the flexible and imitativecharacterofourpeople,ourpoliticalinterestsandthegeographicpositionofourcountry.

ThefateofeachEuropeanstatedependsonthesetofallothers;thefateofRussiadependsonlyonher.

But the fate of Russia is her own civilizingenlightenment: that is thesourceandconditionofallblessings.Whenall theseblessingsareours,wewilldivide themwith therest of Europe and all our debt to [Europe]will be paidwithinterest.(Kireevskii,1911f,vol.2,pp.37­39)

FromthetextabovewecanseetheyoungKireevskii’sintellectualequilibriumbetweenpositionsthatcouldbecalled“Westernizer”(Europeas source of Russian high culture; Russia’s own “pan­European”character)andnationalistpositionsmoretypicalofthefutureSlavophiles(the emphasis on the need for a “national” Russian culture and thecertaintyofitsfuturesuperiorityoverotherEuropeanones). In1830,IvanandhisbrotherPetertraveledtoEurope.Theywerein several cities of Germany, where they attended lectures by GermanintellectualsandhaddirectcontactwithHegelandSchelling.UnlikePeter,the trip seems tohave strongly influenced Ivan. In1832, hewrote theimportantarticleTheNineteenthCentury (symptomaticallypublished inThe European) inwhich his “Westernizer” side (always immersed in ageneral nationalist context) seems to have reached its peak (after thisapex, in later texts, Ivan would gradually move to purely Slavophilepositions).Wecansee these tracesof “Westernizer” influenceonyoungKireevskii if we read the passages in which he analyzes the mainfoundationsofEuropeancivilizationandcomparesthemwiththekindofcivilizingenlightenmentthatwastakingplaceintheRussiaofhisday.

[...] 1) The influence of the Christian religion; 2) Thecharacter of the education and spirit of the barbarians whodestroyed the Roman Empire; 3) the heritage of the AncientWorld. From these three basic principles the whole modernhistoryofEuropedeveloped.Whichof thesewedonothaveor

54

havehad toomuch?Evenbefore the tenthcentury,wehad theChristianreligion;wealsohadthebarbarians,andprobablythesameoneswhodestroyedtheRomanEmpire.Butwelackedtheclassic Ancient World in our development. Let us see whatdifference this hasmade [...] In the duration of the entire (so­called “barbarian”)Middle Ages, the laws of Rome, the Romansystem,sometimesinpureform,sometimesinmixedoradaptedbut always visible form, existed in all parts of Europe whereRomanruleprevailed.Theselaws,thesesystemshave interferedwith thehabitsof thebarbariansandhavenaturally influencedandempoweredtheireducationandcivilianstructureandoftenthe individualmentality.TheOldWorld system also actedupontheformationoftheexternalcharacteroftheRomanChurchandstimulated its political influence during the Middle Ages [...Christianity] proved to be a creative principle, an educator, asourceofcivilization,orderandunity[inEurope...]InRussia,theChristian religionwaspurerandmoreholy,but theabsenceofthe classical world was the reason why the influence of ourchurchintimesofloweducationallevelwasnotsostrongastheinfluence of theRomanChurch.The latter, as the centerof thepoliticalsystem,createdauniquesoul inmanybodiesandthusgenerated a strong connection throughout the Christianworldthatpreventedinvasionfromoutside.Amongus,thisstrength[oftheChurch]wasnotsostrong,andRussia,disunitedandwithoutspiritual connection, fell under the Mongol yoke for a fewcenturies [...] This element, alienated from all the enlighteningcivilization ofEurope, created that systemwhose consequencewas theMongols,whomwe could not oppose either amaturecivilizationor theforceoftheunion.Nothavingenoughcivilizingenlightenment tooppose them spirituallyunited,we couldonlyfreeourselvesphysically,materially[...].InthiswayweseethattheMongol invasion and its influence on us is based on onething: the insufficiency of the classical world [...] Only whenhistoryallowedustoapproachEuropeinthetimesofMininandPozharskii[c.1612],didcivilizingenlightenmentcometous[...]But thisbeginningwassoweakandcontemptiblecompared towhat Peter [the Great ... did] that when we speak of oureducationwe usually call him the founder of our new life […]Couldnotcivilizingenlightenmenthavecometousotherthanbymeansofviolentrevolutioninourdevelopmentorintheformofexternal forces opposed to our previous way of life [...]? Theanswertothisquestionstemsfromwhathasbeensaidbefore.Ifin our previous life there was missing one of the elements

55

necessary for civilizing enlightenment, the classicalworld, thenhowcouldweachieve itwithoutborrowing it fromtheoutside?Andaneducationcomingfromoutsidewillnotbeinstrugglewithanationalityalientoher?(Kireevskii,1911a,vol.1,pp.98­104)

Anyonewho reads thispartof theessayTheNineteenthCenturywithoutknowinganythingabout the lifeof theauthorcould think thatthesearethewordsofafutureWesternizer.Accordingtowhatwasstated,the three main foundations of European civilization are the classicalancient world, Christianity, and the post­Roman barbarians. Since, ofthesethree,RussiadidnotpassthroughClassicalAntiquity,shecouldnothave had a civilization like that of Europe. And thesemore developedEuropeancivilizingprinciples,contrary to theoriginalSlavicwayof life,arealien toRussia.Althoughnecessary for theelevationof theRussiancultural and educational level, these superior civilizing principles couldnotappearamong theSlavsnaturally: theyhad tobe forcefullybroughtfromoutside(likePetertheGreatdid). Butwhatwould be the role ofRussia, taking into considerationthatKireevskiialreadyhadnationalistleanings?Kireevskiipresentsmoreoptimisticprospects forRussia’sfutureincontrasttoitspast,whichhadhaddeficiencies.Commentingon thegreat revolutions thatoccurred inEuropeinthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthcentury,hesaysthatthereisan epistemological break in this era and a new era, a new type ofcivilizingenlightenmentexistsinEuropeinthe nineteenthcenturythatisdifferentfromtheoneoftheeighteenthcentury(whichcametoRussia)and that thiswould have important consequences for the question ofRussia being able to reach the West in terms of civilizationaladvancement:

Thus, European education comes in two types: as theEnlightenment of Europe before and after the middle of theeighteenth century.The oldEnlightenment is linked directly tothewholesystemofitsgradualdevelopmentandtoparticipateinit, it isnecessary tomoveagain throughout theprevious lifeofEurope.ThenewEnlightenment isopposed tothe firstandhasindependentexistence.Therefore,apeoplewhobegintoeducatethemselves can absorb it directly and install it in themselveswithouttheformeranduseitimmediatelyintheircurrentwayof life. This is why [in such young countries as] Russia andAmerica theEnlightenmentbegan tobegeneralizednotbeforetheeighteenthcenturyandespecially inthenineteenthcentury.(Kireevskii,1911a,vol.1,pp.107­108)

56

Thus,inanoptimisticendingaboutthefutureofRussia,KireevskiitakesupthethemeofhisReviewofRussianLiteraturein1829,sayingthatRussia’s own “young” and “virgin” character (in terms of civilizingenlightenment) can be her advantage. If it depended on the type ofancient Enlightenment (pre­mid­eighteenth century), Russia would becondemned to have to repeat all the steps of Europe to reach itscivilizational level.But since inEurope itselfafter the revolutionsof thesecond half of the eighteenth century a new type of Enlightenmentemerged, “young”nations likeRussia and theUnited States could jumpright into thenew trainandmake theirown contributions to thisnewcivilizationalphaseofmankind.AkindofGershchrenkonian “advantageofbackwardness”approachappliedtocivilizationaltheory! But the texts described above were from the young Kireevskiibefore the “shot in thedark”ofChaadaev’sFirstPhilosophicalLetter inthemid­1830s. After that, the camps of Slavophiles andWesternizerswereforming,consolidatingandgainingmoreinternalcoherence.Inthisprocess,Kireevskiibecamea“pure”Slavophile,abandoningthetracesorremnants of “Westernism” present in his first texts. Important to thisconsolidationwere the intellectual exchangeswith Aleksei Khomyakovandalsohismarriagein1834.Hiswife,Natal’ya,wasextremelydevotedto theOrthodoxChurchandsucceeded indrawinghim to theChurch inboth practical and theoretical terms. Until then, Kireevskii (unlikeKhomyakov), though nominally Orthodox, did not place the Orthodoxreligionatthecenterofhistheory.Thischangedafterhis“conversion”byhiswife;andreligionwouldplayacentralroleinhisSlavophilism. In1852,hepublishedinthejournalMoskovskiiSbornikthearticleOn the Character of European Civilization and its Relation with theCivilization of Russia, (Kireevskii, 1911c, pp.174­222) in which hedescribedhisnewphilosophyofhistoryinasystematicway. Herewe can see thathis appreciation of thedifferent stages ofdevelopmentinWesternEuropeandRussiachangedgreatly. InOntheCharacter...hereiterates(makingadaptations)thethreebasicprinciplesunderlyingWesterncivilizationwhichhehaddescribedin The Nineteenth Century, by saying that three historical processesdifferentiatedEurope:(1)thewayChristianitydisseminatedinit;(2)theway inwhich theancientclassicalworldwas later retained in it;3) theway theirstateswere formedafter thebarbarian invasions.(Kireevskii,1911c, p. 182) What differentiates Kireevskii’s thinking now is thatwhere he once saw neutral or positive traits of Europe in these threefields,henownoticesnegativetraits.Asalegacyoftheclassicalworld,heunderstandsthat itwastheheritageofRomethatremainedintheWest.Rome,withitsjurisprudence,hadasystembasedonwrittenlaws,writtenconstitutions, external formalities that had the power to a priori

57

command the real life of people. Similarly, the Roman Catholic Churchfunctionedas theunifying elementofEurope (as in theprevious text),but it did so by means of external, purely rational regulations andformalitieswhichsoughttogoverntherealanddiversifiedlivesofpeople.FinallythemannerinwhichEuropeanstatesformedfromthefalloftheRomanEmpire,with the barbarians killing one another, represented astate formation based on violence and conquest. (Kireevskii, 1911c, p.184) InRussia, things had passed differently. Returning to Pogodin’stheory,Kireevskii says that state formation inRussia begannotwith aviolentconquest,butbyavoluntaryinvitation fromtheregionalSlavstotheHouseofRuriktocomerulethem.Thus,thebasisoftheunionoftheRussians and their relationshipswithone another is in the freedomofvoluntaryandpeacefulconsent.PeaceisbehindthestateformationoftheRussianswhileinEuropetherewaswar,violenceandconquest.InRussia,Christianity, upon entering, did not find a civilization developed inunilateralrationalismlikeRome,butfoundpeoplewhoweremorenaive,receptiveandopen to thenew,so thatChristianitycouldbekeptpurer.(Kireevskii,1911c,p.185) InEurope,theRomanChurchabsorbedtheformalrationalismofitsRomanbases.ScholasticismbasedonAristotle’ssyllogismsdeepenedunilateral European rationalism. But the Russian Orthodox ChurchremainedfaithfultoPatristics,totheteachingsoftheoriginalFathersoftheChurch,notfallingintotherationaltrap.Itsvisionwasmoreholistic,notseparatingreason from faith,butseeing them inan integratedway,with faithas the integratingprincipleofallhumancapacities, includingreason. InEurope the emphasison reason and external formalities lednotonlytoaformofauthorityinthechurchbasedonasingleindividual(thepope,theepiscopatesystem)butalsotointerferencebytheChurchinworldly affairs outside her spiritual sphere . (Kireevskii, 1911c, pp.189­190)Insociety,thefactthatstateformationtookplaceinEuropeonthebasisofconquestandviolenceledtoclasshatred.(Kireevskii,1911c,p. 191) The way inwhich the formation of the state was realized inEuropewasnotorganic,fromitsownoriginalroots,butthroughviolence,throughexternalconquest.Thiswouldmark thecharacterofEuropeancivilization as violent and only controllable by external, rational laws.(Kireevskii,1911c,p.184)Even in theModernAge,unilateralWesternrationalismdeepened.Proofofthiswasthemainseminalthinkerofthisnewphase,Descartes,withhis “I think, therefore Iam.”Descartesandotherphilosophersreachedthepinnacleofrationalism,since“theyexistbecause they think.” (Kireevskii,1911c,p.196)TheapexesofWesternphilosophyproceededinthesamedirection.ThegreatKantwouldcometodeduceGodfromthelogicalproofsofpurethought.HereKireevskii,a

58

formerSchellingianmemberof theSocietyofWisdomLovers,mentionsthateven thesteps taken in adifferentdirection frompurerationalism,withFichteandSchelling,endedup inHegel,whowouldsimplybe theapexofrationalismbystating that “what isrational is real.” (Kireevskii,1911c,pp.197and198) Ancient Russia had avoided the trap of a unilterally rationalworldviewandhadfollowedamoreholisticwayinwhichreasonisonlyonecomponentof trueknowledgeandnot100%of it.Thiswas largelydue to the role of theOrthodox Church.By avoiding scholasticism, sheremained purer, like the original Christian Church, by basing herprinciplesonpatristics,thatis,ontheteachingsoftheFathersofthefirstcenturies of Christianity. (Kireevskii, 1911c, p. 199) According toKireevskii, in the textsofOrthodoxyone shouldnot look for somethingnewaboutChristianityoutsideofwhatwasintheoriginalFathersoftheChurch. And that is where their great advantage lies: in keepingChristianity and Christian knowledge in its purest, original form.(Kireevskii, 1911c, pp. 200­201)WhileWestern Europe in theMiddleAgeswasstuckinscholasticism,theOrthodoxChurch,withoutfallingintorational unilateral thinking, maintained a more holistic mentalframework.At the same time, until the fifteenth century, theOrthodoxChurchhadmuchmoreknowledgeofclassicalGreekcultureasawhole(not justofAristotle) than theWest. In thisworldwhich theOrthodoxknewoftheGreeksasawhole,theynotedthattheancientGreeks hadnospecialpreferenceforAristotle,butwereattractedbyPlato,whosoughtamore complete (not only rational, syllogistic) knowledge. (Kireevskii,1911c,pp.198­199)TheOrthodox,seekingthetruth,concentratedontheinner correction of the thinking being, while Westerners were moreconcernedwith theexternalconnectionsand interrelationsofconcepts.The former soughtwhat ismoral; the latter,what isuseful. (Kireevskii,1911c,p.201)TheteachingsoftheHolyFathersoftheOrthodoxChurchenteredRus' almost from the outset and became an integralpart of it.Even in themost troubled times of the Kievans, the Orthodox Churchformedaunifyingideologicalcementamongthem,evenmore importantthan language itself.(Kireevskii,1911c,p.202;andhereweshouldnotethatKireevskiihadgreatlychangedhisconceptionoftheunifyingpowerof theOrthodoxChurchsincehis textTheNineteenthCentury)ThehighlevelofworldcivilizationofOrthodoxyintheEastpenetratedallclassesoftheRussians from top tobottom.Proofof thiswas thatseveralRussianprincesof the twelfthand thirteenth centurieshad librarieswithmorebooksthanthefirstlibrarythenopenedinEurope(inParis).(Kireevskii,1911c, p. 202) Although this culture of Orthodox monasteries wasengulfedbyEuropeanPetrinecultureinthepreviouscenturyandahalf,according to Kireevskii (1911c, p. 203) it was still alive in the lower

59

classes,inthepeople(narod).Heretheauthorrevisitsaclassicthemeofthe Slavophiles: that the Europeanization brought about by Peter theGreat affectedmainly the upper classes, whereas the ordinary peoplekeptinthemselvesthepreviousOrthodoxculture. However,KireevskiipointsoutthatthismorallysuperiorworldoftheRussiansdoesnotcomefromanyintrinsicethnicadvantage.Hethusavoidsracialexplanations.

There isno intrinsicadvantageof theSlavic tribes thatmakes us anticipate their future flowering. No! Tribalspecificities,suchasthesoilonwhichaseedisthrown,mayonlyaccelerateordelayitsinitialgrowth;canprovideyouwithbroador restricted nutrition, provide you with more or less freedevelopment opportunities; but the characteristics of theresultingfruitdependnotonthesoil,butontheseedthrownintoit.(Kireevskii,1911c,p.204)

ForKireevskii,thetrueChristianfaith,withits(lessone­sidedandmoremoral) path, is kept among the Slavs not because of any ethnicadvantageoftheSlavs.Russia’sadvantageliesintheoriginalseedoftheOrthodox religion which was spread there. Because Rus’ (the KievanState)wasnotoriginatedbyviolentconquest,itwasguidedbyapeacefulcreativeprinciple.But thiscouldhavechangedafterwardand therulingViking elitemight have become tyrants and the peoplemight rebel orfight each other.But there the seed of theOrthodox religionhelped: itmaintainedthesobornost’(collectiveaggregatingprinciple)ofthenationand avoided the “all against all” which was characteristic ofWesternEurope.(Kireevskii,1911c,p.204)Rus’hadnostateformationbyviolentexternal conquest or class struggle, so it functioned organically, notdivided internally,butcollectively,asasinglebody,unitedbyOrthodoxy.(Kireevskii, 1911c, p. 205) And the aggregating role of the OrthodoxChurchwas in the spiritual, cultural field. It did not interferewith thesecular,materialaffairsofthestate.HereKireevskiigivestheexample oftheprincewhoChristianizedKievanRus’inthetenthcentury,VladimirI.TocommemorateChristianization,hewantedtopardoncriminals,butthechurchitselfdiscouragedhim.Thatistosay,theOrthodoxChurchstayedawayfromthestate,tryingnottobeinvolvedinsecularmatters.Andtheprince did notmeddle in the religious part, or pretended to be “holy.”Therewasno “HolyRoman­GermanEmpire” as inEurope. (Kireevskii,1911c,p.205)InEurope,atthesametime,theknightslivedenclosedintheircastlesindividuallyandselfishly.InRussiatherewerenosuchclosedcastles or noble knightswith kings trying to impose themselves uponthem.Onthecontrary,therewereruralcommuneslivinginsolidarityand

60

incontactwithoneanotherunder thegeneralruleof theGrandPrince.(Kireevskii,1911c,pp.206­207)Rus’washeldtogetherbylinksofinnertruth, not by formal, rational, external connections. According toKireevskii,(1911c,p.207)“Internaljusticesurpassedexternalformality.”In theWest the law was external, derived logically, based on writtenreason.InRus’,lawwasbasedoninternaljustice,derivedfromlifeitself,andavoidedexternalrationalarguments.Thelawwasputinwritingonlyafter it had already entered and fixed itself on the life of the people.(Kireevskii, 1911c, p. 207) Here Kireevskii (1911c, p. 208)makes anepistemologicaldistinction between “opinion”(emphasized in theWest)and“conviction”(theregulatoryprincipleinRussia).Opinionisparticularandlinkedtorationalformalism,dividingthecountryintoadversefields.Convictioncomes from the inner lifeof thepeople,butcomes to it inacollective and natural way by the exchange of ideas and experiences,whichinducesagreatercollectiveunionpolitically. IntheWest,privateproperty,createdbythefightofallagainstall,beginstodefinepersonality.InRussia,personalitycomesfirstandprivateproperty right is its occasional consequence. The rural commune, forexample, isredistributedandredesigned from time to timeaccording tothe population growth to contemplate the families of the newgenerations. InRussia,historicallyabsoluteprivateownershipoccurredonlyasanexception.Evenamongtheupperclasses,propertywasgiveninexchange for services renderedby thenobility. (Kireevskii,1911c,p.215) TheWesternindividual,accordingtoKireevskii,(1911c.,pp.210­211)isfragmented.Religionisinonecompartment;behavioratworkinanother. He looks like different people at different times. The Russianpersonisnotlikethat.Hebeginsandendsactionswithprayers.Andthemomentofprayerisinternal,calm.Atthis momenttherearenoextremes.He does not lose hismind during prayer. Reason and faith are alwaystogether, formingagreatercommonknowledge.Intheruralcommunes,eachmemberthinkscollectively.Hedoesnotreasoninindividualterms,selfishly,butcollectivelyasafamilyinthecommune.(Kireevskii,1911c,p.212)Wealth in theWest is accepted as good andwhoeverhas it isconsideredsuperiororblessedbyGod.InRussia,wealthhascomeasanaddiction from the outside and, feeling that there are often vicesassociatedwith it,people apologize for it anddonot standproudof it,alwaysfeelingitspotentialillegalityinthejuridicalandmoralsense.TheWesternmanseeksbythedevelopmentofexternalmeanstocompensatefordeficienciesinhisinnerworld.TheRussianpersonseeksbymeansofinner exploits to free himself from external needs. If political economyhad been invented in the Kievan Rus’ era, it would not have beenunderstoodbyRussians.Theycouldnotmake thesearch for riches the

61

center of their lives. The Russian knows that the pursuit of externalaffluence isonlyasecondary factoramong theprioritiesof lifeandcanonly be undertaken together with themost important primary moralfactors.(Kireevskii,1911c,p.214) Throughout the essay, Kireevskii, revised some concepts of hisearlier writings and sought to establish counterpoints between theculture of Western Europe and Russia. Thus Europeans were toounilaterallyguidedby rational,external,mechanicalprincipleswhile theRussians,enlightenedby theOrthodoxChurch, soughtamorecompleteknowledge(whichdidnotkeepapartreason,faith,intuition)organicallylinked to life andderived from it, internalized throughpersuasion andcollective interaction.Kireevskiinowconsidered theRussianwayof lifelessone­sidedandmorecompletethantheEuropeanone. Near the end of the text, Kireevskii summarizes the pairs ofoppositions that characterize the differences betweenWestern EuropeandRussia.

Christianity penetrated the minds of Western peoplesthrough only the Roman church. In Russia, it burned in thecandlesofthewholeOrthodoxChurch.TheologyintheWesttookthe form of mental abstractions. In the Orthodox world, itmaintained the innerwholenessof the spirit.Thereoccurs thefractionationof the forces of reason.Here there is an effort toaggregatethemvividly.There,themovementofthemindtowardthe truth through the logical sequencing of concepts.Here, thesearch for it by means of an internal elevation of self­consciousnesstowardtheintegralityoftheheartandthecenterofreason.Thereyouarelookingforanexternal,deadunit.Herethe search is forwhat is internal and alive. There the Churchmixed with the state, uniting spiritual and secular power andmergingwhat isof theChurchandwhat isof theworld intoasystemofmixed character. InRussia, ithas remained separatefromthesecularsystemandtemporalgoals.There,thescholasticand juridical universities. In ancient Russia, religiousmonasteries, concentrating in themselves the superiorknowledge.There, therationalandscholarlystudyof thehighertruths. Here, the pursuit of living and integral understanding.There, the correlatedgrowthofpaganandChristianeducation.Here,theconstantsearchforthepurificationoftruth.There,thestatewas formed fromviolentconquest.Here, from thenaturaldevelopmentofthe lifeofthepeople,permeatedbytheunityoforiginalconviction.There, thehostiledelimitationofclassesandestates. In Russia, their unanimous aggregation, with natural

62

variety. There, the artificial ties of the lords in their castlescreatedtrulyseparatestates.Here,theaggregateconcordanceofall lands isexpressed spiritually intoan indivisibleunity.There,agrarian property is the primary basis of civil relations. Hereproperty is only occasionally the expression of personalrelationships.Therethelawisformallylogical.Hereitoriginatesin life itself.There is a tendencyof the law for external justice.Internal justice ispreferredhere.Thererightsarebound to thelogical code.Here, instead of the external connections betweendifferent forms, the law seeks the internal links of legalpersuasionwiththebeliefsofreligionandlife.Therelawscomesoutartificially from thedominant opinions.Here theyarebornnaturally from life. There improvements have always occurredthroughviolenttransformations.Heretheydevelopedinanaturalandharmoniousway.There theagitationof thepartisanspirit.Here,thestabilityoftheprimordialconviction.There,thewhimsoffashion.Here,thefirmnessoflife.There,theinstabilityoffreepersonal choice. Here, the strength of family and socialrelationships. There, the elegance of luxury and artificial life.Here, thesimplicityofvitalneedsand the joyofmoralcourage.There, theeffeminacyof reverie.Here, thewholesome integrityof the forcesof reasonableness.There, the inneranxietyof thesoulwithmentalcertaintyofitsmoralperfection.IntheRussianperson there is a deep silence and calmness of inner self­knowledge alongwith a constant lack of self­confidence and aninfinite demand formoral improvement. In sum, there is thefractionationof thesoul,of the thoughts,of thesciences,of thestate,of the classesandestates,of society,of familyobligationsandrights,of themoralcondition,of thewholeofpersonalandsocial life. In Russia, on the contrary, there is a preferentialsearch for the integrality of inner and outer life, social andprivate,spiritualandmaterial,worldlyandmoral.Thus,ifweputthe things we have just mentioned fairly, fragmentation andintegrality, the rational and the reasonable, are the ultimateexpressions of the culture ofWestern Europe and of ancientRussia.(Kireevskii,1911c,pp.217­218)

KireevskiiseesRussiancivilizationasmoreintegral,moreholisticthan the unilaterally rational Europe. But immediately after thisapparently more “advantageous” (from the Slavophile point of view)descriptionofRussia,heposedthefundamentalquestionthataWesternreaderofhisworkwouldcertainlyaskatthatmoment. IfRussiahadsomanymorepositive traits thanEurope,why is it thatEuropean culture

63

cametodominateRussiaafterthePetrinereforms,andnotviceversa?Heasksthisquestionhimselfandthentriestoanswerit.

Buthereofcoursethequestionarises.WhyhasRussianeducation not developed more fully than European educationbeforetheintroductionofEuropeancultureinRussia[withPetertheGreat]?WhydidnotRussiagobeyondEurope?Whyhasshenot become the apex of the intellectual development of allmankind, having so many guarantees for a correct andcomprehensivespiritualdevelopment?

To say (as an explanation) that thedevelopmentof theRussian intellectwasdelayedby some centuries from thepointwhere itshouldbebecauseofProvidencewouldbetoprovideapertinent explanation but would not answer the core of thequestion.TheHolyProvidence,formoralreasons,canadvanceordelay thepath tracedasdestiny forapeople.FromEgypt to thePromisedLand,theJewishpeoplecandoin40daysthe journeythrough thedesertsofArabia that itdidpreviously in40yearsonlybecause theirsoulhad turnedaway from thepurepathofGod,theirguide.

Butwehave already said that eachPatriarchateof theUniversal Church, each people, each person, brings theirspecificities into the religious service.The verydevelopmentofthese specificitiesbringsdangers to theirown internalbalanceandtotheirconsentedexistenceinthewholespiritofOrthodoxy.

What, then,was thespecificityofRussia incomparisonwiththeotherpeoplesoftheOrthodoxworldandwheredidthedangerforherlie?Anddidthisspecificitynotturnintoanexcessthatcoulddiverthermentaldirection from thestraightpath tothegoalthatwasdestinedforher?

Here,ofcourse,wecanonlymakesomeassumptions.Inmypersonalopinion,IthinkthatRussia’sspecificityconsistedinthe very completeness and purity of the expressionwhich theChristianteachingreceived in itandinthewholevolumeofhersocialandprivatelife.Thiswasthemainforceofherculture.Butitwasalso themaindanger forherdevelopment.Thepurityofexpressionblendedsowellwiththeexpressedspiritthatpeoplecould easily confuse theirmeanings and begin toworship theexternalformonthesamelevelastheinnermeaning.Ofcourse,the very character of Orthodox teachings, which caredpreferentially for the wholesomeness of the spirit, protectedagainst the possibility of such a mixture. However, thereasonableness of these teachings,which people accepted, did

64

notcompletelydestroyhumanweaknesses inthemselves.Intheindividualandinthepeople,moralfreewillisnoteliminatedbyany education or decree. Indeed, we see that in the sixteenthcenturyrespectforformalreadysurpassesrespectforthespirit.Itmaybe that thebeginningof this imbalancemustbe soughtbeforethat,butinthesixteenthcenturyitisalreadyvisible.Someharmful elements had insinuated themselves into the religiousbooks, and some peculiarities in the external rituals of theChurch obstinately remained in the people although theperpetualinterchangewiththeEastshouldinstructthemonthedifferenceswith the other Churches [of theOrthodoxy].At thesametimeweseethattheprivatejuridicaldecreesofByzantiumwerenotonlystudiedbutalsorespectedalmostonthesamelevelastheuniversalreligiousdecreesofOrthodoxy;andvoiceswerealreadycallingfortheiruseinRussia,asiftheywereuniversallybinding.Atthesametimewefindthatinthemonasteries,whichpreserved theirexternalwelfare, therewasa certaindecline intheausterityoflife.Correctatfirst,atthattimetheformationofthemutualrelationshipbetweennoblesandlandowners beginstotake the form of the monstrous formality of a confusedprovincialism [mestinichestvo]. At the same time, the temporalproximityoftheUnionofChurches,thefearofalieninnovations,further intensifies the general tendency of unhealthymaintenanceofeverything,eventhemostexternalandformalinbasicOrthodoxreligiouseducation.

In this way, respect for tradition, which kept Russiastanding,imperceptiblyturnedintorespectforitsexternalformstothedetrimentofthelivingspirit.HencearosetheunilateralismintheRussianformationwhoseacuteconsequencewasIvantheTerrible, and which, after a century, was the reason for theSchism [of the Old Believers] and which later, because of itslimitation,wouldcauseinsomelayersofthethinkingsocietytheoppositeeffectofanotherone­sidedness:thetendencytoacceptalienforms,aliencultures.(Kireevskii,1911c,pp.218­220)

Kireevskiithusseesthatseveraldangerous,alienatingtendenciestoobservewhatisexternal,formalratherthaninternalandessential,hadtakenholdfromthesixteenthcenturyonward,andthisprocessofgradualinternalweakeningwouldpavethewayforthefullinvasionofEuropeancultureduring thereignofPeter theGreat later. It is interesting tonotethat thesixteenthcenturycorresponds to themomentofaffirmationoftheMuscoviteState,whichhad justrid theRussiansof thetwo­century­oldMongolyokeandbegantheconstructionofthefuturetsaristempire.

65

Kireevskiiseesamore“pure”KievanRus’beingfollowedbyaMuscoviteStatebornwiththegermsoffutureseriousproblems.Butitisimportantto recall the last two paragraphs of the above quote, for Kireevskiidiagnosesthediseaseof“alienation”inRussiainfectingmainlytheupperclassesofthecountry.Somuchsothatinthenextparagraphofhistexthewill say that the lower classes, the people [narod] in their ruralcommunes and daily habits, remained faithful to the originalOrthodoxpathandfromthatcamethefuturehopeofredemptionofRussiabywayof a superior synthesis of the originalRussianOrthodoxwaywith thepositivepartsoftheEuropeanculturethathadinvadedthecountrysincePeter.

However, the core of Russia’s culture still lives in thepeople and, evenmore importantly, it lives in itsholyOrthodoxChurch.And it ison thisbasis,andnowhereelse, that thesolidbuildingofRussiancivilization,whichiscomposedofmixedandoften alienmaterials,must be erected, and thereforemust berebuilt from its own pure materials. The construction of thisbuildingwillonlytakeplacewhenthatclassofourpeople,whichis not exclusively occupied with the acquisition of materialmeans,andwhich,therefore,inthesocialformationreceivesthetaskofmentallyworkingtheself­consciousnessofsociety(aclasspenetratedbyWesternconceptions) finallybeconvincedof theunilateral nature of European civilization; when it vividlyperceivestheneedfornewintellectualprinciples;whenit,havingareasonablethirstforcompletetruth,addressesthepuresourcesof theancientOrthodox faithof thepeople,and fromherheartlistens to the echoes of the holy faith of the homeland in theancient life of Russia. Then, freed from the yoke of rationalphilosophical systems from Europe, the educated Russianindividual, in thedepthsof theholisticspeculationsof theHolyFathers of the Church, which are unreachable by Westernconceptions, will find the most complete answers to thosequestions of the brain and heartwhichmost disturb the souldeceivedbythelatestresultsofWesternself­consciousness.Andinthepreviouslifeofhishomelandhewillforeseethepossibilityofthedevelopmentofanothertypeofeducation.Then itwillbepossibleinRussiaasciencebasedonoriginalprinciples,distinctfrom thoseofferedbyEuropeancivilization.[...]Thensocial lifeinRussiawill be confirmed in a different direction fromwhatEuropeancultureconveystous.(Kireevskii,1911c,pp.220­221)

Thereisinthisparagraphasubtletythatmustbenoted.Kireevskii

66

believes that in the future, from the original foundations of OrthodoxculturesurvivinginthelowerclassesoftheRussianpeople,therewillbeatimewhen the intelligentsiawill break free from the hypnotic yoke ofWesternEuropeancultureandwillarriveatamore integral intellectualdevelopmentbasedon the traditionsof thecountry.But thismustoccurdialectically,asa superior synthesisofRussian culture and thepositivepartsofEuropeanculturethathasalreadysettledinthecountry.Inotherwords,Kireevskiididnotproposeapureandsimplereturntotheoriginalstate of ancient Russia: the wheel of history did not have to turnbackward! This was made clear in his final words in the text whichcommented on the last sentence of the previous passage inwhich heforesawthat thesocial lifeofRussia inthe futurewouldtakeadifferentdirection from theEuropean culture thatdominated the country at thetime.

However,insaying“direction,”Iconsideritnecessaryto

add that,with thisexpression, I limit themeaningofmyhope.For if I should ever see inmy dream that any of the externalspecificitiesofourprevious[Russian]life,longdead,resurrectedamong us,meddling in our present life in its original form, Iwouldnotbeglad.Onthecontrary,itwouldscareme.Forsuchamixtureofthepastinthenew,ofthedeadintheliving,wouldbethe same as putting the wheel of a car in another vehicle ofdifferentshapeandsize.Inthiscaseoneofthetwowouldbreak:eitherthewheelorthevehicle.Ionlywishthattheprinciplesoflife constant in the teachings of the Holy Orthodox Churchcompletely penetrate the hearts andminds of all social classesandgroups.(Kireevskii,1911c,p.221)

Thus,Kireevskiiwasnot a nostalgistwhowanted to resuscitatethe culture of Kievan Rus’ in toto. Nor did he want to overcome therationalistic, formalisticandabstractone­sidednessofEuropean culturethathadalreadypenetratedRussiawithPetertheGreatbymeansof itspure and simple annulment. He wants a forward­looking spiritualmovementbasedonthelivingandintegral(holistic)principlesofRussianOrthodox culture with the absorption of those positive aspects ofEuropean culture thathad alreadypenetrated the country.He assumedthat Europe, though unilaterally, had developed materially more thanRussia.However, inher futuredevelopment,Russiawould continuenotonlytobespirituallysuperiorbutwould“catchupandovertake”Europeintheaspectofmaterialprogresstoo. This article, On the Character of European Civilization and itsRelationwiththeCivilizationofRussia,expoundsthehistoricalviewofthe

67

mature Kireevskii. Abandoning some of the “proto­Westernizer”remnantsofhisyouth,hecame toseeRussiancivilizationalreadymoremorallyadvancedthanEuropefromtheearliestdays,andsomeWesternfactors thatwerepreviouslyviewedpositivelyorneutrally (e.g.,Romaninfluence inlaterEuropeanhistory)cametobeseenasnegative.Ontheother hand, he does not completely rule out all aspects of Westerncivilization.HeconcedesthatmateriallyEuropehasdevelopedmorethanRussia (though it remains spiritually backward) and his hope andexpectation is that Russia in the future may overtake Europe bothspirituallyandmateriallybasedonherownmoralfoundations. Ascanbenoticedfromthetext,Kireevskii’shistoricalviewisveryphilosophical. He would later write a text dedicated specifically tophilosophy, inwhich he also analyzed the issue of the Russia­WesternEuroperelationship.ItistheessayOntheNecessityandPossibilityofNewPrinciplesinPhilosophy(publishedposthumouslyin1856).Init,hetakesuphiscentralconceptof “integrality”and thesuperiorityof “inner” lifeand essence over the external, formal aspects. For him, the Westernemphasis on external, formal and rational aspects makes Europeancivilization tooone­sided.Therational isonlyanaspectnotonlyof life,but of integral comprehension itself. To reduce the human being tohis/her rational aspects is tomake him/her one­dimensional. Besidesreason,thereisfaith,theimmediateinstinct,andseveralotherfacetsthatcomplete the self­consciousness of men. According to Kireevskii, thisabstract,autonomousrationalismwasreachingadeadend in theWest,withtheconsequenceoffragmentingsocietyandthethinkingindividualsthemselves. Hence the necessity of a new “integral” philosophy thatrecoverstheintegralityofthehumanbeingwithinthedivinenature.AndthebasisforthisnewphilosophyshouldbeOrthodoxy,foritemphasizedwholeness,theholisticexistenceofbeing,andavoidedthetrapofabstractrationalism.(Kireevskii,1911d,pp.223­264)AlexeiStepanovichKhomyakov(1804­1860) Aleksei Khomyakovcontendswith IvanKireevskiias the founderand figureheadofSlavophilism.Theirpersonalitiesreflect theway theirworkmayvieforsuchposition.Kireevskii,asamoreromantic,idealistic,contemplative,serious person, inclinedeven toahermit­likemysticism,turned inwardly,whileKhomyakovwasmore exuberant,more realisticand pragmatic, given to polemics. This, and the fact that Khomyakov(perhapsevenasaconsequenceofthecharacteristicslistedabove)wasmoreprolificinhiswritingcareer,attractedalargerliteraturedevotedto

68

hisworksthantothoseofKireevskii,andhisinfluenceseemshavebeengreaterinthelater“generations”ofSlavophilesthanthatofKireevskii. Attheriskofoversimplification,wecouldsaythatIvanKireevskiiconcentrated on a few seminal points and explored themmore deeplywhile Khomyakov had a more kaleidoscopic view and, in addition toexploring some fundamental concepts of Slavophilism (some originatedby Ivan Kireevskii), sought to popularize in a more systematic andpragmaticwayaSlavophileworldviewinthevariousfieldsofphilosophy,history, theologyandpoetry.Thegreat ironyof thestory is thatdue tovariousproblems,especiallywithcensorship,mostofhistextswereonlypublished posthumously.During his life, they circulated among friends(manyintheformofletters)andhisideaswerepropagatedinthedebatesoftheSlavophilesbetweenthemselvesandwiththeWesternizers. Khomyakov’sfamilyoriginissimilartothatofKireevskii(and,sotosay,ofalmostallthemainSlavophiles):theenlightenedruralnobilityofMoscowandsurroundings.Hismotherhadagreat influenceonhis life,instilling inhimaworldview thatwaspiousand traditionalist.AnotherinfluenceonthefutureSlavophilewastherelationshipthefamilyhadwiththeir serfs. It was a paternalistic relationship, taking them almost asincapacitatedmembersofone’sownfamilywhoshouldbecaredforandeducatedwithinaconceptionofChristiancharity.It issymptomaticthatAlekseiKhomyakovdied in1860 froman infectionhe contractedwhiletreatingoneofhisserfs. Khomyakov received formal education at home and in 1921 hetookanexaminationattheUniversityofMoscowtoobtainacertificateofgraduationinMathematicalSciences.Between1822and1825,heservedin thearmy. In1825,hemadea firstbig tripabroad. In1828­1829,hefought in the Russo­Turkish War, when he demonstrated gallant andidealisticbravery. LikemostSlavophiles,hedidnot stay ingovernment service forlong.Aftertheendofthewar,hereturnedtohisestatestodevotehimselfto rural administration. Concomitantly, hewroteworks on philosophy,history, theology,wrotepoetry andplays, paintedpictures, andwas anamateur inventor of somemechanisms in the area of agriculture andmedicine. AmonghismajorworksaretheplaysTheFalseDmitriiandErmak(1825),thesetofpoemsToRussia(1854),thearticleOntheOldandtheNew (1839). The text The Church is One is perhaps the one that bestsystematizeshistheologicalvision,whosediversefacetsarescatteredinaseries of other essays and letters. The three volumes of his Notes onUniversalHistoryillustratethepreceptsofhisphilosophyofhistory. Let’sexaminehisworldviewinparts.

69

TheconceptofSobornost’ If the concept of “integrality” (“integral personality,” “integralknowledge”) is probably Kireevskii’s central concept, perhapsKhomyakov’smost influential conceptwas that of sobornost’.This is adifficultword to translatenot only because of its originalmeaning butalsobecauseoftheextraconnotationitassumedpost­Khomyakov.Sobor,in Old Slavonic, denoted different kinds ofmeetings, such as assembly,council,synod.ThegreatexamplewasZemskiiSobor (“TheAssemblyoftheLand”), thegreatassembly (similar to theEstatesGeneralofAncienRégimeFrance)whichwasconvenedbythetsarinspecialcircumstancesand had representatives from allwalks of life. In theOrthodox Churchspecifically,sobormeansagreatcouncil(assembly)ofbishopsandotherchurchparticipantstomakedecisionsonimportanttheologicalissues.Inhis text About the Meaning of the Words “Catholic” and “Sobornyi,”Khomyakov (1871­1907k [1907]), in a controversy with a RomanCatholicauthorwhoaccused theOrthodoxofusing theword sobornost’instead of Catholicism, argues that the original sense of sobornyi isexactly thesameas thatof “catholic”, that is, “universal,”but inamuchmore specific and appropriate sense. After saying that the word“catholic” inmost languagesmeansnothing inparticular,beingonlyanimportationfromtheoriginalGreekandthatintheoriginalGreekithasseveralnuancesofmeaning(aswellassobornyiinRussian),Khomyakovaffirms that the Russianword sobornost’ captures themeaning of theGreek original that is most important theologically, and not just thesimplegeographicalconnotationofuniversalism.Hesaysthatstickingtotheuse oftheword“catholic”todenoteauniversalchurchinthestrictlygeographical sense would be to cling to the merely external, formalaspectsofreligion.Andthatlogicallywouldnotmakesenseeither,sincethe(RomanCatholic)Churchwasfarfromuniversalandmostlandswereinhabited by people who did not follow it. What was interesting,accordingtoKhomyakov,wasthesenseofsobornost’astheunityofallinGod,and thiswas thesense thatguided theSaintsCyrilandMethodius(Greek missionaries who invented the Cyrillic alphabet in the ninthcentury)tousethetermsobornyiinsteadofcatholic.

Theydidnoteven thinkaboutdetermining theChurchgeographicallyorethnically.Thiskindofdefinitiondidnotseemto take place in their theological system. They stopped at theword sobornyi.Theword soborexpresses the ideaofameetingnot only in the physical sense— a visible conglomeration ofpeopleinoneplace—butalsointhemoregeneralsenseofthe

70

eternal,permanentpossibilityofsuchameeting.Inotherwords,it expresses the idea of unity in multiplicity [... That is, a“Catholic”Church]isaChurchformedbyallorbytheunityofall[...,]thechurchoffreeunanimity,oftotalconsensus.Achurchinwhich the different peoples disappeared, where there are noGreeksandbarbarians,nodifferencesofeconomiccondition,noslavesandnoslaveowners.(Khomyakov,1871­1907k[1907],pp.312­313)

Thus,instrictlytheologicalterms,thewordsobornost’denotestheunity of the church, a collectivity inGod: in spite of all the differencesbetweenthemenandpeopleswhoconstituteit,unioninGodcausesthatunitytoexistinmultiplicity. The Slavophiles, from this theological basis, used the termsobornost’ also for the analysis ofRussian society. Since forKireevskii,Aksakov, Khomyakov and other Slavophiles the ideological basis ofRussiansocietyistheOrthodoxChurch,theRussians,intheirpureststate(i.e., without external influences) naturally have the tendency tosobornost’,thatis,toaorganicunity,toacollectivewayoflife,asopposedtoindividualism,whichisahallmarkofWesternEuropeancivilization.Itmustbe said that this concept of sobornost’went beyond the limits ofSlavophileideology,andhashistoricallybeenadoptedbymostnationalistcurrentsinRussia,aswellasafewotherschoolsofthought.7Sobornost’(“organicunity”,“collectivistsentiment”)becamepartofamoregeneralsociological vocabulary as one of the cultural characteristics of theRussianpeople.Khomyakovandthereinventionoftheterm“obshchina” ThefamousRussianruralcommune,soidolizedbytheSlavophiles,inpresent­dayRussianisdescribedbytwoterms:mirandobshchina.Bothmirandobshchinareferredtotwothingsinpre­revolutionaryRussia.Oneis the rural commune in the sense of the communal lands that thepeasantspossessincollectiveusufructandthataredivided(andredividedperiodically)by thepeasant families,each familycultivatingaspecifiedplotof land.Mirandobshchinamayalsoreferspecifically to thegeneralassembly of peasants of the rural commune that meets (under thedirection of a starosta, an old member respected as chief) to make

7 For example, in the 1990s, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation used the term sobornost’ to characterize the collectivist mentality of the Russian people in one of the variants of its official party program. (KPRF, 1998, pp. 29-30).

71

collective decisions.With all the comings and goings of the twowordsoverthecenturies,nowadaysusuallyobshchinareferstothephysicalpart(theland,theconstituentmembers)ofthecommune,whilemirreferstothecouncil (orgeneralassembly)of thecommunewheredecisionsaremadecollectivelybyitsmembers. Until the nineteenth century the only term used to denote theruralcommunewasmir.ThewordobshchinaexistedfromkievanRussiawith several senses related to the obshch (“common”) nucleus like, forexample, community (in general), union, common property, etc. In his1838 lecture On The Old And The New, Khomyakov used the wordobshchina (plural) to indicate small rural communities (as opposed tourbanregions).From thenon,heand IvanKireevskii(later followedbyother Slavophiles)began touse the term obshchina as synonymous (inbothmeanings) ofmir. Suchwas the success of this “neologism” thattodayanordinaryRussian, todescribe theRussian ruralcommune,willmoreoftenusethewordobshchinathanmir.8 Butthemainthingwasnotjusttheintroductionofanewtermtomean the same as the traditionalwordmir.WithKhomyakov and theSlavophiles,thetermobshchinaacquiredidyllicconnotationsoftheruralcommune as representative of the simplicity andpurity of theRussianpeasant as opposed to a decadent and West­friendly urban world(representedbySt.Petersburg). Slavophile literature considered the rural communes the trueessenceofRussianlifeandsangthepraiseoftheirinnerbeauty.Khomyakov’swritingsonchurchandreligion Although IvanKireevskii, inhismaturephasebecamepiousandplaced the Orthodox Church as central to his Slavophile theory, itwasKhomyakovwhomost systematically anddeeply explored the issuesofchurchandreligion inaseriesofessays, lettersandpolemics thatwere

8 For an excellent article on the genealogy of the terms mir and obshchina, see Grant, 1976. However, there are controversies about how the two terms related over time. In the West, the word mir is almost exclusively used to denote the rural commune itself — whereas the Russians prefer the word obshchina — because of the influence of the work by the German Baron August von Haxthausen, who, after a trip to Russia in the mid-nineteenth century, published a study of Russian rural institutions, with special interest in the Russian rural commune, which he called mir. It was this study by Haxthausen (Studien über die innern Zustände, from the Volksleben und insbesondere die Ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands, 1847-1852) that made this Russian institution widely known in the West, and since then Westerners began to use the name mir for the rural commune itself.

72

groupedinthevolume2ofhiscollectedworks.Intheessayscontainedinthisvolume,Khomyakovdefends therole of theOrthodoxChurchas thepurestvisionoforiginalChristianity. He says that, unlike the Catholic Church, which accepts theexternal authority of aman (pope, bishop) as the individual bearer oftruth, no one in the Orthodox Church (or even patriarchs) has theauthority to unilaterally bring changes to the church. The body of theOrthodox Church as awhole is the only instance to have authority todeterminewhat is trueor false.Hence the importanceof theconceptofsobornost’fortheOrthodox.Thewholebodyofthechurch(clericsandthefaithful) takes, in consensual agreement accepted by all, the crucialdecisionsanddetermines the truthor falsityofcertainpropositions.Hecitesthe1848responseoftheOrthodoxPatriarchs toPopePiusIX’s InSupremaPetriApostolicaSedeencyclicalasanexampleofthispositionoftheOrthodoxChurch.

This peculiarity pointed out by me is an indisputabledogmatic fact.TheEasternOrthodoxPatriarchs,united insynodwiththeirbishops,solemnlyproclaimedintheirresponsetotheencyclicalofPopePius IX that “infallibility is exclusively in theuniverse of thewhole Church, united bymutual love, and thatimmutabilityof thedogmas,aswellas thepurityof therites, isnotmaintained by any hierarchy, but by all the people of theChurch,which is thebodyofChrist.” (Khomyakov,1871­1907L[1886],p.61)

Theabovepositionthatreligioustruthisinthechurchasawhole,andnotinanyofitshierarchs,iscommonsenseintheOrthodoxChurchanddifferssharplyfromthedoctrineofpapalinfallibilityinCatholicism,for example. But Khomyakov goes even further and (in a quasi­“anarchist”attitude)assertsthatthereisno“authority”inthechurch,for“authority” isanexternal, formal thing: in theOrthodoxChurch (and inlife),love(theessenceofChristianity)isthefoundationonwhichtruthisbased,andbywhichtruthisattainedimmediately,notrationally.

The Church is not authority, just as God is neitherauthoritynorJesusChrist.Forauthorityissomethingexternaltous.(Khomyakov,1871­1907L[1886],p.54)

Thisassertion that the church (orGod) isnotauthoritywas fartoo “heterodox” for theOrthodoxChurchat the time.Such “anarchistic”outburstsbyKhomyakovareoneofthereasonswhy inhis timehehadproblems with tsarist censorship and many of his writings were

73

publishedonlyposthumously.EventheOrthodoxChurch,atthetime,sawKhomyakovwithsomesuspicionduetotheseheterodoxpoints. Although ina “heterodox”manner,Khomyakovmade thedefenseoftheOrthodoxChurchasthetruerepresentativeoforiginalChristianity.TodefenditagainstCatholicismandProtestantism,hebeginsbydefining theessenceoforiginalChristianityas“the identityofunityand freedommanifestedinthelawofspirituallove.”

ThehumanbeingcannotunderstandtheeternaltruthoforiginalChristianityexceptinitsfullness,thatis,intheidentityofunityand freedom,whichmanifests itself in the lawof spirituallove. Such is Orthodoxy. (Khomyakov, 1871­1907n [1900], p.151)

From this holistic understanding, he criticizes WesternCatholicism and Protestantism. He says that in order to attain unity,Catholicismappealedtoexternalformsofauthority,whenitplacedpopeandbishopsinasuperiorhierarchycapableofdictatingwhatisrightorwrong. Inotherwords, toachieveunity,Catholicismsacrificed freedom.Asareactiontothisattackonfreedom,Protestantismwenttheoppositeway. It denied the authority of popes and bishops and favoured theindividualsearchofeverymandirectlyintheBible.Thatis,it adoptedanindividualistic solution. According to Khomyakov, the Protestants, toachieve freedom, sacrificed unity on the altar of individualisticrationalism. Catholicism represented materialistic rationalism, whileProtestants fell into idealistic materialism. (Khomyakov, 1871­1907L[1886],p.76). Anyattempttoescapefromrationalismwillbedoomedtofailure.The solution lies in the concept of sobornost’ of the Orthodox Church,whichallowsfor“unityinmultiplicity.”Truth,then,isacollectiveconcept,sanctionedby the faithfulandclergymenof thechurchasawhole,and,being from God, is immediately understood, directly, instinctively (notrationally).

Christian knowledge is not a thing dictated by reason,butalivingandbeneficentfaith.Externalthingsarethewritings,thestoriesandtheactions.InternaltothemistheuniquespiritofGod.Fromthewritings,thestoriesandtheactions,thehumanbeingcanextractonlytheexternalandincompleteknowledge[...]Themanoffaithknowsthetruth;themanwithoutfaithdoesnotknow it or knows it in an external and incomplete way. TheChurch does not show itself bymeans of writings, stories oractions,butasthespiritofGodwho lives in it[...](Khomyakov,

74

1871­1907m[1886],p.8) ThusKhomyakov’sconceptionofsobornost’(unityinmultiplicity)isthatthroughittheOrthodoxChurchandthereforetheRussianpeoplecould maintain within themselves the unity/freedom that haddisappearedamongCatholicsandProtestants.FaithandReason Khomyakov’s conception of faith pervades hiswhole critique ofWesternEuropeanrationalism.LikeKireevskii,hesaysthattheWesternman’semphasisonrationalismisapartialanddeficientviewofintegralreason. Intellectual reason is only one of the constituents of integralreason.Beyond it thereare twootherbasicconstituents,withoutwhichthe intellectual reason is lame: faith and free will. According toKhomyakov, faith and free will precede reason and present to it theobjectivematerial.Without them the reason is revolving around itself,autonomous,butwithouttheabilitytodistinguishtheobjectivefromthesubjective.Thewill is the immediateconsciousness in thepre­objectivestage,whereas faithactsas thesightof reason,showing theessenceofobjectstoreason.Thus,Khomyakovplacesfaithasprecedingreasonandstatesthatwithoutfaithreasonisblind,lostinitsownsubjectivities.

Ihavecalledfaiththatabilityofthe[integral]reasonthatreceives the data of reality, transmitting them to theconsciousness and analysis of the intellect [...] That is whatGerman philosophy often calls, in a somewhat vague way,immediateknowledge[dasunmittelbareWissen],somethingthatcould be called internal knowledge, but which in view of itsprominent role must be called faith. (Khomyakov, 1871­1907[1900],vol.1,pp.279and327)

Thus,Khomyakovhasaratherpeculiarviewoffaith.Heputsitonthesameplaneasreason,consideringitasinequanonconditionfortrue,integralknowledgeandforwhathecallsintegralreason.Heplacesfaithinthe field of immediate knowledge, which does not require rationaljustifications.ButherewemustdrawattentiontoKhomyakov’sconceptofsobornost’.Thispathtointegraltruth,whichovercomesthedichotomybetween subjective and objective, is not an individual path. It is acollectivequestinwhichmeninteractspirituallythroughthelawoflove,whichenablesthemtoarriveattrue,collective,integralknowledge.

75

Ofallthegenerallawsofreasonendowedwithfreewilloroffreewillendowedwithreason(forthisistheverydefinitionof thespirit), the first,supremeandmostperfectofall for thepure soul is the law of love. Consequently, being in agreementwith it means strengthening and broadening our minds.Therefore we must submit to it and allow its harmony toovercome the obstinate quarrels of our mental faculties. [...However,]Loveisnotanindividualactivity.Itdemands,discovers,and produces reciprocal responses and relationships, and itgrows, strengthens, and perfects itself in these responses andmutualrelations.Thus,therelationshipofloveisnotonlyhelpful,but absolutely essential to the attainment of truth. And theattainmentoftruthdependsonit,anditisimpossiblewithoutit.Inaccessible to the individual thinkingman, truth is accessibleonly to humans together in love. (Khomyakov, 1871­1907o[1900],p.283)

It is with this epistemological theory, based on the concept ofsobornost’, and using, in adapted form, various concepts about“integrality”— includingapeculiarcharacterizationof“integralreason”whichincludesinitselffaithandfreewill—thatKhomyakovwillplungehimself into the ambitious project of a universal history of which hewouldcompletethreevolumesinhislife,describingfromthebeginningsofmankind until theMiddleAges.This is his historicalwork Notes onUniversalHistory.Khomyakovasanhistorian Like Kireevskii, Khomyakov regarded history from a highlyphilosophicalpointofview.Hesoughtthebasicprinciplesthatguidedthedevelopmentsofuniversalhistory.Firstofall,hepointsoutthatmankindcanbedividedaccordingtothreemaincriteria:1)byethnicityorrace;2)bytypeofpoliticalstate;3)byreligion.(Khomyakov,1871­1907q[1904],8) For him, the criterion of religion, although little used, is the mostimportanttounderstandthefunctioningofthemindsofpeoples.Religiondenotes the spiritual advancement of a people. Pervading political,economicandsocialcharacteristicsisapriorbasicprinciple:thespiritualprinciple.

Thefirstandmainsubjectwithwhichthehistorycriticmust occupy himself is the religion of the people. RemoveChristianity from thehistory ofEurope, orBuddhism from the

76

historyofAsia,andyouwillnotunderstandanythingelseaboutEurope or Asia. The size, character, and sources of a people’scivilizationaredeterminedbythesize,character,andsourcesoftheir religion. The original religion of the people determinedtheirhistoricaldestiny.(Khomyakov,1871­1907q[1904],p.131)

Khomyakovdividedreligionsaccordingtothetwobasicprinciplesoffreedomandnecessity.

The division of ancient religions derives from theprinciplesoffreedomandnecessity.Freedomisexpressedintheideaofcreation.Necessityintheideaofbirth[...]Theprincipleoffreedom is the basis of the Iranian religions. The principle ofnecessityisthebasisoftheKushitereligions.Thefirstprincipleisthebasisofmonotheism;thesecondisthebasisofpantheism.(Khomyakov,1871­1907q[1904],pp.217,235)

Here Khomyakov introduces his idiosyncratic concept (notadoptedbytheotherSlavophiles)ofthedivisionofreligionsintoIranianandKushiteonthe basisoftheprincipleoffreedomandnecessity.Thesetwo termsare tobeseenasWeberian ideal types: inpractice therearepeopleswithmixturesofthetwoprinciplestoagreaterorlesserdegree.9Because religion is at the base of different civilizations, thisIranian/Kushitedichotomyalsoappliedtothem.KhomyakovregardedasKushitethecivilizationsofBabylon,Egypt,China,andSouthIndia.Amongthe Iranian civilizations he listed Greeks, Romans, Germans, Slavs andIsraelites. The book Notes on Universal History analyzes the interactionbetween the Iranian principle of freedom and the Kushite principle ofnecessity throughouthistory.However, thisdichotomywasnotasimpledivision representingbad/good (thoughKhomyakovclearly favored theIranian principle of freedom). Khomyakov, for example, had words ofpraise for the civilizational level reached by ancient China and India.LikewisehisvisionoftheGreeksandRomans(especiallythelatter)wasamixtureofadmirationandcriticism.GreeceandRomewereregardedbyhim as originally Iranian civilizations in which Kushitism had madeinroads to the point of rendering them almost a mixed system. He

9 Some critics see a hint of racism in the use of the Iranian/ Kushite terminology to

represent the two principles. After all, the Iranians are often associated with the Arians (white race) in some narratives and the Kushites were negroes from the kingdom of Kush (in Nubia, north of present-day Sudan), a strong state that came to conquer and rule Pharaonic Egypt between the 8th and 7th centuries BC.

77

recognized the splendor of these two civilizations, but he saw in them(especiallyinRome)someofthenegativepoints,theweeds,whichwouldlatermark the one­sidedness ofmodernWestern Europe. For him, forbetter or for worse, Greece introduced anthropocentrism andindividualism into history. Rome mixed this individualism withutilitarianism.Togetherwith theRoman legal system, based on formalandexternallegalformulas,andareligionabsorbedandco­optedbythestate,thisheritagewouldstronglyinfluencethemergingoftheGermanicbarbarianswiththeRomanbaseduringfeudalismintheMiddleAgesandlater create the foundations for rationalist, formalist (attached to theexternal aspects of life) modern Europe. (Khomyakov, 1871­1907r[1904],pp.237­239,401) TheGermanicbarbarianswho invaded theRomanEmpirewereoriginally based on the Iranian principle. However, with theincorporation of Roman principles by them (in the Romano­Germanicsynthesis of the Middle Ages), little by little Kushitism also left strongmarks in these societies in later times. The apex of Kushitism amongthese peoples was German idealist philosophy when Hegel definedfreedomas “the free recognitionofnecessity.” (Khomyakov,1871­1907q[1904],p.225;Khomyakov,1871­1907r[1904],p.175) In this regard, Khomyakov introduced the Slav barbarians as acounterpoint to the Germanic barbarians. In view of all the historicaldevelopmentsdescribedsofar,itis intheSlavsthattheIranianprincipleoffreedomcanbefullydevelopedinviewoftheprogressthatKushitismhad made made in Western European civilization. At this point,Khomyakov delineates another division of principles: the divisionbetweenthepeopleslivingoffconquestandthepeopleswhomaketheirliving fromagriculture (theGermansbeingexamplesof the formerandtheSlavsofthelatter). According toKhomyakov (1871­1907q[1904],pp.106­118), theconquering peoples (warriors) have pride, exclusiveness and anaristocraticspiritinrelationtootherpeoples:theydonotliketomixwiththemandpossessa feelingofsuperiority toward them.Theagriculturalpeoples do not have this aristocratic spirit and are open to strangers(foreigners): from there they are capable of regeneration ortransmutation.The agriculturalpeoplesarecloser to thegeneralhumanprinciples than the conquering peoples: they have not felt the taste ofvictoryoverothersandthusdonotdevelopanaristocraticspirit towardotherpeoples.Anexampleof this is theSlavs.According toKhomyakov,the Slavs aremore democraticwith other peoples, interact andmarryother ethnic groups in their territories.Khomyakov draws attention tothe fact that the relationship between conquering peoples/conqueredpeoplesisnotone­sided.Theconqueredpeoplesdonotsimplyabsorbthe

78

influences of the conquerors. By receiving these influences, theytransform them; these external influences receive new meanings andtones,andareabsorbedindifferentways.Anewmixedcultureisformedandcanbringnewfruitstomankind.SuchwasEgyptafterHellenization:she enriched, according to Khomyakov, the science of Neoplatonism,whichwasveryusefultohumanity.Inaddition,thereisalsotheinfluenceof the conquered farming people on the conqueror. Especially if theconqueredpeoplehaveastrongand logicalstatesystem, theconquerormayevenbeabsorbedby thecultureof theconquered. Inaddition, thehorrorofslaveryandthestruggleforfreedomarenaturalfeelingsofman,so itmaybe that theconqueredpeoples(especially thosewithastrongand functional state system) “turn the table” and are forced tobecomeconquerorstoachievefreedom. AlthoughKhomyakov(1871­1907q[1904],pp.106­108)saysthattheabilityofRussianstobeopentooutsideinfluencessometimesmakesthemoverlyopenandweakagainstforeigninfluence,healsoemphasizesthat being a farming people— peaceful, closer to the higher generalhumanprinciples— the futurewillmove in theirdirection, not in thedirectionoftheGermanicpeoples.Inhergenesis,KievanRus’wasneitherconquerornorconquered:itwasbornofavoluntaryinvitation fromtheoriginal Eastern Slavs to Rurik’s Vikings to come become their royalHouse.Inthisvoluntaryunionisthesecretoffreedom,whichisthebasisoftheIranianprinciple.ThustheRussianshavethegreatestpotentialtobe thestandardbearerof the Iranianprincipleof freedom in the future,and not German­Latin Western Europe, formed by peoples based onviolentconquest,whichcreatesanatmosphereofhatredbetweenclassesand individuals. One of the symptoms of this potential victory in thefuture, according to Khomyakov (1871­1907q [1904], p. 111)was thepopulation’sownquantitativeaspect: thenumberofpeoplewhocanbeconsideredpurelySlavicwasgreaterthanthatwhichcouldbeconsideredpurelyGermanic.Thisprovedthat, inthe longrun, theSlavsweremoreresilient.OtherSlavophiles WithAlekseiKhomyakov,IvanKireevskiiandKonstantinAksakov,we have the three great authors of Slavophilism, and from thepresentationof their ideasandworkswecanhaveapanoramicviewofthemainconceptionsofthemovement:anemphasisonaproperpath forRussia, different from that of Western Europe; emphasis on organicgrowth according to the traditions (especially Orthodox) of societyavoiding the mechanical, rationalist growth of the European model;

79

searchforan“integral”personality,whichunitesreason,will,andfaithinanintegralandindivisiblewholeinsteadoftherationalistunilateralismofthe West; emphasis on a community model of sobornost’ for societyembodied in the rural commune of the Russian peasantry instead ofWesternEuropeanindividualism;valorizationofthepeasantsasthegreatmaintainersoftheoriginalandtraditionalRussianvaluesoftencombinedwithcriticismoftheoverlyEuropeanizedRussianupperclasses;criticismof the model of revolution from Europe (French Revolution,Enlightenment) in favorof changesbasedon consensus inRussiawiththemaintenanceofthemonarchicalprincipleinwhichthepeopleshouldhavefreedomofopinionandthemonarchfreedomofdecision;acollectiveconception of freedom different from the individual conception offreedomderivedfromEurope;criticismofserfdominRussia;criticismofthe lack of freedom of expression and opinion in nineteenth­centuryRussia;criticismoftheexcessiveWesternizationofRussiasincePetertheGreat. Having emphasized thesemainpoints, shared in amore or lessfaithfulwayby theSlavophiles ingeneral,we canmention someof theother main Slavophiles, especially those who introduced someidyosincraticinnovations,besidesthosecharacteristicslistedabove. InmostofthebooksonSlavophiles,oncethethreeauthorsabovehavebeendescribed,theyoungermembersofthegrouparementioned,two of whom are brothers of members of this original troika: IvanAksakov (Konstantin’s brother) and Peter Kireevskii (Ivan’s brother).Followingthese,therecomeother“minor”slavophiles,likeYuriiSamarinandAleksandrKoshelev. Although they were not as important as the three originalSlavophiles, it is importanttoobservetheirtrajectories,sincethey—asparticipantsof the laststageofSlavophilismafter itsheyday in themid­nineteenth century — were influential in some political and socialmovementsofthetime,forexample,theabolitionofserfdomin1861andtheideologicaltransitiontoPan­Slavism.PeterVasil’evichKireevskii(1808­1856) In comparison to his brother, Ivan, Peter did not represent anoriginal author. His great contribution to the Slavophiles was that hedevotedhislifetocollectingstoriesandpoetryfrompopularRussianoralfolklore.Inaddition,hewas fluentinsevenlanguagesandatranslatorofseveral foreign authors. He did not write theoretical essays for theSlavophileschool,butwasconsideredoneofthegreatRussianfolkloristsofthenineteenthcentury.

80

His adventures and misadventures in trying to publish hisimmense collection of Russian folk poetry reveal much about therelationship of the Slavophileswith censorship.His collection—whichconsisted of items collected personally by him but alsomany sent byother authors interested in the subject, such asPushkin andGogol’—reachedabout ten thousand folkpoems,ofwhichonlya tinypartcouldbepublishedduringhislife.Andthisnotbecauseoffinancialdifficultiesor other prosaic motives. It was mainly because of problems withcensorship. He was only able to finally publish his book Russian FolkPoetry (withasmall initialpartofhiscollection) in1847.Hehad triedbefore in1833and1838,butonbothoccasionsthebookwasreturnedbythecensors(especiallyreligiouscensors)becausehesometimesdealtwith religiousmatters fromaheterodoxpopularpointofview thatdidnot correspond to the officialpoint ofviewof the church. In1852,hemanaged to publish some other folk songs and poetry in the journalMoskovskii Sbornik.When he tried to use the samemethod to publishmoreitems inanotherissueofthe journal,censorshipprohibitedagain,since the folk poetry was accompanied by an article by KonstantinAksakov on The Epic Heroes of Grand Prince Vladimir’s Time from thepointofviewofFolkSongs.ThecensorshipfoundthatAksakovpresentedadistortedviewoftheRussianruralcommuneandartificiallyplacedtheepic heroes [bogatyri] of the folk legends in a position against theauthorityof theGrandPrinceof the time.Even themerecollectingandprintingoffolksongsintsaristRussiasufferedfromsecularandreligiouscensorship! Unlike his brother Ivan, who came to Slavophilism and activeparticipation in the Orthodox Church only after overcoming an earlierquasiproto­Westernizer, not­specially­religious phase, Peter was moredogmatic:fromtheoutsethehadassumedapositionofvaluingnationalprinciples and mistrusting Western European models. His mainoccupationasa folkloristandcollectorof folkpoetryandstorieswasagoodsignofthislifelongstance.IvanSergeevichAksakov(1823­1886) Like Peter Kireevskii in relation to his older brother IvanKireevskii,IvanAksakovalsostartedhiscareerasaSlavophileunder theweightofhavinganolderbrother,Konstantin,whowasoneof themainauthorsofthisschoolofthought.However,unlikePeterKireevskii,whodid not venture into theoreticalwritings on the burning issues of themovement, devoting himself to folklore and translation, Ivan Aksakovwrote articles on a wide range of subjects concerning the Slavophile

81

worldview.Ontheotherhand,IvanAksakovconsideredhimselfahumblefollower of the work of the founding fathers of Slavophilism (IvanKireevskii, Aleksei Khomyakov and his brother Konstantin Aksakov).Indeed his writings mostly popularized Slavophile ideas rather thanlaunchseminalconcepts. In thispopularization front, IvanAksakovwasextremely successful.Hewasprobably themost read Slavophileduringhislifetimeandhisarticleshadgreatimmediateresonance.Butitwasnotall roses inhiscareer.Often the immediate resonancecamealongwithproblemswiththetsaristcensorship.Infact,asummaryofhislifeasaneditor gives an idea of the difficulties of publishing under tsaristcensorship (and this formen, like the Slavophiles,who supported themonarchyandevenautocracy!);italsopresentssomeofthejournalsthattheSlavophilestriedtofoundtopresenttheirideas.In1853,thejournalMoskovskii Sbornik (“Moscow Digest”), of which Ivan was editor,underwentcensorship interventionandIvanwasprohibited frombeingpublisher of any journal. In 1858, Ivan became de facto editor of theSlavophile periodical Russkaya Beseda [“Russian Conversation”] (thenominal editor was Aleksandr Koshelev). In 1859, after receivinggovernmental permission to edit journals again, he founded aweekly,Parus [“The Sail”],which lasted only two numbers until itwas closeddownbycensorship.In1860,IvanbeganpublishingthenewspaperDen’[“TheDay”]which lasteduntil1866. In1867, Ivan began publishing anewspaper,Moskva [“Moscow”],which in the first two years receivedninewarningsandthreetemporarysuspensions.IvanAksakovwasagainbanned from being editor ofperiodicals for12 years. In1880,hewasallowedtoedittheweeklyRus’[“Russia”],whichhediduntilhisdeathin1886.(Riasanovsky,1965,pp.53­54) IvanAksakov joined thepublic service in1842 after graduatingfrom the Imperial School of Jurisprudence. By Slavophile standards—mostSlavophileseitherdidnotworkforthegovernmentorhadlittletimeinthisrole—heremainedinitforarelativelylongtime:until1852.Butinthatten­yearperiodhehadmanyproblemswiththegovernment.Hewas temporarily arrested in 1844 for criticism of the government inlettersopenedby thecensorship. In1852,afterhavingproblemsdue tohis poem A Tramp, in which he suggested criticism of conditions inRussiansociety,heresignedhisgovernmentpost. Inadditiontotheessaysandpoetryhewrote,IvanAksakovhadapeculiarimportancewithinSlavophilism.StrictosensuSlavophilismwoulddecay after the abolition of serfdom inRussia in 1861, for reasonsweshall see later. However, traces of Slavophilism would be absorbed byseveral of the later nationalist currents. One of them would be Pan­Slavism.AndinthattransitiontoPan­Slavism,IvanAksakovwouldplayacrucial role, forhewas someonewhohadbeen apure Slavophileuntil

82

before the 1860s and later— especially after the death of KonstantinAksakovandAlekseiKhomyakov—himselfadrivingforceofthenascentPan­Slavism.HisDen’ (“TheDay”)became themostpopularnewspaperexpressing Pan­Slavist views in Russia at the time. And the definitive“Rubicon crossing,” officially assuming his condition as a Pan­slavist,came when he replacedMikhail Pogodin as president of theMoscowSlavonicWelfare Society after his death in 1875. This “crossing of theRubicon” was an important moment because (with the exception ofKhomyakov)most of themajor Slavophiles focused on the analysis ofRussians, not of Slavs in general. Russian Pan­Slavism had strongconnotationsnotonlyof creatingaunionamong theSlavsbutaunionamong the Slavs, under the aegis of themain and largest Slav ethnicgroup, i.e., the Russians. The latter point was controversial, since inpracticeitcouldeasilyslipintoGreatRussianchauvinism.IvanAksakov’stransition to Pan­Slavism received criticism from some traditionalSlavophiles,especiallyfromAleksandrKoshelev.“Liberal” Slavophilism: Feodorovich Yurii Samarin, Aleksandr IvanovichKoshelev,VladimirAleksandrovichCherkasskii The“liberalism”mentionedaboveshouldnotbeunderstoodintheliteralsense,similartoWesternliberalism.Afterall,Slavophilism,withitsemphasis on sobornost’, is frontally opposed to the individualismemphasizedbyliberalism.Butsomeauthors(e.g.,Wortman,1962)insistthat therewasasubgroupofa latergenerationofSlavophileswhohadsubstantiallymoreliberaltendenciesthanthemainbodyofthefoundingfathersofSlavophilism,suchas IvanKireevskiiandAlekseiKhomyakov.The threemain figures of thesemore “liberal” Slavophiles were YuriiSamarin, Aleksandr Koshelev and Vladimir Cherkasskii. Whatdifferentiated these three was that, while the founding fathers ofSlavophilism, writing in the early days of the debate with theWesternizersinthe1840s,stoodabstractlyagainstserfdominRussia,the“liberal”Slavophiles,writing later,at theendofthe1850s,ontheeveoftheabolitionofserfdom in1861,engagedconcretely in thestruggle forthe abolition of serfdom, writing manifests and texts with technicalsuggestions,andpoliticallyparticipatingintheprocess. The abolition of serfdom in Russia was a turning point forSlavophilism. Itwas at the same time its high point— the Slavophilesachievedwhat theywanted anddirectly influenced theprocess— andthebeginningof itsdecline.Once theabolitionwasachieved,aseriesofnew political demands arose in Russia that criticized the core of theRussianpoliticalsystem,theabsolutistmonarchy.AndtheSlavophilesdid

83

nothaveadequateanswers to thesenewchallenges,since, for themostpart, theydefendednot onlymonarchybut also autocracy itself (in thespecificversionoftheKonstantinAksakov­typeinwhichtsarandpeoplewould have a direct link, with the tsar listening to the people beforemaking decisions). As a consequence, after the abolition of serfdom,classical Slavophilism fell into decay and new forms of nationalismentered the Russian stage which, while sharing some principles withSlavophilism,wereclearlydifferentintellectualconstructs—forexample,Pan­Slavism. TheabolitionofserfdominRussiawasa“top­down”process.Afterthe virtual defeat of Russia in the CrimeanWar (1853­1856), Russia’stechnical backwardness vis­à­vis the western powers of England andFrance became clear. Tsar Alexander II became convinced thatmodernizing reforms were necessary in the country. Influenced byenlightenedconservativeadvisers,suchasNikolaiMilyutin,hesoughttoconvincethenobilitythateithertheabolitionofserfdomwouldbedone“fromabove” inacontrolledmannerortheyriskedseeingrevolts“frombelow” taking charge of thematter. Starting in 1858, local committeeswere created to gather opinions and suggestions for reform. Thesecommitteeswere coordinatedand subordinatedat thenational level totheMainCommitteeonthePeasantQuestion.Afterthevariousdebatesinthese committees, in 1959, to guide the formulation of the reform, anEditingCommissionwasattachedtotheMainCommittee.NikolaiMilyutinwas,inpractice,theoverseerofthisEditingCommission. Anditwasatthetimeofthediscussionstoestablishtheworkingrules of the Editing Commission that the differences of approachesbetween the three(Samarin,CherkasskiiandKoshelev)appeared.Allofthemwantedtheabolitionofserfdombutdifferedonwhatshouldbethedrivingforcebehindthisprocess. Koshelev,himselfa landlord fromRiazan,believed that thesmallruralnobilityknewwell the localconditionsandshouldbeheard in thereform. Through the journal he edited, Sel’skoe Blagoustroistvo (“RuralImprovement”), he sought to attract landlords to more progressivepositions in relation to serfdom and to improvements in productivetechniques. Samarin, coming from a family with a long tradition ofattachmenttothetsars,wasskepticalofthelandlords:hefelttheywouldwanttosabotagethereformordistortitintheirfavor.Toavoidthis,heplacedhishopeson the statebureaucracyand enlightenedbureaucratslikeNikolaiMilyutintocarryouttheabolitionofserfdom inspiteoftheoppositionofthe landlords.VladimirCherkasskiiwas inan intermediatesituationbetweenthetwo.Inpractice,hesupportedSamarinbecausehebelievedthat,atthatinitialmoment,thebureaucracywastheonlyforcecapableofpushing forabolitionofserfdomdespite theresistanceof the

84

landlords.However, his confidence in the state bureaucracywas not asstrongasSamarin’s.Cherkasskiiwassuspiciousofthedangersofleavingimportant processes to the bureaucracy, for he knew of its tendencytowardfossilizationorarbitrariness.Hebelievedthatinthelongruntheissuecouldnotbeleftonly inthehandsofthebureaucracyandatsomepoint itwould be necessary to bring the rural nobility to an effectiveparticipation in the functioningofRussianagriculture. (Wortman,1962,pp.263­265) These different philosophical positions eventually became anacrimoniouspoliticalfeudbetweenthethreefriends.WhenthemembersoftheEditingCommissionwereselected,SamarinandCherkasskiiwerein itandKoshelevwasout. Itwasobvious thatNikolaiMilyutin, the defactopresidentoftheCommission,waspreparingatop­downabolitionofserfdombythebureaucracywithminimaldirectinvolvementoflandlordsin this finalphase of thedrafting of the bill.Koshelev joined the smallrural nobility of the provinces in a series of texts and manifestoesprotestingagainst the exclusionof this importantpartof the real ruraleconomyinthefinalpartofthedraftingofthebill,butitwasuseless.Thereform would be carried out “from above” through the EmancipationManifestoof19February1861.10 Itisinterestingtonotethelaterdevelopmentoftheseadventuresandmisadventures among the three friends of the Slavophile “liberal”wing.With the abolition of serfdom as fait accompli, then othermoreessential political questions of powerwere placed on the agenda. Thethemesofdemocratizationor theendofautocracywerepresent.Aswehave seen, Slavophilism had reached its peak (the abolition of serfdomandthemaintenanceoftheruralcommuneasanorganofthenowfreepeasantry)andalsothebeginningof itsdecline,sincenoneofthemhadtheobjectiveofpromotingdemocratizationoranend tomonarchyandautocracy. And in this new phase, in this BraveNewWorld, the threeliberalSlavophileswenttheirseparateways.Koshelev,disgustedwiththeharshmanner inwhich themembers of the small rural nobility (andhimself)weredisposedof in theprocess ofwriting thepeasant reformbill,would come to defend an aristocratic constitutionalism for Russia.Thetsarshouldcontinueasthehighestleader,butwiththeruralnobilityhaving a strong voice through parliamentary representation. Samarin,mantaining his distrust of the local landlords, continued to advocate aform of development headed by the bureaucracy, with initially localparliamentaryrepresentationinwhichtheruralnobilitycouldeventuallyacquirepoliticalknow­howuntilonedayinthenottoonearfuturewhen

10 It is important to note that only the private serfs were emancipated in 1861. The state serfs would be emancipated in 1866.

85

it could actually have representation in a national parliament.Cherkasskii,withhisdoubtsaboutbothsides(bureaucracyandlandlords)proceededtoproposeasolutionwhichmanagedtobebothconservativeand radical: He proposed a direct tsar­people connection that wouldrenderunnecessarythesupportfromtheruralnobility.Theoreticallythepeople would have a parliament of democratic representation in thisscheme, but the author did notmake it clearwhether this parliamentwouldbeconsultativeor legislative—whichmakesall thedifference intermsofdemocracy!(Wortman,1962,pp.271­273) However,asthe1860spassed,theseconstitutionalmentalprojectsofthe“liberal”Slavophiles,peoplewhoplayedaninstrumentalroleintheabolition of serfdom, found no practical application. Slavophiles, whileleavinga legacyofprinciplesandworldviewthatwould influencea largenumberofculturalmovementsandschoolsinRussiainthefuture,wouldleave the central stage and would assume the form of recurringarchetypes throughout Russian history in the future, as a source ofintellectualinspirationtobereadandre­readindifferentcontexts.TheWesternizers Letusnowlookatthe“otherside”ofthedispute,thenineteenth­century Westernizers in Russia. When we described the Slavophiles,severalcharacteristicsoftheirrivalswerepointedout.Herewewillseekto delve into their theory by examining some important individualWesternizers.Before,however,a fewwordsaboutthehistoricalcontextinwhichthemovementappeared. TheWesternism referred to here— aswell as Slavophilism, itsalter ego — was sparked off from the controversy surroundingChaadaev’sFirstPhilosophicalLetter,publishedin1836.Inthe1840s,thecurrents of Slavophilism andWesternismwere already consolidated indifferent fields. Among the leading Westernizers were literary criticsVissarion Belinskii, Pavel Annenkov and Vasilii Botkin, the socialistAleksandrHerzenandthemedievalhistorianTimofeiGranovskii. One could roughly say that in response to the challenge ofChaadaev’s First Philosophical Letter, by 1839 the field of Slavophilismhad already been established, whereas in 1841 Westernizers couldalreadybedelineatedasafielditself.TheStankevichCircle Beforewe enter themovement of theWesternizers proper,we

86

mustmention a fewwords about the processes and groups thatweretheirprecursorsorpartoftheirformativestage.Amongthemwastheso­calledStankevichCircleinthe1830s.JustastheSocietyofWisdomLoversplayedakey role in thematurationof futureSlavophiles, theStankevichCircleforgedthebreedinggroundformanyfutureWesternizers. TheimportanceofthesediscussioncirclesinRussia(suchasthatof Stankevich, the lyubomudry, etc.) lies in the fact that, with theatmosphereofcensorshipandlackoffreedomofexpressioninRussia,itwas in these circles (kruzhki) functioning as secret societies that newideasweredebatedmorefreely. The Stankevich Circle existed from 1831 to 1839. As Walicki(1989, p. 345) drew attention to, it included people who would laterparticipate in themost varied political trends: Timofei Granovskii andVasilii Botkin (future liberals), critic Vissarion Belinskii (future radicaldemocrat), Mikhail Bakunin (future anarchist) and even a futureSlavophile (KonstantinAksakov).The future socialistsAleksandrHerzenandOgarevhad theirowncircle,but theyexchangedmanyexperiencesanddiscussionswiththemembersoftheStankevichCircle. TheStankevichCirclewent through threeperiods: theuniversityperiod (1831­1834), the post­university period (1834­1837) and thefinalperiodofdissolutionafterStankevich’stripabroad(1837­1839).Inthefirstperiod,mostoftheparticipantswerestudentsfromtheUniversityofMoscow like Stankevich himself: the futurehistorian S.M. Stroev, thefuture disseminator of the enlightenment Yanuarii Neverov, the poetsVasiliiKrasov,I.P.KlyushnivovandA.A.Beer.KonstantinAksakovjoinedin1832.AfterStankevich’sgraduationin1834camethegoldenageofthecirclefrom1834untilStankevich’sdeparturein1837.Inthisperiodtherewere several other post­university professionals such as literary criticVissarion Belinskii, historian Timofei Granovskii, Osip Bodyanskii,AleksandrKellerandAleksandrEfremov.AfterStankevich’stripabroadforhealth reasons in1837— even afterhis return— the circledwindleduntil it was finally extinguished in 1839. From that time dates theparticipationofMikhailBakuninandIvanTurgenev. The intellectual trajectory of the group had its origin anddevelopmentsimilar to thatof theSocietyofWisdomLovers (thegroupthat formedthe futureSlavophiles): itwasbasedonGermanphilosophy,both classical and romantic/idealist. One small initial difference thatperhapscanbenoticed is that theStankevichianshadapredilection forthe still classic German philosopher Schiller, whereas the Lovers ofWisdom were based initially on Schelling’s romanticism. In the laterphase,Hegelwould take center stage. In the initial phase, participantsoften found themselves in the condition of the so­called “superfluousmen,” theRussianphrasedefining the “rebelswithout a cause”ofmid­

87

nineteenth­centuryRussia (popularized in literatureby IvanTurgenev’s1850novelTheDiaryofasuperfluousman).Theywerepeoplewhocouldcritically see the social reality that surrounded them in the absolutistRussiaofthetime,buttheycouldnotfindawaytochangeit,thusfallingintopowerlessnihilism.ThestudyofSchillerandotherGerman idealistsallowedtheyoungmembersoftheStankevichCircle’suniversityphasetoforesee a better idealworld than their present reality and to note thedeficienciesof theRussianrealworldaround them;however, theywereperplexed by their own powerlessness to do “something about it.”Thephase of the study ofHegel allowed some of them to take two furthersteps. (Walick 1989, p. 363) The firstwould be a “reconciliationwithreality.”This is in thespiritof theHegelianphilosophy that “Thereal isrationalandtherationalisreal.”Thecoevaldeplorablestateofaffairswastobeseenonlyas apassingphaseinthepathofthe“WorldSpirit”whichwould continue in search for improvement.Thispaved theway for thesecondsteptakenbysomemembersofthecircle,especiallyBelinskiiandtheStankevichian’s “fellow traveler”AleksandrHerzen.This secondstepwouldbea“philosophyofaction,”that is,creatingatransformingactionfrom thatcriticalawarenessacquiredabout thepresentreal.These twostepsorphasesreflectedwhathappenedafterHegel’sdeathinGermany:his followers split into right­wingHegelians and left­wingHegelians—the former settled into the coeval reality andbecame conservative andthe latter set out for the solution via revolutionary transformation ofsociety,whosegreatestsymbolwasKarlMarx.InRussia,inrelationtotheStankevichCircle,thesetwopossiblereadingsofHegelwererealizednotas a division into separate groups, but as stages in the intellectualdevelopmentofsomeofthemainmembersofthecircle.Inmoreextremecases, such as those of Belinskii and Bakunin, this second steprepresentedadefinitivebreakwiththeSchillerianidealistpastinfavorof“reality­transformingaction.” Thissecondstepwasmoreconsequentlytakenbythemembersofthe so­calledHerzen/Ogarev Circle (1831­1834),which had close linkswiththemembersoftheStankevichCircle.AleksandrHerzenandNikolaiOgarev founded the circle in 1831when theywere all students at theUniversityofMoscow.TheCirclehadabout11peopleandmetinOgarev’shouse.ItwasmoreradicalthantheStankevichgroup inthat itnotonlydiscussedphilosophybutalsopolitics, includingSaint­Simonian theoriesandmoderatesocialism.Theyhadbeengreatlyinfluencedbytheideasofthe French Revolution and the Decembrist Revolt of 1825 in Russia.Althoughitsmemberswerearrestedandthegroupdispersedin1834,itformed a breeding ground from which future liberal and socialistdemocratsemerged.ItsgreatestfigurewasAleksandrHerzen.

88

VariantsofWesternism:Liberals,RadicalDemocratsandSocialists From this batch of intellectual experiments came amultifacetedmovement. Westernizers were ideologically more heterogeneous thanSlavophiles (who in almost all of their totality can be classified asconservative, ifwe use traditionalWestern terminology). In terms of asimplifiedpolitical­ideological classification,we can say that among theWesternizerstherewereliberals(thegreatmajority,amongthemTimofeiGranovskii, Pavel Annenkov, Vasilii Botkin), radical democrats (likeVissarionBelinskii)andevensocialists(likeAleksandrHerzen).Bakuninwould begin as aWesternizer from the Stankevich Circle, but after hisdeparture forEuropehewouldbreakwithhis originalWeltanschauungandbecomeananarchist. Letuslookattheindividualtrajectoryofsomeofthesemembersof the movement to better understand the internal and externalmechanisms that guided them. Let’s start with the two most famousnamesinthegroup:BelinskiiandHerzen.VissarionGrigor’evichBelinskii(1811­1848) Vissarion Belinskii had a background different from almost allothermajorWesternizersandSlavophiles.HewasthefirstgreatfigureoftheRussianintelligentsiathatdidnotcomefromnobleorwealthyorigin.Hewasthesonofaprovincialcountrydoctor.Hehadtoworkforaliving,especially after he was expelled from the University of Moscow forwriting a radicalplay.His sourceof incomewashiswork as a literarycritic,whichoften lefthim in financialdifficulties.Theseconditionshelpexplain the fervor and passionwithwhich hewrote against autocracy,serfdom,andexploitation. HestudiedattheUniversityofMoscowin1829­1832untilhewasexpelled forwriting aplay against serfdom,DmitriiKalinin.From1839onward,hewouldliveinSt.Petersburg. InhisMuscovitephase(before1839),hewrotearticlesofliterarycriticismforTeleskop(untilthejournalwasbannedin1836preciselyforpublishing Chaadaev’s First Philosophical Letter), and for MoskovskiiNablyudatel’(“TheMuscoviteObserver”)in1838­1839.AfterhismovetoStPetersburginlate1839,heservedasliterarycritic(andsometimesaseditor) in Otechestvennie Zapiski (“Notes of the Fatherland”) andSovremennik (“TheContemporary”), twoof themost liberalandradicalRussianjournals,bothpublishedbyNikolaiNekrasov. Hewoulddieearly,attheageof36.Apatientwithtuberculosis,in

89

1847(fromMaytoNovember)hetraveledabroad insearchofadequatehealing stations.ThesearchwasunsuccessfulandhereturnedtoRussia,dyingshortlythereafterinSt.PetersburgonMay26,1848.Belinskii’sintellectualtrajectory Belinskiihadhis intellectualtrajectoryconformed initiallybythediscussionsintheStankevichCircle(thatexistedinMoscowfrom1831to1839). Like the rest of the circle, he began the 1830s with greatenthusiasm for German philosophy, especially Schiller and Schelling.Schiller’s proposal to overcome the gap between thematerial­sensualimpulse(Sinnestrieb)andtherational­formalimpulse(Formtrieb)inmanbymeansoftheSpieltriebsynthesis(playfulimpulse,representingartisticbeauty, or the “living form”) gave the Stankevichians the foresight of apossiblebetter,morebeautiful,moreagreeableworldthantheimmediateRussianrepressivereality.Schillerovercamethedichotomybetweenthesensual/material and rationality, between duty and desire, throughaesthetics, that is, through his artistic concept of beauty— beauty, forhim,was “freedom inappearance.”ThisSchillerian formulaallowed theStankevichans to foresee a betterworld, to escape the immediatemudthatsurroundedtheminmental,spiritualways.Butitdidnot allowthemtoeffectivelychangethesocietyaroundthem,inspiteofthecriticalwaythey faced it. This led to the phenomenon of the “superfluous men”(which appeared with the defeat of the Decembrist revolt of 1825):misfitswho did not fit inwith tsarist reality but could not change thesituationinpractice. Belinskiiwenton to rehearsea first stepoutof this impasse in1835­1836when hewas presented by Bakunin to the “philosophy ofaction”of theGermanphilosopher JohannGottliebFichte (1762­1814).Fichte proposed to solve Kant’s question of the separation betweenphenomena and noumena (or things­in­themselves), between the selfandtheoutsideworld,abandoningtheexistenceofthenoumenon,ortheobjectiveworld, independentof the “I,”andpostulate thatwhatexists isthe world as it presents itself to the Self. That is, he turned self­consciousness intoasocialphenomenon.Concomitantly,heproposeda“philosophyofaction”or “philosophyof theact” (Tathandlung).The “I”posits itselfand, inpositing itself, itposits the “Non­I”(whatwecall theexternalworld)ashisownlimits.Realityisthenactivity,notsubstanceorthing.ThisFichteanrevisionopenedthewindowtoatransformingviewoftheworld,emphasizingaphilosophyofaction,activity,thecreativeactof the Self. It seemed a philosophy tailored to the conditions of theRussian “superfluous men,” allowing for action (configuration of the

90

externalworld) from the “I” (the individual).FichteallowedBelinskii toovercome the duality between the Self and the outside world. In hisFichteanperiod,Belinskiiconsidered that “the ideal life is real life”andthat“theso­calledreallifeisanegation,anillusion.” Butthisviewof“realityasideal”didnotlongsatisfytheBelinskiansoul,highlyconcernedwiththerealitythatsurroundedit.Inan1836text,Belinskii, while praising Fichte’s concern for action, saw theshortcomingsofhisvoluntaristphilosophyasan “abstract ideal taken inisolationfromthehistoricalandgeographicalconditionsofdevelopment.”(Belinskii,1953­1959,vol.11,p.385) The next and farmore important step in the Belinskii saga inovercoming the gap between the power of the individual and thesuffocating reality of the surroundingworldwashisHegelianphase of“reconciliation with reality.” Hegel, in his absolute idealism, viewedhistoryasadialecticalunfoldingof theSpirit.And thisSpirit isrational.Hence comes the famousHegelian saying that “What is real is rationalandwhatisrationalisreal.”By1839(andagainasatemporaryphaseofperhaps lessthanayear),theabsorptionofthisconceptionenabledtheeternally rebellious anddissatisfiedBelinskii to “reconcilewith reality,”that is, tounderstand that even the imperfect conditions ofRussia areonlya transitorymoment in thedialecticalmovementof theSpiritandthat in the future thecountrywilldevelophigher,moreprogressiveandrationalforms. Such Hegelian “reconciliation with reality” can bring forward­looking hopes to the future but also runs the risk of being a merejustificationofthestatusquointhepresent.Suchadangerbecomesclearwhenwe examine a somewhat atypical 1839 text by Belinskii, at theheightofhisshortperiodof“reconciliation.”ThiswashisreviewofTheAnniversary of the Battle of Borodino by V. Zhukovskii. In it,“reconciliationwithreality”leadsBelinskiitowhatcanbereadalmostasanapologyfortsarism:

Yes, the word “tsar” miraculously merges with theconscienceoftheRussianpeopleandforthemthatwordisfullofpoetryandmysteriousmeanings.Andthisisnocoincidencebutthemostfirmandrationalneed,whichisrevealedinthehistoryof theRussianpeople.Thedevelopmentofourhistoryoccurredin contrast to European history. In Europe, the basis of thedevelopment of lifewas always the struggle and victory of thelowerechelonsofstate lifeover thesuperiors.Feudalism foughtthe royal power and, defeating it, limited it, forming anaristocracy.Themiddleclasses fought feudalismandaristocracy.Democracy [i.e., the common people, fought] with the middle

91

classes.Theoppositehashappened tous: the governmenthasalways been at the head of the people, the star guiding thehighestgoals[...],sunwhoserays,comingfromthecenter,spreadthroughout the rest of the body of the executive statecorporation, giving you light and energy. In the tsar is ourfreedom,because fromhimcomesournewcivilizationandourlife. A great tsar liberated Russia from the Tatars and unifiedtheirdisunited regions.Another,evengreater [tsar], introducedhertothefieldofanewandmorecomprehensivesociallife.Andtheir successors completed their works. And so, every stepforwardoftheRussianpeople,everymomentofdevelopmentoftheirlifewasanactoftsarpower.Andthispowerdoesnotexistby chance or abstractly, for it has always been mysteriouslymerged with the designs of Providence, with rational reality.(Belinskii,1953­1959a,pp.246­247)

Thistypeofthinking,souncharacteristicofBelinskii,andhisownphase of “reconciliation with reality” — through which, temporarilypassedothermembersof theStankevichCircle,suchasBakunin, too—didnot last long.AsearlyasMarch1,1841,hewrotea letter toBotkinrenouncinghis“reconciliationwithreality,”hisHegelianadorationoftherealasrational:

A year ago I thought diametrically opposed towhat Ithinknow[...]Whatgoodisitformetoknowthatrationalitywilltriumph,thatinthefuturethesituationwillbegood,iffatenowmakesme awitness to the realmof irrationality,of animalisticforces?[...]VerygoodthisPrussiangovernment,inwhichwesawthe idealofrationalgovernment.Whatcanwesay?Scoundrels,tyrantsofmankind!Memberof the[Holy]TripleAllianceof theexecutionersofreasonand freedom.This isHegel foryou![...]Ihad long suspected thatHegel’s philosophy is only amoment,thoughimportant.Andthattheabsolutecharacterofitsresultsisuseless.Bettertodiethantobereconciledwiththem[...]Thefateof the subject, of the individual, of the personality, is moreimportantthanthefateofthewholeworldorthestateofhealthof the emperor of China (Hegel’s Allgemeinheit).11 (Belinskii,2012a)

It is at this point, freed from the burden of a rigid Hegelian

11 Allgemeinheit literally means “generality” (in this case, in the sense of “universality”) in German.

92

conception— “right­wingHegelian” touse the terminologyof thepost­Hegeldebate inGermany— thatBelinskii executed a grand dialecticalsynthesisofhisearlierpositionswhichwouldmarkhismatureperiodinSt Petersburg in the 1840s. He rescued the principles of “freedom,”“individual”and “action” fromhisSchillerianandFichteanperiods,andcombinedthemwitharespectforHegel’sdialecticalaspects(strippedoftheirexcessivebelief inan intrinsicallyrationalstateand inthepresentrealityasasignofreason).Againusingtheterminologyofthepost­Hegeldebate,Belinskii’snewpositionshad affinitieswithwhatwouldbe the“left­wingHegelianism” inGermany (whichwouldseek touniteGermanabstractthinkingwithFrenchrevolutionarythought). IntheletterstoBotkinofJanuary22andMarch1,1841,Belinskiirevealed that itwasamistake forhim tohaverenouncedSchiller inhisHegelianperiodof“reconciliationwithreality”andretrievedtheFichteanmotto of “action.” For example, in his 22 January letter to Botkin, hewrote:

Allthesocialfoundationsofourtimerequireacompleteoverhaulandageneral transformation [perestroika],whichwillhappen sooner or later. It is time to free the suffering humanpersonality from the degrading fetters of an irrational reality:unfoundedopinionsand theheritageofcenturiesofbarbarism.Oh, Botkin [...]My letters cannot give you an idea how I havechanged [...] I have now become aware, I have foundmy realessence: itcanbe fullyexpressedbythewordTat.12 (Belinskii,2012a)

But as stated above, Belinskii, despite his refusal of Hegel’sexaggerationsanderrors,didnotdismisshimcompletely,usingthevalidpartsofhisphilosophy.ThepointtowhichBelinskiiapproachedtheideasoftheGerman“leftHegelians”isclearinalatertext(his1843reviewofNikolaiMarkevich’s History of Little Russia), in which he analyzes therelationofpoetstophilosophers.In it,hedescribesaphilosophicalviewsimilartothatoftheessaySchellingandRevelationbyFriedrichEngels.

To the poet remained only the right of enthusiasticmadnessandmadenthusiasm.Hewasexcludedfromtherighttobearationalbeing,oneof themostsacredrightsof thehumanbeing.Lovewasleftinhisdomain.Hewasexcludedfromtherightto reason,as if loveand reasonweremutuallyexclusive things,nottwopartsofthesamespirit.Thephilosopherwasunderstood

12 Tat means “act” or “action” in German.

93

to be a cold, dry beingwithout passion. In fact, circumstancesfavored such an opinion. As soon as philosophy started on itscourse,itmovedawayfromlifeandcloseditself,concentratingonthe analysisof reason.Hence comes its asceticism, its cold,drycharacter, its severe solitude. Kant, the founder of modernphilosophy,wasanexampleofthisfirstworkofreflection,whosedriving force is reason. The content of Fichte’s philosophy isalreadymorecomprehensive,anditrevealsitselfastheinflamedtribuneof therightsofthesubjectivespirit,whichhas led toanextraordinary one­sidedness. Schelling, with his great idea ofidentity[andinseparabilitybetweensubjectandnature],openedupthepossibilityofFichte’sreconciliationwiththeoutsideworld.Andfinally,Hegel’sphilosophyabsorbedallthequestionsoflifein general. And if his answers about them sometimes revealthemselvestobelongtoaperiodalreadylivedandsurpassedbymankind,on theotherhandhisrigorousandprofoundmethodopenednewavenuesofawarenessofhumanreason,andfreeditfromeverlastingsinuousshortcuts thatoftendeviated from therightpath.Hegelmadephilosophyascience.Thegreatmeritofthis great modern thinker was the creation of hismethod ofspeculative thinking [...] Hegel was mistaken only on theoccasionswhenhewasunfaithful tohisownmethod. InHegel,philosophy reached itsmaximumdevelopment,butat the sametime,asesotericknowledgealienatedfromreallife,itreachedapointofcrisis.Now,strongandmature,philosophyreturnstothenoisy life she had been forced to abandon in order to knowherself in silenceand solitude.This reconciliationofphilosophywith practice is being done by the left wing of Hegelianism.(Belinskii,1953­1959b,pp.48­49)

From1841onward,Belinskiibeganhismostradicalperiodwhich,atthesametime,willrepresentthematureBelinskii.TothissynthesisofthemorecriticalandactiveaspectsofhisearlierSchillerian,FichteanandHegelian periods, Belinskii added the study of the materialism of theGerman philosopher Feuerbach and of the French “socialist” andpositivist doctrines of Saint Simon and Auguste Comte. The criticwhoalways reproached “art for art” and stood for realism and socialengagementinliterature,wasnowalsosaidtobematerialist,atheistandeven socialist.13 It is not for nothing that hewas nicknamed “Furious

13 On socialism, in his letter to Botkin of 8 September 1841, Belinskii stated: “And now I have come to another extreme: the idea of socialism, which has become to me the idea of ideas [...] The alpha and omega of knowledge [...] For me, it engulfed

94

Vissarion.”Belinskii’s positions in the debate betweenWesternizers and Slavophiles:TheWestandRussia,theroleofPetertheGreat,etc. Belinskii,inhishighlyphilosophicalliteraryreviews,presentedahistoricalviewofRussia’srelationshipwithEurope thatwas inconflictwith that of the Slavophiles, many of whom, by the way, were hisacquaintances and/or friends.Among themost interesting conceptsheintroduced was his conception of the historical transformation of a“people”(narod) into“nation”(natsiya).InfluencedbyHegel’sdialecticaltheory of the development of the Spirit, Belinskii postulated that, likeindividuals,nationspassedthroughastageof“immediacy”thatwastobeshocked in theperiodof “reflection.”From this shockwould eventuallyemerge a superior synthesis in a period of self­conscious “rationalreality.” According to Belinskii, the initial state of pre­Petrine Russia,especially inherKievanRus’period,wasastateof“natural immediacy,”her infantileage. It took theEuropeanizing shockofPeter theGreat touprootRussia from this immediacyandputherbefore the tasksof thereflection characteristic ofmodern and advanced peoples. The possibleEuropean exaggerations of Peter’s time and the contradictions andtensionstheycreatedinRussiansocietywouldbedialecticallyovercomewhen Russia, already equipped with modern rational instruments,enteredthenewstageinwhichnationalandinternationalcharacteristicswould no longer be in conflict and Russia herselfwould be developingautonomously on the path of rationalmodernity,without the need forhelp fromWestern European civilization. Belinskii said that this couldalready be glimpsed in literature. With Pushkin, Russian literaturereached a worldwide significance, uniting the particular (the Russianpopular characteristics) and the general (aworld­class literary quality).Belinskiiwasnotespeciallyenthusiasticaboutfolkliteratureandpoetry.

history, religion, and philosophy.” (Belinskii, 2012a) On his atheism, in a letter to Herzen of 26 January 1845, he wrote that “in the words God and religion I see obscurity, ignorance, fetters and a whip.” (Belinskii, 2012a) Moreover, in his famous letter to Gogol’, of 3 July 1847 (a diatribe against the new conservative positions of that writer), he affirmed that the Russian people was by nature atheist: “According to you the Russian people is the most religious in the world. That is a lie! The basis of religiousness is pietism, reverence, fear of God. The Russian man utters the name of the Lord while scratching himself somewhere. He says of the icon: ‘If it works, pray to it; if it doesn’t, it’s good for covering pots.’ Take a closer look and you will see that it is by nature a profoundly atheistic people. It still retains a good deal of superstition, but not a trace of religiousness.” (Belinskii, 2009)

95

Whilerecognizingitsvalueasanexpressionofapeople’sculture,hesaidthat the art of the people was also of a level of natural and localimmediacy,withoutthelevelofreflectionanduniversalityofhigh­qualityartistic literature. Just as he made the distinction between “people”(narod) and “nation” (natsiya),with the former in the state of naturalimmediacy and the latter having already passed through the phase ofrational reflectionand reality,Belinskiiused theRussian term narodnyi(“popular”inthesenseof“belongingorrelatedtothepeople”)todescribethe stage of folk art and literature (of local importance) and the non­Russian term natsional’nyi (“national”) todescribe the characteristic ofthepeopleswhohavealreadyreachedmaturityasanationintheliteraryandpoliticalfield,havingauniversalmeaning,importantformankindasawhole. It isworthwhile toquote lengthyexcerpts from the1841 text inwhichBelinskiiexpoundedthispartofhistheory(RussiabeforePetertheGreat,whichwasajointreviewofseveralbooksonPeter’sRussia),forinitnotonly themain aspectsofBelinskii’shistoricalperspective shownabovearedescribedbutwecanalsonoticeseveralof theprejudices(ofHegelianorigin) inhisuse of such expressions as “historical andnon­historicalpeoples,” “Europeas thematureageofmankind,” “Asiaas thechildhoodphaseofmankind”etc.

WhatistheimportanceoftheactionsofPetertheGreat?In the transformation of Russia, in its rapprochement withEurope.Andwithout them,wouldRussia find itself inAsia,andnot inEurope?[...]WhatdoesEuropemeanandwhatdoesAsiamean?That is thequestionwithoutwhoseanswerwe cannotunderstand themeaning, the importance and the greatness ofPeter’s actions. Asia is the land of the so­called naturalspontaneity; Europe, the land of conscience. In Asia there iscontemplation; inEurope,willandreason.This is themainandfundamentaldifferencebetweenEuropeandAsia,thecauseandstartingpointof thehistoryofboth.Asiawas thecradleof thehumanraceandcontinues tobe itscradle.Thechildhasgrownbutisstilllyinginacrib.Hegotstronger,buthestillneedshelpwalking.Inlife,intheactionsandintheveryconscienceofAsia,oneseesonlyprimitivenaturalnessandnothingelse.TheAsiancannot be called an animal, because he is endowed withreasoningand theword.But it isanimal in the same sensebywhichonecancallababyanimal.Ababy is thepossibilityofacomplete person in the future.But, in thepresent,what ishislife? Vegetative and animal existence [...] So is the Asian. Thebasisoftheircommunityisthecustom,consecratedbyantiquity

96

andyearsofhabit.“Soourparentsandgrandparentslived”:thisis the basic rule and the supreme rational justification of theAsiatic inhis life [...]Hence adespotismwithout limits and anabsoluteslavery[...]TheAsianconsciousnessisasleeportrappedintheviciouscircleofthechild’snatural immediacy[...]Even inpagan times in the ancientworld, Europe’s character was theopposite of that of Asia. This opposition consisted in theflexibilityandmoralmutabilityofEurope,whosecausewas theeternal effort of the European peoples, through the power ofconscience,toestablishmediationsinalltheirrelationswiththeworld and life. Using feeling and inspiration as stages ofdevelopment, as necessary elements of life, the European gavefreereintothethinking,analysis,and judgmentofhismind.Hesethiscognitive reason inmotion, tearing thestraitjacket fromany immediacy.Hereconciledcontemplationwithactionand inthecontemplationofhisactivityhefoundhisgreatestbliss.Andhisactivityconsistedincontinuallybringingtolifehisidealsandrealizingtheminthislife.ForaGreek,tolivemeanttothink[...]A year for Europe was like a century for Asia; a century forEuropeasaneternityforAsia.Allthatisgreat,noble,human,hasgrown, flourished and come to fruition on European soil. Thevariety of life, the noble relations between the sexes, therefinement of customs, art, science, control over unconsciousforcesofnature,victoryovermatter,triumphofspirit,respectforthe human person, inviolability of human rights [...] are all aresultof thedevelopmentofEuropean life.All that ishuman isEuropean;everythingthatis Europeanishuman.Russiadidnotbelong and could not belong to Asia because of the mainconstituent elements of her life. Shewas an isolated, individualphenomenon. The Tatars [Mongols]were to unite her to Asia.They were able, through external mechanical ties, to connectRussia to Asia for a time [during the Mongol yoke of twocenturies],butspirituallytheycouldnotdothesame,forRussiawas aChristianpower.ThenPeter theGreat actedwellwithinthe spirit of the people, as he drew his own country near toEurope, and expelled from it the Asiatism which the Tatars[Mongols] had temporarily introduced [... Herein] lies the trueunderstanding of Peter, the Great [...] The resolution of thisquestiondemandstoshowanddemonstrate:1)thatalthoughtheconcept of narodnost’ is closely linked to the historicaldevelopment and social forms of the people, they are not thesame thing; 2) that the reform of Peter the Great and theEuropeanismintroducedbyhimdidnotalterandcouldnotalter

97

ournarodnost’:theyonlyanimateditwiththespiritofanewandrichlife[...]IntheRussianlanguagetherearetwowordswiththesamemeaning:oneofRussianorigin,narodnost’,andanotherofLatin origin, coming from the French, natsional’nost’ [... Inreality,] the words narodnost’ and natsional’nost’ have similarmeanings, but not identical. Among them there is not only anuance of tone but a big difference. Narodnost’ relates tonatsional’nost’asa lowerconceptofspecies relates toahigher,more general concept of genus. By “people” [narod] weunderstandthelowerclassesofthepopulation.“Nation”[natsiya]expressestheaggregateofalltheclassesofastate.Inthepeople[narod]thereisstillnonation[natsiya],butinthenationthereisthepeople[...]Thetotalprevalenceofnarodnost’presupposesinthestate theconditionofnatural immediacy,patriarchalism [...]SuchwastheconditionofRussiabeforePetertheGreat[...]Theessence of all nationality [natsional’nost’] consists of itssubstance.Thissubstanceisthatwhichispermanentandeternalin the spirit of a people, which, unchanged, survives allmodifications, passing unscathed and in one piece through allphasesofhistoricaldevelopment.It istheseedinwhich liesthepossibility of future development [...]ThusRussia, before Peterthe Great, was only a people [narod] and became a nation[natsiya]asaconsequenceoftheimpulsegivenbythis reformer[...But]IftheRussianpeopledidnotcontaininitsspirittheseedof rich life, Peter’s reform would not have revived it andenergizeditwithanewlifeandnewforces.Whydoesonepeoplehaveonesubstanceandanotherpeopleadifferentone?Thisisasdifficulttoclarifyaswhenitcomesdowntoindividuals.Ifwetakethehypothesis thatpeoplesoriginate in families, then the firstcause of their substancemust be in blood and race. Externalcircumstances and historical development also influence thesubstanceofapeople, though theyare in turn influencedby it.Butthereisnocausethatcanbemoreenthusiasticallyindicatedthan the climate and geographical condition of the country inwhichthepeoplelive.Allsouthernpeoplesdiffer fromnorthernones.Themindsof the formeraremore lively, light,clear,moresensitive and exhilarating.Themind of the latter is slower butmore grounded, with calmer but deeper feelings, being moredifficult to ignite the passion, but actingmore decisively. Thepeoples of the South are dominated by the immediate feeling;thoseoftheNorthbythoughtandreflection.Intheformerthereismoremobility; inthe latter,moreactivity.Inrecenttimes, theNorthhas left theSouth farbehind in therealmsofart,science

98

and civilization [...Russia]was removed fromEurope earlyon.Byzantium, as far as civilization was concerned, could onlypresentherwiththecustomofdarkeningteeth,clearingtheface,and plucking the eyes of enemies and criminals. Theprincipalities [of Kievan Russia] rivaled and disputed amongthemselves,butinthisrivalrytherewasnorationalprincipleandtherefore nothing good came of it. [...] The Tatars came andwelded thedisunitedmembersofKievanRussiawith theirownblood.ThiswasthegreatusefulnessoftheTatar­Mongolyokeoftwo centuries [overRussia].Butnext to that,howmuchevil itbroughtalong,howmanyvicesitbroughttoRussia!Isolationofwomen, slavery and servility in hearts andminds, flogging, thehabitofburyingmoneyonthefloorandwalkingraggedforfearof appearing rich, extortion in justice, Asiatic lifestyle,mentallaziness, ignorance, contempt for oneself. In short, everythingthatcontradictedEuropeanismandwaseradicatedbyPeter,allthiswas not something native in us, but was brought by theTatars[Mongols]![...]Butthe[Russian]peoplecontinuethesame[in their substance]. Peter did not recreate them (this, exceptGod,noonecando!).Hetookthemoffbeatenandcrookedpathsandputthemontheroadtoauniversal­historicallife.(Belinskii,1953­1959,vol5,pp.98­100,103­105,121­125,129,136)

The long passage above show just how much Belinskii was aWesternizer.ItwasevenWesterninthesensethathisthinkingreflectedmuch ofWestern European thought in the nineteenth centurywith aclear view of the superiority of European civilization over the“barbarians”ofother continents.His viewofAsia as akindof childishchildhood ofmankind, while Europe represented its adult andmaturestagereflectsHegel’sownview inhisbookPhilosophyofHistory.(Hegel,2001, pp. 121­122) That iswhy thework of Peter the Greatwas soimportant.ItstrippedRussiaofherlesscivilizedAsianrootsandputherin thedirectionofamore consistentEuropeandevelopment.Only thenwould theRussianpeople emerge from their conditionofmerenaturalimmediacyasnarodandwouldformatruenation(natsiya). The political vision above is reflected in the terrain of literarycriticismproper inhis text Articles onPopularPoetry. (Belinskii,1953­1959c)Init,Vissarionrefusestoromanticizepopularpoetryandpopularart. He says that they are important but reflect the state of naturalimmediacy (spontaneity) thatneeds tobecomplementedbya literatureorartofgreaterdepthandmaturity,reflectingnotonlythelocalinterestsofapeoplebut thegeneral feelingsofmankindasawhole.Oneshouldcomplement the other.And the bestRussian example of such an artist

99

who is both popular (narodnyi) and universal is the poet AleksandrPushkin.AsBelinskiiputit,

The “popular” [narodnyi] is an extremely importantphenomenon inbothpolitical lifeand literature.But, likeeverytrue conception, italone isunilateralandbecomes trueonly inreconciliation with its opposite. The opposite of “popular” is“general,” in the sense of “universal,” that is, characteristic ofmankindasawhole. Justasnopersoncan existapart from therest of society, no people can exist apart from humanity. Theperson who lives outside the popular element is a ghost; thepeople who do not feel at home within the great family ofhumanity isnot anation,but a tribe [...]For apeople to reallyhavehistorical importance, its“popular”conditionmustbeonlyform,amanifestationofthe ideaofhumanity,andnotanideainitself.Everything that isparticularand singular,all individualityexistsonlythroughthegeneral,whichisitscontent,andofwhichit is only an expression and form. Individuality is an illusionwithoutthegeneral.Thegeneral, inturn, isaghostwithouttheindividual, particular manifestations. So people who demandpurely popular literature are demanding a ghostly and empty“nothingness.”Ontheotherhand,peoplewhoaskforaliteraturetotally stripped of the popular, thus thinking of reaching ageneral, universal literature of humanity, are also seeking aghostlyandempty“nothingness”[...]Thepoetryofeachpeopleisthedirectexpressionofitsconscience,sopoetryiscloselylinkedwith the lifeof thepeople.That iswhypoetrymustbepopularandwhythepoetryofonepeoplediffersfromthatofothers.Foreach people there are two distinct phases of life: the epoch ofnatural spontaneity, or childhood, and the time of consciousexistence. In the first epochof life, thenationalparticularityofeach people manifests itself more sharply and its poetry isbasically popular. In this sense, popular poetrymanifests itselfthroughclearspecificities,whichmakesitmoreaccessibletothemass understanding of its people and less accessible to otherpeoples. Russian songs strongly play the Russian soul, but areforeign and untranslatable into other languages. In the secondepoch of the existence of a people, their poetry becomes lessaccessibletothemassesofthepopulationandmore accessibletootherpeoples.TheRussianpeasantdoesnotunderstandPushkin,but in compensation his poetry is intelligible to any culturedforeigner and translatable in all languages. If a people has noimportance orhistorical significance, then its (popular)natural

100

poetry will be above their cultured literature, for the latterrequiresuniversal,general elementsofallhumanityand if [thepeople]doesnot find them in the lifeof thepeople itself, itwillsimply imitate [foreigners…] Many of us argue that popularpoetryisaboveany literaryworkandthatPushkin,insearchofself­glorification,maskedhispoetryinthesimpleandnaiveformof the popular. A ridiculous misunderstanding, thoughunderstandable in this age of unilateral enthusiasm.No, a littlepoetrybyatrulygreatauthorisimmenselysuperiortoallworksof popular poetry together!No onewill dispute that aMozartrequiemoraBeethoven’s sonataisimmeasurably aboveanyfolksong[...](Belinskii,1953­1959c,pp.305­309)

ForBelinskii,Pushkinwas the symbolof anew era, joining thenational and theuniversal, inRussia. Itwas the step above themerelynationalliterature,orpopularpoetry,towardtheuniversalandhistorical.And this kind of development in the literature of the country becamepossibleonlybecausePeterhadopened thegatesofRussiatothemoreadvancedcivilizedworldofWesternEurope. Belinskiiwasperhapsthegreatestspokesman forWesternisminRussia.However,hiscareerwaschronologicallyshort.Hewoulddieattheageof36,onMay26,1848(June7bytheWesternGregoriancalendar).Itisinterestingtonotethathediedintherevolutionaryyearof1848,whenseveralcountriesofEuropewerecatchingfireintheso­calledrevolutionsof1848against theoldmonarchies.ThisaffectedBelinskii’s thinking intheend.Especiallybecausehe,sickwithtuberculosis,ontheadviceofthedoctors,madeahealingtriptoEuropefromMaytoNovember1847,firsttoSilesiaandthentoParis.Thehealingobjectiveswerenotachieved,andhe returned to Russia at the end of the year, but his stay inWesternEurope,especiallyintheebullienceoftheeveoftherevolutionaryyearof1848, impressed him greatly. At first, in Europe itself, he wasdisappointedwiththestateoftheEuropeanexploitativecapitalismofthetime. The Europe he had envisioned was a society of bourgeoisexploitation.Thus,whileinEurope,hejoinedHerzenandBakunin,whoatthesametimecriticizedtheEuropeanbourgeoisieanditsexploitationofthesubalternclasses.ButBelinskii,uponreturningtoRussiainlate1847and resuming contact with Russia’s “semifeudal” exploitative reality,wouldmodify that view a bit and begin to see the development of amodern bourgeoisie as a progressive step within the framework of aRussiainwhichtherewasstillofficiallyserfdomandfeudalremnants.Hewouldbecome irritatedbythepositionofsocialists,suchasLouisBlanc,whodeniedanypositiveroletothebourgeoisieatthattime.InalettertoBotkin,datedJuly7­19,1847,hewrote:

101

For Blanc, the bourgeoisie is the arch­enemy and has

conspiredagainst thehappinessofhumanitysince thecreationof the world. However, his ownworks show that without thebourgeoisiewewouldnothavehadtherevolution forwhichhehassomuchenthusiasmandthatthesuccessesofthisclassarethefruitofitsownwork.(Belinskii,1953­1959,vol.12,p.385)

Refining this view in his letter to Botkin, dated 2­6 December1847,Belinskiimakesadistinctionbetweenthebigcapitalists(ofwhomhehasanegativeview,asbirdsofprey)andthemiddleclasses.Andalsobetween the rising bourgeoisie (in struggle for its hegemony) and thevictoriousbourgeoisie (afterhavingachievedhegemony in thepoliticalstruggle).

Thewordbourgeoisie isnotwelldefinedbecauseofitselasticity and multiple meanings. The bourgeois and the bigcapitalists,whocontrolsobrilliantlythedestiniesofpresent­dayFrance,andallother capitalistsandproprietorswhohave littleinfluence over the state and few rights, and finally the people,who have nothing.Who is not bourgeois? In fact, theworker,whowatershisownfieldonlyafterwateringthoseofothers.Theenemiesof thebourgeoisieanddefendersof thepeoplearenotmembers of the people but of the bourgeoisie, as wereRobespierre and Saint­Just [...] Thus one must attack not thebourgeoisieasawhole,butthebigcapitalists,liketheplagueandthewrathofmodernFrance. […]Themiddle classalways turnsoutgreatinthestruggletoreachitsgoals.Thenitrevealsitselftobe generous and cunning, heroic and selfish, for some of itschosenonesaresacrificedanddie,andthefruitsofitsexploitorvictoryareenjoyedbyall [...]Thebourgeoisie inbattleand thevictoriousbourgeoisiearetwodifferentthings:atthebeginningof its movement it did not separate its movement from theinterestsofthepeople.Itgottherightsnotforitselfbutforallthepeople.Itsmistakewastothinkthatthepeoplewouldbesatisfiedwithrights,butwithoutbread.Nowitconsciouslysurroundsthepeople with hunger and capital: but now it is no longer thebourgeoisie in battle but the victorious bourgeoisie. (Belinskii,2012a)

If the big bourgeoisie (the big capitalists) could becomereactionary after its victory in advanced capitalist countries, Belinskiimade a clear distinction for Russia. In this country of underdeveloped

102

capitalism, with feudal remnants such as serfdom, in his final year,Belinskii came to see the development of a native bourgeoisie as anantidoteagainstthereactionarypoweroftheruralnobility.AsheputitinhislettertoAnnenkovofFebruary15,1848:

[Bakunin]alsotriedtoconvincemethatGodwouldfreeusfromthebourgeoisieinRussia.Formenowitisclearthattheprocessof internalcivicdevelopment inRussiawillbeginwhentheruralnobilitybecomes bourgeois.Polandisthebestexampleof what happens to a state without a bourgeoisie in fullenjoymentofitsrights.(Belinskii,2012a)

ThusBelinskii inhis lastdays softened somewhathis “socialist”positions and seemed to adopt an opinion that the development of abourgeoisieandcivilizedcapitalismcouldbeawayoftransitiontoamorejustsocietyinacountrylikeRussia,wherethefeudalresidueswerestillstrong.ItisimportanttonotethatBelinskii’s“socialism,”adoptedintheearly 1840s, had always been closer to utopian socialists and to Saint­Simonism than to aMarxist­type radical revolutionary socialism. Thus,thisfinaltransitionwasalessradicalepistemologicalbreakthanitmightseematfirst. FinallywemustnotethatBelinskii’searlydeath(atage36)mayhavesavedhimfromseriousproblems(imprisonmentor evensomethingmoreserious)with the tsaristpolicesystem.Since the timeofhisopenandvirulentcritiqueoftsarisminRussiainhisfamouslettertoGogol’ofJuly3,1847,thepolicewereinvestigatinghimmoreandmoreseriously.Westernizer Konstantin Kavelin (1897­1900, vol. 3, p. 1094)posthumouslyreportedthat“Afterhisdeath[…]intheThirdSection[thesecret police], L.B. Dubel’t furiously lamented that Belinskii had died,addingthat‘Wewouldhavelethimrotinafortress’.”AlexanderIvanovichHerzen(1812­1870) Herzenwastheillegitimate(butlovinglyraised)sonofawealthyRussiannobleman, IvanYakovlev,with aGermanwoman.The teenagerHerzen and his best friend, Nikolai Ogarev (who would become hislifelong intellectual partner) were very impressed by the Decembristrevoltof1825,tothepointofvowing,amongthem,todedicatetheirlivestocontinuing thestruggle for freedom that theDecembristshadstarted.His future life reflected thismood:Herzenwouldbelong to theradicallydemocraticwingoftheWesternizers(alongwithBelinskii)andrecognizehimselfasasocialist. Inhismaturephase,hewouldbeaproponentof

103

whathecalled“Russiansocialism,”anagrarian­basedsocialism(basedontheruralcommuneormir) thatwould influence the thinkingof theso­callednarodniki(“populists”). In1829,heenteredtheFacultyofPhysicsandMathematicsoftheUniversity of Moscow. In 1831, he founded with Nikolai Ogarev adiscussion group. In this so­called Circle of Herzen and Ogarev, theydiscussed philosophical and political problems with other students.During thisuniversityperiod,Herzen sharedwith themembers of theStankevich Circle the interest in Schiller’s Romanticism and Schelling’sphilosophy,buthealsostudiedtheFrenchphilosopherswithanemphasisonutopian socialism, especially Saint­Simon.Thus, the circleofHerzenandOgarevwasa littlemore “politicized” than thatofStankevich at thetime. In1834, theCircle ofHerzen andOgarevwas dissolvedwith thearrestofitsmembers.HerzenwasexiledtoPermandthentoViatkaandVladimir.He spent five years in exile. During that time, as part of hissentence, he had to work as a civil servant, which gave him directexperienceofthecorruptionattheheartoftheRussianstatesystem.Hisperiod inVladimirwasoneof thehappiest timesofhis life, for itwaswhen he married (in 1838) his beloved cousin Natal’ya Zakharina, adevout person who would bring him (temporarily, though) religiousinfluences. In1840,Herzenwasallowed toreturn toMoscow.Hesufferedaphilosophical shock; by the late1830s bothBelinskii andBakunin (hisacquaintances and participants in the old Stankevich Circle) werepreaching the so­called “reconciliation with reality” based on Hegel.Herzen, intrigued, undertook a study of Hegelian philosophy andpresented a version of “reconciliation with reality” different from theconclusions reached at the time by Belinskii and Bakunin.While theinitialversionofBelinskiiandBakunin’s“reconciliationwithreality”tookliterally theHegelian saying that “what is real is rational andwhat isrationalisreal”anddrewpassiveconclusionsofacceptanceoftherealityofthattimeasrationalandnecessary,Herzenproposeda“philosophyofaction” as an outlet for this political impasse of the acceptance ofcontemporary repressive realities as necessary. Reconciliation withreality should not be themere passive acceptance of the reality of themoment.On thecontrary,man,asamoralcreature,has the freedom tostruggletochangethatreality.Succeedinginchangingrealityaccordingtohisneeds and ideals, thenman shall attain a realitywithwhich he canreconcile himself. Therefore, what is necessary for reconciliation isaction.ThisbasisofaphilosophyofactionwouldremainwithHerzenfortherestofhislife. Thesereflectionswouldbeputonpaper inthe formofacycleofarticles titledDilettantism in Science,whichwas crownedby the fourth

104

and lastone, the famousBuddhism inScience. (Herzen,1954­1965,v.3,pp.7­88,inwhichBuddhisminScienceisonpages64­88)Inthisseriesofarticles,written between April 1842 andMarch 1843, and also in hisLettersontheStudyofNature,writtenin1845­1846(Herzen,1954­1965,v.3,pp.89­316),Herzenputdownhisvisionof scienceasa culturallypropellingandenlighteningforceofhumanity.Buthehadapeculiarviewoftheimportanceofscienceandhowitshouldbeconducted.Denyingthereductionistpretensionsofthepositivistsofthetime,whoclaimedtoholdapurelyempiricalsciencebasedon factsandwithoutanyphilosophicalor metaphysical speculation (Herzen, 1954­1965, v. 3, p.9), Herzenpreachedaseriesofsynthesestoovercomethisunilateralism.Firstly,hesaw no insurmountable contradiction between philosophy and science.Both should go together, for “philosophy is the unity of the particularsciences:theseflowtoitandareitsnourishment[...]Thephilosophythathasnobasis on the empiricaldata ofparticular sciences is aphantasy,metaphysics,idealism.”(Herzen1954­1965,vol.3,p.101)

Philosophy is theunityof theparticularsciences: theseflow to itandare its food.Philosophywhichhasnobasis in theempirical data of the particular sciences is a phantasy,metaphysics, idealism [...] It is becoming clear that philosophywithout the natural sciences is as impossible as the naturalscienceswithout philosophy […] A comparison. The particularsciencesrepresenttheworldoftheplanets,whichhasanucleustowhichtheyrelateandfromwhichtheyreceivelight.Butdonotforget that light is the result of two moments, not just one.Withoutplanets,therewouldbenosun.Thisorganicrelationshipbetweenfactualsciencesandphilosophyisnottobefoundintheconsciousnessof some epochs; thisway philosophywallows inabstractions and the positive sciences get lost in the abyss offacts.(Herzen1954­1965,vol.3,pp.93,100,101)

Similarly, Herzen said that the battle between the two greatprinciples of modern science, Bacon’s empiricism and Descartes’rationalism,which forhimwasonly the latestversionofwhathecalledtheancientstrugglebetweenempiricismandidealism,mustalsoendinasynthesisthattakesadvantageofthepositiveaspectsofbothsides. But for the realization of all these grandiose syntheses,Herzensaysthatamoreopenmentalityandadeeperconceptionofsciencearenecessary. Inhis textsonDilettantism inScience(especially inBuddhisminScience),he says that true sciencehas itsopen enemiesand its falsefriends(orunintentionalenemies).Thelatterarealsoanobstacletoarriveat themore dialectical conception of the knowledge that he proposes.

105

Among the false friends, a seriousproblem is thatof the “dilettantes inscience,” i.e., thosewho like science, but practice it lazily and naively,without the depth, seriousness and courage to draw themost difficultconclusions, which may displease, in the search of truth. Herzen alsocriticizesthepositivists(“wholose theiressenceindetails”).Startingfromhispositionthatphilosophy(thatis,aholisticandintegrativeviewofthedifferent particular sciences) is indispensable in the management ofparticular sciences,he criticizeswhathe calls “caste scientists,” that is,ultra­specializedscientistswhocannotattain thegreaterviewofnatureoutsidetheirnarrowandhyperspecializedfields.Scientistsasacastearetheoppositeofdilettantesinscience.(Herzen1954­1965,vol.3,pp.9,43and47) Inhisstruggleagainst theso­called“Hegelianreconciliationwithreality,”assumedbysomeinRussiaintheformofapassiveresignationtotheconditionsofcontemporaryreality(includingbrieflybyBelinskiiandBakunin in the late 1830s), Herzen attacked those whom he called“Buddhists in science.” Buddhists in science get lost in the problem ofreconciliation,understandingitliterallyandmechanically.BothinHegel’sphilosophy—wheretheindividualpersonalityissacrificedonthealtaroftheuniversalspirit,whichiswhatreallydriveshistory—andintheverydevelopmentofthedifferentsciences,which formallyrepresenttheendofindividualitiesandidiosyncrasiesforthesakeofimpersonalobjectivityanduniversalrulesindependentofindividuals,somecurrentsofthinkerstake thissituationas theconfirmation thatpersonalityand individualitymust be sacrificed for the sake of the universal. The term “Buddhists”herereferstothefactthatBuddhismliterallydeniestheexistenceoftheindividual“I.”Indiandoctrinespointtotheultimategoalofnirvana,whichincertainconceptions isanundifferentiatedwhole.Herzenasserts that,likeBuddhists, thinkerswhoviewedHegel’s “reconciliationwithreality”as amere passive acceptance of contemporary reality (demise of therebellious “I” in the face of collective reality) assumed a position likeBuddhistsinreligion.(Herzen,1954­1965,v.3,pp.64­67,69,76­77)Tocounteract this passive “quietism,” Herzen proposes another kind ofreconciliationwith reality,a reconciliation throughaction, inwhich thetransformingactivityofmanwillchangerealityuntilitisinaconditiontobereconciledwithmaninasatisfactoryway.ItisthereconciliationthatHerzencallspositive.Letusfollowhisreasoning:

Science[...]hasachievedreconciliationinitsfield.Ithasrevealed itselfas thateternalmediumwhich,byconscience,bythought,overturns theopposites,reconciles theirdenunciationsofunity,reconciles them inandwith itself,makesconscious thetruth of the principles in struggle. It would be to demand too

106

much of it, to demand that itdoes the same outside its field ofaction.Thefieldofactionofscienceistheuniversal,thethought,reasonasself­knowingspiritandwithinit[science]hasrealizedthemainpartofitsvocation[...]Itunderstoodanddevelopedthetruthofreasonas theunderlyingreality. [Science] liberated thethought of the world from the events of the world, freed theessentialfromtheaccidental[...]tothedarkness,itbroughtlight,discoveredtheeternalinthetemporary,theinfiniteinthefiniteandrecognizedthenecessityoftheircoexistence[...It]developsinman the ideaofhis species, theuniversalreason, freed fromindividualpersonalities.Itdemandsfromtheoutsetthesacrificeof individualpersonalities [...]Thesphereofscience isonly theuniversal, the thought. Reason does not know this or thatindividualpersonality:itknowsonlytheneedofthepersonalityingeneral.Thepersonenlightenedbysciencemustsacrificehisindividualpersonality [...]and,abandoningall individualbeliefs,enteringthetempleofscience[...]Personalitydiedinscience.Butdoespersonalityhavenoothersuperiorvocationinthesphereofthegeneral,of theuniversal? [...]Theswallowingofpersonalityby science is, in fact, a process of transformation of a natural,immediate personality into a conscious and freely rationalpersonality:itdiedtobebornagain.Personality,whichdissolvesitself inscience,didnotdie imperatively: itwas important for itto go through this “death” to convince itselfof its impossibility.Thepersonalitymust refuse tobecomea receptacleof truth; toforgetoneself,nottobeashamedofit,toacceptthetruthwithallitsconsequences [...]Todie in thenatural immediacymeans torise in spirit, and not to die in an eternal nothing, as theBuddhistsclaim.Thisvictoryover itself isonlypossibleandrealwhen there is struggle, effort. Thematuration of the spirit isdifficult,asisthegrowthofthebody[...]Personality,havingtheenergy to put itself on the scene, surrenders itself to scienceabsolutely.Butsciencecannolongerswallowsuchapersonality,and this [personality], in turn, does not annihilate itself in theuniversal,ingeneral[...]itwantsaction,foronlyactioncansatisfyman completely. The action is the personality itself [...] The“Buddhists in science,” entering the sphere of the general,universal,nolongerleavethere.Nothingbringsthembacktotheworld of reality and life [...] The Formalists have foundreconciliationwith science,butan erroneous reconciliation [...]For them, knowledge has paid for life and nothing else isnecessaryforthem.Theylearnedthatlifeisanendinitselfandthey imagined that science is the only objective of the human

107

being [...] The reconciliation of science occurs in thought, but“thehumanbeingisnotonlyrationalbutalsoabeingwhoacts.”The reconciliation of science is universal and negative; hencepersonality is not required. [On the other hand,] positivereconciliationcanonlybeconscious,rational,freeaction.“Actionis the living unity of theory and practice,” a great thinker ofantiquityhadalreadysaidtwothousandyearsago.[...]IsHistorynot an eternal doing, acting? [...] In the morally free andpassionatelyenergeticrationalaction,thehumanbeingreachesthe realityofhispersonality and is eternalized in theworld ofevents. In action, the human being becomes eternal in thetemporary, infinite in the finite, represents the species andhimself.(Herzen1954­1965,vol.3,pp.65­71)

Herzen thus creates a philosophy of action as a dialecticovercoming of the impasses placed between the general and theparticular. Rejecting a view of philosophy as mere abstract a priorithought, independent of practice, he gives philosophy the function ofintegrating thedifferentparticularsciences.Philosophywithoutscienceismereabstraction.Buthealsorejects“science for thesakeofscience,”the hyper­specialization of professional scientists as a caste. Science isnotanendinitself,butameanstolife.Andinlife,manisanactivebeingwho can act and transform his environment. Science (holisticallyintegrated by philosophy) is only one (powerful and indispensable)methodologicalmechanismforaction.Butactionisthegoalinlifeanditshighestinstance. BeforewefinishthisanalysisofhiscycleofessaysDilettantisminScienceandLettersontheStudyofNature,wemustmentionanimportantdetail,inviewoftheobjectofourpresentstudy.AswenotedearlierwithBelinkii,inthesetextsHerzenpresentsaEurocentricconceptionofhistoryandscience.Forexample,inthearticleBuddhisminScience,heconstantlyusestermsfromtheEasttodenotethedelayoranunripereadingofscience.HecertainlydepreciatestheBuddhistviewofanundifferentiatedwholewithouttheindividual“I,”aswehaveseen.ButhealsoemploysotherEasternmetaphorstodenotethisideaofdelayorimmaturity.Thus,heuses,assynonymouswith“Buddhistsinscience”,theexpression“Mohammedansinscience”or“Talmudists(inscience),”sayingthatthesearepeoplewhoviewsciencenotcritically,asifitwerea“Koran”ora“Talmud”whereabsolutetruthisinscribedandcannotbediscussed.(Herzen,1954­1965,v.3,pp.8,64and77)Moreover,reflectingtheconceptionsthatprevailedinEuropeinthenineteenthcentury,inotherpassagesheclearlyimpliesthatscienceisbasicallyaEuropeanthingandthatOrientalpeoplesdidnothaveanotablecontributioninthis

108

field.Forexample,aboutChina—wheresomeofthegreatestinventionsinthehistoryofmankindcamefrom,suchaspaper,gunpowder,compass,press,plushundredsofothersmallerones!—hewrote:

To express the relation of the caste of scientists toscience itself, letusrememberthatthiscastedevelopedmore inChina thananywhereelse.China isconsideredbymany tobeaprosperous patriarchal state. Maybe. There are amultitude ofscientistsandtheprivilegesofscientistsinthepublicserviceareimmense: but there is no trace of science [...] (Herzen, 1954­1965,vol3,p.47).

Herzen’s Westernism (Eurocentrism) is also evident in certaincondescendingexamplesabouttheOrientalsliketheonebelow,whenhecriticizes the intellectuallymyopic peoplewho only seewhat is undertheirnoseandcannotthinkfar:

[Such]personreadsabook,butunderstandsonlywhatisin his head [like] that Chinese emperor who, while learningmathematics from a [European]missionary, thankedhim aftereveryclassforremindinghimofforgottentruths(whichhecouldnothavenotknown,sincehewasparmétieranomniscientSonofHeaven).(Herzen1954­1965,vol.3,p.82)

Finally,thebeginningofthethirdofLettersontheStudyofNature(inwhichhedescribedthehistoricaloriginsofscience) leavesnodoubtaboutHerzen'sviewoftheintellectualdevelopmentoftheOrientalsfromtheearliestdays.

TheEasthadnoscience.Itlivedwithfantasiesandneverascendedtohaveclarityinitsthinking,muchlessdevelopeditinascientificway. It felt itselfasan immensity so infinite that self­determination was not possible. The East shines brightly,especially at a distance, but the human being drowns anddisappears in this brightness. Asia is a land of disharmony,contradictions.Itdoes notknowrestraintandrestraint(therightmeasure, without overestimation or underestimation) is themainconditionfordevelopment[...]TheOrientalhasnotbecomeawareofhisvalue;henceheisaslave,draggedontheground,oranabsolutedespot.His thinkingwaseither tooarrogantor toomodest:eitherheflewoutsidethelimitsofhimselfandofnature,or,renouncinghumandignity,decayed intoananimalstate.Therelation of the subject to the object is envisioned, but

109

indeterminate. The content of Eastern thought consists ofimages, allegories, representations of the most fastidiousrationalism (as with the Chinese) or in enormous poetry inwhich fantasyknowsno limits(aswiththeIndians).TheOrientnevermanaged to convey its thoughts in a trueway and failedbecause it never rationalized the content, but only dreamedimagesaboutit.Andaboutthenaturalsciences,noway!Itsviewofnature led[either]togrosspantheismor togreatmistrustofnature [...]The first step to free thoughtwas givenwhenmanplacedhimselfuponthenobleEuropeansoil,whenheleftAsia:inIonia,beginningofGreeceandendofAsia.(Herzen1954­1965,vol.3,p.142)

Herzen, Belinskii and otherWesternizers tended to reflect theEurocentric conception that scientific, technological and humanisticdevelopmentwasbasicallyaphenomenoncomingfromEuropeandthatAsiawasgenerallyalocusofbackwardnessand/orimmaturity.Herzen’sexileinWesternEurope Herzenendedhislonginternalexileoffiveyearsin1840andwasallowed to return toMoscow.Hewouldspend the1840s inRussia inastormyrelationshipwiththeauthorities.Exceptforanewshortperiodofone­yearinternalexileinNovgorodin1841­1842,hespentthedecadeathis home in Moscow, often going to St. Petersburg to participate indiscussionswith theBelinskiicircle. In1847,he traveled toEuropeandtherewitnessed the revolutionary year of 1848—whichwould effectchanges inhisworldviewculminating in thephilosophyof theso­called“Russiansocialism.”HeneverreturnedtoRussiaanddiedin1870,havingbeenoneofthemostinfluentialcriticsofRussianautocracy. Thefinancialsupportforhislongexileabroadwasthesubstantialinheritancehereceivedin1846uponthedeathofhisfather.In1847,hetraveledabroad.TheRussiangovernmentsenthimanordertoreturntothecountryandsawthisorderignored.In1849,theRussiangovernmenttried to seizeHerzen’s inheritancemoney. Itwasonlywith thehelpofinternational banker James Rothschild that Herzen succeeded intransferringtheremainingsumtoEurope,whichallowedhimtosustainthe intense career of writer and publisher he would later developoverseas by founding The Free Russian Press (Vol’naya RusskayaTipografiya), which would publish a series of political books and

110

periodicals.14Herzen (alongwithhis inseparable friendNikolaiOgarev)founded the famous Kolokol (“The Bell”), a fortnightly newspaperpublished from 1857 to 1865 in London and from 1865 to 1867 inGeneva.Bybeingpublished abroad,Kolokolwouldprove tobe the firstRussiannewspapertobecompletelyfreeoftsaristcensorship.Hiscopieswere smuggled to Russia, where they were read avidly by theintelligentsia and even in government circles. The newspapermade afiercecritiqueofRussianautocracy,but itencouraged theeffortsof thenew tsar, Alexander II, in his quest for the emancipation of the serfs.However, Herzen favored emancipation concomitantly with a radicalagrarianreformwithsocializingpolicies.Whenemancipationtookplacein 1861 without these ingredients, the kolokol criticized theseshortcomings and went on to defend the more radical plans of theRussian Populists,who in turnwere influenced byHerzen’s ideas. Theheyday of Herzen’s (and Kolokol’s) influence was precisely the pre­Emancipationperiod.Fromtheemancipationoftheserfsin1861onward—andespecially from the (unpopular)supportgivenbyHerzen to thePolishuprising (against theRussian rule) in1863 onward—Herzen’sinfluencedeclined,sincethesocialismpreachedbyhimcametobeseenas too moderate by the more radical new currents which were thenappearing in the country. At the end of his life, Herzen, while stilldefendingsocialismforRussia,warnedagainsttheviolencepreachedbythe new radical movements which, in turn, started to regard him asdémodé. The turningpoint inHerzen’s intellectual life thatmost interestsus in our context of the discussion of the European and/or AsianidentitiesofRussia is themoment immediately after the revolutions of1848, which he witnessed in loco in Western Europe. As a trueWesternizer,hehadarrived inEurope in January1847withhighhopesin relation to theprogressiveand revolutionary forcesof thecontinent.Buthehadseriousdisappointmentsinthisrespectthatwouldshapehisthinkinginotherdirections,morespecificallyinthedirectionofso­called“Russiansocialism,”asweshallseebelow. In1847came the first (perhapspredictable)disillusionment.Hewas displeased with the vulgarity and apparent superficiality of theEuropeanbourgeoisie.Inaseriesofessays,titledLettersfromFranceandItaly(writtenin1847­1852),andintheLettersfromtheMarignyAvenue(ofSeptember1847),hedescribedthedecadentscenarioheencounteredinParisandhisdisbelief thatsomethingpositivecouldcomeoutof the

14 In 1851, due to Herzen’s rebellious behavior and his refusal to return to the country as the government ordered, the Russian Senate decreed that he was “banned for life outside state borders.”

111

Europeanbourgeoisieat thatstage.(respectively,Herzen,1954­1965,v.5,pp.7­226andHerzen,1954­1965,v.5,pp.229­244)Forexample,thefollowingcomments:

Thebourgeoisiehasnogreatpastandnofuture.Itwasgood foraminuteasadenial,asa transition,asanopposition,while defending its rights. Its strength appeared in battle andvictory.Butitcouldnothandlethevictory:itwasnotbroughtupfor that. The nobility had its own social religion: you cannotreplacethedogmasofpatriotism,courage,tradition,sacredhonorby the rules of political economy. There is, indeed, a religionopposed to feudalism, but the bourgeoisie is trapped betweenthese two religions. Heir to a brilliant nobility and a rudecommoner, the bourgeois combines in himself the sharpestdisadvantages of both, losing their dignities. He is rich as anaristocrat,butheislikeamerchantshopkeeper.(Herzen,1954­1965,vol.5,p.34)

In the passage above, the “religion” that is alternative to the“religion”offeudalismissocialism.Fromtheprecedingpassage,itcanbeseenthatHerzenseesthebourgeoisieasprogressiveinthe periodofitsrise (“in battle and victory” over the feudal aristocracy).However, thebourgeoisie forgets its ally, the people, after this victory. That is whyHerzenseesno futureforthebourgeoisie.TakingthecaseofFrance,heexemplifiesinLettersfromtheMarignyAvenue:

The bourgeoisie threw itself headlong into economicissues; they tookall itsattention. Itsacrificedall its interests tothem. In this was a great ingratitude, for in all [the last]revolutions, thebeneficiaryofallmisfortunes inFrancewas itsmiddleclass.But,assoonasitwasraisedtothehighestlevelbythe revolution of 1830 and by the laws of September, [thebourgeoisie] forgot itspast, forgoteven thenationalhonoranditsrights(bywhich it foughtsomuchduring theRestoration). Irepeat that thebourgeoisiehasno future. Italready feels in itschestthebeginningofthedeadlydiseasethatwilleventuallyleadittothegrave.(Herzen,1954­1965,vol.5,pp.238­239)

Itisinterestingtonotethatinthesewritingsof1847,stillbeforetherevolutionaryeventsof the followingyear,HerzendemonstratednotonlyadefinitivedenialoftheEuropeanbourgeoisieasaprogressiveforceat that time, but also an incipient skepticism of the more radicalcommunists and socialists. For example, in Letters from the Marigny

112

Avenuehewrote:

Everyone is dissatisfied with the present situation inFrance. All except the financial bourgeoisie and themoneylenders[...]Thecauseofdissatisfactionisknownbymany.How to repair it, knows almost nobody; still less the existingsocialists and communists, defenders of a far­off ideal,which isbarelyglimpsedinthefuture.(Herzen,1954­1965,vol.5,p.234)

Butitiswiththeunfoldinganddefeatsofthe1848revolutionsinEuropethatHerzenwill fall intodeepskepticismaboutthepossibilitiesofamoreprogressiveandradicalevolution inWesternEurope.Hewillcome tobelieve that thevictoryof thebourgeoisieand the reaction inEuropecannotbeoverthrownbytheimpotentprogressive forcesoftheEuropean left, including socialists and communists. And it is from thisspirit of deep disbelief in Europe’s ability for self­improvement thatHerzen’snext intellectualcreationwillemerge: the ideaof the so­called“Russian socialism.” He will develop this idea in several essays (mostwrittenoriginally inFrench fortheEuropeanpublic),suchas:LaRussie(1849),DuDéveloppementdesIdéesRévolutionnairesenRussie(1850),LePeupleRusseet leSocialisme(1851),LaRussieet leVieuxMonde(1854).(respectively inHerzen,1954­1965, vol.6,pp.150­186,Herzen, 1954­1965,vol.7,pp.9­132,Herzen,1954­1965,vol.7,pp.271­306 ,Herzen,1954­1965,vol.12,pp.134­166). Thisconceptionof“Russiansocialism”wentthroughthefollowingreasoning. The defeat of the revolutions of 1848 in Western Europeconfirmed that the revolutionary possibilities of that region wereexhausted: ithadtoomuchballast from thepast,adevelopedbourgeoisworld that had too much to lose for it to engage in revolutionaryadventures.Hencethefierceresistanceoftheconservativeclasses.Russiawasa “newcountry” (likeAmerica),anunexplored landwithno ties tothepast,sinceitstsaristregimewasaheavyburdenthatmanywantedtogetridof,andthereforemorefertilegroundfornewexperiments.HerzenpointedtothecommunistpotentialoftheRussianruralcommune.Morethan90%oftheRussianpopulation(peasants)livedunderanegalitarianenvironmentofcommunitarianandcommunist ideologywithin themir.Thus, it would be easier for the Russian people to enter into arevolutionary process of a communist character. Let us see this inHerzen’sownwords.InLePeupleRusseetleSocialisme(1851),hewrote:

ItseemstomethatEurope,asitexists,hasreachedtheendofherhistoricalrole.Thisdecadencehasbeenrunningeverfaster since 1848 [...] It is certainly not the peoples whowill

113

perish,but theestates, theRoman,Christian, feudal institutions,the parliamentarism of compromises (monarchical orrepublican,itdoesn’tmatter)[...]TothisdaytheEuropeanworldhasonly gone through reforms: the foundationsof themodernstatehaveremained intact,maintaining thebaseand improvingthedetails. Itwas thuswithLuther’sReformationandwith the[French] Revolution of 1789. But itwill not be thuswith thesocial Revolution. [...] Socialism is the denial of all that thepolitical republichas retained from theold society.Socialism isthereligionofman,thereligionoftheearth,withoutasky:itissocietywithoutgovernment [...]The ideaof social revolution isEuropean.However, this does notmean that the peoplesmostcapableofrealizing itare thepeoplesof theWest[...]Europe istoorichtoriskeverythingoranything.Ithasmuchtoconserve,it is too civilized in itsupper regions (and less civilized in thelowerones)tolaunchheadlong intosuchacompleteRevolution.(Herzen,1954­1965,vol.12,pp.134­135)

AboutRussia,hesaysthefollowing(inthetextLaRussie,1849):

Thepositionof theRussians, fromthispointofview, isremarkable.WearemorallyfreerthantheEuropeans.Thisisnotsimplydue to the fact thatwehavegone throughmanyof thegreat trials that theWestwent through in itsdevelopment,butbecause we have nothing of the past that dominates us. Ourhistory is poor, and the first condition of our new life is torenounceitentirely.Wehavenothingleftbutthe nationallife,thenationalcharacter,thecrystallizationofthestate:everythingelseis formed by the elements of the future.Goethe’swords aboutAmericaapplywelltoRussia:“Yourinnerlivesarenotdisturbedbyuselessmemoriesandvainstrife.”(Herzen,1954­1965,vol.6,pp.150­151)

Thus,forHerzen,Russiahasnoballastfromthepasttoarrestheror, toparaphraseMarx,hasnothing to losebuther fetters.But it isnotjustthelackofballastfromthepastthatmakesRussiafertilegroundforthetruesocialistrevolution.Herzenpointsoutthatmorethan90%oftheRussian population (the peasantry) lives under the already largelycommunistregimeoftheruralcommune.Themirmaybethebasisofthefuture socialist/communist regime of the country. In the text LePeupleRusseet leSocialisme(infact,alettertotheFrenchhistorianJ.Michelet,1851)Herzenmakesthisclear.

114

TheRussianpeople livedonly thecommunal life.Theyunderstand their rights and duties only in relation to the ruralcommuneanditsmembers.Outsideofit,theyrecognizenodutiesand seeonly violence. [...]Among themselves, thepeasants arenot deceived. They show for each other an almost unlimitedconfidence. They do not know of written contracts orcommitments. [...] The small differences that arise are readilyresolved by the elders or the commune. Everyone submits totheirdecisions.Thesameoccurswithinthemobilecommunesoftheworkers’associations(theartel)[...]Thecommunesavedthecommon man from Mongol barbarism and civilizing tsarism,from landlords with European veneer and from German­typebureaucracy. The commune organism resisted bravely theintrusions of state power. Fortunately, it remained until thedevelopment of the idea of socialism in Europe [...The people]understoodthattheemancipationofthepeasantryisequivalenttotheemancipationoftheland.Andthattheemancipationoftheland, in turn,will inauguratea social revolutionand consecrateruralcommunism.[...]Andso,Monsieur,youcanappreciatehowfortunate it was for Russia that the rural commune was notdissolved, that individual property did not destroy communistproperty.HowfortunateitwastotheRussianpeoplethatitwasleft out of the European political movement that would havenecessarilyundermined thecommune. (Herzen1954­1965,vol.7,pp.286­291)

It is important to note that Herzen was not a working classsocialist.Hedidnotpreach that thepeasantsandworkers couldgoontheir own to carry out the socialist (or “communist,” inHerzen’s ownwords) revolution. Herzen argued that, without the progressive andrevolutionaryintelligentsia,aconsequentialsocialistrevolutionwouldnotmaterialize, for the workers and peasants still had, because of thecircumstances of class capitalist society, a low cultural level.And ahighculturallevelwasnecessaryfortherevolutionarymovementsothatitdidnot lead tomerepeasantrevolts thatultimatelydidnotbringprofoundchanges in the social regime. Continuing in Le Peuple Russe et leSocialisme,Herzenwrote:

After the muzhik [peasant] communism nothingcharacterizesmore Russia, nothing presagesmore her future,thanitsliterarymovement.AmongpeasantsandliteraturestandsthemonsterofofficialRussia,of“Russia­lie,”of“Russia­cholera”[...]Thepeasantrynevergetsdirtywithcontactwiththisworldof

115

official cynicism: it only bears it […] The camp that opposesofficialRussia is formed of a handful of unresignedmen,whoprotest,whofightit,whounmaskit,whoundermineit.Isolatedfighters, from time to time, find themselves drawn into thecasemates, tortured, deported to Siberia. But the posts do notremainvacantforalongtime.Newfighterscomeforward.Thisisour tradition. It is theproofofour comingof age.The terribleconsequencesofthehumanwordinRussianecessarilyincreaseitsstrength.Thevoiceofthefreemanisreceivedwithsympathyandveneration,fortorisebetweenuswemusthavesomethingtosay.[...]TheRussiannovelis,infact,apathologicalanatomy:itis the realization of the evil that afflicts us, a continuousaccusationofoneself [...]TheemancipatedRussian is themostindependentman inEurope.Whatcouldstophim? Is it respectfor his past? But does not the history of newRussia properlybeginwithanabsolutenegationofnationalityandtradition?[...]On the other hand, your past, Western people, serves asinstruction. That’s all. We do not consider ourselves only astestamentary executors of yourhistory. Yourdoubts,we acceptthem.Your faithdoesnot touchus.Youare tooreligious forus.Yourhatreds,wesharethem.Yourattachmenttotheheritageofyourancestors,wedonotunderstand.Wearetoooppressed,toounhappy,tobecontentwithhalffreedom.Youhavepropertiestoguard, scruples tokeep;wehaveneitherpropertynor scruples[...]Weareindependentbecausewehavenothing.(Herzen1954­1965,vol.7,p.294­299)

ItshouldnotbeinferredfromtheabovethatHerzendespisesthewholeEuropeanpast.Heknowsthatthemerelyagrariancommunismofthe Russian rural commune can be an elemental, brute, and evensuffocatingforce.Herzenalwaysdefendedtheprinciple ofpersonality,ofthe individual realizing himself freely. He knew that this principle ofindividuality came fromEurope. InRussia, thisprinciple ofpersonalityenteredbywayof theworkofPeter theGreat (here the “Westernizer”sideofHerzen isvisible).The true freedombroughtby the futuresocialrevolutionwill then unite the peasant communist principle of themirwith the principle of the free individual personality that is realized inRussia through the progressive and revolutionary intelligentsia. This ismadeclearinLaRussieetleVieuxMonde(1854):

To maintain the [rural] commune and make theindividualfree,extendtheself­governmentofthecommune[…]toallcitiesand thewholecountry,andmaintainnationalunity,

116

develop individual rights andmaintain the indivisibility of theland.ThisistherevolutionaryquestionforRussia,thesamegreatsocialautonomywhose incompletesolutionstirs theWestalike.TheStateandtheIndividual,AuthorityandLiberty,Communismand Egoism (in the broad sense of the word); these are theHerculeancolumnsof thegreatstruggle, thegreatrevolutionaryepic.Europeposes a truncated and abstract solution;Russia, atruncatedandsavagesolution.ThesynthesiswillbemadebytheRevolution. Social formulas never preside over theiraccomplishments,except in avery vagueway.TheAnglo­Saxonpeopleemancipatedtheindividualbydenyingthecommunity,byisolatingman. The Russian people preserve the community bydenying individuality,byabsorbingman.The ferment thatmustsetinmotionthemassoftheinertforcesdormantbycommunalpatriarchalism is theprincipleof individualism,of thepersonalwill.ThisleavenentersRussianlifebyaforeignwayandbecomesincarnate in a revolutionary tsar, who denies tradition andnationality[...](Herzen,1954­1965,vol.12,p.156)

Thus,Herzen considers thatRussia already contains in itself thetwo ingredients for thegreat liberatingsynthesisneeded. Inviewof therevolutionarystagnationinEurope,hegoeson,intheyearsafter1848,toput his hopes in Russia. “Russian socialism” can be the beacon toilluminatetheworld’srevolutionarypathsinthefuture.Thepost­1848andpre­Emancipationperiod Thisphaseof “Russian socialism” causedHerzen tobecome theforerunner and inspirer of future Russian narodnik movement. Thenarodniki (“populists”) also believed that the Russian rural communecouldserveasthebasisforfutureagrariansocialism,withouttheneedtogo throughcapitalism.HoweverHerzenendedupnotbeingable to takeadvantageofthe“laurels”ofhispioneeringwork,forinthe1860s,exactlythe decade inwhich populist ideologywas to form and consolidate inlargercircles,hewaseventuallyovertakenbyeventsandendedupbeingput aside by the revolutionary movement as too moderate. We havealreadyseenthattheabolitionofserfdomin1861wasatthesametimethe apex of Slavophiles and also the beginning of the decline of theirinfluence,asothernationalist currentswereappearing and respondingbetter to the challengesof thenew times. Something similarhappenedwith Herzen. In the 1950s, the “radical socialist” Herzen “tolled” —through his Bell [Kolokol] newspaper — the necessity of abolishing

117

serfdominRussia(totheextentthat,atthebeginningofthegovernmentof liberal Tsar Alexander II, he even wrote articles instigating thesovereign, inasomewhat friendlymanner,togo forwardwiththeplansfortheemancipationoftheserfs).OnceserfdomwasabolishedinRussia,butwithnoimmediateimprovementinthepeasants’livingconditionsorchanges in the structure of Russian society in general, more radicalelements (e.g., Chernyshevskii, Lavrov ant Tkachev) became influentialamongthepopulistsandrevolutionaries,leavingHerzenbehind.AnextrafactorthatcontributedtoHerzen’sdeclineinprestigeandinfluenceinthe1860swashissupportforthe1863PolishrebellionagainsttheRussiandomination. In the wave of nationalist fervor the event provoked inRussia, Herzen’s solitary posture was extremely unpopular andconsiderednon­patrioticbymany. Herzendiedin1870.Frombeingconsideredextremelyradicalinthe1850s, throughout the1860shewasovertakenby themoreradicalwingsofpopulism. InHerzen’s last years, thiswasamovement in twoopposingdirections.NotonlydidthemoreradicalgroupsmovedtotheleftinrelationtoHerzen’spositionbutalsoHerzenhimself,frightenedbytheemploymentofviolentmethodsofstruggle,begantoreconsidersomeof his positions, especially in relation to the bourgeoisie in his laterworks.Fromtheradicaldenialoftheprogressiveroleofthebourgeoisieinthepost­defeatoftherevolutionsof1848,heonceagainenvisagedthepossibility that fractions of the bourgeoisie could contribute to gradualreformswhich,evenwithoutreachingthenecessarydimensionfordeeprevolutionary social transformations, could prepare the ground for afuture humanist socialism. He also warned against the violent andirrationalcharacterof thestruggleproposedby somepopulist terroristgroups, arguing that this could lead not to a better society, but to thesubstitutionofone tyranny foranother.Thesepositionswouldbe fixedforposterityinaseriesoftextsentitledLetterstoanOldComrade(1869,allegedly addressed to his longtime friend, the anarchist Bakunin). Inthem, he says (as if hewere addressing Bakunin, although he did notnamehim):

Wedealwith thesameproblem[...]The finalresolutionisalso thesame forbothofus.Thedifferencesbetweenusarenotinrelationtotheoriesorprinciples,butinrelationtomethodsandpractices,and inrelation to theevaluationof forces,meansand rhythms [...]. The difficult trials of 1848 affected us. Youcontinuedmore as Iwas and I changed [...] But if I changed,remember, everything changed [too]. The socioeconomicquestionisnowdifferentfromwhatitwastwentyyearsago[...]Theslownessandconfusionof thehistoricalprocess infuriates

118

usandsuffocatesus. It is intolerable forus.Andmanyofus,bybetrayingourownreason,hastenandhastenothers.Isthisgoodor bad?That is thewhole point [...]We see clearly that thingscannotgoasbefore,thattheendoftheexclusivedominationofcapitaland theabsoluteright toproperty iscoming faster thanever [...]But thegeneralsettingof theproblemgivesusneitherthewaysnorthemeans[tosolveit].Byviolentmeansitwillnot[be solved]. If the bourgeois world explodes with gunpowder,when thesmokesettlesand theruinsarecleared,somekindofbourgeois world will begin again with modifications. This isbecauseitisnotfinishedinsideandbecausethenewworldtobebuilt,and theneworganization,are still insufficiently ready tohappen hegemonically. None of the foundations on which thepresent order is based is soweakened that itwould suffice toblow it up by force to exclude it from existence on earth [...]Throughviolenceandterror,onecanspreadreligionandpolitics,empiresandrepublic.Byviolenceonecanshakeaplace:nomore[...]The social revolution needsnothing butunderstanding andforces,knowledgeand means[...]Idonotfearthewordgradually.Gradualism, as continuity, is inherent in every process ofunderstanding [...] Between the final results and the presentsituation stand the practical solutions, the compromises, thediagonal paths, and so on. Understanding which one is moreconvenient and faster is a matter of practical tactics, ofrevolutionary strategy. Running forwardwithout looking back,onecanreachMoscowlikeNapoleondid:andthendieinretreat[...]TheInternationalWorkingmen’sAssociation,andallitsotherformsofassociation, itsorgansandrepresentatives,mustdoallefforts to achieve government non­intervention in work,propertymanagement, shouldbecome a freeparliamentof thefourth state and develop its internal organization, fabric of thefutureworld,without theodicy or cosmologies. The forms thatkeep people in semiforced and semivoluntary situations à lalonguedonotbringthedevelopmentofsocialunderstanding[...]Isthecivilizationbroughtbythewhiporthefreedombroughtbytheuseofguillotineindispensablepartsofeachstepforward?[..]YouandIhavenotchangedourconvictions,butwedifferinourstatementof the question.You continue tobreak throughwithpassion for destruction, which you take as creative passion,breaking down obstacles and respecting history only in thefuture. I donot believe in the revolutionary paths of yesterdayand I try tounderstand theprogress ofpeople in the past andpresentsoastoknowhowtowalkwiththem,notbeinglateor

119

going so far thatpeople cannot followme [...My radical criticssay:]“Thetimeofwordshaspassed.Nowisthetimeforaction.”As ifwordwerenotaction!As if the time forwordscouldpass!Our enemies have never separated word from action andpunishedthewordsometimesmoreseverelythanaction[...]Theseparationofwordfromactionandtheoppositionofonetotheother is below criticism andhas a sadmeaning as recognitionthateverything isclearandunderstood, that there isnothing todiscuss,butrathertoexecute[...]Ourstrengthliesintheforceoftruth,ofthought,oftheword[...]Forus,thereisonlyonepower:thepowerof reason andunderstanding [...]Reneging on them,we become renegades of science and civilization [...] Terror ispowerlesstodestroyprejudice[...]Youcannotfreepeopleintheirexternal lifemore than that they are free internally. (Herzen,1954­1965,vol.20,part2,p.575)

Herzen thus arrives at the end of his life, proposing a socialrevolution,buta revolution through reason,not throughviolence.Withthe radicalizationof thesituation inRussiahecomes tobeseenas toomoderateby the revolutionariesof the various strains that croppedupfromthe1870sonward.Moderateornot,Herzen’snamewouldbecomeengravedamongRussianprogressivecirclesinthefuture. Finally,intermsofourmainobjectofstudy,itisworthnotingthatHerzen,despite being a “Westernizer” (although somewhatunorthodoxbecauseofhisinitialpoliticalradicalism)sharedoneofthemostcommonfeaturesofRussianWesternismatthetime.TheviewofAsiaasalocusofbackwardness, especially if compared with Western Europe. Somepassages inhis textsmake this type ofposition clear. For example, thecomparative comments he made when discussing the Russian ruralcommuneinLaRussieetleVieuxMonde:

[...]anewsocialorganization thatdoesnotexist inthepeoplesofEurope.[...]ItisinsomepeoplesofAsia.Anditshows[,forexample,]thattheruralcommuneamongtheHindusisverymuch likeourown[...]WhatholdsthepeoplesofAsiaisnotthecommune, but their immobility, their exclusiveness, theimpotencetoshakeoffpatriarchalism,theexistenceoftherace.This[feature]isnotstrongamongus.Slavicpeoples,bycontrast,havegreatflexibility.Theireasinessinappropriatingeverything,languages, customs, arts and mechanical procedures, isremarkable.They acclimatewellboth in the glacial sea andontheshoresoftheBlackSea.(Herzen,1954­1965,vol.12,p.154)

120

Or,aboutthesametheme,inLaRussieetL'Europe::

[Beforethefourteenthcentury,the]RussianpeoplewerefreerthanthepeoplesofthefeudalWest.Ontheotherhand,theSlavstatealsodidnot look like theAsianstates, itsneighbors. Ifthere were some Eastern elements, the European characterprevailed. The Slavic language undoubtedly belongs to Indo­European languagesandnot to Indo­Asian languages.Moreover,the Slavs have neither such sudden flashes that arouse thefanaticismofentirepopulationsnorthatapathywhichprolongsthe same social existence from generation to generationthroughout the centuries. If individual independence is asundevelopedamong theSlavicpeoplesasamong thepeoplesoftheEast,thereis,however,adifferencetobeestablished:thattheSlav individualwas absorbedby the commune,wherehe is anactivemember,whereastheindividualoftheEastwasabsorbedbyraceorbythestate,whereheonlyhasapassiveparticipation.Russia looks Asian viewed from Europe and European viewedfromAsia.(Herzen1954­1965,vol.7,p.27)

In these and other passages Herzen shares the convictionprevalent innineteenth­centuryEurope thatAsia, fromancient times, ischaracterizedbyimmobilityandbackwardness.Thisisabeliefsharedbymany others of the RussianWesternizers, some ofwhomwewill seenext.TheliberalandmoderatewingsoftheRussianWesternizers The famous RussianWesternizers Belinskii and Herzen (alongwith his longtime intellectual partner in Russia and in exile, NikolaiOgarev)representedthemostradicalwingofthemovement.Mostoftheother renowned Westernizers tended to have a view that could beclassified as moderate liberalism. Among them we can highlight thefiguresofTimofeiGranovskii,PavelAnnenkov,VasiliiBotkin,KonstantinKavelin and Boris Chicherin. Politically they sought reforms in Russiathat could take the countryoutof itsunlimitedabsolutismandmove ittoward a more modern Western­style regime, with the Englishconstitutionalmonarchyoftencitedasthemodeltobefollowed.Theydidnot form a completely homogeneous group differing sometimes in theviewofwhatRussia in thepastandpresent represented in relation totheir European “ideal type.” Moreover, what we are calling here“liberalism”isrelativetothedominantpoliticalideologyadvocatedbythe

121

Russianstate. Inpractice, the thinkingofsomeof itsmembersdeviatedfrom the classicalmodelofEuropean liberalism.Oneof thesepointsofdifferencewastheroleofthestate.Perhapsinfluencedbythefactthatthemodernizing and Westernizing reforms that they considered vital toRussiawereinitiallybroughtbyarepresentativeofthestatepower(PetertheGreat),someofitsmembers(especiallytheyoungeronessuchastheprofessorsoftheUniversityofMoscowKavelin,Chicherin,andSolov’ev)deposited theirhopes for improvements in statepower (againstwhichWestern classical liberals usually point their guns). The two mainrepresentatives of this “statist” currentwere Sergey Solov’ev andBorisChicherin. Solov’ev analyzed the whole of Russian history as a battlebetweenthepro­stateandanti­stateforcesandsawinapositivewaythetendencytowardthevictoryofthestate,theforcecapableofmovingthecountry forward. Similarly, Boris Chicherin said that because of theconditionsofbackwardnessand theneed fordefenseandunificationofthe country in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the statewasforced to “enslave”Russianestateswithautocracyby imposing itselfonthe aristocracy and withdrawing its rights. After the tasks of politicalconsolidationwere fulfilled, the statebegan to “emancipate” the estatesagain.Thefirstmajorstepwasthe1762ManifestoontheFreedomoftheNobility,signedbyPeterIII,whichinitiatedthisprocessinrelationtothenobility.Accordingtothislogicofthe“emancipationofestates”phase,thenextgreatstepwouldbetheemancipationoftheserfs.Thus,justasPetertheGreat introducedmodernization inRussia,Chicherinhoped that theRussian state would be the force to lead the emancipation of theremaining“enslaved”estate(thepeasantry)inadditiontocontinuinglateronthepathofgrantinggreatercivilliberties.SomuchsothatatthetimeofthegreatliberalizingreformsofTsarAlexanderII(whichwouldleadtotheabolitionofserfdom in1861),Chicherinbelieved thatastrongstatewould be needed to overcome the resistance and bring these liberalreforms forward. Inotherwords, thestatecouldbe thedriving force inamplifyingindividualrights.ThisisveryclearinKavelin’swork.HisessayAViewofJuridicalRelationsinAncientRussia(publishedinthefirstissueof thenewversionofSovremennik in January1847)becameknownasthemain “manifesto” of the “Western party” in their disputewith theSlavophiles. In it, Kavelin launched the idea that progress in Russiaconsisted in thegradualreplacementof traditionalismbasedoncustomandkinshiporclanrelationsbyasystembasedonrationallegislation.Inthis process, the individual would be liberated from the shackles oftraditional patriarchal society. This process of “death of clan life” andemergenceoftheindividualinhistorywouldreachitsturningpointwithPetertheGreat.AccordingtoKavelin,“inthepersonofPetertheGreat,individualityhasenteredRussiainitsownright,destroyingthefettersof

122

natural and exclusively national immediate determinations [... Peter]representsthefirst phaseintherealizationoftheprincipleofpersonalityinthehistoryofRussia.”(Kavelin,1897­1900,v.1,p.58)Inthiscurrentof Russian liberalWesternizers, as withWestern liberals, there is anemphasis on the personality principle, that is, the flowering of theindividualas theultimategoal.But this floweringpassesnot throughaminimizationorobliterationofthestate,butbyitsuseandmediationintheprocess.15 ItisalsointerestingtonotetheroleoftheUniversityofMoscowasanarenaforacademicWesternizers.Aswehaveseen,atthebeginningofthedebatesbetweenWesternizersandSlavophiles,the formertended tocomefromthe“Westernized”capitalofSt.Petersburgandthelatterfromthe(more traditionaland typicallyRussian) cityofMoscow.Somuchsothat initially thesedebateswereknownas thediscussionsbetween the“St.Petersburgparty”andthe“Moscowparty”(onlylaterwouldtheterms“Westernizers”and“Slavophiles”becomehegemonic).Inacademicterms,thegreatwedgeinthisprocesscameaboutwhenTimofeiGranovskiiwasprofessor ofUniversalHistory at theUniversity ofMoscow from1839untilhisdeathat theageofonly42 in1855.Granovskiiwasoneof theuniversity’smostpopularprofessors:aside fromhisregular lectures,thepublic lectures he gave on themedieval period in Europe and Russiaattractedawiderangeofaudiences,both fromwithinandfromwithoutthe university. Granovskii, influenced by Hegel, Ranke, and Savigny—whom he had studied in loco in the two years that he had spent inGermany—propagatedtheideathatthedissolutionofbondageintofreelabor and the transition from feudalism to capitalismwas a dialecticalprocess of universal historywhich took place inWestern Europe and,sooner or later, would also take place in Russia. This was a veritable“Westernizerwedge”at theUniversityofMoscow,whichuntil thenwas

15 This Westernizer “manifesto” by Kavelin was answered by Yurii Samarin (1877) with his article On the Literary and Historical Opinions of the Sovremennik (published in the Slavophile periodical The Muscovite, also in 1847). Among other objections, Samarin accused Kavelin of having failed to distinguish between the Russian rural commune and the kinship or clan group. The Russian rural commune would not be synonymous with backwardness but rather with freedom: in it, the peasant was free and equal to all other members. It is interesting to note the similarity of this Slavophile argument with the words by Herzen in his later phase of “Russian socialism.” In the section on Herzen we even quoted verbatim the passage in which he established the difference between the Russian rural commune (which had great flexibility, dynamism and openness for just social progress along with a high degree of internal freedom and isonomy for its members) and, for example, the situation of individuals in Asia, where relations of race, kinship and clan drowned Asians in great immobilism. (Herzen, 1954-1965, vol. 12, p.154).

123

dominated by historians Mikhail Pogodin and Stepan Shevyrev,representatives of the doctrine of “Official Nationality”who edited themonthly journal Moskvityanin, which published articles not only ofrepresentativesofOfficialNationalitybutofSlavophilesaswell.AftertheentranceofGranovskii,agroupofWesternizersgraduallyemergedfromthe University ofMoscow, among them historians Konstantin Kavelin,Boris Chicherin and Sergei Solov’ev. Timofei Granovskii was the“godfather”whoformedthisnewgeneration.The finalanticlimaxof theclashbetweenWesternizersandSlavophiles inthenineteenthcentury Aswesawearlier,WesternizersandSlavophileshadverydifferentviewsonRussia’sidentityintheworld,especiallyasitrelatestotheWest.ButbothcurrentspreachedtheabolitionofserfdominRussia.Ironically,itwaspreciselyatthetimeoftheemancipationoftheserfsin1861thattheoriginalWesternizersandSlavophilesbegantoleavethesceneandbereplacedbynewgroups,withvisionsthatpointedinnewdirections. The abolition of serfdom in 1861, by itself, did not solve thefundamentalproblemsraisedbythetwocamps.OntheSlavophileside,theabolitionof serfdomdidnot lead toagreater stateapproximationwiththeRussianpeasantryandtothereturnofpre­Petrinefreedoms.OntheWesternizerside,after theemancipationsof theserfs, thestatedidnotbecomemoremodern and liberal (as in England, for example). On thecontrary,absolutemonarchylingeredon. Theabsenceofthesedeepertransformations ledtheyouthofthetime to seekmore radical answers. Deepening (and overcoming) theWesternizer reformist intentions (even of the Belinskii/Herzen radicaltype),thepopulistgenerationofthe1860sonwardwouldevenproposeterrorismandothermethodsofrevolutionarystruggle tooverthrowtheregime.HerzenwasbeingovertakenbythemoreradicalChernyshevskiias the intellectual iconof theyoungergenerations in this spectrum.Ontheanti­Westernside,themoderateSlavophileswerebeingreplacedbyanew generation to the right which tended to emphasize strongnationalism centered on the figure of the Great Russians and theirOrthodoxculture.Some formsofPan­Slavismand thepochivennichestvo[“return to the soil”) movement by the Dostoevskii brothers, NikolaiDanilevskii and Konstantin Leont’ev overtook the mild nationalismcontainedinSlavophilism. Thesenew,more radicalcurrents tended to regardWesternizersand Slavophiles aspioneersoutof time.However, theWesternizer andSlavophile positions regarding Russia’s degree of “Westernism” would

124

remainas“idealtypes’thatwouldpermeatesocialdebatesinthefuture. However, before looking at how this took place later (andespecially inpresent­dayRussianFederation),weneed to lookatathirdtransversalcurrentonthisdebatethatemergedinthefirstdecadesofthe20thcentury:Eurasianism.

125

3.THEEURASIANISTS Atthebeginningofthetwentiethcentury,anewideologicaltrendemergedparalleltothedebatebetweenthetwomaincurrentspreviouslymentioned: Eurasianism. Born into the Russian émigré communityabroad in the 1920s, Eurasianists opposedWesternizers, emphasizingRussia’sAsianheritagebyproposingthatthecountryrepresentedastateof equidistant balance between Europe and Asia, with uniquecharacteristics.Criticizingunilateralandunilinearconceptionsoftheideaofprogressandof theEuropean standardasamodel tobeadoptedbyothercivilizations, theyargued thatRussiansshouldnotbeashamedoftheAsianportionof theirpersonality,butuse it fully for theirultimategoals.Amongthemainauthorsofthiscurrentinthe1920swereNikolaiSergeevich Trubetskoi, Peter Nikolaevich Savitskii, Peter PetrovichSuvchinskii and Dmitrii Petrovich Svyatopolk­Mirskii. The first threeparticipated in the collection Exodus to the East, published in Sofia in1921, which can be considered the launching of this philosophicalmovement.Themovementpracticallydiedinthelate1930s,butithadarenaissance in the final part of perestroika through neo­Eurasianism,whichstartedfromtheideasoftheSovietethnologistLevGumilev(sonofthe famous poets Anna Akhmatova andNikolai Gumilev) and acquiredfeaturesofpoliticalmovement in the1990s through thewritingsof thecontroversialAleksandrDugin. TheideasoftheprinceandinternationallyfamousRussianémigréphilologistNikolaiSergeevichTrubetskoi(1890­1938),formedoneofthemost important platforms of Eurasianism of the 1920s. Despite beingagainstcommunism,he thought that theBolshevikRevolutionhad, inaway,made clear the true character of Russian civilization. Ending thesupremacy of Russian tsarism over the rest of the empire, creating aUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsequalpoliticallywithoneother,ithadputanendtoanyaprioriimperialpretensionoftheethnicRussiansovertheothernationalitiesoftheUSSR:“Fromnowon,theRussianpeopleareand will be only one among several peoples with equal rights.”(Trubetskoi,1927,p.92)Butthisshouldnotfrightenthosewhoworriedaboutthecountry’sterritorialintegritydue toseparatism,foranewkindofnationalismwouldarise.

Thus,thenationalsubstratumofthestateformerlycalledtheRussianempire,andnowcalled theUSSR,canonlybe thesetofpeopleswhopopulate thatstate,seenasaspecial multinational nation [...] We call this nationEurasian. Its territory is Eurasia and its nationalism is

126

Eurasian.(Trubetskoi,[1927]2009,p.99) Peter Nikolaevich Savitskii (1895­1968) made the geopoliticaldistinctionbetweenwhathecallsthemaritimesentimentofEuropeandthecontinentalsentimentof“Mongolian”Eurasia.

ThesituationofRussiain theworldcanbeanalyzedinanumberofways[...]Throughoutworldhistory,WesternEuropean maritime sentiment is opposed […] to themongolian continental feeling [...] In the Russianexplorers, in their conquests and explorations, there isthesamespirit, thesamecontinental feeling[...]Russiais part of [a special world…], with deep culturaltraditions. In it, the historical elements of the “steppeworld” and the “sedentary world” are combined [...]Having lived in past centuries the development of theinfluenceofthesteppepeoplesasanexternalinfluence,the present Russian people themselves dominate thesteppe. The steppe principle, grafted into the Russianelementasoneofitscomponentsfromoutside,reinforcesand deepens its meaning, becomes a permanentbelonging. Together with the “farming people” and the“industrial people,” the “horse­riding wanderers” aremaintainedor created,within the limitsof theRussiannational universe, even though practicing the[agricultural] system of three fields. In economiccategories, the image of Russia as an Old Worldterritorial “center,” as an economic combination ofEurope and Asia, as “Eurasia” is shown in economiccategoriesnotonlyinthegeneralhistoricalandculturalsense but also in the economic­geographical sense.(Savitskii,[1922]2012)

P.N.Savitskii(aswellasotherEurasianists)thoughtthetraditionaldescriptionoftheso­calledTatar­MongolyokeoverRussiainthe13thto15th centuries as a sort of “Dark Age” was wrong: it had positiveconsequencesforthefuturedevelopmentofthecountryandhelpedshapeandgivestabilitytothedefinitiveRussianidentity.DevelopmentsintheEurasianistmovementofthe1920s

127

One can say that the origins of Eurasianism go back to thepublishingofthebookEuropeandHumanity inSofia,Bulgaria, in1920.The critique of Eurocentrism contained in thiswork initiated a chainreaction of discussions among Russian émigré intellectuals in Europe.PeterSavitskiiwroteareviewofthebook,entitledEuropeandEurasia,inthe journal RusskayaMysl’ [“Russian Thought”]. This review launchedsomeseminalEurasianistideas.Aroundthe debateonTrubetskoi’sbook,adiscussiongroup composedofSavitskii,GeorgiiVasil’evichFlorovskii,Peter Suvchinskii, andTrubetskoihimselfwas formed.This group thenlaunchedinSofia in1921aworkinwhichtheycollectivelypresentedtotheworld the fundamental principles of Eurasianism: the collection ofarticles called Izkhod k Vostoku (“Exodus to the East”). Itwould be thebeginning of a feverish editorial activity to spread the principles ofEurasianism.On theonehand, theywouldpublish yearlyorbiannuallycollections or programmatic almanacs on Eurasianism.16 From 1923onward, the Eurasianists began to publish their own journal calledEurasian Chronicles and from 1928 onward, the newspaper Eurasia.Besides those, therewere thedifferentbookswritten by the individualauthors. In 1926 and 1927, the Eurasianists published two collectivemanifestoes, respectivelyentitledEurasianism:AnAttemptofSystematicPresentation and Eurasianism: Formulation of 1927. By that time,EurasianismhadalreadyspreadtoseveralEuropeancenterswheretherewereRussianémigrés:Paris,PragueandBerlinformedthemainaxis.In1926theCouncilofEurasianismwascreated,withTrubetskoi,Savitskii,Suvchinskiiandothers. The Eurasianmovement underwent a few splits. First of all, asearly as 1923 Georgii Vasil’evich Florovskii broke with it. In 1928,Florovskii published the anti­Eurasianist text entitled EurasianTemptation.In1928­1929,theEurasianistmovementsplitintoitsleftandright wings. The left wing (e.g., Dmitrii Svyatopolk­Mirskii, SergeiYakovlevichEffron),gatheredaroundthenewspaperEurasia,andbeganto take increasingly pro or sympathetic positions toward the SovietUnion.Trubetskoi,Savitskiiandothersdenouncedthesepositionsoftheleftists and of the newspaper Eurasia as not representative of themovement.

16 These collections and later programmatic almanacs were as follows: Na Putyakh [“At a Crossroads”], published in Berlin in 1922, Rossiya i Latinstvo [“Russia and Latin Catholicism”] (Berlin, 1923), Evraziiskii Vremennik - Kniga 1 [“Annals of Eurasianism - Book 1”] (Berlin, 1923), Evraziiskii Vremennik - Kniga 2 [“Annals of Eurasianism – Book 2”] (Paris, 1925), Evraziiskii Vremennik - kniga 3 [“Annals of Eurasianism - Book 3”] (Paris, 1927), Evraziiskii Sbornik [“Eurasian Collection”] (Prague, 1929), Tridtsatye Gody [“The Thirties”] (Paris, 1931).

128

TheveryrelationshipoftheEurasianistsingeneralwiththeSovietUnionwasdubiousandgaverisetoseveralinternalproblems.Aswesawearlier,theEurasianistswereémigrés,andthereforeofanoriginallyanti­Bolshevik milieu. However, due to their theoretical position (that theUSSR, in spite of her serious politicalmistakes, in a certain way waspositivelyconsolidatingasasinglepan­Eurasianunit),unlikedisgruntledRussian monarchists, Eurasianists did not simply want to nullify theSovietUnion (or turnhistoryback),but to takeadvantageofheras theinitial platform for a transformation toward a countrywith an entirelyEurasianist political regime. This was the case even of of right­wingEurasianists. In the case of left Eurasianists, the relationshipwith theSovietUnionwas evenmore confused. Some of them evolved into thebelief that itmight be possible to shift the USSR from within in thedirectionofaEurasianproject.Inthelate1920sandearly1930s,someoftheseleftistEurasianistsevenreturnedtotheUSSR.Thiswasthecase,forexample,ofDmitriMirskiiandSergeyEffron.Around1928­1929,MirskiimovedintoMarxistpositions.AnémigrélivinginLondonasaprofessorofRussian literature, in 1931 he joined the Communist Party ofGreatBritain. In1932,atMaksimGorkii’s invitation,he returned to theUSSRwhere throughout the decade he worked with English and Russianliterature. In1937,suspectedofespionage,hewasarrested:hedied inprison in 1939. Sergey Effron represented an evenmore complicatedcase.Inthe1930s,heopenlyparticipatedintheLeagueforReturntotheHomeland, a Soviet organization that encouraged the return of theémigrés to theUSSR,while clandestinely collaboratingwith theRussiansecretservices inmonitoring theémigrécircles inEurope.His fatewasalso tragic. In1937hehimselfreturned to theSovietUnion. In1939hewas arrested and, in 1941, executed. These scandals tarnished thereputationoftheEurasianistsingeneralvis­à­visotherémigrés,foritwasclear that themovementhadbeen infiltrated,especially through theso­calledTrestoperationelaboratedbyRussiancounterintelligenceservicesin 1921­1925 and which had created fake migrant organizations toinfiltratecounterrevolutionarygroupsabroad. Because of these and other difficulties, Eurasianism, as anorganizedmovement, lost force and practically disappeared in the late1930sandearly1940s.DeclineandrevivalofEurasianism

ThemovementofémigréEurasianistspracticallydiedinthelate1930s,but ithad a resurgence in the finalphaseofperestroika in theform of the neo­Eurasianism of Lev Gumilev. This somewhat dissident

129

Sovietethnologistconsidered that,with theso­calledTatar­Mongolyokeon the Russians followed by the advance of the tsarist empire on theAsiansteppes, theEasternSlavs (Russians,UkrainiansandBelarusians)mergedwiththeMongolianandTurkicpeoplesofCentralAsia,forminga“superethnos” (just as previously a German­Latin superethnos hadformedinWesternEurope).ForGumilev,theinfluenceofWesternEuropeposedarisktothemaintenanceoftheintegrityofthebiosphereofthisEurasian superethnos. (Gumilev, 2010 [1979] 2008 [1992] and 2011[1981])

With the political opening of perestroika, Gumilev’s ideasresonatedwithRussiansandotherCentralAsianpeoples—Kazakhstan’sPresidentNursultanNazarbaevorderedthecreationoftheL.N.GumilyovEurasian National University in front of the presidential palace in theKazakhcapital. In the 1990s and 2000s, Aleksandr Dugin pushed forward theneo­Eurasianistideaswithamoreradicallyanti­Westernandanti­liberalbias, introducing them formallyand institutionally intopoliticswith thefounding of the Eurasia Party in Russia in 2002 and of the EurasianInternationalMovementinseveralcountriesin2003.SomefundamentaldifferencesbetweenEurasianistsandSlavophiles First of all, the two groups differ on the fundamental Russianidentity intheworld.SlavophilesconsiderthatRussiaisneitherEuropeannor Asian, but a unique civilization. The Eurasianists, on the contrary,consider thatRussia is European andAsian at the same time and herstrengthconsistspreciselyinthissynthesisbetweentheEuropeanSlavicprincipleandtheTurco­MongolAsianprinciple.Moreover,thoughunitedbytheiranti­Westernismandanti­liberalism,EurasianistsandSlavophilesoftenclashinissuesofRussiannationalism.Thenationalismproposedbythe Eurasianists (which, inmany authors, is reflected in the idea of aEurasiansupranationalidentityorevenaEurasiansuperethnos)clashedwiththemoreorthodox,morepurelySlavicconceptionofnationalismofthe Slavophiles. Aleksandr Dugin is emblematic. Although he considershimselfanationalist(“thenationiseverything,theindividualisnothing”and even “the Russian people must be the unifying driving force ofEurasia,”hewroteinhisbookFoundationsofGeopolitics),heisseenasadisguised internationalistbymanynationalistsbecauseofhisemphasison theEurasianandcontinentalbloc inwhichRussiamustbe inserted.Similarly,DuginrejectsSlavophileprojectsbydescribingwhy itwouldbefutiletoattempttoreconstitutethetsaristempireinthepresentage:

130

The return to a tsarist (and consequently “Slavophile”)geopolitics, carries in itself a terrible threat. In the lastfive decades of Romanov emperors, foreign policywasdeterminednotbytheEurasiantraditionsofAlexanderIandbytheprospectsofa HolycontinentalAlliance(withthe powers of Central Europe), but by Anglophile andFrancophileprojectsbywhichRussiaentangledherselfinsuicidal conflicts on the side of her natural opponentsandagainsthernaturalgeopoliticalallies[...]TryingonaSlavophile basis to assert itself in Eastern Europe andgradually come into conflictwith theCentralEuropeanpowers (Russia’s natural allies), the tsarist regimeweakened the foundationsof theRussianstate,and ledRussia toageopoliticalsuicide [inWorldWar I ...]Thistype of vision applies also to thewars against TurkeyandJapan[...]SlavophileutopiacostRussiahertsar,herchurchandherempire.OnlythecomingoftheEurasian­oriented Bolsheviks saved the country and the peoplefrom total degradation, from transformation into a“regionalpower.”(Dugin,2009,partIV,chapter3.5)

Eurasianism today: detailed view of some of the most influential neo­Eurasianists For amore detailed analysis of the ideas of some of themostinfluentialEurasianiststoday,wewilllookatthecasesoftheEurasianistsTrubetskoiandSavitskiiandtheneo­EurasianistsGumilevandDugin.NikolaiSergeevichTrubetskoi Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi came from an important aristocraticfamily.Hewouldbecomeoneofthemostfamouslinguistsoftheso­calledPragueSchoolalongwithRomanJakobson.Amongseveralofhisseminalcontributions to linguistics, Grundzüge der Phonologie (“Principles ofPhonology”) established the famous definition of the phoneme as thesmallestdistinctiveunitinthestructureofalanguage,whichwouldallowthecreationofphonologyasanautonomousfieldwithinphonetics.Inhisworks,Trubetskoirescuedtheimportanceofspeech,rememberingthatitprecedeswrittenlanguageandthereforehasaparamountimportanceinthedevelopmentofculture.

131

TrubetskoigraduatedfromtheUniversityofMoscowin1913andtaughttherein1915­1916.WiththeRevolutionof1917,hewenttoworkat theUniversityofRostov­na­Donu. In1920,heemigrated toBulgaria,whereheworked at theUniversity of Sofia in1920­1922. In1922,heassumed thechairofSlavicPhilologyat theUniversityofVienna,wherehewouldworkuntil1938,whenhediedofaheartattackduringtheNazioccupationofAustria. In emigration, Trubetskoi can be considered the initiator ofEurasianism in the sense that it was the discussion around his bookEurope andHumanity (1920) that generated the formation of the firstgroupofEurasianists.EuropeandHumanity formulatedabroadcritiqueofEurocentrism.Aseminar,composedofotherRussianémigrés,suchasPeter Savitskii,Georgii Florovskii andPeter Suvchinskii,was formed todiscuss the ideas in his book. Of particular importance for theconsolidation ofTrubetskoi’s criticism of Eurocentrism in a specificallyEurasian directionwas the review Europe and Eurasia,which Savitskiiwrote about Europe and Humanity, published in the journal RusskayaMysl’.FromtheseminarinSofia,theoriginalgroupoftheseEurasianistswould expand and multiply forming different Eurasianist nuclei inEurope, especially in Berlin, Prague and Paris. Trubetskoi wouldparticipate in all the collective works of the Eurasianists — At theCrossroads (1922), Russia and Catholicism (1923), the Annals ofEurasianismof1923,1925and1927,EurasianCollection(1929)andTheThirties(1931)—besideswritinghisownindividualworks. FortheexpositionofTrubetskoi’smainideasonEurasianism,wewillpresentexcerptsfromfiveofhismostrepresentativeessays:EuropeandHumanity;AbouttheTuranianElementinRussianCulture;AboutTrueand False Nationalism; We and the Others; Pan­Eurasian Nationalism.(respectively,Trubetskoi,[1920]2012;idem,[1925]2012b;idem,[1921]2012a;idem,[1925a]2012c;idem,[1927]2009).EuropeandHumanity There is no better text with which to begin the analysis ofTrubetskoi’swork thanEuropeandHumanity, for itwas thediscussioncausedbythisbookthatinitiatedtheEurasianistmovement.(Trubetskoi,[1920]2012)In it,TrubetskoimakesacausticcritiqueofEurocentrism.HebeginsbystatingthatEurocentrismendsupbeingaformofEuropean“cosmopolitanchauvinism.”

The positions that each European can assume inrelationtothenationalquestionaremultiple,butallare

132

locatedbetweentwopoles:chauvinismontheonehandandcosmopolitanismontheother.Eachnationalismisasynthesis of elements of chauvinism andcosmopolitanism, an attempt to reconcile these twoopposites[...]Whenonelookscloselyatchauvinismandcosmopolitanism, one notes that there is no essentialdifference between them: they are two degrees, twodifferentiated aspects of the same phenomenon. Thechauviniststartsfromtheaprioripointofviewthatthebestpeopleintheworldarehis.Theculturefoundedbyhispeople isbetter,moreperfect than theothers.Onlyhispeoplehavetheright todominateothers,whomustsubmit to them, accepting their faith, language andculture,mergewith them.Everything thatstands in theway of the final glory of this peoplemust be forciblyremoved. So thinks and acts the chauvinist. Thecosmopolitan denies the difference betweennationalities.Iftherearesuchdifferences,theyshouldbeeliminated.Civilizedhumanitymustbeunitedandhavea single culture. Uncivilized peoples must adopt thisculture, adapt to it and join the family of civilizedpeoples, go with them on the path of a single worldprogress.Civilizationisthegreatergood,inthenameofwhichnationalspecificitiesmustbesacrificed[...].WhatcontentdotheEuropeancosmopolitesplaceintheterms“civilization” and “civilized humanity”?By “civilization”theymean the culture thatwas jointly created by theGermanandLatinpeoplesofEurope.Bycivilizedpeoplethey first understand the Germanic and Latin peoples,and then the peoples who have adopted Europeanculture.Inthiswayweseethattheculturewhich,intheopinionoftheEuropeancosmopolite,mustreign intheworld, dispensing all others, is the culture of the sameethnographic­anthropological unit […] of which thechauvinistdreams.There isno essential difference [...]The only difference is that the chauvinist represents anarrowerethnicgroupthanthe[European]cosmopolite[...] The difference is of degree, not of principle [...] Injudging European cosmopolitanism, wemust note theimprecision of expressions such as “humanity” and“human civilization” and that they hide well­definedethnographic conceptions. European culture is not thecultureofhumanity.(Trubetskoi,[1920]2012,p.2)

133

Trubetskoiwill then assert that Eurocentrism is a form of self­centeredness. But one wonders what caused the “popularity” of thisegocentrism amongotherpeoples.What, for example, ledRussians andotherpeoplestoadoptaformofRomano­Germanicegocentrism?

The psychological basis of cosmopolitanism is thesame as that of chauvinism. It is a variation of theunconscious bias of that particular psychological formwhich is more aptly termed egocentrism. The personwith strongly self­centeredpsychology isunconsciouslyconsidered the center of theuniverse, the basis of thecreation of the best and most perfect things [...]Therefore,anynaturalgrouptowhichhebelongsseemstohim themostperfect.His family,his socialclass,hispeople,histribe,hisrace:theyarebetterthantheothers[...] Egocentrism deserves condemnation not only fromthepointofviewofRomano­Germanicculturebutfromthe point of view of any culture, because it is anantisocial principle that undermines relations betweenpeople[...]Europeancosmopolitanism,whichaswesawabove is nothing more than Romano­Germanicchauvinism, spreads among non­Romano­Germanicpeoples[...]Howisthiscontradiction explained?[...]Thesecret is the hypnosis of words. As stated above, theRomano­Germanic have always been so naivelyconvinced thatonly theyarecompletepeople that theycalled themselves “humanity” and called their culture“human civilization.” With this terminology theymanaged tomask theactualethnographic content thatlay behind these concepts. In this way these conceptsbecame acceptable to representatives of other ethnicgroups [...] Consequently, the dissemination of the so­called European cosmopolitanism among non­Romano­Germanicpeopleswas apuremisunderstanding.Thosewho fell into thepropaganda of theRomano­Germanicchauvinists were deceived by the words “humanity,”“human,”“civilization,”“worldprogress,”etc.(Trubetskoi,[1920]2012,pp.3­4)

Trubetskoi will then proceed to critique concepts such as“universalvalues,”“evolution,”“progress”and“stagesofprogress.”

134

Thefactisthattherepresentationofevolutionasitexists inEuropean ethnology, anthropology andhistoryof culture is itself pervaded by egocentrism.“Evolutionary ladder,” “developmentalphases,”andotherexpressionsaredeeplyegocentricconcepts.Attheirbaseistheideathatthedevelopmentofthehumanracetookplace along the path of world progress. This path isunderstoodasastraightline.Humanityhaswalkedalongthisstraightline,butsomepeoplehavefallenbehindonsomeoftheirpointsandarestillbeingheldthere[...]Itisas if contemporary humanity represented a film ofevolutiondivided in several frames,and the culturesofvariouspeoplesdistinguishpreciselybecausetheyareinthesedifferentphasesofgeneralevolution,asdifferentstages of the common path of world progress.(Trubetskoi,[1920]2012,p.5)

The argument used to criticize the concept of “evolution” and“progress”isasfollows:

Infact,inordertodetermineinwhatspecificphaseofevolutioneachexistingcultureisfound,wemustknowexactlywherethebeginningandtheendofthestraightlineofworldprogressare:only thencanwedeterminethedistanceseparatingeachculturefromthebeginningandfromtheendofthe[evolutionary]laddermentionedand thus determine the place of a culture in generalevolution. Butwe cannot know the beginning and theend of evolutionwithout first establishing the generalpictureofevolution:thuswefallintoaviciouscircle[...]Objectivelyweonlyfindinthe differentculturestracesofgreaterorlesserresemblancebetweensomeofthem.Onthebasisofthesetraitswecangrouptheculturesoftheworldsothatthemostsimilaronesareclosetogether[...]Thisisthemaximumwecando,remaininginthefieldofobjectivity [...] And yet Europeans affirm that theyestablished the general line of this evolution. How toexplain this? [...] Ifwe lookat theresultsof theworkofEuropean scientists on this scheme of evolution ofhumanitythattheyhaveestablished,itbecomesclearthe[great]role thatplayed in thismiraculousdiscovery thevery same egocentric psychology. It showed scientists,ethnologists andhistoriansofRomano­Germanicculture

135

where to seek the beginning and the end of humandevelopment. Instead of remainingwithin the realm ofobjectivity, noticing the blind alley of this position,seekingthecauseoftheimpasseinthemisconstructionof this concept of evolution, and trying to remedy thisidea profitably, Europeans simply took themselves andtheir culture as the crowning of human evolution, andnaively believing that they had found an end of theevolutionarychain,theyquicklybuiltupthewholechain[…] As a result, the “evolutionary ladder of humanity”appeared. At its top, the Romano­Germanic and thepeopleswhofullyacceptedtheirculture[...]Alittlebelow,the “civilizedpeople ofAntiquity,” that is, those peoplewhoseculturemostresemblesthatofEuropeans.Alittlebeyond, the cultured peoples of Asia. Writing,consolidated state formation, and some othercharacteristicsof theculturesof thesepeoplesallowusto find some similarities with the Romano­Germanic.Also the “ancient cultures of the Americas” (Mexico,Peru).Theseculturesarea little lessresembling thatoftheRomano­Germanicandthusaresomewhatbelowtheevolutionary ladder. In spite of everything, thesementionedpeopleshavepointsofexternalresemblancewiththeRomano­Germanicones,whichcausesthemtoreceive the honorablemention of “civilized. Below arethe “uncivilized” and completely “uncivilized” “wild”peoples: they are those representatives of the humanrace who are less like the Romano­Germanic.(Trubetskoi,[1920]2012,p.5)

But what about the argument that objectively it was theEuropeanswhodominatedtheotherpeoplesoftheworld,andnotthetheotherwayroundasproofoftheirsuperiority?

The simplest and most widespread proof is thatEuropeanshave indeeddefeated thesavages.Each timethesavagesbattletheEuropeans,theresultisthevictoryof the “whites” and the defeat of the “savages.” Therudenessandnaivetyofthisevidenceshouldbecleartoevery person of objective mentality. This argumentclearly shows how the cult of brute force, whichconstituted an important characteristic of the national

136

character of the tribes that created Europeancivilization,surviveseven today in theconsciousnessofeverydescendantof theancientGaulsandGermans [...]In history, nomads overcame the sedentary (and thenomadic peoples differ so strongly from the Romano­Germanicthatintheevolutionaryladdertheyarealwaysplaced below the sedentary peoples). All the “greatcultures of antiquity” recognized by European scienceweredestroyedexactlyby the“barbarians”[...]Anotherargument,nolesswidespreadbutevenlesssolid,isthatthe “savages” are not able to absorb some concepts ofthe European citizens and therefore should beconsidered as “inferior race” [...]Europeans completelyforget that if the“savages”arenotable toabsorbsomeconceptsofEuropeancivilization,theEuropeans,inturn,are not able either to penetrate some concepts of theculture of the savages [...] We are told: compare theintellectual baggage of a cultured European with theculturalbaggageofabushman[...]Isnotthesuperiorityoftheformeroverthelatterobvious?However,weclaimthatthistruismismerelysubjective[...]Thesavage—agood hunter­savage possessing all the qualities of histribe(andonlythiskindofsavagecanbecomparedtoaculturedEuropean)—hasanenormousstockofallsortsof knowledge and information. He has studied hisenvironment perfectly, knows all the habits of animalsand also nuances of their daily lives that escape thecuriousgazeof themostattentiveEuropeannaturalist.Allthisknowledgeisnotstoredinthemindofthesavageina chaoticway.Theyare systematized— true,not inthecategories thataEuropeanscientistwoulduse,butinothers thataremore comfortable inhispractical lifeasahunter.Inaddition tosuchpracticalknowledge,themindofthesavagekeepstherathercomplexmythologyofhistribe,thecodeofethics,thenormsandregulationsof etiquette, and, finally, sometimes also amoreor lessconsiderable stock of oral literature productions of hispeople.Inshort,theheadofthesavageisalsofull,butofthings different from that of the European [... Inaddition,] it is pointed out that European culture is inmanywaysmorecomplexthanthecultureofthesavage.However, this relationship between cultures is notobservedinallfields.TheeducatedEuropeansareproud

137

of the refinement of theirmanners, of the subtlety oftheirpoliteness.But there isnodoubt that the rulesofetiquette and the conventions of conviviality amongmanysavagepeoplesare farmorecomplexanddetailedthanamongEuropeans.Nottomentionthattherulesofgood tone are obeyed by the whole tribe withoutexception, whereas among Europeans they run onlyamong the upper classes. Beware of outwardappearance!SavagesoftenshowgreatercomplexitythanEuropeans.Letusrecalltheadvancedtattootechniquesof theAustraliansor the elaboratehairstylesofAfricanwomen [...] Take the example of the relationship tosexual,familyandmaritallife.Soelementarywasthewaythis issue was resolved in the Romano­Germaniccivilization, where the monogamous family existsofficially protected by law, running alongside it arampant sexual freedom, which society and the stateofficiallycondemn,but inpracticeaccept.Compare thiswiththeintricatelydesignedinstituteofgroupmarriagesamong Australians,where sex life is set in a rigorousframework and, in the absence of individualmarriage,measuresaretakenforthewell­beingofchildrenandtoavoid incest.Ingeneral,thegreateror lessercomplexitysays nothing about the degree of perfection of culture.Evolutionnowgoestothesideofcomplexity,sometimesto the side of simplification. Therefore, the degree ofcomplexitycannotserveasameasureofprogress.TheEuropeans understand this very well and employ thiscriteriononlywhenitisfavorabletothem.Inthosecasesin which the culture of the savages reveals itself incertainpointsmorecomplex,Europeansnotonlydonotconsider this greater complexity the criterion ofprogress,but,onthecontrary,theyannouncethatinthatcasecomplexity isasignof“primitiveness.”This ishowEuropeanscienceexplainstheabovecases.Thecomplexetiquette of the savages, their preoccupation withcomplexbodyadornments,andeventhegenialsystemofAustralian group marriage: all this is seen as amanifestation of low level of culture [...] ObjectiveevidenceofEuropeansuperiorityoversavagesdoesnotexistandcannotexistbecauseincomparingthevariouscultures with each other, Europeans know only onecriterion:whatissimilartousisbetterandmoreperfect

138

than anything that isnot similar.But if things are likethis, if the Europeans are not superior to the savages,then the evolutionary ladder, aboutwhichwe spoke atthebeginningofthischapter,mustcrumble. If its top isnothigher than its base, then it is not superior to theothersteps[oftheladder…].Insteadofaladder,wegetahorizontalplane.Insteadof theprincipleofgradationofperfectionbetweenpeoplesandcultures,anewprincipleofequivalenceandqualitative incommensurabilityofallcultures and peoples of the world. The moment ofevaluation must be banished once and for all fromethnology and cultural history, and in general from allevolutionarysciences, forevaluation isalwaysbasedonegocentrism.Therearenosuperiorsand inferiors; justalikeandnotalike.Toannounce those similar tousassuperior and dissimilar as inferior is arbitrarily naive,unscientific, and simply foolish. (Trubetskoi, [1920]2012,pp.6,9and10)

After this blunt critique of the pretensions of evolutionarysuperiorityofRomano­GermanicEuropeanculture,Trubetskoi refers tohow,then,otherpeoplesshouldrelatetoEuropeanculture.Musttherebeatotalandabsolutenegationofanyaspectofthatculture?

[...]Wehave said thatoneof themain conditions thatmake universal Europeanization inevitable is the egocentrismthatpermeates allRomano­Germanic culture.Tohope that theRomano­Germanic peoples themselves correct this fatal flaw isobviously impossible. But the non­Romano­Germaniceuropeanizedpeoples,inborrowingEuropeanculture,canpurgeit of egocentrism. If they can do this, then the borrowing ofspecificelementsof theRomano­Germanicculturewillnothavetheharmfuleffectsofwhichwespeakabove,andmayenrichtheculture of these peoples [...]Considering theRomano­Germanicculture only as one among different alternatives, [a peopleshould] take from it only those elementswithwhich they feelconfortable and understand, and in the future theywill remainfreetomodify[theseelements]inrelationtotheirnationalneedsand tastes, without minimally taking into account theconsiderationsoftheRomano­Germanicpeopleevaluatingthesemodifications from their egocentricpointsofview.That suchareversal,inprinciple,isperfectlyconceivableandpossible,thereisnodoubt.But,against thispossibility,historicalexamplesare

139

insinuated. In fact, history teaches us that no Europeanizedpeople havemanaged tomaintain themselves in such a solidpointofviewinrelationtotheRomano­Germanicculture.Manypeoples, in borrowing fromEuropean culture, initially intendedtotakefromitonlywhatwasmostnecessarytothem.ButinthecourseoftheirfurtherdevelopmenttheygraduallysuccumbedtothehypnotismofRomano­Germanicegocentrismand, forgettingtheirinitialintentions,theybegantoborroweverythingwithoutcriterion, putting as their ideal to take full part in Europeancivilization. Peter the Great, at the beginning of his works,wanted to borrow from the “Germans” only theirmilitary andmaritimetechniques,butgraduallybecamepassionateabouttheloan process and transferred too many things that wereunrelated to the ultimate goal. Yet he remained conscious thatsooner or later Russia, having borrowed from Europe all thatwasnecessary toher,should then turnherbackonEuropeandcontinuetodevelopfreely[...]Buthediedwithoutleavinganheir[...]At theendof thatcentury,and in thenineteenthandearlytwentieth centuries, the heads of themembers of the Russianelite,alreadysaturatedwithRomano­Germanicprejudices, triedtocompletelyEuropeanizeallaspectsofRussian life [...] Inouropinion,thesameisthecaseinJapanwhichinitially[duringtheMeijirevolution]wantedtoborrow fromtheRomano­Germanicpeoples only their military and maritime techniques, butgradually, in their imitation efforts,wentmuch further [...]But,even ifwe recognize thatour solutionof theproblemdoesnotfind historical examples to date, this does not mean that thesolution itself is impossible.Theproblem is that,untilnow, thetruenatureofEuropeancosmopolitanism,andofotherEuropeantheories based on egocentrism, had not been revealed. NotrealizinghowincongruouswastheegocentricpsychologyoftheRomano­Germanic, the intellectuals of the Europeanizedcountries (that is, that part of the people that most fullyincorporated theRomano­Germanicculture)did notknowhowtofightagainsttheconsequencesofthissideofEuropeanculture[...] This picture will change only when these intellectualsconsciously begin to confront the problem and approachEuropean civilizationwith an objective criticism [...] Thus, thecenterofgravity is transferred to the fieldofpsychologyof theintelligentsiaoftheEuropeanizedpeoples.[...]Thisrevolutionintheconsciousnessoftheintelligentsiaofnon­Romano­Germanicpeoples will inevitably prove fatal to the cause of universalEuropeanization.Upuntilnow this intellectualityhasproved to

140

be the main conduit of Europeanization. Believing incosmopolitanismand the “goodofcivilization”andcomplainingofthe“backwardness”and“conservatism”oftheirpeople,ithadattemptedtoincorporatethesepeopleintoEuropeancivilization,by forciblydestroying the foundationsofherown centuries­oldculture. The intellectuals of the Europeanized peoples wentfurther in this direction and devoted themselves to theincorporationintoEuropeanculturenotonlyoftheirownpeoplebutalsoofneighboringpeoples.Thus,theyprovedtobethemainagents of the Romano­Germanic. If they now understand andbecome aware that Europeanisation is an absolute evil andcosmopolitanism a decoy, they will stop aiding the Romano­Germanic and the triumphalpageantof “civilization” shouldbestopped. The Romano­Germanic alone, without help from thealready Europeanized peoples, will not be in a position tocontinuetheirspiritualbondageoverotherpeoplesoftheworld.This is because, aware of their error, the intellectuals of thealready Europeanized peoples [will open] the eyes of otherpeoples to the true essenceof the “goodof civilization.” In thisgreat and difficult task for the liberation of the peoples of theworld from the hypnotism of the “good of civilization” and ofspiritual slavery, the intelligentsia of non­Romano­Germanicpeopleswhohavealready joinedor intend toenter thepathofEuropeanizationmust act together and in harmony.Not for asecondshouldone losesightoftheessenceoftheproblem.Oneshould not be distracted by particular nationalisms or otherparticularisticsolutionssuchasPan­Slavismandotherpan­isms.Theseparticularismsonlyobscure the essenceof the question.WemustalwayskeepinmindthatopposingSlavstoGermansorTuranians to Aryans does not solve the problem. The realopposition isonlyone:Romano­Germanicandallotherpeoplesoftheworld;Europeandhumanity.(Trubetskoi,[1920]2012,pp.17­18)

At the end of the above passage, Trubetskoi invests againstparticularisticxenophobicnationalisms.Hesees theEuropeanizationorWesternizationoftheworldasaprocessinwhichonepartoftheworldtriestoassumethehegemonyofthewhole.Forthisreason,heconsiderstheunionofallagainstthewould­behegemonimportant.Trubetskoithusforesees a world in which different cultures and peoples will coexistwithout hierarchical processes, while maintaining their individualnationalidentities.Heisagainstparticularistandexcludingnationalisms,butinfavorofself­affirmingandnon­excludingnationalisms.

141

Thepost­colonialcriticDavidChioniMoore (1997,pp.323­324)drewattentiontothefactthat,althoughlittleknownandpublicizedintheWest,EuropeandHumanitywasthefirstgreatcritiqueofEurocentrism,beingprecursorofseminaltextsbyfutureanticolonialistandpost­colonialauthors, such as Aimé Césaire’s Discours sur le Colonialisme, FrantzFanon’sPeauNoire,MasquesBlanques,andEdwardSaid’sOrientalism.AbouttheTuranianelementinRussianCulture Aswe saw earlier, the discussion around the book Europe andHumanityledtotheformationofaseminarinSofia,Bulgaria,thatwastheorigin of the first Russian Eurasianist group abroad. Not that allEurasianists fully agreed with the book. Peter Savitskii, for example,wrote the influential reviewofTrubetskoi’s book criticizing thediffusecharacter of the proposition “all the rest of humanity againstEurocentrism” and pointed embryonically to amore focused Eurasiandirection.Savitskii’scriticismwillbeanalyzedlater.Whatisimportantistonote that, in thediscussionwithhispeers,Trubetskoi later followedthe group’s focus on the “Eurasian” character of Russia. Using hislinguisticandethnologicalknowledge,TrubetskoiwroteascientifictexttodrawtheattentionoftheRussianstothefactthattheirculturehadstronglinkswith thecultureof theTurkicandMongolpeoplesofCentralAsia:On the Turanian Element in Russian Culture, first published in thecollectionEvraziiskiiVremennik[“Eurasian Annals”]inBerlinin1925. In the text,Trubetskoirefers toa term invogueat the time,butwhich fell into disuse today: Turanian. It was a generic termencompassing several peopleswho played a prominent role in CentralAsia, especially theMongols and Turks. Pan­Turkism incorporated theterm:someevencametospeakofaTuranianrace.Trubetskoiusedtheterm todrawattention to the important influence that thesepeoplesofCentralAsiahadonRussianculture.17

17 The controversy continues to this day. The terms “Turanian” or “Uralo-Altaic” were used to refer to the peoples or languages of the peoples who occupied the region between the Ural and Altai mountain ranges. Uralo-Altaic languages, for example, would be a hypothetical group of languages bringing together the family of Uralic languages with the family of Altaic languages. Most Uralic or Finno-Ugric languages fall into three main branches: the Ugric languages (e.g., Hungarian); the Finno-Permian languages (such as Finnish, Estonian, Urdmurt, Komi etc.); the Samoied languages (Enets, Nenets and others). Altaic languages include the Turkic languages (Turkish, Turkmen, Azerbaijani, etc.), Mongolian languages (Mongolian, Buriat, etc.) and Tungusic languages (Manchu, Nanai, etc.). Some linguists controversially contended that Japanese and Korean were also part of the Altaic language family.

142

The Eastern Slavic tribes [origin of present­day

Russians,UkrainiansandBelarusians] initiallyoccupiedonly a small part of the immense territory that ispresent­day Russia. The Slavs initially settled only in asmallwesternpartof that territory, in the riverbasinsthatconnecttheBalticSeatotheBlackSea.Alltherest,mostofthatterritoryofpresent­dayRussia,wasmainlyoccupied by tribes that are united under the name“Turanian” or “Uralo­Altaic.” In the history of all theseimmenseregionsmentioned,theTuraniantribesinitiallyhad a much more significant role than the Russian,EasternSlavictribes.Evenintheso­calledpre­Mongolianperiod, the Turanian states within the borders ofEuropean Russia (the Khazar Empire and the VolgaBulgarian Empire) were farmore significant than theRussianVarangians.The very unification of almost thewhole territory of present­day Russia under a singlepowerwasaccomplishednotbytheSlavicRussians,butbytheTurco­Mongols.ThespreadoftheRussianstotheEast was linked to the Russification of a number ofTuranian tribes; the cohabitation of Russians andTuraniansrunsthroughRussianhistory.IfthecontiguityoftheEasternSlavswiththeTuraniansisafundamentalfactinthehistoryofRussia,ifitisdifficulttofindaGreatRussian in the veins ofwhom no Turanian blood hassomehow flowed,andifthissameTuranianblood(fromtheancientnomadsofthesteppes)runstoasignificantextent in the veins of the LittleRussians, so it is clearthat, for proper national self­knowledge, we Russiansmust take into account the presence in us of theTuranian element. We need to study our Turanianbrothers.Bytheway,wehavecaredlittleaboutthatuntilnow.WearealwaysinclinedtoelevateourSlavicorigin,silencingthepresenceinusoftheTuranianelement,asifwewereashamedofthiselement.Weneedtoendthisprejudice.(Trubetskoi,[1925]2012b,pp.59­60)

AndwhoexactlyweretheseTuranians?Trubetskoidescribestheelements that inhis time (and still today,according to somealternativeethnologists), made up the mosaic of the Turanian (or Uralo­Altaicpeoples,astheyaremostcommonlydenominatedintheWest).

143

Under the denomination of “Turanian” or “Uralo­Altaic” peoples the following five groups of people areunderstood: the Finno­Ugric peoples [... Finnish ...Estonians ...karelians etc.]; theSamoyedicpeoples; theTurkicpeoples [...Turks ...Tatars ...Turkmen etc.]; theMongolian peoples [in Russia including, among others,Kalmyks and Buryats, besides the Mongolians fromMongolia herself]; the Manchu peoples […] Despite aseries of anthropological and linguistic characteristicscommon to all these enumerated peoples,which allowthem tobeunitedunder the commondenominationofTuranians, the question of their genetic kinship iscontroversial.One can consider only thekinshipof theFinno­Ugric linguistic group with the Somyedic to beproven: sometimes these two groups are united underthe denomination “Uralic linguistic family.” But even iftheotherthreegroupsofTurkicpeoplesandlanguagesare not genetically related to each other and to the“Uralic,”yetthemarkedresemblanceofalltheTuranianlanguagesandthepsychologicaltraitsofalltheTuranianpeoples isabsolutelynot indoubt.Wehave theright tospeak about a single psychological Turkic type, leavingaside the questionwhether this commonpsychologicaltype is due to blood kinship or any other cause.(Trubetskoi,[1925]2012b,pp.60­62)

Trubetskoi, using his well­known linguistic and ethnographicknowledge, thenbegins tomakeadetailedanalysisof the languageandcultureof theseTurkicpeoples insearchof theircommon traits.Wedonot have space here to reproduce the series of details and completelinguistic and ethnographic descriptions that he presents, but we canreproducehisconclusionsonthecharacteristicsofthementalapparatusof the Turanian people to which he arrived from the study of theirlanguageandculture.

Inthiswaywemakenomistakeifwesaythatinthewhole spiritual creation of the Turks there is afundamentalpsychiccharacteristic:clearschematizationof a relatively rudimentary and not very richmaterial.The typical Turk does not like to devote himself tosubtleties and confusing details. He prefers to operatewiththemainimagesclearlyapprehensibleandtogrouptheseimagesintosimpleandclearschemes[...]TheTurk

144

loves symmetry, clarity and stable equilibrium. But helovesthatthisbegiven[...]thatallthisbedeterminedbytheinertiaofhisthoughts,hisactionsandwayoflife.Toseekandtocreatethesebasicandfundamentalschemesonwhich his lifewill be built is always painful to theTurk, for thisquest isalwaysassociatedwith thekeensenseoflackofstabilityandclarity.ThatiswhytheTurkswillingly borrowed ready­made alien schemes. But, ofcourse, not all alien schemes were acceptable to theTurks. In the schemes theremustbe clarity, simplicity,andaboveall,itmustbeacomfortableschemetohandleeverything in all its concreteness. Once you havebelieved in a certainworldview, transforming it into asubconscious lawthatdeterminesallyourbehavior, i.e.,into a universal scheme, thus achieving a stableequilibrium condition on a clear basis, the Turk calmsdown and clings strongly tohisbelief.Considering thisworldviewas theunshakable foundationofhisspiritualand material balance, the Turk shows rigidity andstubbornconservatisminthisworldview.Faithfallingina Turkish environment inevitably freezes andcrystallizes, for there it plays the role of an immutablecenter of gravity, the main condition of the stableequilibrium [...] Our outline above of the generalpsychological traits of the Turkish tribes may beconsidered characteristic of all “Turanians” or “Uralo­Altayans.”TheMongols formaunity with theTurks. AllthathasbeensaidaboveaboutthetypicalTurkishtraits[...]appliestotheMongols.OnlyintheMongolsdothesetraitspresent themselveswithevenmore force than intheTurks[...].IftheMongolsdifferfromtheTurksinthegreaterstrengthwithwhichthesecharacteristicstypicaloftheTuranianmentalityappear,theFinno­Ugricdifferintheoppositedirection.TheTurkicpsychologicaltraitsappear in the Finno­Ugric in amoreweakeneddegreethanintheTurks[...]Thus,despitethefactthatgenetickinship between the different “Uralo­Altaic” or“Turanian” language families is extremely dubious andthe fact that some Turanian peoples differ from oneanother in many respects, one can affirm a commonTuranian ethnopsychological type (Trubetskoi, [1925]2012b,pp.69­77)

145

HavingdescribedthebasiccharacteristicsoftheTuranianmentalapparatus, Trubetskoi goes on to examine how these characteristicsinfluencedthedevelopmentofRussiancultureitself.

To answer the question how the Turanianpsychological typewasreflected in theRussiannationalcharacter and how important were these Turanianpsychiccharacteristics inRussianhistory,wemust firstof all imagine, clearly and concretely, how this type isusedinthelifeofeachperson.Thetypicalrepresentativeof Turanian psychology, under normal conditions,possesses mental clarity and serenity. Not only histhought,buthisownperceptionofreality,fitwithinhissymmetrical and simple schemes, the so­called“subconscious philosophical systems.” His behavior,actions and lifestyle also fit in the scheme of thissubconscious system. Because of that, the “system” isalreadyperceivedassuch,since ithasentered into thesubconscious, becoming the basis of all spiritual life.Thanks to that, there is no gap between thought andexternal reality, between dogma and life. Externalimpressions, thoughts, acts, and lifestyle merge into amonolithic inseparable whole. Hence comes clarity,serenityandself­control. Inpractice thissteadystateofequilibriumintheconditionsofasomewhatlowpsychicactivity can lead to rigidity or complete immobility.Butthis does not necessarily occur, for these traits arecompletely compatiblewith active psychic life. Stabilityandharmonydonotexcludefuturedevelopment;itisjustthat creative activities are regulated and directed bythosesubconsciousfoundations.Thankstothat,theveryproducts resulting from creative activities fit into thatsystemofworldviewandlifestyle,notharmingitsoverallintegrity and coherence.With regard to the social andculturalvaluesofpeoplewiththepsychologicalTuraniantype, we cannot fail to consider them positive. TheTuranian psyche conveys strength and culturalsustainability to thenation [...]Thepositive side of theTuranian psyche undoubtedly had a salutary role inRussianhistory.Themanifestationofthistypicalaspectof theTuranianpsyche inpre­PetrineRussiacannotbeneglected. The constitutive form, in which beliefs anddaily lifeconstitutedaunity(“dailyconfessionalism”),in

146

which state ideology,material culture, art, and religionwere inseparablepartsofa singlesystem,asystemnotexpressed theoreticallyandnot formulated consciouslybut existing in the subconscious of each one andregulator of the life of the people and of the nationalwholeitself—allthis,withoutadoubt,hasthestampofthe Turanian psychic type. And that was exactly thebasis on which ancient Rus' was founded, that whichgave itstabilityandstrength.Ifsomesuperficialforeignobservers did not notice anything in ancient Russiabeyond thesubservienceof thepeople to theagents ofpower, and the latter to the tsar, thiswas because theobservationwaswrong.Unquestioningobedienceisthebasisof theTuranianstate,but itexists, likeeverythingelseintheTuranianmentality,inaconsequent,completeway; the idea isdisseminatedup to the supreme ruler,who conceives himself as unquestionably obedient tosomehigherprinciple,which,atthesametime,governsthe bases of the life of each subordinate. In ancientRussia this regulatingprinciplewas theOrthodox faith,understood as an organic grouping of dogmas andreligious rituals with a special Orthodox culture, aparticular manifestation of which was state formationwith its hierarchical scale. And it was exactly thissuperior principle, the same for all subordinates,including the tsar,whoruledRussiaasawholeandnottheprincipleofmereslavery[...]Onecannotfailtonoticea certain analogywithwhatwehave said above aboutaspectsof the turanianpsyche.Even thoughOrthodoxywas not brought to Russians by Turanians, but byByzantium,eventhoughitiscontrastedwiththeMongolrule in the national consciousness of the Russians, yetthe relation of eachRussian to theOrthodox faith, andtheveryrolethatthis faithoccupiesinhislife,wastoacertain degree based on Turanian psychology. ExactlyduetotheTurkictraitsofhispsyche,theancientRussiandid not separate faith from his daily life (Trubetskoi,[1925]2012b,pp.77­82)

Trubetskoi assumed as positive those Turanian traits thatappearedinancientRussians.Andthesetraitsbecamemuchstronger intheperiodoftheMongolruleoftwocenturies(XIII­XV)onRussia.Inthisperiod,the TuranianMongols’relationshipwiththeRussiansreachedits

147

peak.Contrary tomostRussianhistorians’assessmentsof the “Mongolyoke”period,whichemphasizethedestructiveaspectoftheinitiallootingand loss of independence, Trubetskoi argued that precisely because ofMongolrule, the later independentMuscovitestatewouldbecomemuchstrongerandmorecentralizedthanthedisunitedandweakKievanRus’.Ironically,itwastheMongolswhoenabledthecentralization(andhencethestrengthening)oftheRussianstatethatsucceededthem.

TheMuscovite statearosedue to theMongol rule.TheMuscovitetsars,stillnothavingfinished“gatheringtheRussian lands,”began to take land from thewesternpartof thegreatMongolmonarchs.Moscowbecameapowerful state only after the conquest of Kazan,Astrakhan and Siberia. The Russian tsar proved to beheir to theMongoliankhan [...] In the formationof theRussian state there are elements that have no directanalogy with the Mongolian state formation: theOrthodox Church and the Byzantine traditions. ThemiracleofthetransformationoftheMongolianstateintoRussian materialized thanks to the effervescence ofreligious sentiment in the recrudescence of Orthodoxyduring the Mongol rule. This religious effervescenceallowed ancient Russia to ennoble Mongolian stateformation, to give it a new ethical­religious characterand to incorporate it. There was a Russification andOrthodoxisation of the Mongolian domains [... On theother hand] the absorption by the Russian psyche ofcharacteristicTuraniantraitsmadeoftheRussianssolidmaterial for the construction of a strong state, whichallowedMuscoviteRussiatobecomeoneofthegreatestpowers. Summingup all thathasbeen saidpreviouslyabout theroleof theTurkicethnopsychological traits intheRussiannationalphysiognomy, one can say that ingeneral thisrolewaspositive[...]Thedisadvantagewasthe excessive rigidity and inactivity of theoreticalthought.Of thesedisadvantages itwasnecessary togetrid,ofcourse,butwithoutsacrificingthepositivesidesofthe Russian national type that were generated in theencounterbetweentheEasternSlavsandtheTuranians.Seeing in theTuranian influence only negative traits isbadfaithandingratitude.Wehavetherighttobeproudof our Turanian ancestors as much as of our Slavicancestors, and we must be thankful to both. The

148

awareness of our belonging not only to the ArianpsychologicaltypebutalsototheTuranian isnecessaryforeveryRussianwhostrivesforpersonalandnationalself­knowledge [...]Mongolrule lasted for twocenturies.TheRussia that fellunder itwasa clusterofdisunitedprincipalities, almost deprived of notions of nationalsolidarity.TheMongolscameandsubduedRussia,butatthesametimetheytaughther.Andintwohundredyears,Russia came out of this yoke with a “solidly sewn”Orthodoxstatepermeatedbyaninnerspiritualdisciplineandunity stemming from the “confessionalismofdailylife,”manifestingexpansiveforceoutward[…]ItwastheresultoftheMongoliandomination.(Trubetskoi,[1925]2012b,pp.82­88)

Trubetskoithusendsbydeconstructing thenegative imageofthetwo­century­long Mongol domination over Russia by saying that byunitingthepreviouslydisunitedSlavsundertheiryoke,theMongolslaterenabled the emergence of the centralized and strong Muscovite state.Besides,byassertingthatevenbeforethemogolepisode,theSlavswerealways in interactionwithTuranian tribesstill intheiroriginalspace intheregionofKievanRus’,theauthornotonlyrescuestheheritageoftheTuranian elements, but affirms that the Russians themselves are amixture of the Slavic principle with the Turanian (especially Turco­Mongol)element.AboutTrueandFalseNationalism Trubetskoi seems to affirm a supranational Eurasian identity.However, what is the relation of this position to the so­callednationalisms?How is the Eurasian identity related to theRussian one?Does the fact that theRussiansdescendboth fromSlavsandTuraniansmeanthatapureRussiannationalismisdiscarded? TheessayOnTrueandFalseNationalism,published in the1921IzkhodkVostokuEurasianistcollection,discussedtheseissues.TrubetskoistartsfromaresumptionofhiscriticismofEurocentrismasaformofself­centeredness and then goes on to analyze what might be true (i.e.,sincere,notegocentric)formsofnationalism..

A person’s relationship with the culture of hispeoplecantakevariousforms.IntheRomano­Germanic,this relationship is determined by a peculiar

149

psychological form that can be called self­centered [...]forthemarepossibleonlytwotypesofrelationshipwithculture.Eitherthatthemostperfectandsuperiorcultureis the culture of the people to which belongs theindividual “evaluator” (German, French etc.). Orrecognitionthattheprizeofperfectiondoesn’tbelongtoaparticularvariety,butstemsfromthecommonsumofcultures created by the jointwork of all the Romano­Germanic peoples. The first type is called in Europe“narrowchauvinism”(German,Frenchetc.).Thesecondtype could be properly called “Romano­Germanicchauvinism.” However, the Romano­Germanic were sonaively sure that only they could be considered fullhuman beings that they called themselves “humanity,”calledtheirownculture“humancivilization”and,finally,calledtheirchauvinism“cosmopolitanism.”Withrespectto non­Romano­Germanic peoples who took the“European” culture, theyoftenabsorbwith this culturethis type of assessment, falling into the trap of theincorrect terms “human civilization” and“cosmopolitanism” thatmask the narrow ethnographiccontent of these concepts. Thanks to that, therelationshipofthesepeoplewiththecultureisbasednoton self­centeredness,buton akindof “ex­centrism”, inthis case, “Eurocentrism.” I have already writtenelsewhere about the fatal consequences of theEurocentrism of non­Romano­Germanic Europeanizedpeople.The intelligentsia of thenon­Romano­GermanicEuropeanized peoples can rid themselves of theseconsequences only by making a revolution in theirconsciousness, in theirmethods of cultural evaluation,realizingthatEuropeancivilizationisnothumanculturebutjustthecultureofaspecificethnographiccluster,theRomano­Germanic,forwhichitismandatory.Asaresultofthisrevolution,therelationshipofthesenon­Romano­Germanic Europeanized peoples with culture shouldchange radically. The former Europeanized standardshould be replaced by a new one, which relies oncompletely different bases. The duty of every non­Romano­Germanicpeopleis,first,toovercomeanyself­centeredness himself, and secondly, to protectthemselves from the lure of “human civilization,” thedesiretobecomeinanywaya“trueEuropean.”Thisduty

150

canbeexpressedintwoaphorisms:“knowthyself”and“beyourself”Thefightagainstone’sownegocentrismisonly possible through self­knowledge. True self­knowledgeindicatestheperson(orpeople)hisrealplaceintheworld,showshimthathe isnotthecenteroftheuniverse or the navel of the earth.But that same self­knowledgeallowsyou toknow thenatureofpeople (orpeoples) ingeneral,makingclear thatnotonly theself­awaresubjectisnotthecenterortopoftheuniversebutalso no other person (or people) is. Through theknowledgeofhisone’sownnature,theknowingsubject,through the deepening of self­knowledge, becomesconsciousofthenon­hierarchicalequalityofallpersonsandpeoples.And theconsequenceof thisknowledge isthe affirmation of lifestyles of each, the effort to be“oneself.”Onlybyknowingone’sownnature,one’sownessence with full clarity and completeness, may theperson be unique, not coming into contradictionwithhimself, nor deceiving himself or others [...] This self­knowledge is the greatestwisdom of the human being[...] Justbeingoriginal,basedon theself, the individual(andpeople)canrestassuredthatheisactuallyfulfillinghismission on earth,which is that forwhich hewascreated. In short, self­knowledge is the only and thehighestendofmanonearth.It’stheend,butatthesametimealsothemeans[...]Everythingthathasbeensaidsofarisrelatednotonlytotheindividualselfbutalsotothecollective self. Ifwe see the people as a psychologicalwhole,asacollectivepersonality, itmustberecognizedthat some form of self­knowledge is possible andnecessary. Self­knowledge is logically linked to theconceptofpersonality:Wherethereispersonalitytheremustbeself­knowledge.Andifintheparticularsphereofindividual life, self­knowledge proves to be a generalpurpose[...],itworksalsoasauniversalprincipleinthecollectivepersonalityofthepeople.Thespecificityofthispersonality is that thepeople live for centuries, and inthis period it constantly changes, so that the result ofself­knowledge at one time does not necessarily revealthesame in later times,althoughacertainbasisalwaysremains, which will serve as a starting­point forsubsequent self­knowledge work. “Know thyself!” and“Beyourself!”aretwoaspectsofthesameposition.The

151

external aspect of the true self­knowledge of anindividual is expressed in original life and harmonicactivities; for a people, it is expressed in an originalnationalculture.Thepeoplehavebecomeself­consciousif their spiritualnature, their individual character findsitsclearestexpressioninanoriginalnationalcultureandthis culture is completely harmonious, that is, itsconstituent parts do not contradict one another. Thecreationofsuchacultureisthetruegoalofeverypeople,justastheendofeachparticularindividualbelongingtothis people is to achieve a way of life in which theiroriginal spiritual nature is clearly and harmoniouslyembodied.Boththesetasks(oftheindividualandofthepeople) are closely linked, complement each other, andconditionthemselves.(Trubetskoi,1921,2012a,pp.36­42)

Trubetskoiwill then show how the national self­knowledge andthe individualself­knowledge (nationalcultureand individualmentality)intermingleandcomplementeachother.

By theway,working on your own individual self­knowledge, each person also perceives himself asrepresentativeofagivenpeople.Thepsychiclifeofeachperson always embodies certain traits of the nationalpsyche. The spiritual physiognomy of each particularrepresentative of a particular people has thecharacteristics of the national character in differentcombinations with the most particular characteristics(individual, family, estate, etc.). In the process of self­knowledge the national characteristics, in theirconnection with the individual characteristics, areconfirmed and thus ennobled.And to the extent that agiven person, self­knowing, begins to “be himself,” hebecomesan illustrious representativeofhispeople.Hislife,beingacompleteandharmoniousexpressionofhisoriginal conscious individuality, inevitably incorporatesinto itself the national characteristics as well. If thisperson engages in creative culturalwork, his creation,bearing the stamp ofhis personality,will inevitably becolored in the toneof thenationalcharacterorat leastwillnot contradict that character [...]As seen,betweentheprocessesof individualandnational self­knowledge

152

there are strong internal connections and constantinteraction. The more people “know themselves” and“arethemselves,”themoresuccesfulwillbetheworkofnational self­knowledge and the creation of an originalnationalculture,whichinturniskeytothesuccessandintensity of individual self­knowledge. Only by thisinterrelationship between individual and national self­knowledgeisthecorrectevolutionofthenationalculturepossible. Otherwise, the latter may stagnate at somepoint as the national character, formed by individualcharacters,changes.Inthiscase,thewholesenseoftheoriginal national culture disappears. Culture loses thecapacitytorespondtothepsycheofitsbearers.Itceasestobetheembodimentofthenationalsoulandsinksintothe traditional lies andhypocrisies [...] Ifwe recognizethat the highest earthly ideal ofman is complete andperfectself­knowledge,thenwemustrecognizethatonlythat culture that can enable such self­knowledge is thetrue one. In order to enable individual self­knowledge,culture must embody within itself those psychologicalelements that are common to all or most of thepersonalitiesthatarepartofthatculture,thatis,thesetof elements of national psychology. And culture mustembody theseelements inaclear,unmistakableway, forthemoreclearlytheseelementsareembodied,theeasierit will become for individuals to recognize them inthemselves through culture [...] Thus, culturemust bedifferent for eachpeople. In theirnational cultureeachpeoplemustclearlyexpressalltheirindividuality,sothatall the elements of this culture harmonize with eachother, colored from the same national tone. Thedifference between different national culturesmust bestronger the stronger the differences between thenational psychologies of their members. Peoples withsimilar national characters may have similar cultures.But a universal culture, unique to all peoples, isimpossible.Withthecoloredvarietyofpsychictypesandnational characters, a “universal culture”would lead toconcentration on the satisfaction of purely materialneeds, totally ignoring spiritual needs, or else imposeupon all peoples the forms of life which arecharacteristicof someparticular ethnographic form. Inboth cases, this “universal” culturewouldnotmeet the

153

requirementsofatrueculture.Itwouldnotgiveanyonetrue happiness. Thus, the desire for universal culturemustberejected.Onthecontrary,eachpeople’sefforttocreateaspecificnationalculture ismorally justified.Allcosmopolitanism or cultural internationalism must berejected. However, not all nationalism is justifiedlogically or morally. There are different kinds ofnationalism, of which some are false, others are true.Onlysincereand truenationalism isanunconditionallypositive principle for the behavior of a people.(Trubetskoi,[1921]2012a,pp.42­46)

Trubetskoiwillthenexplainsomeconcreteformsofwhathecallsfalsenationalisms.

Fromwhat has been stated, it is evident that theonly nationalism that can be considered morally andlogically true is the nationalism that starts from theoriginalnationalcultureorthatisdirectedtowardsuchaculture.Thethinkingaboutthisculturemustgovernalltheactionsofthetruenationalist.Allthatcancontributeto the original national culture, he must support.Anythingthatcandisrupt it,hemustremove.However,ifweusesuchacriteriontoanalyzetheactuallyexistingforms of nationalism,wewill easily be convinced thatmost of them do not prove true but false. The mostfrequent is to find nationalists for whom the nationalcultureisnotimportant.Theystriveonlyfortheirpeopletoachieve independenceatallcostssothattheywillbeconsidered a “great people” or “great power,” a fullmemberof the “familyofnationswithastate.” In theirdaily livestheyimitateexactlythese“greatpeople.”Thistype is found in all peoples, but especially in non­Romano­Germanic “small peoples,” within which itassumes especially monstrous forms, sometimescaricatures. In this type of nationalism, self­knowledgehasnorolewhatsoever,sinceitsfollowersdonotwanttobe“themselves”butwanttobe“liketheothers,”“likethegreatones,”“likethemasters,”althoughtheyareneithergreatnormasters.Whenhistoricalconditionsaresuchthat a particular people fall under the political oreconomic power of another people, and cannot createtheir original national culture without getting rid of

154

foreignpoliticaloreconomicdomination, thenattemptsat emancipation, at state independence, are solidlyjustified, morally and logically. However, it must beremembered that such attempts are a legitimateaspirationonlywhenitiscarriedoutinthenameoftheoriginalnationalculture,sinceindependenceofthestateas an end in itself ismeaningless. In these nationalistsabout whom we speak, efforts toward stateindependenceandthestateofgreatpowerareanendinthemselves.Worse still, in the name of that end, theysacrifice the original national culture [in attempting toimitate foreign “greatpowers” ...]Another type of falsenationalism manifests itself in aggressive chauvinism.Thefalsityofthiskindofnationalismisevidentwithoutmuchexplanation.Afterall,theoriginalityofaparticularnationalcultureisvaluableinsofarasitharmonizeswiththepsychicconformationofitscreatorsandbearers.Assoonasthiscultureistransferredtoanotherpeoplewithdifferent psychic conformation, the whole meaning oftheirwayoflifedisappearsandwithittheveryvalueofculture changes. The main mistake of aggressivechauvinismistoignorethiscorrelationofculturalformswithparticularethnicsubjects[...]Aspecialformoffalsenationalism is the kind of cultural conservatism thatconsists in identifyingnationaloriginalitywith formsoflifeandculturalvaluescreated inthepastanddoesnotallow them tochangeevenwhen theyclearlyno longersatisfactorilyincarnatethenationalpsyche.Inthiscase,as in aggressive chauvinism, the living temporalconnection between the culture and the psyche of itsbearersisignored,andanabsolutevalueisplacedintheculture, regardless of the people: “Not culture for thepeople,butthepeopleforculture”[...]Itisnotdifficulttonotethatallthesetypesoffalsenationalismsleadtofatalpracticalconsequencesforthenationalculture:thefirsttypeleadstonationalanonymity,thedenationalizationofculture; the second, to the loss of racial purity of thebearers of that culture; the third to stagnation,foreshadowing death. It goes without saying that thetypesof falsenationalisms individuallyexaminedbyusblend into one another by formingmixed types.All ofthemhavethecommoncharacteristicofnotbeingbasedon national self­knowledge in the above sense.

155

(Trubetskoi,[1921]2012a,pp.46­50) Armedwiththesenotionsoftrue(honest)and falsenationalism,TrubetskoiwillnowapplythistheoreticalframeworktothespecificcaseofRussia.

If,inthelightofwhatwehaveseensofar,webegintoanalyzethetypesofRussiannationalisminexistenceuntilnow,wewillhave torecognize that therehasnotyetbeentruenationalisminthepost­Petrineperiod.TheeducatedRussians,forthemostpart,didnotwanttobe“themselves” but rather “true Europeans.” And sinceRussia, despite her wishes, did not become a trueEuropean state,many of them began to despise their“backward” homeland. That is why most Russianintellectualshaveremainedapart fromanynationalism.Otherscalled themselvesnationalistsbutunderstoodasnationalismonlythedesiretobeagreatpower, tohaveexternalmilitary and economic power and a brilliantposition in the international arena; to this end, itwasconsidered necessary for Russian culture to becomeeven closer to theEuropeanmodel. In the same servilerelationship with European models was based thedemand of some Russian “nationalists” for“Russification” [of theotherpeoplesof theEmpire]:allthisbecauseitwassaidthattheGermansdidsoand“theGermans are a civilized people” [...] Parallel to Pan­Germanism, Pan­Slavism was founded [...]. This lateEuropeanizing tendency of Slavophilism becamefashionable even in circles which once considered theword “nationalism” to be indecent. However, even theearliest Slavophilism should not be considered a pureform of true nationalism. In it,we can note the threetypesoffalsenationalismtowhichwereferredearlier:atfirst the third type prevailed, then the first and thesecond. Throughout its history, it was noticeable atendency tobuildRussiannationalism in the imageandlikenessof theRomano­Germanic.Thanks to this,olderSlavophilism should inevitably degenerate, although itsstarting point was precisely the struggle for apurificationof theoriginalRussianwayof life and thebeginning of national self­knowledge. These elementswerenotclearlyunderstoodanddeveloped. In thisway,

156

true nationalism, based entirely on self­knowledge anddemand, in the name of self­knowledge, of reformingRussiancultureinthedirectionofitsoriginality,wasthepositionofonlyafewindividuals(e.g.,someoftheolderSlavophiles).Itdidnotexistthenasasocialtendency.Wewillhavetocreate it inthe future.And forthatwewillneedthatrevolutionintheconsciousnessoftheRussianintelligentsiaaboutwhichwewroteatthebeginningofthisarticle.(Trubetskoi,[1921]2012a,pp.52­54)

It is interesting tonote in thepassageabove the exception thatTrubetskoimakes for “some of the first Slavophiles” as one of the fewexamplesoftruenationalism.ThiswillbeaconstantwiththeEurasianistsandneo­Eurasianists.TheydisagreeradicallywiththeWesternizers,buthaveagreaterrapprochementwiththeSlavophiles.Althoughtheypointout mistakes in the latter’s worldview, they admire the sincerity andradicality of the connection, especially of the first Slavophiles,with theRussian people. According to the Eurasianists, several of the earlySlavophiles, unlike the late Slavophiles who embarked on Pan­Slav“chauvinism,”hadarealconnectionwiththeirpeople,withoutattemptingtoimposetheirwayoflifeonothernations.Sincethesesproutsof“truenationalism”didnotspread inRussia, therevolution in thementalityoftheRussian intelligentsianecessary toeffectivelyescape thestraitjacketofEurocentrismwasnotrealizedinthepast.WeandtheOthers If in On True and False Nationalism Trubetskoi differentiatedbetween true and false forms of nationalism and investigated theoccurrence(ornot)ofthemintheRussianpast,intheessayWeandtheOthers (published in the Annals of Eurasianism in Berlin in 1925) heanalyzed the contemporary forces whichadvocatedanalternativepathfor Russia in the future. Trubetskoi differentiates the position of theEurasianists from thatof theotherRussian émigrépoliticalgroups (theso­called“whiteRussians”)andalsofromthepositionoftheSoviets.

Eurasianism, as an ideologicalmovement, initiallyannounced its existence and crystallized in theenvironment and conditions of Russian emigration.Russian emigration is apoliticalphenomenon, adirectconsequence of political events [...] Eurasianists areasked the following questions: “Who are you? Right­

157

wing, left­wingorcentrist?Monarchistsor republicans?Democrats or aristocrats? Constitutionalists orabsolutists? Socialists or defenders of the bourgeoissystem?”Andwhen the inquirersdonot receivedirectanswers,theysuspectsomedeeplyhiddenmachinationsor just shrug their shoulders, declaring that this“movement” is a purely literary and nonconformisttrend. The reason for all this incomprehension andconfusionisthefactthatinEurasianismtheproblemofthe relation of politics to culture is placed in a totallydifferent way from that to which the Russianintelligentsia isaccustomed.From the timeofPeter theGreat, two ideas, or rather two sets of ideas live in theconsciousness of every Russian intellectual (in thebroadest sense of educated people): “Russia as a greatEuropean power” and “European civilization” . The“tendencies”ofeachpersonweredetermined, toa largeextent, by these two ideas. There were two opposingtypes. For some, themost important was Russia as agreat European power [...] They were therepresentatives of the reaction in government. For theothers, the “progressive” ideas ofEuropean civilizationwere more important than anything else. They said:“Whatevertheprice,evenatthecostofstatepower,orofthestatusofgreatpower,wewillrealizeinRussiatheidealsofEuropeancivilization”(forsome,democracy,forothers socialism, etc.) and “we will make Russia aprogressive European state.”These were the radical­progressive representatives of society.The tragedy wasthat neither path could be taken to the ultimateconsequencesintheconditionsofRussianlife.Eachsidenoted the inconsistenciesand failuresof theother.Thereactionaries understood perfectly that liberatingdemocracy,ineffectliberatingthesemi­savage(fromtheEuropean point of view) peasant element, theprogressiveswouldbegivingan irreparableblow intheveryexistenceofRussiaintheEuropeancivilization.Theprogressives, for their part, correctly pointed out thatfor the maintenance of Russia in the “concert ofEuropean great powers,” itwas necessary to raise thelevel of domestic policy to the level of other Europeanstates. But neither the reactionaries nor theradicals/progressivesunderstood theirownutopianism

158

and internal inconsistency. There were, of course,representatives of the “middle path” (rationalconservatism or moderate liberalism), fusing greatpowerpatriotismwith thedemandsof liberaldomesticpolitics,but, intheend,thatpartofsocietyalso lived inutopia. Both the basic ideas (the idea of great­powerpatriotismandtheideaoftherealizationinRussiaoftheideals of European civilization), which in differentmutual combinations formed the different Russianpolitical tendencies,were fundamentally artificial. BothweregeneratedbythereformsofPetertheGreat.Peterintroduced themwithoutconsulting theRussianpeopleif they desired them; and therefore both wereorganically alien to the Russian people [...] Right­wingers, leftists, conservatives, liberals, andrevolutionaries all revolved around the sphere ofpost­Petrine Russia concepts and European culture. Whentheyspokeabout thisor that formofgovernment,theythought such a form of government exactly in thecontext of European culture or of Europeanized post­PetrineRussia[...]FortheEurasianiststhemainthingisexactly to change the culture: the change of politicalideasorthepoliticalsystemwithoutchangeincultureis,from the point of view of Eurasianism, unfeasible andmeaningless(Trubetskoi[1925a]2012c,pp.77­81)

Havingdemarcated theEurasianistsagainstvirtuallyallpreviousideological and political currents in Russia, Trubetskoi examined thedifferencewitheachof thecurrents (rightand left in tsaristRussiaandtheSoviets themselves).Hebeganwithwhatseparates theEurasianistsfromtheoldtsaristright.

Eurasianism rejects the dogmatic authority ofEuropean culture. Since European culture is generallyseenas“progressive,”manyconsiderEurasianismtobeareactionarycurrent.Eurasianismdemandsthenationalculture and specifically states that Russian nationalculture is not conceivable without Orthodoxy. Thisbrings,formany,associationswiththeinfamousformula“Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality,” which furtherreinforcesthebeliefthatEurasianismisanewformfortheoldideologyofRussianreactionaries.Inthisillusion,notonlyleftistsbutalsomanyright­wingersfall,someof

159

whomhasten to considerEurasianism as “oneof theirown.”Thisisaprofound misunderstanding.Inthemouthof theRussian right, the formula “Autocracy,OrthodoxyandNationality”has acquired a very specificmeaning.Strictly speaking, this formula could be replaced by aword:“Autocracy.”CountUvarovdefined“Nationality”asthe union of autocracy with Orthodoxy. RegardingOrthodoxy, the governmental representatives of thereactionbythistermunderstood(andunderstandtothisday) the official religious synod elite [...] For them,Orthodoxy and Nationality are nothing more thantraditional accessories of autocracy […] Eurasianism,proclaiming nationalcultureasitsmotto,separatesitselfideologically from the entire period of the imperialbureaucracy of St. Petersburg. It does not support theimperial autocracy of this period, but rather the deepOrthodox religious sentiment of all the peoplewho, bytheireffervescence,surpassed theMongolyoke leadingtothetsar’sOrthodoxyandtransformedtheMongolulusof Batu into an OrthodoxMoscow state. This religioussentimentdescribedaboveis,intheeyesofEurasianists,the main value of Russian history. Eurasianism seesimperial autocracy as a degeneration of the genuinelypre­Petrine nationalmonarchy [...] Eurasianism cannottolerate the conversion of Orthodoxy into a mereaccessory to autocracy and the disfigurement of“nationality” as a mere cliché. It demands a genuineOrthodoxy, rooted innational cultureandbasedon the“confessionalismofeveryday life,”and recognizesas itsidealonlythatmonarchythatisanorganicconsequenceofnationalculture. (Trubetskoi, [1925a]2012c,pp.82­84)

Having delimited theEurasianists from the tsarist right­wingers,Trubetskoiwilldemarcatehisterritoryagainstthepre­revolutionaryleft.

The undoubtedly negative attitude of EurasianismtowardimperialRussiaanditsemphasisonthevalueofthe people’s genuine way of life can lead to anothermisunderstanding:theidentificationofEurasianismwiththe revolutionary currents of narodnichestvo[“populism”]. However, Eurasianism differs stronglyfrom this type of populism. In any case, the Russian

160

revolutionarymovement of populism has always beenandisavariantofsocialism.Andsocialismisaproductof theRomano­Germanic culture, completely foreign toEurasianism.Ifinthemoderatecurrentsofpopulismtheelementofsocialismpresents itselfattenuated, thisdoesnot change anything in principle. The relation of thepopulists with the so­called “Russian identity”fundamentallydiffersfromtherelationofEurasianismtoit. From the life of the people, from the popularaspirations, the populists artificially took away only afewelements:theruralcommune,communeassemblies,the“principle”oftheartisancooperative(artel),theideathat “land is sacred,” rationalist sectarianism, hatred ofthe “landowners,” the songs of outlaws, etc. All theseelementsofidentityandworldviewweretornfromtheirhistorical context, idealized and declared as the onlyessentialandlegitimateaspectsofthepeople:everythingelsewassetaside.Ofcourse,theselectionwasmadeonthe basis of what was appropriate to socialism.Everything in the life and vision of the world of thepeople that did not fit into socialism was deemed“backwardness” and “ignorance of themasses,” whichshould be overcome through school and propaganda.Identity[ofthepeople]inpopulismplaystheroleofonlya stepping stone to be able to leap into a process ofleveling Europeanization. The “Going to the People”[movement], after all, reveals itself only as a specialtactic, a specialmethod for achieving Europeanizationand introduction intoRussiaofthewell­known idealsofRomano­Germaniccivilization[...]Exactlybecauseof itssocialist, Western essence, revolutionary populism istotally unacceptable to Eurasianism. EurasianismaddressestheRussiannationalculturewithnodesiretoreplace it with any form of Romano­Germanic life(already realized in Europe or imagined by Europeanpublicists). On the contrary, it wants to free it fromRomano­Germanic influence and put it on the path ofgenuinely independentnationaldevelopment.Of courseEurasianismdoesnotincorporateeveryaspectofthelifeoftheRussianpeople,and italsodistinguishesbetweenwhatisvaluableandwhatisharmfulorindifferent.Butin thisdistinctionEurasianism isnotguidedbywhat inthataspectofRussian life is favorable totherealization

161

of this or that ideal borrowed from Europeans(socialism, democratic republic, etc.) but only by theintrinsic value of that aspect in its general connectionwith the national culture. From this point of view,wemust distinguish between random, transient andprofound phenomena and also between creative,founding and destructive phenomena. For example, theruralcommune,onwhichthepopulistsinsistverymuch,isa transitoryphenomenon thathasappearedandwilldisappear historically. The dissolution of the ruralcommuneand the transition to individualagriculture isan inevitable historical process, which should not bestopped by artificial means. To the extent thatcommunal property inhibits the development ofagricultural productivity, one can even consider it as aculturally destructive phenomenon whose substitutionfor other forms of rural economy must be helped.Eurasianism,preachingRussianidentity,doesnotincludetheruralcommuneamong theessential featuresof thisidentity.Analyzingtheworldviewofthepeople,andtheirmanifestationinpopularcreativity,thepopulistssilencedor put into the account of popular ignorance thesubmission to the will of God, the idealization of thetsar’s power, religious poems, religious piety, ritualconfessionalism; and all this when exactly thesecharacteristics are the most valuable, since, from thepointofviewofthenationalculture,theygivestabilitytothepopularfoundation.Andthepopulistsappreciatedallmanifestationsofrebelliousness,hatredoflords,creationof songs and legends idealizing outlaws and satirizingpriests,eventhoughitisclearthatthesephenomenaarepurely negative, anticultural and antisocial, and do notcontain any creative culturalpotential [...]Thepoint atwhichEurasianismmostdisagreeswithpopulism is itsrelation to religion.Populists, like thesocialists,are, forthemostpart,atheistsor,at least,abstractdeists.Fromthe religious life of the people, they succeeded in“understanding” and appreciating only rationalistsectarianism.EurasianismrestsonthesoilofOrthodoxy,confessingitastheonlytrueformofChristianity[...]Theexistence and partial success in the people of Baptistsand other rationalist sects is the consequence of twocenturies of Europeanization, during which the upper

162

andlowerstrataofthenationwereseparatedfromeachother by a huge abyss. Intellectuals and pseudo­intellectuals,closing theireyes to thespiritualwealthofOrthodoxy, regarded it as the religion of the rudepeasantryandbecameinfectedwiththedecadentformsof the Western religion. And the government, havingfrozenandimprisonedtheRussianchurch,depriveditofall initiative and freedom of action, did not takemeasures for raising the level of the clergy or forspreadingtrueOrthodoxeducation.Ifthepeople,inthosedifficult centuriesofRussianhistory,haveoften turnedawayfromthechurch,notfindinginitthetrueOrthodoxspirit, and fallen into the temptations of cheaprationalismbrought to itby thestray intelligentsia,onemustsee inthissadphenomenononlythesymptomofthedisease.The government, in fighting this symptom(worsestill,withpolicemeasures),waswrongbecauseitwasnecessary to treat thedisease.But thepopulists,who saw these symptoms as healthy,were evenmorewrong [...]. For the Christian, Christianity is not anelement of a culture, but a leaven that is capable ofentering into various cultures and stimulating theirdevelopmentinacertaindirection,withoutleadingtothelossof itsoriginalityanddiversity. (Trubetskoi, [1925a]2012c,pp.84­89)

Having demarcated Eurasianism from the tsarist left and right,Trubetskoiwill now demarcate his ownmovement in the face of theSoviet government in power in the USSR. This is slippery ground, forseveralRussiannationalistand/orright­wingémigrégroupsaccusedtheEurasianists of sympathetically seeing the Soviet hold of power overEurasiaasakindof “writing straightby crooked lines.”Trubetskoiwilldenythis.

Finally, wemust point out another question: therelationbetweenEurasianismandBolshevism.Loversof“labels” sometimes try to characterize Eurasianism as“Orthodox Bolshevism” or “the result of an illicitmarriage between Slavophilism andBolshevism.”Whiletheparadoxof these contradictio inadjecto (“OrthodoxBolshevism” is like lightdarkness)shouldbeclear toall,thequestionofthepointsofconvergenceanddivergencebetweenEurasianismandBolshevismdeservesa closer

163

look. Eurasianism convergeswithBolshevism in denialnotonlyofthisorthatpoliticalform,butofanyculturethatexistedinRussiaimmediatelybeforetherevolution[of1917]andwhichcontinues toexist in thecountriesof theRomano­GermanicWest;andalso in thedemandfor a radical transformation of the whole culture.Eurasianism convergeswithBolshevism in the call fortheliberationofthepeoplesofAsiaandAfrica,enslavedby the colonial powers. But all this similarity issuperficial, formal. The internalmotives of BolshevismandEurasianismarediametricallyopposed.Thatculturethatmust be replaced, the Bolsheviks call “bourgeois”and theEurasians “Romano­Germanic.”And theculturethatshouldcomeinreplacementofit,theBolshevikscall“proletarian”andtheEurasians“national”(inthecaseofRussia, “Eurasian”).Marxists depart from the point ofview that culture is created by [social] classes.Eurasianists, however, see culture as the fruit of theactivity of certain ethnic units, nations or groups ofnations. Therefore, for Eurasianists, the concepts of“bourgeois” or “proletarian” culture are pureimagination. In any socially differentiated nation theculture of the upper strata is a little different from thecultureof the lowerstrata.Inanormal,healthynationalbody, the difference is only of degreewithin the sameculture. If, in this case, the superior culture is called“bourgeois” and the subaltern “proletarian,” thereplacementofbourgeoisculturebytheproletarianleadsto a decrease in the cultural level, to simplification, touneducation, which cannot be placed as an ideal. Ininfirm nations, infected with the virus ofEuropeanization, elite culture differs from subalternculture not only quantitatively (in degree or intensity)butalsoqualitatively[...]Onlyinrelationtothesenations(including pre­revolutionary post­Petrine Russia) onecanspeakoftheconvenienceofreplacingthecultureoftheupperstratawiththatofthelowerstrata,andevensoonlymetaphorically. In fact, this should be understoodnot as a transition from the culture of the top to theculture of the bottom (an inevitably ordinary thing inthisway),butrather thecreation fromaboveofanewculture that differentiates itself from those from belowonlyindegree(quantitatively)andnotqualitatively.Only

164

inthiswayisthelackofcultureofthemiddlestrataofthenation eliminated, and the national organism becomeshealthy, culturally valuable, and capable of furtherdevelopment in general, both in the upper and lowerstrata. This is exactly what Eurasianism demands. Buthere it is clear thatwe speak of changes in the ethnicnatureofcultureandnotinitsclassnature.BeingatthemercyofMarxistschemesandapproachingcultureonlyfromthepointofviewoftheseschemes,theBolsheviksare totally incapableofdoingwhat they intended, i.e. tocreateanew culture inplaceof theold. Its “proletarianculture” isexpressedonly inrough formor inakindofparody of the old, supposedly “bourgeois” culture. Inboth cases the process ends up being a simpledestruction, without creation. A new culture is notattained.And this is thebestproofof the falsityof thetheoretical assumptionsofBolshevism itself and of theunfeasibilityofthetaskof“proletarianizationofculture.”Theconceptof “proletarianculture” is inevitablyempty,for the very concept of the proletariat, as a purelyeconomic conception, is devoid of all other concretefeatures of culture except the economic ones. Quitedifferentisthecasewiththeconceptofnationalculture.Everynation,beingpotentialorrealcarrierandcreatorof a concrete culture, includes in its own conceptconcrete characteristics of the elements and of thetendencyof the culturaldevelopment.Therefore,anewculture can only be created as a culture of a specificnation,whichhasnotyethadanindependentcultureorisundertherepressiveinfluenceofaforeignculture[…]From all this it follows that if Eurasianism andBolshevismhaveasacommon task therejectionof theold culture and the creation of a new one, then theBolsheviks canperform only the first task and not thesecond. But the realization of the task of destroyingwithout simultaneously creating certainlydoesnot leadto good results [...] In short, it can be said thatBolshevism is a movement of destruction andEurasianism amovement of creation.Bothmovementsare diametrically opposed and collaboration betweenthem is unthinkable. This opposition betweenBolshevism and Eurasianism is not fortuitous and isbased on the deep essence of these movements.

165

Bolshevism is atheist; Eurasianism is religious [...]Bolshevism,likeeverycreatureofthespiritofdenial,hasa tendency toward destruction without the wisdom ofcreation.Thatiswhyitmustdisappearandgivewaytoacontrary, religious and creative force. Will that beEurasianism? This is for the future to say […] OnepositivesideofBolshevism is that,having removed themask and shown satan inhisnaked form, through thebeliefintherealityofsatan,itledmanytobelieveinGod.Inaddition,Bolshevism,byabsurdlycavingin(duetoitsinabilitytocreate)life,deeplystirredtheRussianterrain,throwingupthingsthatwerebelowandthrowingdownthings that were on top. And when new people areneeded for the creation of the new national culture,perhapsthesepeoplearetobefoundexactlyinthenewstratathatBolshevismhappenedtothrowonthesurfaceof Russian life. In any case, the true criterion for thechoiceof thenewpeoplewillbe thedegreeofaptitudefor the task of creating the national culture andconnectingwiththecreativespiritualfoundations.Thosenewpeople generated byBolshevismwho do nothavetheseattributeswillproveincapableand,ofcourse,willdisappearalongwiththeBolshevismthatcreatedthem.Theywilldisappearnotbecauseofanyintervention,butbecause nature tolerates neither emptiness nor puredestruction and requires creation, creativity. And true,positive creativity is possible only when affirming thenational principle and the feeling of the connection ofthe person and of the nationwith the Creator of theuniverse.(Trubetskoi,[1925a]2012c,pp.90­97)

Thus Trubetskoi ends his task of demarcating Eurasianismideologically in relation to the tsarist rightand to theMarxistBolshevikleft.TheessayWeand theOthersrepresentedan importantclarification,sinceEurasianismconfusedobservers.Theleftregardeditasaright­wingphilosophy while the émigré right viewed the Eurasianists with thesuspicion that theymight in factbeBolshevik“fellow travelers.”Weandthe Others played an important role in this work of demarcating theEurasianists’ideologicalterritory.Pan­EurasianNationalism

166

If inWeandtheOthersTrubetskoidemarcatedEurasianism fromothercurrents,adifficulttheoreticalquestionneeded tobewellworkedout so that the position of the Eurasianists did not elicit confusion. IfEurasianists refused exclusive Russian nationalism and proposed acommunion of Eurasian peoples, how could then their position beclassifiedasnationalist?WouldtheminglingoftheRussianelementinthelargersetoftheEurasianamalgammeanlosingthenationalpointofviewand/or opening the way for some sort of internationalism orcosmopolitanism(albeitnotEuropeanized)? IntheessayPan­EurasianNationalism,publishedintheEurasianChronicle (Paris, 1927), Trubetskoi explained how to establish anationalismthatencompassesaunityaslargeasEurasiaasawhole.

Beforetherevolution[of1917],theownerofthewholeterritoryofRussiawas theRussianpeople. Inprinciple,nodifferencewasmadebetween theregionswhere themostlypureRussians livedandregionswherea largelynon­Russianpopulation lived.TheRussianpeoplewereconsidered owners of one and the other, and the“foreigners”(notRussians)werenotconsideredownersbut external members “of the homeland.” During therevolution, the situation changed. In the well­knowninitialrevolutionaryphaseofgeneralizedanarchy,therewas the threat of Russia disintegrating into separateparts.TheRussianpeoplesavedtheunityofthestatebysacrificing their position as the country’s only owner.Thus, the inexorable logic of history destroyed thepreviousrelationshipbetweenthenativeRussianpeopleand the “foreigners.” The non­Russian peoples of theancientRussianEmpire acquired a condition theyhadnot before.TheRussian people came to be considerednottheownerbutoneofthemanypeoplewhoinhabitinequalconditionsthestateterritory.Itistruethat,owingto its vast numerical superiority and its secular statetradition, theRussianpeople,ofcourse,have,andmusthave, a prominent role among the peoples of the stateterritory.Butthisisnolongertoownahomeinhabitedby other non­family members, but being first amongequals.Thedescriptionof thechange in thepositionofthe Russian peoplemust be taken into account by allwho think about the futureofour country.One shouldnot think that the new position of the Russian people

167

between thepeoplesof the formerRussianEmpireandthepresentUSSR is amerepassingphenomenon.Therights now enjoyed by the non­Russian peoples of theUSSRcanno longerbe takenaway.Timereinforces thecurrentsituation.Inthefuture,theattempttoremoveordiminish these rights would generate the fiercestresistance. If the Russian people ever embark on thispath of taking away or diminishing the rights of theotherpeoplesofthestateterritory,itwilldrawagainstita long and hard strugglewith all these other peoples,remaininginanopenordisguisedstateofwarwithallofthem.Thereisnodoubtthatsuchawarwouldbehighlydesirable by the enemies of Russia and that, in theirstruggle against the pretensions of theRussian people,some self­determined peoples of the former RussianEmpire and of the presentUSSRwould find allies andsupportamongthegreatpowers.And,moreover,fromamoralpointofview, thepositionof theRussianpeople,intryingtoremoveordiminishthenationalprerogativesoftheotherpeoplesofthestateterritory,wouldbeverydisadvantageous, almost indefensible […] There shouldbe no talk about withdrawal or diminution of rightsacquired by thepeoples of the formerRussianEmpireduringtheRevolution.ThatRussiawhosesoleownerofterritorywas the Russian peoplewas lost in the past.From now on, theRussian people are andwill be justoneof thepeoplesequal in lawwhopopulate the stateterritoryandtakepartinitsadministration.Thischangein the roleof theRussianpeople in relation to thestateposes a series of problems to Russian national self­consciousness. Before, even themost extreme Russiannationalist was a patriot. Now the state in which theRussianpeopleliveisnolongertheirexclusiveproperty.An exclusively Russian nationalism would destroy thebalance of the formative parts of the state and wouldconsequently lead to thedestruction of stateunity.Theexcessive riseofRussiannationalpridewouldplace alltheotherpeoplesofthestateagainsttheRussianpeople,i.e.,would isolate theRussianpeople from theothers. IfeventhemostextremeRussiannationalpridewasoncea factor onwhich the state could rely, now that pride,rising above a certain point, can become an anti­statefactor, which does not build but destroys state unity.

168

Under thepresentconditionsof the roleof theRussianpeopleinthestate,extremeRussiannationalismcanleadto Russian separatism, which would have beenunthinkablebefore.Anextremenationalistwhowanted,atallcosts,fortheRussianpeopletobethesoleownerofhis state, in the current conditions, would have toconform to thepossibleexitof the “frontierregions”ofRussia, that is, thathis “Russia”coincidedroughlywiththeboundariesof landspopulatedexclusivelyormostlybynativeRussians,mainlywestoftheUrals.Onlyinsuchnarrow geographic limitswould the realization of thisextreme nationalist dream be possible. Thus, at thepresent moment, such extreme Russian nationalistreveals itself to be, from the state point of view, aseparatist like any other separatist, be him Ukrainian,Georgian,Azerbaijani,etc.Ifthemain factorholdingtheRussianEmpiretogetherwasthatitbelongedtoasingleowner— the Russian people ruled by its tsar— thatfactorhasnowdisappeared.Thequestion arises:whatotherfactorcankeepallpartsofthisstatetogetherasasingle whole? As a unifying factor, the Revolutionpresented the realization of awell­known social ideal.TheUSSRisnotonlyagroupofseparaterepublicsbutagroupofsocialistrepublics,i.e.,thatcravethesameidealof a social system. And this ideal unites all theserepublics into a single whole. The community of thesocialidealandconsequentlythedirectiontowhichthedifferent parts of the present USSR are directedconstitute a powerful unifying factor.And even if overtimethenatureofthisidealchanges,theprincipleoftheobligatorypresenceofacommon idealofsocial justiceandcommonefforttowardthatidealmustremainatthebase of the state configuration of those peoples andregions that are now united in the USSR. But thequestionariseswhether thisfactoraloneissufficientforthe unification of these different peoples in a state.Indeed, the fact that the Uzbek Republic and theBelarussian Republic are governed in their internalpolicies by the effort to achieve the same social idealdoes not at all imply that both republics must uniteundertheshadowofasinglestate.Moreover,itdoesnotfollow from this fact that the two republics cannot beenemies or even be atwar [...]Moreover, according to

169

Marxist doctrine, the proletariat has no nationalistinstincts,whichareattributesofthebourgeoisieandthebourgeois system. The struggle against nationalism isconducted by transferring the center of people’sattention from the sphere of national emotions to thesphere of social emotions. The awareness of nationalunity, which is a prerequisite for all nationalism, ishampered by the intensification of class hatred; andmost national traditions have been linked with anopprobrium to the bourgeois system, to aristocraticculture,orto“religiousprejudices”[...]ThusonecansaythattheunifyingfactorofallpartsofthepresentUSSRina single state whole again is the presence of a soleofficiallyrecognizedownerof theentirestate territory:onlyearlierthiswastheRussianpeopleruledbythetsar,andnowthisowneristheproletariatofallthepeoplesoftheUSSR,ledbytheCommunistParty.Theshortcomingsof the current proposed solution described above areobvious.Not tomention the fact that thedivision intoproletariatandbourgeoisieofmanypeoplesoftheUSSRis artificial or impossible. Itmust be emphasized thatthissolutionoftheproblempointstoitsownephemeralcharacter.Infact,thestateunityofpeoplesandcountrieswhere the proletariat has seized power is onlyappropriate from the point of view of that particularstageoftheproletariat’sstruggleagainstitsenemies.Theproletariat itself as an exploited class, according toMarxism, is a passing phenomenon that will beovercome.Thesameappliestoclassstruggle.Inthisway,bythesolutiondescribedabove,theunityofthestateisbasednotonapermanentbuttemporarybasis,subjecttochange.Thiscreatesanabsurdsituationandaseriesof unhealthy phenomena. To justify its existence, thecentralgovernmentartificiallyinflatesthedangersfacedby theproletariat.Objectsofclasshatredarecreated inthe figureofthenewbourgeoisie, inorderto incitetheproletariat against this class, etc. [...] The aim of thisarticle is not to critique the merit of the Marxistconceptionofthestate.Hereweanalyzethe ideaof thedictatorshipof theproletariatonly inoneof itsaspects:asaunifying factorofall thepeoplesof theUSSR inasingle statewhole that resists the nationalist­separatisttendencies. And it must be recognized that in this

170

respect the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat,althoughithashithertobeeneffective,cannotbecomeastable and lasting solution to the question. ThenationalismofthevariouspeoplesoftheUSSRdevelopsas these peoples become accustomed to the newsituation.The development of education andwriting inthe variousnational languages and the appointment ofnativesofeachlocalitytoadministrativepositionsdeepenthe national differences between the different regions,create in the native intelligentsia a jealous fear of thecompetition from “outside elements” and the desire toconsolidateposition.Atthesametime,theclassdivisionsand contradictionswithin each people of theUSSR arefading. All this creates favorable conditions for theemergence of nationalist and separatist tendencies ineachofthepeoplesoftheUSSR.Againstthis,theideaofthedictatorshipoftheproletariatprovestobe impotent[...]Thus, the ideaof thedictatorshipof theproletariat,theawarenessofthesolidarityoftheproletariatandthepromotion of class hatred must, in the end, proveimpotent in the face of the development of nationalistandseparatistaspirationsinthepeoplesoftheUSSR[...]Inorder foreachpartof the formerRussianEmpire tocontinue to live as part of a single state, a uniquesubstratum of state configuration is necessary. Thissubstratecanbenational(ethnic)orclass.Thesubstrateofclass,aswehaveseenabove,iscapableofunitingthedifferent parts of the former Russian Empire onlytemporarily.Apermanent and solidunity, therefore, ispossibleonlywithanethnicsubstrate(national).Beforethe Revolution, this substratewas the Russian people.Butnow,aswehavesaidabove, it isno longerpossibleto return to the situation inwhich the Russian peoplewere thesoleownerofallRussian territory.Ofcourse,nootherpeopleinthisterritorycanplaytheroleofsoleowner.Consequently,thenationalsubstrateofthatstate,formerly called theRussianEmpireandnow called theUSSR,canonlybethegroupofpeopleswhoinhabitthatterritory,seenasaspecialnationwithmanypeoplesandassuchhaving itsownnationalism.Wecall thisnationEurasian, its territory Eurasia and its nationalismEurasian.(Trubetskoi,[1927]2009,pp.90­99)

171

The last twosentencescontain thecoreof theEurasianists’mainthesis.TheyproposethedaringstepofcreatingatrulyEurasian“nation”basedontheEurasiannationalitiesasawhole.Itwastheoreticallydaringand risky topropose the coagulationof the various ethnicunitsof theUSSR not in an abstract multinational state, composed of differentnationalities seen aswatertight compartments, but in a common livingcollective organism, seen as an internally heterogeneous nation thatemergeshistoricallyfromtheinteractionofthoseseveralpeoplesinthesame geographical space (Eurasia). It is a proposition loaded withpossible ambiguities and Trubetskoi goes on to explain how one canconsiderthesedifferentpeoplesasone(Eurasian)nation.

All nationalism stems from the intense feeling ofthenatureof thepersonalityofaparticularethnicunit.Therefore, above all, it affirms the organic unity andpeculiarityof thisethnicunit(people,groupofpeoples,orpartof apeople).But there are, or virtually are,nopeople in the world who are completely uniform andhomogeneous. Ineverypeople,even in theminorones,there are always some tribal varieties, sometimesdifferentiatingone from theother sensibly in terms oflanguage, physical type, character, customs, and so on.There are also (or virtually) no people who areabsolutely different in everything from others. Eachpeople is always part of some group of peoples, withwhich it has some characteristics in common.Sometimesapeople,asfarasonetypeofcharacteristicsisconcerned,ispartofagroupofpeoplesand,asregardsothercharacteristics,ispartofanothergroup.Itcanbesaid that the uniformity of an ethnic unit is inverselyproportional (and its heterogeneity directlyproportional) to its size: only the smallest ethnic units(e.g., some small tribal branch of a people) approachperfecthomogeneitywhilegreatervarietyisachievedbylarge ethnic units (e.g., a group of peoples). Thus,nationalism always somehow abstracts itself from thedegreeofsegregationand realheterogeneityofagivenethnic unit, and depending on the degree of thisdeviation one can distinguish different types ofnationalism.Fromwhathasbeensaid it isclear that ineach nationalism there are both centralizing elements(affirmation of the unity of this ethnic group) andseparatistelements(affirmationofthespecificityofthis

172

ethnicgroupanditsoriginalityinthefaceofotherlargerethnic groups). Moreover, it is clear that with theinterpenetration of one ethnic unit into another (apeopleispartofa groupofpeoplesatthesametimeasitisformedbydifferenttribalorregionalvarieties),theremay be nationalisms of different amplitudes, differentlatitudes that even interpenetrate, as well as formingconcentric circles consistent with the ethnic units towhich they are directed. Finally, the centralist andseparatist elements of the same ethnic unit do notcontradict each other.But the centralist and separatistelementsof twoconcentricnationalismsareexcluded. Ifethnicunit“A”ispartofalargerethnicunit“B”,thentheseparatist elementofnationalism “A” and the centralistelementofunit“B”areexcluded.Forthenationalismofagiven ethnic unit not to degenerate into sheerseparatism,itmustcombinewiththenationalismofthegreater ethnic unity to which this first ethnic unit“belongs.”ApplyingthistothecaseofEurasia, itmeansthat thenationalismofeachpeopleofEurasia (presentUSSR) must be combined with pan­Eurasiannationalism,thatis,with“Eurasianism.”EverycitizenoftheEurasianstatemustrealizethatheisamemberofacertainpeople(orbranchofapeople)butalsothatsucha people is amember of the Eurasian nation.And thenational pride of this citizenmust find satisfaction inthese two forms of consciousness. The nationalism ofeach of these peoples must be so built. Pan­Eurasiannationalismmustbeanextensionof thenationalismofevery Eurasian people, a kind of fusion of all theseparticular nationalisms. Among the peoples of Eurasiathere was (and was easily established) a feeling offraternization, generated by the existence ofsubconscious chains of attraction and sympathy. Theopposite case — of antipathy and subconsciousrevulsion — was very rare [...] For some reason, aEurasian people can easily be part of a group of non­purely Eurasian peoples. For example, by the linguisticcriterion, the Russians are part of the group of Slavicpeoples and the Tatars, Chuvaches and Maris of thegroupof theTuranianpeople;by religious criteria, theTatars,bashkirsandSartsbelongtothegroupofMuslimpeoples.Butthosebondsforthesepeopleshouldbeless

173

strong and clear than the relations that unite thosepeople in the Eurasian family. Neither Pan­Slavism forthe Russians, nor Pan­Turanianism for the EurasianTuranians, nor Pan­Islamism for the EurasianMohammedans should be in the foreground but ratherEurasianism. All these Pan­isms, by increasing thecentrifugal forces of the nationalisms of the particularpeoples, unilaterally emphasize the connection of suchpeoplewithotherpeoplesonlyonthebasisofaspecifictypeofcriterionandthereforearenotcapableofmakingthese peoples a real nation, alive and with its ownpersonality.Ontheotherhand,intheEurasianfraternity,the peoples are linked to each other not by a singlecriterionbut ratherby the general communityof theirhistoricaldestinies.Eurasia isageographical,economicand historical whole. The destinies of the Eurasianpeoples have intertwinedwith each other and form alarge solid circle that can no longer be broken, for theseparation of a people from this unity can only beaccomplishedthroughartificialviolenceovernatureandmust leadtosuffering.NothingcanbesaidaboutthosegroupsofpeoplesthatareatthebasisoftheconceptofPan­Slavism,Pan­Islamism orPan­Turanianism:neitheroneof thesegroups isboundby suchastrongunityofdestiny […] It is necessary to reeducate the self­consciousness of the peoples of Eurasia so thatEurasianistnationalismcanfulfillitsunifyingroleintheEurasian state. It canbe said that life itself isnaturallyalreadyinchargeofthisreeducation.ThemerefactthatEurasianpeoples—unlikeallotherpeoples—forafewyearsnowliveandcoexistunderthecommunistregimegenerates among these peoples thousands of newpsychological and historico­cultural links and forcesthem to truly and clearly feel the community of theirhistorical destinies. Of course, this is not enough. It isnecessaryforthoseindividualswhohaveclearlybecomeawareof theunityof themultinationalEurasiannationtoproclaimtheirbeliefinthatEurasiannationinwhichthey live. Here there is a mountain of work forphilosophers,publicists,poets,writers,artists,musiciansandscientistsofthemostdifferentspecialties[...]Inthisworkofre­educationofnationalself­consciousnessandestablishment of a “symphonic” unity of the

174

multinational Eurasian nation, itwill be necessary fortheRussianpeople to strivemore than otherEurasianpeoples.Firstofall,itneedsmorethantheotherstofightagainst the old attitudes and points of view that putRussian national self­consciousness out of the realcontextoftheEurasianworldandthepastoftheRussianpeopleoutofthegeneralperspectiveofEurasianhistory.Secondly,theRussianpeople,whobeforetheRevolutionwere the sole ruler of the entire territory of Russia­Eurasia and are now the first (in number andimportance)amongtheEurasianpeoples,naturallymustset an example for the others. The work of theEurasianists in re­educatingnational self­consciousnesstoday isextremelydifficult.Inthe territoryoftheUSSR,this work cannot be done openly. Emigration isdominated by peopleunable to assimilate the objectivechanges and results of the Revolution in theirconsciousness.Forsuchpeople,Russiacontinuestoexistas a whole of the territorial units conquered by theRussian people and belonging solely to it. Hence theycannotunderstand theproblem of the creation ofPan­EurasiannationalismandaffirmationoftheunityoftheEurasian nation formed of diverse peoples. For them,Eurasianists are “traitors” for having replaced theconceptof “Russia”with thatof “Eurasia.”Theydonotunderstand that itwas not the Eurasianistswhomadethischangebutrather life.TheydonotunderstandthattheirRussiannationalism,inthepresentcircumstances,isamereRussianseparatismand that thepureRussiatheywant torevive isonlypossiblewiththeseparationof all the border regions, that is, the borders ofethnographicGreatRussia.OthercurrentsofemigrationattackEurasianists intheoppositedirection,demandingan end to any claim of national originality, andunderstand that Russia can be built on the basis ofEuropeandemocracy,withoutdistinctionofanynationalor class substratum for Russian state configuration.Being representativesof theabstractWestern trendsoftheoldergenerationsoftheRussian intelligentsia,thesepeopledonotwant tounderstand that fortheexistenceof thestate it isnecessaryanawarenessof theorganicbelonging of the citizens of that state to a totality, anorganic unity that can only be either ethnic or class­

175

based. That iswhy, under the current conditions, onlytwosolutionsarepossible:eitherthedictatorshipoftheproletariatortheawarenessoftheunityandoriginalityof theEurasiannation formedbyvariouspeopleswithPan­Eurasiannationalism.(Trubetskoi[1927]2009,pp.99­105)

TrubetskoithusendshisappealinfavoroftheencouragementofaPan­Eurasian nationalism to replace the former Russian particularistnationalism.Hismain argument is historicist.He argues that the long(oftenfriendly)coexistenceamongtheEurasianpeoplesledtoanorganiccommunityamongthem.Andthatthisorganiccommunitywasnotonlyinevitable but alsohealthy and should be actively stimulated instead ofadheringtotheformerformsofpurelyRussiannationalism. Itisnotdifficulttonoticehowhereticaltheseideasseemedtothetraditional nationalists of white Russian emigration. Not only didTrubetskoi attack the sacrosanct character of the larger role of GreatRussiabutheseemedtobedangerouslyclosetojustifyingtheroleoftheBolsheviksasprogressiveintheconsolidationofaSovietstatewhich,inone way or another, maintained and strengthened the unity of theEurasianpeoplesunderit. FromtheinitialtextwehaveseeninEuropeandHumanitytoPan­EurasianNationalism, Trubestkoi seems to reason in a line of thoughtwith a priori concepts (on the importance of the national and ethnicelement, for example) that starts off from abstraction and goes on tohistoricalexamples. It is interesting tonote thecontrast in this respectwith the other great name of Eurasianism in the 1920s, i.e., thegeographer Peter Savitskii. Perhaps influenced by his professionaltraining,Savitskiitendedtobemoreconcreteinhisthinking,drawingonexisting geographical and historical examples and extrapolatingEurasianistconclusions therefrom.Savitskiiwasalsoresponsible for thespecifically “Eurasian” turn of the criticism that Trubetskoi made ofEurocentrisminEuropeandHumanitybywritingabookreviewthatdidjustthat:itredirectedTrubetskoi’sgeneralanti­EurocentriccritiquetoaspecificallyEurasiansolutionforthecaseofRussia.Let’slookatsomeofhisLeitmotivebelow.PeterNikolaevichSavitskii(1895­1968) Interestingly, inrelationto(Russian?Eurasian?)nationalism,it isto be noted that Savitskii was a descendant of the Little Russian (i.e.,Ukrainian)nobility;hewasnotaGreatRussian,likeTrubetskoiandmost

176

of the other émigré eurasianists. His father was a landowner (fromChernigov, in Northern Ukraine) who became amember of the StateCouncil of the Russian Empire. After spending his childhood andadolescence inChernigov, Savitskii got into theFacultyofEconomicsofthePolytechnicInstituteofSt.Petersburgwhereheobtainedthediplomaof “economist­geographer” in 1916. At that time, he was closelyconnectedwithPeterStruve,whowastheleaderoftherightwingoftheKadet (Constitutional Democratic) party. Struve was his teacher andmentor at the Polytechnic Institute and published some of Savitskiiarticles in the journals he edited, such as Russkaya Mysl’ (“RussianThought”).SavitskiistoodoutasoneoftheyoungpromisesofmoderateRussian nationalist liberalism. In 1916­1917, Savitskii worked at theRussian embassy in Norway. With the outbreak of the Bolshevikrevolutionin1917,hereturnedtoUkraineandjoinedthewhitearmiesofgeneralsDenikinandWrangel.Heserved(againwithPeterStruve)intheso­called Foreign Ministry of General Wrangel’s rebel movement.Defeated,he fledalongwithpartof the remnantsofWrangel’sarmy toTurkey,where,alongwithStruve,herevived the journalRusskayaMysl’.The influenceofTrubetskoi’sbookEuropeandHumanitycausedhim tobreakwith the Eurocentrism of his former nationalist liberalism, thusdistancinghim fromStruve. In1920,hemovedtoSofia,Bulgaria,wherehe participated in the Eurasian Seminary that would generate theorganizedEurasianmovementwiththeeditionofthecollectionExodustotheEast.In1921,hemovedtoCzechoslovakia,whereheliveduntilWorldWarII.InPragueinthe1920s,hetaughtgeographyandeconomicsattheRussian People’s University, the Russian Institute for AgriculturalCooperation and the Russian Free University. In the 1930s, he taughtRussianandUkrainianlanguageandcultureattheGermanUniversity inPrague. At the time of the Nazi occupation in the 1940s, he becamedirector of the Russian Gymnasium in Prague. In 1945, with theinstallationof theSovietregime inCzechoslovakia,hewasarrestedandsent back to the USSR. In 1956, with Khrushchev’s process of de­Stalinization,hewasreleasedandrehabilitated.HelivedinCzechoslovakiaagain.In1961,hewasarrestedforhavingpublished(underpseudonymintheWesttheyearbefore)abookofpoemsnarratinghisexperienceinthe Stalinist Gulag camps. Shortly afterwards he was released due topressure from foreign intellectuals, led by Bertrand Russell.Symptomatically,hediedonApril13,1968, in themiddleof thePragueSpring,themovementthatsoughtanalternativepathtoCzechsocialism. Peter Savitskiiwas instrumental in outlining Eurasianism asweknow it. IfTrubetskoi catalyzed the possibility of the beginning of themovement with his anti­Eurocentric Europe and Humanity, it wasSavitskii, with his critical review of this book (entitled Europe and

177

Eurasia),thatchanneledTrubetskoi’sgeneralanti­Eurocentriccriticismina specifically Eurasian direction. In addition, as a geographer, Savitskiiwas arguably the first great thinker ofRussian geopolitics to create aspecifically“Russian”geopoliticalschoolratherthanamerecopyofearlyWesterngeopolitical thinkers suchasHalfordMackinder,AlfredThayerMahan, Friedrich Ratzel, and Karl Haushofer. Because he lived inemigrationinPrague,lessthanfourhoursfromBerlin,SavitskiiwasveryexposedtothedebatesoftheGermangeopoliticalschool,especiallyinthefigure of Karl Haushofer. In his essays, Savitskii also introduced ordeepened some special concepts that would later influence theEurasianist thinkers. He was very attentive to the importance of thenomadicpeoplesintheformationofEurasiaasadistinctbloc.Helikedtocall himself a “nomadologist” by claiming that “nomadology” was hisspecialbranchofstudies.EspeciallyinfluentialinthissensewashisessayOntheTasksofNomadology:WhyshouldScythiansandHunsbeinterestingto Russians? (Savitskii [1928] 2012) He introduced the concepts ofmestorazvitie (“space­development,” i.e., the intersection betweengeographic space and the socio­cultural environment that forms thedifferentgeographic­culturalunitsoftheworld)andcontinentaleconomy(typicalofcountriesandregionswithoutaccesstowarm­waterseas) inthe studies of economics and geopolitics. Geosophy was one of thedimensions inwhich he oftenworked. In hismore politicalworks, headvocatedtheconceptofideocracyinwhichtheidea(orideal)shouldbethe organizing force of the political system. In the 1930s, inspired byNikolai Trubetskoi’s and Roman Jackobson’s (linguistics) structuralmethod,heworkedonthecreationofastructuralistgeography. BelowwewillexaminesomeofSavitkii’s ideasbasedonhisowntexts. We will start with his text Europe and Eurasia (a review ofTrubetskoi’s book Europe and Humanity), written before theinstitutionalizationoftheEurasianistmovement.EuropeandEurasia We begin with this text, because it was fundamental for thecatalyzingof forces that laterwould form theEurasianistmovement. In1920, Nikolai Trubetskoi published the book Europe and Humanity inSofia, Bulgaria. This work represented a major essay againstEurocentrism ingeneral,urgingotherpeoplestoresist it.InEuropeandHumanity, Trubetskoi advocated no nationalism specifically, limitinghimselftoopposinghumanityingeneraltoEurocentrism.PeterSavitskiithenwroteareviewofTrubetskoi’sbookentitledEuropeandEurasiaandpublisheditinthejournalRusskayaMysl’in1921.Init,Savitskiicriticized

178

theexcessivelygeneral,undifferentiatedtoneoftheanti­EurocentrismofEurope andHumanity,proposing instead that, in theRussian case, theanti­Eurocentriccriticismshouldtakethedirection oftheconstructionofa Eurasian identity in Russia opposed to the Romano­Germanicintellectual yoke.Thus, the review EuropeandEurasiawas seminal forEurasianism.ItwasthroughthisredirectionbySavitskiithatTrubetskoi’santi­Eurocentriccriticismcametoserveasthebasisfortheformationofan anti­Eurocentric bloc centered on the idea of Eurasia. In concreteterms,thiswouldcometolifeintheseminarinSofiainwhichthesetwoauthors(plusGeorgiiFlorovskii,PeterSuvchinskiiandothers),discussedthese ideasand fromwhichwouldemerge the embryoofaEurasianistmovementunitedaroundsome(anti­EurocentricandEurasian­oriented)premises. LetusexaminesomeofthemainideasofEuropeandEurasiafromsome parts of the text. Early on, Savitskii criticizesTrubetskoi’s overlygeneralizingviewregardingtheabsoluteincomparabilityandqualitativeincommensurability between the different cultures of humanity.Whilearguing that this is true forvarious culturalaspects,hewill say that inscience and technology some comparative universal criteria can andshouldbeintroduced.

In the recently published brochure Europe andEurasia,PrinceN.S.Trubetskoiaddressedthequestionofthe relationshipofWesternEuropean culture—whichPrinceTrubetskoi,bythecriterionoftheracialoriginofthe principal peoples of Europe, called “Romano­Germanic” —and theculturesof the restofhumanity.To the question “Can one objectively demonstrate thattheRomano­Germanic culture ismoreperfect than theother cultures existing or that existed in the world?”,PrinceTrubetskoi respondsnegatively.Andhegoeson:“But ifso, then theevolutionary ladder (culturebuiltbyWesternEuropeanscientists)mustcollapse [...] Insteadwe get ahorizontal surface. Instead of theprinciple ofhierarchy between cultures and peoples in terms ofimprovement,wehave thenewprincipleofequalityofvalueandqualitative incommensurabilityofallculturesandpeoplesoftheglobe.”PrinceTrubetskoifirmlyinsistson this “newprinciple.”But it is appropriate to ask: isthis principle really new? Doesn’t the thought thatTrubetskoipositexpressexactlythedefinitionofculturethatcurrentlyexistsinculturalstudies?Cultureisthesetof “cultural values.” And “cultural value” (according to

179

Prince Trubetskoi’s definition, following the formula ofthe “Romano­Germanic” sociologist Gabriel Tarde) is“what isaccepted forthesatisfactionoftheneedsofallorpartofthemembersofcertainpeople.”Consequently,fortheemergenceofa“culturalvalue”itisnotnecessarythatitbeadoptedtosatisfytheneedsofallmembersofthe human race, of intelligible humanity. For theappearance of a cultural value, recognition by aparticularsocialgroupissufficient,evenifitisnotlarge.In otherwords, the concept of “cultural value” and itsrelated“culture”absolutelydonotappealtothecriterionofuniversalrecognitionanduniversalobligation.Inthevery definition of “cultural value” is included theindication that there isnouniversalcriterionbywhichthe “cultural values” of a people can be considered“betterormoreperfect”thantheculturalvaluescreatedby other peoples. In this sense, cultural value is a“subjective” rather than an “objective” value; and asubjectivevalue,bytheveryidea,eliminatestheproblemof“objectiveevidence”of itsperfectionor imperfection.The sphere of cultural evaluations is an area of“philosophical freedom” and Prince Trubetskoi isabsolutely right when he praises, for example, theinstitution of group marriage of Australians, exposingthe advantagesover “elementaryEuropeanmonogamy”orplaces,inprinciple,onthesameshelftheworksofartoftheprimitivepeoplesandthe“futuristicimagesdrawnby the Europeans.”But the “Romano­Germanic personwithacleanconsciousness”wouldalsoberightshowingthe superiority of monogamy and futurist paintings.After all, both were established and approved as“culturalvalues”inthesocialenvironmenttowhichtheybelonged, and by definition a “subjective” value in itscollective expression cannot be considered “better ormoreperfect”inauniversalsensethananothercreatedbydifferentpeople.Undoubtedly, thereareanumberof“culturalvalues”inrelationtowhichPrinceTrubetskoi’sview of his “value equivalence and qualitativeincommensurability” is absolutely true. But are all“cultural values” qualitatively incommensurable amongthemselves?PrinceTrubetskoi talksaboutall “cultures”and,on theotherhand,perceives “culture”asa certaincommonset:“normsoflaw,artisticworks,technicaland

180

institutionaldevices,scientificandphilosophicalworks.”Is suchageneralizing conceptionpossible? Is theviewon “value equivalence and qualitativeincommensurability” between cultures justifiablewhentheobjectofcomparison is “technicaldevices,”suchascomparingaboomerangwitha rifleasaweapon?Canwe here speak of the lack of a common criterion forjudging the degree of “perfection” as in the case of“worksofart”and“institutionalarrangements”?Istherenot aneed for some sort of general judgmenthere? Isnoteveryhomosapiensobligedtoacceptthattherifleis“more perfect” than the boomerang as a weapon ofattack and defense? The savages already familiarwithglass may think that theskyvisible to them ismadeofglass.Isitpossibletoascribetotheseviews“qualitativeequivalence” with the Romano­Germanic knowledgeabout the atmosphere? Prince Trubetskoi apparentlydoes not deny the universality (in other words,“perfection”) of the logic created by the Romano­Germanic. Either way, expressing his hope that hisarguments have been “logically demonstrated,” he doesnot expose any form of non­Romano­Germanic logic.From thepointofviewof logic,someof these “culturalvalues”provetobe“comparable”and“notequivalentinvalue”:somerespondingtologicandothersnot.Ifso,isPrince Trubetskoi right when he uses his concept of“valueequivalence”and“qualitativeincommensurability”nottocertain“culturalvalues”butto“cultures”takenasa whole? Within the inventory of culture one mustdifferentiate two types of cultural values: one refers tothedeterminationof theprincipaldirections,objectivesand“endinitself”ofthelifeofhumankindandhumanityin general; the other refers to the means to achievethoseends.Thisdifferencecanbeexpressedinanotherwaybytheoppositionbetweenideologyontheonehandand technology and empirical knowledge on the other.Norms of law, works of art, and institutionalarrangementsrelate to thesphereof ideology.Technicaldevicesandscientificarrangementsnaturallyfallintothesecond group. It is conceivable that there are cases ofdoubt to which sphere belongs a “cultural value.” Thepossibility of such a doubt does not eliminate theimportanceofthedistinction.EvenifweassumePrince

181

Trubetskoi’s “principle of equivalence in value andqualitative incommensurability” for the sphere ofideology, it is important topointout that in the fieldoftechnologyandempiricalknowledge,bytheverynatureof the subject, it is impossible not to recognize theexistence of common universal principles for theevaluationof thegreateror lesser improvementof thisor that technical or scientific advance, noting thedisparities between them and their qualitativemeasurability.(Savitskii,[1921]2012,pp.1­4)

Savistskii says that this lack ofdistinctionbetween ideology andtechnologyon thepartofTrubetskoican lead tounderestimationof thefactor“force”inhistory.

From thepointofviewofmethodologicalanalysis, it isperfectly clear why these ambiguities and ingenuities(fromwhich the book Europe andHumanity of PrinceTrubetskoisuffers)arose.TheyhavemadeTrubetskoi’swork enduppreaching culturalweakness because theauthor ignores the meaning of force as a mobilizingfactor of national cultural life [...] The situation isdifferentwhenoneevaluatesthe degreeofperfectionofcultures from the point of view of the development ofempiricalscience.Fromthispointofview, it ispossibleto rank cultures in relation to the degree ofwealth ofempirical knowledge accumulated within each culture.Butitisalsopossibletoevaluatethedegreeofperfectionof cultures by the criterion of their relative stability orstrength when in contact with other cultures. All the“great cultures of Antiquity” recognized by Europeanscienceweredestroyedby “barbarians.”These latter, inturn,sufferedtheinfluenceofthecultures“destroyed”bythem.Fromall this, it isconcluded that thecriterionofgreaterorlesserforcecanbeestablishedinvariouswaysin the different branches of human culture. In somecases, thesameculturehaspolitical­militarysuperiorityandsuperiorityinthefieldofculturalinfluence,asinthecase of the encounter between the present­dayEuropeansandtheprimitivepeoples.Butinothercasesa stronger culture in the political­military spherebecomes weaker in the field of cultural influence (ashappenedwhen the “great cultures of Antiquity”were

182

overthrownby“barbarians”).TheEuropeanvictoryovertheprimitivepeoplesasproofofthegreater“perfection”of European culture over that of the savagesmust beexplained in the direction of the greater cultural“perfection” from thepointofviewof force [... Surviveand] acquire historical importance only those culturesthat in theencounterwithothersprovestrongenoughtoensuretheirsurvival inoneofthesensesmentionedabove:whetherinthepolitical­militarysphereorinthefield of cultural influence. Otherwise, the culturedisappears as the culture of the Incas and the Aztecsdisappeared.[...]Equally,themaximofnationallifethatwe have discussed previously (“always own ideology,technologymay be own or alien”) applies only to thepeoples who have demonstrated stability and survivalcapacity in their cultural existence. After all, is “ownideology” possible in a people that cannot defendthemselves militarily or in any way resist culturalinfluences fromothers? [...] (Savitskii, [1921]2012,pp.5­7)

Thus, Savitskii’s view is somewhat different from that ofTrubetskoi’s,grantinginterculturalcomparisonsinthefieldoftechnologyand science and emphasizing the factor of force (stability) in therelationship between peoples and cultures. Condemning the overlygeneralandabstractcharacterofTrubetskoi’scriticismofEurocentrism,SavitskywillstudythespecificRussiancaseandarguethatthebestwayfor Russian culture to defend itself from Eurocentrism is to assume aEurasian character—which comesnaturally inboth geographical andhistoricalterms.

[In relation to the defense of their cultures ininternational encounters] the peoples of theworld arenot,andhaveneverbeen, inthesamesituationand findthemselves on a “ladder” rather than a “horizontalsurface.”ThiscircumstancedeterminesourevaluationofPrince Trubetskoi’s conception of the correlationbetweenRomano­Germanicandnon­Romano­Germaniccultures.TrubetskoitalksaboutEuropeandHumanity.Inthis case, the Romano­Germanic are “Europe”; and“Humanity” is the setof “Slavs,Chinese,Hindus,Arabs,Blacksandotherpeoples[...]withoutdistinctionofcolor”(p. 76). “We should always keep in mind that the

183

opposition between Slavs and Germans, or betweenTuraniansandAryans,doesnotprovideatrueanswertotheproblem.Therealoppositionisonlyone:EuropeandHumanity.” (p. 82) The challenge of combating “thenightmare[…]ofuniversalEuropeanization” isdirectedprecisely to “humanity.” This is the formulation of theproblem by Prince Trubetskoi who, as we have seen,ignores the factor of force in the questions of thecorrelation between human cultures. Can one considersuch formulation correct from thepointofviewof therecognitionofforceasthefundamentaldrivingfactorinthissphereofhumanexistence?Fromthispointofview,in order to combat “the nightmare [...] ofEuropeanization”itisnotpossibleforthisorthatpeoplesimply to exist as one of the constituent parts of“humanity,” but it is necessary to be able to opposeRomano­Germanic culture with a culture of equalstrength; this culture will help such people to manumilitari resist the political attacks of the Romano­Germanicand toannul thedominationof theirculturalinfluence. In other words, to overthrow the “yoke” ofRomano­Germanic culture, it is necessary not only tohavethedesire,buttohavethepowertodoso.Andthechallenge,thechallengeto“humanity”tofreeitselffromthehypnosisofthe“benefitsofcivilization,”onlymakesreal­empirical sense if it is proved that all the peoplesthat make up “humanity” actually have the strengthnecessaryforsuchatask.Itseemstousthatthereisnosuchevidenceatthepresenttime.Manypeoples,suchasAfricans and Malays, not to mention Australians andPapuans, have little chance of successfully resistingRomano­Germanic aggression. As long as the presentinterconnectionofallpartsof theworld isnotchanged,there is only one possibility for these peoples: theexchange of Romano­Germanic domination by another[...On theotherhand,does] theappearanceofcalls foremancipation, such as that of Trubetskoi’s, not meanthatinsomeempiricalnationalenvironment,especiallyin the one inwhich the callwasmade, the conditionsthat create the possibility for the realization of suchemancipation appeared? For reasoning that takesempirical reality into account, the opposition “Europeand Humanity,” as a program of struggle for cultural

184

emancipation, is an empty cry. But doesn’t behind thebuilding created by Trubetskoi stand the reality ofanother type of opposition? If we delve into PrinceTrubetskoi’s ideas, itseems tous that there isnodoubtthatsucha further realityexists.And this reality is theopposition between Europe and Russia [...] If at thepresentmomentitcannotbeexpectedthatinhumanityas a whole there is enough power to eliminate“Europeanization,”aren’t theresigns that, inoneof thepartsofhumanity(asunderstoodbyTrubetskoi), i.e., inRussia,suchpowerexists?Twofactsofempiricalrealityseemespeciallysignificant tous in thisrespect.On theone hand, in the process of Europeanization itself,Russia’s self­assertion in the field of literature and arttookplace.Thisself­assertionbecamesoundoubtedlyafact that, in the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies, Russia’s intellectual “export” in this fieldequaledorsurpassedits“import.”Ontheotherhand,asaresultoftheFirstWorldWarandtheRevolution,thereappeared in Russia that historical phenomenon calledBolshevism. It ispossible to imagine thehorrific terrorcarried out by theBolsheviks or the destruction of theeconomic lifederived from theireconomicexperiments.But, at the same time, we must recognize thatBolshevisminitswayofliferadicallydeniesthestateofmind thatmade theRussianpeopleevaluate “itspeopleand culture [...] from the Romano­Germanic point ofview.” It is true that, in the acts of the Bolsheviks, theinfluence of the West had an important role. ButBolshevism of the people, Bolshevism as a practice,departed substantially fromwhat theiroriginal leaders,the“WesternMarxists”thought.Asanaccomplishment,the Bolshevik social experiment, in its ideological andspatialscale,hadnoprototypeinthehistoryoftheWestand,inthissense,provedpeculiarlyRussian[...]Even fornon­Bolsheviks it is clear: the phenomenon ofBolshevism, by the global importance it has acquired,marks a significant change in the historico­culturalrelations between Europe and Russia. In thisphenomenon,theWestnolongeractsintheroleofactivefactorandRussia in the roleof imitator, followingwithsome delay the ways of other peoples. In this case,[Russia]doesnotrepeat,asusual,whathappenedinthe

185

main centers of the world (above all of Romano­Germanic Europe), but she herself determines herdestiny and the destiny of the world. Of courseBolshevismwillsooneror laterbe replacedbyanothersystem.Whatever the other system, itwill absorb thischange in the historico­cultural relations betweenEuropeandRussiabroughtaboutbytheBolsheviks.Fortheessenceofthischangeisnottheoppositionbetweenthe socialist system in its Bolshevik version and thecapitalist system of theWest [...] The essence of thischange is the new combination of elements of activityandpassivity,ofcreationandimitation,asitisinrecenttimesintherelationshipbetweenEuropeandRussia[...]This is a reality that we feel in the work of PrinceTrubetskoi.Wehavereducedto“EuropeandRussia”theopposition he placed between “Europe andHumanity.”Buteventhislastformulahasdisadvantagesintermsoflogicand,wewouldsay,intermsofgeography.Russia,byuniversally accepted conventions, has part of her inEurope,butapartelsewhere.TomskandIrkutskareasmuch part of Russia as Penza and Kharkov. In otherwords,EuropeanRussia figures inbothelementsof theopposition “Europe and Russia,” which destroys itslogicalandgeographicalconsistency. Itshouldbenotedthat, in a purely geographical sense, Russia [...]represents a special world, different from “Europe”(takenas thesetofcountries lyingwestof the Pulkovomeridian on the Atlantic side) and from Asia (as acombination of the plains of China, the Indiansubcontinent and Mesopotamia with themountainouscountriesbetween them and the adjacent islands).Thebasic topographical element of Russia as a geographicclusteristhethreeplains[…]Russiaistheunionoftheseplainswith thepartof themountainousborder regionsintheSouthandEast[...]Inalmostallitsextentithasafairly homogeneous climate in its basic characteristicsand itdiffers substantially from theprevailing climatesinEuropeandAsia[...]ThedifferencebetweenthetypesofdominantclimatesinRussiaandthoseofEuropeandAsia may be summarized in the traditional divisionbetween“continental”and“oceanic”climates.[...]Russia,formingbyitssizeaswellasbyitsgeographicalnatureaunique whole, and differing from the nature of the

186

adjacent countries, is a “continent in itself.” Thiscontinent,borderingEuropeandAsia,butunlikethetwo,deserves,inouropinion,thename“Eurasia”[...Thus]wedifferentiatebetween three continents:Europe,EurasiaandAsia.[...]Wehave identifiedRussiawithEurasia.Inthis sense, the antithesis “Europe and Russia,” whichcontainsinitselfageographicalincongruity,revealsitselfto us, more correctly and clearly, as the antithesis“Europe and Eurasia” [...] This modification is alsooriented toward some historico­cultural circumstances.Taking into account that some historico­culturaldeterminations are linked to the concepts of “Europe”and“Asia”,weincludeinthename“Eurasia”someofthecondensedhistorico­culturalcharacteristicsoftheworldwhich,atothertimes,wecall“Russian”:itscharacteristicas a combination of historico­cultural elements of“Europe”and “Asia”,withoutat thesame timebeing incompleteanalogywiththegeographicalnatureofEuropeorAsia.[...]Itisclearthatinthenon­Romano­Germanicworld, inwhichweput thequestionwhether “Eurasia”or “Russia” is not the force capable of overturning theunconditional “Romano­Germanic” domination [...]ethnographic Russia has a central and decisive role.(Savitskii,[1921]2012,pp.7­12)

ThereseemstobeacontradictioninSavitskii’sreasoning.Hesaysthat Russia is a “continent in itself” while claiming that it containshistorico­culturalcharacteristicsofEuropeandAsia(thatis,atthesametime it is a “synthesis” of both). It is interesting to note in his lastsentenceabovethatSavitskii,whilerecognizingtherelevanceoftheAsianpeoples in the formationof “Eurasia,”sees theethnicRussians,by theirpopulation weight and historical relevance, playing a “central anddetermining role” in the Eurasian struggle against excessive Europeaninfluence.Andhewillgoon todefend theposition thatotherEurasianpeoplesshouldjointheRussiansinthisbattleagainstEurocentrism.

[...]IfRussia,initsoppositiontoEurope,attractstoits field a number of non­Russian peoples, doesn’t itmean that these peoples will be simply replacing theyokeof the “Romano­Germanic” cultureby the yokeofRussianculture?Toanswerthisquestion,itmustfirstbenoted that the peoples of Eurasia are heterogeneousamong themselves. Their cultural powers are different

187

[...]Life iscrueland theweakerpeoplesofEurasiacangravitate to both the Russian yoke and the Romano­Germanic yoke.But in relation topeopleswho are notdevoid of cultural power, the main characteristic ofEurasian national conditions is the fact that relationsbetween the Russian nation and the other Eurasiannationsaredifferent from those in regionsattracted tothe sphereofEuropean colonialpolicy [...]Eurasia isaregion where there is a certain equality and“brotherhood”betweennations,withnoanalogy in theinternational relations of colonial empires. And“Eurasian” culture can be conceived as amore or lesscommoncreationandheritageofthepeoplesofEurasia.Is such a community of cultural creation and culturalheritageconceivableinrelationtotheRomano­Germanic,forexample,among theBlackBantuorevenamong theMalays?(Savitskii,[1921]2012,pp.13­14)

From thispositionofantithesisbetween “Eurasia”and “Europe,”Savitskii will end his book review by placing his differences withTrubetskoi’s position on the problem of European “science” and“ideology” andon the abstractnatureof theTrubetskoian sloganof theoppositionbetween“EuropeandHumanity.”

In what realistic way can “revolution [...] inpsychology”and“struggle[...]withoutanycompromises”occur that should free the non­Romano­Germanicpeoples from the “illusion of Romano­Germanicideology”?Forthisstruggletobeaccomplished,Romano­Germanicscienceandtechnologymustberemovedfromthis “revolution [...] inpsychology,” aswehave tried toshowbefore.Otherwise,theRomano­Germaniccannonsveryquicklyandradicallywill returntheseself­assertivepeople to their “odious yoke.” In other words, the“revolution [...] in psychology” must be restricted to“ideology.” Prince Trubetskoi discusses the “self­centeredness that pervades the whole culture of theRomano­Germanic[...]andwhich forcesus tosee inallthe elements of this culture something absolutelysuperior and perfect.” Prince Trubetskoi sees in self­centeredness a “fatal deficiency” of Romano­Germanicculture. His program of “struggle [...] without anycompromise”leadstotheconclusionthat“non­Romano­

188

GermanicEuropeanisedpeoplesby receivingEuropeanculturecanpurge itofegocentrism.”According towhatwas written before, this “purge” can relate only toideology. So ifweput theproblemof the realizationofPrince Trubtskoi’s “program,” then we must askourselves:Is itpossibleto liberatethenational ideologyof this or that people from egocentrism? Let usremember that ideology, like any “cultural value,” existsinsofar as it is accepted for the satisfaction of certaintypes of needs “of all or part of the members of aparticular people.” Is it conceivable that the people (orpart of it) who affirms with their recognition theoriginalityofthisideologycandenyegocentricityintheirappreciationof it? Is itnotobvious that it is preciselybecausetheyseeinit“something[...]moreperfect”thatpeopleadopt thisor that ideology for thesatisfactionoftheir spiritual needs? And does recognizing an alienideologyassomethingsuperiorormoreperfect(orevenequal)thanone’sownnotmeangivingupone’sideologyand eliminating its existence? It seems to us that theveryelementofegocentrismis included inthenotionofideology.SincePrinceTrubetskoi’sbook, in thehopeofbreaking the shackles of the “heavy yoke” ofRomano­Germanic culture, wishes to do so by purging theegocentrismfromculture,hisideasareasunrealisticandalienatedfromempiricalrealityashisthinkingaboutthepossibility of cultural emancipation of all “humanity.”Isn’t the best proof of that Prince Trubetskoi’s ownattitude in relation to the ideology preached by him ofstruggle “against the nightmare [...] of generalEuropeanization”? […] He considers that all the“oppositions” proposed before him “do not give a realsolution to theproblemand that the realopposition isonly one”; obviously the prince’s proposal of “theRomano­Germanicandalltheotherspeopleoftheworldor Europe and humanity.” Doesn’t it show that theauthor of the book also recognizes the ideology hecreated as “superior and more perfect” than all theothersrelated to thisquestion? It is interestinghowhedemonstratesthepossibilitythatnotonlyindividualsbutpeoples can renounce egocentrismwhen he himself istrapped in this “fatal flaw.” It is necessary to recognizecategoricallythattherealisticempiricalplacementofthe

189

problem of emancipation from the “inevitability ofgeneral Europeanization” is not linked to therenunciationof “egocentrism”by thepeopleswho seeksuch emancipation. Not the end, but the beginning ofEuropeanization is linked to such renunciation. It isprecisely when the people begin to “eradicate theirnativecultureinfavoroftheEuropeanone,”whentheirintellectualsbeginto“seethemselvesasbackward,stuckin their development in the human family” and toevaluate“theirpeopleandculture[...] from thepointofview of the Romano­Germanic” that the peopleoverwhelminglyrejectegocentrismandsincerelystoptothink that their own “native” culture is “somethingsuperiorandmoreperfect.”Atthatmoment,thenumberof national self­asserting ideologies in the worlddecreases by one. The Romano­Germanic ideologyeliminates the original ideology of that people andreplaces it.Thisphenomenonoccurred inRussiaunderPetertheGreat,andafterhim,whenRussia,ideologicallyspeaking, crawled before Europe. A true cultural“emancipation”ofapeoplemustbe theexactopposite.Thepeopleshouldreturntotheconsciousnessthattheirideology, not some other’s, is “superior and moreperfect.” They are bathed in egocentrism, exalt theirideology and are ready to effectively defend itssuperiorityinthefaceofforeigners.Thenumberofself­affirming national ideologies in theworld increases byone. What has been said applies to the conceivablecultural emancipation of Russia­Eurasia. Emancipationcannot be achieved on the basis of the opposition“Europe and Humanity,” which exists only in mysticalaspirations,neitheronthebasisofpurgingtheRomano­Germaniccultureofitsegocentrism,butontheveryrealopposition of Eurasian egocentrism to Europeanegocentrism. The guarantee of the realization of suchemancipation lies in the creation of an effective andcreative (conscious and unconscious) Eurasian“egocentrism” that gathers strength in order toaccomplish featsandsacrifices. (Savitskii, [1921]2012,pp.14­16)

In Peter Savitskii’s review Europe and Eurasia about NikolaiTrubetskoi’s seminal book EuropeandHumanity, the initialdifferences

190

betweenthetwoareclear.Trubetskoipointed(withoriginalityonaworldscale, incidentally) to the dangers of Eurocentrism. But his criticism ofEurocentrism was of an abstract and general character, supposedlyrelatedtoa“characterflaw”(i.e.egocentrism)which,ifovercome,wouldmake available to mankind in general the possibility of emancipationfromEuropeanization(Westernization).Savitskiiagreeswiththecritiqueof Eurocentrism in principle, but criticizes this abstract and subjectivecharacterofthePrince’scriticism.Firstofall,hedisagreeswiththethesisabout the qualitative equality of all cultures and, in particular, withTrubetskoi’sdenialofthesuperiorityofEuropeanscienceandtechnologyoverthatofotherpeoples.Non­EuropeanpeoplesshouldtakeownershipofEuropeantechniquesandusethemagainsttheEuropeans.Butthetitleof Savitskii’s article denotes the difference of background between thetwo.Fromthemomenthethinksthatnotallculturesarepotentiallyequal(especially inscientificand technicalterms),Savitskiiproposesthat, forthe Russians, the best way is not to follow Trubetskoi’s oppositionbetween “Europe and Humanity” but rather the more pragmatic andrealistic antithesis “Europe and Eurasia”, even more so because heregardsEurasiaasacontinentinitself,geographicallyandculturallyonaparwithEuropeandAsia. It will be in the clash of these two conceptions of anti­Eurocentrism,especially from theEurasianseminaryorganized inSofia(Bulgaria) onward, that Eurasianistswould form theirWeltanschauung.Trubetskoi, a linguist and philosopher, without abandoning his moregeneralhumanisticprinciples,would inpracticeworkwithinaEurasianperspective of opposition toEurocentrism in Europe and correction ofBolshevikerrorsandexcessesinRussia.Savitskii,withhismorepracticaltraining as geographer and economist, would develop his vision ofEurasianisminotheressaysandimportantbooks,someofwhichwewillseebelow.TheSteppeandtheSedentaryLife Savitskii’sTheSteppeandtheSedentaryLifewaspublishedintheEurasianist compilation Na Putyakh [“At the Crossroads”] in Berlin in1922.Init,Savitskiicritiquesthe(SovietandWestern)viewthatthetwo­century(XIII­XV)MongoldominationoverRussiawasbadforthecountry.On thecontrary,Savitskiiargued that itwas theMongolswhoendedupuniting the disunited Russians, which would make possible thecentralizedandstrongMuscovitestatelater.Itwasarevisionistarticlenotonly historically but geographically, in showing the importance of theinteractionoftheAsiansteppenomadswiththefarmersofthefieldsand

191

with the forest hunters of the European regions of Russia. SavitskiibeginsbyputtingRussiaatthecenteroftheso­calledOldWorld.

Russia’spositionintheworldthatsurroundshercanbeseen from various points of view [...] Itmay be [seenfrom] theperceptionof theOldWorldasaunity [...] Inthis line of perception, there is an opposition betweenthe“marginal”and“coastal”regionsoftheOldWorld(inthe East [China], South [India, Iran] and West [theMediterraneanregionandWesternEurope])ontheonehand, and the “central”worldwith its “elasticmass” ofnomadsfromthesteppes,whetherTurksorMongols[...]Firstofall,letussaythefollowing:withoutMongolrulethere would have been no Russia. There is no worsecliché than the arrogant exaltation of the culturaldevelopment of pre­Mongolian Kievan Rus’,whichwassupposedlydestroyed and shattered by the invasion oftheTatars.We do notwant to deny certain, and great,cultural feats of the ancient Rus’ of the eleventh andtwelfth centuries. But the historical evaluation of thisperiod is distorted, since it does not demarcate theprocess of political and cultural degeneration thatwasvisibleinpre­MongolianRus’betweenthefirsthalfoftheeleventh century and the first half of the thirteenthcentury. This degeneration was expressed in the shiftfrom a relative political unity in the first half of theeleventhcenturytothechaosofdisunioninlaterperiods.This caused the decay of material possibilities, forexample, in thearts [...] If theCathedralofSt.Sophia inKiev inthe firsthalfoftheeleventhcentury in termsofsizeandqualitydeservedlyrivaledtheLatincathedralsoftheWest,what did the Russian coeval counterparts ofthe Parisian cathedral of Notre Dame, completed in1215, have to offer? [...] In the pre­MongolianRus’ lifetherewasanelementof instability,witha tendency fordegradation,whichwould eventually lead it to fall intosomeformofforeignyoke.Thiswasafeatureofvariouspeoples. The medieval and modern history of certainSlavic tribes was built under this paradigm: an initialflowering and then, instead of a strengthening of thatbloom, comes thedecline and the “yoke.”Thiswas thehistoryof theBulgarianSlavs, theSerbs,and thePoles.Thiswas also the fate of pre­Mongolian Rus’. Itwas a

192

greathappinessforRussiathat,bythetimeshewasduetofall,shewascaughtbytheMongolsandnotbyothers.The Mongols form a “neutral” cultural environment,becomingaccustomedtoallkindsofgodsandenduringanykindofculture.RussiafellunderthepunishmentofGod, but she did not lose the purity of her nationalculture.IfRussiahadfallenundertheTurks,infectedby“fanaticism and Iranian exaltation,” her tormentwouldhave beenworse and her fate bitter. If she had fallenundertheyokeoftheWest,shewouldhavelosthersoul.The Mongols did not change the spiritual essence ofRussia,buttheirdifferentialatthattime,asanorganizedmilitary force creating states, undoubtedly influencedRussia.By force of example,by the newblood infused,they gave Russia the ability to organize militarily,generate a strong state center, achieve stability. Theygavehertheabilitytobecomeapowerful“horde.”[...]Letussayplainly:throughouttheworldhistory,theWesternEuropeanmaritimesensationhasbeenpolarlyopposed,on equal terms,with the unique continental feeling oftheMongols.AndRussianexplorers,inthedimensionsofRussianconquestandexploration,havethesamespirit,thesamecontinental feeling.But theMongolswerenotexactly colonizers; the Russianswere. [...] TheMongolyoke, enabling the Russian state organization,discovering or reviving dormant abilities, wassimultaneously the crucible in which Russian spiritualoriginalitywas forged.The foundationof that isRussianreligiouspiety.AndthisRussianreligiousdevotion —asitis,andasitwasnurturedbytheRussianspirituallife—wascreatedpreciselyat the timeofMongol rule. Inthe pre­Mongol Rus’ era: loose traces, allusions. InMongol Russia came the completeness of mysticaldeepeningwiththeappearanceofherbestcreation:theRussianreligiousiconpainting.AnditspeakcameintheMongolera![...]RussiaisanheiressoftheGreatKhans,thecontinuationoftheworkofGenghisKhanandTimur,astheunifierofAsia[...]Inher,the“sedentary”elementand the “steppe” element come together. (Savitskii,[1922]2012a,pp.123­126)

The ideasoutlinedaboveare “heretical” formanyRussians.NotonlydoesSavitskiiunderestimatetheculturalandpoliticalachievements

193

ofKievanRus’(traditionallyseenastheoriginofRussiancivilization),buteven a large part of the religious deepening of the Russian people iscredited to the “infidel” Mongols! It was really a profound historicalrevisionismonthepartofthisEurasianistthinker. Savitskii, a professional geographer, will also investigate thesituation from the point of view of geography, analyzing the differenttypesofclimateandvegetationofRussia.Beforewereadhisownwords,itisusefultoreviewsomepointsaboutthegeographyofRussiaandthehistoricalmomentinwhichtheauthorwrotetobetterunderstandwhathe isdiscussing.18 In termsof vegetation, there are fivemajor areas inRussiathatareroughlydistributedfromthenortheasttothesouthwest:the tundra, the taiga (forest zone), the steppe (grassland with grassyvegetation), thearid zoneand themountain zone. In the farnorth, thetundra is a sparsely populated plain with no trees, withmuch of thesurface frozen andmanymarshes. Below comes the taiga, the largestforestareaintheworld,largelyconiferoustothenorthandmixedfurtherto the south. It coversmost of Russia. Its northern portion is poorlyadaptedtoagriculture,whileinthesouthernportion(the“brown”lands)itisreasonablyarable.Butitismoreinthesouth,inthegrassyplain,withfewertrees,thataretheso­called“blacklands,”themostfertilesoilofallRussia.To theeastof theCaspianSea, theareaof arid,semi­desertanddesert landsgraduallybegins.Finally, in theSouth,wehave theCrimeaandtheregionoftheCaucasusMountains(whereGeorgia,ArmeniaandAzerbaijan are located, aswell as Russian regions such as Chechnya),quite sunny andwarm. Savitskiiwill speakmuch of the encounter—which traditional authors called “shock”— between the original Slavicinhabitants(farmersandhunters)oftheforests(taiga)andthenomadicpeoples of the steppe. Finally, Savitskii will often mention Russianagriculture. To understand this fixation that seems somewhat “pre­modern”withtheprimarysectoroftheeconomy,oneneedstorecallthatSavitskiiwrotetheessayTheSteppeandtheSedentaryLife in1922,stillundertheeffectsofthegreatfaminecausedbybadharvestsinRussiain1921­23.Thequestionofhow to feed thepeople freshlyoutofa three­yearcivilwar(1918­1921)waspresentinSavitskii’sheadatthattime. Afterthesecontextualclarifications,letusfollowSavitskii’sideasinTheSteppeandtheSedentaryLife.

In pre­Mongol times, the Russian population evidentlydidnotgodeepintothesteppes,butitoccupiedagoodpartofthefrontierbetweentheforestsandthesteppes

18 The following description of Russia’s climate and vegetation can be seen in more detail in Mackenzie & Curran (1982, pp. 4-5).

194

[...] During theMongol rule, the Russians “stuck theirbutts” in the forests.An importanthistorical factof thepost­Mongol era was the expansion of the Russianpopulationtothesteppes,thepoliticalandethnographicconquest of the steppes. Combining in themselvesundoubted traces of the “steppe” heritage (“Asian” parexcellence)with an equally close approximation to thecharacterofWestern “peripheral”worldculture,Russiatoday is, in termsof territory,acombinationofregionsreproducing the geographical nature of some parts ofWestern Europe with the expansion of countriescharacteristically“outsideEurope”[...]Theoriginalityofthe Russian attitude toward the steppe was that theRussian ethnographic element transformed it from aregion dominated for centuries by nomadism into aregionwithagriculture.Inassessingthecharacterofthisprocess it is necessary to make clear the economic­geographical conditions inwhich theagricultureof thecolonizedsteppesis.InNorthAmerica,especiallyintheEast, the colonizers’ agriculture found conditionsfamiliar to their European origins, and there theyemploy the intensivemethods developed in Europe forthe cultivating of tubers and forage. The generalizedavailabilityofthecountryforsuchplantingwetakeastheprincipium individuationis of the geographicalEuropeanization of the country (provided that thisavailabilityismadeintheabsenceofartificialirrigation,since the latter’s existence is not a characteristic of“Europe”).Thereisnodoubtthat,fromthepointofviewof planting of tubers and fodder, the entire forest areaandmuchof the frontierzoneofRussia’ssteppe forestbeforetheUralscanbecharacterizedas“European.”Butis the Russian steppe “European”? The abstractclimatological analysis and the empirical economicanalysisdemonstratehowunfavorable thesteppe is forthecultivationof tubersand forage:excessivelydry [...]TheRussiansteppe,whichinsomepartsofitisgoodforplanting wheat, is not soil for potatoes or clover. Thetransition from the three­field system to otheragricultural production systems in Europe was madeprimarily on the basis of these two plants. In otherwords, the current agronomy of the Russian steppe islargelyandinevitablyanareaforthethree­fieldsystem.

195

This conclusionhasnotonly agricultural and technicalimplications but also cultural implications. If theinhabitantsof theWest,NorthwestandCentralpartsofRussiacanachieve,intheiragriculturalactivity,acertaindegreeof“Europeanization,”intheSouth,SoutheastandEast, and in some regions of Siberia, the extensiveeconomiccharacterisindeliblymarked.EvenpartsoftheRussian steppewill never be given to agriculture andwillcontinueascattleandequinebreedingregions(theso­called “absolute stockbreeding”). Again thesecircumstances have not only technical and agriculturalconsequencesbutalsoculturalones.NorthAmericaandAustralia also have regions with semi­desert and drysteppe.ButinNorthAmericaandAustraliatheseremainas “deserts,” without an important past or forms ofsettlement.ThesteppeofRussia,however,isahistoricalsteppe.ItisthesteppeoftheTurksandMongols,oneofthemain elements of the OldWorld [...] The extensivecharacterof its economicactivities,whichpersistsasalegacyofthesteppes,mustbecharacterizednotonlyassuch;thepreservation, in its inhabitants,ofa“feelingofthe steppes” […] The Russian people, who in theiroriginswerehunters in the forests and farmers in thefrontier regions of steppe­forest, in the last centuriesalso became a “people of the steppes.”We repeat thatthisisoneofthemostimportantfactsofmodernRussianhistory.Havinglived,inpreviouscenturies,theinfluenceof the people of the steppes as external, the presentRussiansconquerthesteppesthemselves.The“steppe”principle,graftedontheRussianelementfromoutsideasone of its constituent parts, is strengthened anddeepened in importance [...] and together with the“farmingpeople”and the “industrialpeople”within thelimits of the Russian nationalwhole, the “horse­ridingpeople,”eventhoughpracticingthethree­fieldsystem,isstrengthened [...]. Three economic tasks emerge fromthissetofhistorico­geographicalcircumstances:1)Theproblem of the “Europeanization” of agriculture in theregions of Russia which lend themselves tointensification [...].2)Theproblemofadaptationof thesteppestoagricultureinoriginalconditions,notfoundinEurope.3)Four agricultural areas follow eachother inRussianterritory.Thefirstisthe“European”agricultural

196

area(potatoesandclover).Thesecondistheagriculturalsteppe zone (wheat, inevitable three­field system). Thethird is thezoneof “absolutestockbreeding.”The latterends in the deserted area, where neither wheat norlivestockcangrow.Buthere,asawayofovercomingthedesert,theareaofartificialirrigationarises[...]Thus,inthe economic categories, the image of Russia as aterritorial“center”oftheOldWorldisdiscovered,astheeconomic equilibrium of “Europe” and “Asia” as“Eurasia,”notonlyinthehistoricalandculturalbutalsoeconomic­geographicalsense[...]There isacertain linkbetween economic and political tasks. The former canonly be realized under conditions of stability of thepoliticalsystem,under thepaxrossica. In the formationofthelatterweshouldnotlookonlyattheexampleofthepax romana. As terrible as theMongol rulewas, in itsappearance and expansion, the paxmongolicawas themost general in history. It was a time when “Frenchmerchantsandmonarchs”traveledquietlyandsmoothlyfrom Europe to China [...] In the face of the threat ofdeath by hunger that surrounds millions of Russians[today],argumentsabouteconomicnatureandabouttheeconomic composition of Russia may seem mereramblings [...] Itwillnotbe just economic concernsor[technological]“intensification”thatwillsaveRussiaifitis to be saved. Through spiritual enlightenment andspiritual fervorrunthepropheticpaths.Butraisingthespirit, it would be irrational and sinful to despise thematerialgiftsgivenbyGod.Tensioningthespirit,wewillovercome and eliminatemisery in themotherland. [...]The flow ofwaterwill be divided into ditches and theblessingofGodwillmakethedivinegardenbloomtherewhere ithadbloomedbeforeandhasnomore.And letthe sea of wheat and rye flow, noisier than ever, [...](Savitskii,[1922]2012a,pp.127­135)

Intheabovetext,Savitskiishowshis“pragmatic”characteramongtheEurasianists.JustasinthereviewEuropeandEurasiahehadbroughtthe general and abstract character of Trubetskoi’s criticism toEurocentrism (in Europe and Humanity) to a more practical level ofoppositionbetweenEurasiaandEurope,inTheSteppeandtheSedentaryLife Savitskiidwellsonproblemsof theday (in this case, the famineof1921 inSovietRussia).Despitealsomaking thecharacteristicappealof

197

the Eurasianists to the spiritual and religious side of the Russians, heproposed not to forget the practical side of using and developingGod­givengifts(theblessedsteppeandothernaturalresources)tosolvethatcatastrophic situation. Pragmatically, he is not against the use ofEuropean(“intensive”)methodsinthosepartsofRussiawherethistypeoffarmingisappropriate.ButheemphasizesthatRussia’sgreatestroadiselsewhere:inthesteppes,andeveninthefuturepotentialofthedesertand semi­desert areas with artificial irrigation (a historically “Asian”productionmethod,incidentally).Other texts: “Geographical andGeopolitical Foundations of Eurasianism”;“TheEurasianistConceptionofRussianHistory”;“GeopoliticalFoundationsofRussia” After these seminal texts, throughout the 1920s and 1930s,Savitskiidevelopedhisideasinaseriesofarticles(e.g.,“GeographicalandGeopoliticalFoundationsofEurasianism”,“TheEurasianistConceptionofRussianHistory”, and “Russian Geopolitical Foundations”). In them, hewill deepen some his concepts. One is the opposition between thecentrifugal tendencies of the fragmented European states and thecentralizing tendency in theEurasianworld.Forexample, inGeographicandGeopoliticalFoundationsofEurasianism(1933)hestatesthat:

Russia hasmuchmore foundation than China toassert herself as the “Middle Kingdom” (Zhongguo inChinese). And themore time passes, the stronger thebasewillbe.Europe,forRussia,isnothingmorethanapeninsula on the Old Continent west of her borders.Russiaoccupiesmostofthatcontinent,itsbackbone[...]Thenatureof theEurasianworld isunfavorable to thedifferent types of “separatisms,” whether political,culturaloreconomic.[…]Thebroadopendispositionofthe [geographical] zones in the layout of a “flag withhorizontalstripes”doesnotinduceanyofthis[...]Inthenorth of Eurasia there are hundreds of thousands ofkilometersofforests,amongwhichthereisnohectareofarableland.Howwilltheinhabitantsofthesespaceslivewithout contactwith the regions of the South? In theSouth,inspacesnolessvast,therearethesteppes,goodfor livestock and partly for agriculture; however wetravel thousands ofmiles there without seeing a tree.How can the inhabitants of this region live without

198

economic cooperation with the North? The nature ofEurasia suggests much more to men the need forpolitical,cultural,andeconomicunion thanEuropeandAsiado [...] It isnowonder that in theEurasianspacesgreat unifying political effortswere generated, such asthoseoftheScythians,theHunsandtheMongols(13th­15thcenturies),amongothers.Theseeffortscoverednotonlythesteppeandthedesertbutalsotheforestareatothenorthand themountainousregion to thesouth.NowonderEurasiabreathes thewindof the “brotherhoodof peoples,”which has its roots in centuries of culturalcontactandfusionofpeopleofdifferentraces,fromtheGermans (Crimean Goths) and Slavs to the Manchu,through the links of the Finnish, Turkish andMongolpeoples.This “brotherhood of peoples” is expressed inthe fact that here there is no opposition between“superior”and“inferior”races,thatheretheattractionisstronger than repulsion, thathere it iseasier togatherthe“willof thecommoncause.”ThehistoryofEurasia,since itsearliestchapters,bearswitness to that.Russiaabsorbed these traditions inherbasichistorical reality.In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, theywere temporarilyobscuredbydeliberate “Westernism,”whichrequiredRussianstofeel“European”(whichtheywere not) and treat the other Eurasian peoples as“Asians” or “lower race.” Such an attitude has not ledRussia to anything except disasters (for example, theRussianadventureintheFarEastintheearlytwentiethcentury). It ishoped that today this conceptionwillbetotallyovercome in theRussianconsciousnessand thatthe last Russian “Europeanism,” still surviving in exile,will loseallhistorical importance.Only theovercomingof deliberate “Westernism” opens theway for the truebrotherhoodofpeoples:Slavs,Finns,Turks,Mongols,etc.[...]Eurasiahas in thepastplayedaunifyingrole in theOldWorld.Today’sRussia,absorbingthistradition,mustdecisivelyandirrevocablyabandontheancientmethodsofunification,whichbelongtotimespast:themethodsofviolenceandwar.Inthecontemporaryperiodonemusttake the path of cultural creativity, inspiration,discernment and cooperation. This is what theEurasianistsaretalkingabout.(Savitskii,[1933]2012)

199

Savitskii reiterated his view of the tendency toward unificationandcentralizationof theEurasianpeoples(asopposed to theEuropeandynamicsofdecentralization) inthepaperTheEurasianistConceptionofRussianHistorywhichhereadataninternationalcongressofhistoriansinWarsawin1933.

Eurasianism,asan ideologicalmovement,emergedaround1921inthesettingofanewgenerationofyoungRussian intellectuals. It attempted to change basicconceptions in thewayofseeing thecourseofRussianhistory[...]Inthefieldofhistoriography,itconcentratedattention on the appearance of the Russian Empire oftheeighteenththrutwentiethcenturiesandof theSovietrepublics that succeeded it.What aspects of the pasthave produced these phenomena? What are thehistorical traditions embodied in them? In order toanswer these questions, the Eurasianists argue for thedecisive expansion of the framework in which theseproblemsaredealtwithinRussianhistory.TheyconsideritnecessarytoenlargethepicturetothesizeofEurasiaasaspecialhistoricalandgeographicalworld,extendingfrom the borders ofPoland to theGreatWallofChina.The Eurasianists paid close attention to certaingeographicalpeculiaritiesof thisworld—centerof theOldContinent—asopposedtothegeographicalfeaturesofitswestern(Europe)andsouthern(Asia)shores.Thecharacteristicofthisworldthatstandsoutisitslayoutasa “striped flag,” that is to say, theway its climatic andbotanical zones are disposed in horizontal layerssuperposedasinthestripesofaflag.Withinthelimitsofthisworld,overthecenturies,therehasbeenatendencytowardpoliticaland culturalunification.ThehistoryofEurasia, toa largeextent, is thehistoryof these trends.Its presence differentiates the history of Eurasia fromthehistoryofEuropeandAsia,muchmorefragmentaryfrom the cultural and political point of view. Suchtendencies were already present in the Copper andBronze Ages, throughoutwhich thewhole area of theEurasian steppe [...] was occupied by cultures of the“crouchedandcolored”skeletons (socalledby the typeofburial).ThenwecanseethespecificlinkbetweentheEurasianculturesofthesteppesandthezoneof forestsmore to the north [...] In later times, already close the

200

limits of the Iron Age, themain fact of the history ofEurasiawastheexistenceoftheScythiansandHunsaspowerful [...] Themost important fact in Pan­EurasianhistorywastheformationandexpansionoftheMongolEmpire [...] The so­called Kievan Rus’ emerged on thewestern frontierofEurasia at the time of a temporaryweakeningofPan­Eurasianunifyingtrends.Butthesoilonwhich itdevelopedwas, toa largeextent, thesoil inwhich, indue course, thepowersof the Scythians andtheHunsweredeveloped[...]TheconquestofRus’bytheMongols involved Russians in the general course ofevents inEurasia.Subsequently itbecame clear that itsnortheastern part, in the figure of Muscovite Russia,incorporated such power and spiritual strength that itcouldbe consideredheirtotheMongols:thesesedentarypeople took on the role of Pan­Eurasian unifier, a rolethat had previously been performed exclusively bynomadic powers of the steppes. Along with theweakening of the Golden Horde occurred whatTrubetskoicalledthe“transferringoftheMongolthronetoMoscow.”TheScythian,HunnicandMongolperiodsofPan­Eurasian history were followed by the Russianperiod.What has been said allows us to observe thehistorical continuity that enabled the formation of theRussian state in its features of the XVI­XX centuries.According to theEurasianists, tracing thissuccession inits Scythian, Hunnic, Mongol stages and intermediatelinksisofnolessimportanceforaRussianhistorianthanthestudyofRussianhistoryitself.[...]Thus,accordingtothe Eurasianists, the Russian state of the 16th­20thcenturiesismoreacontinuationoftheScythian,Hunnicand Mongol powers than of the state forms of pre­Mongol Rus’ (which, of course, does not exclude thetransfer of other important elements of the culturaltradition of the latter). This conclusion has beenconfirmed with particular force by observations fromthefieldofsocialhistory.Thesysteminwhichallclassesofsocietyare“ofservice,”pay“taxes,”wherethereisnorealprivatepropertyof land,andwheretheimportanceof each social group is assessed in its relation to thestate; all thishas its roots in thehistorical form of thenomadic nations. This system was appropriated byMuscovite Russia and gave it enormous political

201

strength.ImperialRussiaonlyincompletelyandpartiallymovedaway from it(in favorofEuropeanmodes).Oneobserves therenaissanceoftheprinciplesof“classesofservice”and“tributes”inthepoliticalandsocialregimeoftheUSSR.Fromthissamesourcecomestheprincipleof “statism,”with the enormous role of the state in theeconomy, so characteristic of Russian history of therecentyears[...]Intheculturalrealm,fortheEurasianistconception, it is especially important to observe twocircumstances:1) toemphasize thatsince the fifteenthcentury Russia is not a national but rather amultinationalstate.[...](2)toaffirmthatinthehistoryofRussia,thetieswithAsiaarenolessimportantthanthetieswithEurope.(Savitskii,[1933]2012a)

Eurasianism In the Evraziiskii Vremennik (“Eurasian Annals”) published inBerlin in 1925, Savitskiiwrote a text entitled Eurasianism inwhich herecapitulatedsomeof themain features of themovement, itsrelation tootherphilosophical currents (suchasSlavophilism, for example)and itspoliticalpositioninrelationtotheUSSR.ItisinterestingtoseethepartsofthislongessaythatgiveusinsightintotheEurasianistworldviewasacollectivemovement.

The Eurasianists are representatives of a newprinciple of mentality and life [...] Its name has a“geographical”origin. It isa fact that,while theancientgeographyspannedtwocontinentswithintheOldWorld(Europe and Asia), they began to differentiate a thirdone,thecentralcontinentof“Eurasia”[...]IntheopinionoftheEurasianists,theconceptof“Europe”asawholeofWestern Europe and Eastern Europe does not makesense.Inthewest[ofEurope],geographicallydescribed,there is a rich coastal development, an erosion of thecontinent intopeninsula and islands; in the [European]east there is a solid continentalmasswith only a fewscatteredconnectionswith thecoast. In termsofrelief,in the West there is an intricate combination ofmountains,hills,and lowlands; in theeast,an immenseplain,surroundedbymountainsonlyontheperiphery.In

202

termsof climate, in thewest there is a coastal climatewith relatively small differences between winter andsummer; in theeast, these temperaturedifferencesareacute, with hot summers and severe winters. To behonest,theEasternEuropeanplainismuchmoresimilarto theplainsofwesternSiberiaandTurkestan, lying tothe eastof it, than toWesternEurope [...]These threeplains mentioned, together with the mountain rangeswhich separate them from each other andwith thosethatformtheirbordersintheeast,southandsoutheast[...] constitute aworld in itself, geographically differentfrom both the countries to the west and from thecountriestotheeastandsouth.And ifthe formerwereto be called “Europe” and the latter “Asia,” then thisintermediateworlddeservesthename“Eurasia”[...]Theneed to differentiatewithin the OldWorld not two, aswas done before, but rather three continents is no“discovery” of Eurasianists. It stems from conceptsalready expressed earlier by some geographers,especiallyRussian(e.g.,Prof.V.Lamanskiiinhisworkof1892). The Eurasianists sharpened this formula andbaptized the new continent with a name that wassometimes used to designate the whole Old World(“Europe” and “Asia”) together [... A] qualification ofRussian culture as “Eurasian” is the one that bestdescribesitsessence.Fromtheculturesofthepasttherewere two great and well­known to us: the Hellenisticculture (combining in itself elements of the Helleniccultureofthe“West”withthatoftheancient“East”)andtheByzantineculture thatcontinued it.The thirdgreat“Eurasian” culture [the Russian] emerged to a largeextent as a continuity of the two precedent ones [...]DefiningRussian culture as “Eurasian,”Eurasianists actas awareness­raisers of Russian cultural originality. Inthis sphere, theyhave evenmorepredecessors than intheir purely geographical definitions. One mustrecognizeassuchallthethinkersoftheSlavophilechain,including Gogol’ and Dostoevskii (as philosopher­publicist). Eurasianists as a whole are followers of apowerful tradition of philosophical and historicalthought.Inamoreimmediatesense,thistraditiondatesbacktothe1830sand1840swhentheSlavophilesbegantheiractivities. Inabroadersense, to this traditioncan

203

beaddedaseriesofworksofancientRussianliterature,the oldest of which emerged in the late fifteenth andearly sixteenth centuries. When the capture ofConstantinople (1453) sharpened in Russians theawareness of their role as defenders of Orthodoxy andfollowersofByzantineculture, ideasappeared inRussiawhich, inasense,maybeconsideredprecursors to theSlavophiles and Eurasianists. Some of thesemen who“paved the way” for Eurasianism — like Gogol’ orDostoevskii,butalsootherSlavophilesandsympathizersof the type of Khomyakov and Leont’ev — simplyovershadowedEurasianists because of the sizeof theirhistoricalfigure.Butthisdoesnotalterthefactthattheyand the Eurasianists have the same thinking about anumber of issues and that the formulation of thisthinkingbytheEurasianistsisinsomewaysmoresubtleand sophisticated than in their great predecessors. Totheextent that theSlavophilesreliedon theconceptionof“Slavism”asthebasicprincipleoftheoriginalculturaland historical originality of Russia, they assumedpositions that were difficult to defend. Among certainSlavic peoples there is undoubtedly a historico­culturalandmainly linguisticconnection.ButSlavophilismdoesnot serve as the basic organizing principle of culturaloriginality — at least in the empirical sense it hasassumed at the present time. The creative culturalexpression of the personality of the Bulgarians andSerbo­Croatians still needs strengthening in the future.Culturally, thePolesand theCzechsbelong to theworldof “Western Europe” [...] The historical originality ofRussia clearly cannot be based either principally orexclusivelyonherbelongingtothe“Slavicworld.”Sensingthis, the Slavophiles turned intellectually to Byzantium.But by emphasizing Russia’s ties with Byzantium,Slavophilismdidnotandcouldnotgive formulaswhichfully expressed the character of Russian historico­cultural traditionsand impressedaunilateral characterintheviewofcontinuitybetweenByzantiumandRussia.Eurasianism, in a way, overcomes this one­sidedness.The “Eurasianist” formulation, taking into account theimpossibilityofdeterminingRussianculturaloriginality(past,presentorfuture)byconcentratingontheconceptof“Slavism,”pointsoutasasourceofsuchoriginalitythe

204

combination, in Russian culture, of “European” and“Asian”elements.AstheRussiancultureshowsthelatterelements, Eurasianism establishes the link betweenRussian culture and theworldofAsian culture [...] andthisconnection isoneof thestrongestsidesofRussianculture. Thus Russia’s relationship with Byzantium,which,inthesamesense,alsohadan“Eurasian”cultureis correctly framed [...] In short, this is the role of theEurasianists in raising awareness of the historico­cultural originality of Russia. But the content of theseteachingsisnotlimitedtoawareness.Thisawarenessisbasedonageneralconceptionofcultureand from thisconception one draws conclusions fromwhat happenstoday.We will first present this conception and thenmoveontotheconclusionsconcerningtoday’sworld.Inboth spheres, Eurasianists feel as the ideologicalsuccessors of the Russian thinkers mentioned above(Slavophiles and sympathizers) [... Initially] theEurasianists confronted the thesis of the “absolute”characterofmodernEuropeanculture,seenasthemostperfectcompletionof thepreviousculturalevolutionofthe world [...] The Eurasianists have noted that theEuropeans call “savage” and “backward” not the onewho isobjectivelybelow their levelofachievementbutsimplytheonewhohasawayofseeingandactingintheworlddifferent from them, “Europeans” [...] Itmustberecognizedthatintheculturalevolutionoftheworld,weare facedwith “cultures” or “culturalmilieux,” some ofwhich have achieved more and others less. Butdetermining the level of achievement of each culturalmilieu is possible only by dividing such culture intodifferent fields or sectors. A cultural milieu that hasachieved less inonesectormayhaveachievedmore inanother [...] Eurasianists join those thinkerswho denythe possibility of universal “progress” [...] If theevolutionary line develops divided into several sectors,then there can be no single upwardmovement nor aconstant and irreversible approximation to perfection[...] This provision applies especially to the culturalenvironment“ofEurope.”FromtheEurasianistpointofview, she bought her technical and scientificimprovementattheexpenseofideologicaland,aboveall,religious impoverishment. The ambiguity of her

205

achievements isclearlyexpressed inher relation to theeconomy. For centuries there has been in Old Worldhistory a correlation between theideological/moral/religious principle on the one handandtheeconomicprincipleontheother.Moreprecisely,therewasasubordinationofthelattertotheformer[...]Theeconomicphilosophy[oftheancients]was,tosomeextent, the philosophy of the “subordinate economy.”They emphasized that there should be a binding linkbetweenthesatisfactionofeconomicneedsandgeneralmoral principles. The economic philosophy ofmodernEuropeansopposesthisview[...and]affirmsthesphereofeconomicphenomenaassomethingautonomousandself­sufficient [...] If themetaphysics of the formerwasthe philosophy of “subordinate economy,” themetaphysics of the latter is the philosophy of “militanteconomism” [...] Historical materialism is the mostcomplete and dramatic expression of that [...] For theEurasianist consciousness, the experience of thecommunist revolutionmade clear a truth both ancientand new: healthy social living can only be based onman’s close connection with God, with religion. [...] Itwouldbesuperficialandanimpotentattempttocombatonlythemostapparent formsofhistoricalmaterialism,atheismandcommunism.It isnecessarytodeclarewaron the “militant economism” wherever it is [...] Onlypersonal faith is not enough. It must take collectiveforms.EurasianistsareOrthodox.TheOrthodoxChurchis the light that illuminates them [...] The OrthodoxChurch is the achievement of supreme freedom. Itsprinciple isconcordance,asopposed to theprincipleofpower,whichdominatesintheRomanChurchwhichhasseparatedfrom[theOrthodoxChurch].ToEurasianists,itseemsthatinseverecasesofworldlylifethereisnowayto go without severe power, but in the spiritual andreligiousmatters good leadership comes only throughfreedomandharmony[...]AndsoperhapstheOrthodoxChurch has the ability, under the new religious era, tobless thenew techniquesandeconomics,purging themof the “superstructure” of the ideological “militanteconomism,”materialism and atheism [...]Eurasianismisnotonlyasystemofhistoricalortheoreticalteachings.It tries to combine thoughtwith action.And,within its

206

limits, besides the theoretical positions, it proposes amethodology of action [...] The Eurasianists are bothadvocates of religious principles and consequentfollowers of empiricalpractice [...] In thepractice field,theEurasianistseliminate theoppositionbetween “left”and “right” in political and social decisions [... For theEurasianists] the important thing is the religiousemphasis, which is obtained outside the empiricalpolitical and economic sphere. As decisions in thissphere allow for religious evaluation, “right” and “left”decisionsmaybegood[...]Inpracticaldecisions, fortheEurasianist,withoutanyprejudice,theguidingprincipleis the demands of life. Hence, in some decisions theEurasianistmay bemore radical than radicals, and inothers more conservative than conservatives.Eurasianists have a viscerally historical perception.Anintegralpartofthisperceptionisthesenseofcontinuityofhistoricaltraditions.Butthisfeelingdoesnotturnintoastereotypicalstraightjacket[...]RenderuntoCaesarthethings that are Caesar’s (i.e., take into account alleconomic and political demands of the time) withoutabandoning and harming what is God’s. The task forEurasianists is this[...](Savitskii,[1925]2012,pp.100­123)

Savitskii’s Eurasianism article illuminates key points of themovementasawhole,whileatthesame timerevealingsomepeculiaritiesof Savitskii as a thinker. In it, Savitskiimakes clear the relationship ofcontinuityanddiscontinuitywiththeoldSlavophilethinkers:hesupportstheir opposition to thematerialism ofWestern Europeans, but at thesametimehecriticizestheSlavophiles’worshippingoftheSlavicelementoftheancientRus’.Thisisanextremelyhereticalpositionvis­à­visalmostallotherRussian“nationalist”currents,which,byandlarge,tendtoholdthe Slavic elementas themainstayof their ideologies.Eurasianists,asawhole,tendtoconsiderKievanRus'fragilebecauseofitsdecentralizedanddisunitedcharacter.ButSavitskiigoes furtherthanmostEurasianistsbysuggesting that the culture of Kievan Rus’ was not so grandiose aspredecessorofpresent­dayRussianculture,byclaimingthatitwasintheperiodofMongolrulethatthegreatspiritualtraitsoftheRussianpeople(especially their religious devotion) really consolidated. AnothercharacteristicofSavitskii’sisclearinthetext:his“pragmatism”withinthelarger cultural and spiritual frameworkof theEurasianists.Throughoutthe text, it isclear that forSavitskii,as formost traditionalEurasianists,

207

thespiritualandreligious(andevenspecificallyOrthodox)elementisthegreatmainstayofhisworldview,includingpolitics.However,justasintheessay The Steppe and the Sedentary Life, Savitskii, after stating thecardinalimportanceofspiritualprinciples,drawsattentiontothefactthatpragmatic andmaterial aspects should not be overlooked either. Thisbecomes clear when he says that the main problem today is not“historicalmaterialism,atheismand communism”but rather that “it isnecessarytodeclarewaron ‘militanteconomism’”,thesubordinationofall dimensions of human life to market laws. This makes clear hispragmatismandattentiontothedetailsofthe“economicbase”ofsociety.AndonthesideoftheEurasianistsasawhole,itisnowonderthatsuchpositions tended to arouse distrust from othermore traditionalist andconservative currents that accused the Eurasianists of being at leastlenientaboutthedangersofBolshevismandCommunism. Savitskii,asageographer,wasoneoftheEurasianistswhopointedto Eurasia as an extra continent, separate from Europe and Asia. Theposition of several other Eurasianists is not so clear, with someemphasizing the aspects of Eurasia as a synthesis ofEurope andAsia.After all, the view that one of the greatmainstays ofRussia’s strengthcomespreciselyfromtheblendofthe“European”Slavicelementwiththe“Asian”Turkic/Mongolian (Turanian)element isa fundamentalprincipleof theEurasianists.Aswehaveseen in the textsabove,Savitskiiclearlystates that Eurasia is a separate continent from Europe and Asia.However, there issomecontradictionbetween this “separatist”positionandsomeofhisstatementssuchastheonewehaveseenabovethat“ifthefirsttwo[worlds]werecalledEuropeandAsia,thenthemiddleworlddeserves thenameEurasia.” In such passages, Savitskii seesEurasia assomehow “deriving” from the concepts of Europe and Asia, whichcontradictssomewhathisclaimofEurasiaasaseparatecontinent,withitsowncharacteristics.ThistensionbetweenEurasiaasaseparateworldandEurasiaasasynthesisofEuropeandAsiaissharperinSavitskiithaninmostothermoderateEurasianists,whoaremore likely toaccept theviewofRussiaasasynthesisofEuropeandAsia,orabridgebetweenthetwo.ThefateofTrubetskoi,SavitskiiandEurasianistsingeneral ThetextsabovebyTrubetskoiandSavitskii, thetwogreatnamesofEurasianism inthe1920sand1930s,giveusa fairlyclear ideaof themajorconceptionsofthemovement’smainstream.Whatwasthefateofthismovement? Aswe also saw earlier, Eurasianismwas born in the1920s and continued with relative strength until the 1930s. Several

208

factorscontributedtoitsdecayinthe1940sanditsvirtualdisappearanceasanorganizedmovement around the timeofWorldWar II.Themainfactor may have been the “impossible situation” of the interwarmovement.AswesawinSavitsky’stextsabove,Eurasianistsproposedtobe not only theoretical but also practical agents of politicaltransformation. They proposed nothing less than steer the USSR in aEurasiandirection.However,theywereabunchofemigrantsanddidnothave substantial internal support in the USSR. This put them on an“impossiblemission”: at the same time that they could notmodify theUSSR internally, their understanding of certain “positive,” “Eurasian”aspects of the consequences of Bolshevik actions isolated them fromother currents of Russian emigration which were viscerally anti­Bolshevik and anticommunist. To make matters worse, the SovietinfiltrationoftheEurasianistmovementbymeansoftheTrestoperation,whichmainlyhit the leftwingof themovement, furtherdiscredited theEurasianists vis­à­vis their ideological competitors. And finally, the laststone castwas the SecondWorldWar itself. Firstly, because theNazi’ssavageinvasionoftheUSSRraisedsympathytheworldoverforthebraveresistanceof theRussiancommunists(suffice it tosay that theU.S.andtheWesternpowersbecametheirallies!).Thismadelifemoredifficultforopponents of Russian Bolshevism, even “lenient” ones like theEurasianists. Secondly, the USSR, victorious inWorldWar II, occupiedseveralEasternEuropeancountries inwhich theEurasianistshad theirbases, such as Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. After a Soviet regimewasinstalled inCzechoslovakia, Savitskii,a resident there, spent time in jail.Thus,the firstwaveofEurasianismpracticallydiedoutasanorganizedmovementwithWorldWarII. ButEurasianismasan ideologywouldbe rebornasaphoenix inthefinalperiodoftheUSSR,intheformofneo­Eurasianism.Thecrucialfigure of this renaissance in the final period of the USSR was theethnologistLevGumilev,whomwewillstudybelow.LevNikolaevichGumilev(1912­1992) Gumilev’sparentsweretwofamousRussianpoetswhobegantheircareersintheso­calledSilverAge(shortlybeforetheRussianRevolution)of Russian poetry: Nikolai Gumilev and Anna Akhmatova. Nikolai andAnnawerepre­revolutionarypoetswhohadneverbeenabletoadapttotheBolshevik system.Theywerepersecutedby the regime and youngLevfelttheconsequences:hewasrepeatedlyarrestedandexpelledfromeducational institutions because he was “the son ofcounterrevolutionaries.” His father, amonarchist, divorced hismother

209

when Lev was seven, and was executed in 1921 on charges ofcounterrevolutionaryconspiracy.Hismotherwouldmarryagain,andLevwaspractically raisedby hispaternal grandmother in theTver region,halfway between Moscow and St. Petersburg. This tenuous andcontradictoryrelationshipwiththefamousmotherwouldmarkGumilev’slife. Lev Gumilevwas born in Tsarskoe Selo, near St. Petersburg, in1912.His lifewould thus revolvearound the cityofLeningradandnotMoscow.And his youthwould bemarked by the “damned” heritage ofparentsdislikedby theSoviet regime.Often treatedasablacksheepatschool, in 1930 he tried to get into university, but was refused. Afterpassing throughsome jobs,heobtainedanofficialpositionatageologyinstitute, the Institute ofNon­MetallicMineral Resources. This enabledhimtoparticipateingeologicalresearchtoursthroughvariousregionsofRussia,whichputhim incontactwith severalnon­Europeanpeoplesofthecountry.In1933and1935,hewasbrieflyarrestedformisdemeanors,such as participating in readings of poems considered somewhatsubversive.In1934,hewasacceptedasanundergraduateattheHistorydepartmentoftheUniversityofLeningrad.Beforegraduating,in1938hewas arrested for the third time, now with a serious accusation ofparticipating in a terrorist conspiracy against Leningrad party leaderAndreiZhdanov.Hewassentencedtofiveyearsinlaborcamps.In1944,uponhisreleasefromprison,hebecameavolunteertofightinWorldWarII.Heparticipated in the battle forBerlin.With the endof thewar,hereturned to Russia and graduated in history from the University ofLeningrad at thebeginningof1946. In that same year,hegot into themaster’s program (aspirantura) in Oriental Studies of the Leningradbranchof the InstituteofOrientalStudiesof theAcademyofSciencesoftheUSSR,buthewouldbeofficiallyexcludedfromthereforthereasonof“nothaving thenecessaryphilologicalpreparation for this specialty.” In1947,hebecamealibrarianattheLeningradPsychotherapeuticHospital.Throughlettersofrecommendation,hemanagedtocontinuehismaster’s(aspirantura), now in the area of History. On December 28, 1948, hedefended hismaster’s dissertation (dissertatsiya kandidat istoricheskikhnauk)inhistoryattheUniversityofLeningradentitledPoliticalHistoryofthe First Turkish Khanate. He began to work as a researcher at theMuseum of Ethnography of the Peoples of the USSR. OnNovember 7,1949, hewas arrested and sentenced to ten years in labor camps.Hewould be freed only in 1956, after Stalin's death, with the collectiveamnestybroughtaboutbyKhrushchev’sThawliberalizationprocess.HereturnedtoLeningrad,wherethedirectoroftheHermitagemuseum,M.I.Artamonov,gothima jobasalibrarian.Itwaswiththisjobthathewasable to prepare for the defense of his doctoral thesis (doktorskaya

210

dissertatsiya)inHistoryattheUniversityofLeningradin1961.ThetitleofthethesiswasTheTurksofAntiquity,sixthtoeighthcenturies.Afterthedoctoral defense, Gumilev was invited to work as a researcher at theInstitute of Geographical Scientific Research at the University ofLeningrad.Hemaintained thispostuntilhis retirement in1986. Itwasthrough thisbridgewithgeography that in1974hedefendeda seconddoctoral thesis, now in Geography,with the title ofwhatwould in thefuturebehismostfamousbook:EthnogenesisandtheBiosphereofEarth.Thecontroversysurroundingthisthesiswouldbesogreatthatfinally,onMay21,1976,GumilevreceivedthenewsthathisseconddoctoralthesisinGeographywouldnotbeenoughtogivehimaseconddoctoraldegree. Gumilev’spost­doctoralacademiclifedidnotfeaturearrestsaswasthe case in his youth. With the end of Stalinism at the time ofKhrushchev’s thaw, and later in the bureaucratic Brezhnev era, theclimate was no longer of an open witch­hunt. Gumilev’s unorthodoxscientificthinking,whichsubtlyevadedMarxistorthodoxy,displeasedtheauthorities. Until perestroika, his works were not published by bigpublishers or had sizable print runs. Gumilev published his articles inspecialized collections of small circulation, edited by the institutionswhere heworked.Hisworkwas tolerated by the system, but receivedunfavorable treatment in termsofpublication.Thesituationwouldonlychangewith perestroika (1985­1991), in the final phase ofwhich hisworks (inparticular,Ethnogenesisand theBiosphereofEarth,publishedas a book initially with a small print run in 1979) would be verysuccessful. In the finalphaseofperestroika,orthodoxMarxism fell intodisfavorandGumilev’salternativeapproach(thoughcontroversial) wonmanysupportersamongthepublic. GumilevpracticallydidnotsurvivetheUSSR(whichdisintegratedinDecember1991):hediedonJune15,1992. AmongthemainworksbyGumilevare:TheHistoryoftheHsiung­nu (1960), The Turks of Antiquity (1964), Searching for an ImaginaryKingdom:TheLegendoftheKingdomofPresterJohn(1970),TheHsiung­nu in China (1974), Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of Earth (1979),AncientRus’andtheGreatSteppe(1989)andFromRus’toRussia(1992). InouranalysisofGumilev’s ideas,wewill focusonthe lastthreebooks.EthnogenesisandtheBiosphereofEarthwastheseminalworkinwhich Lev systematized his new theory of the emergence, growth,decline,anddisappearanceofethnicities.Anditwasinthelasttwobooksthat,withtheopeningofperestroika,Gumilevcouldopenlyusehistheoryto explain events in the history of Russia and Eurasia, without thelimitations of the old Soviet times. In the decades prior to perestroika,Gumilev’s work was purposely technical and academic on ancientcivilizationsandpeoplesof theEast.StudyingAntiquitywasaway,used

211

bymanyscholars,toescapethestraitjacketoftheofficialSovietMarxism,which broughtmoreweight to bear the closer the analyses got to thecontemporarytimesofmoderncapitalismandsocialism.EthnogenesisandtheBiosphereofEarth This book (originally hisdoctoral thesis in geography) launchesGumilev’stheoryoftheemergence,growth,declineanddisappearanceofethnicities.ThatiswhyGumilevisgenerallydescribedasan“ethnologist.”This denominationmay be right, because in his ethnology, the authorusesamultidisciplinaryapproach.Onemustremember thatGumilev, inaddition to hismaster's and doctorate in History, also got amaster’sdegreeinOrientalStudiesandaPhDinGeography.Hebringstohisworkthe contribution of these and other areas (including the biological andgeological sciences, which form the most controversial part of hisapproach). Because it issomultidisciplinary,histheory iscomplex.Herewewillattempttopresentasummaryofhisbasicideasusing,inadditiontoEthnogenesisandtheBiosphereofEarth,thelaterbooksAncientRus’andtheGreatSteppeandFromRus’toRussia,whichexemplifyhistheoryonthehistoryofRussia andEurasia. (Gumilev,2010 [1979],2011 [1989]and2008[1992]). The initialquestion inEthnogenesisandtheBiosphereofEarth isrelated to the theme of “the sudden fortification of peoples and theirconsequent disappearance.” (Gumilev, 2010 [1979], p. 11) Why doethnicitiesarise,grow stronger,decline,anddisappear?The conceptofethnicity or ethnic group (from the Greek ethnos, plural ethnoi) thenbecomes fundamental.Gumilevprovidesseveralapproximatedefinitionsofethnos.Thefirstgeneralexplanationofthebookisasfollows:“Ethnosisaphenomenonofthebiosphere,asystemicwholeofthediscretetype,functioningonthebasisofthebiochemicalenergyofthelivingorganism,according to thesecond lawof thermodynamics,which iscorroboratedbythediachronicsequenceofhistoricalevents.”19(Gumilev,2010[1979],

19 The second law (or principle) of thermodynamics says that “The amount of entropy of any thermodynamically isolated system tends to increase with time until it reaches a maximum value.” If the first law of thermodynamics (“The total energy transferred to a system is equal to the variation of its internal energy”) establishes the principle of conservation of energy, or equivalence between work and heat, the second law establishes the conditions for transformations. One of the consequences of the second law is that, when one part of a closed system interacts with another part, the energy tends to divide equally, until the system reaches a state of thermal equilibrium.Entropy is a thermodynamic quantity which expresses the degree of irreversibility of a system.According to the second law of thermodynamics, work can

212

p.11) By this initial explanation one notices that the author uses aheterodoxdefinitionofethnicgenesis.Gumilev(2010,pp.31­32)deniesthatethnogenesis isamerelysocialphenomenon,tobestudiedonlybythehuman and social sciences, and says that it runs in the intersticesbetweenhistory,geographyandbiology. It isnecessary tousematerialfrom these three disciplines together to understand the ethnogenicprocesses, and none of the three, in themselves, is sufficient toencompassthemasawhole. Inadditiontobeingheterodox,theviewthatsuchphenomenaarenot merely social, but biological, brings to the author accusations ofbiologism andwill also open adoor to accusations of biological racismwhen using the theory for certain phenomena.On the other hand, theemphasison geographic features attracts some criticismof “geographicdeterminism.”Thesecriticismswewillseelater. LetuslookatthegeneralschemeofGumilev’sexplanationfortheprocessofethnicgenesisortheemergenceofnewethnoiorethnicities.First,hedismissestheusualdefinitionsofethnicityas“asocialgroupthatsharesacommonanddistinctiveculture,religion, language,or the like.”(dictionary.reference.com;Gumilev,2010 [1979],pp.46,48,50and54)

be completely converted into heat and thermal energy, but thermal energy cannot be completely converted into work. The part of energy that cannot be transformed into work is measured by means of entropy. By the second law, in closed systems in which natural processes occur, the entropy always grows: the opposite never occurs. Thus, from the moment a system is closed until the final state (state of thermodynamic equilibrium), the tendency of entropy is to grow. Entropy is defined, in simplified form, in regular dictionaries as “thermodynamic magnitude that expresses the degree of disorder, the thermal agitation of a reversible system, expressing the energy of the system that cannot transform into work and dissipates: the more disordered the energy, the greater the entropy and the less the amount of work obtained.” This definition has to do with the identification of “work” as ordered movement of particles and “heat” with disordered movement of particles. In work as transfer of kinetic energy, or thermal energy, the particles responsible for the transfer move in an ordered, directed way, following the movement boundary, whereas in heat the propagation of thermal energy happens in a more random, non-directed way. Increasing the disorder would thus mean wasting energy that could be harnessed as work; not being used as work, it is delivered in the form of heat to the cold source of the system. Once it is delivered to the cold source, the energy tied to the increase in entropy can no longer be converted into work. The concept of entropy is fundamental to understanding Gumilev’s hypothesis of ethnogenesis, which is, as we shall see later, based on the assumption that the energy that triggers ethnic genesis is biochemical and obedient to the second law of thermodynamics. In an ethnic system in which the initial genetic impulse has occurred, after a certain time, unless external influences occur to modify this panorama, the tendency is that the entropy grows and the energy of that initial impulse diminishes.

213

Hedismissesthisbyshowingtheexistenceofethnicitiesthatdonothaveacommonlanguageorreligion(buttwoormore,suchastheSwiss),havecustomsverydifferentiated internallyand/ordifferent typesof culture.He also discards the mythological versions of a common ancestor inantiquity.His finaldefinitionofethnos is: “Acollectiveofpeople formednaturallyonthebasisofauniquestereotypeofbehavior,whichexistsasan energetic system based on the sensation of complementarity,whichcontrastswithothercollectivesformedonthesamebasis.”(Gumilev,2010[1979],p.549) In this definition some elements are important. The concept of“stereotype of behavior” is fundamental to understanding the author’sway of thinking. Gumilev believes that, rather than being an abstractconcept of culture or customs, ethnoi develop a pattern of commonresponse tocertainsocialsituationsorcertainchallengesofnature thatsurround them. This is not a merely social or psychological adaptivemechanism.Duetothebiologicalandenergeticnatureofthe impulseofethnogenesis(asweshallsee later),“stereotypesofbehavior”acquireanatural,moreobjectivecharacterthanthesubjectiveconceptsofcultureor customs.Thedefinition of stereotype of behavior byGumilev (2010[1979],p.546)is:“Complexpatternsofbehaviorofmembersofanethnicsystem, variable over time and transmitted through signal heredity(signal’nayanasledstvennost’).”SignalheredityisaconceptcreatedbytheRussiangeneticistMikhailE.Lobashevtodescribeinananimalgroupthetransmissionofbehavioralhabitstotheoffspring,throughlearningbytheconditioned reflexof imitation. Imitationenables importantpatterns forthe survivalanddevelopmentofananimal collective to spread throughthegroupandpotentiallybepasseddownthroughthegenerations.Theidea of this concept came to Lobashevwhen observing that,when cutprematurely from contact with their group, young animals ceased todevelop certainhabits consideredvitalor important for thatgroup.Theobservationofhowtherestoftheyounganimals in thegroupacquiredthese vital capacities through repetitive imitation led Lobashev to theconceptofsignalheredity.GumilevappliedthisconceptofLobashev’stothe study of ethnic groups by identifying itwith the role of tradition.Accordingtohim,

Itwouldseemthattraditioncouldneverbeclassifiedaspart

of biology, but the mechanism of intergenerationalinteraction discovered by Professor M.E. Lobashev(precisely when studying animals, among which heidentified the processes of signal heredity) is simplyanothername fortradition.Individualadaptationoccurs

214

in the animal kingdom through the mechanism ofconditioned reflexes, which provides animals with anactivechoiceoflivingconditionsandself­defense.Thesereflexesaretransmittedbytheparentstothechildren,orby the older members of the pack to the youngermembers.That’swhy thestereotypeofbehavior is thesupremeformofadaptation.Inmanthisphenomenonisknown as the “continuity of civilization,” which isassured by the “sign of signs”: speech. This continuityincludeshabitsof life, formsof thought,appreciationofobjects of art, treatmentof the elders and relationshipsbetween the sexes,which ensureoptimaladaptation totheenvironmentandaretransmittedbysignalheredity.In combination with endogamy (i.e., isolation fromneighbors), which preserves the gene fund, traditionserves as a factor to ensure the stability of an ethniccollective.(Gumilev,2010[1979],p.238)

Thus,thisstereotypeofbehavior(orcommon,“learned”formsofreaction to certain situations or conditions in the surroundingenvironment) is the central factor of identification of an ethnic group,rather than mere genotype/phenotype considerations (racial type,physical type,commongeneticorigin,etc.).This stereotypeofbehaviorcanvarywith time (diachronically)but is synchronically stable, i.e., thestereotypeofRussianbehavior in theseventeenthcenturywasoneandinthenineteenthcenturywasanother,buttheformerwassharedbyallRussians of the seventeenth century and the latter was shared by allRussiansofthenineteenthcentury.

Everyethnoshas itsown internalstructureand itsuniquestereotypeofbehavior.Sometimes thestructureand stereotype of behavior change from generation togeneration.This indicates that theethnosdevelopsandits ethnogenesis is not, as a rule, dying away [...] Thestructureofastereotypeofethnicbehavior isastrictlydefined formof relations:a)between thecollectiveandthe individual; b) between individuals; c) between theinternalgroupsofthecollective;d)betweenethnosandits internal groups. These norms, unique in each case,changenowrapidlynowslowlyinallfieldsof(daily)life,perceivedbyeachethnosineachseparateepochastheonlywayofcoexistence[...]Theforceofthesterotypeofethnicbehavior isenormous,since themembersof the

215

ethnos perceive it as the onlymeritorious way, whileeverything else is “primitive” [...]Thus, the ethnos is acollectiveof individuals thatdistinguishes itself fromallother collectives. The ethnos is more or less stable,although it appears and disappears in historical time.Thereisnosingleattributefordefininganethnosthatisvalid for all cases we know of. Language, commongenetic origin, habits, material culture, ideologysometimes prove decisive, but sometimes not.We canemphasize only one thing: the acceptance by eachindividualofthemaxim:“wearesuch­and­such,andallothersaredifferent.”Asthisphenomenonisgeneral,wecan assume that it reflects some biological or physicalrealitythatwewilltakeasabase.Tointerpretthis“unitofmeasurement,”wemustanalyze theappearanceanddisappearance of ethnoi and establish the fundamentaldifferencesoftheethnoiamongthemselves.Toestablishthe differences between them requires a carefuldescription of the stereotypes of behavior of differentethnoi.However,itmustberememberedthatanethnos’behaviorchangeswithage,whichmustbecountedfromits emergence in the historical arena. It is thereforeimportant to introduce a means of recordingethnodynamics in the analysis. (Gumilev, 2010 [1979],pp.90­93)

In addition to the biological component, Gumilev’s conceptionencompassesastronggeographicandecologicalcomponent(weshouldnot forget that the book Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of EarthwasoriginallythedoctoralthesisingeographydefendedbyLevNikolaevichin1974). For Gumilev (2010 [1979], pp.196, 199­200), one of themostimportant components for the formation of the stereotype of behaviorand for theunique experience (thedifferentiated formof existence)ofthe ethnos is its relation with the geographical environment (whichGumilev calls Landschaft in Russian, literally “landscape”). An ethnosdevelops socially, technologically, etc. But, however developed a society,theethnoswillalwaysdevelopinrelationtothe“landscape”bywhichitissurrounded. And this relationship is not univocal: not only does thesurrounding environment influence the ethnos, but the ethnos itselfinfluences—andevenmodifies—thelandscapethatsurroundsit.ThereisastrongecologicalcomponentinGumilev’stheoryinthathepointsouttheecologicalconsequencesoftheethnoi’sdevelopmentalways. The importance of geography is so great for Gumilev (2010

216

[1979],p.321)thathegoesasfarastosaythata“normal”developmentofanethnoswithoutitsrelationtoitsownlandscapeisnotpossible.Thisis a delicate moment in Gumilev’s theory. If an ethnos cannot beconceived normallywithout its own geographical environment, i.e., aterritory,what thenof theethnoiwithout territory (e.g., the Jews foralongtimeinthepast)?Gumilevhasanegativeconceptionoftheseethnoiwithouttheirownlandscape,sayingthattheywillhaveastrongtendencyto live “parasitarily” in the landscapes of other ethnoi. It is thephenomenon that can take the form ofwhathe calls xenia,20 that is, aminorityguestwholives insome formofsymbiosisamongthemajoritynatives,withoutminglingwiththem.(Gumilev2010[1979],p.543)HereGumilevopenshis flank toaccusationsofanti­Semitism.ThisgotworsewhenGumilev,afterperestroika,released thebookAncientRus’and theGreat Steppe. In it,he describedhow the ancientRussians, in order todeveloptheircivilization,hadtodefeattheirneighbors,theKhazars.AndGumilevaffirmed that thedecadenceof thepowerfulKhazarKhaganateoccurredwhen therewas a penetration of the Khazar elite by Jewishmerchantelements,withtheresultthatJudaismspreadamongthatelite.(Gumilev,2011[1989],pp.39­40,49­51,87­92,104­107,120­125,141,171­175,179­181,186­190)Gumilev’ssupporterssay that this isnotaspecificdiscriminationagainsttheJews,butratherpartofamoregeneralviewofGumilev’sthatmiscegenation(mixtureofethnoi)isnotahealthything for the survival of an ethnos in the long run. ForGumilev (2011[1989],pp.87­88),endogamyismoreconducivetotheconservationofanethnosthanexogamy. ThesearethemostcontroversialpartsofGumilev’sworkfromthepointofviewof thehumanities.Buthisemphasison thebiologicalandphysical aspectof thephenomenon of ethnogenesis (according tohim,not a merely social process) becomes especially controversial in thecentralconceptofhistheoryofethnicgenesis:passionarnost',whichcanbe translated as “passionarity.”21 Gumilev emphasizes that thephenomenon thatgeneratesnewethnicities isnot justa randomsocialprocess,butaformofenergy(intheliteralphysicalsense),abiochemicalenergy. Passionarity, for Gumilev, is a form of biochemical energy, anexcess of energy that leads certain people to act “passionately,”

20 Xenia (from the Greek xenos, “guest”; meaning “guest-friendship”) is the ancient Greek concept of hospitality; in geology, a xenolith (“foreign rock”) is a rock fragment that becomes enveloped in a larger rock during the latter’s development and solidification. 21 In English there is the adjective “passional” but there is no such noun as “passionality” and therefore passionarnost’is usually rendered as a neologism: “passionarity”. Gumilev calls the person full of passionarity “passionary.”

217

extrapolating the limits of the rationalism of self­preservation. Usuallypeopledonot “risk”much, fearing to risk their lives, their assets, theirsafety.This is a rational response to the risksof life.But, according toGumilev, there are certain times when an excess of energy forms incertain individuals who begin to act “passionately,” changing theirenvironmentandstatusquoinnewdirections,evenifthismayjeopardizetheir safety, and even their lives. It is in thesemomentsof eruptionofpassion (which first affects certain individuals, and then spreadsthroughout the rest of society) that the oldmoorings are released andnewethnicitiesmaketheirappearancealongwiththeirnewstereotypesofbehavior.

Thus, passionarity is the capacity and effort tomodifytheenvironmentor,translatingintothelanguageof physics, to destroy the inertia of the aggregativecondition of the environment. The impulse ofpassionarity is so strong that its bearers (the“passionaries”) cannot control themselves or feel theconsequences of their acts. This is an importantcircumstance thatdemonstrates thatpassionarity isnotan attribute of the conscience but of the subconscious[…]Thelevelofpassionarityvaries,butinordertohavehistorical visibility it is necessary that the number ofpassionaries be great, that is, that passionarity is notonlyan individual,butagroup characteristic. (Gumilev,2010[1979],p.271)

The emphasis placed above by Gumilev on geographical(relationship to territoryandenvironmentsurroundingtheethnos)andbiological/physical (passionarity as a form of biochemical energy) ishighlighted in the title of the book with the word biosphere inEthnogenesisand theBiosphereofEarth.Gumilev thusdefined the termbiosphere:

Biosphere: scientific term introduced by V.I.Vernadskii, which designates one of the layers of theearth and includes in itself, in addition to the total ofliving organisms, all the results of their vital activity:soils, sedimentary rocks, the free oxygen of theatmosphere.Thus, the relationshipdiscoveredbetweenethnogenesis and the biochemical processes of theatmosphere is not a “biologism,” as some of myopponentsclaim. It iscloser to “geographism”,although

218

this label isnotadequateeither.Afterall,everythingonEarth’s surface in one way or another is part ofgeography, be it physical, economic, or historicalgeography.(Gumilev,2010[1979],p.516)

Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskii (1863­1945) was the Russianscientistwhoconsolidatedandpopularized thetermbiosphere inSovietandworldscience.Thebiosphere,as thesumofallEarth’secosystems,hadbeeninventedasatermbythegeologistEduardSuessin1875,whodefined it as “theplaceonEarthwhere lifedwells.”But itwas actuallyVernadskii who deeply investigated, systematized and popularized theterm in the 1920s, becoming one of the pioneers of biochemistry andgeochemistry.Hisstartingpointwastheconceptionthattheformsoflifeon earth interactwith (influence and are influencedby) the inanimateformsoftheEarth.Thus,hepostulatedthatthedevelopmentoftheEarthhas gone through some stages. The first was the geosphere (withinanimatematter), the second thebiosphere (which includes biologicallife).Andhepostulated,visionarilyandcontroversially,athirdstage, thenoosphere (aconceptcreatedbyTeilharddeChardin), inwhichhumancognition, the power of thought, interacts and transforms both thegeosphere and the biosphere. His ideaswere one of the bases of theintellectualcurrentcalledRussiancosmism. GumilevusedthisVernadskiianconceptualbasistoassertthatthegenesisofnewethnicitiesisnotonlyasocialandhistoricalprocessbutalso(throughthenotionofpassionarityasbiochemicalenergy)biological,geographic and physical. That iswhy ethnogenesis is also part of thenaturalsciences.Actingon the interfacebetween thesocialandnaturalsciences,without being identified onlywith one side or the other, thestudyofethnogenesisgaveGumilevtheinspirationforthecreationoftheconceptofethnosphere.

This mosaic anthroposphere, which has beenconstantly changing in historical time and interactingwiththetopographyofplanetEarth,isnothingelsethananethnosphere.Sincemankindhasspreadeverywhere,though unevenly, over the land surface, and alwaysinteracts with the Earth’s natural environment, butdifferently, it issensible to treat itasoneof theEarth’senvelopes,butwith anobligatory correction for ethnicdifferences.SoIamintroducingtheterm“ethnosphere”which,likeothergeographicalphenomena,musthaveitsown patterns of development, different from thebiologicaland thesocial.Ethnicpatternsareobservable

219

in space (ethnography) and in time (ethnogenesis andthe palaeogeography of the anthropogenic landscape).(Gumilev,2010[1979],p.39)

In this ethnosphere, one can distinguish several levels of ethnicformations,suchasethnosandsuperethnos.TheconceptofsuperethnosisacreationofGumilev’sandoneofthemainstaysofhistheory. In termsof scope, from the smallest to the largest, thedifferentethnic levels identified by Gumilev are: consortium (convicinity) ­>subethnos­>ethnos­>superethnos.EthnoshasalreadybeendefinedbyGumilevaboveand is easier tounderstandbecause,althoughGumilev’sdefinitionisidiosyncratic,itsapplicationintherealworldcorrespondstowhat we normally call ethnicities (e.g., “French,” “Russian,” “English”).Gumilev (2010 [1979], 110) understands as a superethnos “a group ofethnoiarisingatthesametimeinadefiniteregionconnectedtogetherbyeconomic,ideological,andpoliticalcontacts.”Gumilevgivesexamplessuchas those of theWestern European (orRomano­Germanic superethnos,whichincludestheEnglish,theFrench,theGermans,amongothers),theMuslim superethnos (whose basic ethnicity is Arabic), the Helleno­Roman superethnos (paganGreeks andRomans) and theByzantineorOrthodox superethnos (which united the Greeks and other ancientpeoplesoftheOrthodoxreligion).(Gumilev, 2010[1979],pp.111,462)Ifexternallytheethnoiaregroupedintothelargerunitsofthesuperethnoithroughtheirsystemicconnections,internallytheethnoiaredividedintosubethnoi,whichare subsystemsof the former.To this categorybelongregional groups within the same ethnic group or groups formed bymeansofspecificcharacteristics(areligiousschism,orfromestates).Forexample,withintheGermanethnosaresubethnoiwithspecificities,suchas the Bavarian and the Frisian; within the Russian ethnos, the OldBelieverscametoconstituteasubethnosandsoon.Thesubethnoioftenarise in history from smaller units, called by Gumilev (2010 [1979],pp.106and109)consortiaandconvicinities.

We call consortia groups of people united by acommon historical destiny. They include “circles,”cooperatives, guilds, sects, bands, and similar unstableassociations. They usually dissolve quickly, butsometimes they persist for several generations. Thentheybecomeconvicinities,thatis,groupsofpeoplewithawayof lifeandordinary familyconnections.Theyarenot very resistant. They suffer erosion from exogamyandareshakenbysuccession, that is,acutechanges inhistorical circumstances. The unharmed convicinities

220

become subethnoi. Suchwere theRussian explorers [...who formed]consortiaofdesperate travelerswhogaveriseto[thesubethnosofthe]Siberians;thiswasalsothecase of theOld Believers. The first English colonies inAmerica were founded by consortia and becameconvicinities.(Gumilev,2010[1979],p.109)

Thus,throughvarioustypesoffusionanddivergenceattheethnicand subethnic levels,new ethnicitiesariseoutof thepassionary shock,that is, themomentwhen passionarity reaches certain regions of theearth(initiallyaffectingsomepeoplewithinacertainsocietyandthenthenew stereotype of behavior spreads to the rest of the population).Becauseofhischronologyofwhenthepassionaryshocksthatgaveriseto the various ethnoi and superethnoi occurred — especially whennoticing the geodesic form of their lines of dissemination across theterrestrial surface— Gumilev raised the hypothesis that perhaps thisshockofpassionarityhadcosmicorigin,throughthecosmicraysthathittheEarth(somethingliketheinfluencethatthephasesofthemoonhaveonthemovementsofthesea).(Gumilev&Ivanov,1984)Accordingtothedegree of internal passion, individuals can be divided into threecategories: (1) passionary; (2) harmonic and (3) subpassionary. Ifwetakepassionarity(readasanimpulsetochangethestatusquo,evenattherisk of one’s life or security) as opposed to the impulse of self­preservation, passionary individuals are those inwhom passionarity isgreater than the impulse of the instinct of self­preservation; thesubpassionary those inwhom passionarity is less than the impulse ofself­preservation; andharmonic individuals are those inwhich the twoimpulsesareequivalent.(Gumilev,2010,pp.268,289,542,544and546)Whenthepassionaryshock(perhapsofcosmicorigin)reachesaregionof the earth, the level of passionarity in a given population rises alongwiththenumberofpassionaryindividuals—whoselevelsofpassionarityarenaturallyremarkable—actingastheshocktroopsofthemovementtoward themodification of the ethnic status quo (modification of thestereotypeofbehavior). Once the passionary shock reaches sufficient criticalmass, theprocess of ethnogenesis begins. Ceteris paribus, the inertia of apassionaryshocklastsforabout1200to1500years,butfewethnoicancomplete the whole course, since external influences can modify thetendencies launched by the original shock. Like a living organism, anethnosundergoes severalphases in thisperiod.Gumilev (2010 [1979],pp.400,513)classifiedthemas:1)ascensionphase;2)climaxphase;3)phaseofcollapse;4)inertialphase;5)phaseofobscuration;6)memorialphase(orrelictphase).

221

The ascension phase is the period after the passionary shockreachesacertainregioninwhichthereisasensibleandstableincreaseinthe level of passionarity of the population. The individuals (formerlyclassified as) passionary have added to their naturally high level ofpassionarity theextrapassionaryenergybroughtaboutby theexternalshockandbegintodemandchangesinthestatusquo:

[…]acertainnumberofpersonsappear inoneortwogenerationswhoarenotresignedtothelimitationsthat their grandfathers willingly put up with. Theydemandaplaceinthesuncorrespondingtotheirtalents,energy,feats,andsuccesses,butnotpreviouslyaccordedthem,anddeterminedonlybyaccidentsofbirthinsomefamily. The first of them perish because the collectiveresists them, but if the process goes on long enough,thereprovestobeasufficientnumberofthesehothead,desperate, foolhardy, recklessmalcontents to rally andimpose their will on people of the old disposition.(Gumilev,2010[1979],pp.381­382)

The initialphaseof theascension is the incubationperiodwhenthecontoursof thenewethnosaregraduallydelineatedon thebasisofthe imperative “Wemust change theworld because it is bad” by thepassionaries and their followers. In the fully developed period of theascension phase, where it is already clear that the passionaries havebasicallywon thebattleof ethnic formation (i.e.,ofnew stereotypesofbehavior),theimperativebecomesmoreproud:“Wewanttobegreat!” In the climaxphase, thepassionary tension is vibratingwithinthelimitsofitsmaximumpossiblelevel.Itisone ofthemostcontradictoryphasesrepresentingatthesametimethepeakandthepossibilityofthebeginningofdescentbecause,by definition,one cannot gohigher thanthemaximum.Atthisstage,thepassionarypridecanreachsuchapointthat it becomes individual and competitive with one another. Theimperativebecomes“Beyourself.”

[...]inthetransitionfromtheascensionphasetotheclimaxphase[...]thesubordinationoftheelementsofthestructure decays, every person “wants to behimself/herself” and because of this the organizationsuffers,withtheinterestsoftheethnosfallingvictimtoindividual interests.Asarule,whenthishappens,bloodisshed,buttheculturedoesnotsuffer;onthecontrary,itflourishes.Aclearexampleofthiswasthedissolutionof

222

theArabCaliphateinemiratesinthetenthcentury.ThecoincidenceofpoliticaldissolutionwiththeflourishingofthepolyethnicMuslimculture,notedbyallscholars,wasclearlynotfortuitous[...]Intheclimaxphase[thereis]apassionate“overheating”[...andthen]comestheperiodof conquest andmigration. (Gumilev, 2010 [1979], pp.400­401)

Aftertheclimaxcomescollapse.Inthisperiod,theimportanceofthe subpassionary elements increases, sincemany passionaries eitherwent abroad for conquest or perished in the internal disputes of theperiodof“overheatingpassionarity”oftheclimax.Inthetransitiontothecollapsephase,theimperativeis:“Wearetiredofthebigones!” Afterthecollapsecomesthephaseofethnicinertia,the“goldenautumn”ofcivilization.Init,therehappens

[...]adrop in thepassionarityof theethnicsystemalongside an intensive accumulation of material andcultural values. After the cataclysmic changesexperienced,people,shaken,donotwantsuccessesbutrather peace.And they have already understood thatindividuality, the desire to always demonstrate one’soriginality,posesadangertoone’sneighbors.Toavoidit,itisnecessarytochangetheimperative.Justimagineorrationalize an ideal bearer of the best stereotype ofbehavior (even if it does not exist in practice) anddemandthateveryonebe likehim.InAntiquity,thecultof the emperor as God was founded on this basis.(Gumilev,2010[1979],pp.435,437)

In the phases of decrease of the level of passionarity (e.g., thephaseofinertia)thenatureoftheregionoftheethnossuffersmorethaninthephasesofascensionandclimax.

In the phase of ethnic inertia the capacity forterritorial expansion decreases and the time comes toinfluencethelandscapeofthecountryitself.Itincreasesthe technosphere, that is, the amount of necessary orunnecessary buildings, utensils,monuments, articles—at the expense of nature, of course. (Gumilev, 2010[1979],p.450)

The phase of obscuration is described by Gumilev as the

223

“twilight”ofanethnos:

The differentiating element [...] is the decrease ofthe active element and the total satisfaction of theworkingandpassivepopulationemotionally.However,athird variant should not be ruled out: the presence ofuneducated, non­creative people with mental andemotionalinsufficiencybutwithhighdemandsonlife.Inheroic times of growth and self­assertion, theseindividualshave littlechanceofsurviving.Theyarebadsoldiersandbadworkers,andthepathofcrimequicklyled to the scaffold. But in the “soft” era of civilization,withthegeneralmaterialabundance,thereisapieceofbreadandwomenforall.The“loversoflife”(thecurrentauthorapologizes for thisneologism)begin tomultiplywithoutlimitationand,astheyconstituteanindividualofanewtype,createtheimperative“Belikeus!”,Thatis,donotstriveforanythingthatisnoteatingordrinking.Allgrowth becomes hateful, love of work is subject toridicule,andintellectualdelightsprovokefury.Inthearts,there is a degrading of style. In science, the originalworksgivewaytocompilations.Insociallife,corruptionbecomes“law.”Inthearmy,thesoldierskeepofficersandsub­officers submissive, threatening them with riots.Everythingisforsale,youcannottrustanyone,orrelyonanything.Inordertorule,theprincemustusethetacticsofleadersofbandsofthieves:suspect,followandkillhisallies. The order established in this period, morecorrectlycalled “obscuration,”shouldnotbeconsidereddemocratic.Here,as inpreviousphases,certaingroupspredominate; only the selection principle becomesnegative.Education,skills,principlesarenotvaluedbutratherignoranceandlackofskillsandprinciples.Notallordinarymencanfitthispattern,andthereforebecome,from thepointofviewof thenew imperative,defectiveandunequal.Butherecomestheretribution:the“loversoflife”onlyknowhowtoparasitizeinthefatbodyofthepeople “eaten” in this period of civilization. Bythemselves, they cannot create or preserve. They feedonthebodyofthepeople,likecancerinthehumanbody,but when they win, by killing their rivals, they diethemselves. Indeed, even for the preservation of thefamily and the upbringing of children, quite different

224

qualities are needed than those so carefully cultivated.Otherwise,childrengetridoftheirparentsassoonasitbecomes comfortable for them todo so.Thus,after thebeginning of the reign of obscuration, its initiatorsdisappearlikedustandthedescendants(survivorsofallproblems)oftheinitiatorsofthestaticstateremain,who,among the ruins,againbegin to teach their children tolive quietly, avoiding conflictswithneighbors andwitheach other. Anatomically and physiologically they areintegral human beings, adapted to the geographicalenvironment,but the passionate tension in them is solowthatthedevelopmentprocessoftheethnosdoesnotcontinue. Even when a passionary individual is bornamong them,he seekshiswaynot inhisown country,but in others (for example, the Albanians made theircareersinVeniceorConstantinople).Atthispointthereremain two alternatives: to remain alive in the sadexistenceasarelictethnosorthey fallintothe[ethnic]melting pot and from some of their wreckage a newethnoswill emerge [...] and again the processwill gothrough all those same stages (unless interrupted byfortuitous external factors). Strangely enough, theobscuration phase does not always lead the ethnos todeath, though it always represents a strong blow toethnic culture. If the obscuration occurs quickly andthere are no predatory neighbors around, thirsting forconquest, then the imperative “Be like us!” receives alogical reaction: “Mine is theday!”Asa result, theverypossibilityofmaintainingtheethnicdominantandofanycollective enterprise, evendestructive ones, disappears.Purposeful development degenerates into a kind of“Brownianmotion”inwhichtheelements(individualsorsmallishconsortiathatpreservetradition,evenpartially)getachance tooppose the tendency togradualdecline.With thepresenceofsomepassionary tensionand theinertiaoftheday­to­daynormsgeneratedbytheethnosinearlierphases,theyretain“islets”ofculture,creatingadeceptive impression that theexistenceofethnosasanintegral system is not over.That is self­deception.Thesystem disappeared, leaving only a few individuals andtheirmemoryof the past.Thephaseofobscuration ishorrible because it represents a series of suddenvariations in the level of passion, in spite of the

225

insignificanceof theirabsolute size.Adaptation to suchrapid and frequent changes in the environmentinevitably takes time and the ethnos perishes assystemic totality [... As an example, in] China of theMiddle Ages obscuration gradually seeped in. By themiddle of the seventeenth century the rotten Mingbureaucracy capitulated to the peasant militia of LiZicheng, and the latterwas fulminantly destroyed by agroup of Manchus who had just joined under PrinceNurhaci. After that, China found herself in a state ofcatalepsy for twohundred years,which gaveEuropeanobserversreasontoevaluatethistemporary lethargyasan intrinsic feature ofChinese culture. In fact thiswasnot a disease of a developing culture, but the naturalaging of an ethnos that had already existed formorethan a thousand years (581­1683). (Gumilev, 2010[1979],pp.451­453,463­464)

Thememorial (or relict) phase is described by Gumilev as aresidualperiod,“aftertheend”oftheethnosasanactiveanddevelopingelement.

The memory of the past survives the inertia ofpassionarity,butpeoplearenotinapositiontopreserveit. Their efforts find no resonance in contemporaries,though they are not wholly unproductive. Thecompositionsofthepoetsarepreservedasfolklore.Themasterpiecesof artists become themes of folk art.Thehistoryoftheexploitsofthedefendersofthemotherlandturns into legends, a genre inwhich acuity isplaced inthebackground.WecanobservethispictureintheAltairegion.Sixtribeslive there[...]Allhavearichballadepic,manyof the subjectsofwhich arose in thedaysof theTurkic Kaghanate of the sixth to eighth centuries thatperished instrugglewiththeTangDynasty.TheTurkutswho saved themselves from the slaughter,hid away inthevalleysoftheHighAltai,andthereawaitedthetimeoftheirrebirthinvain.Theypassedintoastateclosetohomeostasis, but preserved their heroic poetry as amemoryofthepast.[...]Ethnoithatareinthisphaseofethnogenesisalwaysevokeafeelingofprofoundrespectamong ethnographers and “harmonic” (in the sense ofdegree of passionarity) colonists who find a common

226

language with the aborigines. But amongsubpassionariesandrapaciouspassionariestheyarousea savage, unrestrained hatred that excludes anypossibility of peaceful contact. That is especiallynoteworthy in thehistory ofNorthAmerica [...]Thereareverymanyisolatedethnoi,rememberingandvaluingtheirculture,buttherearealsosubethnoi,removedfromforwardmovement by the calamities of historical fateandconsciouslypreferringtopreservethestereotypeoftheirwayoflife,ifonlytopreservethememory,deartothem,of the“goldenpast.”Evenat thebeginningof thenineteenthcenturytheOldBelievercommunities intheRussian Empire lived that way. Under Catherine theGreattheOldBelieversceasedtobepersecutedfortheirfaithandwereabletokeepuptheritesandritualstheyconsidered “old.” [...]The examples show that after theendofthedynamicphasesofethnogenesisthesurvivingpeoplebynomeansbecomeworse, i.e.weaker,ormorestupid, than thosewho up to then had constituted theoverwhelmingmajorityoftheethnos.Itisnotthepeoplewho have changed but the ethnic system’s integrity.Earlier,alongwiththemajoritytherehadbeenayeastofpassionarity, exciting the system, interfering witheverything, but giving the system, i.e., the ethnos,resistanceandastriving forchanges.The ideal then,orrather forecast for thedistant future,wasdevelopment,but now the ideal became conservation. Theaggressiveness of the ethnic system, naturally,disappears,and its resistance is lowered,but the lawofpassionaryentropycontinuestooperate.Onlyinsteadofgainsthereare losses.Andmuch inthisdependson thecharacter of the ethnic environment.A subethnos thatlosttheinertiaofdevelopmentis,ofcourse,doomed,butthe peoplethatconstituteithaveachanceofmixingwithother subethnoiwithin their ethnos.Here they are athomeandnobodyisgoingtokillthem.Butadefencelessethnossurroundedbymembersofothersuperethnoiisa picture that chills the blood. The English did notconsider theTasmanianshuman,and rounded themupand got rid of them. [...] ***But even if these islets ofcultureintheseaofignoranceandferocitywereabletoholdoutandnotsink intochaosannihilating itself,theyare powerless against the last relict phase preceding

227

homeostasis, inwhich the descendants ofmembers ofthemost sluggish convicinities that have long ago lostpassionarity, are guided by the imperative “Troll, tothyselfbeenough!,”becausetheyarenolongermembersof an ethnos, as a system,but like the trolls inhabitingundergrowthandgorges(accordingtothebeliefsoftheoldNorwegians);thephraseIhavetaken is fromIbsen,becauseitisverysuitableforthem.Itmeans:“Trynottogetinthewayofothers,donotpesterthem,butdonotgrieveyourself,andhavepityonnothing.(Gumilev,2010[1979],pp.464­467)

Thus, at the end of their natural cycle, without passionarystrenght,theethnoiageorperish,orareabsorbedbyneighbors,orelseenterintoahomeostaticstateinwhichtheyendure,withdifficulties,likerelicsofthepast,justashadowofwhattheywerebefore. It is important tonote that these (denominationsof the)phasesrefer to levels ofpassionarity throughout ethnichistory.Ethnichistory,accordingtoGumilev(2008[1992],pp.14­15;2010[1979],pp.46­48),should not be confused with social history. The fact that ethnic(passionary) energy is diminishing in the phases of decline does notnecessarily mean that the country’s culture or wealth is fallingproportionally.Thepeakofculturegenerallyoccursinthecollapsephase,when,after theexcessesanddisputescausedby thehubbubofpassionduringtheclimacticphase,thecultureaccumulateduntilthencan,morequietly, reign. The great example was the Renaissance which, in theWesternEuropeansuperethnos,occurredinthecollapsephase.Materialwealth usually reaches its peak in the inertial phase.Only later do thedeclinesofspiritualandmaterialculturecorrelatemoredirectlybetweenthemselvesandwiththedeclineofpassionaryenergy. Regarding themain themeofourpresentwork(RussiabetweenEurope and Asia), of particular relevance is Gumilev’s concept ofsuperethnos. As we have seen, the different ethnoi were grouped byGumilev into largergroups,calledsuperethnoi,that is,agroupofethnoithat arise at about the same time in a specific region, from the samepassionary shock, and that, for that reason, share several traits incommon. Gumilev gives great importance to the surroundinggeographicalenvironment,i.e.,theregion(Landschaft)wheretheethnoslives.Anethnosnaturallybelongstothatregion,adaptstoit(andmodifiesitintheprocess),andthereforemodificationsinLandschaftbringaboutchanges in the ethnos. According to Gumilev, as the ethnoi of asuperethnos share a common origin, space, and traits, exchange and“borrowing” among them (even including periods of wars) does not

228

endanger their existence as a whole. Different is the situation in therelation between ethnoi of different superethnoi. If one ethnic groupabsorbsthevaluesofanethnicityofothersuperethnoi,itriskslosingits“personality”and“life”(becomingextinct).Gumilev(2010,pp.138­139)even uses the word “chimera” to designate the “form of contact ofincompatible ethnic groups of different super­ethnic systems inwhichethnic originality disappears.” In that sense, Gumilev warned against“Westernizing” Russians who want to reformat Russia according toEuropeanvalues.Gumilevsays that thiswouldbe thesuicideofRussianculture,sinceWesternEuropeconstitutesanothersuperethnosdifferentfromtheRussianone. TheWestern (orRomano­Germanic)Europeansuperethnoswasborn in the ninth centurywhen the “feudal revolution” divided the oldCarolingianEmpireintothreeparts,thusgivingbirthtothe“French”and“German”asethnicgroupsperse.(Gumilev2011[1989],p.64) Russia’s case ismore complicated.Unlikemost historians (bothWestern and Russian) who emphasize the (almost purely) “Slav”character of the Russians, Gumilev (2011 [1989], pp. 609­612; 1991[2013]) considers modern Russia as a superethnos in itself, moreEurasian than Slavic. The fourteenth century (with the symbolicmilestone of the Battle of Kulikov in 1381) was the initial period offormationof thisnew superethnosandofmodernRussians. Itwas theperiod inwhichMoscow, after endingMongol rule, established itself asthe center of a powerful and expansive new state. The so­calledGreatRussians (who differentiated from Little Russians, or Ukrainians, andWhiteRussians,orBelarusians,duringtheMongoldominionoverRussiain the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries) aremade up of threemaincomponents: the Slavic, the Finno­Ugric and the Turco­Mongol. InGumilev’sview,duringtheperiodofMongoldominationoverRussiathecontacts (political, cultural,mixedmarriages, etc.) led to a great geneticandculturalmixtureofthesethreemaincomponents(andothersmallerEurasian ones), which then made Russia a fundamentally Eurasiansuperethnos, and not purely Slavic­European as often proclaimed.Gumilev has a very positive view of the influence of the Mongols onRussia;itmadepossiblethesynthesisoftheSlavelementwiththeTurco­MongolelementcreatingaEurasiansuperethnosofgreatresilience. What is the connection of this new Muscovite State with theformerKievanStateorRus’?Againsttraditionalhistory(whichplacestheKievan State as the most remote source of present­day Russiancivilization), Gumilev (2008 [1992], pp. 288­289) views them as twodifferentandseparateepochs,withdifferentethnicstructures.Thusthepresent­dayRussians(theGreatRussians)werenotaninevitableproductoran ethnic continuationofRus’.TheSlavic ethnosof theancientRus’

229

haditsoriginsinapassionaryshockofthefirstcenturyCE.Littlebylittlethe predecessors of the Slavswould differentiate andmigrate throughEasternandSouthernEurope.Between the9thand12thcenturies, theEastern Slavs constituted the flourishing Kievan State or Rus’ (Gumilevunderestimates the role of the Varangians in the formation of Rus’ asepisodic). Between 1100 and 1300 (in its phase of obscuration), Rus'began todisintegratedue to internal conflicts and the conquestby theMongols. In 1300­1480, in its memorial phase, the last remainingautonomous remnant of the Kievan State, the city ofNovgorod, lost itsindependence (destructionof the lastethnic relicts).TheendofRus’,onthe other hand, represented the rise of the Muscovite state. Unliketraditional historians (both Russian and Western), Gumilev sees theMuscovitestateasatotallydifferentunitperse.Ethnicallyitdiffersfromthe Kievan state, for in Muscovite Russia (by virtue of the period ofMongolruleinthe13th­15thcenturiesonRus')thereisanethnicmixturewhich includes not only the Slav element but also the Turco­Mongolelement and the Fino­Ugric element (in addition to otherminor ones).MuscoviteRussiawastheresultofthepassionaryshockoftheyear1200thatbeganinLithuania,passedthroughRussia,AsiaMinorandEthiopia.Between 1200 and 1380 therewas the incubation period of the newethnos–theGreatRussians ­onthebasisofthe fusionofSlavic,Turco­Mongol,LithuanianandFinno­Ugricpeoples.Between1380(yearofthebattleofKulikov,inwhichtheMuscoviteprinceDmitriDonskoidefeatedthearmyof theGoldenHordeof theMongols)and1500 therewas theunionoftheGreatRussiansandtheformationofaEurasiansuperethnos.Between 1500 and 1800, in the phase of passionary climax,MoscowbecamethecenterofanexpandingEurasianstate.Theperiodfrom1800to2000isthephaseofthecollapseoftheethnos,whentheinfluenceofWesternizerideasinRussiastartsfromPetertheGreatandcontinuesintotheatheistcommunismofthetwentiethcentury. We can perceive this Gumilevan negation of the continuitybetween Muscovite Russia and Kievan Rus’ and his negative attitudetowardRussianWesternizersintheauthor’sownwords:

UnlikeNovgorod,Moscowwasnotthecontinuationof the traditions of Kievan Rus’. On the contrary, itdestroyed the traditions of the freedoms of the vecheassemblies and the internal struggles between theprinces, replacing themwith other norms of behavior,manyofwhichborrowedfromtheMongols:asystemofiron discipline, ethnic tolerance and deep religiousness[…]Itwaspreciselythisnewsystemofbehavior,createdon the ideological basis of the Orthodox religion, that

230

allowed Russia to impose herself on the history ofEurasia. This continent, in historical terms, has beenunifiedthreetimes.InitiallybytheTurks,whofoundedagreatkhanatethatwentfromtheYellowSeatotheBlackSea. Theywere replaced by theMongols from Siberia.Then,afteraperiodofdisintegration, the initiativewasresumedbyRussia.From the fifteenthcenturyonward,the Russiansmoved to the East and ended up in thePacificOcean.Thisnewpowerthusrevealeditselfasthe“heir”of thegreatkhanates,bothTurkishandMongol.Unified Eurasia (under Russia) has traditionallyconfrontedCatholicEuropeintheWest,ChinaintheFarEast and the Muslim world in the South. Unlike thelandscapesofWesternEurope,thelandscapesofEurasiashowgreatvariety.Foreachpeopleisveryimportanttherelationwith thenatal landscape that surrounds it andthatdeterminesitseconomicsystem.Anethnos adaptstoits environment: it feels confortable therein. If thesurrounding landscape changes radically, then theethnos changes radically. If there is a change in thesurrounding landscape that surpasses certain criticalpoint,inplaceoftheoldethnosappearsanewone.Thevariety ofEurasian landscapespositively influences theethnogenesis of its peoples. Each one found anappropriate place for itself: the Russians occupied thevalleysnear the rivers, theFinno­Ugricpeoplesand theUkrainianstheareasnearwatersprings,theTurksandMongols the steppes, and the paleo­Asian the tundra.Andevenwithallthisvarietyingeographicalconditions,union, rather than separation, has always been moreadvantageous to the peoples of Eurasia. Disintegrationexhausted strength and endurance. Disuniting, underEurasianconditions,meantplacingoneselfinasituationof dependence on neighbors, not always altruistic andmerciful. That is why political culture in Eurasia hasdeveloped its own paths and objectives. The Eurasianpeople built their own type of statehood, based on theprincipleof the rightofeachpeople toacertainwayoflife. In Rus’, this principle was embodied in theconception of sobornost’ (“communalism”) and wasstrictly observed. In this way, the right of everyindividual was assured [...] Historical experiencedemonstrated thatwhen the rightofeachpeople tobe

231

itselfwaspreserved, theunionofEurasia resistedwellthepressuresofWesternEurope,ChinaandtheMuslimworld.Unfortunately, in the twentieth centurywe havemoved away from this healthy and traditional policytowardourcountryandhavebegun toguideourselvesbyEuropeanprinciples:wehavetriedtomakeeveryoneequal.Whocares tobe like theothers?ThemechanicaltransferenceofWesternEuropeanbehavioral traditionsunder theconditionsofRussiahasdone littlegood.Andthat’snotsurprising.Afterall,thesuperethnosofRussiacame 500 years later. Andwe, aswell as theWesternEuropeans,havealways felt thisdifference,andwedidnotconsiderourselvesclosetoeachother.Duetothefactthat we are 500 years younger, however much westudied theEuropeanexperience,wecouldnotachievethewell­beingandcustomscharacteristicofEurope.Ourageandour levelofpassionarity suggestuscompletelydifferent imperatives of behavior. This does notmeanthat we should out of hand reject everything that isforeign.Onecan,andonemust,studytheexperienceofothers,butitisworthrememberingthatitisexactlytheexperience of others. The so­called civilized countriesare linked toanothersuperethnos, thatof theWesternEuropeanworld, formerlycalledthe“Christianworld.”Itemerged in the ninth century and in a millenniumcompleted the journey to the final stage of its ethnichistory.Thatiswhyweobservethedevelopedtechniqueand the rule­basedorder.All this is the resultofa longhistoricaldevelopment.Of courseonecantryto“jointhecircle of civilized peoples,” that is, in anothersuperethnos. But unfortunately nothing happenswithoutconsequences.Onemustbeawarethatthepriceof integrationbetweenRussiaandWesternEuropewillbethecompleterejectionofthetraditionsofthecountryand its subsequentassimilation [...]Thebasisof ethnicrelations isoutside thesphereofconsciousness: it is inthe emotions of relations of sympathy/antipathy andlove/hate. And the direction of thesesympathies/antipathiesisconditionedforeachethnicity.Youcanevaluatethisphenomenonasyouwish,butthatdoesnotmakeitlessreal.(Gumilev2008[1992],pp.287,291­293)

232

Inthefinalperiodofperestroika,whenfreedomofexpressionwasmuch greater in the USSR, Gumilev assumed the continuity of theEurasian ideologyof the1920sand1930s,with theadditionofhisowncontributions. In a 1991 interview to the literary magazine NashSovremennik,hesaid:

IamgenerallyconsideredaEurasianist;andIdonotdeny it. You are right: it was a powerful historicalcurrent. Ihave studied theirworks carefully.And Ididnotonlystudy.WhenIwasinPrague,ImetandtalkedtoSavitskii,IcorrespondedwithG.Vernadskii.Iagreewiththemain theoretical­methodological conclusions of theEurasianists. But the main part of the theory ofethnogenesis—theconceptofpassionarity—theydidnotknow.(Gumilev,1991[2013])

As we see, Gumilev “resurrected” Eurasianism in Russia as aninfluentialschoolofthought.HeconstitutedabridgebetweentheclassicalEurasianism of before and the future neo­Eurasianism of the 1990’s.Similarlyto theoriginalEurasianists,LevGumilev’stheorywasreceivedwithreservations,bothon thesideof liberal“Westernizers”andon theside of traditional Russian nationalists.Westernizers criticize not onlyGumilev’santi­Westernismbutalsohis insistence thathis theory isnotonly part of the human sciences but also of the natural sciences,especiallywhen he studies the origin of passionarity as an energy ofnature,avariable independentof social interactions.Theaccusationsofbiologismor geographicaldeterminism abound.On theotherhand, theemphasis on the “Eurasian” nature of the Russians, the assertion thatRussians are not a purely Slavic people, and the overvaluation of theTurco­Mongol element in the formation of modern Russia, alienateorthodox Russian nationalists from Gumilev’s worldview. For orthodoxnationalists,theSlavicpurityoftheRussiansisapointofhonor.Thewayin which Gumilev underestimates Kievan Rus’ contribution to theformation of modern Russia contradicts even some of the classicalEurasianistswhohada somewhatmorebalancedpositionbetween theSlavic and Turco­Mongol poles of the Russian soul and had a certaindegreeofaffectionandspecialunderstanding for theancientSlavophiles(Slavophileswho tended to glorifyKievanRus’ andher institutions).Onthisspecificpoint,thepresentneo­EurasianistsareclosertotheclassicalEurasianiststhantoGumilev. Incidentally, Lev Gumilev’s mother, the famous poetess AnnaAkhmatova, was from a family that contained, in addition to Slavicancestry,alsoTurco­Mongolancestry.Somuchsothat,havingbeenborn

233

AnnaAndreevnaGorenko,latershetookthepennameAnnaAkhmatova,usingthedistinctlyTatarsurnameofhergrandmother.Aninterestingandunexplored questionwould be to analyze howmuch this line of Tatarancestry via Lev Gumilev’s mother consciously or unconsciouslyinfluencedhislater“Eurasian”worldview.22Neo­EurasianismafterGumilev Afterall,wasLevGumilev“thelastofthe[classical]Eurasianists,”asheoncecalledhimselfinanarticle,23orwashetheinitiatoroftheneo­Eurasianist movement that exists today in Russia? Regardless of thisdiscussion, Gumilev proved to be a turning point for the rebirth ofEurasianist ideas in Russia. After a long time in the Soviet period—especially after World War II — in which the debates betweenWesternizers, Slavophiles and Eurasianists seemed to have submergedbefore theoverwhelmingLeviathanof theMarxist class ideologyof theSovietstate,duringperestroikathesedebatesreemergedandoneoftheirmainpropellerswasGumilev.24 Perestroikabeganin1985and,startingin1988,politicalopennessalready provided space for debates that began to escape the desirablecircle circumscribed by the communist party. Heretical ideas began tocirculate,especially insmalldiscussiongroupsand informal movementsthat abounded in the period. Itwas in this new context that not onlyGumilev’s ideasbegan togainstrengthbutalsothestudyoftheclassicalEurasianists (of the 1920’s and 1930’s in emigration) was resumed,initially insmallcircles.With theendof theUSSR in1991, thecountryembarked on the decidedly pro­Western course of the Yeltsin capitalistgovernment for the rest of the decade.However, the serious economic

22 I thank Natal’ya Shinkarenko for drawing my attention to the detail of Gumilev’s “Eurasian” ancestry. 23 Gumilev, 1991a. 24 The assertion that in pre-perestroika USSR the debates between Westernizers, Slavophiles and Eurasianists were “submerged” or practically nonexistent is relativized by some authors on several planes. For many, Marxism — which prevailed in the Soviet regime — was at bottom a Westernizer ideology, since it was born in the West, and Marx (1968, p. 12) made assertions, as in the preface to Vol. 1 of Das Kapital, suggesting that the industrially more developed countries [of the West] showed the future path that would have to be traversed by the backward countries. On the other hand, the post-war dissident movement within the USSR harbored several currents, some of which took up themes from these three schools of thought. Pospielovsky (1979), for example, carried out a study of neo-Slavophile currents existing within the USSR in the post-World War II era.

234

depressionthataccompaniedthesystemictransformationsofthe1990’sgenerated, by themiddle of the decade, strong dissatisfactionwith theYeltsin government in different spheres. It was in themidst of thesedissatisfactions that the Eurasianist ideology — now with thedenomination neo­Eurasianism — placed itself as a geopoliticalalternative to the “Westernizer” course of Yeltsin. In the ideologicalvacuum of themid­1990’s—with both Soviet socialism and the newcrisis­ridden “Westernizer” liberal capitalist course discredited— neo­Eurasianism seemed an attractive alternative. It was an oppositionalternative in thepoliticsof1990’s. In the2000’s,withPutincoming topoweronaplatformmorecloselylinkedtothedefenseandaffirmationofthe Russian state, neo­Eurasianism became more influential, even incertain governmente circles.Due toPutin’smore “nationalist” instance,many Eurasianists abandoned their previous oppositional position(during Yeltsin’s presidential term) and supported the new (Putinian)government.But one great neo­Eurasianist thinker,Aleksandr Panarin,forexample,remained inopposition,even toPutin.This isexplainedbyPutin’s ambiguous character in this debate between Westernizers,SlavophilesandEurasianists.Differentobserversclassifyhimindifferentways within these three currents; hence the ambiguity of some neo­Eurasianiststowardhim.Currentswithinneo­Eurasianism Neo­eurasianism is not a homogeneous movement but ratherconsists of several internal currents, some even conflicting with oneanother.Differentauthorshaveproposedclassificationsofthesecurrents.(e.g.,Aliev, 2012,p.11; Zaleskii,2011, pp.1­3;Garvish, 2003,pp.1­2;Nartov,1999,pp.4and5)WecandistinguishafirstdemarcationbetweenRussian and non­Russian neo­Eurasianists. There is another divisionbetween academic neo­Eurasianism and political or publicist neo­Eurasianism. These compartments are not watertight; they intersect.Thus,forexample,themostfamousofthenon­Russianneo­EurasianismsistheoneproposedbythepresidentofKazakhstan,NursultanNazarbaev.InfluencedbytheideasofLevGumilev(whosenamewasgiventooneofthemain universities of Kazakhstan), since 1994 Nazarbaev has beenproposing a Eurasian Union among the countries of that region.Obviouslyhiscasealsofallswithinthescopeofpoliticalneo­Eurasianism.ThegreatestnameofRussianacademicneo­EurasianismwasAleksandrPanarin,aprofessorattheUniversityofMoscow,whowroteaseriesofarticles and books on the subject. The best­known name ofpublicist/political neo­Eurasianism within Russia is Aleksandr Dugin,

235

who wrote numerous articles and books with a neo­Eurasianistgeopolitical project that has found resonance in certains circles of thehigher echelons of power, especially in the 2000s. All these divisionsinterpenetrate.Shortlybeforehisdeath,Panarin lefthisacademicnicheandevenenteredthePoliticalCounciloftheEurasianpartyofAleksandrDugin in2002— thisdespitehavinghaddifferenceswithDugin in theearly 1990s. If Panarin went from academic to political Eurasianism,Duginwenttheotherway.Afterspendingmuchofthe1990sand2000swith a prolific production of publicist character on Eurasianism, hebecameaprofessorattheUniversityofMoscowin2008. Thesearethemainexponentsofthesecurrents.Inaddition,otherauthorsmaybementioned. Inacademicneo­Eurasianism,inadditiontoPanarin,wealsohavethenamesofBorisSergeevichErasov,EduardAleksandrovichBagramov,SergeyBorisovichLavrov,IrinaBorisovnaOrlovaandMikhailLeont’evichTitarenko.25 InadditiontotheaforementionedNursultanNazarbaev(presidentofKazakhstan)andAleksandrDugin(creatorand leaderof theEurasianparty),weshouldindicateasinfluential,intheirsphere,thecharactersofMuslimoriginwhopreachaPan­IslamicEurasianistperspective:Abdul­Vakhed Niyazov and Mintimer Shaimiev. Classifications using thisterminology ofPan­IslamicEurasianism generally do so to differentiatefromwhat they callNazarbaev’s Pan­Turk Eurasianism. In the 1990’s,Abdul­Vakhed Validovich Niyazov (Tatar whose name was VadimValerionovichMedvedev)ledtheMuslimLeagueofRussiaandtheIslamicpartyRefakh. In2001,heparticipated in the foundingand leadershipofthe Eurasianist Party of Russia (Evraziiskaya Partiya Rossii).MintimerSharipovichShaimievwaspresidentofTatarstan(oneof theconstituentrepublics of the Russian Federation today) from 1991 to 2010. In hispolitical activities within Russia he defended Eurasianism as a visioncapable of holding together the different nationalities and religiousgroupsofthecountry.26 Tounderstandinmoredepththethinkingofneo­Eurasianists,wewill take Aleksandr Dugin as the paradigmatic figure to be studied indetail.ThisisbecauseDugin,inadditiontobeingthegreatestpropagatorofpresent­dayEurasianism(intermsofarticlesandbooksdevoted to it,influence in themedia and in circles of Russian power), is a kind ofsynthesisofitsdifferentcurrentssinceheisapublicist,anacademicandapoliticalcreatorofpartiesandmovements.Butbeforewegetdown to

25 See, for example, Erasov (1994, 1994a), Bagramov (2001), Orlova (1998) and Titarenko (1998). 26 See, for example, Niyazov (2001) and Shaimiev (2004).

236

the detailed examination of hiswork,we shall briefly discuss the twootherleadingfigureswithintheacademicfieldandinthepoliticalsphere:respectivelyAleksandrPanarinandNursultanNazarbaev.AleksandrSergeevichPanarin(1940­2003) Aleksandr Panarin acted as a philosopher, political scientist andgeopoliticsexpert.Hegraduated (1966)andcompletedmaster'sdegree(aspirantura,1971) inPhilosophyat theUniversityofMoscow. In1991,he defended his doctoral thesis [doktorskaya dissertatsiya] entitled TheContemporary Civilization Process and the Phenomenon of Neo­Conservatism. Throughout the 1990s he was professor and chair ofpoliticaltheoryatthePhilosophydepartmentoftheUniversityofMoscow.Writing at the interface between philosophy and political science, hepublishedextensivelyonculture,civilizationalprocesses,andgeopolitics.Amonghismost famousbooksareRevengeofHistory:Russia’sStrategicInitiative in the 21st Century (1998), Global Political Forecasting inConditionsofStrategicInstability(1999),TheTemptationofGlobalization(2002)andOrthodoxCivilizationintheGlobalWorld(2002). Panarin’s intellectual trajectory is interesting and denotes thetribulations that Russia underwent because of the transition from theSoviettothepost­Sovietperiod.27Panarin,havingbeenbornin1940, is,in a sense, a shestidecyatnik, that is, representative of the so­called“generation of the 1960s.” This was the generation that becameproductiveafterKhrushchev’sthaw,thatis,intherelativeopennessthatfollowed Stalin’sdeath.The1960swere a timeof great internaldebateandthisspirit imbuedtheyoungPanarin.InthePhilosophydepartmentof the University ofMoscow, he participated in a heterodox group ofstudiesontheyoungMarxthatinterpretedtheGermanthinkerinawaydangerously close to that of social­democracy. This would bring himproblemslaterand,alongwithotherfactors,woulddelayPanaringettingateachingpostattheUniversityofMoscow;hewouldgetoneonlyinthefinalperiodofperestroika.Foralongtimeaftergraduatinghehadtoseekpositions in institutes not directly related tophilosophy. In thatperiodPanarin could not be called a dissident, but he underwent a certainostracism due to his heterodox positions. It was with the opening ofperestroikathatPanarinwasabletoexpresshisopinionsmorefreely.Atthat time he was working on his doctoral thesis on Westernneoconservatism.Influencedinpartbyhissubjectmatter,heassumeda

27 I base my description of Panarin’s intellectual trajectory on Tsygankov (2013). I recommend this excellent essay for more details on Panarin’s work.

237

Westernizer and liberal position,welcoming perestroika but criticizingGorbachev’s statist position. Influenced especially by Frenchneoconservatives,he emphasized the need to liberate the creative andentrepreneurial energies of individuals, but on the other hand, unlikethem, he preached the need for these economic reforms to beaccompaniedbyrealpoliticaldemocratizationand, inaddition,hebegantodenythetheoryofspecificityandsuperiorityoftheUSSRinexchangefor a global vision of universal humanitarian values. Panarinwas thenpositioned to the “right” of Gorbachev as regards the need fortransformation toward a market economy and a clearlyWestern andliberalposition.28 Thedisintegrationof theUSSR and the beginning of the radicaland troubled reforms in post­Soviet Russia in the 1990s lead to atransformation in Panarin’s thinking. Alarmed by the elitism and highsocialcostoftheshocktherapyusedforsystemictransformationtowardcapitalism intheearlyyearsofthedecade,theauthorbegan toabandonhisWesternizerposition.Inthefirsthalfofthe1990s,Panarinwasstillaliberal, but no longer a Westernizer liberal. He blamed the WesternadvisersoftheRussiangovernmentwho,inhis view,encouragedYeltsinto adopt shock therapy in a “revolution­from­above” style, withoutconcern for the popular social strata. To this elitist capitalism, thephilosopher opposed the idea of popular capitalism from below. It is aderivation of his previous position during perestroika when heemphasized that the transformations should lead not only to amarketeconomybutalsotoarealdemocratizationofthesystem.Hedidnotseethissecondpart in theYeltsinianreforms,besidesaccusing theRussiangovernmentofbeingexcessivelysubmissive to thedictatesof theWest.

28 The terms “right” and “left” became relative during the period of perestroika in the USSR. In that context of transformations, for a time the “conservatives,” — those who wanted to preserve the former Soviet socialist statist regime — were deemed “rightists” in the reformist Soviet press while those who wanted transformations toward a more flexible regime and market economy were considered “leftists.” For example, Yeltsin was “to the left” of Gorbachev because he wanted reforms that were more radical than those of the highest Soviet leader. In other words, for a time during perestroika we had a “left” that defended the market economy or capitalism and a “right” that defended socialism! This was ephemeral during that period of transition and, in post-Soviet Russia the terms “left” and “right” returned to their original senses, with the socialists being “on the left” and the defenders of capitalism “on the right”. We have said that Panarin was to the “right” of Gorbachev during perestroika according to Western terminology for having defended anti-statist market principles more profoundly than him; however, according to the Soviet terminology of the time, Panarin was to his “left.” Typical of this Panarian period during perestroika were his 1989 book Retro Style in Ideology and Politics: Critical Essays on French Neoconservatism and his 1991 article Revolution and Reformation.

238

To fillthevoidleftbyhisabandonmentofWesternism,PanarinwentontoemphasizethatreformsinRussiamustbefirmlyplantedinthesoilofnational traditions. Reforms made with ideologies from the outside,without a firm anchoring in the culture of the country itself,would bedoomedtofailureorimplantedauthoritarily,“fromabove.”Having,stillinperestroika, rejected revolution in favor of reform, Panarin moreoverenphasized that reforms should be promoted anchored in nationaltraditions, not in spite of them.Within the context of this quest for apropernationalideaforRussiahebegantoapproachEurasianismasthemostappropriateprojecttointegratethedozensofEurasiannationalitieslivinginthecountry.Ashewasstillaliberalatthattime,hemovedawayfrom the currents of what he considered to be an authoritarian,isolationistandpuerilelyanti­WesternEurasianism,suchasthewritersoftheDen’andElementyjournals(includingAleksandrDugin).However,this“centrist”position ofPanarin contained some contradictions, especiallywhen viewed from a position of classicalWestern liberalism. Panarindefended a strong presidential government for Russia: he saw nocontradictionwiththeliberalidea,forhesawthestrongstateasastatetodefend theweak,not a state todefend the interestsof the elites, asheconsidered to be the case with Yeltsin. Sometimes he defined thisconceptionas“liberalstatist.” Inaddition,hesometimesmentioned thathis liberalprojectwas inspiredbyEuropeanneoconservatism. If, in theera of perestroika, he saw in European neoconservatism both positiveaspects (liberation of the vital business energies of individuals) andnegative ones (fear of deepening the relations of democratization insociety), now, in the face of the chaos of the transformations of thetransition to capitalism in Russia, he got closer to the positions ofEuropeanneoconservatismingeneral.29 IfPanarinceasedtobea Westernizerinthefirsthalfofthe1990sbut still remained within the framework of what was consideredliberalism in Russia, in the second half of the decade he gradually losttheseremnantsofliberalismandmovedtomoreconservativepositions;initially tomoderate conservatism and, toward the 2000s, to a radicalconservatism thatwould lead, inhis lateryears, toanapproximation, inpractice,with the “authoritarian” Eurasianists themselves (e.g.,Dugin),whomhehadcriticizedat theoutsetof the1990s. Inbooks likeGlobalPolitical Forecasting in Conditions of Strategic Instability (1999), TheTemptation of Globalism (2002) and Orthodox Civilization in the Global

29 Typical of this still liberal but no longer Westernizer phase of the first half of the 1990s are the articles Project for Russia: Fundamental Liberalism or Liberal Fundamentalism (Znamya, no. 9, 1993) and Between Atlantism and Eurasianism (Svobodnaya Mysl, no. 11, 1993).

239

World (2002a),hebegan tomakeofWesternismandEurocentrism thefocalpointofhisEurasianistcriticism.Thisapriorianti­Westernismwassomething that he had previously criticized in themore conservativeneo­Eurasianists, accusing them of childishly being against any ideacomingfromtheWest.Influencedbytheclimateofthesecondhalfofthe1990s,withtheexpansionofNATOtowardRussiaandthebombardmentofYugoslaviabytheWesternpowers,Panarinbegantosharethefeelingthat the West was trying to keep Russia in a weakened state in acontinuation of the mentality of the Cold War. Moreover, from thecivilizationistpositionhehelduntil the firsthalfof the1990swhen therecovery of Russian civilizationwouldmean a contribution to generalglobal civilization, Panarin moved to a position of emphasizing thegeopoliticalconfrontationbetweenEurasianRussiaandtheWest.Forthisdefenseagainst theWest,Panarinpreachedan integration between thecountriesof the formerUSSRandanalliancewith the countriesof theEast,especiallyChinaandIndia.Regardingtheideaof themarket,attheturnofthe1990sto2000Panarindroppedtheideaofpopularcapitalismas an adequate form of support for the new Russia, and increasinglyemphasized the ideaofastrongstate; service to thestatewouldbe thebestwaytoguaranteethecountry’sterritorialandculturalintegrityatatimewhen theWestwasdoing everything (as inYugoslavia) to fomentdisintegrative processes in former communist Eastern Europe fromliberalandglobalistpositions.Littlebylittle,throughoutthesecondhalfofthe 1990s, Panarinwas approaching the positions of the traditionalistneo­Eurasianists (like A. Dugin), whose authoritarianism and a priorianti­Westernism he had previously condemned. The resultwas that, ayearbeforehisdeath,PanarinjoinedthePoliticalCounciloftheEurasianparty of Aleksandr Dugin in 2002.He completed the turnaround frombeingaliberalWesternizertobecomingananti­Westernneo­Eurasianist. A curious detail, though. Unlike most of the traditionalist neo­Eurasianists,Panarin,untilhisdeath,remained inoppositiontothenewPutingovernment,eventhoughithadfollowedapathofrevitalizationoftheRussianstateandareductionofcontrolof theRussianeconomybytheYeltsinian financialoligarchyof the1990s.One explanation for thiscontradictionisperhapsthefactthatPanarinlivedonlythroughthefirstpresidential term of Vladimir Putin from 2000 to 2004, when theinfluential prime minister and Minister of Trade and EconomicDevelopment were, respectively, the liberals Mikhail Kasyanov andGermanGref.The liberalism of some leaders of Putin’s economic teammay have displeased Panarin, who at the time negatively associatedliberalismwiththe“anti­Russia”West.ItwouldbeinterestingtoseewhatPanarinwould have said if he hadwitnessed Putin’s later presidentialtermswhenthoseliberalswereoustedfromtheministry.

240

Panarin’s trajectory isnotonlyof individual importance (due tohisweightasanintellectual).ItalsorepresentsatrajectorycharacteristicofpartoftheRussianintelligentsiathatbeganasliberalandWesternizerinthefinalperiodofperestroika,butwhich—confrontedinternallywiththe “wild” and oligarchic capitalism of the transition of the 1990s andexternallywith the expansionofNATO, the bombingofYugoslavia andthe West’s diplomatic and economic forays into the former Sovietrepublics— underwent a change ofWeltanschauung and entered the2000swith anti­liberal and anti­Western sentiments. Thiswould havepoliticalimplicationsforthe“Putinera”inthecountry’shistory.NursultanNazarbaevAbishevich(1940­...) If Panarin was the greatest name of purely academic neo­Eurasianism,NursultanNazarbaev representspoliticalneo­Eurasianismatitshighestlevel.Heisthepersonwiththehighestpoliticalofficewhoopenly declares his Eurasianist position. He is the president ofKazakhstan,afterRussiathe largestcountrythatwaspartofthe formerUSSR,with about 2.7million square kilometers of surface (it alone islargerthanallofWesternEuropetogether).LocatedinCentralAsia,mostofherterritoryisinAsiawithasmallpart(14%)inEurope,thatis,tothewestoftheUrals. Nazarbaevwasbornintoapoorruralfamilyin1940.Afteragoodacademicperformance inaboardingschool,heworked inmetallurgicalindustries.In1962,hebecameamemberoftheCommunistParty,actingin the Konsomol (Youth League of the party). By the 1970s, he hadalready become a full­time party official. In 1984, he became “primeminister” (President of the Council ofMinisters) of the Kazakh SovietSocialistRepublicand,in1989,FirstSecretaryoftheCommunistPartyoftheRepublic.OnApril24,1990,hewaselectedtothenewlycreatedpostofpresidentofRSSKazakh.InthefinalperiodofthedisintegrationoftheUSSR, he was elected president of the new independent country,Kazakhstan (on December 10, 1991). In April 1995, a referendumextended his mandate until the year 2000. He would again win theelectionsofJanuary1999,December2005andApril2011,allwithaverylargeofficialpercentageofvotes(98.8%in1991,81%in1999,91,1%in2005and95.5%in2011).Thesehighvotetallies,coupledwiththegreatcontrol of society and repression of opposition parties by thegovernment, make critics accuse Nazarbaev of engendering anauthoritarian regime. Symptomatically, since its creation as anindependent country,Kazakhstanhasbeen classified everyyearas “NotFree”inFreedomHouseratings.(FreedomHouse,severalyears).

241

These accusations of authoritarianism are symptomatic inWestern­Eurasianist disputes. Western authors accuse Eurasianists ofbeingtraditionalistandpotentiallyauthoritarian.Eurasianistsrespondbysaying thatWesternizerswant theEurasiancountries to followa liberalpattern that is typical of theWest, but not suited to the realities ofEurasian countries,moreaccustomed toa collectivistmentality than anindividualistone. Nazarbaev’sEurasianismmayalsohave todowith theeconomicrealityofKazakhstanat the timeof thedisintegrationof theUSSR.Therepublicwas very rich inminerals (especially oil), butwas one of themost integratedeconomieswith the restof theUSSR. Itspipelinesandother forms of flow of minerals and products passed through otherrepublics (especially Russia). In addition, their (typically Soviet) largecompanies involved complex supply and distribution networks withcompanies located in other Soviet republics (again especially Russia).That iswhyKazakhstanwas the last of the Soviet republics to declareindependence.AndcurrentlyherleaderisoneofthegreatestsupportersofintegrationbetweentheformerEurasianrepublicsoftheUSSR. AnotherfactorthatlinksKazakhstanalmostumbilicallytoRussiais the large number of ethnic Russians living in the country. Thismigration of Russians to Kazakhstan, which began when the RussianEmpire expanded into Central Asia in the nineteenth century, wasreinforced in theSovietperiod,whenKazakhstanrepresentedakindof“eastward expansion” analogous to the “westward expansion” innineteenth­century USA. Especially memorable was the “Virgin Landscampaign” initiatedbyKhrushchev, involvinghundredsof thousands ofRussians from thewestern part of the country to occupyKazakhstan’svirgin lands in order to increase the agricultural frontier and foodproductionintheUSSR.Asaresultofallthesefactors,fromthe1930stothelate1970s,thereweremoreRussiansthanKazakhsinKazakhstan.Atthe time of perestroika the populationwas divided into approximatelytwo fifths of Kazakhs, two fifths of Russians and a fifth of othernationalities. During the first years after the dissolution of the SovietUnion, in the1990s therewasa largeemigrationofRussiansoutof thecountry(especiallybacktoRussia).Thus,currently,ofthepopulationofabout 16.4 million people, approximately 63% are Kazakhs, 23%Russians and the rest distributed in a large number of small ethnicgroups. Nazarbaev, although initially reasserting the hegemony andpriorities of theKazakhs in the country’s government, has sincemadeefforts not to alienate and even encourage the participation of theRussianminoritypopulation.

242

HowNursultanNazarbaev’sEurasianismmanifestsitself The Big Bang of the emergence of Nursultan Nazarbaev’sEurasianismonaninternationalscaleisconsideredthespeechhemadeattheUniversityofMoscowonMarch29,1994, inwhichhe launched theidea of creating anew integrativeprojectbetween the countriesof theformerUSSRandneighborscalledEurasianUnion(EvraziiskiiSoyuz)byhim.(Nazarbaev,1997,p.32)AtatimewhenthecountriesoftheformerUSSRwerestillinthemidstoftheeconomicdepressionbroughtinbytheearly post­Soviet phase, Nazarbaev’s idea was seen as visionary andperhaps too idealistic for its time.On June 3, 1994,Nazarbev signed aformal project in Almaty to form such a Eurasian Union. (Nazarbaev,1997,p.38)BasedontheexperienceoftheinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnion, he proposed a stronger integrative project than the existingCommonwealthofIndependentStates(CIS).Whatwasnewwas the ideathat themain thingwasnot that themembercountriesbelonged to theformerUSSRbutrathertheir“commondestiny”asEurasians.Itbecameadecisivemoment forEurasianismasamovement, since it ceased tobejust an intellectual current and became a state policy proposed by theheadofastate.Itjumpedfromthetheoreticalorbittopractice. IftheEurasianUnion’sproposalwasconsideredtooutopianatthetime, Nazarbaev’s efforts were at the center of all later integrativeprocesses of the decade, culminating in the creation of the EurasianEconomic Community on October 10, 2000 bringing together Russia,Kazakhstan,Belarus,KyrgyzstanandTajikistantofacilitatetradebetweenthese countries by reducing the barriers between them.On January 1,2012, the so­called Common Economic Space between Russia,Kazakhstan and Belarus was founded with the objective of eventuallycreating an effective commonmarket (a real free trade zone) betweenthesecountries.Thisbasewaswidenedwith thecreation,on1 January2015, of the Eurasian Economic Union which included these threecountries plus Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (and replaced the formerEurasianEconomicCommunity,whichwasabolishedon thesameday).Alloftheseintegrativeeffortsare,infact,formsinspiredbyNazarbaev’soriginalEurasianUnionprojectof1994.

Another crucial “Eurasianist” moment by Nazarbaev was thecreationof theL.N.GumilevNationalEurasianUniversity inAstana (thenewcapitalofKazakhstan)in1996.TheUniversitywascreatedfromthemerger of two previously existing higher education institutions: theTselinograd Construction Engineering Institute and the TselinogradPedagogical Institute. Since then it has become the most importantuniversity in Kazakhstan, with over 11,000 students and about 1,600teachers.TheL.N.GumilevMuseum—dedicatedspecificallytothework

243

ofthatethnologist—islocatedthere. The creation of the Gumilev University—with all its symbolicemphasison theworkof thatgreatneo­Eurasianist—and theoriginalprojectof theEurasianUnion—nowtaken from theperspectiveof theEurasianEconomicUnion—denotehowEurasianismisatthecenterofNazarbaev’spracticalpoliticalwork. In theoretical terms, Nazarbaev, in his speeches, articles andbooks,frequentlymentionsEurasianismasthebasicconceptionguidingall his integrative projects between Kazakhstan and the other formerrepublicsoftheUSSR.Severalofthesespeechesandarticlescanberead(includingonline)inNazarbaev(1997,2000,2009,2009aand2009b).Differences and tensions betweenNazarbaev’s Eurasianism and RussianEurasianism In general Nazarbaev’s Eurasianism iswell received in Russia,especially in the political sphere. Nazarbaev’s relationship with theRussianpresidents (Putin,Medvedevand evenYeltsin)wasalwaysverygood and his integration ideas were warmly received (although notalways implemented inpractice).However, in terms of theory one cannotesomeareasofdifference,oreventension,betweenNazarbaevanandRussianEurasianism. First of all, unlikemost Russian Eurasianists (who have a clearanti­Western tendency), Nazarbaev has always emphasized that hisEurasianism is not anti­Western. He does not see (likemany RussianEurasianists)EurasiaasaspecialcontinentseparatedfrombothEuropeandAsia.Nazarbaev,on the contrary, seesEurasiaasabridgebetweenEuropeandAsia,thepointwhere the tworeallymerge.Symptomaticofthis is the frequentnumberof timeshe cites theEuropeanUnionasamodelforthefutureEurasianUnion.(Nazarbaev,1997,pp.27,29and31;Nazarbaev,2000,p.429). Many Russians, especially those who regard Russia and theOrthodoxreligionastwobasicpillarsofEurasianism,aresuspiciousofapossible Pan­Turkism of this Kazakh Eurasianism so “independent ofRussianpower.”Nazarbaevretortsthathe isforademocraticintegrationbetweenequals,notanintegrationwithahegemonicpowerorattemptstorestoretheformerSovietUnioninotherways.Heemphasizesthatthegreat religions of Eurasia, such as the Orthodox and Islam, should betreated as “sister” religions, of equal value to each other and not givepriority to one of them over the other. (Nazarbaev,1997,pp.255 and257). In short, Nazarbaev’s Eurasianism is an important variant of

244

current neo­Eurasianism, especially by moving away from the earlyEurasianistparadigmoftakingRussiaandRussiancultureasthebasisforthe future Eurasian civilization, and especially for having been theEurasianism that emerged from the theoretical sphere andmoved topoliticalandstatepractice:NazarbaevwasthefirstheadofstatetoclearlyassumeEurasianismasthebasisofhisstatepolicy(somethingVladimirPutinneverdid).AleksandrGel’evichDugin(1962­...) The main author to be examined within neo­Eurasianism isAleksandrDugin.Thereareseveralreasonstoputhiminthelimelight.InRussia,whenonespeaksofneo­EurasianismthefirstnamethatcomestomindisthatofDugin.Thecontroversysurroundinghis ideashelpedlurethespotlighttohim.Heisthetypicalpublicintellectual,withappearancesin television programs, radio and other means of communication,including theuseofapublishinghouse thatpublishes, throughprintedbooksandvirtualtexts,hisworks:Arctogeia.Heinvestedbothinthefieldof politics (he founded the political party Eurasia in 2002) and in theacademic field (he became a professor at the University ofMoscow in2008).Butaboveall,hewastheintellectualwhohasrealizedthebroadestsynthesisof the ideasofclassicalEurasianismwithothercontemporarycurrents for practical application in geopolitical studies. Finally, hisgeopoliticalthesesareinfluentialinimportantcirclesofthemilitaryandgovernmentsectorsofthecountry. AleksandrGel’evichwasborn inMoscow in1962.His fatherwasanintelligenceofficeroftheSovietmilitary.In1979,hebeganuniversityeducationattheMoscowAviationInstitute,butwasexpelledfromthere.Laterhewouldcompletehisundergraduatecourse through thedistancelearning course of the Institute of Engineering and Improvement ofNovocherkasskii.Inthefirsthalfofthe1980s,heparticipatedinthecircleof themysticpoet EvgeniiGolovin—which later led to accusations ofoccultism—alongwithhisfriendGeidarDzhemal(nowpresidentoftheRussian Islamic Committee). In 1988, in the midst of perestroika, hejoinedDmitryVasil’ev nationalist organization Pamyat’,but soon left itbecauseheconsideredtheirRussianchauvinismtoonarrow.In1993,hejoinedtheBolshevikNationalPartyofEduardLimonov.HebrokeupwithLimonovin1998.InthesameyearhebecameadvisertothePresidentoflower house of the Russian parliament (Duma), Gennadii Seleznev. In2001, he founded the Eurasian movement. In 2002, he founded thepoliticalpartyEurasiaandin2003theInternationalEurasianMovement.In2008,he became aprofessor at theDepartment of Sociology at the

245

UniversityofMoscow.30TherehewouldleadtheCenterforConservativeResearchandcoordinatethechairofSociologyofInternationalRelations.His master’s thesis (kandidatskaya dissertatsiya) in Philosophy (TheEvolutionoftheParadigmaticFoundationsofScience)wasdefendedattheNorthern Caucasus Science Center (Severo­Kavkazskii Nauchnyi TsentrVysheiShkoly)inthecityofRostov­na­DonuonDecember20,2000.Hisdoctoral thesis (doktorskaya dissertatsiya) in Political Science wasdefendedattheRostovanLawFacultyoftheMinistryofInteriorofRussia(Rostovskii Yuridicheskii InstitutMVD Rossii), in the city of Rostov­na­Donu in theyearof2004. Its titlewasTheTransformationofStructuresand Political Institutions in the Process ofModernization of TraditionalSociety.ChangesinDugin’sthinkingwiththeendoftheUSSR Throughoutthe1980s,Duginwasafierceanti­communist.Atthattime, because of his involvement in Evgenii Golovin’s circle, he wasmarked by the mystic influences of the traditionalist school of RenéGuénonandJuliusEvolaandbythepoliticalinfluencesoftheFrenchNewRight(NouvelleDroite)ofAlaindeBenoist.ThedisintegrationoftheUSSRhad a devastating and transformative effect on Dugin. Seeing itgeopoliticallyasadefeatofRussian“continentalcivilization”byWestern“maritimecivilization,”hebegan toemphasizehisEurasianistpositionsasasolution towhathesawasan invasionanddominationofWesternvaluesoverRussia.InthestyleoftheclassicinterwarEurasianists,healsoreassessedtheroleoftheSovietUnionashavingoncehadapositiverolein maintaining Russia­centered Eurasian civilization, despite all thedownsidesofcommunismasatheisticandmaterialistic.ThebasisfortheDuginian synthesis was then formed: a geopolitical neo­EurasianisminfluencedbythetraditionalistschoolandNouvelleDroite,allbasedonaperspectiveofConservativeRevolution.31

30 In 2014, in a confusing episode perhaps related to Dugin’s political position (considered too radical) in relation to the Ukrainian crises, Aleksandr Gel’evich did not have his contract as a professor at the University of Moscow renewed and lost his post there. 31 Much later, in his book Putin Against Putin (2012), Dugin thus summarized his ideological inflection under the impact of the disintegration of the USSR: “[...] I began with traditionalism, Conservative Revolution, Third Position, Eurasianism. I leaned a bit to the left in the 1990s by recognizing the archaic traditionalist aspects of socialism and communism (which I did not see before the fall of socialism). After the end of the Soviet regime, I changed from a patriot with anti-Soviet inclinations to a pro-Soviet patriot, that’s all.” (Dugin [2012], 2014, ch. 1)

246

TwodifferentmomentsoftheDuginianinfluenceinthepost­Sovietperiod In the 1990s,Dugin joined politicallywith the left and right toopposePresidentBorisYeltsin’soverlyWesternizercourse.Aspartoftheso­called red­brown opposition—which united left­wing socialists andcommunistswith the anti­Yeltsinnationalist right— he participated inepisodes such as the parliament’s defense against the presidentialbombardment of its building in 1993. In the same year, he joined theNational Boshevik Party of the writer Eduard Limonov, which alsoproclaimed itself above the dichotomies of right and left, but wasconsidered by the majority of the experts as a radical party of thenationalistright.Duginwas inopposition throughout the Yeltsinperiod.WithPutin coming topower in the2000s,Dugin came to support thenewpresident.Thisradicalchangefromoppositiontosupportinrelationto Putin’s figure divided neo­Eurasianists, some of whom (such asAleksandrPanarinandGeidarDzhemal)remained inoppositioneven tothenewpresident.Inthe2000s,theinfluenceofDuginandEurasianismas awholewould rise sharply in Russia, even reaching high circles ofpower. In particular, the leadership of the armed forces discussed theEurasianist geopolitical vision:Dugin himself gave several lectures andcourses atmilitary institutions for officers. Even before the end of theYeltsin administration, Eurasianism, as a geopolitical alternative toRussiandiplomacy,receivedaboost in1996,theyearEvgeniiPrimakovwasappointedForeignMinister.Primakov,aspecialistinorientalstudies,wasconsideredcloseorsympathetic toEurasianism.Duringhis tenure,this intellectual current received a strong impulse to get out of theposition of oppositionist isolation in which it was. During the Putinadministration, even without being the hegemonic current, it wasacceptedasoneofthevalidcontributionstoinfluencetheformulationofthecountry’sforeignpolicy.AsforDuginpersonally,inthe2000sunderPutin,he shifted position frombeing amarginalized oppositionist to acentral figure inpoliticalandacademiccirclesof thecountry—he isorhas been adviser to various bodies of the Duma and Russian armedforcesand in2008becameaprofessor in theprestigiousUniversityofMoscow.Dugin’soriginalintellectualfoundations The main intellectual influences on Dugin have already beenmentioned: traditionalism (René Guénon and Julius Evola), Nouvelle

247

Droite (Alain de Benoist), the perspective of the so­called conservativerevolution, the German geopolitical school (Friedrich Ratzel, KarlHaushofer) and, of course, classical Russian Eurasianism. The politicalphilosophy of Carl Schmitt and the existentialist phenomenology ofMartinHeideggerwere later acquisitions that became important in hiswork.Eurasianism,Germangeopolitics,CarlSchmittandHeideggerarewellknownandself­explanatory.However,itmaybeworthsomewordsaboutthetraditionalistschool,theFrenchNewRightandtheperspectiveof the conservative revolution that are currents of thought not sowellknown.Moreover, it is important tounderstand them, for theywere thefirstmajor influencesonDuginbeforeallothers, includingEurasianism.Aswehaveseenabove,inthe1980s,Dugin’sinitialradicalanti­Sovietismwas formed largely in thecirclecreatedaround themysticpoetEvgeniiGolovin,whichwouldbealocusofstudyoftraditionalismandtheFrenchNew Right. These early influences would continue to mark Dugin’sintellectual trajectory even as he fully assumed his EurasianistWeltanschauunginthepost­Sovietperiod..Traditionalism The Traditionalist School (also called traditionalism orperennialism) is founded on the idea that all great religions share thesameoriginandpossessacommontranscendentprimordialprinciple.Itis the current equivalent of what was called in Latin during theRenaissancephilosophiaperennis.Theterm“tradition”hereisunderstoodnot as the mere opposite of “modernity” but rather in the sense of“IntegralTradition,”whichreferstotheeternalprinciplesofdivineoriginthat have generated the world and humanity. According to thetraditionalists,this“PrimordialTradition”islostinthemodernmaterialistworld.TheRenaissancetendstobeseenastheillustrativemomentfromwhichmandefinitivelyabandons thehigherplaneandbegins todevotehimself to the lesseranthropocentricworld.Thus, traditionalists tend tovalue theancientandmedievalworldsanddevalue themodernworldasspiritually decayed.RenéGuénon, for example,dates the accelerationofthedeviationoftheWesternworld fromthePrimordialTraditiontothefourteenthcentury,after thedefeatoftheorderoftheTemplars.Wesaytheaccelerationof theseprocesses, sinceGuénon (like JuliusEvolaandmany other traditionalists) accepts the Hindu vision of the four greatcyclic ages (yuga) through which the Earth passes: Satya Yuga, TretaYuga, Dvapara Yuga and Kali Yuga. Instead of evolutionary theory,traditionalists emphasize that there has been an involution of society

248

fromanoriginalgoldenage to the lattereraof theKaliYuga,which isatimeofthedarknessofmaterialism.KaliYugawouldhavebegunaroundthesixthorfifthcenturyBC,thatis,fromabouttheendofprehistory.Inancient timesmankindwouldbe losing itsknowledgeof theprimordialtradition:whileinantiquityandtheMiddleAgesitstillsoughttomaintaincontactwith it, inmodern times these last bastions of the primordialtradition are disappearing almost completely. (Evola, 1995; Guénon,2001) Traditionalists emphasize, then, esoterism, that is, immersion intheinner,deepestandmostessentialaspectofthisPrimordialTradition.But they do not despise exoterism (that is, the aspect of rituals andexternalproceduresthattypifyindividualreligions).Theytendtoassumethe view that the passage through a specific individual religion is anecessaryfirststepforall,includingthosewhoarecapableanddeservingoffurtheringontothedeeperspiritualesotericlevel. AmongthetraditionalistphilosopherswhomostinfluencedDuginwere the Frenchman René Guénon and the Italian Julius Evola. RenéGuénon, born in 1886, was a scholar influenced by diverse religioustraditionsof theWestandEast.Afteran initialattemptat traditionalistrestoration based on the Catholic Church and Masonry, he gotdisillusionedwith the WestandbecomeaMuslim in1912. In1930,hemoved toCairo,Egypt,wherehe remaineduntilhisdeath in1951asaSufist.He criticizedWesternmaterialistic and individualisticmodernityfrom the esoteric positions of Eastern religions, especially from thestandpoint of Hinduism and Sufism. Julius Evola (Baron Giulio CesareAndrea Evola, 1898­1974) was an Italian esoteric philosopher.Traditionalist likeRenéGuénon,withwhomhe exchanged impressionsand influences, he was more linked to the political reality than theFrenchman. He had a close but ambiguous coexistence with Italianfascism,whomhe accusedofnotbeingconsistentenoughinthepursuitof the regenerative goalsof the country.Also, likeGuénon,he criticizedmodernity(hismostfamousbookisRevoltAgainsttheModernWorld)andsawthehistoryofmankindnotundertheprismofatheoryofevolution,but of involution. If the aristocratic principle was already present inspiritualtermsinGuénon(forwhomthepossibilityofesotericinitiationisnotforeveryone,butforthedeservingones),inEvolaantidemocratismreachesveryhighlevels.InthebookRevoltAgainsttheModernWorld,hedefendedmonarchismashis idealpoliticalregime,re­reading theHinducaste system inwhich he places the category of kings (warrior kings)even above the pure Brahmins. Like Guénon and following the Hindutradition,he believed thathumanity is traversing theKaliYuga, aDarkAgeofcrassmaterialisticappetites.TheoriginalGoldenAgewouldhavehad its geographical origins, according to Evola, in the hypothetical

249

Hyperborea,oranoriginalArcticlandfromwherethesuperior“Uranian”racewouldhaveoriginated.Itisinterestingtonotethatthenameoftheorganization thatpublishes anddisseminatesDugin’s books,Arctogaia,refers exactly to this original mythological arctic earth (arcto + gaia,whichistheGreekgoddessofEarthorMotherEarth).32 Guénonisseenasoneofthefoundingfathersoftraditionalism(ifnotthemostimportantofthem).JuliusEvolaisalater,andcontroversial,additiontothemovement.SomeauthorsevenrefusetoclassifyEvolaasatraditionalist. Evola’s ambiguous proximity to the fascists and Nazismarkedthecontroversyofthisauthorwithintraditionalism.AndDugin’sadmiration for Evola fuels the mistrust of some observers (e.g.,Shekhovtsov & Umland, 2009) in relation to a fascist potential in thisRussian neo­Eurasianist. For example, in the dispute between GuénonandEvolainrelationtothehierarchicalorderinthecorrectcastesociety,Guénon defends the traditional Vedic hierarchy inwhich the Brahmins(priests, spiritual teachers) are at the top with the Kshatriyas (kings,[military] rulers) coming just below them whereas Evola defendssituationsinwhichtheKshatriyasareatthetopandthesacerdotalclassbeneath them. In other spheres, Guénon defends the priority ofcontemplation vis­à­vis action (intellect over politics) whereas thephilosophyofEvolaisonepredominantlyofactionandgiventopolitics.Inthis dispute, Dugin aligns himself with Evola (even though he highlyesteemstheworkofGuénonasawhole),advocatingpoliticalaction.ForDugin, there is no doubt that Evola is a traditionalist and the latterconstitutesoneofthemainstaysofthetraditionalismoftheformer. Traditionalismiselitist(itarguesthatonlyanelitecanremainintune with the Primordial Tradition in the world today) and distrustsnotions like equality anddemocracy.Many traditionalist authors, aswehaveseenwithGuénonandEvola,absorbthenotionofdivisionbycasteasanormalorderforsociety.33NouvelleDroite

32 The official manifesto of the Arctogaia organization begins as follows: “Literally ‘Arctogaia’ means ‘Land of the North,’ a mythical continent that formerly existed in the North Pole, but which has long since disappeared physically and from the short human memory. Along with it disappeared a spiritual axis of Being, the Tree of the World, which gave to all the traditions and religions of the world an illuminating and operative-transformative sense.” (Arktogeya, 1996). 33 To check Dugin’s relationship with the authors of the Traditionalist School, see his book Philosophy of Traditionalism, in which he examines this school in philosophical and historical terms. (Dugin, 2002).

250

Theso­calledFrenchNouvelleDroiteisamovementthatcoalescedaround the thinkerAlain deBenoist.He created theGRECE think­tank(Groupement de recherche et d'études pour la civilization européene) in1968.Theideasofthemovementreceivedgreatimpetuswhenoneofitsthinkers, Louis Pawels, in 1978 became director of the newly createdweekly LeFigaroMagazine (aderivation from the traditional LeFigaroright­wing newspaper). The magazine went on to reflect and bringarticles from variousmembers linked to theNouvelleDroite (includingBenoist’s) until 1981, the year of the election of Socialist PresidentFrançoisMitterand. The FrenchNouvelle Droite influenced intellectualssuchasArthurKoestler,AnthonyBurgessandJeanParvulescu. Due to Alain de Benoist’s central role in the creation andpropagationof themovement,wewill takehis ideasas themainstayofthe Nouvelle Droite’s intellectual description. With legal training, butactingasaphilosopher,politicalscientistand journalist,deBenoistwasborn in 1943. In 1961, he joined the Fédération des EtudiantsNationalistes(FEN).Inthefirsthalfofthe1960shispositionwasclosetothe traditionalextreme right,defendingAlgeria for theFrench andevenracistSouthAfrica. In the secondhalfof the1960s,heevolved towardpositionsofwhatwouldlaterbecalledNouvelleDroite.In1968,BenoistcreatedGRECE,whichbecame the think­tankof theNouvelleDroite. Inthe same year GRECE founded Nouvelle École, an annual periodical ofphilosophical­political character, of which Benoist became director. In1973,GRECE founded thequarterlyÉléments (full title:Élémentspour lacivilization Européene), of which he became editor. In 1988, BenoistfoundedKrisis,aself­described“magazineofideasanddebates.”Hisideaswere disseminated through this journalistic activity and the dozens ofbookshewrote (among them,Vudedroite:anthologiecritiquedes idéescontemporaines, 1977, which won the French Academy’s Great EssayPrize; Comment peut­on être païen,1981; Europe, Tiers Monde, mêmecombat, 1986; Demain, la décroissance, Penser l'ecologie jusqu'au bout,2007). WhatdoesthisNouvelleDroiteconsistofandinwhatdoesitdifferfromthetraditionalFrenchrightandextremeright?IfwetaketheideasofAlaindeBenoistasastartingpoint,heproclaimedhimselfabove theclassic division of right and left. He rejected the narrow, racist andChristiannationalism of theFrench extreme rightof the Jean­MarieLePen type. De Benoist criticized Christianity and, influenced by thetraditionalistschoolofRenéGuénonandJuliusEvola,defendedaformofneopaganism as a religious Weltanschauung more appropriate forEurope. Unlike strictly French xenophobic nationalism, he defended amultifacetedEuropeancivilizationalethnicparadigm.ItwouldbeakindofcoexistenceofdifferentEuropeanethnicities,each in itsownniches.

251

Hecalled itethnopluralism (which in the initialGRECEdiscussionswascalledethnodifferentialism).Hecriticizedtheimmigrationofforeignersassomethingpernicious(asignoftheweaknessoftheeconomicsysteminproviding a standard of living appropriate to migrants in their owncountries), but unlike the French extreme right, he is not againstimmigrants themselves,nordefends theracialsuperiorityof theFrenchoverthem.Thatis,theNouvelleDroiteconsidersthebiologicalracismofthetraditionalextremerightprimitiveandtransfersthe“rightofpeoplestobedifferent” from thebiologicalsphere to theculturalsphere:everypeoplehastherighttoliveaccordingtotheirowncustomsandAlaindeBenoist considers the attempt to mix or homogenize the differentculturespernicious—especiallyifforthesakeofasupposedlyuniversalculture. Inaddition to theclashwith theChristian racismof theFrenchextreme right,Benoistand theNouvelleDroitealso criticize theFrenchtraditional right for its narrow political conservatism and economicliberalism.DeBenoistisinfluencedbytheoriesoftheThirdPositionandthe Conservative Revolution of the interwar period in Germany. Anti­AmericanismisaconstantinAlaindeBenoist,asdenotedinthetitleofhisbookEurope,TiersMonde,mêmecombat(1986),inwhichheproposestodefendEuropefromtheAmericaninvasionbyidentifyingwiththeThirdWorldinthisbattle. We see that here there are several points of intersection withDugin’s thinking: anti­Americanism and anti­Atlanticism, conservativerevolution, influence of traditionalist doctrines, neo­pagan vision,affirmation of the overcoming of the left­right political dichotomy,criticism of narrow nationalism, defense of compartmentalized ethniccoexistence in civilizationalbases (negationof rudimentary racism,butdefense of the separate coexistence of different ethnic­civilizationalgroups),etc.34Conservativerevolution Duginassertshimselfabovetherightandleftdivisions.Oneofthebasesforsuchanaffirmationistoarguethatheisnotreactionary,doesnot preach the maintenance of the status quo, and indeed advocatesprofound, qualitative, “revolutionary” changes in society toward aconservative revolution.ThispositionofConservativeRevolution refersto a chain of homonymous thought that existed between thewars in

34 To check Dugin's view on the French Nouvelle Droite and Alain de Benoist in particular, see chapter 5 of part 2 of his book Foundations of Geopolitics in which he discusses the “Geopolitics of the New Rightists.” (Dugin, 1997).

252

Germany.Inthe1920s, variousthinkers,shiftingtheirindignationatthehumiliatingtermsofGermany’sdefeatinWorldWarItothedemocracyoftheWeimar Republic—which officially accepted them— denied thematerialistic liberalism of such bourgeois democracy andpreached theneedforitsoverthroworovercoming,evenifbyrevolutionarymeans,tocreateanewregimebasedonconservativeprinciples.It is important tonote, however, that by adopting this position, they demarcatedthemselves fromthereactionarieswhosimplysoughttoturnthewheelofhistoryback tosome“goldenage.”ThemajorityalsorejectedMarxistcommunismasamere formof materialism,butmanyadvocated someform of socialism or non­communist socialist and non­Marxistcorporatism for theeconomy.Theyemphasized thecommunityconceptofVolksgemeinschaft(communityofthepeople).Butthisconcepthadnotraditionaldemocraticbias.Onthecontrary,theVolksgemeinschaftshouldbematerialized in an organic state, in which the leader or leadershipwouldgoverninanauthoritarianway,butconnectedtothepopularwill. Inorder tounderstand thehistoricalcontextof the formationofthisculture,itisnecessarytonotethattheWeimardemocraticandliberalsocial­democratic republic — which succeeded the defeated GermanEmpire in World War I and accepted the “humiliating” terms of theVersailles treaty — attracted the hate of both the radical right(nationalists) and the radical left (communists). For a moment, thestrangepoliticalmovementoftheQuerfront(“cross­front”)unitedradicalleftand radical rightpositionsagainst theWeimarRepublic’seconomicandpoliticalliberalism.Andthisunionwasnotonlythefruitofpoliticalopportunism. Indeed, some members of the right were againstCommunism, but, not accepting economic liberalism, they preachedsome communitarian or socialist form of a national economy under anationalist government.And the communistKarlRadek, in search of awayofdiminishingtheinternationalisolationofthenewlycreatedUSSR,boosted(withhisfamous“Schlageterspeech”of1923)thediscussionofthe concept of National­Communism (which would later veer towardNationalBolshevism) todesignate thepartof thenationalistright,withanti­capitalist economic ideas, that could be co­opted for cooperationwith theSovietcommunistcamp.Both theGerman termQuerfrontandtheconceptofNational­Bolshevismrefertothisintersectionofrightandleft to which we will see that the movement of the ConservativeRevolution is linked. Names such as Ernst Niekisch navigate betweenthesethreerelatedconceptualspaces. Among the main names associated with the ConservativeRevolutionwereArthurMoellervandenBruck,Edgar Julius Jung,ErnstJünger, Ernst Niekisch. The jurist Carl Schmitt and the geopoliticalthinkerKarlHaushofer,twoofthemaindirectinfluencesonDugin,were

253

alsocollaterallyrelatedtothisschoolofthought. Therelationof the intellectualsof theConservativeRevolution toNazismisasourceof infinitediscussion.Many liberalauthorspointoutthat these intellectuals, by undermining the legitimacy of liberalism,democracy, andMarxism, and emphasizing an authoritarian leadershipstyle, created the breeding ground for a culture that later legitimizedNazism.The relationship is somewhatmorecomplicated,with theNaziideologicalleadershipdistrustingtheintellectualismoftheseConservativeRevolution theorists (especially those who had greater openness tosocialism)whileappropriatingpartoftheirintellectualbaggagefortheirownends.Thegreatexamplewouldbetheuseinthe1930softhetitleofArthurMoellervandenBruck’sbookDasDritteReich(“TheThirdReich”,1923)asaprecursortotheThirdNaziReich,whiledenyingthatMoellerwas one of its precursors, since he had historically distrusted Hitler’s“proletarianprimitivism.”AfterHitler’sseizureofGermanpowerin1933,theconservativerevolutionariessplit.Somesettledintotheregime,whileothersturnedawayfromitandsomewerepersecutedbytheNazis(e.g.,ErnstJüngerandErnstNiekische). The position of the Conservative Revolution movement ininterwar Germany, which combined right­wing political conservatismwithaproposalofeconomicswithelementsofnon­Marxistsocialismofnationalcharacter(i.e.,politicalandeconomicantiliberalism)profoundlymarksthethinkingofAleksandrDugininpresent­dayRussia.35Geopolitics Inrelationtothethemeofthisessay(thedebatesontheRussianidentitybetweenEuropeandAsia),amongtheinfluencesontheDuginianthought,geopoliticsisofspecialinterest.Duginwasoneofthefirstpost­Soviet thinkers tonotonly incorporatebutalsodevelopgeopoliticsasacentral part of his Weltanschauung. His book Osnovy Geopolitiki(“Foundations of Geopolitics”, 1997)was considered the great Russianpost­Sovietgeopoliticalmanual.Itisabookadoptedinmilitaryacademiesand universities of the country. It is not only a manual of generalgeopolitics,inwhichthegreatauthorsandforeigntheoriesarepresentedbutalsoservesasan essayin whichDugindevelopshisownEurasianist­basedgeopolitical theory.And thissuccesswasrecognized in theWest.Eurasianismingeneral,andDugininparticular,areidentifiedasthemainbases of a specificallyRussian geopolitics. In otherwords, if there is a

35 To check Dugin’s view on the subject of Conservative Revolution in detail, see his namesake book Konservativnaya revolyutsiya. (Dugin 1994)

254

specifically Russian geopolitical theory, Eurasianism is its maincomponent,andDuginisseenasitsmainauthortoday. We shall analyze the book Osnovy Geopolitiki, alongwith otherworks by the author, later; beforewe should examine the discipline ofgeopoliticsasawhole.Whatisit?Andwhatpartsofitareofmostinterestto Dugin? It is good tomention some general essential points aboutgeopoliticsasadiscipline studiedonaworld scale so thatwe can laterbetterunderstandtheparticularuseDuginmakesofit. Geopolitics emerged as a study of the effects of geography onpolitics and international relations. The termwas coined and put intovoguebytheSwedishpoliticalscientistRudolfKjellén(1864­1922)intheearly twentieth century, but some thinkers before him delineated theoutlinesofthisnewdiscipline.Thiswasdone,forexample,bytheGermangeographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844­1904) in works such as PoliticalGeography (1897), Anthropogeography (1882­1991) and Lebensraum(“LivingSpace,”1901).The latter,astudy inbiogeography, isoftencitedasthebeginningofgeopoliticsasadiscipline.Perhapsinfluencedbyhisoriginaltrainingasazoologist,Ratzelhadanorganicconceptionofstatesintheworld.Asalivingorganism,statesareborn,grow(develop),anddie.Thedevelopmentofstates(especiallylargeones)involvesliteralgrowth.In this sense, Ratzel created the concept of Lebensraum (living space)whichisthespacenecessaryforstatestofullydeveloptheirpotentialities.The concepts ofRaum (space) andKultur (culture) are essential in theRatzelian scheme.The culture of a people as itdevelops “fertilizes” thespaceinwhichtheylive.Inthisprocess,bordersarenolongerfixed.Thestrongestcultures(i.e.,thestrongeststates)feeltheneedofexpansiontorealizetheirpotentialities.Thisisanaturalphenomenonandthereforesopresent in the history of the world. In examining the state not as asuprahuman entity but rather emphasizing the interaction betweenculture,thewayoflifeofapeople,andthelandinhabitedbyit,Ratzelwasinstrumental in the development of so­called human geography. In hisbookAnthropogeography,hestudiedtheeffectsofthephysicalgeographyonthecultureandway oflifeofapeople. Ratzel was the initiator of the German school of geopolitics,which,infact,isthestrandofgeopoliticsmoststudiedandadvocatedbyDugin.Inparticular,DuginemphasizesoneofthefollowersoftheworkbyRatzelandKjellén, theGermangeneraland geographerKarlHaushofer(1869­1946).Havingreached therankofgeneral in thearmy,after thedefeat inWorldWarI,thedisillusionedHaushoferenteredtheacademiccareer. Eventually he would become a professor at the University ofMunich,where in1924heestablishedageopolitical journal thatwouldbecomeveryinfluentialwiththetitleZeitschriftfürGeopolitik. It isnotdifficult tounderstandwhyHaushofer isoneofDugin’s

255

favorite authors in geopolitics. Haushofer, absorbing not only thegeopolitical precepts of the German school but also the fundamentalconcept of the opposition between continental powers and maritimepowers, strongly present in the analyses of the Anglo­Saxon school ofMackinderandMahan,advocated toGermany the formationofwhathecalledContinentalBlock,aunion,oraxis,betweenGermanyandRussiainalliance with Japan, as opposed to the Western maritime powers ofEngland,Franceandothers.That is,heproposedanOstorientierung,anorientation to the east, not to the west. It is easy to imagine thecommonalities between this Haushoferian position (a true Eurasiancontinentalblock)withDugin’sEurasianistpositions. Inaddition to theGermangeopoliticalschool—which,with theobviousexceptionofthegeopoliticalRussianEurasianismoftheinterwarperiod, is the greatest intellectual influence in this field on Dugin—geopolitics as a whole developed remarkably in other big “national”schools;inparticulartheAnglo­SaxongeopoliticsandtheFrenchschool. TheAnglo­Saxonschoolisdeeplymarkedbythecontributionsofthree fundamental thinkers: American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan(1840­1914),English geographerHalford JohnMackinder (1861­1947)andgeographerandgeostrategist,bornintheNetherlandsandsettledinthe USA, Nicholas John Spykman (1893­1943). Alfred Mahan, in hismagnum opus, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660­1783(published in1890),popularized the concept that countrieswithmorepowerful navies would have the greatest impact on the world. Thisfundamentalgeopoliticaldichotomybetweenseapowersandcontinentalpowers(“seaand land”)wouldbeenthronedbyMackinder.DisagreeingwithMahan, he stated that the navy was the basis of the era of theColombianempires(from1492tothenineteenthcentury),butthatinthetwentiethcenturylandpowerwouldplayacrucialroleduetotheimpactof the railroads. His seminal paper The Geographical Pivot of History(1904)introducedconceptsthatwouldemphasizethecentralroleofwhathecalledthePivotArea(actuallytheEurasianheartoftheworld)whichwould later bedeveloped inhis completeHeartland theory in thebookDemocratic Ideals and Reality: a Study in the Politics of Reconstruction(1919). In his original article, The Geographical Pivot of History,Mackinder employed the concentric division of theworld between thePivotArea(thecoreofEurasia,whollycontinental),theInner(Marginal)Crescent (surrounding area of partly continental and partially oceaniccountries such as Germany, Austria, Turkey, India and China) and theOuter (Insular)Crescent (theouterarchof fullyoceaniccountries fromthepointofviewof thePivotArea suchasGreatBritain,SouthAfrica,Australia, theUnitedStates,Canadaand Japan). In thebookDemocraticIdealsandReality,hecreatedtheconceptsofWorld­Island(thesetofthree

256

interconnectedcontinentsofEurope,AsiaandAfrica,seenasthecentralcontinentalmassoftheworld)andHeartland.TheHeartlandwouldbethePivot Area (between the Volga and Yangzi rivers and between theHimalayasand theArctic)plus theeasternpartof theBlackSea to theBaltic Sea. TheWorld­Island is much larger than the other parts andcontainsmorethanhalfoftheworld’sresources.TheHeartland’scentralpositionmade it the key toWorld­Island control and prevented it frombeingeasilyassailedfromthesea.Inaddition,acontinentalpoweroftheHeartland could acquire ports at sea and thus become a powerfulamphibious power. Democratic ideals and Reality also expressed thefamous saying that presented a geopolitical alternative to Wilsonianidealism in the debates of the ParisPeaceConference for thepost­warreorganization of Europe: “Who rules East Europe commands theHeartland;whorulestheHeartlandcommandstheWorld­Island;whorulestheWorld­Islandcommandstheworld.”(thatis,heemphasizedthecrucialcharacterofEasternEuropeasastrategicroutefortheentireHeartlandandseemedtoindicatetotheAnglo­Saxoncountriestheneedforabufferstate between Germany and Russia to prevent these two continentalpowerstodominatetheheartlandalone).MackinderthusshiftedMahan’semphasis from the sea to the land as the crucial factor and advocatedcountries likeEngland,France,andtheUSA touseapolicyofbalanceofpower and try to prevent a sole continental power (such as Russia orGermany)fromcontrollingtheHeartland. IfMahanemphasizedmaritimepowerandMackinderlandpower,itwouldbewiththeDutch­AmericangeostrategistNicholasSpykmanthatairpowerwouldalsobeintroducedintothisequationofglobalgeopolitics.Airpowerwouldallowustogooversomeoftheoldlogisticallimitationsoflandandnavalforces.SpykmanusedMackinderandMahan’sconceptsbymodifying them. While agreeing on the importance and diverse geo­strategic advantages of Mackinder’s Eurasian Heartland, he relativizedthem due to the expanded powers of navy and aeronautics in thetwentieth century. He also somewhat modified the Mackinderiangeostrategic division of the world. Spykman created a differentiateddivision of: Heartland, Rimland (somewhat analogous to Mackinder’s“Inner(Marginal)Crescent,”containing theEuropeancoast, thedeserticMiddle East and monsoon Asia) and Offshore Islands and Continents(partially analogous to Mackinder’s “Outer [Insular] Crescent”,encompassing the two continents on the flanks of Eurasia, Africa andAustralia,theNewWorldandtheislandsofJapanandGreatBritain).ThebigdifferencewithMackinderisthatSpykmandoesnotseeworldpoliticsbeingbasicallyaconstantbattleoftheseapowerstocontaintheEurasiancontinental powers but rather as amore complex game that revolvesaround theRimland, and not theHeartland.Historically thewars have

257

eitherbeenonone sideBritain (andherallieson theRimland)againstRussia(andheralliesontheRimland)orelsebetweenBritainandRussiatogether against some rising power on the Rimland. Spykman thuschangedMackinder’s famoussaying (“Who rulesEastEurope commandstheHeartland;who rules theHeartland commands theWorld­Island;whorulestheWorld­Islandcommandstheworld”)to“WhocontrolstherimlandrulesEurasia;whorulesEurasiacontrolsthedestiniesoftheworld.” The strong geographical determinism of the Anglo­Saxon andGermanschoolsofgeopoliticswouldbesomewhatlessenedintheFrenchschoolofgeopolitics.From itsremotepre­originswiththegeographerÉlisée Reclus and his monumental 19­volume La Nouvelle GéographieUniverselle,Terre et lesHommes (1875­1894), inwhich this scientistofanarchistpolitical ideasdealtwith the interactionbetweenenvironmentandmanindifferentregionsoftheworld,theFrenchaspectofgeopoliticstendstoaccentuatetheaspectsofhumangeographyinthesensethatthegeographic factor is not seen as mere dead matter but rather as amaterialitypermeatedbytheworkandculturalactivityofman.Insteadofemphasizing thepermanent,unchangingcharacterofgeography,Reclusemphasizedthatitwasmodifiedaccordingtothedevelopmentofhumansociety. Jaques Ancel, considered by some the first French geopoliticaltheoretician,wouldcontinue in thisdirection,rejecting thedeterminismof the German school. Paul Vidal de La Blache, themain figure in theestablishment of geopolitics in France, in opposition to determinismwouldpreachpossibilism,a term thathehimselfdidnotuse,butwhichwould laterbeused todescribehisgeographicalapproachbasedon thepotential polymorphism of spaces from different factors, includinghumanandculturalfactors.YvesLacoste,rescuingthelibertarianspiritofÉliséeReclus,wrote in1976theprovocativebookLagéographieçasertd'abordàfairelaguerre,inwhichhecriticizestraditionalgeographyandgeopoliticsforbeingchauvinisticandhavingamilitaristicorientation. In1976, Lacoste founded the journal Hérodote: stratégies, geographies,ideologies (renamed in1982RévuedeGéographieetdeGéopolitique). In1989,hefoundedCRAG(Centrederechercheetd'analyseengéopolitique)whichwould later evolve into the Institute Français de Géopolitique. InFrance, strong leftist and/or left­wing revisionist views on geopolitics(YvesLacoste,PascalLorotandothers)coexistwithgeopoliticalcurrentsin the more traditional Realpolitik mold (François Thual, AymericChauprade and other thinkers linked to the Revue Française deGéopolitiqueandtheAcadémieInternationaledeGéopolitique). TheRussian school par excellence of geopolitics is Eurasianism:both the interwar Eurasianism (P.N. Savitskii, Nikolai Trubetskoi andothers)aswellastheneo­EurasianismthatwewillseelaterdepictedinAleksandrDugin.

258

Dugin’swork(s) HavingreviewedthemajorintellectualinfluencesonDugin,letusnowexaminehisthoughtinitself.Wewilldothisthroughtheanalysisofsome of his most important works. It will not be an exhaustiveexamination (he is an extremely prolific author!). And we will notnecessarilyfollowthechronologicalorderofhispublications,butwewilltry to examine thoseworks thatweremarkers in the evolution of histhought toward a consolidated (neo­)Eurasianist Weltanschauung. WeshallbeginwithhisbookPhilosophyofTraditionalism(2002).PhilosophyofTraditionalism(2002) Tostartwiththiswork,especiallywhentheobjectofthecurrentstudy is Dugin’s geopolitical theory, may seem strange since it is ahermetic work, almost without references to geopolitical aspects.However, it isagoodstartingpoint,sincewehavehereacontroversialpositioninrelationtothewholeofDugin’sworks.Forsomeauthors,themoremysticalaspectsofDugin’swork (his traditionalism, forexample)areaccessoryanddonotinfluencehisgeopoliticalthinking.(Shekhovtsov&Umland,2009,pp.669,671and676).Inourview,thisisnottrue.Notonlydid traditionalismcomechronologicallybeforegeopolitics inDugin—evenbeforeperestroika,whenheparticipatedintheso­calledGolovincircle,whereashisgeopoliticsonlyemergedattheendofperestroika—butithasalsopermeatedandinfluencedhisWeltanschauungtothisday.For this reason, it isworthbeginning the examinationof theDuginianbibliography by the book in which he explains traditionalism as aphilosophyendogenoustohimself. It is important tonote thatThePhilosophyofTraditionalismwasdrawnfromthecompilationofthecycleoflecturesgivenonthesubjectatthe so­called New University in the period 1998­2001. The NewUniversitywasasortofinformalacademyinwhichDuginandotherlike­mindedauthorsgavelecturesonthephilosophicalandmysticalaspectsoftraditionalismandother related topics.Recallingwhatwehavealreadysaid inthedescriptionof the traditionalistschool,thetradition towhichthe traditionalists refer to isnotmerely the traditions (habits,customs)rooted fora long time (decadesor centuries) in societies,but thegreatPrimordialTraditionorIntegralTraditionwhichwastheoriginalwayoflivingofmankindinitsheroicordivinetimesbeforethegreatdistortionsthat created the modern man, who is unconnected to the Integral

259

Tradition, individualistic, selfish, lost in thehereandnow,unconnectedwith the eternal divine. It is this original Integral Tradition that thetraditionaliststrytorescue. Philosophy of Traditionalism begins with the description of thegreat initiator of traditionalism, the Frenchman René Guénon. (Dugin,[2002]2013,L.1)Itusesalinguisticapproach.DuginsaysthatGuénon’sgreatestfeatwastohaveunveiledthelanguageofTraditioninoppositionto the languageofModernity,whichwouldbe the two greatontologicalparadigmsindisputetoday.Guénoncreatedametalanguagethatallowedhim toglimpseandanalyze thedifferencesbetween these languages. Intheparadigmofmodernity,timeislinearandunidirectional (theideaoflinearprogress toward a secular, “modern,” industrial,orpost­industrialsociety)andexistenceandtimeareidentified(SeinalsZeit)sinceoutsideof time nothing exists.Guénon’s traditionalism asserts that the form ofexistence of being, on the contrary, is outside of time, in eternity. Theconceptionofspacealsodiffersinthetwoparadigms.Inmodernity,spaceisseenbasicallyinthequantitativedimension,thatis,bodiesextendedinspace.Itisabasicallymaterialistconception.AsDuginputit,

In the language of Tradition there is a completelydifferentviewofspace: spaceassomethingqualitative.This derives from the conception of cycle, from thecyclicalnatureofreality.Thecyclearisesbecausethereiseternity;andspatialheterogeneityappearsbecause thecycleexists.Thereisasymbol:theso­called“Celticcross.”ItisacirclewithacrossthatrepresentsoneoftheoldestIndo­Europeancalendars,anancientmodelofcycle.Thissign embodies within itself the space and time asunderstood by Tradition. It is as if time weretransformed into spaceor space dynamicallyanimatedby time. The whole cycle is encompassed by eternitywherewesee thebeginningandendnotconsecutively,butsimultaneously[…](Dugin,[2002]2013L.1)

Central to the understanding of this traditionalist perspective ofalways emphasizing the permanent (eternal) and the qualitative is theconception of soul. According to traditionalists, modern anthropologyreducesman to the levelof themerelyanimal,biological.Man isseenasananimalwithculture.Contrarytothistransient,immanentperspective,traditionalism rescues the concept of soul. “The soul (anima) is thefixationofthepresenceofthetranscendentalinaconcreteperson[...]Italways remains the same:whenwe are born,whenwe live and evenwhenweareno longer in thisworld.” (Dugin [2002]2013,L.8)Dugin

260

saysthat theobjectofstudyofmodernanthropology is“manminusthesoul.” What modern men consider a great advance for an objectivescience,withoutsubjectivismandsuperstition,isforthetraditionalistsaview that excludes themain thing, the transcendental inman, reducinghimtothelevelofthemerelyanimal. InPhilosophy ofTraditionalism,Dugin ([2002]2013, L.11) alsodefendspatriarchalism.Hesays that inesotericdoctrines themasculineprinciple is the solar, subjective, creative, rational principle that givesorder to thingswhereas the feminineprinciple is lunar,night,negation,objectivityandobject(i.e.,givesplasticitytothingsbyturningthemintoobjects).Dugin reaffirms the precedence and priority of themasculineprinciple,whileobserving that they complement each other, andhencethat the feminine has an important and also sacred role within theTradition. To confirm man’s priority, Dugin seeks the example of thebiblicalnarrativethatmanwascreatedfirstandfromhimthewoman. The word sacred is important for the understanding oftraditionalism, since one of the great differences between thetraditionalist paradigm and the modern one is that the formeremphasizesandseeksthesacredwhilethelatterdesecratesandseekstheprofane. Sofarthedescriptionoftraditionalismisalmostidenticaltothatofa religious narrative. But one of the most emphasized points inGuenonian traditionalism (and that can differentiate it a bit from theordinary religious narrative) is its concentration on initiation rituals.Guénon’sphilosophy iselitist in thesense thatheconsiders thatnotallmenwillachievesalvation (return to theprimordialTradition)becausetheyareinexorablylostinthetrappingsofthemodernworld.Onlyafewwillbeable toundergoall the trialsand initiatory ritualsnecessary forthisreconnectionwiththeTradition.Notonlywillnoteveryonebeabletopassthroughthetrialsofinitiatoryrituals,givinguponthem,asmanywilllosethemselvesininitiation,takingthedegeneratepathsofcounter­initiation or follow allegedly initiatory sects that actually lead theneophytetothewrongpath:theAntichrist. Dugin stresses the importance of sex metaphysics in initiationrituals.

Whatisinitiation?Initiationistheprocesscontraryto the appearance or emergence of theworld from itsCause. If theworld iscreated through thealienationofGodfromhimselfandthecreationofsomethingexternaltohim,initiationtravelstheoppositeway.ItisthereturntoGodofsomethingthathaddepartedfromhim:itisthereturn totheOrigin, fromwhichhehadwithdrawn; it’s

261

theway back.There is a legend thatwhen Christwasbaptized, thewaters of the Jordan flowed back.This isthemomentofinitiation.Baptism isaformofChristianinitiation: themomentwhen thewaters flowbackward.Themanwho ison thepathof initiationmoves in theoppositedirectionfromwhichhecame.Hepasses,intheoppositedirection, throughallstagesofdeparture fromthe original Principle, before his emergence [...] Ininitiatorypractice, the symbolismof thesexesplaysanimportantrole[...]Themainobjectofalchemistinitiationisthemanorthe masculineprinciple.Andmale,inthatcase, is taken in the very ordinary sense. He is anordinary man, in whom transcendental masculinity isonlyapotentiality,notyetrealized.Forsuchaman,therearetwopaths.Thefirstwayistoconserve,maintainthisrelativemasculinityand,forexample,raisechildren,buildahouse, raise cattle, go towork, and soon.All of thismeansfollowingacommon,non­initiatorypath.Insucha case,man follows the impulse given him from birth.Having been created and having received the call to“bearfruitandmultiply,”hemovesinthatdirection,buthis potential solar couragewill thus remain potential,unrealized, to the end [...] Man disappears without areturn.There isanotherwaywhenmanchoosesa logiccontrary to the inertia of the arising, the logic of thereturn to theorigin.The first thinghemustdo in thisway(tospeakinthelanguageofhermeticsymbolism)isto lose his masculinity. He must realize that hismasculine qualities are a kind of illusion. They arevirtual and potential, and in fact there is somethingdifferent, totally non­masculine. This procedure inalchemyiscalled“firstmarriage”or“blackmarriage.”Atthatmoment, themasculine principle or, asHermeticscall it, “OurKing”mergeswith theaggressive feminineprinciple, that is, with the “Black Lady” [...] Alchemisttexts describe this stage the followingway. “Our King”descendswiththe“BlackLady”totheblack(river,ocean,tomb) pool,dissolves there and disappears completely.The first male cycle ends. But, unlike ordinary death,initiatory death (for which the initiate seeks toconsciously, voluntarily keep under spiritual attention)hasatotallydifferentmeaning.Itisnothingmorethanapurge. As a result of the corrupt “firstmarriage” (or

262

“blackmarriage”),the“chemicalman”onlygetsridofallqualitatively non­masculine elements. There is awashing,apurgingofthepuremasculineprincipleofallsediments that could previously be taken as aspects ofthe masculine (subjective) principle, but which wereactually female(objective)elementssecretlymixedwithit. After the stage of blackmarriage (initiatory death),“Our King” is reborn, but reborn in a totally differentquality:heisanotherman.Heisa“WhiteMan”:allthatwas feminine (black) in him was withdrawn in theprocess of this primary dissolution [...] If in a naturalmanmasculinity was external, in the “WhiteMan” or“Reborn King” it becomes internal. It is difficult tointelligibly describe the characteristics of such acreature, for biological (not to speak of spiritual)processes occur in these “transcendental” men in acompletelydifferentway fromordinarymen. It isonlyfairtosaythatafterinitiatorydeath,ordinarybiologicaldeath isexperienced inacompletelydifferentway: it isseen not as an exceptional but normal event, notaffecting theprinciples of the initiate’s existence.Afterthe restoration of “transcendental masculinity,” the“resurrection,”the“newsubject”opensthepossibilityofcreatinghimselfaccording tohisownplan,notthroughthe inertia of the Father in the original creation, butthroughhisself­affirmation,throughhissovereign,real,autocraticwill.Thusarises the“sovereignman”orself­agent. This is due to themodification of themode ofrelationshipofthecreaturetotheprincipleoftheFather:heisnolongeroutsideofHim,asagivenoriginalimpulseor as a referential instance, but is digested by Him,identifieswithHim,becomes “Father”himself:nomoreproduct, but creator, not result, but cause. The malepromisecomestrue.Itisveryimportanttonotethatthiskindofinitiationispossibleonlyinasacredperspectiveinwhichtheprincipleofthecauseisseenascoexistentwith the consequence, and time is seen as cyclical [...]The “White Man” in alchemy is called “King” and isdescribedasamanon the thronewith the scepter [...]Thisstageofattaining“transcendentalmasculinity”isnotthe last step. Then there is the “secondmarriage” (or“whitewedding”), this timewith the “WhiteLady.”The“White Lady” marries the initiate to perform the

263

ultimate, supreme level of initiation and realize “OurAndrogyne”orRebis,amysterious,two­headedcreature.This creature compels us to face the original instancethat precedes the appearance of the masculine andfeminineinbeing.The“WhiteLady”isafeminineplasticsubstance,purifiedby the fireof the“NewMan.”Undertheinfluenceofthe“WhiteKing,”shetransformsherselffrom a hellish energy blinded by chaos into a pureobedientsubstance,the“PhilosophicalLand.”Nowsheisready for anew reintegrationwith the “man”:nowhedoes not dissolve in her, but she ignites in him. Thescepter of marriage is the Androgyne. This is a verydistant, unrepresentable metaphysical sphere [...]Leaving aside the transcendental androgyny,which is aseparatetheme,letusfixourselvesonthetwomen,the“old”andthe“new”beforeandafterthe“blackwedding.”How do they differ? [...] This is a subtle thing that inTradition is treated as “the problem of the location ofintelligence.”Modernpeople are convinced thatmentalactivityisassociatedonlywiththebrain[...]Thelocationof intelligence in the brain is characteristic of theordinaryman,whodidnotundergo initiation[...]Intheprocess of initiation through “black marriage,” theintelligence of man undergoes a fundamentaltransformation. Symptomatic is the fact that varioustraditions describe initiation (“first marriage”) as a“decapitation,” the loss of thehead [...] identifying itselfwith the loss of reason [...] The reason located in thehead is dangerous, since it tends to act as a real“patriarchal”principlewhen,infact,itisaveiled“female”instance [...]The initiatedman after the “resurrection”has another type ofmind, and it is not located in thebrain,but in theheart [...] In the languageofTradition,thoughtisaformofactivityoftheheart[...]IntheworldofTradition everythingwasdifferent.The true locationofthemindwasintheheart.Inthebrainwereonlythereflections,theshadowsofthelightoftheheart[...]asinPlato’scave.Ideasliveintheheart;inthebrainareonlytheirdistortedreflexes[...]Returningtothethemeofthe“sacredfoundationofpatriarchy,”itcanbeformulatedasfollows: patriarchy is only metaphysically legitimatewhenitsstructurefunctionsonthebasisoftheinitiatoryritual of the “black marriage” and the consequent

264

resurrection;whenmen (even ifnotallbut thechosenones) tread the path of the ontological realization oftheirmetaphysical presuppositions [... and]when theystop thinkingwith theirheadsandbegin to thinkwiththeirhearts[...]followstheconclusion[that]Thepresentpatriarchy is no longer legitimate, since it has nometaphysicalbasisandisnotconfirmedbytheinitiatoryexperience. Consequently, in a sense, this “modern”patriarchy becomes a “criptopatriarchy” [...]. (Dugin,[2002]2013,L.11)

ThusDugin's traditionalistphilosophy followsGuenon’spathandrecoversametaphysicalvisionoftraditionthatisbasednotonthepurepursuitof the simpler,more rustic,more traditionalelements in today’ssociety but on a total denial of modern and contemporary society. Itmystically seeks the lost origins of the original Tradition andtranscendence, considering that life is only legitimate when based onthesemetaphysical principles. This becomes clear when you speak ofpatriarchy,ofthemasculineprincipleasthebasisofsocietyinTradition.Duginmakes it clear that he refers here to ametaphysical patriarchy,anchored in Tradition and initiation. Only this is legitimate.Contemporarypatriarchy,thedominationofwomenbymentoday,basedonmerematerialisticmachismo, is not legitimate, according toDugin.And if themasculine principle is the principle of affirmation and thefeminineprincipleisthatofnegation,thisshouldnotbeseeninthemoralsenseas“good”or“bad,”butascomplementaryaspectsofametaphysicalrelationshipwithinanaturalorder. We havementioned above thatDugin followsGuénon’s view ofTradition.However, in the bookDuginmakes an important distinctionbetweenGuenonistsandpost­Guenonistsandplaceshimselfinthefieldofthelatter,whichwillbeanimportantnuanceintermsoftheclassificationofDugin’sthinking.

Whatispost­Guenonism?Post­Guenonismisatermthat represents a kind of reaction to Guenonism. TheGuenonistas are authorswho repeat Guénon,who seehimasaguruanddedicate themselves torepeating theGuenonian discourse (and not tomasterhis language)with very little deviation [...] To differentiate Guénon'straditionalism as a metalanguage of Tradition fromreproduction of Guénon's discourse, of pure repetitionwithvariationsofwhatGuénonsaid, itmakessense tointroduce the term “post­Guenonism.” (Dugin, [2002]

265

2013,L.1) Dugin’s self­identification as a “post­Guenonist,” and notmerely“Guenonist” isof fundamental importance.Firstofall, thisclarifiesabittheeternalcontroversiesoverwhetherDuginisreallyatraditionalistornot.Forexample,intheirarticleIsDuginaTraditionalist?,Shekhovtsov&Umland(2009)defendthethesisthatDugin,despiteallhisrhetoric,isnotfaithfultoGuénon’steachings,beingmuchmoreadiscipleofJuliusEvolathan of Guénon. One of their main arguments is that Guénon wasessentiallyapoliticalandsawnopoint inengaging inpolitics tochangetheworld(anychangeintheworldwouldcomemuchmorefromspiritualthanmaterial bases).BothDugin and Evola ventured into the politicalworld and so not only non­traditionalist critics, but also manytraditionalists, hold the view that both cannot be considered genuinetraditionalists. Thisisacomplexissuethatdividescritics,includingtraditionalists,aswehave seenabove. Indeed,Guénon isadisbelieverofmaterialisticpoliticsandbelieves thatany substantial change or transformationwilloccurfromandonthespiritualplane.InhisbookSpiritualAuthorityandTemporalPower(1929),Guénondefendedtheprimacyoftheformeroverthe latter. JuliusEvola responded in the same yearwith an eponymousarticleintheItalianjournalKrurinwhichhearguedexactlytheopposite:the superiority of the kings’ power over priests, since kings also hadspiritual powers beyond temporal ones because the two castes hadstemmed from a common origin. (Guénon, 1929; Evola [1929] 2014)That is, Guénon defended the primacy of contemplation over action inwhich hewas not accompanied by Evola. Since then, authors such asShekhovtsov&Umland(2009),takingGuénonasthefundamentalbasisoftraditionalism, claim that Evola is outside this movement (as well asDugin) for his too much emphasis on political activity as a way ofchangingtheworld. Thiscanbeanswered intwoways.First,aswehaveseen,Duginposes as apost­Guenonist, someonewho attempts todevelopGuénon’swork, notmerely repeat it. That leaves room for variations like this.Another important detail to note is the following. Guénon reallyemphasizes contemplation over action and spiritual meditation overpoliticalwork.Hebelievedthatanyreallyimportantchangewouldcomefrom the spiritual side. In general, the presentworld (which is in thefateful era ofhecatombs andmaterialistic degradation that the Indianscall Kali Yuga) is destined for an apocalypse. But as the traditionalistconceptionoftimeiscyclical,anotherera,morespirituallydeveloped,willcome.Inthispassagetherewillbeanelite(thefew“chosen”ones)whowill lead thisway.Evenpessimistic in thepossibilityof regenerationof

266

theworld still in this age (especially in theWest),Guénon says that ifsomething improves, itwillnothappenasaresultofmassmovements,but rather by the influence of an elite of spirituallymore enlightenedpeople.Thiselitewouldexertinfluence,notthroughpoliticalactivity,butrather,asGuénonputitinhisbookTheCrisisoftheModernWorld,

Thetrueelite,ontheotherhand,wouldnothavetointervenedirectly in these [political,material] spheres,nor takepart inanyexternalaction.Theywoulddirecteverything through an influence that peoplewould noteven notice; an influence that, themore invisible, themorepowerfulitwouldbe.(Guenon,2001,p.80)

Guénondidnotventureintopoliticsandwaspessimisticaboutit.He did not completely rule out a remote possibility of relativeregenerationinthisage,buthedidnotpreachanyopenpoliticalactivity.On the contrary, the important thing for him in this sense was theexistenceofasmall“enlightened”elitewhowouldhavegreatreferentialpower,agreatspiritualandintellectualauthority,anditwouldbethroughthis sheer authority that itwould influence, almost imperceptibly, themassesandevents. That’swherewecanmakeabridgewithDugin.Duginiscertainlymuchmore politically engaged than Guénon, and on this plane he isactually closer toEvola than toGuénon.However,whenwe look at theoutcomeofDugin’spoliticalactivity,wenote thathispolitical influencecomes much more as an intellectual reference (geopolitical, as thegreatestnameofneo­EurasianisminRussia)thanfromhisownpartisanactivity(asfounderofthe[small]Eurasianparty,forexample).Duginisakindofgreyeminencethat,directlyand(especially)indirectly,influencesvariouspoliticalcurrentstoaparticular field.Inaway,heresemblestheGuenoniandescriptionaboveofalmostsubliminal formsof influenceonthemasses. Forall thesereasons,weagreewithauthors likeMarkSedgwick(2004)whoconsiderDuginoneofthelegitimatenamesoftraditionalismtoday. We also emphasize that Dugin’s traditionalism is not just apersonal,somewhatmystical,characteristicofanauthorwhohasnothingtodowiththescientificpartofhiswritingsrelatedtogeopolitics,assomeauthorsput it.Traditionalism formsabasis that influenceshisanalyseseven in themorescientific texts (suchasFoundationsofGeopoliticsandthe book that resulted from his doctoral thesis, Evolution of theParadigmatic Bases of Science). For example, in his sole mention ofgeopoliticsinthebookPhilosophyofTraditionalism,afterunderliningthat

267

traditionalismemphasizeswhatiseternal,permanent,inspaceandtime,hebuildsabridgestogeopolitics,whichisasciencethatemphasizesthemost permanent, most durable, less transient aspects in internationalrelations(i.e.,thegeographicalfactorsandtheirinfluenceonthehumanpopulations associated with them). Dugin, [2002] 2013, L. 1) InFoundationsofGeopolitics,chapter6ofpart1ofbook1(entitled“FromSacredGeography toGeopolitics”),Duginutilizes theconceptof“sacredgeography”originatedinhismoremysticalbooksandtherefrombuildsabridge to geopolitics in its scientific version. As we saw earlier, theconceptof “sacred” is fundamental to traditionalism,unlike themodernparadigm,which emphasizes the secular, theprofane, as the only trulyscientificapproach.

Geopolitics, in the form that exists today, isundoubtedlyasecular,“profane”science.Butperhapsit,among all themodern sciences, has preserved in itselfthe greatest links with Tradition and the traditionalsciences.RenéGuénonsaid thatmodernchemistry isaresultof thedesacralizationofthe traditionalscienceofalchemyandmodernphysics,ofmagic.Itcanalsobesaidthat contemporary geopolitics is the result of thedesacralization of another traditional science, sacredgeography.However,sincegeopoliticsoccupiesaspecialplaceamong themodernsciences,and isoftenreferredtointhecategoryof“pseudo­sciences,”itsprofanationisnot as complete and irreversible as in the case ofchemistryandphysics.Tieswithsacredgeographyarequite visible. Thus, it can be said that geopoliticsoccupies an intermediate place between traditionalscience(sacredgeography)andprofanescience.(Dugin,[1997]2010,book1,part6,chapter6.1)

Andfromtherehegoesontodescribeseveralmysticalaspectsofwhat he calls “sacred geography” still extant and visible in thecontemporary science of geopolitics: the fundamental geopoliticaldivision between sea and land (sea powers vs. continental powers) asrepresentative of the fundamental metaphysical polarities of stabilityversus change, mobility versus immobility, body versus blood etc; thecharacteristics of relief symbolizing different perceptions of life andrelationswith thecosmos,asbetweenplainandmountain; themystical(spiritual) symbolism of the East andWest and so on. (Dugin, [1997]2010,book1,part6,chapter6)

268

Influence from traditionalism can also be seen in Dugin’smostpolitical­partisan texts.Forexample, to the text inwhichhedefends theperformanceof theRussiannationalBolsheviks in the1990s— in theperiod inwhichhewaslinkedtotheNational­BolshevikPartyofEduardLimonov — he gave the title Templars of the Proletariat: National­Bolshevismand Initiation.That is,hedescribed theperformanceof theNationalBolsheviksintermsofcomparisonwiththemysticalorderoftheKnightsTemplaroftheMiddleAges.(Dugin,1997a) For all these reasons listed above,we defend the position thatDugin’straditionalismwasnotonlyayouthfulpassionoraminorhobbythatceased tomatter inhis laterworksofamorescientificorpoliticalcharacter,butratherthattraditionalismprovidedhimwithphilosophicalbasesfromwhichhedevelopedideasinthefieldofpoliticsandthehumansciences.36Traditionalism,with its initiatoryvisionsofa few spirituallydevelopedmen being saved in the “end of time” (Kali Yuga cycle), alsoexplains the salvationist,almostmissionary (in the senseof “manonamission”)characterofDugin’swork,especiallyinthepoliticalfield.Heisneverjustapoliticianor justasocialscientistinhispraxisinthesefields:there is always thismystical strand flickering behind his political andscientific endeavors. The traditionalist background helps explain thisidiosyncrasy.Archeomodern In a thematic sequence, we chose, as Dugin’s nextwork to bestudied, a little­known text, but which we believe is an importantstepping­stonefromamorespiritual,mysticalvisioninThePhilosophyofTraditionalismtoapoliticaluseoftheseinitialbases.Archeomodernisthetitle thatDugingave to the last lecture thatended the functioningof theso­calledNewUniversity,his informalacademy foresotericstudies.ThelecturewaspublishedasanessayontheArktogeyaportal.(Dugin,2008)In it, the author launches the concept of archeomodern to be able toexplain the current situation of Russia in the world context — andindirectly illuminate the situation of other countries in a similarsituation.37

36 For example, in the book Putin Against Putin, Dugin described himself thus: “The main direction of my activity is the exploration of ontology. I am interested in the fields of thought, of the foundations of being, of paradigms that appear in everything and everyone. All the rest (sociology, history of religion, geopolitics, political science, culturology, literary studies, etc.) derives from ontology.” (Dugin, [2012] 2014). 37 In a conversation with the current author during his visit to Brazil to give lectures, Dugin commented that Brazil would also be a great example of the archeomodern in

269

Dugin begins by describing pre­modernity, modernity, andpostmodernityasWeberian ideal typesofsuccessivepatternsofvariouscountriesandregionsoftheworldthroughouthistory.Whilenotingthat,likeallidealtypes,theyneverfullyandperfectlyexistinactualhistoricalpractice,hetakestheUSA(andtoalesserextent,WesternEurope)astheregionsoftheworldthathavepassedmorefullythroughallthesephases.Note, however, that in Russia (and inmany other countries not fullydeveloped) thedeviations from these idealizedpatterns ofdevelopmentaresogreat that theycan justify thedesignationofaparallelpattern,adeviation, a “pathological anomaly” in this sequence of pre­modern,modern and postmodern. He names this paradigmatic anomaly“archeomodern.” The term describes a society that has apparentlymodernized itself,butwhere in facttherearesomanyarchaicremnantsof the pre­modern that it becomes a kind of unpredictable anddysfunctional Frankenstein, difficult to classify and understand. Duginsays thisholdsasmuch fornineteenth­century tsaristRussiaas for theSovietUnionandthepresentRussianFederation.Russiaistrappedinthearcheomodernandcannotgetoutofit. Tobetterunderstand thisconcept,weneed todetailwhatDuginunderstands as pre­modern,modern, and postmodern.He starts from aWeberian orthodox view of themodern as the “disenchantment of theworld”:menstopbelievinginpre­modern“magical”religiousbeliefsandbegintohaveasecular,non­magicalviewoftheworld.Itisthepassagetothe rational, the “scientific.”Metaphorically,Dugin states that it iswithmodernitythatthe“subject”arises.

What ismodern?Themodern is a concept that isconnectedwith the appearance of the subject.Wherethere isthesubject intheclassicCartesiansenseoftheterm, there is themodern.What dowe understand assubject? As subject we understand, following WesternEuropean philosophy, the rational­volitional principle.Wherethereisreasonandwherethereisthewill,therein the intersection of thewillwith reason, the subjectarises[...]Therewherethesubjectappearsasarational­volitive principle [...], where the philosophical subjectappears,therebeginsthemodern.(Dugin,[2008]2014)

Thisvolitionalrationalizationwill lead to thedevelopmentof theindividual,ofindividualism,throughliberalisminWesternEurope.Dugin

the world today, as well as Russia. (Dugin, in personal communication to Angelo Segrillo, on September 3, 2012, at the State University of Rio de Janeiro)

270

willarguethat inRussiatherewasnoappearanceofthesubject inthisphilosophicalsense. ButbeforeexaminingthespecificcaseofRussia,letuslookattheDuginian view of the postmodern. If Dugin’s view of the modern issomewhatorthodox,followingthegeneralWeberianlineofthemodernas“disenchantment” and “rationalization” of the world, his view of thepostmodern is heterodox. Most thinkers who use the concept of the“postmodern”seethepostmoderngenerallyinoppositionto,orasakindofantithesisof, themodern. (cf.Harvey,1992,pp.43and116;Hassan,1985, pp. 123­124) Dugin follows a heterodox current and sees thepostmodern,infact,asa“deepeningofthemodern.”

Indeed,themaintaskofthepostmodern, ifwe lookat its social, political and philosophical agenda, is tocompletewhatthemodernhasfailedtocarryout[...]Inotherwords, postmodernists assert that in themodernthere is still much of the pre­modern and the maincriticismthatthemodernsuffersfromthepostmodernisthe discovery of archaic traits in themodern. (Dugin,[2008]2014)

That is, in the USA (and, secondarily, inWestern Europe), thepostmodernshowsthemodernhowmuchirrationalityitstillhasinitselfandseeks(initsownway)tocriticizeanderadicatetheseremnants. To better explain this process, Dugin resorts to the concept of“kerygma”bytheProtestanttheologianRudolfBultmann.

Bultmann gives his definition of “kerygma” as“Christian doctrine minus mythology.” In his view, inChristianity there is a rationalpart (thekerigma itself)and a huge layer of irrational elements that haveinfiltrated vestiges of pre­Christian pagan traditions,mysticism (Jew, Hellenistic), and so on. He includeseverythingthatisirrationalintheconceptofmythology.Mythology is a structure that naturally penetrates intoanytraditionandhasanimportant,oftendecisive,roleinit.(Dugin,[2008]2014)

Duginborrowsthispolarityof“kerygma”versus“structure”(inhisview of Bultmann’s ideas, kerigma being the rational core of Christiandoctrineversusthestructureofnon­rationalmythologiessurroundingit)asthebasisofhisanalysisofthearcheomodern.

271

Thearcheomodernisthecoexistenceofkerygmaandstructureinastateofdisorderandconflict.[Ingenuinelymoderncountries...]thesecondparadigm(modernity)isbased on the negation of the first paradigm (pre­modernity): the kerigma expels the structure. In thearcheomodern things happen differently. These twoparadigms are not excluded, but overlap one another,thatis,thekerigmadoesnotexpelthestructure.(Dugin,[2008]2014)

Dugin then draws attention to the fact that in modernity thestructureisexpelledbykerygmainanorderly,systematicway,whereasinthe archeomodern the archaic structure manages to survive, in adisorderedandpathologicalway,instrugglewiththekerygma.Thishelpsto clarifyDugin’sposition on thepostmodern as away to complete anincompletemodernity, to expel the irrational spaces that still exist ingenuinelymoderncountries.What is thedifference (as faras irrationalremnantsofgenuinemodernity)withthesituationofthearcheomodern?Dugin points out that, during modernity itself, there emerge theorieswhichhecalls “philosophiesofmistrust,”suchas thosebyMarx,Freud,andNietzsche: “In their interpretation of structure, theirmission is torethink the balance of the reflective and the non­reflective within thesubject.”Thesethreephilosophersundressthenon­apparentweaknessesandcontradictionsof thebourgeoisrationalsystemofmodernity: if theCartesiansubjectisrationallyconscious,these“philosophersofmistrust”haveshownthesubconsciousstructurethatliesaround(andpotentiallymines) the consolidated bourgeois rational kerigma. In Freud, this isliteral: the study of the subconscious. In Marx, the analysis of theeconomicstructure(base)showsthecontradictionswiththerelationsofproduction (Marxsawmanasproducerofthingsandofhisown life).IfFreud sought the exit from the underground (subconscious) andMarxfrom the levelof theground (shop­floor),Nietzchesoughtawayup.Hecriticized themoralityof thecommonbourgeoismenandsaid that theexitwouldbeshownbythesuperman.Duginseesthese“philosophiesofmistrust”asimportanttoshowthecontradictionsthatevencompleteandgenuine modernity still has in it. According to him, it is thesecontradictions thatwillalsobepointedoutbypostmodernism. If in fullmodernity the structure (irrationalities) was generally expelled by thekerygma,thepostmodernauthorscriticizethemodernkerigmaitselfandinquire whether the modern kerigma doesn’t contain irrationalitieswithin itself. Hence comes the whole postmodern attack on the greatmodern metanarratives which purport to explain the world in amonocausal or simplified way. The postmodernists point out the

272

contradictionsbetweenthevariousmodernexplanatorysystemsasproofthat there is not really one genuine history but only stories (differentnarratives):modern rationality is criticized as irrational for its utopiandesire to “explain the world in a definitive, rational way.” It is theseirrationalities within the modern kerygm itself that postmodernitycriticizesandtriestochange. Dugin considers that the postmodern critique of “irrationalitywithinmodernrationality”(i.e.,within thekerigma itself) iscorrect.Buthesees postmodernismasacontinuation(oftheerrors)ofmodernity.ForDugin, postmodernism falls into a total nihilism of language gameswithout a real basis, for it continues modernism, that is, it furtherdeepens man’s path away from the truth of the original spiritualTradition. What is the solution then? Within the problematic of thearcheomodern, Dugin proposes the solution of the “ConservativeRevolution.”Accordingtohim,thisisthesolutionthatwillallowRussiaatthesametimeto“modernize”itself(i.e.,tocreateakerigma,tobecomearealsubjectinhistory)andtokeepthesource(ofits)tradition. Atthispoint,wemustagainrecallthediscussionbetweenGuénonand Evola within the traditionalist school about the relationcontemplation/action and spiritual power/temporal power. Guénonrejectedmodernity enbloc anddespisedparty­political struggles.Dugin(asanassumedpost­Guenonist)works fromadifferentperspective.Forhim, theRussians shouldundergoa trueandgenuinemodernization. Itwould be a modernization different from that of Western Europe. InWestern Europe, modernization was accompanied by sheersecularization: in Russia it could be realized in a differentway, takingadvantageofthemystical,spiritualandtraditionalbasesofthecountry.AsagreatexampleofapossiblemodernRussiansubject(differentfromtheWestern),Duginmentions theOldBelievers.Themovement of theOldBelieversoriginatedwithareligiousschismthatoccurredintheRussianOrthodox Church in the seventeenth century. Patriarch Nikon hadreformed some of the church’s religious rituals in the middle of thecentury,butamong themore traditional common folkmany refused tofollow thenew rites and continued to follow the ancientmanners.Theintense repression that accompanied this process led to the exile andimprisonment of the dissidents, but could not end themovement. Forcenturies the Old Believers suffered discrimination on the part of theChurchand thestate.Despite it(orperhapsbecauseof it, following thepattern ofmovementslikethepersecutedCalvinists,Quakers,andJews),the Old Believers developed great discipline and willingness to work.Manyhavebecome important in industryandcommerce inRussia. It isthis example of union between the most severe tradition and skilful

273

behavior in themodernworldof industryand tradeof theOldBelieversthat Dugin gives as one of the examples of possibility of ConservativeRevolutioninRussiaasanalternativetothepathofthesimpleimitationoftheWestproposedbyWesternizers.38 Aswesawearlier,theconceptofConservativeRevolution,fromitsinterwarbeginningsinGermanyandRussia,especiallywiththeso­calledNationalBolsheviks,brings together right and leftprecepts.Dugin saysthat the Russian adherents of the Conservative Revolutionmust startfrom the critics of the “philosophies ofmistrust” ofmodernity andusethem in the critique of the anomalous situation of the Russianarcheomodern.JustasMarx,FreudandNietzscheshowedtheenormityofthenon­rational thatstillexistswithin thereflectionofmodernity (howmuch structure still determines the modern kerygm from within),ConservativeRevolutionariesmust take thegreatest step inRussia,notonlytogetridofthearcheomodernbutalsotocriticizethemodernandthepostmodern.

The act of theConservativeRevolution is possibleonly as a volitional and rational choice between thekerygma and the structure. Making the choice forstructure,we affirm the highest form of the kyigmaticprinciple, the highest reason: consciously sacrificeoneself.(Dugin,[2008]2014)

Dugin believes to be able to overcome the impasses of thearcheomodernandthemodern(atthesametimeavoidingtheimpasseofthe postmodern) via the Conservative Revolution. It would be theconscious and rational choice of structure (Tradition). That is to say,Dugindoesnotpreacha“returntothehistoricalarchaic”,forit,intheoldform,proveditselfincapableofdefendingitselfagainstthemodern.Duginadvocatesamodernitydifferent fromtheWesternone(which issecular,repressiveof traditions“assuperstitions”andcurrently flowing into thepostmodern).He advocates an alternative path thatwould have a newsubjectwhose rationalitywouldnotbe (touseaWeberian expression)merely “instrumental” (i.e., “accountant­like”, focused exclusively on themost efficient ways of producing material goods), but a full reason,attuned to the most important truths, including and especially thespiritualones,oftheexistenceofman.

38 Dugin would eventually join the Old Believers movement. He did so within the current known as edinoverie which is a strand of the Old Believers that recognizes the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate and in return is recognized by the Russian Orthodox Church and has autonomy to maintain its own ancient rites.

274

TounderstandallthesetwistsinDuginianthinking,itisimportanttorememberthatheself­proclaimedlyalignshimselfwithso­calledpost­Guenonites. If Guénon was against modernity en bloc, Dugin ([2002]2013,L.1)recalls thatpost­Guenonists(likeMirceaEliade)believe that,even in modernity, among the traditional forms of everyday life thatsubsist, there are somewhichremotelyconnectwith theoriginalgreatTradition. And these “traces of Tradition in the modern,” even ifweakened, have a regenerative potential that can be useful totraditionalists. Thus, Dugin, contra Guénon, is in favor of an engagement oftraditionalistsinpolitics.Ontherelationbetweenphilosophyandpolitics,inthetextArcheomodern,hecametodeclare:“Thedesiretodividethesetwothings(‘Let’spracticepoliticsandnotgetinvolvedinphilosophy’or,instead, ‘Let’s study philosophy: politics is a dirty thing’) is absolutelyflawed.Wemust, forthehundredthorthousandthtime,assumethatthepolitical and the philosophical are intertwined, and it is from thiscombination ofphilosophy andpolitics thatwillbebornwhatonedaywillbetheRussianConservativeRevolution.”(Dugin,[2008]2014) In this vein, the title of another text by Dugin is symptomatic:“ModernizationWithoutWesternization.”Init,Dugin([1997]2010,L.2,pt.7)proposesthatRussiamodernizeitself(technologically),butwithoutbeingWesternized (culturally).This isapost­Guenonistposition (somecriticswouldsayanti­Guenonist)thatdiffersagreatdeal fromGuénon’spracticallysheerrejectionofmodernity. Insum,DuginproposestheconceptofarcheomoderntodescribethesituationofRussia(andofmanyThirdWorldcountriesinadditiontosome inan idiosyncraticsituation,suchas Japan). Inorder tosolve theimpasse of this pathological situation, he proposes the ConservativeRevolution. The example of the struggle of the ConservativeRevolutionariesmaybeusefulalsoindevelopedWesterncountries,wherethemodernisreachingtheimpasseofthepostmodern.Inpracticalterms,theparty­politicalstrugglemeantDugin’sadherencetoEduardLimonov’sNational­Bolshevikpartyinthe1990sand,afterhisfeudwithLimonov,inthefoundingandimplementationoftheEurasianpartyinthefirstdecadeof the 2000s. As we have previously pointed out, Dugin’s influence,through the doctrine of neo­Eurasianism, seems to have been greateroutsidehis particularpartymilitancy thanwithin it.Dugin is a kind ofintellectual grey eminence, whose Eurasian geopolitical theoreticalpositions influence diverse individual and collective actors in varioussectorsofthepoliticalandculturalspectrumofpresent­dayRussia.TheFourthPoliticalTheory

275

Going deeper into Dugin’s political theory, we should analyzeDugin’sbookTheFourthPoliticalTheory,asitrepresentsasummaryandconclusionofhistrajectoryintermsofpoliticalphilosophy.(Dugin,2009) The Fourth Political Theory, is, to a certain extent, a DuginianresponsetothechallengeposedbyFrancisFukuyama’sessayonTheEndof History (1989). On the other hand, it is the culmination of Dugin’spoliticalstudies,hisownfinalproposalinthestrictosensufieldofpoliticaltheory,independentlyofhisgeopoliticalstudies.39ThebestwaytomakethisclearistopresentDugin’swordsintheintroductionofhiswork.

Wehavethe impression thatpolitics isover intheworld today; at leastpolitics aswe knew it. Liberalismthwarted itself against the political opponents offeringalternative recipes — such as conservatism,monarchism, traditionalism, fascism, socialism,communism—andbytheturnofthetwentiethcenturyhaddefeatedallof them. Itwouldbe logical toassumethatpoliticswouldbecomeliberal,andallitsopponents,jammedintotheperiphery,wouldbegintorethinktheirstrategiesand formanew front (AlaindeBenoist).Butthe beginning of the 21st century has shown anotherscenario. Liberalism, always emphasizing theminimizationof thePolitical,after itsvictorydecided tocancel politics. Perhaps not to allow the formation ofpoliticalalternativesandtomakeitsdominationeternal.Perhaps conservatism, fascism, communism (and theirvariants) lost, and liberalism, having vanquished,immediately mutated into a sub­political ontology ofpostmodern fragmentarystylecenteredoneveryday life,consumerism and individualism. Politics becamebiopolitics, transferred to the individual andsubindividuallevel.Itturnedoutthatnotonlypoliticallydefeated ideologies, but politics itself, including theliberalversion,were takenoutof thepicture.Forsomereasonthosewhodonotagreewithliberalismandseek

39 The Fourth Political Theory is a kind of thesis, the proposal of a new paradigm by Dugin in the field of political theory. To get a broader overview of Dugin’s political thinking as a whole, it is interesting to read his book Philosophy of Politics, a sort of Eurasianist and traditionalist political science manual in which Dugin examines the theories of the various thinkers of political philosophy under the light of his own positions. In the work, it is then possible to verify Dugin’s position on the most diverse currents of political theory. (Dugin, 2004a)

276

alternativeswill find themselves inadifficult situation.How to conduct politics when politics does not exist?Thereisonlyonewayout.Toabandonclassicalpoliticaltheories,onboththelosingandthewinningsides,andtoemploy the imagination,tounderstandtherealityofthenewglobalworld,tocorrectlydecipherthechallengesofthe Postmodern and to create something new, beyondthe political battles of the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies .Thisapproach isan invitation to formulateafourthpoliticaltheory,beyondcommunism,fascismandliberalism.(Dugin,[2009]2013,intro.)

In chapter1,Duginwill furtherdetail thisdescriptionby statingthatthetwentiethcenturywaspoliticallymarkedbythebattlesbetweenthreegreatparadigms(liberalism,communismandfascism)fromwhichthe first one emerged victorious. But this victory coincided with theemergenceofthepostmodernandthisgaveunexpecteddirectionstothehistoryofpoliticsinthe21stcentury.

Themain ideologiesof thetwentiethcenturywere:liberalism (right and left), communism (includingMarxism but also socialism and social democracy) andfascism (including National Socialism and otherideologies of the Third Position: Franco’s NationalSyndicalism,Peron’s justicialism,Salazar’s regime,etc.).[...]The firstpolitical theory is liberalism. It came first[...] Today it is clear that liberalism is what bestcorrespondedtotheepochofthemodern[...]Itisfairtocallcommunism(aswellassocialisminallitsvariants)asecondpoliticaltheory.Itappearedafterliberalismasacritical reaction to the establishment of the bourgeoiscapitalist system [...] And, finally, fascism is the thirdpolitical theory. Intending to reflect the spirit of themodern [...] fascism, at the same time, was related tosymbols and ideas of traditional society [...] Fascismappeared last and disappeared before all others. Thealliance of the first theory with the second one, andHitler’s suicidal geopolitical strategies, caused itspremature death. The third political theory diedviolently, not seeing old age or natural degradation(unlike the USSR). [...] When it disappeared, Fascismgavewaytothestrugglebetweenthefirsttheoryandthesecondone.Thishappened inthe formof theColdWar

277

[...] In 1991, the first political theory (liberalism)overcame thesecondone(socialism). Itwas theendofworld communism. Thus, at the end of the twentiethcentury, of the three political theories capable ofmobilizingmillions ofpeople all over theplanet, thereremained only one: liberalism. Butwhen itwas alone,everyoneshouted inunisonaboutthe“endof ideology.”Why? […] It so happens that the victory of liberalismcoincidedwith its end [...] The subject of communismwasclass.Thesubjectoffascismthestate(inthecaseofMussolini)or race (in the caseofHitler). In liberalism,the subjectwas the individual, freed from all forms ofcollective identity, fromall “belonging” (l'appartenance).While the ideological struggle had formal opponents,peoplesandentiresocietiescould(atleasttheoretically)choosewhatkindof subject theywanted to report to:class, state (race) or the individual. The victory ofliberalism solved this question: the normative subject,forhumanityasawhole,becametheindividual.Itwasatthismoment that thephenomenonofglobalization, themodelofpost­industrialsociety,andthepostmodernerabegan [...] The values of rationalism, scientism andpositivismwereidentifiedas“veiledformsoftotalitarianrepressive strategies” (grand narratives) and criticized[...]Atthisstageliberalismceasestobethefirstpoliticaltheory and becames the only post­political practice. Itleads to the “End of History.” Politics is replaced byeconomics(worldmarket).Statesandnationsareplacedin themelting pot of globalization.Having vanquished,liberalismdisappears,mutatingintosomethingdifferent:post­liberalism. Ithasnomorepoliticaldimension. It isnolongeraformoffreechoice,havingbecomeakindof“destiny” (hence the thesis of postindustrial society:“Economicsasdestiny”).Thus,thebeginningofthe21stcentury reveals the “end of ideologies” (that is, of allthree of them). They had different endings.TheThirdPolitical Theory was annihilated in its “youth.” TheSecond one died of senility. The First one becamesomething different— “post­liberalism” or the “globalmarket society.” In any case, they are no longeruseful,effective,andrelevantinthemannertheyexistedinthetwentiethcentury.Theydonotexplainanything.Theydonothelpusunderstandwhatisgoingonandrespondto

278

global challenges. From this observation emerges theneed fora fourthpolitical theory. (Dugin, [2009]2013,chapter1)

Surprisingly Dugin seems to concur to a theory of “End ofHistory”, “End of Ideology”. In spite of disagreeing with thepostmodernists,hesaysthatinordertoformulateafourthpoliticaltheoryto account for those new paradoxical conditions of postmodernity thatseem tohavedecreed the endofpolitics,onemustbeginwork towardthistheorybystudyinganddeeplyunderstandingthepostmoderninordertotherefromseekanalternativetoit.SurprisinglythetraditionalistDuginmakesthepostmodern(i.e.,thecriticalstudyofit)thestartingpointforapotentialfourthpoliticaltheory.

Thefourthpoliticaltheorywillnotappearbyitself.It may or may not emerge. The precondition of itsappearance is disagreement. Disagreement with post­liberalism as a universal practice, with globalization,withthepostmodern,withthe“EndofHistory,”withthestatusquoofthe inertialunfoldingofbasiccivilizationalprocesses at the dawn of the twenty­first century. Thestatusquoandinertiadonotpresentanypoliticaltheory.The global world must be governed exclusively byeconomic laws and the universal morality of “humanrights.”All political decisions are replaced by technicaldecisions. Technique and technology dominateeverythingelse.The(human)“masses”arereplacedbyasinglemassofindividual products.Thatiswhythepost­liberalreality(infact,virtuality,whichincreasinglytakesthe place of reality) leads directly to the annulment ofpolitics. It can be argued that liberals “lie”when theyspeakofthe“EndofIdeology”andsticktotheirideologysimplybydenyingtherightofallotherstoexist.Butthisis not so.When liberalism ceases to be an ideologicalposition and becomes the only content of social andtechnologicalexistence,itisnolongerideology,butafactof life, an objective order of things which is not onlydifficult but absurd to challenge. Liberalism, in thepostmodernera,shiftsfromthesphereofthesubjecttothatoftheobject.Inthelongperspective,thiscanleadtothe totalreplacementofrealitybyvirtuality.TheFourthPoliticalTheory is conceived as an alternative to post­liberalism, but not as an ideological position before

279

another ideological position, rather as an idea inopposition to matter [...] Thus, the Fourth PoliticalTheorycannotbeacontinuationoftheSecondorThirdones[...]Theyhavethrowntheirchallengesinthespiritof themodern [...] andwere defeated.Thismeans thatthe struggle against the postmodernmetamorphosis ofliberalism in the formof globalpostmodernitymustbequalitatively different, be based on different principles,and propose new strategies [...] If the Third Politicaltheory criticized capitalism from the right, and theSecondPoliticalTheory from the left, in thisnewstagethe old political topography does not apply to post­liberalism:itisnotpossibletodeterminewheretherightis and where the left [is ...] Thus any appeal to themodern,towhichtherepresentativesoftheSecondandThird political theories clung, loses its relevance. Thebattle for theModern is already lost (to the Liberals).That is why the theme of the Modern (andmodernization) can be taken off the agenda.The battleforthePostmodernbegins.(Dugin,[2009]2013,chapter1)

Dugin’sposition that the “modern”has slipped from the agendaand lost its relevance may seem to contradict what he said in hisArcheomodern essay, in which he complained about the “incompletemodernization” of Russia. However, it is important to note that theArcheomodern essay seeks to study the specific, concrete situation ofRussia.InTheFourthPoliticalTheory,Duginmovesontoamoreabstractlevel, of political theory, and of amore global scope, regardless of thespecific situation of individual countries. At this level of theoreticalelaboration,he seesas themost important thing to study the challengeposed by the “postmodern” and by the “post­liberalism” that has theworld hegemony at the moment. This relation between studying thepostmodernandthemoderninsearchofanalternativeisdetailedbyhimlater.Hestartsbytalkingabouttheconditionsofthepostmodern.

Itisherethatnewperspectivesopenforthefourthpolitical theory. The Postmodern that is realized inpractice today(Post­Liberalmodernity)annuls thestrictlogicoftheModern:afterthegoalhasbeenreached,thestepsusedtoachieveitloseimportance.Thepressureofthe ideological corpus becomes less severe. Thedictatorship of ideas is replaced by the dictatorship of

280

thingsandaccesscodes(login/password)[...]Newholesappear in the fabric of postmodern reality. As in theirtimes the Third and Second political theories tried to“ride the Modern” in their struggle against liberalism,thereisnowachancetodosomethinganalogoustothepostmodern using exactly these “new holes.” It isnecessarytoevaluatethesenewpointsofdangerfortheglobal system, to decipher their access codes, to shakethesystem[...]TheeventsofSeptember11inNewYorkhave shown that this is possible technologically. Thenetwork society can also serve itshardenedopponents.Inanycase,itisindispensable,firstofall,tounderstandthenewsituationof thepostmodernno lessprofoundlythan Marx understood the structure of industrialcapitalism [...] The Second and Third political theoriesclaimed to express themodern.And these claims havefailed[...]However,theveryfactthattheyhavelostmustbe seenmore as their advantage thandisadvantage. Inlosing,theydemonstratedthattheydidnotbelongtothespiritoftheModernwhich,inturn,ledtothepost­liberalmatrix.And thatwas to theiradvantage.Moreover, thismeansthattherepresentativesoftheSecondandThirdPoliticalTheories,consciouslyorunconsciously,wereontheTradition side, even though theydid not recognizethis or drew the necessary conclusions from it. It isnecessary to rethink the Second and Third PoliticalTheories, removing from themwhatmust be rejectedandmaintainingwhat is valuable [...] In any case it isnecessary to rethink the Second and Third PoliticalTheories in a newway, fromnewpositions [ ...]Theirorthodoxies is what is less interesting and useful inthem.Whatwould bemost productivewould be their“cross­reading”:“Marxviewedpositivelyfromtheright”and “Evola viewed positively from the left.” But thisattractive“National­Bolshevik”beginning(inthespiritofN.UstryalovorE.Niekisch)isnotenoughinitself[...]Infact,themainandmostimportantreadingoftheSecondandThirdPoliticalTheoriesispossibleonlyonthebasisof the nascent Fourthpolitical theory,where themainobject (although objectible as value) is thepostmodernand its conditions: global world, governance, marketsociety,universalism ofhuman rights, “realdominationofcapital”andsoon.(Dugin,[2009]2013,chapter1)

281

Dugin states that his book is not intended to present a FourthPoliticalTheory,sincehethinksthisisacomplextaskthatwillrequirethecollectiveworkofmanythinkingminds.Ontheotherhand,hemadesomeobservationsandestablishedsomepointsofdeparture,whichhebelievesmaybeusefulinthefutureformulationofsuchatheory.Themainnodalpointshepresentedaspromisinglinksofafuturefourthpoliticaltheoryare: traditionalism,conservativerevolution(overcomingof theright/leftdichotomy), and Heidegger’s Dasein theory. With regard to Russiaspecifically, he considers Eurasianism the starting point of Russian“resistance” to the post­liberal challenge together with Carl Schmitt’sconceptsof“GreaterSpaces”and“rightsofthepeoples”andadvocatestheimperialprinciple as thebestbuilding block forRussia administrativelyspeaking.Letustakealookatthesesuggestions. Weshallstartwithtraditionalism.Aswehaveseenpreviously,thetraditionalistschool(Guénon,Evola andothers)isoneofthemainbasesof the Duginian thought. He was a traditionalist before being aEurasianist. And traditionalismwas one of the factors that led him tochoose Eurasianism as a geopolitical option. Thus, the traditionalistWeltanschauung isasinequanon,according tohim, fora futureFourthpoliticaltheory.Tothosewhoobjectthatproposingareturntotradition,to the past, as a response to the postmodern challenge seems to be acontradiction in terms, Dugin replies that traditionalism does not dealwith“whathappened”butwith“whatiseternal”:theyareeternal,lastingvaluesthatareindependentofthe“fads”ofthemodernandpostmodern.Duginpointsoutthatpostmodernityis,infact,amorepropitiousperiodforareturntoreligionthanmodernityitself.

Tradition (religion, hierarchy, family) and theirvalueswere dumped in the dawn ofmodern times. Infact, all three political theories were conceived asartificialideologicalconstructionsofpeoplewhofacedinvarious ways the “death of God” (Nietzche), the“disenchantmentoftheworld”(Weber),the“endof thesacred.”Thiswasthenerveofmoderntimes:intheplaceofGod cameman; in the place of religion, philosophy;and science in the place of Revelation […] But if theModern is exhausted in the Postmodern, along with itendstheeraof“huntingdownGod.”Thepostmodernistsdonotregardreligioninimicallybutratherindifferently.In addition, some aspects of religion (usually thoseassociatedwithSatanism, i.e., the“diabolical texture”ofpostmodernphilosophers)havebecomequiteattractive.

282

In any case, the period of persecution of religion hasended, although (following the very logic of post­liberalism) what can be expected after that is theappearance of pseudo­religions [...] The cooling of thepersecution of the Faith can become an opportunity ifthebearersoftheFourthpoliticaltheoryareconsequentandintransigentinthedefenseoftheidealsandvaluesofTradition.What had previously become “outlawed” inthemoderneracanbebravelyproclaimedasapoliticalprogramtoday[...]Thecorrectnessofsuchastatementisconfirmed not only by the serious success of Islamicfundamentalismbutalsobythereturnofinfluencefromextremely archaic Protestant sects (dispensationalists,Mormons,etc.)onU.S.policy(BushstartedtheIraqwarbecause, inhiswords,“GodtoldmetoattackIraq!”ThisisveryinthespiritofhisProtestantMethodistteachers).(Dugin,[2009]2013,chapter1)

ButhowdowedrawfromtheTraditionthevisionsandvaluesfora (postmodern) reality that is so remote from it?Would going back toarchaismsnotbeadeadendintermsofanewtheoryforthetwenty­firstcentury?Firstofall,Duginsayshedoesnotpreachareturntothearchaic.Ashehimselfputit,thearchaichasalreadylosttomodernityonaworldlevel.Thereisnowayoutinasimplereturntoit.Duginreaffirmsthathedoesnotwantareturntothe“archaic,”the“pre­modern,”butalookattheoriginal Integral Tradition (which is not an old thing, but an eternalthing).InpracticaltermsofmethodologytowardaFourthPoliticaltheory,hesuggests theuseof theontologicalvisionof theGermanphilosopherMartinHeidegger.

Heidegger’s conception, in short, is as follows. Atthe dawn of philosophical thought, people (theEuropeans, or rather the Greeks) put the question ofBeing in the spotlight. But, by so doing, they riskedgetting lost in the nuances of the complex relationshipbetweenBeingandthought,betweenpureBeing(Seyn)and its expression in existence, as a being (Seiende),betweenthebeinginitshumanform(Dasein)andbeingin itself (Sein). These failures had already occurred inHeraclitus’teachingsonphysisandlogos.Thentheywereobvious in Parmenides. They culminated in Plato,whoplacedideasbetweenmanandexistenceanddeterminedtruth as that which corresponds to them (referential

283

theory of knowledge). Hence the alienation thatgradually lead to “instrumental reason”and then to thedevelopmentoftechnology.Littlebylittlemanlosessightof and contactwithpureBeing and enters thepathofnihilism.Theessenceoftechnology(basedon technicalrelations with the world) expresses this growingaccumulationofnihilism.Inmoderntimesthistendencyreaches culmination. The technical enframing (Gestell)finally displaces Being and puts “nothingness” on thepedestal.Heideggerfiercelyhatesliberalism,consideringittheexpressionofthe“instrumentalreason,”whichliesat the basis of “Western nihilism.” The postmodern,whichHeideggerdidnotsee, is theultimateoblivionofBeing, the “midnight” when nothingness (nihilism)appears from all cracks. But his philosophy was nothopelesslypessimistic.HebelievedthatnothingnesswasthereverseofpureBeing,which,inthisparadoxicalway,remindsmankind of its existence. And, ifwe correctlydecipherthelogicofthedevelopmentsofBeing,thinkinghumanity can instantly be saved, at the verymomentwhentheriskisgreatest:“Butwherethedangeris,alsogrows the saving power,” Heidegger quotes Hölderlin.Heidegger uses the term Ereignis (“the Event”) todenominatethissuddenreturntoBeing.Itoccursexactlyatmidnight,when theworld is at its darkest point inhistory.Heideggerhimselfwashesitant to saywhetherthis point had already been reached or “not yet.” Aneternal “not yet”…Heidegger’s philosophy can becomethemain axis thatwill guide everything else: from thereconsideration of the Second and Third PoliticalTheoriestothereturnoftheologyandmythology.Thus,at the center of the fourth political theory, as itsmagnetic center, is the vector of the approachingEreignis (“Event”), in which the triumphant return ofBeing will be embodied, precisely at a time whenhumanity forgets about it in the most definitive andirreversibleway.(Dugin,[2009]2013,chapter1)

Thus, Dugin deems fundamental Heidegger’s criticism of thecourse taken by philosophy.Uncertain in the obscure relation betweenBeingandthought,philosophyslowlyabandonspureBeingandbeginstodealwiththelattertothedetrimentoftheformer—inKantianterms,itbecomesimpossibletoknowthething­in­itselfandwecanonlydealwith

284

phenomena, or things as we perceive them in our mind. As atraditionalist,Dugincannot resignhimself to thisabandonmentofpureBeingandproposesHeidegger’sphilosophyasastartingpoint toreturntoit.Duginconsidersthisfundamentaltoescapetheimpassesofthetotalnihilismofthepostmodernera.Inshort,notestowardapossibleFourthPoliticalTheory In conclusion, Dugin asserts that he has not ready a fourthpolitical theorycapableofovercoming the impassesof thepostmodern,post­liberal realityof today (a task thatwill require theparticipationofmanyminds in jointaction),but inhisworkhepointsout somebasesthatmayprovefruitfulasaspringboardforaneventualelaborationoftheFourth theory.Theseare: traditionalism(not in thesenseofareturn totheold,but to thatwhich iseternal,primordial); theovercomingof theleft/right dichotomy by means of a National­Bolshevik strategy withaggiornamento for today’s postmodern condition; and the use ofHeidegger’sontologicaltheoryasthebasis foranepistemologicalreturnto the concepts of pure Being and Dasein that can break out of thephilosophicalsimulacraoftheeraofpost­liberalpostmodernity. These are some general pointers. In the book,Dugin also givessuggestionsforthespecificsituationofRussiainthiscontext.ButwewillleavetheobservationsreferringspecificallytoRussiaforthenextsection,when we will examine the 1997 book Foundations of Geopolitics: thegeopoliticalfutureofRussia,inwhichDugindealtinmoredetailwiththepoliticalandgeopoliticalsituationofRussiaintheworld.FoundationsofGeopolitics(1997) This is probably Dugin’s best­known work and the one thatlaunchedhimasthegreat(re)foundingnameofgeopoliticsinpost­SovietRussia. The reasons for this are understandable. In the Soviet period,geopolitics (which does not examine class problems) was seen as a(pseudo) bourgeois science. Therefore, after the disintegration of theUSSR,thenewRussiahadavacuum inthis fieldvis­à­vistheWest.AndDugin's book fit like a glove in that vacuum, even being adopted inmilitaryschools.Itssuccessisduetothefactthat,ontheonehand,itisanintroductorymanualofgeopolitics,reviewingthegreatclassicaltheoristsfounders of the field, thus constituting a textbook that was promptlyadoptedinthefaceofthelackofqualitynativematerialinthisareaatthetime. On the other hand, in this book Dugin re­emphasized the

285

geopolitical classics of inter­war Eurasianism (pontificating there thefigure of Peter Savitskii), gave them a new reading and proposedgeopolitical strategies to Russia in the light of this neo­Eurasianistapproach. In1997, on the eve of theAugust1998 financial crisis thatrepresented the rock bottom of the Yeltsin government’s economicdepressionandweakness,themoodwasset forabookthatproposedadifferent course for Russia. All these factors contributed to the workbecomingakindof“bestseller”inhisarea.ItwasfromtherethatDuginslowly shifted his image from “marginal” intellectual to influentialcharacter in the mainstream of the new Russian governmentestablishment thatwould slowlybegin to set inafter the “rockbottom”crisisofAugust1998.Itwouldbesymptomaticthatthegreatnameofthepost­1998crisisrecovery,thenewPrimeMinisterEvgeniiPrimakov,wasconsidered a Eurasianist. The background was formed for Dugin’sinfluenceonRussia’sgeopoliticalthinkingtotakeoff.Divisionandsectionsofthework FoundationsofGeopoliticsisdividedintotwo“books.”Each“book”isdividedinto“parts”containing,eachofthese“parts,”several“chapters.”The work begins with a grand panorama of the leading classicalgeopoliticalthinkers,followedbyananalysisofthemainschoolstakenasawhole.After thisgrand initialgeneralappreciation, in themiddleandfinalparts,DuginfocusesmorespecificallyonRussia,proposingaseriesofstrategiesforthecountryfroma(neo­)Eurasianistpointofview.“Book1”isthemainoneinthisrespect.Theso­called“book2”iscomposedofaseriesoflooseessaysofamorephilosophicalcharacterthatmixpolitics,historyandsociologywiththeinitialgeopoliticalbasisofthework.40 InBook1,Part1isdividedintotenchapters,eachchronologicallyfollowingthedevelopmentofgeopoliticsthroughitsfoundingfathersandgreat exponents. It is not necessary here to go into detail about eachgeopolitical author, but the order of development is interesting, as itdemonstrateswhatDuginconsiders theevolutionofgeopolitics,startingwith theAnglo­Saxon classics (Mackinder andMahan), continuingwiththeGermangeopoliticalschoolofKarlHaushoferandculminatingintheEurasianists of the Soviet period (Savitskii). Thus, instead of the

40 In relation to this division of the work in “Book 1” and “Book 2” it is important to note the following. The (first) print edition of Foundations of Geopolitics, 1997, was only composed of this “Book 1.” Later an an electronic version of the book was made available in Russian on the internet, with the addition of that “Book 2,” which consists of various articles related to the topic written by Dugin.

286

mainstreamWestern view of a geopoliticsmainly based onMackinderandMahan,DuginsuggeststhatRussianEurasianismisaculminationofanevolutionofthedisciplinetoapositionthat ismoreconducivetothecontinental Eurasian world than continuing to follow the Mackinder­Mahanian “Atlanticist” tradition.Duginwilldefend both theEurasianistview and theGermanHaushoferian school as togethermore suited tocontinental countries (such as Russia and Germany, which he thinksshould unite in a strategic [geo] political alliance) than Anglo­Saxongeopolitics. In Chapter 1 of Part 1, Dugin describes the work of FriedrichRatzel (1844­1904), the German geographer who with works likePoliticalGeography(1897)wastheforerunnerthatlaunchedthegermsofwhat would later be called geopolitics. In chapter 2 he describes theSwedishRudolfKjellén,whocoined the term“geopolitics.” InChapter4,AmericanAdmiralAlfredMahan,whowithhisbookTheInfluenceofSeaPower Upon History, 1660­1783 (published in 1890) popularized theconcept that countries with more powerful navies would have thegreatestimpactontheworld,initiatingtheideaofthebasicdichotomyofgeopoliticsbetweensea powersandcontinentalpowers(“seaandland”).Chapter 3 describes the British geographer Halford Mackinder, whoenthroned this basic dichotomy by postulating the concept of theheartland,acentral partof theworld (theEurasian regionbetween theVolga and Yangzi rivers) object of attention of the greatpowers of theworld.Duginemphasizesthis fundamentalstepofMackinder’semphasison continental power as a counterpoint to Mahan’s emphasis onmaritimepower.Chapter5showstheFrenchgeopoliticalschool,which,withtheoriessuchastheso­calledpossibilismofPaulVidaldeLaBlache,sought to escape the determinism of the Anglo­Saxon school. Duginreturns to this school inChapter6by addressing the reexaminationofMackinder’sideasbytheDutch­AmericanthinkerNicholasSpykman,whoemphasized thenewpowerofaeronautics.Alongwithdevelopments inthe navy, this new power would relativize many of the geo­strategicadvantagesofthecontinentalpowerspointedoutbyMackinder. Then Dugin will examine the geopolitical school of his specialpreference forbeing the firstgreat “continental”geopoliticalschool: theGerman one. In chapter7,he emphasizes the seminal characterof thefigureofKarlHaushofer,who,absorbingthefundamentalconceptoftheopposition between continental and maritime powers, advocated aContinental Block, an alliance between Germany and Russia (includingJapan aswell) against themaritimepowers ofWesternEurope.Duginverymuch appreciatedHaushofer’s Ostorientirung (“Orientation to theEast”)andabsorbed the ideaof thisGermany­Russia­Japanaxisalso forthe21stcentury.

287

In thesectionon theGermanschool,Dugindevoteschapter8 tothe jurist Carl Schmitt, who is not traditionally seen as a geopoliticalauthorstrictosensu,butwhohasgreatinfluenceonDuginianthinking.Inthis chapter are shown the main geopolitical prisms of Schmittianphilosophy explained in books such as Land und Meer, Eineweltgeschichtiliche Betrachtung (1942) and Der Nomos der Erde imVölkerechtedesJusPublicumEuropaeum(1950):theoppositionbetweencontinental andmaritime civilizations (in the Schmittian language, theoppositionbetween“Behemoth,”anchoredinstabilityandtraditionalwayof life, and “Leviathan,” of fluid and dynamic character, withoutpermanentmoorings) and the concept of Grossraum (“greater space”),i.e.,thegrowthandagglutinationofcommunitiesinlargespacessharingacommonculture,interestsororigins(asopposedtotheidealizationofthemore “atomized”nation­states as theperfect and complete formof theevolutionofstatesinhistory). Inchapter9ofPart1ofBook1,DugincompleteshispanoramicviewofthemaingeopoliticalschoolswiththeRussianEurasianistsoftheinterwarperiod,takingtheleadingfigureinthisfield,PeterSavitskii,asamodel. Several of Savitskii’s ideas are analyzed, especially his view ofRussiancivilizationnotasanexclusivelyEuropeanSlavic type,butasasynthesis of several European and Asian principles (Slavic, Finnish,Turkic,Mongol,amongothers).Russia­Eurasiawouldbethe“continental”centerof theworld,asopposed tothemaritimecivilizationsofWesternEurope and Asia, for example. Savitskii developed the concepts ofmestorazvitie (which denotes the organic integration of the differentgeographic environmentswith the populations that inhabit them) andideocracy (todescribecivilizations thataredrivenbysome fundamentalideaorideasthatintegratethemandguidetheminoppositiontothefluid,dynamic, malleable civilizations that have no great structuring idea toserveasaframework). Thesearethechaptersthatmakeupalmosttheentiretyofpart1ofBook1.Thispart ispracticallyamanualofclassicalgeopolitics,withnothing that differs greatly from the usual manuals used in othercountries,inthesensethatitisadescriptionofthemainauthors(thoughDuginhasanidiosyncraticwayofdescribingthem,clearlystressingthatforhim theGerman andEurasian geopolitical schools are an evolutionand adaptation to the conditions of the “continental” countries, whichwouldbebetter thananorthodoxvision emphasizingonly the classicalauthors of the Anglo­Saxon school). As this panoramic view of thedisciplinedoesnotdiffer fromother textbooks,what is important is toanalyzetheotherpartsofthework,inwhichDuginappliesthisclassicalknowledge of geopolitics to the concrete situation of Russia. The bookdealswith several fields related to the theme and itwould escape the

288

scopeof thecurrent text todescribe themexhaustively.That iswhywewillconcentrateonthepartsofFoundationsofGeopoliticsthatmostrelatetoour theme: theRussian identitybetweenEuropeandAsia,WestandEast.“Introduction”and“Conclusion”(ch.10)ofPart1ofBook1of“FoundationsofGeopolitics” BeforeweentertheotherPartsofBook1,itis interestingtoseesomeexcerptsfromthe“Introduction”andtheconcludingchapterofPart1, for there, inpresenting the fundamentalnotionsofgeopolitics,Duginsignalsthebiasofhissubsequentapplicationofthesebasicprinciplesofthediscipline.

Geopolitics is a worldview, and as such is bestcomparednottosciencesbuttoscientificsystems.It ison the same level asMarxism, liberalism, etc., that is,systems of interpretation of society and historywhichchoose as a fundamental principle some importantcriterion and correlates to it all the other innumerableaspectsofmanandnature.Marxismandliberalismbasethe the economic side of human existence on theprinciple of “economics as destiny”. It does notmatterthatthesetwoideologiesreachoppositeconclusions.Soit is with geopolitics. But in contrast to “economicideologies,”itisbasedonthethesis:“geographicreliefasdestiny.” Geography and space have in geopolitics thesame function that money and the relations ofproductionhave in liberalismandMarxism:theyreportallthemainaspectsofhumanexistenceandtheyserveasthebasicmethodof interpretationofthepast,actingas themain factors of human life and organizing theotheraspectsofexistence [... IfMarxismand liberalismaffirm]homoeconomicus,geopoliticsaffirms the“spaceman”[...]Thedependenceofeachindividualinrelationtothe economy is obvious in both small and largeproportions. That is why economic determinism isintelligiblebothtothecommonmanandtotheinstancesofpower[...]Thedependenceofmanonspace,thebasicthesis of geopolitics, is seen only with a certaindetachmentfromeachindividual.Thatiswhygeopoliticsdoes not become an “ideology of the masses” [...]

289

Geopolitics is a worldview of power, a science aboutpowerandforpower.Onlyastheindividualapproachesthe social elite does geopolitics begin to show him itsmeaninganditsusefulness,forbeforethatitisfeltasanabstraction.Geopolitics is adiscipline ofpolitical elites(both actual and alternative elites) [...] In thecontemporary world it is a “Ruler’s Guide” [...Tellurocracy and thalassocracy] The main law ofgeopolitics is the affirmation of a fundamentaldualismthat is reflected in the geographic organization of theplanet and in thehistorical civilizational typology.Thisdualism is expressed in the opposition between“tellurocracy” (terrestrial power) and “thalassocracy”(maritime power). The character of this oppositionderives from the contrast between commercialcivilization (Carthage, Athens) and military­authoritariancivilization(Rome,Sparta).Inotherwords,thedualismbetween“democracy”and“ideocracy.”Fromthe outset such dualism has the quality of enmity,alternationbetween these twopoles, although the levelmayvaryfromcasetocase.Thewholehistoryofhumansocieties is thus seen as composed of two elements:“liquid” (fluid, variable) and “solid” (hard, permanent).The“tellurocracy,”theterrestrialpower, is linkedtothefixation of space and the stability of its characteristicsandqualitativeorientations.Atthecivilizationallevelthisisexpressed insedentarismandconservatism,inseverelegalnorms [...]Thesolidityof the land isexpressed inthe rigidity of ethics and solidity of social traditions.Continental people (especially the sedentary ones) arenot linked to individualism, to the spirit of economicentrepreneurship. Collectivism and hierarchy arecharacteristic of them.The thalassocracy, themaritimepower, represents a type of civilization based onopposite foundations. This type is dynamic, mobile,inclined to technical development. Its priorities arenomadism (especiallymaritime), commerce, individualentrepreneurship. The individual, as the most mobilepartof thecollective, iselevated to theroleofsupremevalue and legal and ethicalnorms become relative andchangeable.This type of civilizationdevelops rapidly, iteasily changes its external cultural characteristics,keeping only the general typological inner identity

290

unchanged [... In modern times,] England’s war ofpositionwiththecontinentalpowersofRussia,Germany,and theAustro­HungarianEmpirewas thegeopoliticalcontentoftheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies;fromthe middle of our century the main fortress ofthalassocracyhappened tobe theUSA.During theColdWarof1946­1991 thedevelopmentof this geopoliticaldualism reached its maximum proportions, withthalassocracy identifyingwith theUSAand tellurocracywiththeUSSR.(Dugin,1997,Introduction)

Intheconcludingchapter(chapter10)ofPart1ofBook1,Duginarguesthatthisdualismoftellurocracy/thalassocracy isalsoreflected inthe writers and geopolitical schools themselves, when they find that“geopoliticalthinkersarealwaysengaged.”

Another characteristic of the founders’ views ofgeopoliticsistheirconstantpoliticalengagement.Thereis practically no geopolitical author who is alienatedfrom participation in the political life of his country.Hence comes thepassionofallwithoutexception.Thegeopolitical thinker, in carrying out scientific research,necessarilyhas todeterminehisownplace in thechartofthegeopoliticalpoles.Thiswilldependonthebiasofthevisionhewillusetoanalyzealltheworldprocesses.Throughout the history of geopolitics,we did not findanyauthorwhowasindifferenttothefateofhiscountryanditspeople,whodidnotshareitsbasichistoricalandethicalorientation.Thisisevidentinthepolaroppositesof the Anglo­Saxon authors—who consistently followthelogicandvaluesystemofseapower,ofThalassocracy,formulatingtheirtheoriesfromtheAtlanticistviewpoint—andtheRussianEurasianists—equallyconsistentintheirbeliefintheidealsoftheheartland,notdoubtingtheabsolute historical and ethical superiority of ideocracyandRussia­Eurasia.InrelationtotheFrench,thepictureismore complex: there is a theoretical choice of self­identificationbetween thalassocracyand tellurocracy. Inthe foreground there is solidaritywith theAnglo­Saxonworld, with sea power. On the other hand, there isGermanophilia. Both variants undoubtedly expressnational sympathies. Theoretically both trends arepresent among French geopolitical authors. Themost

291

finished picture is given by the group of “Atlanticists,”followersofVidaldeLaBlache,whobecame thecentralfigureinthisfield.Itsgeopoliticalantipodes(LavalanddeGaulle),fromthetheoreticalpointofview,arebehind.InGermany there is also an ambiguous situation. If itsgeopolitical thinking generally has continental and“Eurasian” orientation, this orientation is limited by acomplicatedrelationshipwiththeSlavicworld,Asia,andespeciallyRussia.Thislimitationissosubstantial,andsostubbornwereGermany’sattemptstovoluntarilyequateitsCentral European conditionwith aCentral Eurasiancondition passing over the historical sense of Russia­Eurasia,thatinbothworldwarsGermanyeventuallyhadto to fightnotonlywith the thalassocraticpowersbutalsowith his Eurasian logical ally (Russia/USSR). Onemight say that it is characteristic of Germany a “non­Eurasianist” continentalism [...] AmericansMahan andSpykman and the English Mackinder [...] are“spokesmen”ofAtlanticism,ofthalassocracy.VidaldeLaBlache (and his school) represent Atlanticist France.LavalanddeGaulle lean toward continentalism [...]TheGermansRatzel,HaushoferandSchmittidentifyGermanywiththeaxisoftheland,oftellurocracyandtrytocreatea“GreaterSpace”inGermanythatcanopposetheAnglo­Saxon [...] The radical continentalists Ernst Niekisch,Friedrich Georg Jünger, ArthurMoeller van den Bruckand others go further and understand the future ofGermany only in a strategic integrationwith EurasianRussia. Finally, the Russian Eurasianists (Savitskii,Trubetskoi, etc.) express themost finished version ofcontinentalism and the most radical position oftellurocracy, the “nomos” of the earth. (Dugin, 1997,book1,Part.1,chapter10).

HavingidentifiedRussiaasthecruxoftheMackinderianheartlandin opposition to the great sea powers, Dugin suggests that, in thesituation inwhichshe findsherself, themostappropriatepolitical formforRussia,asacountry,isthatofempire.

Russiahasneverbeenanalogous to those “nation­states” characteristic of modern­day Europe […] The“nation­state” is based on the administrative unity andbureaucratic centralism that form the political

292

communitycreatedbythestateandwhichisintrinsicallylinked to it.Without a doubt, the “nation­state”modelwasfirstformedinabsolutistFranceandlaterdevelopedin the Jacobin revolutionary model. The “nation­state”from the outset had a markedly secular nature andrepresented,aboveall,politicalunity.Inthisconception,the term“nation” isunderstoodasa“groupofcitizens”and not as a “people” or “peoples” in the organic,“holistic”sense.Thistypeofstateisbasedontheethnic,religiousandclassstandardizationof the population,ontheadoptionofequallegalandproceduralnormsforthewhole of society without taking into account regional,religious or racial specificities.Nominally, the “nation­state” can bemonarchical, democratic or socialist. Thefundamentalelement isnot thespecificityof itspoliticalregime but the state’s understanding as a centralizedadministrative body superimposed over any ethnic­social or cultural­religious difference. It should beemphasized that “nation” in this case is understood intheexclusivelypoliticalsense,differingsharplyfromthemeaning as the nationalists understand the term.Historicallythe“nation­state”emergedinEuropeintheperiodof the finaldisintegrationof imperialunityasaresult of the disappearance of the last vestiges of theimperial system that subsisted in the form of regionalfeudalstructures.The“nation­state”isessentially linkedto the domination of profane, bourgeois values whichreduce qualitative social differences to a simplifiedquantitative administrative structure. In general, the“nation­state” isnot guided by a “divine idea” (such astheocracy or the “Holy Empire”) or by a “heroicaristocraticpersonality”(suchasthefeudalsystem)butratherbythe“dictatorshipoflaw”(“nomocracy”),whichgivesenormouspower to juristsand legalbureaucracy.In practice, the “nation­state” is revealed as themostconvenientpoliticalrealitytomanageandquantify,sinceall “irrational,” non­quantifiable factors are kept to aminimum. InRussianhistory, the “nation­state”assuchdid not arise.When in eighteenth­century Europe thismodel began to be established, Russia resisted itdesperately by allmeans. The tsarist regime sought tokeep the imperial structure intact asmuch aspossible,althoughsomeconcessionswereconstantlymadetothe

293

Europeanmodel. In spite of the pro­European Petrinereforms, the Russian Empire preserved the theocraticelements and the aristocratic principle [...] Only at thebeginningof the20thcenturydidRussiaapproach theimplementation of a “nation­state” in the Europeanmodel.Butatthesametimetheprocesswasderailedbytherevolutionaryimpulse[...]TheUSSRdidnotbecomea “nation­state”: itwas a continuationofdeep imperialnational traditions [...] In themodernist rhetoricof theBolsheviks, theRussians vaguely recognized their owneschatological ideals: the triumph of Idea, Justice andTruth.TheSovietstatewasperceivedbythepeopleasa“NewEmpire,”a “KingdomofLight” [...]andnotas thecreation of themost rational device of administrationand management by quantitative units. (Dugin, 1997,book1,Part.4,chapter3.2)

Dugin continues his argument by saying that in an eminentlymultinationalstatelikeRussia,theattempttoforma“nation­state”wouldmeantheexploitationofmanynationalitiesbyoneofthem.

Not being a monoethnic state or nation­state,Russia,practicallyfromthebeginning,wasapotentiallyimperialstate.BeginningwiththeunionoftheSlavicandFinno­UgrictribesunderRurikandreachingthegiganticdimensionsof theUSSR (and the territoriesunderherinfluence), the Russian people followed the path ofspatial and political integration, imperial construction,andcivilizationalexpansion.ItshouldbenotedthattheRussianexpansionhadaverycivilizationalsense:itwasnotautilitariansearchforcoloniesorabanalstrugglefor“living space.” It was not a lack of “living space” oreconomicneedthatmadetheRussianpeopleconstantlyexpandtheirborderstotheEast,South,NorthandWest.The lackofspacenever represented the truemotive ofRussian imperial construction. The Russians expandedas bearers of a special mission whose geopoliticalprojectionconsistedinadeepawarenessoftheneedtounite thegigantic territoriesof theEurasian continent.Thepolitical unityoftheEurasianspacehasanintrinsicvalue to Russian history [...] The cultural factor is anatural complement of the purely geopoliticalpredestination of Russia. The geopolitical mission is

294

conscientizedattheculturalleveland,conversely,cultureconscientizes, processes and implements geopoliticalmomentum. Space and culture are two of the maincomponentsoftheRussianpeopleaspeoplewhocreateempire par excellence. Neither blood nor race noradministrative control nor even religion would havemade theEastern Slavs an original,unique community:theRussianpeople.TheRussianpeopleweregeneratedpreciselybythehugeunlimitedEurasianspacesandbyanextremeculturalopenness[...]Ethnic,political,ethicalandreligiousaspectswereredefinedunderthebannerof“Space and Culture.” The Russians were formed,developed andmatured exactly as a nation under theEmpire, in the heroic acts of its construction, in theexploits of its protection, in the campaigns for itsexpansion.Therenunciationof the functionof imperialconstruction means the end of the existence of theRussianpeopleasanhistoricalreality,asacivilizationalphenomenon. Such renunciation represents a nationalsuicide.(Dugin,1997,book1,part.4,chapter3.2)

Despite characterizing Russia as the Eurasian power parexcellence, Dugin adds that Russia has a worldwide mission that goesbeyondregionaldimensions.

The Russian people, with its civilizational andgeopoliticalmission,have traditionallybeen(andare)aseriousobstacletothegeneralspreadoftheprofoundlyliberalmodeloftheWestontheplanet[...]Atthepresenttime,afterthedisintegrationoftheUSSR,theWesttriesto impose another geopolitical function on Russia [...,]that of a regional power [...] The status of “regionalpower,”proposed(imposed)bytheWesttoRussiatoday,representsasuicidefortheRussianpeople[…]IfwetakeintoaccountthespecificityofRussianimperialnationalself­identification,itbecomesclearthatRussia’sadoptionofthestatusof“regionalpower”cannotbecomethelastline of defense. The blow in the Russian nationalconsciousness in this case will be so strong that thematterwillnotbeexhaustedwithin thebordersof theRussianFederationoranyothersimilarterritorialspace.Havinglosttheirmission,theRussianswillnotfindthestrengthtomakeuseoftheirnew“reduced”identityasa

295

“regional power” [...] Consequently, disintegratingprocesses are likely to continue at the regional powerlevel:theRussianswillnotbeabletowithstandthewaveofregionalandreligiousseparatism[...]ThiswillbethenaturalresultofthelossoftheirimperialmissionbytheRussians.(Dugin,1997,book1,part4,chapter3.3)

Duginthen goesontodescribetheidealeconomicsystemsothatthisimperialregimemayhavesufficientstrengthtoresisttheonslaughtsoftheWest,whichseekstoreduceRussiatoapowerwithweakenedormerely regional status. And for this, he retrieves economic ideas thatoriginatedintheGermanauthorGeorgFriedrichList.

The [perestroika and post­perestroika economic]reformswere necessary, but the dualistic logic (eitherSoviet socialism or capitalist liberalism) put thediscussion on a completelywrongplane from the start[...]Strictlyspeaking,people shouldchoosenotbetweenliberalcapitalismandSovietsocialism,butamongliberalcapitalism, Soviet socialism and a special economicdoctrine that combinesmarket elements and planningelements by subjecting them to the main imperative:nationalprosperityandstatesecurity(“thirdway”).This“third way” in economics is not a compromise or asyncreticmixtureofheterogeneouselementsof the twoother economicmodelsbut a finished and independentdoctrinethathasalonghistoryandmultipleexamplesofrealization in practice [...] The “third way” in theeconomyisnotidenticaltoeithertheSwedishmodelortheSwissmodel[...]SwedenandSwitzerlandarenotfullgeopolitical formations and do not have high strategicsovereignty. Consequently, they do not possess thatgigantic portion in the military, industrial and statesectors necessary for the formation of real self­sufficiency [...] The genuine “third way” in economicsfounditsclassicexpressionintheworksofFriedrichListwho formulated theprinciple of “economic autarchy ofgreaterspaces.”Thistheoryisbasedontheinequalityinthe capitalist development of societies and the logicalconsequences of the economic colonization of thepoorestcountriesbytherichest.Insuchcircumstances,“free trade” is favorable to the richer countries and

296

unfavorable to thepoorer.Therefromheconcluded thatatcertainstagesofthecapitalistdevelopmentofasocietyitisnecessarytoresorttoprotectionism,dirigismeandcustoms restrictions, that is, to the limitations of“freedomof trade” at the international level inorder toreach state independence and strategic power at thenationallevel.Inotherwords,itwascleartoListthattheeconomy should be subordinated to national interests,andthatanyappealtothe“autonomyofmarketlogic”isonly a disguise for the economic (and hence political)expansionofthewealthierstatestothedetrimentofthepoorer [...]TheeconomichierarchycreatedbyListcanbe reduced to a simple formula: those aspects ofeconomic life that by their dimensions are compatiblewith the interests of individualsmust be governed bymarketprinciplesandbebasedon“privateproperty.”Itis the sphere of housing, small industry, small ruralpropertiesandsoon.Withthegrowthoftheimportanceof a certain type of economic activity, this form ofproductionmustincorporatecharacteristicsofcollectiveproperty,becauseinthiscase“privateproperty”andtheindividual factormay contradict collective interests: inthis case, the “cooperative” or “corporate” criterionshould apply. And, finally, the economic spheresintrinsically linked to the state and its strategic statusmust be controlled, subsidized and directed by stateentities, since these are interestsof ahigher level than“privateproperty” or “collective benefit.”Thus, in sucheconomicstructure,itisnottheelites,themarketorthecollective that determine the economic, industrial andfinancial features of society. They are formed on thebasisof theconcrete interestsofaconcretestateunderconcrete historical conditions. Consequently, there canbenodogmatisminthismodel:asthegeopoliticalstatusand the historical and national conditions of the statechange, theproportionbetween thesizeof these threelevels in the economichierarchy can vary considerably.For example, in times of peace and prosperity, theprivatesectorandthecollectivesectormayincreaseandthestatesectordecline.And theoppositemayoccur incomplicated times of the national history [...] It isinteresting tonote that itwas precisely to this Listianmodelthattheadvancedcapitalistcountrieshistorically

297

resorted to in times of crisis. Even the United States,radical advocates of the principle of “free trade,”periodically resorted to protectionist measures andgovernmentsubsidiestotheindustrialsectorwhentheyfound themselves in periods of “economic depression.”This economic variant of the “third way” is the onlyalternativeforRussiatoday.(Dugin,1997,book1,part4,chapter8.1)

HavingarguedthatRussiaisanaturallyimperialconstructionthatmusthavea strategic economicbase inordernot tobe reduced to thestatusofpurelyregionalpower,Dugingoeson todescribe thealliancesthat the countrymust seek inworld politics tooppose theprincipleofAtlanticism. In Europe, Russiamust ally herself with Germany. In theMiddleEast,hepreachestherapprochementwithShiiteIranoverSunniSaudiArabia.IntheFarEast,headvocatesprioritytotieswithJapanandnot,asmightbeexpected,withChina.Toopposetheworlddominationofthe so­called “American Empire” of the United States—which has asdirectspheresof influenceWesternEuropeandLatinAmerica—Duginproposes the formationof a “NewEmpire”of theGreatEurasia,whichwouldstretch fromCentralEurope to thePacificOceanandwouldbeakindoffederationofminorcounter­hegemonicempirescenteredonthestrictosensuEurasian“Empire”ofRussiaandhavingasotherimportantconstituents a “European Empire” (centered on Germany), an “IslamicEmpire”(withcapitalinTehran)anda“PacificOceanEmpire”(intheFarEastwithcapitalinTokyo).

TheNewEmpire,whichtheRussianpeopleneedtobuild,has its internalgeopolitical logicembedded in thenatural structure of the planet’s geographic space.Thebasic geopolitical law, expressed most clearly byMackinder, says that historically the fundamentalgeopolitical process is the struggle of continentalterrestrial powers (having as a natural form theideocratic political system) against maritime, coastalstates (with an economic system based on themarketandtrade).ItistheeternalconfrontationbetweenRomeandCarthage,SpartaandAthens,EnglandandGermany(andsoon).Sincethebeginningofthetwentiethcenturythis confrontation of the two geopolitical constantshastaken on an increasingly global character. The UnitedStates became the commercial maritime pole, whichattracts all other countries to its orbit, while Russia

298

becamethecontinentalpole[...]ThedisintegrationoftheEasternEuropeanblocand theUSSRbroke the relativegeopolitical balance in favor of Atlanticism [...] The“common enemy,” Atlanticism, must become theconnecting linkof thenewgeopoliticalconstruction[...]In theWest, theNewEmpirehas a strong geopoliticalsupportinCentralEurope[...]CentralEurope,for naturalandhistorical geographical reasons,has apronouncedcontinental character that opposes the “maritime,”“Atlantic” spaces of Western Europe […] Berlin canlogicallybeconsideredthegeopoliticalcapitalofCentralEurope [...]GeopoliticallyEngland is the leastEuropeanstate. Her interests traditionally oppose those of thepowers of Central Europe and continental trends inEurope in general [...] France is another geopoliticalformationwith contradictions. French history, inmanyrespects, presented Atlanticist character, opposing thecontinentaltrendsofCentralEurope.ButinFrancethereisalsoanalternativegeopoliticaltrend,derivedfromtheNapoleonic continental line [...] All tendencies towardEuropeanunificationaroundGermany(CentralEurope)willhaveapositiveeffectonlyifafundamentalconditionis observed: the formation of a solid strategicgeopoliticalaxisMoscow­Berlin.Byitself,CentralEuropedoesnothaveenoughmilitaryandpoliticalpotential toachieverealindependencefromUSAtlanticistcontrol[...]Bismarck’s words that “In the East, Germany has noenemies”mustagaingovernpoliticaldoctrinewhile theoppositedictumshouldbeadoptedbytheRussianrulers:“On thewesternbordersofCentralEurope,Russiahasonly friends” [...] The New Empire must have a clearstrategy toward its eastern side [...] From thisperspective, it isabsolutelyunconditional thatweneedtobeinclosecontactwithIndia,ournaturalgeopoliticalally inAsiaby racial,politicaland strategicparameters[...]Indiaisacontinentinherself.However,thesphereofher influence isrestrictedtoHindustanand toa limitedarea of the Indian Ocean situated to the south of thepeninsula. India will necessarily become a strategicpartneroftheNewEmpire,itsoutpostintheSoutheast,but itmustbeborne inmind that Indiancivilization isnot prone to geopolitical dynamics and territorialexpansion.Moreover,Indiantraditiondoesnotcontaina

299

universal religious dimension in itself, and for thisreasonIndiacanonlyplayanimportantroleinalimitedpartofAsia[...]IndiaisanimportantallyofEurasiabutnot the principal ally. For the role of genuine easternpolesofEurasia,thereareonlytwogeopoliticalrealitiesas candidates today: China and Japan simultaneously.Here it is necessary tomake a choice. At first glance,China represents the continental land mass. Hercivilization has a traditionally authoritarian (non­commercial) character and the very preservation ofcommunistideologyfortherealizationofliberalreformsinChinatodayseemstoindicatethedefinitivechoiceofChinaasacounterweighttothecapitalistislandofJapan.However, history shows that itwas exactly China, notJapan, the important geopolitical base of Anglo­Saxonforces on the Eurasian continent while Japan, on thecontrary, maintained a union with the Europeancountriesofopposite trend.Tounderstand thisparadox,one must look closely at the map to observe thegeography of the last two world wars. The NorthernHemisphere can, in principle, be divided into fourgeopolitical zones corresponding to the mainparticipants in world conflicts (countries or blocks ofcountries). The Atlanticist “FarWest,” brings togetherUSA,Britain,FranceandsomeotherEuropeancountries.Thiszonefollowsthecleargeopoliticalorientationofthe“maritime,” “Carthaginian”worldhistorical line.This isthespaceofthegreatestcivilizationalactivityandcradleof all “antitraditional,” “progressive” formations. Thesecond zone is Central Europe, Germany, Austria­Hungary.Thisimmediatelyadjacentspacetotheeastofthe Atlanticist block has all the characteristics of thecontinental,anti­Atlanticistorientation.Geographically itgravitates toward the east. The third zone is, properlyspeaking,Russia, located in thecenterofbalanceof thecontinent and responsible for the destiny of Eurasia.Continental and non­liberal,her “conservative” essenceis evident. And finally, the fourth zone is the PacificOcean area, where the central role is exactly that ofJapan, which develops rapidly and dynamically whilemaintaining a system of traditional values and a clearunderstanding of her geopolitical role. Japan hasessentially anti­Western and anti­liberal orientation

300

since her value system is the exact opposite of the“progressive” ideals of Atlanticism. TheWestern world(Atlanticism), in the person of its deepest ideologues(Mackinder,Mahan, etc.),perfectly understood that thegreatest threat to planetary atlanticism would be theconsolidationofthethreezonesofGreaterEurasia(fromCentral Europe to the Pacific Ocean with theparticipationofthecentralroleofRussia)againstAnglo­SaxonandFrench “progressivism.”For this reason, themain task of the Atlanticist strategists was to createconflictsbetweenthesethreezonesandtheirimmediateneighboring countries, which thus became potentialAtlanticist allies. [...] Within this context, Japan, as asymbol of the entire area of the Pacific Ocean, has intheseanti­Atlanticistprojectsprimary importance,sinceJapan’s strategic position, the dynamics of herdevelopment, and the specificity of her value systemmake her the ideal partner in the struggle againstWestern civilization. For its part, China played noparticular role in thisgeopoliticalgame,having initiallylost her political independence (English colonialintervention)andthenhergeopoliticaldynamics.Itwasonly in theperiodofactiveMaoism thatadeep­rootedEurasian tendency appeared in China and prevailed inthe projects of “peasant socialism” and Soviet­orientednationalism. But this condition did not last long, andChina, on the pretext of disagreeing with the Sovietmodel of development, once again assumed dubiousdestabilizinggeopoliticalfunctions[...]Thereisnodoubtthat the Chinese reforms of the 1980s represented aninflection from the Maoist period toward a pro­Atlanticistmodel[...]IntheNewEmpire,theeasternaxismustbeMoscow­Tokyo[...]TheMoscow­Tokyoaxisalsosolvesanumberof important issues inboth countries.Firstly, Russia receives an economic giant as an ally,equipped with highly developed technology andimmense financial potential. However, Japan has nopolitical independence, strategic military system, anddirectaccesstomineralresources.EverythingthatJapandoesnothave,Russiahas inabundance.Andall that ismissing from the Russians, the Japanese have inabundance [...] TheMoscow­Tokyo axis, alongwith thewesternMoscow­Berlin axis,will create a geopolitical

301

space contrary to the main model by Atlanticistideologues[…]ThepolicyoftheEurasianEmpireinthesouthern direction must also be guided by a solidcontinental alliance with a force that satisfies —strategically, ideologically and culturally— the generalEurasian tendency of anti­Americanism. Here too theprincipleof the “commonenemy”mustbe thedecidingfactor. In South Eurasia there are some geopoliticalformations that could theoretically assume the role ofthe southern pole of theNew Empire. Since India andChinaaretobeattributedtotheeasternzoneandlinkedto theprospectofpan­Asian integration, thereremainsonly the Islamic world, which extends from thePhilippines and Pakistan to the countries of theMaghreb,namelyWestAfrica.At firstthewholeIslamiczone is a geopolitical reality naturally friendly to theEurasian Empire since the Islamic tradition, morepoliticized and modernized than most Eurasianreligions, perfectly understands the spiritualincompatibilitybetweenAmericanismandreligion.TheAtlanticists themselves regard the Islamic world as apotential enemy [...] It would be ideal to have anintegrated Islamicworldas thesoutherncomponent ofthe Eurasian empire, stretching from Central Asia toNorth Africa [...] The Islamic world is very divided.Within it, there are diverse ideological and politicaltendencies and also different geopolitical projectsconflicting with each other. The following trends aremost global: 1) Iranian fundamentalism (continental,anti­American,anti­Atlanticist,andgeopoliticallyactive);2) the Turkish secular regime (of the atlanticist type,whichreinforcesthelineofPan­Turkism);3)thelineofPan­Arabism,preachedbySyria, Iraq,Libya,Sudanandby sectors of Egypt and Saudi Arabia; 4) the type ofWahhabist fundamentalism in SaudiArabia; 5) variousversions of “Islamic socialism” (Lybia, Iraq, Syria intendencies close to a “left­wing Pan­Arabism”). It isevident that the clearly Atlanticist poles of the Islamicworld,whether “secular”as inTurkeyor religiousas inSaudiArabia, cannotperform the function of southernpoles of Eurasia in the overall project of a continentalempire. There remains the “Iranian fundamentalism”and left­wing Pan­Arabism. From the standpoint of

302

geopoliticalconstants,the priority inthisquestionmustundoubtedly be given to Iran since she meets allEurasian parameters: it is a large continental powerclosely linked to Central Asia [...] Iran occupies such apositiononthemapofthecontinentthatthecreationofa Moscow­Tehran axis solves a great number ofproblems for the New Empire. Including Iran as thesouthern pole of the Empire, Russia instantly solves astrategicgoalithaspursued(throughwrongmeans)forcenturies:warmwaterseaports.Thisstrategicaspect—theabsence inRussiaof suchan exit—was themainassetofAtlanticistgeopoliticseversincecolonialtimesinEngland,which completely controlledAsiaand theEastusing exactly theRussiandeficiency indirect access tothe southern seas of the continent. [...] On the otherhand, there is theproblemof the formerSovietCentralAsia where there are three geopolitical trends today:“Pan­Turkism” (Turkey, Atlanticism), “Wahhabism”(SaudiArabia,Atlanticism)and “fundamentalism” (Iran,anti­Atlanticism) [...]TheNewEmpire canonly relyonthepro­IranianorientationthatseekstotaketheregionoutofthedirectorindirectcontroloftheAtlanticists[...]The Moscow­Iran axis is the fundamental Eurasiangeopolitical project [...] ] The second line of allianceswiththeSouthisthePan­Arabproject,whichoccupiesapartofAsiaMinorandNorthernAfrica [...]Taking intoaccountthatthemodelofpurelyIranianfundamentalismwouldhardlybeuniversallyacceptedbytheArabworld(duetothespecificitiesofShi’ismintheAryanversionofIranianIslam),thePan­Arabprojectshouldtrytocreatean independent anti­Atlanticist bloc where the prioritypoleswouldbe Iraq,Libya and liberatedPalestine (andunder certain conditions, also Syria), that is to say, theArab countries more clearly aware of the AmericandangerandthatmoreradicallydenythemodelofmarketcapitalismimposedbytheWest[...]Butitisnecessarytoclearly understand that the construction of the mostharmonious formofPan­Arab space isamatternot somuch for Russia but for Europe (Eastern Europe,Germany) or, more correctly, the European Empire.Russia’s main concern in the Islamic world mustprecisely be Iran [...] The New Empire, whoseconstruction corresponds to the global, planetary

303

civilizational mission of the Russian people, is asuperprojectthathasmanysublevels.ThisNewEmpire,theEurasianEmpire,willhaveacomplexdifferentiatedstructure within which there will be varying levels ofinterdependenceandintegrationofthedifferentparts.Itis obvious that the New Empire will not be like theRussian Empire or the USSR. The main integratingelementof theNewEmpirewillbe thestruggleagainstAtlanticism and fierce opposition to the “maritime,”“Carthaginian” civilization ofmarket liberalism that iscurrentlyembodiedintheUnitedStatesandthepolitical,economic,andmilitarystructuresthatserveAtlanticism.Forthesuccessofthisstruggle,itisnecessarytocreateagiant continental geopolitical bloc that is unified in itsstrategy. It is precisely the unity on the continentalstrategicfrontiersthatwillbethemainintegrativefactorof theNew Empire. This empirewill be an indivisiblebody in themilitary­strategic sense and thiswill placepolitical limitations on all internal sub­imperialformations.Alltheblocksthatmakeupthecompositionof theNewEmpirewillhavepolitical limitationsatonepoint:itiscategoricallyforbiddentoservetheAtlanticistgeopolitical interests, to leave the strategic alliance, toharmcontinentalsecurity. In this,andonlyat this level,theNewEmpirewillbeaclosedgeopolitical formation.At the next, lower level, the New Empire will be a“confederationofGreaterSpaces”orsecondaryempires.The fourmainones canbe immediatelydiscerned: theEuropean Empire in the West (around Germany andCentral Europe), the Pacific Ocean Empire in the East(around Japan), theCentralAsianEmpire in the South(around Iran) and the Russian Empire in the center(around Russia). It is entirely logical that the centralposition in suchaproject shouldprove tobe themainone, since it is precisely on that basis that all theterritorialconnectionandhomogeneityofall theothercomponents of the gigantic continental block depend.Some of the Greater Spaces will exist separately: inaddition to the aforementioned blocs of India, thePan­Arab world, the Pan­African Union, there will also beChina, whose status is difficult to determine evenapproximately. Each of the secondary empireswill bebased on a particular integrating factor (it may be

304

political, religious, cultural, racial) that will vary fromcasetocase.Thelevelofintegrationofeachempirewillalsovarydependingon theconcrete ideologicalbasisofeach. Within each of these secondary empires, theconfederation principle will also hold true for smallernational, regional, and ethnic units (what we mightroughtly call “countries” or “states”). Of course, thesovereignty of these “countries” will have substantiallimitations: firstly, strategic ones (derived from theprinciplesoftheNewContinentalEmpire),andsecondly,thoserelatedtothespecificitiesoftheGreaterSpaceofwhich they are part. In this question, great flexibledifferentiation will be used, taking into account thehistorical,cultural,geographicandracialpeculiaritiesofeachregion[...]AtthegloballeveloftheconstructionofthenewplanetaryEmpire,themain“scapegoat”willbethe USA: undermine their power (or even completelydestroy such geopolitical construction) will be thesystematic and relentless goal of all New Empireparticipants.Inthissense,theEurasianprojectproposesEurasianexpansiontotheSouthandCentralAmericasinorder to get them out of control ofNorthAmerica [...](Dugin,1997,book1,part4,chapter4)

Dugin thus plans to create powerful counter­hegemonic blocksaroundaGreaterEurasia (stretching fromCentralEurope to thePacificOcean)tocountertheAtlanticistdrivefromtheUSandWesternEurope.But even in Western Europe Dugin believes that it is possible to doEurasianistwork. He deals with this in the section entitled “The TwoWests”:

WesternEurope isa rimlandofEurasia [...]whichhas fully assumed the functions of a completethalassocracyandhas identified itsdestinywith thesea.Atthe forefrontof thisprocesswasEngland,butalltheother European countries that picked up the baton ofindustrialization,technicalprogress,andthenormsandvaluesof the “trade system” also sooneror later joinedthis thalassocratic ensemble. During the course ofestablishing the definitivemap of Europe, the primacypassed from the island of England to the continent ofAmerica,especiallytheUnitedStates.Inthisway,theUS(and the NATO controlled by them) has become the

305

ultimateembodimentofthethalassocracyinitsstrategic,ideological,economicandculturalaspects.ThisdefinitivegeopoliticalfixationofplanetaryforcesplacesthepoleofAtlanticismandthethalassocracyontheothersideoftheAtlantic, in the American continent. Europe (evenWesternEurope, includingEngland) from the centerofthe thalassocracy became a “buffer zone,” a “coastalzone”or“strategicappendix”oftheUSA.Thisshiftofthethalassocraticaxistotheothersideoftheoceangreatlychanged thegeopoliticalconfiguration. IfacenturyagoEurope (England and France)was themain enemy ofRussia,afterWorldWarIIthisregionlostitsindependentstrategicmeaning,having become a strategic colony ofthe USA. This transformation corresponds fully to the“eyesonthesea”approachthatcharacterizesthetypicalcolonial relationship with the continent that anythalassocracy has. If before the “seaside” nature ofEuropewasapotential featureactivatedby thespecialgeopolitical formation of the “English Island”, it nowcorresponds perfectly to the actual map of thedistribution of forces. The United States, a geopoliticalreality born out of Europe as its almost artificialprojection, became a completely independent pole andthe West in the absolute sense of that word, havingtransformedEuropefrommetropolistocolony.Allofthiscorresponds perfectly to the classical logic ofthalassocratic geopolitics. Thus, for Russia, today thegeopolitical problem of the planetary West in thebroadestsensedividesitself intothesetwocomponents:theWestas theUSAand theWestasEurope.From thepoint of view of geopolitics, these two realities havedifferent meanings. The West­as­US is Russia’s totalgeopoliticaladversary[...]Inthisregard,theheartland’sposition isclear:itisnecessarytoopposeUSAtlanticistgeopoliticsatalllevelsandinallregionsoftheEarth[...]The second reality, also called the “West,” has anothermeaning. It is Europe, whose geopolitical sense hasradically changed in recent decades. Having been thetraditional metropolis of other parts of the planet,Europe for the first time finds itself in thepositionofastrategic, cultural, economic and political colony.Americancolonialism isdistinguished from theclearestand most brutal forms of the past, but its meaning

306

remainsthesame.AtpresentEuropedoesnothaveherown geopolitical and geographicalwill. It is limited tothe function of serving as an auxiliary base in Eurasiaand themost likelyplaceof conflictwithEurasia.Thissituation automatically causes an anti­American line tobecomeageopoliticalalternativefortheEuropeanstatesunited in an unprecedented common project. TheunificationofEuropeinMaastrichtisthefirstsignoftheemergence of Europe as a united and independentorganism thatclaims tohaveherhistoricalsignificanceandgeopoliticalsovereigntyback.Europedoesnotwantto be either Russian or American [...] From a purelygeopoliticalpointofview,EurasiahasaclearinterestingettingEuropeoutofUSAtlanticistcontrol[...]AfriendlyEuropeasastrategic allyofRussiacanariseonly ifshestaystogether.Otherwise,theAtlanticistenemywillfindmultiple ways of sowing dissension and gaps in theEuropean bloc, provoking conflicts similar to the twoworld wars. That is why Moscowmust help Europe’sunityasmuchaspossible,especiallyby supporting theCentralEuropeanstates,withemphasisonGermany.ThealliancebetweenGermany andFrance, theParis­Berlinaxis,projectofCharlesdeGaulle,isthebackbonearoundwhich the body of theNew Europe canmost logicallyform.Both in Germany and in France there is a stableanti­Atlanticist political tradition (both in right and leftpoliticaltendencies)[...]Moscowmustbeguidedbythisline[...]EurasianeedsaunitedandfriendlyEurope[ ...](Dugin,1997,book1,part5,chapter5.1)

Thus Dugin traces his entire geopolitical line. The bookFoundationsofGeopoliticsisnotonlyamanualofgeopoliticsinwhichthemain theoriesandgeopoliticalauthorsarepresentedbutalsoawayofexpressing Dugin’s geopolitical thought. And his thought is basicallyEurasianist and anti­Atlanticist. Anti­Atlanticism provides the mainconduitforDuginianEurasianism. One final consideration is important. As we have seen fromDugin’s earlier works described in the current text (especially ThePhilosophy of Traditionalism), Dugin’s geopolitics is mixed with atraditionalist philosophy that gives a spiritual, mystical basis to hisWeltanschauung.Duginadvocates theworldofTradition (withacapitalletter, in the sense of Integral Tradition) against modernism andpostmodernism, which he links to Atlanticism in the present age.

307

Atlanticismisrelatedtotrade,dynamismandcontinuousmutation.Giventhat Dugin advocates that Russia (Eurasia) be capable not only ofresisting but also overcoming the Atlanticist powers, what about thequestionof technologicaldevelopment? If theemphasisonmaterialandtechnicaldevelopmentisafeatureofAtlanticism,howshouldRussiaandEurasia behave in this sphere of human activity? Should they reject it,clingingtotraditionalformsofproduction(àlaGandhi,forexample)?Orshould theyembrace technological (material)developmentandmaterialmodernization in general as essential for the strengthening of theEurasian field?But in thiscase,howcan theydo thiswithout losing thetraditionalcharacteristicslinkedtothespiritualfieldwhich,accordingtoDugin,arepartoftheessenceofthetraditionalistwayofbeinginRussia(Eurasia)?Headdresses this issueofEurasianistRussia’sstance towardtechnological development in the unpublished article ModernizationwithoutWesternization,includedasanannexinthedigitalversionofthebookFoundationsofGeopolitics.HissolutionisaneclecticmixofthemesraisedbysuchauthorsasSamuelHuntingtonandFriedrichList.

In the famous article in which he describes thearrival of the clash of civilizations, SamuelHuntingtonmentionedanimportantformula:modernizationwithoutWesternization. It describes the relationship that somecountries (in general, from theThirdWorld)havewiththe problem of technological and socioeconomicdevelopment. Understanding the objective necessity ofdeveloping and perfecting the economic and politicalmechanismsof theirsocialsystems, they refuse in thistasktoblindly followtheWest:onthecontrary,theytrytoput someWestern technologies (excluded from theirliberalandideologicalcontext)intoserviceoftraditionalnationalist, religious, andpolitical value systems.Thus,many representatives of the elites of the East, afterhavingreceivedhighereducation in theWest,return totheircountrieswithasetofnecessarytechnologicalandmethodological knowledge, but use this knowledge tostrengthen thepowerof theirownnationalistsystems.Contrary to the approximation between civilizationsexpectedbyoptimistic liberals, thearmingof “archaic,”“traditional” regimes with modern technologies takesplace,whichmakesthecivilizationalconfrontationmoreacute. To this insightful analysis can be added theconsideration that the majority of intellectuals, artistsandpersonalitiesofcultureintheWestingeneralhavea

308

nonconformist and antisystem disposition.Consequently, the people of the East, in studying thegeniusesof theWest,onlyreinforced theirowncriticalpositions [...] Along this path were also RussianSlavophiles, who borrowed different models fromGermanphilosophers(Herder,Fichte,Hegel)toserveasabasisfortheirclaimsofdeepRussiannationalism.Thisisalsothemethodofthecontemporaryneo­EurasianistswhocreativelyandintheinterestsofRussiaprocessthenonconformist doctrines of the European “New Right”and “New Left.” The separation of the concepts of“modernization” and “Westernization” has a colossalmeaning in itself. After all, the West does everythingpossible so that in the collective unconscious the twoterms become synonymous.According to this logic, allchangesandanyreformsareonlypossibleifonecopiesWesternmodels and followWestern rational logic.Anyalternative means “stagnation,” “archaism,”“conservatism,” inefficiency, lack of dynamism. In thisway, theWestachieves itscivilizationalgoal: to imposeon the rest of theworld the frameworks, criteria andlaws hegemonized by itself. This partiality andselfishness of the liberals toward those to whomliberalism is imposedasa “progressivealternative”hasbeendescribedbyFriedrichList,abrillianttheoreticianofeconomicscience.Inhisworks,hedemonstratedthatcountries that already have long experience with themarket economy and liberalism take advantage whensuch a model is imposed on other countries withdifferent economic models. The supposedly “equal”conditions of “free trade” actually lead to greaterenrichmentofcountrieswithadevelopedmarketandtothe impoverishmentofcountries thathave justenteredthemarketpath.Thus therichgetricherand thepoorgetpoorer.According toList, it isadvantageous for thetraditionally liberal countries (especially the Anglo­Saxons) to impose their model on all others becausetheyareguaranteedtoreceiveenormouseconomicandpoliticalbenefits.Butwhatshouldnon­liberalcountriesthat,due toobjective circumstances, are confrontedbyefficientandaggressiveliberalcompetitorsdo?Thiswasanacuteproblemfornineteenth­centuryGermanyanditwas to itssolution thatFriedrichListdedicatedhimself.

309

Theanswerwas the theoryof the “autarchyof greaterspaces”,which isan economic synonymof the formula“modernizationwithoutWesternization.”NotethatList’sideaswereusedwith colossal success by politicians ofdifferentkinds likeWaltherRathenau,CountWitteandVladimir Lenin. The concept of “autarchy of greaterspaces”presupposes that states that donothave “freemarket” economies should develop an autonomousdevelopmentmodel,partlyreproducingthetechnologicaladvancesofliberalsystems,butinthestrictframeworkof the limitation by a “customs union.” In this case,“freedomoftrade”isconfinedtoastrategicblocofstatesthat unite their socio­political and economic­administrative efforts tourgently raise thedynamicsofthe economy. In contrast to themoredeveloped liberalcountries,adensecustomsbarrier isestablished,basedontheprinciplesofsevereprotectionism.Inthiswaythesphere of the use of the most modern economictechnologies expands to the maximum; on the otherhand, economic and political sovereignty issystematicallymaintained. No doubt such an approachdeeply irritates the liberals of the developed marketeconomy countries, as it exposes their strategy andaggressive intentionsandeffectively resists geopoliticalinterventionandexternalcontroloverthecountriesthatliberals try to transform into economic and politicalcolonies.Letusnote that this thesis of “modernizationwithoutWesternization”initselfisaconceptualweaponwhose appearance was extremely undesirable for therepresentativesoftheWest.FortheWest,itisimportantto control the consciousness of society through adualistic scheme: on the one hand the reformists,advocates of change and, on the other hand, theconservatives,stubbornsupportersof thepast.As longas the equation is solved in thisway, some substantialsupportfor“Westernizingmodernizers”willbeassured.But just introducea thirdelement into the formulaandthepicturebecomesmuchmore interesting.Inadditionto “Westernizing modernizers” and “anti­Westernnonmodernizers”whose “soon tobe” confrontation isalways defeated by the “reformers” supposedlyembodying the “future,” there are “anti­Westernmodernizers” or “conservative revolutionaries.” The

310

veryfactoftheexistenceofsuchforceasanindependentplatform,asan ideologicalbloc,asaneconomicplatformand cultural front, acutely affects the balance of banalpolitical confrontation.The “anti­Westernmodernizers”areforradicalreforms,forrevolutionarychangesintheeconomicmodel,fortheexplosiverotationofelitesinthevitally important sector of administration, for themassivemodernization of allwalks of life. But in thisprocess, it isanabsoluteand indisputablecondition forthem to fully maintain geopolitical, economic andculturalsovereignty,fidelitytotheroots,andsupportfortheirownidentity.Bothconditions,“modernization”and“sovereignty,”areabsolute imperativeswhichcannotberenouncedunderanycircumstances [...] “ModernizationwithoutWesternization”:Thismustbe themain themeof the “new opposition”, the best forces of both the“conservative” and the “reformist” camps. This newplatform, if it is developed in a consequent way andactivelyintroducedintotheconsciousnessofthemasses,cansuddenlyclarifyseveraldarkmomentsofourpoliticaland economic life.Moreover, it is clear the disruptivenatureoftheactivityoftheforceswhicheitherdenytheneed for reforms (the apologists for nostalgia andstagnation) or deny the need for subordination ofreforms to the national imperative in its geopolitical,civilizational,andculturalaspects(theagentsofinfluencefrom theWest). Consequently, in our critical situation,both must be set aside in our political establishmentwhile the (ideological, economic, and conceptual)initiative must be delegated to the new front of the“conservative revolutionaries.” (Dugin, 1997, book 2,part7)

From the above statements (not only fromhismagnum opus ingeopoliticswhichwehave just quotedbut also from the earlierworksalready described), we can have an overview of the DuginianWeltanschauung.Ingeopoliticalterms,wecanseethathebasesitontheMackinderiandichotomybetween theviscerallycontinentalpowersandthemaritime countries, especially between theEurasianheartland andtheUSAtlanticpowerandtheiralliesinWesternEurope.Hencehedrewup an entire program of action for Russia, based precisely on anti­Atlanticism, with the formation of allied axes such asMoscow­Berlin,Moscow­Tehran andMoscow­Tokyo, including even attempts to foment

311

dissentinWesternEuropeagainstUShegemony.Thisprogramofactionincludes the imperial form as a political organization and an economywith strong state leadership in opposition to the free­market liberaleconomy of the Anglo­Saxon Atlantic countries. Butwe have seen thatintellectual influences on Dugin go beyond strictly geopoliticalconsiderations. As an adept of traditionalism, he adopts a series ofmysticalvisionsoftheoppositionbetweenanoriginaltraditionalspiritualworld and today’s bourgeois materialistic civilization. Dugin was atraditionalist before becoming a geopolitical author. Although manyobservers disregard this traditionalist side of Dugin as inauthentic orsomething he grew out of (e.g., Shekhovtsov & Umland, 2009), weconsiderthatitinternallyinformshisgeopoliticalworkandisresponsibleforhistoneof“missionaryzeal”. Dugin is themost famousamongRussianneo­Eurasianists (thatis, those who currently retrieve and/or update, in various forms, thephilosophy originated with the classical Eurasianists of the interwaryears).Itissoforseveralreasons.Nomatterhowcontroversialhisworksorhisconclusionsare,heistheauthorwhomost intellectuallyanalyzed,disseminated and deepened in new ways the works of the earlierEurasianistsbyproposinganewformadaptedtothepost­SoviettimesofRussia.HisintellectualprestigeamongRussiansincreasedwhenhebeganteachingattheillustriousUniversityofMoscowin2008.Hisgeopoliticalwork has great influence in high power circles, especially among themilitary,wherehisgeopoliticalmanualisadoptedinmilitaryschools.Byhaving direct political participation,with the foundation of Eurasianistinternationalpartiesandmovements,headvancedtheEurasianistcauseinthisareaaswell.Colaterally,itisnecessarytonoticetheefficientwayinwhichheusestheinternettodisseminatehisworksandcausesamongthepopulationingeneral. Ontheotherhand—andcontradictorily—theradicalismofhisideaskeepshimsomewhatstill“marginal”intheRussianscenario.Letustake,forexample,hisrelationshipwithPutin.Dugin,whilenotconsideringPutin100%Eurasianist,believesthatheadvancestheEurasianistcausein thecurrentconditions (especiallybystrengthening theRussianstateandresistingWesternpressures)andgenerallysupportshiminlaudatorytone. Inhis book PutinAgainst Putin,Dugin (2012)makes a thoroughanalysis of his relationship with Putin, supporting him in his pro­Eurasian and anti­American attitudes while criticizing theWesternizerwing of his entourage (including the former president of Russia andprime minister Dmitrii Medvedev). In the Putin era, Dugin rose inprestigeandposition,becomingprofessorat theUniversityofMoscow,quite unlike the Yeltsin era when he was literally marginalized frompower.ButPutinneverexplicitlyendorsedDugin’sideasbecauseoftheir

312

radicalism.PutinpraisesEurasianismasapatrioticworldviewtoRussia,but does not venture beyond the bounds of praise to moderateEurasianismforfearofalienatingsectionsoftheRussianpopulationwhodisagreewithDugin’sradicalEurasianism.Thatis,Putintacitlyaccepted(or even encouraged) Dugin’s rise, but without openly declaring hissupportforhim. Equally controversial is Dugin’s position among Russiannationalists,or even amongpartsof theneo­Eurasianist spectrum.Thefactthathehassucharadicallyanti­Atlanticistandanti­Americanstance—besideshismixingofEurasianismwithheterodox externaldoctrines(suchastraditionalism)—alienatesespecially themoremoderatewingoftheneo­Eurasianists.TaketheexampleofthepresidentofKazakhstan,NursultanNazarbaev,oneof thegreatestadvocatesofEurasianpoliciesand philosophies. Nazarbaev is one of thosewho defend Eurasia as abridge between Europe and Asia, not Eurasia as an independent“continent”initself,aprioriturnedagainsttheWest(asisinferredfromthe position of Dugin and themore radical Eurasianists). (Musirovna,2010,p.279)TomoderateEurasianists,defendersofthisWest­East­boundEurasiancondition,itisnotintheirinteresttoalienateWesternpowersbut ratherdraw them into amajor integrativeproject.And they thinkDugin’sradicallyanti­Westernstanceiscounterproductive.41 Among many Russian nationalists, Dugin is also viewed withsuspicion. Russian nationalists might even have connections with theSlavophiles, but they have difficultieswith the Eurasianists. In general,RussiannationalismisstrictosensuSlavic.Forthem,RussiansareaSlavicpeople,that’sall.TheEurasianists’attempttopresentRussiansasmainlythe result of a blend of the European Slavic principlewith the Turco­MongolAsian principle is flawed.Russian xenophobic nationalists havegreat distrust ofAsianMuslim peoples and do not seek to incorporatethemintotheircountryproject,asDugindoes.Inextremecases,thereareRussian nationalists who consider Dugin a “traitor” for his“internationalist”ideas. In theWestern academic literature, Dugin is also the subject ofstrong criticism. Arguably, the Western authors who most deeplyanalyzedDugin’sworkweretheFrenchMarlèneLaruelleandtheGermanAndreasUmland.InherbookRussianEurasianism:AnIdeologyofEmpire,MarlèneLaruelle (2008) examinesDugin’swork in itsdifferent aspectsand contradictionsand concludes that,as inmost classicalEurasianists,Dugin’semphasisonempireasthebestformofpoliticalorganizationfor

41 Shpil’kin (2012, ch. 3). Musirovna (2010, pp. 290-291) drew up a list of the differences between the moderate Eurasianism of Nazarbaev and the Russian anti-Western neo-Eurasianism of the Duginian type.

313

RussiadenotesthathisEurasianismhasanimperialistandundemocraticcharacter.AndreasUmland,inaseriesofbooksandarticleshehaswrittenabout the Russian extreme right (e.g.,Umland, 2005), emphasizes thatDuginshouldbeclassedasafascist.AlthoughDugin(forexample,inhisbookTheFourthPoliticalTheory,discussedhere)seekstoovercomeleftand right ideologies (socialism and fascism) in anew synthesis for thetwenty­firstcentury,Umlandargues thatDugin (and theEuropeanNewRightingeneral)seeksonlyanewlanguageandconceptualinflectionforpositionswhich,intheend,stem fromfascism—which,initstime,alsoinsistedthatitwasovercomingtheleft­rightdichotomy.BothLaruelleandUmland also criticizeDugin’s “racialist” stance.They claim thatDugin’sutilizationofLevGumilev’sconceptionofethnosrepresentsanotherwayof rescuingnationalismand,alongwith this,a rescueof the conceptofrace through Dugin’s emphasis on the versions of the legends of thehyperboreanraces(thelatterapartofDugin’sesotericphilosophywhichwe did not analyze here because it has in practice no crucialconsequences inhis geopolitical viewbutwhich canbe seen inDugin,1993). However, Laruelle (more than Umland) admits that Dugin’sthinkingiscomplexandhiscontradictionshamperapurely“nationalist”or“racialist”readingofhisphilosophy.

[...]DuginfollowedtheNewRight’stheoreticalshiftfromabiologicalviewofdifferencesbetweenpeoplestoaprimarilyculturalview.This tendency toward “ethnicpluralism,” shifted from the “left” to the “right” in the1980s, fit in well with Russia because it suited theheavily ethnicized conception of nation there. This“differentialist neo­racism” (in Taguieff’s formula) andtheexaltationofthe“righttobedifferent”areneitheranewideanoramereimportfromtheWest.Throughoutthe nineteenth century, the leading thinkers of the“Russiannationaldistinction”hadaculturalistapproachand, unlike their Western counterparts, attached littleimportance to racial determinism [...] Dugin, however,employsambiguous,cultural,andbiological terminologyinrelation to this issue.Heuses the term ethnos in thepositivesense,seeingitasthecentralpointofcollectivereference (“thewhole, the ethnos, is, according to theEurasianists,greater than thepart, the individual”),butat thesame timehe iscriticalofethnicnationalism [...]Dugin condemns nationalism in its ethnic and“chauvinistic”varietywhichheconsidersdangerousandobsolete [...] “The Eurasianist attitude toward ethnos

314

remainsconservative,basedontheprincipleofabsoluteneedtoprotecteachethnicgroup from theprospectofhistorical disappearance.” This terminology remainsparadoxical:Duginnotonlyrefusestorejecttheideaofrace but seems confused in his understanding ofethnicity, for he gives it an eminently cultural andcivilizational sensewhile at the same timeheuses theethnosterminologywhich,followingtheSoviettradition,remains linked tonatureandeven tobiology. (Laruelle,2008,pp.138­139)

If, in Western literature, Duginian philosophy (and Neo­Eurasianism in general) is analyzedmostly via a criticalprism— as anationalistdoctrineof the radical rightor even fascist— inRussia thepicture is different.Not only because it is the country of origin of thephenomenonbutalsobecauseofthecommandof thenative language,42thenumberofstudiesbasedonprimarysourcesandoriginaldocumentsismuchlargerandthespectrumofanalysiswider.TypologiesofEurasianismstudiesinRussia DifferentRussianscholarshaveproposedvarioustypologiesinthestudyofthecurrentswithin(neo)Eurasianism. YuriiShpil'lkin(2012,chapter3)divides thecurrentsofpresent­dayEurasianismintofour:1)“right­wing”Eurasianism,oftheDugintype;2) the current of Islamic Eurasianism, headed by Geidar Dzhemal’,presidentoftheRussianIslamicCommittee;3)theacademicEurasianismofuniversity professors and researchers such asAleksandr SergeevitchPanarin, IrinaBorisovnaOrlovaandSergeyBorisovichLavrov;4)Non­Russian “integrative”Eurasianismof the typeofKazakhstan’spresidentNursultanNazarbaev. Sachko(2002,pp.9­11)proposedasimplerdivisionbetweenthetheoretical and the practical/political aspects of Eurasianism. Thetheoretical side corresponds to Shpil’kin’s academic Eurasianism. Thepracticalside includesall theotherdivisionsofShpil’kin’s, that is, those

42 In Western countries, the number of scholars who fluently speak (read) the Russian language is still not very large. As many of the texts of the neo-Eurasianists (and even of the classical Eurasianists) have not yet been translated into English, the number of Western observers who comment on the phenomenon of Eurasianism based on the Russian original texts is relatively small. The majority do so from secondary literature or from the relatively few translated texts. Hence the great prominence for authors such as Laruelle and Umland in this panorama of Western “Eurasianismology.”

315

Eurasianistswho are involved in the political struggle for Eurasianism,either on the side institutionalized and/or connected to the executivepower, like Nazarbaev, or those who founded or participated inmovements (such as Dugin and Abdul­Vakhed Validovich Niyazov andtheir Eurasianist movements and parties; Dzhemal and his IslamicCommittee of Russia, etc.). From this political point of view, SachkodistinguishesbetweenRussianOrthodoxEurasianism(oftheDugintype)andtheIslamiccurrents(DzhemalandNazarbaev). Zalesskii(2011),basedonSamokhin(2004),proposesadivisioninfivedirections:1)Theacademicschool;2)Dugin’sneo­Eurasianism;3)the followers of Lev Gumilev; 4) the left­wing current; 5) theright/conservative current. The first two are self­explanatory. The lastthreeare idiosyncratic, typologically speaking.The third refers to thosewhofollowtheteachingsofLevGumilevinamoreliteralway,especiallythose inserted in the Gumilevka website (dedicated to print andelectronically distribute Gumilev’sworks) and in the electronic journalEvraziiskiiVestnik(“EurasianistBulletin”).UnlikeotherEurasianists,suchasDugin,whoacceptmanyofGumilev’sstatementsbutmix themwithother influences, this group (led by the editor of Evraziiskii Vestnik, I.Shishkin) remains more literally within the Gumilevan conceptualuniverse.Forexample,critics (evenEurasianists)of this tendencypointout that inGumilev’s theory (unlikemany present­dayneo­Eurasianistswho emphasize the cultural character of the ties that bind Eurasianpeoples into an integrated civilizational complex) there is no singlecultural notion of Eurasian peoples: Gumilev clinged to the biologicalaspect,creatingthenotionofthesuperethnos,aconglomerateofethnoiofclosegeneticorigin,toexplainthissenseofunionbetweentheEurasianpeoples.ThisultrabiologicalviewisnotaconsensusamongEurasianists. Zalesskii (2011) and Samokhin (2004) call left­wing current ofEurasianism those authors who use the Eurasianist civilizationalapproach to understandRussia’s Soviet past and its consequences, e.g.Sergey Georgievitch Kara­Murza, Tamerlan Afiyatovitch Aizatuplin,RustemRinatovitchVakhitov .Manyofthese“leftEurasianists”revolvedaround thewebsiteKrasnayaEvraziya (“RedEurasia”),which, in2003,publishedthemanifestDeclarationofLeftEurasianistswhichstatedthat

[...] Left Eurasianists differ from Russiancommunists by a few points. Left Eurasianists arereligiouspeople,and therefore,considering that “evil isin theworld,” they do not believe that an ideal society,communism, can be built on Earth, and thus theirdemandsgono further than“realsocialism,”thebestofimperfectsocietiesonEarth.Finally, leftEurasianistsdo

316

not reason in universalist categories, but in thecategories of theories of local civilizations. LeftEurasianistsconsiderthatonlyinthekingdomofheaven“there are neither Greeks nor Jews,” but on earth, bydivine providence, people are divided into peoples andcivilizations. The attempt to mix all peoples andcivilizations ina“crucible” is thesameasattempting tobuildanewTowerofBabeland is thusunacceptable toleftEurasianists.Thus,leftEurasianistsareopponentsofany globalization, be it the current capitalist or thecommunist, which is forming in the distant future.Havinggroundedtheirdifferenceswiththecommunists,Left Eurasianists must understand that they have nocloserpoliticalandideologicalallythanthecommunists.(Utverzhdenie…,2003)

TheleftEurasianistsoftodayareanideologicalcontinuationoftheleft­wing of interwar Eurasianism (Dmitrii Svyatopolk­Mirskii, SergeyYakovlevichEffron, Lev PlatonovitchKarsavin)who sought to establishbridgesbetweenEurasianismandtheSovietsystem. Finally,thelastgroupisthe right/conservativecurrent.Thesearetheauthorswho,disregardingtheSovietexperience,refertoelementsofthe right in the tsarist era (many of themmonarchists). Perhaps theirmost representative name is Vadim Valerianovich Kozhnov who,according to Zalesskii & Samokhin’s interpretation, tries to linkEurasianism to the conservatism of the early 20th­century BlackCenturies. If Zalesskii & Samokhin emphasize the political aspects todifferentiategroupsamongtheEurasianists,F.B.Aliev(2012)emphasizescultural/religious aspects for such differentiation. He divides today’sEurasianismintofivemajorcurrents:(1)A.Dugin’sneo­Eurasianism(2)“Academicneo­Eurasianism”(whichhesubdividesbetweenthehistorical­civilizationalschoolofA.PanarinandB.Erasovandtheculturalschoolofthe E. Bagramov type); 3) the Pan­Islamic current (G. Dzhemal’, M.Shaiviev); 4) the current of the Pan­Turkism (where he places N.Nazarbaev and O. Suleimenov); 5) the anti­Sovietmodel of a EurasianConfederation by academician A.D. Sakharov. This classification isidiosyncraticnotonlybyhighlightingthenon­OrthodoxreligiouscurrentsofEurasianism(thoughsomewhatcontroversiallybylinkingthemtothemorepoliticalmovementsofPan­IslamismandPan­Turkism)butalsobyrecalling the 1989 proposal by the physicist Andrei Sakharov of thecreationofa“UnionofSovietRepublicsofEuropeandAsia(abbreviatedas the European­Asian Union)” as an alternative to the Soviet Union

317

model thenstill inexistence.Asnootherauthorclassifies thephysicistAndrei Sakharov as a Eurasianist, the mention is controversial. Butironically,inthisseconddecadeofthetwenty­firstcentury,theprojectofaEurasianUnionhas not only been revived but steps are being takentoward it by country presidents, such as Vladimir Putin andNursultanNazarbaev, as seen in the official creation of the Eurasian EconomicUniononJanuary1,2015. Thetypologiesabove(whicharefourofthemainonesandwhich,ingeneral,encompassthepossiblevariationsinthetypologiesproposedby other Russian scholars)make clear some important features aboutcurrentEurasianism(orneo­Eurasianism). Firstof all, thehighlighted roleofAleksandrDugin’swork.He isundoubtedly the most influential neo­Eurasianist author on boththeoreticalandpracticalgrounds.Fromthetheoreticalpointofview,hisvariousbooksonthesubject(morethananyotherauthor)havedivulgedand deepened (in the idiosyncratic direction followed by Dugin) thestudies of Eurasianism in post­Soviet Russia.On the practical side, notonly did Dugin create Eurasianist movements and parties but hisgeopolitical magnum opus, Foundations of Geopolitics influenced animportantpartoftheRussian(mainlymilitary)governmentaleliteinthedirectionofEurasianism. Another point to emphasize is the Eurasianist condition of thepresident of Kazakhstan,NursultanNazarbaev. The above statement ofDugin being the most influential Eurasianist in the theoretical andpractical fields is almost consensual in the part of theory (onemightsuggestPanarin’snameinthisfieldasastrongcompetitor),butdebatablein the practical part in relation to Nazarbaev. Kazakh authors (e.g.,Musirovna, 2010) emphasize the practical successes achieved by thePresident of Kazakhstan in the implementation of what constitutes aEurasian international policy project (currently embodied in theEurasian Economic Union). The dispute between which of the twoEurasianists most influences the Eurasianist movement in practice isdeepenedby the fact thatDugin’sproject is clearly anti­Western (or atleastanti­Atlanticistandanti­American),whereasthatofNazarbaevisnotanti­Westernincharacter. The question of left­wing Eurasianists is controversial. Someauthorsdonotdelimit them as a separate field (and someEurasianistsreject them in toto, just as the pro­Soviet leftist wing of interwarEurasianismwasrejectedbyitsmainstreamcurrent). Also controversial is the attempt by some authors to divideEurasianismbyreligiouscriteria(e.g.,OrthodoxversusMuslim)or,morecontroversially, theattributionofaPan­IslamicorPan­Turkcharacter tocertainIslamicEurasianistauthors,evenwhentheythemselvesdenysuch

318

affiliation. Finally,therecollectionthatAndreiSakharovproposedamodelofunion of the Eurasian type in Soviet times seems to be more of ahistorical curiosity (for having left no direct practical vestiges in thepresenttimewhenSakharovisdead)thanamomentcapableofjustifyingatypologicalgroupinitself. These “borderline cases” such as that of Sakharov’s, when anauthor somehow advances conceptions that can be read as having“Eurasian” content without the author openly declaring himself anEurasianist,hasimplicationsinthepost­Sovietperiodinotherimportantexamples.Aname tobementioned is thatofEvgeniiPrimakov,ForeignMinister and prime minister of Yeltsin. Primakov (an academicspecializedinOrientalstudies),inhistenureasRussia’sforeignministerin1996­1998,divertedRussiafromthefranklypro­WesternrouteofhispredecessorAndreiKozyrevtoamorebalancedroutebetweentheWestandEast(whichatthetimeinvolvedtakingmanymeasuresofresistanceagainst theWest, especially in relation to NATO expansion initiatives)that led some observers to label him “Eurasianist” or “sympathetic toEurasianism” (Ersen, 2004, p. 143; Tsygankov, 2007) Another“borderline case” is the leader of the Communist Party of the RussianFederation, Gennadii Zyuganov, the biggest name of the opposition toYeltsinandPutininRussia,who,althoughcommunist,usesarethoricthatcould be called “Eurasianist” in his geopolitical view of the world.(Zyuganov,1997,pp.98,103and127)CouldPrimakovandZyuganovbelabelled“Eurasianists”?Finally,wehavethesupreme“borderlinecase”inRussia:VladimirPutin.Afterall,isPutinaEurasianist,aWesternizeroraSlavophile? The answer is controversial (with different authors givingdifferent views on this) but is important to understand present­dayRussia.And itwill be examined in thiswork in relation to post­SovietRussia’sforeignpolicybetweenEastandWest.

319

4.INFLUENCEOFTHEDEBATESINPRESENT­DAYRUSSIA:THECASESOFYELTSINANDPUTIN In their Eurasian geographical situation, Russians have forcenturieswonderedwhether Russia is a basically European country, abasically Asian country, a synthesis of both or simply neither, beingratherauniquecivilizationthathasnothingtodowithEuropeandAsia.Historically, threemajor schools of thought have formed on this issue:Westernism, Slavophilism, and Eurasianism. These debates haverepercussionsinthepresenteraandinthewayRussiabehavesbetweentheWest and the East.Wewill use these ideal types ofWesternizers,Slavophiles,andEurasianists foranapplication in thestudyof thepost­Soviet Russia case, especially in relation to her foreign policy. As thehistory of post­Soviet Russia can be roughly divided into the Yeltsin(1990s)andPutin (2000s) eras,wewill take these two charactersandexamine them in the lightof theirpositioning, inpractice, inrelation tothese three schools.Much of the analysiswill focus on Putin not onlybecauseofhis importance inpresent­dayRussiabutalsobecause,asweshall see, his figure reverberates, in a very illustrative way, how thedebatebetween thesephilosophicalschools influencesRussian (foreign)policies.Background:Post­SovietRussiadividedintotheYeltsinera(1990s)andthePutinera(2000s) Beforeweenterthefieldofforeignpolicy,whichwillbethefocusof this final case study, we must make some observations about thedomestic political situation of post­Soviet Russia (i.e., the RussianFederation) in its firstdecadesofexistence.Thiswill formabackgroundfrom which external developments will become more intelligible andintegratedwithinternaldevelopments. Firstofall,wemustnotethatthehistoryofpost­SovietRussiacanberoughlydividedintotwomajorphases(underYeltsinandunderPutin)andthesetwophaseshadverydifferentdynamics. Ineconomicterms,aswecanseefromtable1inAppendix1,from1991to1998everyyear(withtheexceptionofone)hadnegativegrowthoftheeconomy.Togetanideaoftheextentofthecrisis,sufficeittosaythat the fall of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product in those years of the1990swas greater than the fall ofU.S.GDP in the decade of theGreatDepressionof the1930s!By thesame table,wecanalsosee thatwhenPutin came to power— first as primeminister in 1999 and then as

320

presidentin2000—thatsituationchangedradically.From1999onward,Russiaexperiencedhigheconomicgrowthformanyyears(untilthe2008global crisis affected the country aswell). This radical change for thebetter in economic terms was largely responsible for Putin’s greatpopularity after coming to power. Especially because this highmacroeconomic growthwas also reflected in the individual level. Statewagesandpensions,whichwereoftenpaidinarrearsunderYeltsin,weresettled in less than a year after Putin took over.The realwages of thepopulationrosesteadilyafter1999(morethanquadrupledindollartermsfrom theearly2000s to2007)and thepoverty rateplummeted fromapeak of 41.5% in 1999 to 19.6% in 2002 and to below 15% in 2007.(Iradian,2005,p.35;WorldBank,2005,p.70;WorldBankRussiaCountryOffice,2008,pp.33and45).Afteryearsofeconomiccrisis(technically,depression) under Yeltsin it is nowonder that Putin’s popularity soonreachedextremelyhighlevels. Of course, amore in­depth analysis of the situation will dilutesome of thisManichean view of a totally negative Yeltsin and a totallypositivePutinontheeconomicside.Yeltsinpresidedovertheinitial(mostdifficult)phaseofthetransitionfromagiganticstatesocialisteconomytoasystemofprivatecapitalism.Suchanexperience—pioneering in theworld due to its gigantism—was a priori condemned to be prone todifficulties,mishaps and flaws due to the complexity of the economic,political and social issues involved. On the other hand, Putin came topowerataparticularlyfelicitoustime:shortlyafterthe“rockbottom”ofthe economic crisis of the 1990s. The bottom line was the RussianfinancialandcurrencycrisisofAugust1998.Bydefinition,thingscannotgetworse than “rock bottom” and the situationwill either stabilize orimprove thereafter. Table 1 in Appendix 1 shows the trend forimprovementinRussianGDPgrowthafter1998.Inaddition,1999/2000weretheyearsinwhichthepriceofoilsoaredintheworldmarket.ThepriceofabarrelofBrentoil,whichhitoneof the lowest levels in1998(justunder$10),rosesteadilyoverthenexttenyearstoreachapeakof$149inJuly2008..ItwaswiththeextraincomeprovidedbythissurgeinoilpricesthatPutinwasabletoperformtheapparent“miracle”of,inlessthan a year in power, set right and pay regularly the statewages andpensionsthatwereconstantlyinarrearsunderYeltsin. Regardless of their real merits and demerits, in the popularimagination ofmost Russians, Yeltsin’s imagewas associatedwith theeconomic stagnation of the 1990s and Putin’s image associated witheconomicimprovement.Asweshallseelater,thiswillhaveimplicationsfor greater or lesser public acceptance of Western and/or liberaleconomicpoliciesinRussia. On the political side, the dynamics were the opposite of the

321

economic.IfontheeconomicsidetheYeltsinperiodisassociatedwith“aworsening situation” and thePutinperiodwith “improvement,” on thepoliticalside the formerwasaneraofrelativeopennessand liberalism,whilethelatter,accordingtomanyobservers,isassociatedwithpoliticaltighteningandevenauthoritarianism inrelation to thepreviousperiod.(Kryshtanovskaya & White, 2003; McFaul, 2004; Ostrow, Satarov &Khakamada, 2007; Politicheskaya..., 2011) The Freedom Houseorganization,which isdedicatedtorankingcountries inrelationtotheirdegreeofdemocratic freedoms, forexample, in2004downgradedRussiato the statusofa “not free country”andmaintains this classification tothisday.(FreedomHouse,2015) Onceagainthesituation,whenanalyzedindepth,ismorecomplexthan thissimpleManichaeismofa liberalanddemocraticYeltsinandanauthoritarianPutin. For example, even in theYeltsinperiod,post­SovietRussianeverhadthestatusof“freecountry”accordingtoFreedomHouseandwasconsidered“partiallyfree”before2004.(FreedomHouse,2015)Yeltsin himself occasionally relapsed into authoritarianism at somecrucialpointsinthehistoryoftheRussianFederation,especiallywhenhehad the “White House” (the then Russian parliament building)bombardedduring thedisputebetween thepresidentandparliament inOctober 1993.On the other hand, classifying Putin’s regime as ameredictatorshipdisregards significant elementsofpluralismandoppositionin both the political arena and in the area of media and socialmovements.43 Independentlyofthenuancesandcomplexitiesofdeterminingthereal democratic or undemocratic character of the Putin and Yeltsinregimes,thelatterwasassociated,bothintheRussianpublicimaginationandinmostWesternanalyses,asmoreliberalandopen,whiletheformerwasidentifiedaslessliberalandopen.Thiswillagainhaveconsequencesin the discussions ofWesternizers, Slavophiles and Eurasianists on thecharacterofRussianpoliticsundervariousrulers. In termsofdomesticpolitics,bothon theeconomicssideandonthepoliticalside,andinthepopularimaginationaswellasintheanalysisofmost scholarly experts, the Yeltsin governmentwas associated withliberal policies, characteristic of theWesternizermovement in Russia,while thePutinadministrationwasseen(thoughnotasunanimouslyontheeconomicside)ascontrarytosuchpolicies.44 43 For a nuanced view of the democratic and authoritarian elements of the Putin regime, I recommend my essay The Question of Democracy in Post-Soviet Russia. (Segrillo, 2012b) 44 We say that the economic side of the situation is not clear in relation to Putin’s anti-liberalism, because, especially in his first term, he kept a balance between ministers who favored greater state intervention in the economy and others who

322

Ontheforeignpolicyside Ourcasestudywillfocusonthefieldinwhichthepositionsmostclearlyappear inrelationto theRussian identitybetweenEastandWestasWesternizer,Slavophile,orEurasianist:foreignpolicy.Attheoutset,wewill give a description of the course of Russian foreign policy underYeltsin and Putin in order to see how these two rulers positionedthemselves in relation to such identity dilemmas, and finally discusswhether the analysis of these figures under the prism of the debatesbetween the three schoolsof thought canprovide important insights toexplaintheirempiricalbehavior.WewillputmoreemphasisonthefigureofPutin,notonly forbeing thecurrentrulerbutalso forbeing theonethathashadthelongestinfluenceonpost­SovietRussia.Thevariousphasesofpost­SovietRussiaforeignpolicy The same general basic division that we use for the domesticpolicyoftheRussianFederationcanbeusedforforeignpolicy,thatis,wecan roughly divide thewhole period from the creation of the RussianFederationintheearly1990stotodayintheYeltsinandPutineras.Thisisasimplificationforpractical purposes,asthequestionofthepresidencyofDmitriiMedvedev in2008­2012 (theperiod inwhichPutinwashisprimeminister)arises.Theissueisimportant,sinceforeignpolicy(alongwithdefense),according to theRussianConstitution, isanattributionofthe president of the Russian Federation (while the prime minister isresponsible for domestic policy). Although Putin continued to be thecountry’s“strongman”in2008­2012,thistechnicalitycompelsustoviewtheperiodof theMedvedevpresidencyasapeculiarperiodwithin thatgeneralumbrellathatisthedivisionbetweenthe1990sunderYeltsinandthe2000sunderPutin.The fact that thesame foreignminister (SergeyLavrov) served both under Putin and under Medvedev since 2004,following in general the same line of foreign policy, facilitates themaintenanceofthemajordivisionbetweentheYeltsineraandthePutinera, even as foreignpolicy is concerned, as long aswenote occasional

preached a more liberal economy and less state intervention. Suffice to say, for much of his early years in power, Putin retained three ministries/key posts in the hands of people with an openly liberal slant: Aleksei Kudrin was finance minister from 2000 to 2011; German Gref, Minister of Economy and Trade 2000-2007; and Mikhail Kasyanov was prime minister from 2000 to 2004.

323

inflectionsduringMedvedev’spresidency.45 For description’s sake, itmay be best to subdivide these largephases into sub­phases according to the current foreignminister. Forexample:1)Yeltsin’spresidency(10July1991­31December1999)1a)ForeignMinisterAndreiKozyrev(Oct.11,1990­Jan6,1996)1b)ForeignMinisterEvgeniiPrimakov(January9,1996 ­September11,1998)1c)ForeignMinisterIgorIvanov(September11,1998­March9,2004)2)Putin’spresidency (31Dec.1999­7May2008;May7,2012­presenttime)2a)ForeignMinisterIgorIvanov(September11,1998.­March9,2004)2b) ForeignMinister Sergey Lavrov (March 9,2004 up to thepresent,includingduringtheMedvedevpresidencyin2008­2012) This division into presidencies and subdivisions by foreignministersraisesthequestionofwhoactually“commands”foreignpolicy.Ifthereweresubstantial,qualitativeinflectionsfromministertominister,this, ceteris paribus,would denote that theMinistry of Foreign Affairswouldhavesomebureaucraticautonomyinthefieldofforeignpolicy.Ontheotherhand,the1993Russianconstitutionclearlygivesthepresidentpowers over foreign policy. As Putin is usually considered the “strongman” of Russia, we will have a case of special interest in DmitriiMedvedev’s presidential term in 2008­2012 (when Putin was primeminister). Did the fact that Medvedev keep Putin’s Foreign Minister,Sergey Lavrov,mean that, evenwithMedvedev as president, Putin, asprimeminister,stillhadinfluenceintheareaofforeignpolicyaswell? Weshallseetheseissueslaterwhenweexaminemorecloselythevariousphasesandsubphasesabove. OntheMedvedev­Putin“diarchy”in2008­2012,wemustestablisha preliminary discussion to better understand the formal and informalfunctioning of the Russian political system. We must discuss thepresidential (or non­presidential) character of the Constitution of the

45 The presidential term in Russia was initially 4 years. In 2008 it was decided that for the presidency to be inaugurated in 2012 the mandate would be 6 years. In practice, including resignations and changes, the presidential mandates in the Russian Federation to date have been as follows: Boris Yeltsin (10 July 1991 - 9 Aug 1996; 9 Aug. 1996 - 31 December 1999, when he resigned), Vladimir Putin (31 Dec. 1999 - 7 May 2000 [acting president]; 7 May 2000 – 7 May 2004; 7 May 2004 – 7 May 2008), Dmitrii Medvedev (7 May 2008 – 7 May 2012), Vladimir Putin (7 May 2012 - 7 May 2018; 7 May 2018-…).

324

RussianFederation.DoesRussiahaveapresidentialpoliticalsystem? TheRussianconstitutionprohibitsthere­electionofthepresidentafter two consecutive terms. Until near the end of Putin’s secondpresidential term in2008, therewasspeculation thathe (usinghisvastmajorityofparliamentarysupport)would try tochange theconstitutiontoallowhima thirdconsecutivepresidential term.Afterall,Russiawasconsidered to have a strong presidential system and the president isconsidered to be the most powerful man in the country politically.However, this line of reasoningwas basedon falsepremises.A carefulreadingofthe1993ConstitutionshowsthatRussiadoesnothaveapurepresidential systembut the so­called semi­presidential regime (such asthatinforceinFrance).Inasemi­presidentialregimethereisapresidentandaprimeministersimultaneously,andthetwohavedifferentiatedbutequallystrongpowers.InRussia,asinFrance,thePresidenttakescareofforeignaffairsandthearmedforces(inthecaseofRussia,securityforcesin general), and the primeminister takes care of domestic policy. Therolesaredifferent,butbotharepowerful.InFrancetheproblemoftheso­called“cohabitation”comestotheforewhenthepresidentandtheprimeministerarefromopposingparties.Inthiscase,whatdecidesinasemi­presidentialregimewhichofthetwowillhavemorepoliticalstrengthatthatmomentistheamountofsupporteachhasinparliament.Inthecaseof Putin and Medvedev this problem did not arise, since both weresupportedby the same forces,andPutinhada comfortablemajority intheparliament.WhenMedvedevwaspresident,Putinwasnot onlyhisprimeminister but alsobecame the formal leaderof theUnitedRussiaparty(the“rulingparty”thatdominatedtheDuma).Thisguaranteedhimpower not only by being prime minister but also by controlling thegovernmentmajorityinparliament.Asecureposition,therefore,withouthavingtogothroughthestrainofforcingaconstitutionalchangetoallowforathirdconsecutivepresidentialterm.46Intheareaofforeignpolicy

46 For a discussion of the semi-presidential character of the Russian constitution (including pointing to differences with French semi-presidentialism), see Harvey, 2008. For a position of those who argue for the merely formal character of this semi-presidentialism and that there is actually a form of super-presidentialism in Russia, see Colton (1995) and Fish (1997).

325

How did the internal Russian odyssey in the 1990s and 2000sreflecton the foreignpolicy agenda?Diddevelopments in this field alsoreflectissuesofthedebatesdescribedbetweentheschoolsofWesternism,SlavophilismandEurasianism? YeltsinistraditionallyseenashavinghadWesternizerpositionsinhis presidency. (Dunlop, 1993, p. 58; Kagarlitsky, 1995, pp. 59­60;Tsygankov,2006,p.60;Donaldson&Nogee,2009,p.111)Hehelped todismantle the SovietUnion in favorof a regimemore in tunewith theliberal capitalist democracies of the West and, on the external plane,soughtrapprochementwiththeWest inthe1990s, leavingthebellicoseisolationoftheUSSRinrelationtoitbehind. Putin is polemical in terms of classification.Uponhis coming tomaximum power, different specialists classified him alternately as aEurasianist, Slavophile or Westernizer. The fact that he significantlyaltered Yeltsin’s foreign relations course and frequently confronted theWest on a number of issues over the course of the 2000s led someobservers to classify him as anti­Western.Olga Kryshtanovskaya, in aninterviewwithNikolsky (2007, p. 42), considered him a Slavophile forfollowing thepatternofwanting to replace a liberal (Western)Russianregimewitha strong state capableof imposingaunifyingorderon thepopulation.Shlapentokh(2005)arguedthatPutinwasontheEurasianistcamp in view of Putin’s praise for the Eurasianist Lev Gumilev andcongruentattitudes in thatdirection inhis foreignpolicy,especiallyhisattentiontotheAsianSovietrepublics.ThosewhoarguedthatPutinwasaWesternizerpointedtohisprofessionaloriginsinthe“Western”cityofSt.PetersburgandtosomeofhisstatementsthatRussiawasaEuropeancountryandpraisingtherole ofPetertheGreat.(Rivera&Rivera,2003) Personally, I argue that Putin is a moderate Westernizer. Thisallows us to contrast him with Yeltsin, who was a more explicitWesternizer,withouttakingthemoutofthesamegeneralfield.Putinisamoderate Westernizer because he starts off from basic Westernizerpositions.47 However, he is also a pragmatic politician and a

47 See, for example, the clearly Westernizer positions that Putin assumed in the long biographical interview published in book form by Gevorkyan, Kolesnikov & Timakova (2000, pp. 155-56): “We [Russians] are part of European culture. In fact, we derive our value exactly from that. Wherever our people dwell, whether in the Far East or in the South, we are Europeans.” Putin was born and had his most important formative years of youth in the great “Western” metropolis of Russia (Saint Petersburg/Leningrad). He is an admirer of Emperor Peter the Great (whose bust he usually keeps in his workplaces). In personal terms, the current author met Igor Shuvalov (then special adviser to Putin and later his deputy prime minister) in a diplomatic seminar with members of Putin’s entourage. In it, Shuvalov said that in the internal meetings of his team, Putin made it clear that he considered Russia a

326

gosudarstvennik (defender of a strong state). These two extra featuresmakehimdefendRussiannationalinterestsinapragmaticway.Itisnotthat he is anti­Western a priori— to the contrary— but ifWesterncountries seek to subjugate the interests of theRussian state,Putin—now lordingoveracountryeconomicallystrongerthan theweakRussiaof the1990s—willbestronglyopposed. It is important tounderstandthese nuances. Just as the French President Charles de Gaulle oftenopposed the interestsof theUnitedStateswithout thismeaning thathewasanti­Western,PutinopposedtheAmericangiantinseveraloccasionsnot because he is a priori anti­Western but because he is agosudarstvennik defending the interests of his countrywhen he thinkstheyarebeingthreatened. In counterfactual terms, if Putin were either a Slavophile or aEurasianist (currents that have, in themselves, strong anti­Westerntendencies), the possibilities for active cooperation with the US andEurope would be smaller. Being a Westernizer, even if moderate, thechancesof cooperationwith theWest increaseandoccasional frictionsaredue toreal factors(e.g.,aggressivepositionsby theUSorEuropeancountries towardRussia) rather than an a priori anti­WesternRussianpositioning. Has this been the reality we have witnessed in the past twodecades?TheYeltsinandPutinperiodsastwoblocks Doeswhathappened in the last twodecades in termsof foreignpolicyallowusareadingofYeltsinandPutininthetermsabove,thatis,the former as an open Westernizer and the latter as a moderateWesternizer? ThepresidencyofYeltsinasawhole (1992­2000) can clearlybeseenashavingageneralWesternizerorientation.Yeltsinemerged fromSoviet isolation and animosity toward the advancedWestern capitalistcountries and adopted an attitude of rapprochement and avidincorporation ofWestern liberal democracy. Perhaps the highlightwastheendoftheG7andthecreationoftheG8withtheincorporationofthe

European country. (Shuvalov, in personal communication to the current author, 11/16/2004) The fact that Putin rarely expresses his Westernizer positions in public has to do with his political pragmatism. As there is no consensus among the Russian population in this identity debate between Westernizers, Eurasianists, Slavophiles and other smaller groups, in order not to hurt susceptibilities of parts of his constituency that might not agree with a specific position in this debate, Putin seeks to stay out of it.

327

Russian Federation into the elite forum of the advanced Westernindustrial countries in 1997. Other points of cooperation were thecreation of the Russia­NATO Council in May 1997 for exchange ofinformationbetween the twoparties, the signatureof the START I andSTARTIIarmsreductionagreementsrespectivelyin1991and1992,andthegeneralmoodofYeltsin’sproximitytoseveralWesternleaderssuchasHelmutKohl. WhataboutthePutinperiodinthe2000s? WhenPutin came topower, and especiallywhenproblemswiththeUS intensified later, several observers came to regard him as anti­Western, either a Slavophile or a Eurasianist. (Shlapentokh, 2005;Nikolsky,2007,p.42)Butacloser readingwillshow that there isno apriorianti­Westernism inhis foreignpolicy.Forexample,assoonashecame to the presidency, and especially in the immediate aftermath ofSeptember11(2001),Putin’spositionwasoneofsolidcooperationwiththeUnitedStates in the fightagainst terrorismand in Afghanistan.NotonlydidheallowUSfighterplanestoflyoverRussianterritoryenroutetoAfghanistanbutatremendousamountofexchangeofconfidentialanti­terror information between the two countries began.Moreover, Russiadidnotoppose theUS installingmilitarybases inKyrgyzstan,TajikistanandUzbekistan,countrieslocatedincentralAsiaandconsideredsensitivezones ofRussian influence.This showsRussian goodwill and ability toengage in forms of active cooperation with the West. Anotherdemonstration of how Putin is not anti­Western a priori was theimproving relations between Russia and the US with Barack Obama’scoming to power in the White House. Following a period ofconfrontationalpolitics between theRussianFederation and theUnitedStatesat theendof thesecondBush term (especiallyon issuessuchasthemissiledefenseshieldinPolandandtheCzechRepublicandtheanti­Russian episodes inUkraine and Georgia),when some observers evenfeared the resumption of a cold war between the two countries (e.g.,Galeno, 2008), thenewObama administration initially showed signs ofadopting less conflictive policies toward Russia (e.g., postponingindefinitely the missile defense shield plans, avoiding overlyconfrontational language in episodes occurred in the former Sovietrepublicsandadoptingtheso­calledresetpolicy).Totheseinitiatives,theRussiangovernmentrespondedwithcooperativeandreceptivelanguage.That is to say, the episodes in which Putin’s Russia gave a sternerresponsetotheWestseemtohavebeentheresultnotofanapriorianti­Westernstance,butofastancebyastrongstatesmanwhenherealizedthat his countrywas being unfairly treated (for example, the plans forBush’smissiledefenseshield,criticismsofRussia’sbehaviorinhernear­abroad, of her internal policy in relation to Chechnya or of her

328

trade/militaryagreementswithIranandVenezuela). The fact that inObama’s second presidential term the situationbetween the US and Russia became extremely tense again with theepisodes that led to theoverthrowof thepro­Russian rulerofUkraine,ViktorYanukovych,inearly2014,doesnotmeananapriorianti­WesternpositionbyPutin.Historically,Ukrainians,RussiansandBelarusianswereoneand thesamepeopleoriginally in the timeof theKievianstate,andeven afterward,Ukraine remained related toor in thedirect sphereofinfluence of Russia. The fact that the Ukrainian president­electYanukovychwasoverthrownbyextra­constitutionalmeanswasseen inRussiaasaformofdirectinterferencebytheWesttryingtogetUkraineoutofRussia’ssphereofinfluenceandbringherclosertotheWest.Thisiswhereour“deGaullian”viewofPutin asagosudarstvennik(defenderofastrongstate),willingtodefendRussia’sinterestsbothagainstindividualcountries of the West and the East without distinction, comes in.Counterfactually, if the West ends this “meddling” (from the Russianstandpoint) in Ukraine, Putin ceteris paribusmay be open to overturetoward the West again, without prejudices of the Slavophile orEurasianisttypeinthisregard.48SubphasesoftheYeltsinandPutinperiods Ifthecontrastbetweenthetwoperiods(YeltsinandPutin)canbeseen as corresponding to the reading of a more openly Westernizerpresidencyvis­à­visthemandatesofapragmaticgosudarstvennikrulerofmoremoderateWesternism,itmustalsobenotedthattheseperiodswerenothomogeneous internally.Wehad the following foreignministers intheRussianFederation:1991­January1996AndreiKozyrevJanuary1996­September1998EvgeniiPrimakov11September1998­March2004IgorIvanov

48 We say ceteris paribus because it is important to note that Putin does not act in a vacuum. He also responds to various pressures stemming from the country’s internal politics. In the period when the United States and some European countries were, in the view of many Russians, “on the offensive” against Russia (NATO’s enlargement toward Russia, missile defense shield plans, medlling in Georgia and Ukraine with an anti-Russia policy etc.), as reaction grew inside Russia nationalist, Slavophile, and truly anti-Western Eurasianist currents who can later press Putin in an anti-Western course even though he himself is not anti-Western a priori. The effectiveness of such pressures and the degree of influence they will have on Putin is difficult to predict, but not negligible.

329

9March2004­...SergeyLavrov Kozyrev and Primakov were foreign ministers under Yeltsin;Ivanov, inthe lasttwoyearsoftheYeltsinpresidencyand inPutin’s firstpresidentialterm.LavrovassumedthepostinPutin’ssecondpresidentialterm (being kept in office byMedvedevwhen he took office in 2008).HowdidRussianforeignpolicydifferinthesesubperiods? Ivanov and Lavrov turned out to be technocrats, adaptingthemselves to the directives coming from the presidency, withoutdemonstrating their own autonomy. Thiswas how Ivanovmanaged tokeep thepostduringYeltsin’s transition toPutin (another sign that thetransition fromonegovernment toanotherwasnotas radicalassomeobservers want it). Lavrov also remained during Putin’s presidentialtransition toMedvedev,whichmaysignal two things. If thepresidenciesPutinandMedvedevfollowedverydifferentdirections,keepingLavrovinoffice would be indicative of his non­autonomous adaptability topresidentialdirectiveswhatevertheymightbe.OritmaysignalthattherewasnoradicalchangebetweenthePutinandMedvedevpresidencies(atleastinforeignpolicyterms).Herewewillworkwiththislasthypothesis,withoutrulingouttheconcomitantpossibilityoftheformer. More sensitive changeswere felt in the transitionof the foreignminister Kozyrev to Primakov (both under the presidency of Yeltsin).AndreiKozyrevwasa trueWesternizer. Initially, in1992,heandYeltsinled an openly “Atlanticist” (Westernizer)policy seeking tobringRussiacloser to the United States and other Western countries. With the“explosion”ofrelationsbetweenthepresidentandtheRussian parliamentin 1993, followed by the Duma elections in December 1995—whichelected apowerful anti­Westernopposition—Kozyrevbegan to sufferconstantcriticism fromparliamentarians forachange in theexcessivelypro­Westerncourseofhisforeignpolicy.Yeltsin,seekingfurthersupportinahostileparliament, surrendered topressuresand, in January1996,replacedKozyrevwithEvgeniiPrimakov,aprestigiousOrientalistandapragmatic nationalist with Eurasianist leanings. With greaterparliamentarysupport,Primakovundertookapolicyof turning Russianattention to the “near abroad” of the formerEurasian republics of theUSSRfollowedbyafirmerstanceoftheRussianFederationinitsrelationswith the West, especially in relation to the conflict in the formerYugoslaviaand theenlargementofNATO.Primakov,however,wasalsoapragmatist.ConsciousofRussianeconomicweaknessinthecrisisofthe1990s,hedidnotallowRussia’sgreaterassertivenesstoleadtosituationsoffrontalimpassewiththeUSandEurope.ThisentailedcommitmentsnotalwaysfavorabletoRussia,suchasthe1995DaytonAccordsonBosnia,aconsultative­only partnership with NATO through the Russia­NATO

330

Councilof1997andhavingtoacceptthefirstwaveofNATOexpansiontoEasternEuropeancountriesthattookplacein1999. Although not a Eurasianist, Putin is also pragmatic andgosudarstvennik as Primakov. With a much more favorable economicenvironment in the 2000s, he was able to implement policies thatPrimakovhadnotbeenabletocarryout.Thus,hisforeignpolicyismuchmoreassertivethanthattheeconomicallyweak RussianFederationcouldaccomplishinthepreviousdecade.Histwotechnocraticforeignministers(Igor Ivanov in the first presidential term and Sergey Lavrov in thesecond)followedhisinstructionsdutifullywithoutmajorautonomousorinnovative claims. DmitriiMedvedev, president of Russia from 2008 to2012,with Putin as his primeminister, kept Lavrov in charge and, ingeneral,pursuedaforeignpolicyofcontinuationofthePutinianline, i.e.open to periods of collaboration and confrontation with the West,according to theperceptionwhether theWestwas trying tocollaborateorconfrontvis­à­visRussia.Afteraninitialperiodin2008marked bytheincidentoftheRusso­GeorgianwarthatcreatedtensionswiththeUS,theinitiative to propose the reset policy of theObama administrationwaspositively received by theMedvedev government.This led to a relativerelaxationintherelationshipbetweenthetwocountrieswhichlasteduntiltheinitialpartofthenewpresidentialtermbyPutinin2012.Meanwhile,theepisodeoftheEuromaidanrevolution inUkraineat theendof2013whichculminatedintheextraconstitutionaldepositionofthepro­RussianUkrainianpresidentYanukovychonFebruary22,2014,ledthenewphaseof confrontation between the US (plus some European countries) andRussia. Thus,using and adapting a classification byDonaldson&Nogee(2009),we can say that Russian foreign policy toward theWestwentthrough the followingphasesduring thedifferentpresidentialmandatesandforeignministers:1992­KozyrevandYeltsin,withaclearAtlanticist,pro­Westernline.1993­1995 ­ Due to the conflicting opposition of the parliament(Supreme Soviet) to thepresident in1993until the electionofananti­Western oppositionist parliament in December 1995, the pro­Westernforeign minister Kozyrev, under constant criticism and pressure, wasforced to make concessions and found it difficult to follow a purelyWesternizerlineinforeignpolicy.1996­1998 ­With the supportof the anti­Western and anti­Atlanticistmajority of parliament (Duma), the pragmatic nationalist foreignminister of Eurasianist leanings Evgenii Primakov promoted a coursecorrection toward greater attention to the former Soviet republics andattemptsatallianceswithChinaandIndiatocounterbalancethestrength

331

that the West had vis­à­vis economically weakened Russia. Althoughopposing Western policies injurious to Russia (such as the NATOenlargementandconflictsinRussia’sformerallyYugoslavia),Primakov’spragmatismmadeitpossible,throughconcessionsandtacticalretreats,topreventproblemswith theUS andEuropeanpowers from reaching anexplosivelyantagonisticlevel.1998­2000 ­ForeignMinister Igor Ivanov,a technocrat, in the last twoyearsofaweakenedYeltsinseeked to followapragmaticcourse towardthe West, neither excessively pro­Western nor Eurasianist, avoidingconflicts.2000­untiltoday­AperioddominatedbytheinfluentialfigureofPutin,whowithamoreeconomicallyrecoveredandstrongerRussia,managedto carry out amore assertive policy toward theWestwithout startingfromanaprioriantagonismtowardit.Theperiodcanbedividedintothefollowingsubphases:2000­2001 – Putin’s tentative first steps,with emphasis on domesticpolicy, attempted to build consensus on foreign policy, and underwentmomentsof tension (e.g., theepisodeofmutualexpulsionsofdiplomatsbecause of the Bush administration accusation of espionage inMarch2001)andmomentsofcooperationwiththeUS(suchaswhenBushmetPutinforthefirsttimeinJune2001andsaidhehad“lookedthemanintheeye[…]andfoundhimtobeverystraightforwardandtrustworthy”).AttheoutsettherewasnocleardirectioninPutin’sorientation,whichledto controversies among observers whether he was a Eurasianist,SlavophileorWesternizer.September 2001­early 2002 ­ The September 11, 2001 attacks andRussia’s immediate cooperative response to the fight against terrorismcreatedarapprochementbetweenthePutinandBushgovernments.2002­2004­TheremainderofPutin’sfirstpresidentialtermwasmarkedbyanaccumulationofsmallandmedium­sizedtensionswiththeUnitedStatesthatcausedthepost­September11cooperationclimatetoworsen.2004­2008 ­ InPutinandBush’scoincidentalsecondpresidential term,theclimateofconfrontationgrewuntil it reachedapeakaround2008.ThemainpointsofcontentionweretheNATOenlargement,theUSmissiledefenseshieldplansinPolandandtheCzechRepublic,Westerncriticismof Russia’s actions toward former Soviet republics like Georgia andUkraine,andRussia’strade/militarynegotiationswithcountriesoftheoldandnew “axisofevil”,suchas IranandVenezuela.Thehighlightof thetensionswastheRusso­Georgian“war”ofAugust7­12,2008,earlyinthepresidencyofDmitriiMedvedev.2009­2012­AftertheheightoftensionswiththeRusso­Georgianwarin2008 and the tensemonths that followed, slowly, from2009onward, aslight relaxation occured during the coincidence of the Obama and

332

Medvedevpresidencies.Thebeginningof thismaneuvering in relationsbetween the two countries came on the famous occasion when USSecretary of StateHillaryClinton onMarch 6,2009, offered toRussianForeignMinisterSergeyLavrovabuttonwhich(allegedly)hadthewordRESETinEnglishandRussianprintedonit.49ObamavisitedRussiaon6­8July2009andMedvedevmetObamaintheUSinJune2010.50Initially,thepolicyofresettingtherelationshipbetweenthetwocountriesseemedto bear fruit. In July 2009, President Medvedev gave permission forAmerican planes to fly over Russia on their trips to bring supplies toAfghanistan.OnSeptember17,2009,PresidentObama announced thathewasgivingupplans(inheritedfromtheBushadministration)tocreateamissiledefenseshieldinEasternEurope.InMarch2010,RussiaandtheUSreachedanagreementtoreducetheirnucleararsenals.InMay2010,the US, Russia and other powers agreed to impose sanctions on Iran,prompting theUS to liftsanctions ithad imposedon theRussianarmsexport agency because of its arms trade with Iran. Overall, in hispresidency,MedvedevcontinuedPutin’s foreignpolicy line,includingthemaintenanceofhisforeignministerSergeyLavrov.2012­today ­ The new Putin presidency began in 2012 in a relativelycalm environment in continuation of the reset policy. Meanwhile, theUkrainian crisis of late 2013 and early 2014, culminating in thedeposition of pro­Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich onFebruary22,2014,there­annexationofCrimeabyRussiainMarch2014and therevoltof theregionsof theso­called“republics”ofDonetskandLugansk,populatedmainlybyethnicRussians,againstthenewUkrainiancentral government in Kiev (which they did not recognize it aslegitimate), completelydeterioratedRussia’s relationshipwith theWest,especially theUSA.According to some observers, a “ColdWar” climatewas reintroducedbetween theUSandRussia,withmutualaccusations, 49 We say “allegedly” because, by mistake, the Russian word printed on the button was peregruzka (“overload” in Russian) instead of the correct perezagruzka (meaning “reset”, “reboot” or “fresh start” in Russian). At the time, the two foreign ministers laughed about the involuntary error. The “reset” expression was first used by Vice President Joe Biden at the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy on February 7, 2009, when he said: “The last few years have seen a dangerous drift in relations between Russia and the members of our Alliance. It’s time — to paraphrase President Obama — it’s time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia.” (Office of the Vice President, 2009). 50 In November 2008 and on April 14, 2010, President Medvedev was in the US, but without meeting Obama personally. It was the visit of June 25, 2010, the first official meeting of Medvedev and Obama in the United States, which signaled a significant rapprochement in the relationship between the two countries (and in particular between the two rulers).

333

exchangeofsanctions,etc. Inconclusion,whatcanbededuced from thegeneral frameworkoutlined so far? The reading of Yeltsin as an openWesternizer and ofPutinasamoderateWesternizer(aswellasapragmaticgosudarstvennik)accountsforboththediversitythatexistedbetweentheYeltsinandPutinperiods vis­à­vis the West (closer approximation under Yeltsin, moreambiguousrelationshipunderPutin)andforthefactthatboth(includingPutin)arenotanti­Western.ThefactthatPutinonanumberofoccasions(especially after9/11or at the time of theproposed resetpolicy)waswillingtocooperateextensivelywiththeWestshowsthatthemomentsoftension that occurred in the second concomitant presidential terms ofPutin andBushwere generatedmore byWestern positions that Putinconsideredunjustly insulting to theRussianstate(e.g.,expansionof theNATOmilitary alliance towardRussia in thepost­ColdWar context, themissiledefenseshieldaimed inRussia’sdirection,depositionof thepro­RussianUkrainianpresident­elect)thanbyanapriorianti­Westernstanceon the part of Putin. Putin’s reading as a moderate Westernizer isheuristicallyvalidand fruitfulbecauseitdrawsattentiontothefactthatunder favorable and friendly conditionsRussiawill cooperatewith theWest—whichwouldnotbe so certain if this influentialRussian leaderwereaSlavophileorevenaEurasianist. If the correct reading of the Weltanschauung (in terms ofWesternism/Slavophilism/Eurasianism) ofRussian leaders is importanttoassist in theprognosisofRussian foreignpolicyattitudes toward theWest, it should be complemented by an analysis of the conditions ofdomestic politics. These can force the Russian leaders (especiallypoliticallyweakened leaders) to adopt policies that diverge from theirownpersonalinclinations.ThiswasdemonstratedinthetransitionfromKozyrev toPrimakovas foreignministersunderYeltsin.Theexperiencewith Igor Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov shows that when the Russianpresidentispoliticallyempowered,hispositiontendstoprevailinviewofhisconstitutionalpowersinthefieldofforeignpolicy.

334

5.CONCLUSION Thephysicalmaterialityofacountry’sgeographicdistributiononEarth influences its (ecological, economic, and sociopolitical)developmentsovertime.OnedoesnothavetobeageopoliticalthinkeroftheHalfordMackinderorAlfredMahantype(forwhomthismaterialityiscentral in theunderstandingofsuchprocesses) torealize this influence.In the caseofRussia, this facetbecomesmore conspicuousdue to theproportions.Thesizeofthepresent­dayRussianFederationisalittleover17millionsquarekilometers,making itthe largestcountry intheworld.Thesizeof the formerUSSR (takenasroughlyequivalent to the formerRussianEmpireattheendofthe19thcentury)was22.4millionsquarekilometers,representingroughlyone­sixthoftheearth’ssurface. Geopoliticalwriters(butnotonly)callattentiontothefactthat,ininternational relations, “sizematters”: the fact that a countryhas largeproportions ceteris paribus is likely to generate tendencies towardgreater involvement in international issuesbecauseof theextensionofborders, or even a propensity to what the Russians call derzhavnost’(great power mentality or behavior). For example, the simple fact ofhaving largetractsof land(againceterisparibus)givesacountrygreaterchanceofbeingendowedwithmineralresources.(cf.Diamond,2005,pp.281,284,286,406and407)ThiswasessentialinthecaseofRussia.TheUSSR,forexample,owedmuchofherabilitytosurvive(bothintheearlyperiod of the civilwar/foreign intervention of 1918­1921 and duringWorld War II) to its relative autarchy in terms of mineral resources.Perhaps if the firstsocialistrevolutionhadhappened inasmallcountrywithouttheabundantresourcesoftheUSSR, itwouldnothaveenduredthose stifling externalpressures.Similarly, in the1990s,when thenewpost­SovietRussia (in its turbulentsystemic transition fromsocialism tocapitalism)experiencedaneconomicdepressionworse than thatof theUSinthedecadeoftheGreatDepression,withmuchofherindustrybeingdismantled in internationalcompetition,atno timedidshehavea tradedeficit with the outside world, since the export of mineral resourcescompensatedforweaknessesinothersectorsandenabledthecountrytosurviveeconomically. In thecaseofRussia, the importanceof thegeographicvector isnotlimitedtothesizeofthelandmassbutratherhow(inwhatposition)thatmassisdisposed(located)ontheplanet.(Ibid.)RussiastandsintheEurasian (Euro­Asian) position par excellence. This had strongconsequencesinherhistory.SituatedliterallybetweenEuropeandAsia,betweenWest and East, Russia’s identity question between these twoworldswasobvious. In themodernage,when theconceptsofWestand

335

East, Europe and Asia were definitively consolidated, this search foridentity became a conscious issue. But since time immemorial defenseproblems—RussiawasattackedbypeoplesfromboththeWestandtheEast—obligedRussia topositionherself strategically (inmaterialandintellectualterms)inrelationtotheexternalforcesandinfluencescomingfromthesetwoflanks.(cf.Kennan,1946,p.5) In modern times, these identity discussions in Russia wereconsolidated into three major schools of thought: Westernism,Slavophilism, and Eurasianism.As this discussion is notwidely knownoutsideRussiaandmanyofthemostimportantoriginalbasictextsoftheauthors of these schools have not yet been translated into otherlanguages, in this work, a description of how these debates havedeveloped historically (whenever possible in the very words of theoriginalauthors)mayproveuseful.Throughoutthishistoricaldescriptionwe have also been inserting comments (especially of the classificatory,taxonomictype)bysecondaryauthorsonthepositioningoftheseseveralprimaryauthorsand theirschools.Webelieve thiswillbean importantadditiontotheWesternliteratureaboutthedebatesbetweenthesethreeRussianschoolsofthought. Butwebelieve that thepresent studyhasnotmerely exegeticalutility.Although the seminal culminationof thesedebates tookplace inearlier times (Westernizers versus Slavophiles in the 19th century andtheemergenceofEurasianists in the early twentieth century), theyarestillaliveandtheirinfluence,directlyorindirectly,isfeltinaspectsoftheinternalandexternalsociallifeofthecountry.Moreover,webelievethatthe goodunderstanding of this crucial identity debatehas theheuristicpotential to illuminate concrete current situations, such as aspects ofRussian foreign policy as enacted by itsmain individual actors. Sowedecidedtointroducea“casestudy”todemonstratethisheuristicpotentialbytakingtheexampleofRussianpost­Sovietforeignpolicyunderitsmainpresidentialactors intheperiod,YeltsinandPutin,withanemphasisonthe latter.The emphasisonPutin’s figure isnotonlybecausehe is thecurrentpresidentbutalsobecausehe isalmostconsensuallyconsideredinthe literatureasthecountry’s leading individualpolitical figure inthe2000s(ifnotpost­SovietRussiaasawhole).ConsideringthattheRussianConstitution (in its article 86) formally places the federal president asresponsibleforforeignpolicy,weconsiderthatitwouldbeofinteresttoanalyzewhether Putin’sposition on these identity debateshelps in theunderstandingoftheformulationofhis foreignpolicyand,consequently,intheunderstandingofpost­SovietRussia’sbehaviorontheinternationalscene. (Konstitusiya…,1993)Webelieve that thiswillespeciallyhelp inunderstanding Russia’s position vis­à­vis the West in recent years asRussia’s relationshipwith theWest has been at the center of debates

336

betweenWesternizers,SlavophilesandEurasianistssincetheirinception. Would Putin’s classification within the spectrum of debatesbetween these three schools help better understand his foreign policydecisions,especiallyvis­à­vistheWest? Aquestionarisesimmediately.Afterall,whatisPutin’spositiononthe spectrum of these debates? Is he a Westernizer, Slavophile orEurasianist? Thisisoneofthequestionsthathasmostconfusedobservers.HisclassificationhasdividedanalystsandhehasbeenvariouslyconsideredSlavophile, Westernizer or Eurasianist, depending on the angle ofobservation. Regarding Putin’s “Eurasianist” tendencies, a Russian analystwrotein2005:

Putinhasgivenevidencethatheisagainhanging intheEurasian direction. During the celebration of themillenialanniversaryofthecityofKazan,Putinpubliclypraised Lev Gumilev, the historian and philosopheracknowledgedas the founderof themodernEurasianistmovement.AtatimewhenEurasianistthoughtisagainontheriseinMoscow,itisworthtakingacloserlookattheideologicalfoundationsofEurasianism.(Shlapentokh,2005)

On the other hand, sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya did nothesitatetoputPutininthefieldofSlavophilesinaninterviewwithAlekseiNikolsky.

Question: Is the Putin regime a modern version of theSlavophiles?

Olga Kryshtanovskaya: Yes. The distinctive feature ofRussian history is that our state becomes strong onlywhenallpowerispyramidalandthespiritofautocracyunites our vast and sparselypopulated land. InRussia,Western ideas meant a weakened state and thedestruction of thewhole system.The elite assume thatweakening the state will inevitably lead to thedisintegration of the entire country. As a result,Slavophiles have always been in power longer thanWesternizers.WhenWesternizersare inpower,privateenterprise and the economy flourish, but the stateweakens and border problems appear. There thetraditionalists appear to restore order, and this

337

eventuallyleadstoeconomicstagnationQuestion:AndthentheWesternizerscomebacktopowerto

rescuetheeconomyandsavethecountryfromcollapse?OlgaKryshtanovskaya:Exactly.Agrouprestoresorder,but

cannot create an effective economic system.The othergroup candevelop the economy, butneverhas enoughtimetoestablishanewdemocraticorder.

Question: So the last seven years have been the mostsuccessful phase of a Slavophile government, restoringorder?

OlgaKryshtavnovskaya: Yes.(Nikolsky,2007,p.42) Inthisessay,IwillarguethatPutinisamoderateWesternizer.Thequalification “moderate” is important in order to distinguish him fromextremeWesternizers, suchasmembersofpro­Western liberalRussianpoliticalparties(suchastheformerSPSorYabloko),orevenYeltsin,whoin theWesternism/Slavophilism spectrumwasmuch closer to the firstpolethanhissuccessor. WhatpromptsustodefendthisclassificationofPutin?Firstofall,somepersonalexperiencesof thecurrentauthor.Someyearsago Ihadpersonalcontactatadiplomaticseminarin2004withIgorShuvalov,thenspecialadviser toPresidentPutinandcurrentdeputyprimeministerofthecountry.Onthatoccasion,Shuvalovcommentedthatinmeetingswithhis circle of closest advisers, Putinmade it several times clear that heconsidered Russia a basically European country. (Shuvalov, in personalcommunicationtothecurrentauthor,11/16/2004)ThisisaWesternizerposition. Thispersonalinsightwasimportanttoconsolidatemyviewonthesubject, for at that time, Putin’s position on this point was unclear,confusinghisobservers,aswenotedinthepositionsofShlapentokhandKryshtanovskayaabove.SincethenIhavebeenputtingtogetherpiecesofthe puzzle by following Putin’s sparse utterances about the subjectthroughouthiscareer. Beforewego into thepresentationofthesepiecesofevidenceofPutin’s “Westernizer” tendencies, a few words about the difficulty ofclassifying Putin within the Westernism/Slavophilism/Eurasianismspectrum. Firstofall,aswementionedabove,heisamoderateWesternizer.That would denote some discretion in his position, not making it soimmediatelyobvious.Even so, thiswouldnotbe enough to explain thepersistenceofthevariousviewsonthispoint.Otherfactorsareinvolved. Two characteristics,bothpersonalandpolitical,ofPutinhelp inelucidating the question: he is a pragmatic politician and is a

338

gosudarstvennik.Thesetwotraitsare,inmyview,closelylinkedtoPutin’spastasaKGBagentandheadoftheFSB(thesuccessororganizationtotheKGBinpost­SovietRussia). Former KGB agents (especially thoseworking overseas such asPutin), contrary to certain stereotyped views, were not mere violent“gorillas”indefenseofaspecificpoliticalorder.Infact,theyhadaratherapoliticalandtechnocraticWeltanschauung.InaninheritancethatcomesfromthetroubledStalinisttimes,whenthefieldofpoliticswasveryshakyandtreacherousandthe involvement in it,with itsconstantunexpectedchanges,couldprovefataltothemostunsuspecting,KGBagentsavoidedgettinginvolvedinpolitics:defensivelysoughttocarryouttheirworkinthemost technocraticandneutralwaypossible topreventproblems forthemselvesinotherareas.51 ThispragmaticcharacterwasimportedbyPutinintohispoliticalcareer. Thus, he does not cling to too rigid ideological principles, butrather seeks results,within a general gosudarstvennik political project.PragmatismcausesPutintoavoidpubliclyproclaiminghispositionintheideological debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles, for example.This isbecauseheknows that themajorityof theRussianpopulation isneitherWesternizernorSlavophile inextreme.InthespectrumbetweenWesternism and Slavophilism, the population disperses among thevarious points of the scale, and the “average” Russian (this artificial,nonexistent, but heuristically useful statistical creation) seems to besomewhere inbetween, somewhatmore to the Slavophile side,butnottoomuchandwithvariationintime(see,forexample,opinionsurveysonRussianattitudesandperceptionstowardtheWestinPIIE,2009,pp.105­106 andDiligensky&Chugrov,2000,pp.25 and32) In this context itwould not be politically interesting for the pragmatic Putin to clearlyassumetheextremepositionononeside,whichcouldalienatetheotherpartofthepopulation.Hencehemaintainsalowprofileinthesequestionsofprinciplesandideologicalpositionsofthatspecificspectrum. TheotherreasonthatconfusesthosewhomightclassifyhimasaWesternizeristhatPutinisagosudarstvennik(defenderofastrongstate).TheRussianhistoricalexperiencewith thequestionof the strong statewasdifferentfromthatofseveralcountriesoftheWestthatendedupinaliberalWeltanschauung (emphasisonindividualismandminimizationofthestateasawayofcontrollingitsoppressivepotential).

Political liberalism emerged with John Locke in seventeenth­

51 See Gordievsky (1996) for a review of memoirs by former spies and members of the Russian/Soviet intelligence community published in Russia and the West in which the functioning of the security organs in Russia/USSR and the behavior of their officers are described.

339

century England at the time of the Glorious Revolution as a form ofcommitment to resolve long periods of civil wars, many of religiousbackground.Inordertobreaktheimpasseofgroupsthatwereinpower,imposing theirdoctrineor religionand repressing theothernessof thelosers, a compromise was reached in which religion (and politicalconvictions in general) were consigned to the sphere of individualconscience: it should not be forcefully imposed by the state andconflicting interests should be resolved through parliamentary debate.Thus,liberalismsolvedtheproblemofthosesocietiesbydiminishingthestate (traditionally used by religious or ideological groups in power tooppress others) and strengthening the individual sphere (towhich thereligious/ideological convictions, traditional sources of armed disputes,wereconsigned).

Russia’s historical experience was different. Russians’ socialpsyche wasmarked by the difference between the two great EasternSlavic civilizations: the Kievan state and the Muscovite state. Thegeographical origin of the present Russian, Belarusian and UkrainianpeoplesliesnotinRussiabutinUkraine.Itwastheso­calledKievanstateorRus',whichexisted from the9th tothe12thcenturies.Itwasa looseconfederationofcity­statesvassalsof theGrandPrinceofKiev. Itwasarelativelyflourishingcivilizationforthetime.However,thiscivilization,ofwhichtheRussiansareproud,couldnotmilitarilyresisttheinvasionsandconquestbytheMongolsinthethirteenthtofifteenthcenturiesbecauseofitsfragmentationanddisunity.TheRussianswereonlyabletogetridoftheMongolswith the formation of theMuscovite state,whichnotonlyexpelled the Mongols but also created a great empire. And this newempire,unlikeRus',wasextremelycentralized,withastrongstate,atthehandsofthe tsar.TheMuscovitestatenotonlyexpelledtheMongolsbutcreatedoneofthelargestcontinentalempiresintheworld.

This experience of having a flourishing but decentralized anddisunitedcivilizationthatcouldnotwithstandforeigninvasionsmilitarily,andanothercentralizedcivilizationwithastrongstatethatwasablenotonly to expel the invaders but alsohave great internationalprojection,stronglymarked theRussianpsyche.Afterall, itwaswithastrongstatethatRussian society achieved itsheyday ofpower. For this reason, theRussianpsychedoesnotnecessarilyseethestateasapotentialrepressorof society but rather has amore organic view of state and society bywhich often the strong Russian state is themeans by which Russiansociety can flourish and thrive. In short,most Russians have a strongconceptionofgosudarstvennost’(stateconfiguration,“statism”).

This is where the figure of Putin comes in, as the man whorecovered the traditional gosudarstvennost’ conception of theRussians,afterthechaoticYeltsinperiodinwhichthepowerofthestateseemedto

340

declinedownhill.Thus, the key to understanding why Putin, despite being a

Westernizer, is seen by many observers as something diverse (as aEurasianist or Slavophile), is that Putin is not just aWesternizer. Likeevery human being, he is multidimensional. Much influenced by hisexperience in the KGB and FSB, he is also a pragmatic politician andgosudarstvennik:thatis,hefirmlydefendsthenational(federal)interestsofRussia,eveninthefaceoftheWestfromwhichhedoesnotnecessarilywant toalienatehimself.Thus,the factthathehasbumped into theUS,especiallyinthesecondG.W.Bushpresidentialterm,doesnotmeanthathe is necessarily anti­Western a priori, the sameway as the fact thatFrench leaderdeGaulle sometimesconfrontedtheUSdidnotmakehimautomaticallyanti­Western.DisputesbetweencountriesexistevenwithintheWesterncamp.

Firmness in defendingRussiannational (federal) interests gavePutinananti­Western impressionalsobecause itcameafter theYeltsinperiod. Putin is amoderateWesternizer, aswe have seen. YeltsinwasclosertotheextremeoftheWesternizerpolethanhissuccessor.Thisalsocontributedtothefactthatthegreatercontrastbetweenthetwofiguresgave the impression theywere indifferentcamps: in fact, theywere indifferentquartersonthesamesideofthegeneralaxisofWesternism.EvidenceofPutin’sWesternism WhatevidenceisthereofPutin’sWesternism? AgoodstartistocollectsomeofPutin’sownrecordedstatementsthatmaycharacterizehimasaWesternizer.Afirstclueisthathenotonlylived a significant part of his life in Saint Petersburg (the mostwesternizedofthebigRussiancities)butalsohasPetertheGreatasoneofhis idols,a factoftenreported in journalisticcoverage. Inaddition, inhis book of “memoirs” dictated in interviews to journalists, the thenpresidential candidate Putin stated that, “We [Russians] are part ofEuropeanculture.Infact,wederiveourvalueexactlyfromthat.Whereverour people dwell, whether in the Far East or in the South, we areEuropeans.”(Gevorkyan,Kolesnikov&Timakova,2000,pp.155­56) Whatconfuses theseclearevidencesofaWesternizerposition isthe timeswhenPutinassumedadiscourse thatmayresemble thatofaSlavophileoraEurasianist,as in theabove­mentionedepisode inwhichhe, at the commemoration of themillennial anniversary of the city ofKazan,publiclypraisedLevGumilev,thegreatnameofneo­Eurasianism. Togetoutofthetrapofpoliticians’statementsaboutthemselves(anotoriously slippery terrain),wecanciteaquantitativestudyon the

341

degree of “Westernism” of Putin and his government. Doing acomprehensivestatisticalanalysisofPutin’sgovernmentmeasuresintheareas of democracy/governance, economics, judicial reform and publicstatements,Rivera&Rivera (2003,p.30)concluded thatPutinactsasaSlavophileinthefirstoneandasaWesternizerinthelastthreeonesandcanthereforebeconsideredaWesternizeringeneral.ThediscrepancybetweenPutin’sWesternizerWeltanschauungandPutin’sforeignpolicyactionsandthesearchforthebestwaytoexplainit How to reconcile the fact that Putin is aWesternizer (even ifmoderate)withhisanti­Westernactionsinforeignpolicy? WeshallrepeatheretheimportantfactthatourviewofPutinasamoderateWesternizerisadescriptionofanidealtype,i.e.,itisanaprioriposition and ceteris paribus. In concrete situations, Putin (like allhumans)isamultidimensionalcharacter,withbuilt­infacetsfromseveralotherareas. Inaddition tobeingagosudarstvennik(defenderofastrongstate),heisapragmaticpolitician.Thesetwodimensions(amongothers)makehimdefend the interestsof theRussian stateagainstother states(whether from theWestor theEast, from theNorthernHemisphereortheSouthernHemisphere),anddonotdenoteanyaprioripro­Westernoranti­Westernposition. Hence,thequestionarises.WhatforisthisidealtypeofPutinasamoderateWesternizer?Isnotthisconceptofsuchalevelofabstractionasto render ituseless inheuristic terms?Would itnot bebetter touse aclassificationclosertoreality,evenifitdilutestheidentitydebatesofthethreegreatschoolsofthoughtvis­à­vistheWest? Take, for example, the main theories of international relationswhen used to explain the behavior of Russian foreign policy. Is thereroom for them to introduce these identity debates as fundamentalelements for theunderstanding of theWeltanschauung andbehavior ofthemainRussian actors (in this case,PresidentPutin) in internationalrelations? Beforewe go into the analysis of the actual use of theories ofinternationalrelations intheRussiancase,wemustmakeapreliminaryremark. Unlike the mainstream orthodox historians, who emphasizearchival research and originalprimary sources for the investigation ofwell­defined areas and populations in time and space (and are oftensuspiciousofexcessivegeneralizations in theirconclusions), theoriesofinternationalrelations(IR)have,sincetheirinception,beenbornwithamarkedly“generalizing”character.Duetothefactthattheyarededicatedto studying the behavior ofmany countries, very different from each

342

other,intheirmutualinteractions,thetheoriesofIR(asopposedtoareastudies specialists) sublimate the excessive internal diversities ofindividualcountriesinsearchofaheuristicsynthesisthatcanexplainthebehaviorofsuchdiverseactorsasawhole.52 Havingmadethisinitialobservation,wemustthennotethatmostanalysesofIRauthors,especiallythemost“orthodox”ones,thatis,thoseaffiliatedwith themainstream currents of realism and liberalism, seeRussiaasa “normal country,” “like theothers,”whosebehaviorpatterncanbededuced from the interactionof thevariablesof the internalandexternalpoliticalgame.Thatis,theytendnottobecountry­specificandtoseeall internationalactorsas indifferentlyrational.This isveryclearwiththerealists.Whether it is inmodernorthodoxrealism(oftheHansMorgenthau type, for example), inwhich there is a certain “biological”viewofthebehaviorofstates(whichaccordinglyact, likepeople,basedontheprinciplesofsurvivalandthesearchforpower),orneorealism(ofthe Kenneth Waltz type), in which the structural conditions of theinternationalsystemconstrainindividualactorstoactinacertainwayinsimilar situations, the analyses tend to examine Russiawith the samehomogenizing clinical eye with which other nations are examined,withouttheneed formoredetailedandin­depthinternalanalysesoftheidiosyncrasiesoftheformationofRussianthought.53 Among the main IR theories, the one that opens up moreopportunityfortheanalysisofidentitydilemmasissocialconstructivism.54Within the framework of constructivism, we consider that the mostprofoundandproductiveworkonpost­SovietRussianforeignpolicyhasbeen thatofAndreiTsygankov.Perhapsbecauseofhisdualexperienceboth in Russia and in the West (he is Russian and teaches at SanFrancisco State University, USA), he has achieved a fairly balancedsynthesisoftheuseofWesternIRtheorieswithaspecificknowledgeof

52 See the interesting comparison between historians and IR theorists when dealing with generalizations in Puchala (2003, pp. 31-32 and passim). 53 One example of this type of analysis is provided by the theoretician of “offensive realism,” John Mearsheimer, who has long admonished Americans to abandon the normative idealistic view of Russia as “evil” and anti-democratic (as opposed to democratic America) and face the fact that Russia (like the United States) is a great power and acts as such (as well as the US), its behavior having nothing inherently good or bad. (Mearsheimer, 1990 and 2014) In addition, see also the review of realist authors’ analyses of Russian foreign policy in Wieclawski (2011). Liberal approaches to Russian foreign policy can be seen in Fukuyama (1994), Malcolm, Pravda, Allison & Light (1996), McFaul (1997/1998), Trenin (2001) and Lo (2002). 54 Morozov (2002), Spildboel-Hansen (2002), Fischer (2003) and Tsygankov (2006, 2007 and 2014) are examples of social constructivist analyses of Russian foreign policy.

343

Russian social and ideological reality. In his magnum opus, Russia’sForeignPolicy: Change and Continuity inNational Identity, inwhich heanalyzesthedevelopmentofRussianpost­Sovietforeignpolicy,hedividesthespectrumofRussianforeignpolicythinkingintothreemainstreams:Westernizers, statists and civilizationalists. (Tsygankov, 2006, p 61)Westernizers are exactly the same as those described in the currentwork.Tsygankovdividesthembetweenliberals(likeKozyrev)andsocialdemocrats (likeGorbachev,who founded theSocialDemocraticPartyofRussiain2001).AccordingtoTsygankov,thebulkofthecivilizationistsis composed of Eurasianists (among whom he controversially positsVladimir Zhirinovskii), and also includes what he calls the nationalcommunists(whosemainfigure,accordingtohim,isGennadiiZyuganov,the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation whopreachesamixtureofcommunist,nationalistandEurasianistideas).Thestatistgroup,however,mixesa seriesofpragmaticactorswithdiversetendencies,whosecommonpointisthedefenseandstrengtheningoftheRussianstate.ThequestionofrapprochementwiththeWestand/orEastisentirelysubordinated to thisprincipalconsiderationandmayvary intime according to the national interest. Evgenii Primakov is theirfigurehead.According toTsygankov,thistripartiteclassificationcapturesthemaincurrentsofRussianpost­Sovietthoughtaboutforeignpolicy. IsthistaxonomybyTsygankov(whomwepersonallyconsiderthemostauthoritativeauthoronRussianforeignpolicytoday)differentfromthe one we present in the current work? The two taxonomies arededicated to illuminating different but related issues.Our division intoWesternizers,SlavophilesandEurasianists (and theirmoremoderateormore extreme internal spectra) focuses on Russia’s original identitydilemmabetweenEuropeandAsia,betweentheWestandtheEastas itformedand institutionalized from thediscussionsabout theheritageofPetertheGreat.Thus,ourclassificationcaptureshowpolitical,collective,or individual actors (such as Putin, for example) identify with thisparticular issue.Andwe believe that the positioning on this particularissue informs (and to a great extent, formats) the foreign policypreferencesof these individualactors,especially inrelation totheWest,exactly the subject that gave birth to our current discussion. That is,although this classification was not created to explain Russian foreignpolicy,itisveryimportanttoexplainmuchoftheWeltanschauungbehindit,especiallyRussia’s(political)actors’relationshipwiththeWest. Tsygankov’sclassificationismorespecific.Itaimstomakeexplicitthe factors (not just that identity issue) that directly participate in theformattingofRussianforeignpolicy.Inotherwords,asweourselveshavealready put it, the Russian foreign policy makers, in addition to thisextremely important identity issue, have other concerns, interests and

344

valueson theirminds that also influence the formulationof thatpolicy.ThatiswhyTsygankovcreatedalargerumbrellaclassificationthat,eveninternally encompassing much of this original identity discussion (hecites theWesternizers as a separate group, gives a prominent role toEurasianists within the wing of civilizationists, etc.), also absorbsimportantconcernsfromotherareas. Whatwouldbetheuse,then,ofataxonomyliketheonepresentedinthecurrentwork ifitcoversonlyonefacet(importantasitmaybe)ofthe Russian Weltanschauung in relation to the outside world? Is thisheuristically valid?Or is it better to simplymove on to anothermorecomprehensive taxonomy, more directly linked to the formulation ofRussianforeignpolicy,liketheonebyTsygankov? Our response to this objection is as follows. Thiswork aims atprovidingthepublicwithaverydetailedanalysisoftheRussian identitydebatesvis­à­vistheWest,thequestionofRussiaasEuropeorAsia,etc.Thisanalysisinitselfrepresentsagreatadvanceinthefaceof therelativeunderdevelopmentofthisareaofstudyintheWest.However,weconsiderthatthesedebatesshouldnotbeseenasmerehistoricalcuriosity,relicsofthe nineteenth century (when the Westernizer/Slavophile disputeserupted) or the interwar period of the twentieth century (whenEurasianism emerged as a schoolof thought).Theymatter and informabout the behavior and theWeltanschauung ofRussianpolitical actorstoday.And,inourview,theyarecentraltounderstandingRussia’scurrentforeignpolicy.ThatiswhyweconsiderthatthisoriginalclassificationofWesternizers,SlavophilesandEurasianistsshouldbekeptseparately foranaprioristudyoftheWeltanschauungofRussianforeignpolicymakers.Ceteris paribus, understanding the a priori position of these policyformulatorsinrelationtothiscentralandcrucialidentitydebate,wewillhaveasolidinitialplatformtowhichwecanaddthe importantelementsofotherareasforamoreconcreteandcompleteunderstandingofRussianforeignpolicy as it really is.Therefore, in our description of Putin,weclassifyhimasamoderateWesternizerapriori.We thendrawattentionto the fact that he is amultidimensional character and that there areotherareasofhispersonality(especiallyhispragmatismandthefactthatheisagosudarstvennik,ordefenderofacentralizedandstrongstate)thatcanaffecthisbehaviorinforeignpolicysometimesconfusingobservers. It is precisely because of the confusion at this second (moreconcrete) stage of observation that we consider it important first toestablishouroriginalidentityclassificationaprioriandonlythenaddtheotherconcretemodifyingelements.Ifwesimplytrytogetstraighttothemore concrete classification, we run the risk of going over (ormisunderstanding)thatearlierstageofthemain identity issue,probablythemostrelevantinheuristicforeignpolicyterms.

345

ThecurrentstateofRussianforeignpolicyintheworldisaprimeexampleofthis.RussiaisexperiencingmomentsoftensionwiththeWestthatsomeevencallasecondColdWar.(Trenin,2014)ManyblamePutindirectly for thisworsening of relations,placinghim as an anti­Westernpoliticianapriori.That,incidentally,seemstobethemainstreampositioninmostWesternmedia.ConsequentlyitwouldbeawasteoftimefortheWesttotrytogetPutin’scooperationandthebestpolicyvis­à­visRussiawouldbesomeformofcontainmentorevenrollback.Inourview,thisisanerroneousandevendangerouspositionforinternationalpeace.Aswehave shown above, Putin is not, a priori, anti­Western but rather, a(moderate) Westernizer. According to our description, in most majorconflictswiththeWest(read,especiallyUSA),Putinactedmorereactivelythanactivelybecauseofhisgosudarstvennikcharacter. Indefenseof theRussianstate,heopposedtheNATO enlargement,theconstructionofthemissile defense shield in Eastern Europe, theWestern interference inUkraine (culminating in the extralegal deposition of the pro­RussianUkrainian president in 2014) and the “color revolutions” that deposedpro­russiansrulers in (formerSoviet)countriesbyreplacing themwithpro­Westernleaders.55Hisbehaviorismorelikethebehaviorofaleaderlike the Frenchman Charles de Gaulle than that of an anti­WesternSlavophile or Eurasianist. Somuch so thatwhen theWest approachedRussiawithouthiddenagendas,thereceptionwasquitepositive(aswhenPutin helped the US logistically and with information after the 9/11attacks,orat the timeof the resetpolicyofObamaandHillaryClintonetc.). In short, our initial, differentiated classificatory view of theideological actors within the spectrum of the original Westernizer,SlavophileandEurasianist identitydebateallows fora focusonPutin’saprioriposition,whichiscentral(thoughincomplete)tounderstandsomebasicaspectsofhispositioninginforeignpolicy.Thisdoesnotexcludethelater refinements that we also pointed out (his gosudarstvennikdimension, his pragmatism). However, we consider the isolation andmaintenanceof this importantoriginal identity taxonomic element very

55 As Mearsheimer (2014, pp. 5-6) put it: “Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Mexico and Canada in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider NATO expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any effort to turn those countries against Russia — a message that the 2008 Russo-Georgian war also made crystal clear.”

346

important.Itsnon­isolationmay leadtoconceptualconfusionwithotherconstituentelementsofPutin’sbehaviorandeventoan invertedviewofthisRussianleaderasanti­Westerntoutcourt.Andthis,inturn,mayleadto misguided notions and policies that it is futile to attempt furthercooperative approaches with Russia. Putin’s classificatory vision as amoderateWesternizeropensup theprospect that theWestmay ratherattempttoco­optPutinforamorecooperativerelationshipwiththeWest—althoughprobablytobeeffective,thiswouldrequirenotonlyachangein Putin’s but also in theWest’s (especially the US’s) confrontationalbehavioraswell!).56 Inconclusion,webelievethatthefurtherstudyofthedebatesonRussia’sidentitybetweenEuropeandAsia,betweentheWestandtheEastwillnotonlyprovideabetterhistoricalunderstandingofthecountrybutalsohelpincomprehendinghercurrentbehaviorontheworldstage.

56 The outline of our position on Putin as a moderate Westernizer becomes clearer when we constrast it with Tsygankov’s position on Putin, which is close to ours but with a crucial inverted element. For Tsygankov, Putin is a statist “not inherently anti-Western”, “who seeks pragmatic cooperation with the West.” (Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2010, p. 669; Tsygankov, 2006, p. 171) In our view, Putin is an a priori (moderate) Westernizer who also has other central characteristics, including being a gosudarstvennik (defender of a strong state). In Tsygankov’s view, Putin will incline to the West circumstantially while in our view he will do the same tendentially, provided that force majeure circumstances do not prevent him to do so. This small nuance carries within itself a more optimistic view of the possibility of a good relationship between the West and Russia under Putin, which is the point to which we draw attention at this time so pessimistically called by some observers “new Cold War.”

347

6.ANNEX1Table 1: Post­Soviet Russia Gross Domestic Product (GDP) PercentageGrowth:1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

-9 -19.4 -10.4 -11.6 -4.2 -3.4 0.9 -4.5 6.4 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

7.2 6.4 7.7 8.5 5.2 -7.8 4.5 4.3 3.4 1.3 0.6

Source:World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund), May2000,April2007,October2008,April2010andApril2015issues.

348

7.REFERENCES­ AIZLEWOOD, Robin. Revisiting Russian Identity in Russian Thought:From Chaadaev to the Early Twentieth Century. The Slavonic and EastEuropeanReview,v.78,n.1,pp.20­43,Jan.2000.­ AKSAKOV, Konstantin Sergeevich. Polnoe Sobranie SochineniiKonstantina Sergeevicha Aksakova. 3 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow:Universitetskaya Tipografiya, 1889. Available online athttp://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003514902#?page=1 (accessed01/13/2012)­ AKSAKOV, Konstantin Sergeevich. Ob Osnovnykh Nachalakh RusskoiIstorii. Available online athttp://az.lib.ru/a/aksakow_k_s/text_1860_ob_osnovnyh_nachalah.shtml(accessed01/13/2012a).­ AKSAKOV, Konstantin Sergeevich. O Vnutrennem Sostoyanii Rossii.Available online athttp://society.polbu.ru/radugin_philohrest/ch64_all.html (accessed09/18/2009).­ AKSAKOV, Konstantin Sergeevich. Ob Osnovnykh Nachalakh RusskoiIstorii. In: AKSAKOV, Konstantin Sergeevich. Polnoe Sobranie SochineniiKonstantina Sergeevicha Aksakova. 3 vols. Moscow: UniversitetskayaTipografiya,1889a.Vol.1,pp.11­15.­AKSAKOV,KonstantinSergeevich.OTomZhe.In:AKSAKOV,KonstantinSergeevich.PolnoeSobranieSochineniiKonstantinaSergeevichaAksakova.3vols.Moscou:UniversitetskayaTipografiya,1889b.Vol.1,pp.16­24.­ AKSAKOV, Konstantin Sergeevich. Pis’mo k Gosudaryu Aleksandry II iZapiski o Vnutrennem Sostoyanii Rossii. In: AKSAKOV, KonstantinSergeevich.PolnoeSobranieSochineniiKonstantinaSergeevichaAksakova.3vols.Moscow:UniversitetskayaTipografiya,1889c.Vol.1,pp.600­627.­AKSAKOV,KonstantinSergeevich.DopolneniekZapiskeoVnutrennemSostoyaniiRossii. In:AKSAKOV,Konstantin Sergeevich. Polnoe SobranieSochinenii Konstantina Sergeevicha Aksakova. 3 vols. Moscou:UniversitetskayaTipografiya,1889d.Vol.1,pp.628­634.­ ALIEV, F.B. Neoevraziistvo: problemy i Tendentsii. Available online athttp://mopi.bakuvirtual.net/wp­content/uploads/2012/05/%D0%90%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%B2­%D0%A4.%D0%91.­%D0%9D%D0%B5%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE­%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BC%D1%8B­%D0%B8­%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%86%D

349

0%B8%D0%B8.doc1.pdf(accessed12/12/2012).­ANDERSON,Benedict. ImaginedCommunities:Reflectionson theOriginandSpreadofNationalism.London:Verso,1983.­ ARKTOGEYA. Manifest Arktogeya, 1996. Available online athttp://arctogaia.org.ru/article/46(accessed12/20/1996).­ ASH, Timothy Garton. History of the Present. Essays, Sketches andDispatchesfromEuropeinthe1990's.London:AllenLane,1999.­AZADOVSKII,Konstantin,EGOROV,Boris.FromAnti­WesternismtoAnti­Semitism:StalinandtheImpactofthe"Anti­Cosmopolitan"CampaignsonSovietCulture. JournalofColdWarStudies,v.4,no.1,pp.66­80,Winter2002.­ BAGRAMOV, Eduard Aleksandrovich. Evraziiskii Proekt na StranitsakhZhurnala “Evrazii”. Available online athttp://www.rptb.ru/test2/10LET/STATI10/stati20.html (accessed12/12/2001).­ BASSIN, Mark. Nurture is Nature: Lev Gumilev and the Ecology ofEthnicity.SlavicReview,v.68,no.4,pp.872­897,Winter2009.­ BÉDARIDA, François.Definición,Método y Práctica de laHistoriaDelTiempoPresente.CuadernosdeHistoriaContemporânea,no.20,pp.19­27,1998.­BASSIN,Mark.Eurasianism"Classical"and"Neo":theLinesofContinuity.Available online at http://src­h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no17_ses/14bassin.pdf (accessed12/18/2011).­ BASSIN, Mark. Classical Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of RussianIdentity. Available online athttp://www.dartmouth.edu/~crn/crn_papers/Bassin.pdf (accessed01/17/2010).­BELINSKII,Vissarion.Grigor’evich.PolnoeSobranieSochinenii.Moscow:Izdatel'stvoAkademiiNaukSSSR,1953­1959.13vols.Availableonlineathttp://www.vgbelinsky.ru/texts/13/(accessed04/02/2012).­ BELINSKII, Vissarion Grigor'evich. Borodinskaya Godovshchina V.Zhukovskogo. In: BELINSKII, Vissarion.Grigor’evich. Polnoe SobranieSochinenii.Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1953­1959a. 13vols.Vol.III,pp.240­250.­ BELINSKII, Vissarion Grigor'evich. Istoria Malorossii NikolayaMarkevicha. In: BELINSKII, Vissarion.Grigor’evich. Polnoe SobranieSochinenii.Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1953­1959b. 13vols.Vol.VII,pp.43­64.­ BELINSKII, Vissarion Grigor'evich. Stat’i o Narodnoi Poezii. In:BELINSKII, Vissarion.Grigor’evich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii.Moscow:Izdatel'stvoAkademiiNaukSSSR,1953­1959c.13vols.Vol.V,pp.289­450.­BELINSKII,VissarionGrigor'evich. Pis'ma1841­1848Availableonlineat

350

http://az.lib.ru/b/belinskij_w_g/text_3900.shtml (accessed04/06/2012a).­ BELINSKII, Vissarion.Grigor’evich. Pis’mo Gogolyu. Available online athttp://az.lib.ru/b/belinskij_w_g/text_3890.shtml (accessed09/30/2009).­ BENOIST, Alain de. Vu de droite: anthologie critique des idéescontemporaines.Paris:ÉditionsCopernic,1977.­ BENOIST, Alain de. Comment peut­on être païen? Paris: AlbinMichel,1981.­ BENOIST, Alain de. Europe, TiersMonde,même combat. Paris: RobertLaffont,1986.­ BENOIST, Alain de. Demain, la décroissance! Penser l'ecologie jusqu'aubout.Paris:Edite,2007.­ CHAADAEV, Petr Yakovlevich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii i IzbranniePis’ma.Moscow:Nauka,1991.2vols.­CHAADAEV,PetrYakovlevich.FilosoficheskiePis’ma.Availableonlineathttp://www.philosophy.ru/library/chaad/lettr/chaad1.html (accessed09/18/2009).­CHAPMAN,MichaelC.The1969SymposiumontheSlavophiles.StudiesinSovietThought,v.20,no.1,pp.23­42,July1979.­ CHASE­DUNN, Christopher,ÁLVAREZ,Alexis, PASCIUTI,Daniel. PowerandSize:UrbanizationandEmpire­formationinWorld­SystemsSincetheBronzeAge. In:CHASE­DUNN,Christopher,ANDERSON,E.N. (eds.) TheHistorical Evolution of World­Systems. New York: Palgrave­Macmillan,2005.P.92­112.­COPLESTON,Frederick.AHistoryofPhilosophy:RussiaPhilosophy (vol.10).London:Continuum,2011.­COLTON,TimothyJ.SuperpresidentialismandRussia’sBackwardState.Post­SovietAffairs,v.11,no.2,1995.P.144­148.­DIAMOND, Jared.Guns,Germsand Steel: theFates ofHuman Societies.NewYork:W.W.Norton,2005.­DILIGENSKY,Guerman,CHUGROV,Sergei.TheWestinRussianMentality.Moscow: InstituteofWorldEconomyand InternationalRelations,2000.Available online at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98­00/diliguenski.pdf(accessed10/12/2009).­ DONALDSON, ROBERT H., NOGEE, Joseph L. The Foreign Policy ofRussia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests. 4th ed. Armonk: M.E.Sharpe,2009.­DUGIN,AleksandrGel’evich. [Manyofhisbooksareavailableonlineatthe“Biblioteka”sectionofthewebsitehttp://arcto.ru/]­DUGIN,AleksandrGel’evich.MisteriiEvrazii.Moscow:Arktogeya,1991.Availableonlineathttp://arcto.ru/article/68(accessed10/25/2013).­DUGIN,AleksandrGel’evich.GiperboreiskayaTeoriya:Opytariosofskogo

351

issledovaniya. Moscow: Arktogeya, 1993. Available online athttp://arctogaia.org.ru/article/63(accessed07/10/2015).­DUGIN,AleksandrGel’evich.Konspirologiya.Moscow:Arktogeya,1993a.Availableonlineathttp://arcto.ru/article/64(accessed10/25/2013).­ DUGIN, Aleksandr Gel’evich. Konservativnaya Revolyutsiya. Moscow:Arktogeya,1994.Availableonlineathttp://arcto.ru/article/20(accessed10/25/2013.­ DUGIN, Aleksandr Gel’evich. Osnovy Geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoebudushchee Rossii. Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997. Available online athttp://www.arctogaia.com/public/osnovygeo/ Also available athttp://ratnikjournal.narod.ru/zip/Dugin.Geopolitika.pdf (accessed07/08/2010)­ DUGIN, Aleksandr Gel’evich. Tampliery Proletariata: Natsional­bol’shevizm i Initsyatsiya.Moscow:Arktogeya,1997a.Availableonlineathttp://arcto.ru/article/47(accessed10/25/2013).­DUGIN,AleksandrGel’evich.AbsolyutnayaRodina.Moscow:Arktogeya,1999. Available online at http://arcto.ru/article/66 (accessed25/10/2013).­ DUGIN, Aleksandr Gel’evich. Filosofiya Traditsionalizma. Moscow:Arktogeya,2002.Availableonlineathttp://arcto.ru/article/72(accessed10/25/2013).­ DUGIN, Aleksandr Gel’evich. Evolyutsiya Paradigmal’nykh OsnovaniiNauk. Moscow: Arktogeya, 2002a. Available online athttp://arcto.ru/article/9(accessed10/25/2013).­ DUGIN, Aleksandr Gel'evich. Evraziiiskaya Missiya NursultanaNazarbaeva. Moscow: ROF Evrazia, 2004. Available online athttp://evrazia.org/FTP/1­288_polosi.pdf(accessed09/10/2013).­ DUGIN, Aleksandr Gel'evich. Filosofiya Politiki. Moscow: Arktogeya,2004a. Available online at http://www.arcto.ru/article/1188 (accessed10/26/2013)­DUGIN,AleksandrGel'evich.Arkheomodern.Moscow:Arktogeya,2008.Available online at http://www.arcto.ru/article/1472 (accessed01/15/2014).­DUGIN,AleksandrGel’evich.ChtvertayaPoliticheskayaTeoriya.Moscow:Amfora, 2009. Available online athttp://konservatizm.org/news/global/030909004230.xhtml (accessed10/25/2013).­ DUGIN, Aleksandr Gel'evich. Putin Protiv Putina: byvshii budshchiiPrezident. Moscow: Yauza­Press, 2012. Available online athttp://bookz.ru/book.php?id=108785&n=1&p_count=23&g=critic&f=putin­pr_558&b_name=%CF%F3%F2%E8%ED%20%EF%F0%EE%F2%E8%E2%20%CF%F3%F2%E8%ED%E0.%20%C1%FB%E2%F8%E8%E9%20

352

%E1%F3%E4%F3%F9%E8%E9%20%EF%F0%E5%E7%E8%E4%E5%ED%F2&a_name=%C0%EB%E5%EA%F1%E0%ED%E4%F0%20%C4%F3%E3%E8%ED&a_id=aleksandr­dugin(accessed02/14/2014).­DUGIN,AleksandrGel’evich.TheFourthPoliticalTheory.London:Arktos,2012.­ DUNCAN, Peter J.S. Westernism, Eurasianism and Pragmatism: theForeign Policies of the Post­Soviet States, 1991­2001 (Working PapersSerie in Politics Paper No. 2). London: School of Slavonic and EastEuropeanStudies –UniversityCollegeLondon,2002.Availableonlineathttp://www.ssees.ucl.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/duncan.pdf(accessed01/17/2010).­DUNLOP, JohnB.TheRise ofRussiaand theFallof the SovietEmpire.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993.­ERASOV,BorisSergeevich.Sotsial'nayaKul'turologiya.Moscow:AspektPress,1994.­ERASOV,BorisSergeevich.Rossiya iVostok:tsivilizatsionyeotnosheniya.Moscow:InstitutVostokovednieRAN,1994a.­ERSEN,Emre.Neo­EurasianismandPutin’s “Multipolarism” inRussianForeign Policy. Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, no. 4, pp. 135­172,2004.­EVOLA,Julius.SpiritualAuthorityandTemporalPower.[1929]Availableonline at http://thompkins_cariou.tripod.com/id95.html (accessed01/09/2014).­ EVOLA, Julius. Revolt Against the Modern World. Rochester: InnerTraditionsInternational,1995.­FILONOVA,L.G.EvraziistvovFilosofsko­IstoricheskoiiPoliticheskoiMysliRusskogo Zarubezh’iya 1920­1930­x godov. Moscow: RossiiskayaGosudarstvennaya Biblioteka, 2011. Available online athttp://www.rsl.ru/datadocs/doc_4677ri.pdf(accessed11/11/2012).­ FISCHER, S. Russlands Westpolitik in der Krise 1992­2000: EineKonstruktivistischeUntersuchung.Frankfurt:CampusVerlag,2003.­ FISH,M. Steven.The Pitfalls ofRussian Superpresidentialism. CurrentHistory,v.96,no.612,pp.326­330,1997.­ FREEDOM HOUSE homepage. Available online atwww.freedomhouse.org­FUKUYAMA,Francis.TheEndofHistory?TheNationalInterest,v.16,no.3,pp.3­18,Summer1989.­ FUKUYAMA, Francis. The Ambiguity of “National Interest”. In:SESTANOVICH,S.(ed.)RethinkingRussia’sNationalInterest.Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,1994.Pp.10­23.­ GALENO, Renato. Putin Inicia a Nova Era da "Paz Quente". O Globo,06/10/2008,p.40.­ GARVISH, G.B. Neoevraziistiskii Proekt Politiko­Pravovoi Modernizatsii

353

Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennosti. Available online athttp://www.law.edu.ru/book/book.asp?bookID=129509 (accessed12/12/2003)­GELLNER,Ernest.NationsandNationalism. Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1983.­ GEVORKYAN, N., KOLESNIKOV, A., TIMAKOVA, N. Ot Pervogo Litsa:razgovorysVladimiromPutinym.Moscow:Vagrius,2000.­ GEVORKYAN, N., KOLESNIKOV, A., TIMAKOVA, N. First Person: anAstonishinglyFrankSelf­PortraitbyRussia’sPresidentVladimirPutin.NewYork:PublicAffairs,2000a.­ GORDIEVSKY, Oleg. New Memoirs from Moscow. Intelligence andInternationalSecurity,v.11,no.3,pp.586­592,July1996.­GRANT,StevenA.ObshchinaandMir.SlavicReview,v.35,no.4,pp.636­651,Dec.1976.­ GUÉNON, René. Autorité Spirituelle et Pouvoir Temporel. Paris: Vrin,1929. [{Paris: Éditions Véga, 1984} also available online at:http://www.scribd.com/doc/55985410/Livre­Rene­Guenon­1929­Autorite­Spirituelle­et­Pouvoir­Temporel­CLAN9­livre­electronique(accessed01/09/2014)]­ GUÉNON, René. The Crisis of the Modern World. Hillsdale: SophiaPerennis,2001.­ GUMILEV, Lev Nikolaevich. [Gumilev’s works are available online athttp://gumilevica.kulichki.net/works.html]­ GUMILEV, Lev Nikolaevich. Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere. Moscou:Progress Publishers, 1990. Available online athttp://gumilevica.kulichki.net/English/ebe.htm(accessed01/16/2013).­ GUMILEV, Lev Nikolaevich. Menya Nazyvayut Evraziitsem. NashSovremennik, no. 1, pp. 62­70, 1991. Also available online athttp://gumilevica.kulichki.net/articles/Article111.htm (accessed05/01/2013)­GUMILEV,LevNikolaevich. Istoriko­FilosofskieSochineniekniazyaN.S.Trubetskogo (Zametki Poslednogo Evraziitsa). Nashe Nasledie, no. 3,1991a. Also available online athttp://gumilevica.kulichki.net/articles/Article46.htm (accessed05/25/2013).­GUMILEV,LevNikolaevich.OtRusikRossii.Moscow:AirisPress,2008[original 1992]. Also available online athttp://gumilevica.kulichki.net/R2R/index.html(accessed10/09/2009).­GUMILEV,LevNikolaevich.EtnogeneziBiosferaZemli.Moscow:Astrel',2010 [original 1979]. Also available online athttp://gumilevica.kulichki.net/EBE/index.html(accessed10/09/2009).­ GUMILEV, Lev Nikolaevich. Drevnnaya Rusi i Velikaya Step’.Moscou:Airis Press, 2011 [original 1989]. Also available online at

354

http://gumilevica.kulichki.net/ARGS/index.html(accessed10/10/2009).­GUMILEV,L.N.,IVANOV,K.P.EtnosferaiKosmos["EtnosferaeCosmos"].In: Materialy Vtorogo Vsesoyuznogo Soveshchaniya po KosmicheskoiAntropoekologii ["Materiais do Segundo Encontro de AntropoecologiaCósmicadeTodaaUnião"].Moscou:1984.Pp.211­220.Availableonlineathttp://gumilevica.kulichki.net/articles/Article08.htm (accessed04/25/2013).­GVOSDEV,NikolasK.Rússia:EuropeanbutnotWestern?Orbis,pp.129­140,Winter2007.­HARVEY,ColeJoseph.TheDouble­HeadedEagle:Semi­presidentialismandDemocracy in France and Russia. Available online at http://d­scholarship.pitt.edu/9393/1/Harvey_Cole_ETD2008.pdf (accessed12/30/2008).­ HARVEY, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into theOriginsofCulturalChange.Cambridge(EUA):BlackwellPublishers,1992.­HASSAN,IhabHabib.TheCultureofPostmodernism.Theory,CultureandSociety,vol.2,no.3,pp.119­132,1985.­HEGEL,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich.ThePhilosophyofHistory.Kitchener:BatocheBooks,2001.­ HERZEN, Aleksandr Ivanovich. Sobranie Sochinenii v 30 Tomakh.Moscow:Izdatel'stvoAkademiiNaukSSSR,1954­1965.30vols.Availableonline at http://philolog.petrsu.ru/herzen/texts/texts.htm andhttp://philolog.ru/herzen/index.html(accessed05/13/2012).­HOBSBAWN,E.J.NationsandNationalismsince1780:Programme,Myth,Reality.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990.­ Izkhod k Vostoku. Sofia: Rossiisko­Bolgarskoe Knigoizdatel’stvo, 1921.Also available online at http://nevmenandr.net/eurasia/1921­isxod.php(accessed08/31/2012)­IRADIAN,Garbis.Inequality,PovertyandGrowth:cross­countryevidence(working paper WP 05/28). Washington, DC: International MonetaryFund,2005.­ KAGARLITSKY, Boris. Restauration in Russia:Why Capitalism Failed.London:Verso,1995.­ KARAMZIN, Nikolai Mikhailovich. O Drevnei i Novoi Rossii v eePoliticheskom i Grazhdanskom Otnosheniyakh. Berlin: FerdinandSchneider, 1861. Available online athttp://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003545232#?page=1 (accessed01/02/2012).­KARAMZIN,NikolaiMikhailovich. IstoriyaGosudarstvaRossiiskaro. SãoPetersburgo: [various printing shops], 1842­1852. 12 vols. Availableonline athttp://old.rsl.ru/table.jsp?f=1016&t=3&v0=%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F+%D0%93%D0%BE%D1%81%D

355

1%83%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B0+%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%BE&x=18&y=6&f=1003&t=1&v1=&f=4&t=2&v2=&f=21&t=3&v3=&f=1016&t=3&v4=&f=1016&t=3&v5=&useExternal=true&bf=4&b=&d=0&ys=&ye=&lng=&ft=&mt=&dt=&vol=&pt=&iss=&ps=&pe=&tr=&tro=&cc=b3&i=1&v=tagged&s=0&ss=0&st=0&i18n=ru&rlf=&psz=20&bs=20&ce=4&debug=false(accessed01/02/2012).­ KAVELIN, Konstantin Dmitrievich. Sobranie Sochinenii K. D. Kavelina.Saint Petersburg: Tipografiya M.M. Stasyulevicha, 1897­1900. 4 vols.Available online at http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003962389#?page=1(vol. 1): http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003962388#?page=1 (vol. 2);http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003962387#?page=1 (vol. 3);http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003962386#?page=1 (vol. 4) (accessed08/01/2012)­KENNAN,George.Telegram,GeorgeKennan toGeorgeMarshall («LongTelegram»), February 22, 1946. Available online athttp://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6­6.pdf(accessed11/27/2015).­KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.PolnoeSobranieSochineniiAlekseyaStepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow: [various printing shops], 1871­1907.8vols.AvailableonlineatVol.1:http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003951147#?page=1 (= vol. 1, 3rd ed.enlarged,UniversitetskayaTipografiya,1900);Vol.2:http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003986832#?page=1 (= vol. 2, 1st ed., tipo­litografiyaKushnerev’,1907);http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003951146#?page=1(vol.2,3rdnonenlargeded.UniversitetskayaTipografiya,1886)Vol.3:http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003832716#?page=1 (= vol. 3, 1st ed., org.Hilferding,TipografiyaBakhmeteva,1871);Vol.4:http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003951144#?page=1 (=vol. 4, 1 st ed.,UniversitetskayaTipografiya,1900);http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003832715#?page=1 (vol 4, 1st ed., org.Hilferding,tipografiyaBakhmeteva,1873)Vol.5:http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005406014#?page=1 (= vol. 5, 1st ed.,UniversitetskayaTipografiya,1900);http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003951136#?page=1 (= vol.5,1st ed.,Tipo­litografiyaKushnerev’,1904)Vol.6:

356

http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005406021#?page=1 (vol. 6, 1st ed., tipo­litografiyaKushnerev’,1904);Vol.7:http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003951141#?page=1 (= vol. 7, 1st ed., tipo­litografiyaKushnerev’,1906);Vol.8:http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003951150#?page=1 (= vol. 8, 1st ed.,UniversitetskayaTipografiya,1900);http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01004049144#?page=1 (=vol.8,1st ed., tipo­litografiyaKushnerev’,1904)­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich.Mnenie Inostrantsev o Rossii. IN:KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii AlekseyaStepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow: [various printing shops], 1871­1907a.8vols.Vol.1,pp.3­30.­KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.MnenieRusskikhobInostrantsev.In:KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii AlekseyaStepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow: [various printing shops], 1871­1907b.8vols.Vol.1,pp.31­72.­KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.Pis’moobAnglii. In:KHOMYAKOV,Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii Alekseya StepanovichaKhomyakova.Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907c.8vols.Vol.1,pp.105­142.­KHOMYAKOV,Aleksei Stepanovich. Po PovoduOtryvkovNaidenykh veBumagakhI.V.Kireevskogo.In:KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.PolnoeSobranie Sochinenii Alekseya Stepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907d.8vols.Vol.1,pp.263­286.­KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.PoPovoduStat’i I.V.Kireevskogo"OKharaktere Prosveshcheniya Evropi i o Ego Otnoshenii kProsveshcheniyuRossii". In:KHOMYAKOV,Aleksei Stepanovich. PolnoeSobranie Sochinenii Alekseya Stepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907e.8vols.Vol.1,pp.197­262.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. K Serbam. Poslanie izMoskvy. In:KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii AlekseyaStepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow: [various printing shops], 1871­1907f.8vols.Vol.1,pp.377­408.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Zapiski o Vsemirnoi Istorii: chast’pervaya. In: KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe SobranieSochineniiAlekseyaStepanovichaKhomyakova.Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907g[1871].8vols.Vol.3.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Zapiski o Vsemirnoi Istorii: chast’vtoraya. In: KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe SobranieSochineniiAlekseyaStepanovichaKhomyakova.Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907h[1873].8vols.Vol.4.

357

­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Zapiski o Vsemirnoi Istorii: chast’tret’ya.In:KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.PolnoeSobranieSochineniiAlekseya Stepanovicha Khomyakova.Moscow: [various printing shops],1871­1907i[1906].8vols.Vol.7.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Tserkov’ Odna. In: KHOMYAKOV,Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii Alekseya StepanovichaKhomyakova.Moscow: [various printing shops], 1871­1907j [1907]. 8vols.Vol.2,pp.3­26.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. O Znachenii Slov "Kafolicheskii" i"Sobornyi". In: KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe SobranieSochineniiAlekseyaStepanovichaKhomyakova.Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907k[1907].8vols.Vol.2,pp.305­314.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Neskol’ko Slov PravoslavnogoKhristianina o Zapadnykh Verospovedaniyakh po Povodu broshyuryGospadina Loransi. In: KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. PolnoeSobranie Sochinenii Alekseya Stepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907L[1886].8vols.Vol.2,pp.27­92.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Opyt Katikhizichskogo IzlozheniyaUcheniyaoTserkvi:TserkovOdna.In:KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.PolnoeSobranieSochineniiAlekseyaStepanovichaKhomyakova.Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907m[1886].8vols.Vol.2,pp.1­26.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Po Povodu Gumbol’dta. In:KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii AlekseyaStepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow: [various printing shops], 1871­1907n[1900].8vols.Vol.1,pp.143­176.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Po Povodu Otryvkov naidenykh vBumagakhI.V.Kireevskogo.In:KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.PolnoeSobranie Sochinenii Alekseya Stepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907o[1900].8vols.Vol.1,pp.263­286.­KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.Pis’mooFilosofiikYu.O.Samarinu.In:KHOMYAKOV,AlekseiStepanovich.PolnoeSobranieSochineniiAlekseyaStepanovicha Khomyakova. Moscow: [various printing shops], 1871­1907p[1900]. 8vols.Vol.1,pp.321­349.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Zapiski o Vsemirnoi Istorii: chast’pervaya. In: KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe SobranieSochineniiAlekseyaStepanovichaKhomyakova.Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907q[1904].8vols.Vol.5.­ KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Zapiski o Vsemirnoi Istorii: chast’vtoraya. In: KHOMYAKOV, Aleksei Stepanovich. Polnoe SobranieSochineniiAlekseyaStepanovichaKhomyakova.Moscow:[variousprintingshops],1871­1907r[1904].8vols.Vol.6.­KIREEVSKII,IvanVasil’evich.PolnoeSobranieSochineniiI.V.Kireevskagov Dvukh Tomakh. Moscow: Tipografiya Imperatorskago Moskovskago

358

Universiteta,1911.2vols.Availableonlineathttp://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01004003655#?page=1 (vol. 1) andhttp://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01004003654#?page=1 (vol. 2). (accessed01/21/2012).­ KIREEVSKII, Ivan Vasil’evich. Dvyatnadtsatii Ve. In: KIREEVSKII, IvanVasil’evich.PolnoeSobranieSochinenii I.V.KireevskagovDvukhTomakh.Moscow:Tipografiya ImperatorskagoMoskovskagoUniversiteta,1911a.Vol.1,pp.85­108.­ KIREEVSKII, Ivan Vasil’evich. Ve Otvete A.S. In: KIREEVSKII, IvanVasil’evich.PolnoeSobranieSochinenii I.V.KireevskagovDvukhTomakh.Moscow:Tipografiya ImperatorskagoMoskovskagoUniversiteta,1911b.Vol.1,pp.109­120.­KIREEVSKII,IvanVasil’evich.OKharaktereProsveshcheniyaEvropi ioEgo Otnoshenii k Prosveshcheniyu Rossii. In: KIREEVSKII, IvanVasil’evich.PolnoeSobranieSochinenii I.V.KireevskagovDvukhTomakh.Moscow:Tipografiya ImperatorskagoMoskovskagoUniversiteta,1911c.Vol.1,pp.174­222.­KIREEVSKII,IvanVasil’evich.ONeobkhodimostiiVozmozhnostiNovikhNachal’ dlya Filosofii. In: KIREEVSKII, Ivan Vasil’evich. Polnoe SobranieSochinenii I.V. Kireevskago v Dvukh Tomakh. Moscou: TipografiyaImperatorskagoMoskovskagoUniversiteta,1911d.Vol.1,pp.223­264.­KIREEVSKII,IvanVasil’evich.NechtooKharakterePoeziiPushkina.In:KIREEVSKII,IvanVasil’evich.PolnoeSobranieSochineniiI.V.KireevskagovDvukh Tomakh. Moscou: Tipografiya Imperatorskago MoskovskagoUniversiteta,1911e.Vol.2,pp.1­13.­ KIREEVSKII, Ivan Vasil’evich. Obozrenie Russkoi Slovesnosti za 1829god. In: KIREEVSKII, Ivan Vasil’evich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii I.V.Kireevskago v Dvukh Tomakh. Moscou: Tipografiya ImperatorskagoMoskovskagoUniversiteta,1911f.Vol.2,pp.14­39.­KOLSTO,Pal.PowerasBurden:TheSlavophileConceptoftheStateandLevTolstoy.RussianReview,vol.64,no.4,pp.559­574,2005.­ KOSTKA, Edmund. A Trailblazer of RussianWesternism. ComparativeLiterature,vol.18,no.3,pp.211­224,Summer1966.­KonstitutsiyaRossiiskoiFederatsii12dekabrya1993g.Availableonlineathttp://www.gov.ru/main/konst/konst0.html(accessed11/23/2015).­ KPRF: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii. ProgrammaKommunisticheskoiPartiiRossiiskoiFederatsii.In:PASHENTSEV,EvgeniiNikolaevich (org.) Oppozitsionnye Partii iDvizheniya Sovremenoi Rossii.Moscow:Informpechat’,1998.Pp.24­40.­ KRYSHTANOVSKAYA, Olga,WHITE, Stephen. Putin’sMilitocracy. Post­SovietAffairs,vol.19,no.4,pp.289­306,Oct.­Dec.2003.­LAGROU,Pieter.De l’ActualitéduTempsPrésent. Bulletinde l’Instituted’Histoire du Temps Présent, no. 25, June 2000. Available online at

359

http://www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/spip.php%3Farticle470&lang=fr.html (accessed01/16/2010).­ LAL, Deepak. Does Modernization Require Westernization? TheIndependentReview,vol.5,no.1,pp.5­24,Summer2000.­ LARUELLE, Marlene. Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2008.­LO,Bobo.RussianForeignPolicyinthePost­SovietRussia:Reality,IllusionandMyth­making.London:Palgrave,2002.­ LO, Bobo. Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy.Oxford:BlackwellPublishingLtd.,2005.­ LUSHNIKOV, Oleg. Evraziiskaya Perspektiva: sovremennye proektystrategicheskogo razvitiya Rossii. Vestnik ChelyabinskogoGosudarstvennogoUniversiteta, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 6­22, 2006. Availableonline at http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evraziyskaya­perspektiva­sovremennye­proekty­strategicheskogo­razvitiya­rossii (accessed12/01/2014).­MaCKENZIE,David, CURRAN,MichaelW. AHistory of Russia and theSovietUnion.Homewood:TheDorseyPress,1982.­MALCOLM,N.,PRAVDA,A.,ALLISON,R.,LIGHT,M. InternalFactors inRussianForeignPolicy.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1996.­MARX,Karl.DasKapital­BandI.In:Marx­EngelsWerke,vol.23.Berlim:Dietz­Verlag,1968.­MAZUREK,Slawomir,TORR,GuyR.RussianEurasianism:HistoriosophyandIdeology.StudiesinEastEuropeanThought,vol.54,no.1/2,pp.105­123,March2002.­McFAUL,Michael.PrecariousPeace:DomesticPolitics intheMakingofRussian Foreign Policy. International Security, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 5­35,Winter1997/1998.­ McFAUL, Michael. The Putin Paradox. Washington, DC: Center forAmerican Progress, June 24, 2004. Available online athttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/06/b99061.html(accessed06/24/2004).­McNALLY,Raymond.AgainstaFriendlyEnemy:IvanKireevskij.StudiesinSovietThought,vol.32,no.4,pp.367­382,Nov.1986.­McNALLY,RaymondT.Chaadaev’sEvaluationofPeter theGreat. SlavicReview,vol.23,no.1,pp.31­44,March1964.­MEARSHEIMER,JohnJ.BacktotheFuture:InstabilityaftertheColdWar.InternationalSecurity,vol.15,no.1,pp.5­56,Summer1990.­MEARSHEIMER,JohnJ.WhytheUkraineCrisisistheWest’sFault:TheLiberalDelusions thatProvokedPutin.ForeignAffairs,vol.93,no.5,pp.77­89,Set./Oct.2014.­ MOORE, David Chioni. Colonialism, Eurasianism, Orientalism: N.S.Trubetzkoi'sRussianVision.TheSlavicandEastEuropeanJournal,vol.41,

360

no.2,pp.321­326,Summer1997.­MOROZOV, V. Resisting Entropy, Discarding Human Rights: RomanticRealismandSecuritizationofIdentityinRussia.CooperationandConflict,vol.37,no.2,pp.409­429,2002.­ MOROZOVA, Natalia. Geopolitics, Eurasianism, and Russian ForeignPolicyUnderPutin.Geopolitics,vol.14,no.4,pp.667­686,2009.­MUSIROVNA,AuanasovaKamilla.PerspektivyiRazvitieIdeiEvraziistvavSovremennoi Istorii Kazkhstana. Ph.D. Dissertation – KazakhskiiNatsional’nyi Pedagogicheskii Universitet im. Abaya. Almaty, 2010.Available online at http://e­history.kz/ru/books/library/read/76#scontent(accessed07/16/2015).­ Na Putyakh. Berlin: Gelinkon, 1922. Available online athttp://nevmenandr.net/eurasia/1922­naputiax.php (accessed09/01/2012).­NARTOV,N.Geopolitika:uchebnikdlyavuzov (Glava5).Availableonlineathttp://www.gumer.info/bibliotek_Buks/Polit/nart/05.php(accessed12/12/1999).­ NAZARBAEV, Nursultan. Evraziiskii Soyuz: idei, praktika, perspektivy,1994­1997. Moscow: Fond Sodestiviya Razvitiyu Sotsial'nykh iPoliticheskikh Nauk, 1997. Available online athttp://personal.akorda.kz/upload/books/644a113d856b9f6c5f5d5944faa850dc.pdf(accessed09/10/2013).­ NAZARBAEV, Nursultan. Strategiya Transformatsiya Obshchestva iVozrozhdeniya Evraziiskoi Tsivilizatsii. Moscow: Ekonomika, 2000.Available online athttp://personal.akorda.kz/upload/books/d6a18360711e2459ab86bc08c6a31b09.pdf(accessed09/10/2013).­NAZARBAEV,Nursultan. Izbrannye Rechi, 1989­1991. Astana: Sayarka,2009. Available online athttp://personal.akorda.kz/upload/books/a68b0562db1b23e55f8d636b3490480c.pdf(accessed10/09/2013).­NAZARBAEV,Nursultan. Izbrannye Rechi, 1991­1995. Astana: Sayarka,2009a. Available online athttp://personal.akorda.kz/upload/books/388fc6caa99afb36c4b9cb89bba091ff.pdf(accessed09/10/2013).­NAZARBAEV,Nursultan. Izbrannye Rechi, 1995­1998. Astana: Sayarka,2009b. Available online athttp://personal.akorda.kz/upload/books/081a115163361fbe46e14cebee343eed.pdf(accessed09/10/2013).­ NIKOLSKY, Aleksey. The Power of the Chekists is increadibly stable.Kommersant­Vlast,no.10,p.42,March19­25,2007.Availableonline athttp://www.wps.ru/en/pp/story/2007/03/22.html (accessed10/11/2007).

361

­ NIYAZOV, Abdul­Vakhed Validovich. Evraziistvo kak Osnova RazvitiyaRossiiskogo Gosudarstva. Available online athttp://old.nasledie.ru/ipravo/20_10/21_2/article.php?art=10 (accessed12/27/2001).­ NOVIKOVA, L.I., SIZEMSKAYA, I.N. Rossiya Mezhdu Evropoi iAziei:EvraziiskiiSoblazn.Moscow:RossiiskayaAkademiyaNauk ­InstitutFilosofii,1993.­OFFICEOFTHEVICEPRESIDENT.RemarksbyVicePresidentBidenat45th Munich Conference on Security Policy. Available online athttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the­press­office/remarks­vice­president­biden­45th­munich­conference­security­policy(accessed12/10/2009).­ O'LOUGHLIN, John. Geopolitical Fantasies and Ordinary Russians:PerceptionandReality in thePost­YeltsinRussia.Paperpresentedat theAnnualMeetingoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers,Pittsburgh,April 6, 2000. Available online athttp://www.colorado.edu/UCB/Research/IBS/PEC/johno/pub/pittsburgh.pdf(accessed12/18/2011).­ ORLOVA, Irina Borisovna. Evraziiskaya Tsivilizatsiya: Sotsial'no­istoricheskayaretrospektivaiperspektiva.Moscow:Norma,1998.­ OSTROW, Joel M., SATAROV, Georgyi, KHAKAMADA, Irina. TheConsolidation ofDictatorship inRussia: an Inside View of theDemise ofDemocracy.Westport:Praeger,2007.­ PANARIN, Aleksandr Sergeevich. Stil’ “Retro” v Ideologii I Politike:kriticheskiiocherkfrantsuzskogoneokonservatizma.Moscou:Mysl’,1989.­PANARIN,AleksandrSergeevich.RevolyutsiaiReformatsiya.Znamya,no.6,1991.­ PANARIN, Aleksandr Sergeevich. Proekt dlya Rossii: fundamental’nyiliberalizmililiberal’nyifundamentalizm.Znamya,n.9,1993.­ PANARIN, Aleksandr Sergeevich.Mezhdu Atlantizmom i Evraziistvom.SvobodnayaMysl’,no.11,1993a.­ PANARIN, Aleksandr Sergeevich. Revansh Istorii: RossiiskayaStrategicheskayaInitsiativavXXIVeke.Moscow:Logos,1998.­ PANARIN, Aleksandr Sergeevich. Global'noe PoliticheskoePrognozirovanie v Usloviyakh Strategicheskoi Nestabil'nosti. Moscow:EditorialURSS,1999.­ PANARIN, Aleksandr Sergeevich. Iskushenie Globalizmom. Moscou:Eksmo­Press,2002.­ PANARIN, Aleksandr Sergeevich. Praavoslavnaya Tsivilizatsiya vGlobal'nomMire.Moscou:Algoritm,2002a.­ PANDEY, Sanjay Kumar. Asia on the Debate on Russian Identity.InternationalStudies,vol.44,no.4,pp.317­337,2007.­ PIIE (PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS).Russian Attitudes toward the West. Available online at

362

http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/4242/07iie4242.pdf(accessed10/11/2009).­POGODIN,MikhailPetrovich.PetrPervyi iNatsional'noeOrganicheskoeRazvitie. Available online athttp://az.lib.ru/p/pogodin_m_p/text_0250.shtml(accessed01/09/2012)­POGODIN,MikhailPetrovich.Paralell'RusskoiIstoriisIstorieiZapadnykhEvropeiskikh gosudarstv Otnositel'no Nachala. Available online athttp://www.portal­slovo.ru/history/39076.php?ELEMENT_ID=39076&PAGEN_2=2(accessed01/09/2012a).­POGODIN,MikhailPetrovich.Istoriko­kriticheskieOtryvki.Moscow:Tip.Avgusta Semena, 1846. Available online athttp://www.dp5.ru/index.php/­2/56662­pogodin­m­istoriko­kriticheskie­otryvki­1846­463­s.html or athttp://books.google.com.mx/books?id=VuEDAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false(accessed01/09/2012b)­ POGODIN, Mikhail Petrovich. Istoricheskie Aforizmy. Moscow:Univesitetskaya Tip., 1836. Available online athttp://books.google.ru/books?id=32w­AAAAYAAJ&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12&dq=%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B5+%D0%B0%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC%D1%8B+%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD&source=bl&ots=u56uyzfmTp&sig=TZtPD5dWASDrxf4IzmHv1Nycj0c&hl=ru&sa=X&ei=88MHT5rDOcTuggeUhuySAg&ved=0CEcQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q&f=false(accessed01/09/2012c)­ POGODIN, Mikhail Petrovich. Petr Velikii. In: POGODIN, MikhailPetrovich. Istoriko­kriticheskie Otryvki. Moscou: Tip. Avgusta Semena,1846. Pp. 335­363. Available online at http://www.dp5.ru/index.php/­2/56662­pogodin­m­istoriko­kriticheskie­otryvki­1846­463­s.html orathttp://books.google.com.mx/books?id=VuEDAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false(accessed01/09/2012d)­PoliticheskayaSistemaRossiiPoslePutinskikhReform.Availableonlineathttp://www.polit.ru/article/2005/01/27/polit_system/ (accessed10/18/2007)­POSPIELOVSKY,Dimitry.AComparativeEnquiry intoNeo­SlavophilismandItsAntecedentsintheRussianHistoryofIdeas.SovietStudies,vol.31,no.3,pp.319­342,July1979.­ Prezident Rossii – Vystupleniya i Stenogrammy. Available online athttp://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts(accessed01/16/2010).

363

­PUCHALA,Donald James.TheoryandHistory inInternationalRelations.London:Routledge,2003.­ PUTIN, Vladimir. Razgovor s Rossiei: stenogramma “Pryamoi Linii sPrezidentom Rossiiskoi Federatsii V.V. Putinym” (Pervyi Kanal, telekanalRossiya,RadioMayak,RadioRossii)19dekabriya2002goda].Moscow:Olma­Politizdat,2003.­ PUTIN, Vladimir. Putinki: Kratkii Sbornik iz Rechii Prezidenta (Pervyisrok).Moscow:EkhoBuk,2004.­ PUTIN,Vladimir. Poslanie PrezidentaRossiiskoi Federatsii Federal’nomySobraniyu:opolozhenii v strane iosnovnikhnapravleniyakh vnutrennei ivneshneipolitikigosudarstva.Moscow:Izvestiya,2007.­RATZEL,Friedrich.StudiesinPoliticalAreasII.Intellectual,PoliticalandEconomicEffectsofLargeAreas.AmericanJournalofSociology,vol.3,no.4,pp.449­463,Jan.1898.­RIASANOVSKY,NicholasV.Russiaand theWest in theTeachingsof theSlavophiles:astudyofromanticideology.Gloucester:PeterSmith,1965.­RICHARDSON,Paul.SolzhenitsynandPutin.Colchester:VermontPublicRadio, 12/11/2007. Available online athttp://www.vpr.net/episode/42353/#(accessed10/10/2009).­ RIVERA, David, RIVERA, Sharon. Putin, the West, and the Roots ofRussian­AmericanCooperation(paperpresentedattheannualmeetingoftheAmericanAssociationfortheAdvancementofSlavicStudies,Toronto,Nov.20­23,2003).­ROUSSO,Henry.L’HistoireduTempsPrésent,VingtAnsAprès.Bulletinde l’Institute d’Histoire du Temps Présent, no. 25, June 2000. Availableonline at http://www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/spip.php%3Farticle471&lang=fr.html(accessed01/16/2010).­ SACHKO, Galina. Predstavlyayu Evraziiskii Razdel Zhurnala. VestnikChelyabinskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 8­13,2002. Available online athttp://www.lib.csu.ru/vch/10/2002_01/vcsu02_01.pdf (accessed01/01/2015)­ SACHS, Jeffrey. What I did in Russia. Available online athttp://jeffsachs.org/2012/03/what­i­did­in­russia/ (accessed12/20/2014).­SAMARIN,YuriiFedorovich.OMneniyakhSovremennika,istoricheskikhi Literaturnikh. In: SAMARIN, Yurii Fedorovich. Sochineniya Yu.F.Samarina.Moscow:TipografiyaA.I.Mamontova,1877.Vol.1,pp.28­108.Available online at http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003890085#?page=1(accessed08/01/2012)­SAMOKHIN,A.V. IstoricheskiiPut’Evraziistvakak Ideino­PoliticheskogoTecheniya.Almanakh“Vostok”,vol.15,no.3,March2004.Availableonlineathttp://www.situation.ru/app/j_art_317.htm(accessed07/17/2015)

364

­ SAVISTSKII, Petr Nikolaevich. Evropa i Evrazia. RusskayaMysl', book1/2, pp. 119­138, 1921. Also available online athttp://nevmenandr.net/eurasia/1921­PNS­eur.php (accessed11/03/2012).­ SAVITSKII, Petr Nikolaevich. Step’ i Osedlost’. In: Na Putyakh. Berlin:Gelinkon, 1922. Pp. 341­355. Also available online athttp://nevmenandr.net/eurasia/1922­naputiax.php (accessed09/01/2012) and also athttp://philosophy.ru/iphras/library/evrasia/index.html#СОДЕРЖАНИЕ(accessed11/02/2012a).­SAVITSKII,PetrNikolaevich.Evraziistvo.EvraziiskiiVremennik,Berlim,Book4,pp.5­26,1925.(Alsoavailable)In:NOVIKOVA,L.I.,SIZEMSKAYA,I.N. Rossiya Mezhdu Evropoi i Aziei:Evraziiskii Soblazn. Moscow:Rossiiskaya Akademiya Nauk, Institut Filosofii, 1993. Pp. 100­123.Available online athttp://philosophy.ru/iphras/library/evrasia/index.html#СОДЕРЖАНИЕ(accessed11/02/2012).­SAVITSKII,PetrNikolaevich.OZadachakhKochevnikoveden'ya(pochemuskify igunnydolzhny byt' interesnydlya russkogo?).Prague:EvraziiskoeKnigoizdatel'stvo, 1928. Also available online athttp://gumilevica.kulichki.net/SPN/spn01.htm(accessed11/12/2012)­ SAVITSKII, Petr Nikolaevich. Geograficheskie i Geopoloticheskie OsnovyEvraziistva,manuscript, 1933. (Also) In: SAVISTSKII, Petr Nikolaevich.KontinentEvrazii(org.AleksandrDugin).Moscow:Agraf,1997.Pp.295­303.Alsoavailableonlineathttp://lib.rus.ec/b/391062/read (accessed11/02/2012).­ SAVITSKII, Petr Nikolaevich. Evraziiskaya Konseptsiya Russkoi Istorii(oralpaper).Warsaw: InternationalHistorians’sCongress,1933. (Also)In:SAVISTSKII,PetrNikolaevich.KontinentEvrazii(org.AleksandrDugin).Moscow: Agraf, 1997. Pp. 123­126. Also available online athttp://lib.rus.ec/b/391062/read(accessed11/02/2012a).­ SAVITSKII, Petr Nikolaevich. Geograficheskie i Geopoloticheskie OsnovyEvraziistva. (manuscript),1933. (Also) In:SAVISTSKII,PetrNikolaevich.KontinentEvrazii(org.AleksandrDugin).Moscow:Agraf,1997.Pp.295­303.Alsoavailableonlineathttp://lib.rus.ec/b/391062/read (accessed11/02/2012b).­SAVISTSKII,PetrNikolaevich.KontinentEvrazii(org.AleksandrDugin).Moscow: Agraf, 1997. Also available online athttp://lib.rus.ec/b/391062/read(accessed11/02/2012).­ SEDGWICK,Mark. Against theModernWorld: Traditionalism and theSecret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century. New York: OxfordUniversityPress,2004.­ SEGRILLO, Angelo. Occidentalisme, Slavophilie et Eurasianisme: Les

365

Intellectuelset lêsHomesPolitiquesà laRecherchedeL’indentitéRusse.In:ModernitésNationales,ModernitésImportées:entreAncienetNouveauMondeXIXe­XXIeSiècle.Paris:L’Harmattan,2012.Pp.47­60.­SEGRILLO,Angelo.OsRussos.SaoPaulo:Contexto,2012a.­SEGRILLO,Angelo.AQuestãodaDemocracianaRússiaPós­soviética.In:Alves, André Augusto deMiranda Pineli (org.) O Renascimento de umaPotência?:ARússianoSéculoXXI.Brasília:IPEA,2012b.Pp.97­128.­SEGRILLO,Angelo.ODeclíniodaUniãoSoviética:umestudodascausas.Curitiba:Prismas,2013.­ SEGRILLO, Angelo. Ásia e Europa em ComparaçãoHistórica: o debateentreeurocentrismoeasiocentrismonahistóriaeconômicacomparadadeÁsiaeEuropa.Curitiba:Prismas,2014.­SEGRILLO,Angelo.DeGorbachevaPutin:asagadaRússiadosocialismoaocapitalismo.Curitiba:Prismas,2014a.­SEGRILLO,Angelo.TabeladePatentesdePedro,oGrande.In:SEGRILLO,Angelo(org.)Rússia,OntemeHoje.SaoPaulo:FFLCH/USP,2016.Pp.139­149.­SEGRILLO,Angelo.AFirstCompleteTranslationintoEnglishofPetertheGreat’sOriginalTableofRanks:ObservationsontheOccurrenceofaBlackHole in the Translation of RussianHistoricalDocuments. LEAWorkingPapers Series, n. 1, Nov. 2016a. Available online at:http://lea.vitis.uspnet.usp.br/arquivos/arttableofrankslea.pdf­ SHAIMIEV, Mintimer Sharipovich. Vystuplenie Prezidenta RespublikiTatarstanMintimeraShaimievanaMezhdunarodnoiNauchnoiKonferentsii"Idei Evraziistva vNauchnomNasledii L.N. Gumileva.Available online athttp://kitaphane.tatarstan.ru/rus/gumilev/shaimiev.htm (accessed08/07/2004).­ SHCHERBATOV,MikhailMikhailovich.OPovrezhdeniiNravov vRossiii.Moscow: Werden­Verlag, 2001. Available online athttp://imwerden.de/pdf/scherbatow_o_nrawach.pdf (accessed12/30/2011)­ SHCHERBATOV,MikhailMikhailovich. Primernoe Vremyaischisletel’noePolozhenie, voskol’koLet,priBlagopoluchneishikhObstoyatel’stvakhmoglaby Rossiya Sama Soboi, bez samovlastiya Petra Velikogo, doiti do Togosostoyaniya,vkakomOnanyneest’vRassuzhdeniiProsveshcheniyaiSlavy.Available online at http://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01003542526#?page=1(accessed12/31/2011)­ SHEKHOVTSOV, Anton. The Palingenetic Thrust of Russian Neo­Eurasianism: Ideas of Rebirth in Aleksander Dugin’s Worldview.TotalitarianMovementsandPoliticalReligions,vol.9,no.4,pp.491­506,2008.­SHEKHOVTSOV,Anton.AleksanderDugin’s Neo­Eurasianism:TheNewRight à la russe. Religion Compass, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 697­716, 2009.

366

Available online at http://www.mod­langs.ox.ac.uk/russian/nationalism/shekhovtsov2.html (accessed07/01/2015)­ SHEKHOVTSOV, Anton, UMLAND, Andreas. Is Aleksandr Dugin aTraditionalist?“Neo­Eurasianism”andPerennialPhilosophy.TheRussianReview,no.68,pp.662­678,October2009.­ SHEVYREV, Stepan Petrovich. Vzglyad Russkogo Na SovremennoeObrazovanie Evropy. Available (in two parts) online athttp://pstgu.ru/download/1191321476.shevyrev.pdf andhttp://pstgu.ru/download/1205341736.shevyrev.pdf (accessed01/08/2012).­ SHLAPENTOKH,Dmitry.RossiiskayaVneshnyaya Politika iEvraziistvoNewYork:OpenSocietyInstitute(Eurasianet.org),10/062005.Availableonline athttp://www.eurasianet.org/russian/departments/insight/articles/eav090605ru.shtml(accessed10/10/2005).­SHLAPENTOKH,Dmitry.DuginEurasianism:aWindowontheMindsoftheRussianEliteor an IntellectualPloy?StudEastEurThought,vol.59,pp.215­236,2007.­ SHPIL’KIN, Yurii. Neoevraziistvo. Available online athttp://www.proza.ru/2012/06/23/557(accessed12/01/2012)­SOMERVILLE,John.SomePerspectivesonRussiaandtheWestfromtheHistoryofRussianPhilosophy.PhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch,vol.13,no.3,pp.324­336,March1953.­SPILDBOEL­HANSEN,F.Russia’sRelationswiththeEU:aConstructivistCut.InternationalPolitics,vol.39,no.4,pp.399­421,2002.­ SUKHORUKOVA, Ol’ga Aleksandrovna. Formirovanie KontseptsiiGosudarstvavo VzglyadakhEvraziitsev:1920­30­egg.(Ph.D.Dissertation)Tver: Moskovskii Gosudarstvennyi Institut Elektronnoi Tekhniki, 2004.Available online at http://www.dissercat.com/content/formirovanie­kontseptsii­gosudarstva­vo­vzglyadakh­evraziitsev­1920­30­e­gg(accessed11/12/2012).­TIKUNOV,VladimirS.,CHRESHNYA,OlgaYu.TheGeographicalSizeofaCountry andMethods for its Calculation andMapping. In: BANDROVA,Temenoujka, KONECNY, Milan, ZLATANOVA, Sisi (eds.) ThematicCartographyfortheSociety.Berlin:Springer­Verlag,2014.Pp.131­140.­ TIKUNOVA, M.F. et al. On Eurasia and the Eurasians. Petrozavoksk:Petrozavodsk University Press, 1997. Available online athttp://www.petrsu.ru/Chairs/Archiv/BIBLENG.RTF (accessed11/12/2012).­ TITARENKO, Mikhail Leont’evich. Rossiya Litsom K Azii. Moscow:Respublika,1998.­ TORBAKOV, Igor. Understanding Classical Eurasianism. In: OLDBERG,

367

Ingmar (org.) Sven Hedin and Eurasia: Knowledge, Adventure andGeopolitics (Proceedings of a Symposium in Stockholm, 10 November2007). Stockholm, Östbulletinen, 2008. Pp. 35­43. Available online athttp://www.academia.edu/253237/Sven_Hedin_and_Eurasia (accessed11/11/2012).­ TRENIN, Dmitri. The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border betweenGeopoliticsandGlobalization.Moscow:CarnegieMoscowCenter,2001.­TRENIN,Dmitri.PirouttesandPriorities:DistillingaPutinDoctrine.TheNational Interest, Winter 2003. Available online athttp://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_74/ai_112411721/?tag=content;col1(accessed12/19/2011)­TRENIN,Dmitri.WelcometoColdWarII.ForeignPolicy,March4,2014.Available online at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/04/welcome­to­cold­war­ii/(accessed11/26/2014).­ TRUBETSKOI, Nikolai Sergeevich. Evropa i Chelovechstvo. Sofia:Rossiisko­bolgarskoe Knigoizdatel’stvo, 1920. Also available online athttp://oboguev.tripod.com/nstev.htm(accessed08/31/2012)­ TRUBETSKOI, Nikolai Sergeevich. Ob Istinnom i LozhnomNatsionalizme. In: Izkhod k Vostoku. Sofia: Rossiisko­BolgarskoeKnigoizdatel’stvo, 1921. Pp. 71­85. Also Available online athttp://philosophy.ru/iphras/library/evrasia/trub.html (accessed10/09/2012a).­ TRUBETSKOI, Nikolai Sergeevich. O Turanskom Elemente v RusskoiKul'ture. [Originally] In: Evraziiskii Vremennik – Kniga 4. Berlim:Evraziiskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 1925. Pp. 351­377. [Also] In:NOVIKOVA, L.I., SIZEMSKAYA, I.N. Rossiya Mezhdu Evropoi iAziei:Evraziiskii Soblazn.Moscow:RossiiskayaAkademiyaNauk, InstitutFilosofii, 1993. Pp. 59­89. Available online athttp://philosophy.ru/iphras/library/evrasia/index.html#СОДЕРЖАНИЕ(accessed10/09/2012b).­ TRUBETSKOI, Nikolai Sergeevich. Obshchevraziiskii. EvraziiskayaKhronika, Paris, no. 9, pp. 24­31, 1927. [Also] In: NOVIKOVA, L.I.,SIZEMSKAYA, I.N. Rossiya Mezhdu Evropoi i Aziei:Evraziiskii Soblazn.Moscow: Rossiiskaya Akademiya Nauk, Institut Filosofii, 1993. Pp. 90­105. Available online athttp://philosophy.ru/iphras/library/evrasia/index.html#СОДЕРЖАНИЕ(accessed10/08/2009).­TRUBETSKOI,NikolaiSergeevich.MyiDrugie.In:EvraziiskiiVremennik–Kniga4.Berlim:EvraziiskoeKnizhnoe Izdatel’stvo,1925a. Pp.66­82.[Also] In: NOVIKOVA, L.I., SIZEMSKAYA, I.N. RossiyaMezhdu Evropoi iAziei:Evraziiskii Soblazn.Moscow:RossiiskayaAkademiyaNauk, InstitutFilosofii, 1993. Pp. 77­97. Available online athttp://philosophy.ru/iphras/library/evrasia/index.html#СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

368

(accessed10/09/2012c).­TSYGANKOV,AndreiP.Russia’sForeignPolicy:ChangeandContinuityinNationalIdentity.Lanham:Rowman&Littlefield,2006.­ TSYGANKOV, Andrei P. Finding a Civilizational Idea: “West”, “Eurasia”and “Euro­East” inRussia’sForeignPolicy.Geopolitics,vol.12,no.3,pp.375­399,2007.­ TSYGANKOV, Andrei P. Aleksandr Panarin kak Zerkalo RossiiskoiRevoliyutsii. Ideologia i Politika, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 4­36, 2013. Availableonline athttp://ideopol.org/sites/default/files/ideopol.org/www/sites/default/files/3/___3.1.%20Tsygankov%20Panarin%20RUS.pdf (accessed08/22/2013)­ TSYGANKOV, Andrei P. Contested Identity and Foreign Policy:Interpreting Russia’s International Choices. International StudiesPerspectives,no.15,pp.19­35,2014.­TSYGANKOV,AndreiP.&TSYGANKOV,PavelA.NationalIdeologyandIRTheory: Three Incarnations of the “Russian Idea”. European Journal ofInternationalRelations,vol.16,no.4,pp.663­686,December2010.­UMLAND,Andreas.DuginkeinFaschist?EineErwiderunganProfessorA.JamesGregor.Erwägen,Wissen,Ethik,vol.16,no.4,pp.424­429,2005.­ UMLAND, Andreas. Fascist Tendencies in Russian PoliticalEstablishment: The Rise of the International Eurasian Movement.Available online at http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/88134(accessed07/07/2015)­ Utverzhdenie Levikh Evraziitsev. Krasnaya Evraziya, 2003. Availableonlineathttp://redeurasia.narod.ru/(accessed07/18/2015)­ UVAROV, Sergei Semenovich. Doklady Ministra NarodnogoProsveshcheniyaS.S.Uvarova ImperatoryNicolayu I. Availableonlineathttp://krotov.info/acts/19/1830/1833119.html(accessed01/03/2012)­ WALICKI, Andrzej. A History of Russian Thought: From theEnlightenmenttoMarxism.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1979.­WALICKI,Andrzej.TheSlavophileControversy:HistoryofaConservativeUtopiainNineteenth­CenturyRussianThought.NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1989.­WIECLAWSKI, Jacek.ContemporaryRealismand theForeignPolicyofthe Russian Federation. International Journal of Business and SocialScience, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 170­178, Jan. 2011. Available online athttp://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._1;_January_2011/16.pdf(accessed11/25/2015).­WORLD BANK. Russian Federation: reducing poverty through growthandsocialpolicyreform.Washington,DC:WorldBank,February8,2005.­WORLDBANKRUSSIACOUNTRYOFFICE.RussianEconomicReportNo.17.Moscow:WorldBankRussiaCountryOffice,2008.

369

­ WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK [International Monetary Fundperiodical],variousissues­WORTMAN,Richard.Koshelev,Samarin,andCherkasskyandtheFateofLiberalSlavophilism.SlavicReview,vol.21,no.2,pp.261­279,June1962.­YELTSIN,Boris.AgainsttheGrain:anAutobiography.NewYork:SummitBooks,1990.­YELTSIN,Boris.ZapiskiPrezidenta.Moscow:Ogonek,1994.­YELTSIN,Boris.MinhaLutapelaRússia:odiáriodeBorisYeltsin.RiodeJaneiro:Record,1994a.­YELTSIN,Boris.TheStruggleforRussia.NewYork:TimesBooks,1995.­YELTSIN,Boris.MidnightDiaries.NewYork:PublicAffairs,2000.­ YELTSIN, Boris. Prezidentskii Marafon: razmyshleniya, vospominaniya,vpechateleniya.Moscow:Ast,2000a.­ZALESSKII,B.L.KontseptsiiSovremennogoEvraziistva.Availableonlineathttp://www.businessnews.by/index.php/journalism/lektsii/369­zalesskij­bl­kontseptsii­sovremennogo­evrazijstva­2011 andhttp://archive­by.com/page/2518807/2013­07­29/http://businessnews.by/index.php/journalism/lektsii/369­zalesskij­bl­kontseptsii­sovremennogo­evrazijstva­2011(accessed12/12/2011)­ ZIMMERMAN, William. Slavophiles and Westernizers Redux:ContemporaryRussianElitePerspectives.Washington,NCEEER,2006.­ZYUGANOV,Gennady.MyRussia:ThePoliticalAutobiographyofGennadyZyuganov.Armonk:M.E.Sharpe,1997.