University of Glasgow

Russia, America &the Cold War, 1949-1991 by Martin McCauleyReview by: Vojtech MastnyEurope-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 5 (Jul., 1999), pp. 900-901Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/153868 .

Accessed: 25/06/2014 02:02

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and University of Glasgow are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Europe-Asia Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.78.43 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 02:02:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

REVIEWS REVIEWS

simple conclusions from history. The break-up of the Soviet Union radically changed Russia, and there are too many variables which form foreign policy. They find that domestic politics today play a much larger role in Russian foreign policy making than ever before. In fragmented and pluralist Russia foreign policy emerges from the interaction of decision makers with different personal and institutional perspectives. Russia's geopolitical realities are different today as its boundaries are pushed back from those of tsarist and Soviet times. This 'shrunken' Russia is much to the concern of the Russian political elite and is a prevalent issue in domestic debate. There is widespread awareness of Russia's economic and military weakness and the importance of international co-operation and a stable international environment for Russia to recover economically, but the struggle for power at the top continues.

The authors claim that the structure of the international system continues to be the crucial factor to explain Russian foreign policy and the confines of its policy today. The international system is again multipolar even if the USA remains its strongest player, and the multipolar system encourages a Russian balance-of-power policy.

The authors do not discuss different options for a Russian balance-of-power policy in terms of which states will constitute partners and which will not. They make a general conclusion from tsarist and Soviet policy, that Russia, when faced with a stalemate in relation to the West, turns instead to the East. It is an open question, which bedfellows Russia will choose in the future in order to promote its interests in a balance-of-power policy. The authors point to recent frictions in Russia's relations with the West because of differing policies over Iraq and Kosovo. Yet, the authors conclude, these contradictions are small compared to the 'larger forces at work', which so far have produced more international co-operation between Russia and the West than at any previous time during the last century.

Donaldson and Nogee have produced a thought-provoking exposd of Russia's long history but could have been more brave in the analysis of Russia today and the discussion of the prospects for the future. The analysis of present-day Russia is not made on the same level of analysis and generalisation as earlier chapters. The authors stress that no predictions can be made with regard to what policy would follow from periods of weakness. However, in Russian history periods of weakness have been succeeded by periods of strength, periods of contraction by periods of expansion. Geopolitical factors have from time to time created a push toward the sea and toward creating safe buffer zones along the borders. To the reader it would therefore have been interesting to have the prospects for future policy discussed also in the context of these 'eternal' questions of possible cycles in Russian history in order to get a better understanding of what would make a future economically recovered and military strong Russia remain a partner to the West.

Swedish Institute of International Affairs LENA JONSON

Martin McCauley, Russia, America & the Cold War, 1949-1991. London & New York: Longman, 1998, v + 154 pp. ?6.75 p/b.

DOING JUSTICE TO A TOPIC as complex and contentious as the Cold War in a hundred pages is

possible but difficult. In trying to overcome the difficulty, the author of this book would have done better to be guided less by anger at Western statesmanship (as epitomised by the anti-American cartoon by the notorious Soviet outfit Kukryniksy adorning the cover) and more by balanced use of the copious new evidence, as is common among historians of the younger generation. McCauley's frame of reference is still essentially that of the 1970s and 1980s, while new sources are largely confined to those collected by the Russian dissident polemicist Vladimir Bukovsky during his initial exploration of former Soviet archives.

simple conclusions from history. The break-up of the Soviet Union radically changed Russia, and there are too many variables which form foreign policy. They find that domestic politics today play a much larger role in Russian foreign policy making than ever before. In fragmented and pluralist Russia foreign policy emerges from the interaction of decision makers with different personal and institutional perspectives. Russia's geopolitical realities are different today as its boundaries are pushed back from those of tsarist and Soviet times. This 'shrunken' Russia is much to the concern of the Russian political elite and is a prevalent issue in domestic debate. There is widespread awareness of Russia's economic and military weakness and the importance of international co-operation and a stable international environment for Russia to recover economically, but the struggle for power at the top continues.

The authors claim that the structure of the international system continues to be the crucial factor to explain Russian foreign policy and the confines of its policy today. The international system is again multipolar even if the USA remains its strongest player, and the multipolar system encourages a Russian balance-of-power policy.

The authors do not discuss different options for a Russian balance-of-power policy in terms of which states will constitute partners and which will not. They make a general conclusion from tsarist and Soviet policy, that Russia, when faced with a stalemate in relation to the West, turns instead to the East. It is an open question, which bedfellows Russia will choose in the future in order to promote its interests in a balance-of-power policy. The authors point to recent frictions in Russia's relations with the West because of differing policies over Iraq and Kosovo. Yet, the authors conclude, these contradictions are small compared to the 'larger forces at work', which so far have produced more international co-operation between Russia and the West than at any previous time during the last century.

Donaldson and Nogee have produced a thought-provoking exposd of Russia's long history but could have been more brave in the analysis of Russia today and the discussion of the prospects for the future. The analysis of present-day Russia is not made on the same level of analysis and generalisation as earlier chapters. The authors stress that no predictions can be made with regard to what policy would follow from periods of weakness. However, in Russian history periods of weakness have been succeeded by periods of strength, periods of contraction by periods of expansion. Geopolitical factors have from time to time created a push toward the sea and toward creating safe buffer zones along the borders. To the reader it would therefore have been interesting to have the prospects for future policy discussed also in the context of these 'eternal' questions of possible cycles in Russian history in order to get a better understanding of what would make a future economically recovered and military strong Russia remain a partner to the West.

Swedish Institute of International Affairs LENA JONSON

Martin McCauley, Russia, America & the Cold War, 1949-1991. London & New York: Longman, 1998, v + 154 pp. ?6.75 p/b.

DOING JUSTICE TO A TOPIC as complex and contentious as the Cold War in a hundred pages is

possible but difficult. In trying to overcome the difficulty, the author of this book would have done better to be guided less by anger at Western statesmanship (as epitomised by the anti-American cartoon by the notorious Soviet outfit Kukryniksy adorning the cover) and more by balanced use of the copious new evidence, as is common among historians of the younger generation. McCauley's frame of reference is still essentially that of the 1970s and 1980s, while new sources are largely confined to those collected by the Russian dissident polemicist Vladimir Bukovsky during his initial exploration of former Soviet archives.

900 900

This content downloaded from 62.122.78.43 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 02:02:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

REVIEWS REVIEWS

In the few instances where up-to-date scholarship is taken into account, such as in the discussion of the second Berlin crisis, the resulting picture is convincing. But elsewhere, notably in interpreting the origins of the Korean War as a 'civil war' (p. 17), it is vintage revisionism showing no familiarity with the Soviet management of the campaign as docu- mented during the past few years. The description of the deployment of SS-20 missiles as Moscow's alleged 'response' (p. 56) to Helmut Schmidt's acceptance of Carter's concept of SALT II ignores contrary testimony by Soviet insiders. Neither does the view of the 1986 US raid on Libya as a 'response' (p. 68) to Gorbachev's readiness to withdraw from Afghanistan reveal any but arbitrary causality.

This is an opinionated book par excellence. McCauley professes to know that Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was 'not against nuclear war per se' (p. 58)-a presumptive attitude which makes even Stalin look good by comparison. Wishing only the peaceful reconstruction and development of his country, we are told, the Soviet leader 'was being forced to invest more and more in security' (p. 20) because of the West's behaviour. The same shaky grasp of Soviet realities permeates the judgment that 'Johnson, Nixon, Reagan and Bush became as deceitful as any Russian ruler' (p. 98)-a comparison that any Russian historian today, as indeed anyone capable of reading Russian sources, would receive only with a smile.

Taking extensive excursions to the Cold War's Third World battlefields, the book skirts much of Eastern Europe-the region of overriding Soviet concern, where the conflict began and ended. Ignoring Solidarity altogether, it never explains why martial law was imposed in Poland in 1981 and with what results. But precious space is wasted on describing how Eduard Shevardnadze cut a dashing figure when donning a ten-gallon hat and cowboy boots during his American visit.

In a book attempting to synthesise, conciseness requires precision. It is perhaps not so important that it was Gerald Ford rather than Henry Kissinger who decided to drop the word 'detente' in 1976. But referring to the 1955 Austrian settlement as the conclusion of a 'peace treaty' (p. 24) is missing the very essence of that country's neutrality established by the State Treaty. And offering as desultory a definition of the IMF as 'an international body concerned with macroeconomics' is not of much use to the potential student reader (p. 84).

The concluding chapter, grandly entitled 'The Twentieth Century: An Overview' (p. 88), abounds in simplifications dispensed with an air of breezy superiority. Nowhere is this more evident than in the confused explanation of what 'can also be called the security dilemma' (p. 94). The overview ends with the bizarre assertion that the current division of the world between 'those who pollute most, led again by the US, and the rest' is as severe as its Cold War division used to be. There follows the fatuous conclusion that 'the world is always divided' (p. 103). After studying the Cold War for 10 years following its end, we can certainly do better.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC VOJTECH MASTNY

Ian D. Thatcher (ed.), Regime and Society in Twentieth-Century Russia. Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995. Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St Martin's Press, 1999, xi + 266 pp., $45.00 h/b.

IN THIS VOLUME Ian Thatcher has divided 11 selections from the 1995 Warsaw congress into four unequal parts: 1. Conceptualising Regime and Society; 2. Constitutionalism in Twentieth- Century Russia; 3. Lenin and the Bolsheviks: A Conscious Dictatorship; and 4. Intellectuals and Regime in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia. As is inevitable in collections of this sort, the

In the few instances where up-to-date scholarship is taken into account, such as in the discussion of the second Berlin crisis, the resulting picture is convincing. But elsewhere, notably in interpreting the origins of the Korean War as a 'civil war' (p. 17), it is vintage revisionism showing no familiarity with the Soviet management of the campaign as docu- mented during the past few years. The description of the deployment of SS-20 missiles as Moscow's alleged 'response' (p. 56) to Helmut Schmidt's acceptance of Carter's concept of SALT II ignores contrary testimony by Soviet insiders. Neither does the view of the 1986 US raid on Libya as a 'response' (p. 68) to Gorbachev's readiness to withdraw from Afghanistan reveal any but arbitrary causality.

This is an opinionated book par excellence. McCauley professes to know that Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was 'not against nuclear war per se' (p. 58)-a presumptive attitude which makes even Stalin look good by comparison. Wishing only the peaceful reconstruction and development of his country, we are told, the Soviet leader 'was being forced to invest more and more in security' (p. 20) because of the West's behaviour. The same shaky grasp of Soviet realities permeates the judgment that 'Johnson, Nixon, Reagan and Bush became as deceitful as any Russian ruler' (p. 98)-a comparison that any Russian historian today, as indeed anyone capable of reading Russian sources, would receive only with a smile.

Taking extensive excursions to the Cold War's Third World battlefields, the book skirts much of Eastern Europe-the region of overriding Soviet concern, where the conflict began and ended. Ignoring Solidarity altogether, it never explains why martial law was imposed in Poland in 1981 and with what results. But precious space is wasted on describing how Eduard Shevardnadze cut a dashing figure when donning a ten-gallon hat and cowboy boots during his American visit.

In a book attempting to synthesise, conciseness requires precision. It is perhaps not so important that it was Gerald Ford rather than Henry Kissinger who decided to drop the word 'detente' in 1976. But referring to the 1955 Austrian settlement as the conclusion of a 'peace treaty' (p. 24) is missing the very essence of that country's neutrality established by the State Treaty. And offering as desultory a definition of the IMF as 'an international body concerned with macroeconomics' is not of much use to the potential student reader (p. 84).

The concluding chapter, grandly entitled 'The Twentieth Century: An Overview' (p. 88), abounds in simplifications dispensed with an air of breezy superiority. Nowhere is this more evident than in the confused explanation of what 'can also be called the security dilemma' (p. 94). The overview ends with the bizarre assertion that the current division of the world between 'those who pollute most, led again by the US, and the rest' is as severe as its Cold War division used to be. There follows the fatuous conclusion that 'the world is always divided' (p. 103). After studying the Cold War for 10 years following its end, we can certainly do better.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC VOJTECH MASTNY

Ian D. Thatcher (ed.), Regime and Society in Twentieth-Century Russia. Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995. Basingstoke: Macmillan and New York: St Martin's Press, 1999, xi + 266 pp., $45.00 h/b.

IN THIS VOLUME Ian Thatcher has divided 11 selections from the 1995 Warsaw congress into four unequal parts: 1. Conceptualising Regime and Society; 2. Constitutionalism in Twentieth- Century Russia; 3. Lenin and the Bolsheviks: A Conscious Dictatorship; and 4. Intellectuals and Regime in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia. As is inevitable in collections of this sort, the

901 901

This content downloaded from 62.122.78.43 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 02:02:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions