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Russia

A concise but extraordinarily rich survey of Russian politics in the twentieth centuryfocusing on the problem of state development in all its aspects territorial, institu-tional, economic, cultural and geopolitical. An outstanding synoptic study and theo-retically challenging analysis of the challenges facing Russia as it enters the twenty-first century: rich in detail and firmly located in the literature of comparative politics,the book is ideal both for newcomers to the field and for those looking for an orginalinterpretation of Russias evolution.

Professor Richard Sakwa, The University of Kent at Canterbury

A thoughtful analysis, and one that offers us a novel interpretation in terms of theproblem of the Russian state.

Professor Stephen White, University of Glasgow

A very useful analysis of the problems of the contemporary Russian state. In an agewhen globalisation is the main focus in academe, it is very useful to have a reminder ofthe continuing significance of the state, along with an assessment of the problemspertaining to the Russian case.

Associate Professor Peter Shearman, University of Melbourne

Over the last hundred years, Russia has undergone a succession of failed projects ofstate construction from Tsarist modernization to Soviet state socialism to liberaldemocratic market capitalism. This new book introduces these vastly different pro-jects, and explains their failure in order to illuminate the common problems of balan-cing social and economic transformation with political stability that Russias rulershave faced during the twentieth century.

Russia: a state of uncertainty traces Russias complex historical development in the lastcentury, as well as its recent political troubles and economic misfortunes, and its placein the contemporary international system. Providing up-to-date information onRussian political developments, including the elections of 1999 and 2000, NeilRobinson assesses the chances of success of future projects of political and economicreconstruction. Written in a clear and accessible way, this book will be an invaluabletext for students learning about Russia for the first time, as well as anyone interested inthe state and history of Russia.

Neil Robinson is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Limerick. His writingincludes: Ideology and the Collapse of the Soviet System; he is the co-author of Post-Communist Politics: An introduction and edited Institutions and Change in Russian Politics.

Postcommunist States and Nations

Books in the series

Belarus: a denationalised nationDavid R. Marples

Armenia: at the crossroadsJoseph R. Masih and Robert O. Krikorian

Poland: the conquest of historyGeorge Sanford

Kyrgyzstan: Central Asias island of democracy?John Anderson

Ukraine: movement without change, change without movementMarta Dyczok

The Czech Republic: a nation of velvetRick Fawn

Uzbekistan: transition to authoritarianism on the silk roadNeil J. Melvin

Romania: the unfinished revolutionSteven D. Roper

Bulgaria: the uneven transitionVesselin Dimitrov

Lithuania: stepping westwardThomas Lane

Latvia: the challenges of changeArtis Pabriks and Aldis Purs

Estonia: independence and European integrationDavid J. Smith

Russia: a state of uncertaintyNeil Robinson

RussiaA state of uncertainty

Neil Robinson

London and New York

First published 2002 by Routledge11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

# 2002 Neil Robinson

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted orreproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,or other means, now known or hereafter invented, includingphotocopying and recording, or in any information storage orretrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataRobinson, Neil, 1964Russia: a state of uncertainty/Neil Robinson.p.cm(Postcommunist states and nations)

Includes bibliographical references and index.1. Soviet UnionPolitics and governing 2. Russia (Federation)Politics and government19913. Russia (Federation)Economicconditions1991 I. Title II. Series.DK266.R57 2002947dc21

2001041989

ISBN 0-415-27113-4 (pbk)ISBN 0-415-27112-6

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

ISBN 0-203-40288-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-40928-0 (Adobe eReader Format)

For Maura

Contents

List of tables ixChronology: Russias twentieth century xPreface and acknowledgements xxivMap of Russia xxvii

1 Introduction: strong states, weak states and the Russian

problem 1

2 The limits of absolutism: Tsarism and Soviet socialism 19

The failure of the Tsarist state 20

The formation of the Soviet system, 19171953 31

The decline of the Soviet system: the diminishing capacity, autonomy and

organizational integrity of an absolutist-bureaucratic state, 19531985 43

Perestroika, the end of the USSR and the re-emergence of Russia 53

Conclusion 63

3 Russian politics under Boris Yeltsin: democratic hopes

versus political fragmentation 69

Creating the fault-lines of Russian politics: the foundation of the Russian

presidency 72

The fault-lines exposed: surviving the constitutional conflict, weakening

reform, 19911993 75

Politics under the new Constitution, 19931996: more of the same 81

The endgame of Yeltsinism, 19961999 90

Conclusion 97

4 From planned economy to virtual economy: the failure

of economic transformation 102

Problems and promises: Soviet legacies and the grand designs of

shock therapy 103

The failure of economic reform, 19921994: opposition versus credible

commitment 110

Banks, bonds and state bankruptcy: from the crash of 1994 to the crash of

1998 114

Conclusion: after August 1998 the crash that never happened and Yeltsins

economic legacy 124

5 The politics of faded grandeur: Russias new international

relations 132

After globalism: from confrontation to co-operation to divergence with

the West 135

After empire: Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States 145

Conclusion 155

6 Conclusion: a state of uncertainty Russia between the

past and the future 159

Select bibliography 177

Index 181

viii Contents

Tables

1.1 State formations and their characteristics 52.1 Selected indicators from the first five-year plan 382.2 Soviet economic growth rate, 19651985 512.3 Selected Soviet economic statistics, 19871991 613.1 The 1993 Duma elections 843.2 The 1995 Duma elections 853.3 The Russian presidential election of 1996: opinion polls and

results 883.4 Party list vote in 1995 Duma elections, voting intentions for

the 1999 elections, election results for 1999 954.1 Selected economic indicators, 19921998 1154.2 After the crash: selected economic indicators, 19982000 1266.1 Trust in the institutions of Russian government, 19932000 1666.2 The Putin election 1696.3 Parties and deputies factions in the Duma elected in

December 1999 170

Chronology

Russias twentieth century

1903 July: Russian Social Democratic Labour Party splitsand the Bolshevik faction under Leninsleadership is created

1904 January: Russo-Japanese war begins1905 January: Bloody Sunday massacre sparks revolution

October: General strike; Tsar issues October manifestopromising moderate political reform

December: Armed suppression of revolution in Moscow1906 April: First Duma opens

July: First Duma dissolvedNovember: Stolypin decree on agricultural reform issued

1907 FebruaryJune: Second Duma convenedNovember: Third Duma convened

1911 September: Stolypin assassinated1914 August: World War I begins1915 September: Nicholas II dissolves the Duma and takes over

personal responsibility for Russias war effort1916 December: Murder of Rasputin1917 February: Riots and rebellion in Petrograd; Soviets formed

March: Nicholas II abdicates; power is transferred tothe Provisional Government; period of dualpower begins

April: Lenin returns to Russia and calls for theradicalization of the revolution

May: Provisional Government becomes a coalition ofmoderate socialists and conservatives

July: A failed Russian offensive against the Germansleads to the rebellion in Petrograd; Kerenskyreplaces Prince Lvov as Prime Minister;Bolsheviks are suppressed and Lenin goes intohiding

September: Kornilov uprising and fear of counter-revolutionleads to the unbanning of the Bolsheviks;

Bolsheviks win majorities in Moscow andPetrograd Soviets

October: (November by new calendar) Bolshevik uprisingin Petrograd, declaration of Soviet power

November: Elections to Constituent AssemblyDecember: Negotiations begin between the Bolsheviks and

Germany on armistice; Cheka (secret police)established; Civil war begins in earnest

1918 January: Constituent Assembly dissolved by Bolsheviks;creation of Red Army

March: Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ends war with Germany;British troops land at Murmansk as part of aloose anti-Soviet coalition, to be followed by theFrench, the Japanese, and the Americans

June: Industry nationalizedJuly: Tsar and royal family murdered in

Ekaterinburg; Social Revolutionaries try tooverthrow Bolsheviks

September: Declaration of Red TerrorNovember: End of World War I

1919 January: Comintern founded to promote internationalrevolution

March: Kolchak offensive against Bolsheviks; creation ofPolitburo

June: Denikin offensive against BolsheviksOctober: White forces threaten Petrograd and Orel

1920 April: Poland invadesAugust: Red Army defeated at Warsaw; peasant

rebellion breaks out against Bolsheviks inTambov

November: Red Army defeats Whites in the South to endthe main campaigns of the Civil War

1921 March: Revolt against Bolsheviks at Kronstadt; 10thParty Congress adopts New Economic Policy(NEP) and bans factional activity in the party

Summer: Famine begins1922 April: Stalin becomes General Secretary of the

Communist PartyMay: Lenin has a strokeDecember: Declaration of the formation of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics1923 March: Lenin incapacitated by another stroke; Trotsky

fails to press Lenins criticisms of Stalin at 12thParty Congress

July: First Soviet Constitution published

Chronology xi

Summer: Economic crisis1924 January: Lenin dies; Petrograd renamed Leningrad

November: Trotsky publicly attacks Stalins allies, Zinovievand Kamenev

1925 January: Trotsky dismissed from post as Commissar forWar

April: 14th Party Congress accepts Stalins idea ofbuilding socialism in one country

1926 October: Trotsky dismissed from Politburo1927 Autumn: Start of grain procurement crisis as collection of

grain from the peasantry fallsDecember: 15th Party Congress resolves to collectivise

agriculture1928 January: Stalin urges forced collection of grain from

peasantryMay: Show trial of bourgeois specialists accused of

Anti-Soviet activitiesAugust: Announcement of first five-year plan for

industrialization, initial growth targets aremodest

October: Start of attacks on Bukharin and RightOpposition; first five-year plan begins

1929 April: Industrialization targets are raised dramaticallyJuly: Compulsory grain delivery targets issued as a

Prelude to collectivizationAutumn: Collectivization and dekulakization beginNovember: Bukharin expelled from Politburo

1930 March: Collectivization temporarily halted by StalinNovember: Second show trial of bourgeois specialists

accused of anti-Soviet activities1932 Famine begins and lasts until 1934

December: Introduction of internal passports and residencyregistration to control movement of population;completion of first five-year plan declared

1933 Nazis come to power in Germany1934 January: 17th Party Congress, the Congress of Victors,

declares that main battles in socialistconstruction have been won

December: Kirov assassinated in Leningrad1935 January: Zinoviev and Kamenev tried for complicity in

Kirov assassination and sentenced to prisonterms

August: Introduction of Stakhanovite movement to tryto increase labour productivity

xii Chronology

1936 Stalin sends aid to Republican forces in SpanishCivil War

August: Second trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev for Kirovmurder; Trotsky, Bukharin and others are alsoimplicated; Zinoviev and Kamenev arecondemned to death

September: Yezhov becomes head of NKVD; purges pick uppace

December: Stalin Constitution introduced1937 January: Trial of Radek, Pyatakov and other former

party leadersMayJune: Arrest and execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky

and leaders of armed forces; purges reach theirheightSovietJapanese forces clash on SovietChineseborder

1938 March: Trial of Bukharin and other leadersNovember: Beria replaces Yezhov as head of NKVDDecember: Introduction of labour books to control

industrial workers and their movements1939 August: Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact

September: Germany invades Poland from the West, USSRinvades Poland from the East; World War IIbegins

December: SovietFinnish war begins1940 June: USSR annexes Baltic states, Bessarabia and

BukovinaAugust: Criminalization of absenteeism from work;

Trotsky murdered in MexicoNovember: Relations with Germany begin to deteriorate

1941 June: Germany invades USSRJuly: Anglo-Soviet alliance against Germany and

Italy proclaimedSeptember: Siege of Leningrad beginsDecember: German advance on Moscow halted

1942 January: Soviet, British, American Grand Allianceformed

September: Siege of Stalingrad beginsNovember: Soviet offensive encircles German army at

Stalingrad1943 January: German army at Stalingrad surrenders

July: Soviet forces prevail at battle of Kursk; Germanretreat slowly begins

1944 January: Siege of Leningrad ends

Chronology xiii

June: Allied invasion of France; Soviet forces begin tomove into Eastern Europe

1945 February: Yalta conference between Churchill, Stalin andRoosevelt

May: Germany surrendersDecember: Potsdam conference begins and the wartime

alliance begins to fragment1946 Famine in Ukraine; 19461948 establishment of

communist regimes in Eastern Europe underSoviet tutelage

1948 January: Purge of Jewish intelligentsia beginsJune: Break with Yugoslavia; USSR blockades Berlin

as Cold War takes shapeAugust: Death of Leningrad party leader, Zhdanov,

followed by purge of the Leningrad party1949 September: Soviet atom bomb tested

December: Communists take power in China1950 January: Sino-Soviet alliance

June: Start of Korean war1953 January: Doctors Plot announced, a new wave of purges

loomsMarch: Stalin dies; Malenkov becomes Prime MinisterJune: Beria arrestedJuly: Armistice in Korean war; release of some Gulag

prisonersSeptember: Khrushchev becomes General Secretary of the

CPSU1954 Khrushchev begins Virgin Lands campaign1955 February: Bulganin replaces Malenkov as Prime Minister

May: Warsaw Pact established1956 February: Khrushchev makes Secret Speech to the 20th

CPSU Congress; destalinization beginsNovember: Soviet invasion of Hungary

1957 February: Khrushchev announces formation of regionaleconomic councils (Sovnarkhozy)

June: CPSU Central Committee supports Khrushchevagainst the Anti-Party Group

October: Launch of Sputnik, the worlds first space satellite1958 February: Khrushchev replaces Bulganin as Prime Minister

Start of split with China1959 September: Khrushchev visits the USA1960 May: USSR shoots down US spy plane over its

territory1961 April: Launch of first manned space flight

xiv Chronology

June: Crisis in Berlin leads to building of the BerlinWall

November: 22nd CPSU Congress introduces a new partyprogramme and advances destalinization;Stalins body is removed from the LeninMausoleum on Red Square

1962 June: Riots in Novocherkassk over food price rises areviolently suppressed

October: Cuban missile crisisNovember: Khrushchev announces the bifurcation of the

CPSU; Solzhenitsyns One Day in the Life of IvanDenisovich is published

1964 November: Khrushchev removed from office; LeonidBrezhnev becomes General Secretary of theCPSU; reversal of many of Khrushchevsreforms begins and destalinization is halted

1965 September: Kosygin economic reforms beginsDecember: Pushkin Square demonstration in Moscow

calling for the observation of the SovietConstitution marks the beginning of thedissident movement

1966 February: Trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel begins as awarning to dissidents to curtail their activities

1967 May: Yuri Andropov becomes head of the KGB1968 January: Dubcek becomes head of the Czechoslovak

communist party and the reforms of the PragueSpring begin

August: Warsaw Pact countries invade Czechoslovakia;dissident movement in USSR grows

September: Promulgation of the Brezhnev Doctrine1970 October: Solzhenitsyn wins Nobel Prize for Literature1971 February: Khrushchev dies1972 May: BrezhnevNixon summit in Moscow marks

height of period of detente1973 October: ArabIsraeli war leads to confrontation with

USA1974 February: Forced deportation of Solzhenitsyn from the

USSRDecember: Brezhnev has heart attack and begins slow

physical and mental decline1975 October: Dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov wins Nobel

Peace Prize1977 June: Brezhnev becomes President of the USSR

November: Introduction of a new Soviet Constitution

Chronology xv

1978 November: Gorbachev appointed Central CommitteeSecretary in charge of agriculture

1979 November: Gorbachev becomes candidate member of thePolitburo

December: USSR invades Afghanistan; second Cold Warbegins in earnest

1980 Summer: US and other countries boycott of MoscowOlympics

August: Strikes begin in Poland leading to creation ofthe Solidarity trade union

October: Gorbachev becomes full member of thePolitburo

1981 December: martial law introduced in Poland1982 November: Leonid Brezhnev dies after 18 years as leader of

the USSR. Yuri Andropov succeeds as GeneralSecretary; Andropov launches anti-corruptioncampaign, tries to increase labour discipline andbegins to assemble what will eventually bereform team under Gorbachev

1984 February: Andropov dies. Konstantin Chernenko succeedshim. Chernenko temporarily stops reform

1985 March: Chernenko dies. Gorbachev succeeds as GeneralSecretary

May: Anti-alcohol campaign begins; Gorbachev callsfor economic reform

November: First meeting between Gorbachev and RonaldReagan in Geneva

1986 FebruaryMarch: 27th CPSU Congress. Gorbachev begins tobroaden and deepen reform and criticizesBrezhnev era as the period of stagnation

April: disaster at Chernobyl increases financial crisis ofSoviet state but allows Gorbachev to extendglasnost

October: ReaganGorbachev summit in ReykjavikDecember: Sakharov released from internal exile; riots in

the capital of Kazakhstan are the first sign ofnationalist unrest

1987 January Major CPSU Central Committee plenums;and June: Gorbachev begins internal party reform and

democratization, and presses for economicdecentralization

June: Experiment with multi-candidate elections in 5per cent of constituencies at local elections

July: Major law on industrial organization passedallowing limited autonomy for economic

xvi Chronology

enterprises from central bureaucracy andplanners

August: Rallies in Baltic republics against their forcedinclusion in the USSR in 1940

October: Boris Yeltsin criticizes slow pace of reform atCentral Committee meeting; Yeltsin is removedas head of Moscow City CPSU in Novemberand begins drift into opposition

November: 70th anniversary of October 1917 revolution;Gorbachev talks of different paths to socialism indifferent countries a sign of weakening controlover Eastern Europe

1988 June: 19th CPSU Conference; Gorbachev launchesreform of state structures. Promises newparliaments and multi-candidate elections

August: Independent political activity grows throughoutUSSR in response to 19th CPSU Conference

October: Gorbachev becomes Chair of the SupremeSoviet

December: Constitutional amendments passed establishingCongress of Peoples Deputies and new electoralsystem

1989 March: elections to Congress of Peoples DeputiesApril: Army kills peaceful demonstrators in Tblisi,

capital of GeorgiaMayJune: First Congress of Peoples Deputies sessions;

election of Supreme Soviet; Gorbachev electedChair of the Supreme Soviet

July: first outbreak of labour unrest in mining regionsSeptember: CPSU Central Committee plenum on

nationalities policyAutumn: Collapse of communist regimes in Eastern

EuropeDecember: Lithuanian Communist Party declares itself

independent of the CPSU1990 January: CPSU begins to break up as radicals inside the

CPSU set up the Democratic PlatformFebruary: CPSU Central Committee agrees to abolish

Article Six of the Soviet constitution that gavethe party the legal right to power and supportsmove towards a presidential system; SupremeSoviet passes bill on presidency at the end of themonth

March: Local and republican elections; Russian radicalmovement Democratic Russia wins large

Chronology xvii

number of seats in Russian Congress of PeoplesDeputies and takes over city government inMoscow and Leningrad; nationalists win in mostof the republics; USSR Congress of PeoplesDeputies elects Gorbachev President andchanges the constitution to remove Article Six;Lithuania declares independence; Estoniasuspends the Soviet Constitution

May: Latvia declares independence; Yeltsin electedhead of Russian parliament by DemocraticRussia deputies; War of laws begins betweenthe republics and the central government overwho controls what

July: 28th CPSU Congress; Yeltsin and other radicalsquit the CPSU; the Congress supportsGorbachev, but comes up with no new ideasabout how to get out of crisis

AugustOctober: Gorbachev attempts to find economic reformstrategy; makes a brief alliance with Yeltsin tosupport the radical 500 Days plan for economicreform, but caves in under conservative pressureand begins his drift to the right

September: Gorbachev granted additional presidentialpowers by USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies

December: Shevardnadze resigns as Minister of ForeignAffairs and warns of the prospect of a right wingcoup; Gorbachev forces the election of GennadyYanayev as vice president and proposesreferendum on the future of the Union; Yeltsinlater adds a question on the establishment of aRussian presidency to the referendum.

1991 January: Military intervention in Lithuania and Latvia ashardliners attempt to assert central control;Yeltsin pledges solidarity with the Baltic states

February: Majority vote for Union in ambiguously wordedreferendum; Russians vote for the establishmentof a Russian presidency

April: 9+1 agreement signed by Gorbachev and theleaders of nine of the republics; agree a newUnion treaty to be signed in August that willsubstantially revise the balance of power infavour of republics

June: Conservatives attempt a constitutional coup byasking for more powers for the Prime Minister

xviii Chronology

August: Hardliners led by Yanayev launch coup attempton the eve of the signing of the new UnionTreaty; coup fails after three days

September Yeltsin accumulates power to begin economicNovember: Reform; is granted additional powers for a year

by the Russian parliament and appoints his owngovernment, making himself Prime Minister andYegor Gaidar Minister of Finance; negotiationsfor a new Union treaty fail; Chair of Russianparliament and Russian vice president begin tooppose government economic policies; coup inChechnya, Dzhokar Dudayev becomes leader

October: Dudayev elected President of Chechnya andChechen declaration of independence

November: Yeltsin declares state of emergency in Chechnya,but attempted Russian intervention fails; state ofemergency is revoked and troops withdraw

December: Ukraine votes for independence in referendumand all hope of new Union treaty dies; Belarusand Russia persuade Ukraine to join inCommonwealth of Independent States; CentralAsian states, Azerbaijan and Armenia join aweek later; Gorbachev resigns as President on 25December; USSR officially ceases to exist on 31December

1992 January: Prices liberalized in Russia in attempt to controlinflation, create basis of market economy andbreak up the power of industrial managers

March: Federation treaty signed by all of Russiasrepublics except Tatarstan and Chechnya

April: Russian Parliament backs government economicpolicy but with reservations and Yeltsin is forcedto compromise on the composition of thegovernment; Russia receives a $24billion aidpackage from the West

June: Privatization legislation passed; Yeltsin appointsGaidar acting Prime Minister

October: voucher privatization beginsDecember: Russian parliaments oppose government. Gaidar

removed as Prime Minister by ViktorChernomyrdin; Yeltsin does deal with theparliaments and gets the promise of areferendum on the constitution

1993 March: Parliament reneges on deal on referendum andattempts to strip Yeltsin of his powers; Yeltsin

Chronology xix

decrees emergency rule and referendum;parliament responds by trying to impeach him,but fails; eventually a deal is done on thereferendum

April: Referendum on economic reform, prospect ofnew elections for the presidency and theparliaments and confidence in Yeltsin; Yeltsinwins on all questions.

June: Yeltsin calls Constitutional Conference to try toget an agreement on a presidential system frommajor political actors. Fails

September: Yeltsin brings Gaidar back into the governmentand then suspends the parliaments and decreesemergency rule; parliament meets in emergencysession and makes Rutskoi president

October: Pro-parliament demonstrators clash with riotpolice; Yeltsin calls in the army to restore order;over 100 people killed (at least); elections fornew parliaments and a referendum on theconstitution called for December

November: Campaigning begins. Some parties fail to getsufficient signatures to stand for PR seats; statecontrolled television throws weight behindGaidar and the Russias Choice party

December: Victory for Yeltsin on new constitution giveshim extra powers as President, but RussiasChoice does poorly at the polls; surprise successfor Zhirinovskys extremist Liberal DemocraticParty

1994 January: Economic reformers quit the government inresponse to the December 1993 Duma elections.

February: Treaty signed between federal government andTatarstan; Duma pardons the 1991 coup leadersand the parliamentary leaders imprisoned in1993

October: Rouble crisisNovember: Russian Security Council votes to send troops to

ChechnyaDecember: Russian troops invade Chechnya and advance

on the capital, Grozny1995 January: Grozny is brought under Russian control; many

Russian troops and civilians are killed in thefighting

May: Yeltsin vetoes law passed by both the Duma andthe Council of Federation calling for

xx Chronology

unconditional talks with the Chechens; OurHome is Russia party set up by Chernomyrdin

June: General Alexander Lebed resigns as commanderof 14th Army in Moldova to go into Russianpolitics; Chechens take hostages at Budennovskand provoke a government crisis

July: Yeltsin hospitalized with heart complaintOctober: Yeltsin hospitalized for second timeDecember: Duma elections; CPRF heads the party list

voting1996 January: Kozyrev resigns as foreign minister and is

replaced by Primakov; Russia admitted toCouncil of Europe

March: Duma vote condemns the agreements thatfounded the CIS; Yeltsin unveils peace plans asa part of his electoral campaign

April: Treaty with Belarus establishing Community ofSovereign States

May: Korzhakov calls for the election to bepostponed; bulk of democratic forces declaretheir support for Yeltsin

June: First round of voting in the presidential electionssees Yeltsin and CPRF leader Zyuganovthrough to a second round run-off; Yeltsinmakes Alexander Lebed (third in the voting)Secretary of the Security Council; DefenceMinister Grachev is removed from office;Korzhakov and other hardliners in thegovernment are removed for plotting to upsetthe second round of voting

July: Yeltsin disappears from public view on eve ofsecond round of the presidential elections;rumours circulate about his ill-health, but hebeats Zyuganov convincingly in the secondround of voting; Chechens protest that the termsof the peace deal are being broken by Russia;Lebed charged with securing peace in Chechnyaby Yeltsin; fighting restarts in Chechnya;Chubais appointed head of the presidentialadministration

August: Yeltsin hospitalized; power struggle betweenLebed and other members of governmentdevelops; Lebed brokers a peace deal inChechnya that promises troop withdrawals andautonomy for the area

Chronology xxi

October: Yeltsin fires Lebed from post as Secretary of theSecurity Council

November: Yeltsin has quintuple heart bypass operationDecember: Russian troops begin to withdraw from

Chechnya1997 February: Government reshuffle introduces new wave of

economic reform headed by Chubais and BorisNemtsov

Summer: Bank wars begin over privatizationNovember: Yeltsin removes Boris Berezovsky from the

Security Council; Chubais is accused ofcorruption by media owned by Berezovsky;Chubais just holds on to office

1998 January: Chernomyrdins powers as Prime Minister areexpanded

March: Yeltsin fires Chernomyrdin and reorganizescabinet; battle starts with Duma on approval ofSergei Kiriyenko as Prime Minister

April: Kiriyenko approved as Prime Minister on thirdDuma vote

August: Rouble devalued, Russia defaults on debts andentire government is sacked by Yeltsin;Chernomyrdin appointed as interim PrimeMinister

September: Duma refuses to approve Chernomyrdinsappointment as Prime Minister twice andYeltsin nominates Primakov for the post

1999 May: Yeltsin fires the entire government;impeachment proceedings begin in the Dumabut vote fails; Duma approves Sergei Stepashinas Prime Minister

Summer: Chechen incursions into neighbouring territoriesand bombings in Moscow and other towns leadto calls for a new invasion of Chechnya; supportfor Primakov as Yeltsins successor grows

August: Yeltsin fires Stepashin; Duma approvesnomination of Vladimir Putin as PrimeMinister; military action begins in Chechnya

December: Duma elections; CPRF tops the poll, but Putinsfavoured party, Unity, features strongly in thevoting; Yeltsin resigns on New Years Eve andPutin becomes acting President

2000 March: Putin elected President in first round ofelections; attacks on oligarchs begin

xxii Chronology

May: Putin begins to attack media and commercialinterests of the oligarchs; seven new Federaldistricts created as part of reform of federalsystem and centre-regional relations

August: The submarine Kursk sinks whilst on exercises

Chronology xxiii

Preface and acknowledgements

The title of this book is not accidental: this is a book about the Russian stateand its uncertain future. Consequently, it is also a book about the uncertaintyof life in Russia and with Russia for those of us who do not live there created by the Russian states instability. The Russian state, its dysfunctions,and the efforts that have been made to resolve them over the course of thetwentieth century, are the books main object of enquiry. Russia has beenplagued throughout its recent history by the inability of its political leaders tocreate a strong state. The dimensions of this failure are multiple: Russia is,and has been, uncertain about its geographical boundaries as a state, firstbecause of its existence within empire, and subsequently because of the col-lapse of empire. Russian politicians are, and have been, uncertain about whatthe institutions that they inhabit, control and contest are capable of, of thepurpose of state power and its use. At many points in Russias recent historythere has even been a great deal of uncertainty about what constitutes theRussian state. Under the Tsars, the private concerns and fate of one family,the imperial dynasty of the Romanovs, overlapped with the state and thestruggle of parts of it to become more representative of Russian society and tomodernize it. It almost makes no sense to talk of the state as an autonomousset of institutions during the Soviet period since state structures were perme-ated and controlled at all levels by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union(CPSU). As a result, where authority and responsibility lay became confusedand personal relationships substituted for clear lines of authority and effectivegovernance. This situation has not notably improved since the collapse of theSoviet party-state. Russias weak state is a barrier to the consolidation ofdemocracy and the stabilization of the Russian economy (let alone the pro-curement of economic growth), and makes Russia a fickle and variable part-ner in the reconstruction of post-Cold War international relations.

We need to remember, however, that Russias state of uncertainty is morethan a problem of politicians defining and using political institutions, and ofestablishing and maintaining the borders of the state. There is another stateof uncertainty that is both a product and a cause of the failure of Russianpolitical leaders to create a strong state. This is the state of uncertaintyexperienced by Russians about how life is to be lived in desperate times.

The failure of Russian politicians to build an effective state is responsible inlarge measure for this other state of uncertainty. Social life all over the globewas subject to dramatic change in the twentieth century, but in twentiethcentury Russia change was more traumatic, violent, rapid and fundamentalthan the norm. Russia underwent three fundamental shifts in social organiza-tion in the twentieth century from agrarian society to state socialism and toa hybrid form of capitalism and each of these changes caused massive socialdisruptions and privations. Each shift in social organization began with thefailure of the Russian state and the collapse of the ruling political order orregime. Each new form of social organization was constructed by a newpolitical regime to consolidate state power and was carried out by stateofficials.

This process has not reached an end. Russians today look to VladimirPutin to create a political system that can guarantee a more peaceful andprosperous way of life. Whether or not he will succeed cannot be stated withcertainty, especially since his political programme remains unclear in manyimportant aspects. This book does not aim to second-guess the success ofPutin, but to examine the problems of state building in twentieth centuryRussia to see what the general problems are that have faced Russian leaders,and what the legacies of the recent past are for Vladimir Putin. The book isnot about Putin, although it does make some reference to his policies at theend. Rather, it is an attempt to talk about the problems of the Russian state.This is as necessary as any discussion of Putin because at present the Russianstate is too often talked about as a synonym of democracy: democratizationhas failed, so the argument runs, because the Russian state has failed and viceversa. Whilst this is not untrue in that state failure is antithetical with demo-cratic consolidation, we should, through the study of the state, recognize thatstate building is not the same as building democracy, and that Russiascurrent state formation is as likely to throw up a strong state that is notdemocratic as it is to evolve into a strong democratic state. To recognizethis, however, means that we have to have some idea about the variety offorms that a state can take and the different things that rulers can do withthem. Consequently, this book starts and ends with a discussion of the stateand tries to analyse state building failures and problems in light of this dis-cussion in an effort to highlight the wide range of possibilities that lie beforeRussia and that make it so uncertain.

This book was mostly written in rural Ireland in a house that has seenbetter days (and will one day see them again). That I was able to spend somuch time writing rather than carving out a habitable niche is due to thehard work and cheerful tolerance of filth of John Adshead, Theresa Adshead,Jim Cahill, Helen Cahill, Sara Ryklif, Luke Ashworth and Elizabeth de Baor-Ashworth. Many of the ideas in the book were developed whilst I was work-ing at the University of Essex and I am very grateful to my former colleaguesat Essex for their advice, help and encouragement. I would particularly liketo thank Peter Frank, Alastair McAuley, Frances Millard, Tony Swift, David

Preface and acknowledgements xxv

Howarth, Todd Landman and Aletta Norval. Parts of the books argumentshave appeared in conference papers and seminar presentations and manypeople have made suggestions or raised questions that have helped me clarifymy thought. Particularly important to me were two ECPR workshops orga-nized by Hugh Ward and Colin Hay on The evolution of the state atWarwick in 1998, and by Phil Cerny on National models and transnationalstructures at Mannheim in 1999, and a panel on Regime and political actorsin post-communist Russia organized by Richard Sakwa at the ICCEESWorld Congress in Tampere in 2000. I am grateful to all of them and tothe other participants in these events for their comments, and am particularlygrateful to Richard Sakwa for his encouragement and thoughts over the lastfew years. Finally, but not last and never, ever least, one person above all isresponsible for anything that is good about this book and for all that has beengood about the time that I have spent on it, Maura Adshead. Words and thededication of the book to you cannot repay the debts that I owe, but Ill tryand repay you with the same love and patience that you give to me.

Neil RobinsonBaile Hoibeaird

October 2000

xxvi Preface and acknowledgements

Source:US

Geograp

hical

Survey

1 Introduction

Strong states, weak states and the Russianproblem

The cycles of state failure and reconstruction that make up Russian history inthe twentieth century have created a paradox. The failure of the state and thebrutality with which the state has tried to reconstruct Russia in the past haslead many Russians to distrust the state, to see it as something alien andpredatory that has imposed new ways of life on them against their will.The very idea of state power was not legitimate in the eyes of manyRussians for much of the twentieth century and as Russia enters thetwenty-first century, popular esteem for political institutions is at whatmight be its lowest ever ebb. Many Russians prefer private life to the vicissi-tudes of public life and are loyal to family and networks of friends and kinrather than to the state. However, despite this, and as Vladimir Putin,Russias new President, has noted, Russians expect the state to play a largerrole in public life than might be common in established liberal democraciesand expect it to take the lead in solving Russias political, economic and socialcrises.1 This is not as surprising as it might seem at first glance. The brutalityof Russias rulers has destroyed public institutions and eroded faith in publiclife to the point where the only body left that might act for the collective goodis the state, or some part of it. Moreover, Russians are right to want actionfrom the state since only a reconstructed state in Russia can provide thepublic goods (goods that all citizens share equally, that no one in a societycan be excluded from enjoying) necessary for a decent, peaceful and prosper-ous life. Only the state can provide for the rule of law across Russia, for arelatively stable currency that is honoured throughout the country, for secur-ity of property rights, and the enforcement of contracts whether they arebetween businessmen, banks and their clients, employers and employees, orwelfare recipients such as pensioners and those agencies responsible for payingthem.

If the states role is desired and also necessary to the reconstruction ofpublic life in Russia, how can we explain the failure of the Russian state inthe past and its current weakness? There are two common explanations forRussias problems that appear in the media when Russia has a crisis, or thatare often to be found in the academic literature on Russia: the argumentthat Russias problems are historically inevitable, and the argument that

Russias problems are culturally determined and hence unavoidable.Neither of these arguments is very good. The causes of state failure inRussia have been different at different times. It is not simply a matter ofstate weakness and failure explaining state weakness and failure ad infinitum.Variously, different combinations of personality, ideology, the pressures ofmodernization and international forces have caused state failure in Russia.A history of state failure does make constructing a stable polity and econ-omy more difficult. Each failure means that a state and nation lags behindits competitors and is overtaken by emerging powers. Consequently, there isfurther to go to deliver comparable standards of living and security, toproduce goods of a comparable technological level and quality, etc., andit is harder to attract investment, capture markets, or command respect andproject influence in international politics. Nevertheless, failure, whilst it mayget harder to avoid, is not inevitable. Structural factors (which states cannoteasily change or avoid because they are beyond their individual control)such as international competition, the health of the global economy andones position in it, or the fact that society and economy are agrarian ratherthan industrial, or industrial rather than post-industrial, are importantinfluences on the outcome of state building projects, but they are notnecessarily decisive. Success and failure are contingent on many thingsand the influence of structural factors can be mediated by how politiciansapproach them. Nor is failure to be surprised at or despised. State failure ismore common than success; very few states had stable political systems overthe course of the twentieth century and the majority of states that appear tobe most stable and most successful have only recently so become.2 Thelessons of history are the same for Russia as for any other state: failure isnot surprising, nor is it inescapable.

Arguments that assert that the failure of the Russian state over the lastcentury is explicable by reference to culture are not much better. The Russianstate does not fail because it is Russian; past and present crises of politicalauthority and state failure have not been caused by something intrinsic toRussianness or the Russians. Certain common Russian traditions and atti-tudes have not helped state building in Russia. However, these traditions andattitudes are often themselves the result of state failure and can be amendedby fresh state building projects, or serve as their basis or inspiration. It istherefore inappropriate to blame culture for all of the failings of the Russianstate, especially if this means that factors specific to a particular moment atwhich the Russian state failed are not given their proper due and explanatoryweight.3 To put it another way, why say a crisis is due to some vague qualityof Russianness if it is better blamed on some clearly visible combination ofpoor leadership, economic crisis, international apathy or hostility and inade-quate institutions, each of which has a form unique to its own time of crisis?The cultural argument is also contradictory; it blames state collapse andfailure of Russianness, but also argues that Russians have a cultural affinityfor order and discipline, two features of any well-ordered state.

2 The Russian problem

If we cannot blame Russias problems on historical inevitability or on someinnate cultural tendency, we must seek answers to state failure that are morespecific. We must explain how the forms taken by the Russian state in thetwentieth century proved inadequate and how contemporary politicians havemade decisions that have produced a particular form of state to the detrimentof democratization and economic transformation. This requires us to under-stand something about states in general. The fact that the state has been theproblem in Russia and yet is necessary if the resolution of Russias currentproblems is to be a happy one demonstrates something about states in gen-eral: they are not easy to define and it is not easy to distinguish what affect,positive or negative, that they have on societies and their fate. Nevertheless, itis to these questions that we must now turn. If we are to argue that a failure tobuild a strong state is at the heart of Russias historical and contemporaryproblems, we must have some notion of what constitutes a strong state so thatwe can measure Russias historical and contemporary state weakness againstit.

Defining the state is difficult since they are not the sort of abstract, formalobject which readily lend themselves to a clear-cut, unambiguous definition.4

This is because states are defined by political factors and phenomena that areoften unstable and contested. Essentially and basically, we can say that stateshave three main features.5 The state is, first, a set of institutions . . . mannedby the states own personnel. This means that the state is not a unitary actor,a single organism that always acts according to a common purpose. It cannotdecide to do something and do it even when great power is vested in a singleruler like a Tsar, a General Secretary of the Communist Party of the SovietUnion (CPSU), or a president. A state is a composite of different institutions,leaders and interests, and even when one institution is more powerful than therest it relies on other institutions to implement its orders and they may oftensubvert its will. Second, the state has a dual character because the institutionsthat comprise it are at the centre of a geographically-bounded territory,usually referred to as a society. As a result, the state both looks inwards tothe society that it manages and outwards to larger societies [the internationalsystem of states] in which it must make its way. Thus, the domestic policies ofthe state are often the product of its international concerns and vice versa.Finally, the state monopolizes rule making within its territory, to define andenforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the nameof their common interest or general will.

The basic features of a state the fact that it comprises institutions, hastasks of social management and an international role, and that it seeks tomonopolize rule making in a specific territory all demand that the statestrive to create three things: capacity, autonomy and organizational integrity.A state has capacity where it has the ability to get things done: rules are made,policies are formulated and the machinery (institutions) exists to ensure thatpolicy is implemented and rules are kept. A state is autonomous when it is ableto define policy independently of social groups and act independently of their

The Russian problem 3

interests, when private interests do not capture it. Finally, a state has orga-nizational integrity when its machinery and the officials who serve in it(bureaucrats, civil servants) are unified by a clear set of norms and goals,and where officials do not subvert state policy for private ends. States striveto create some measure of capacity, autonomy and organizational integritybecause creating autonomy, capacity and organizational integrity enablesthem to better respond to international events and to the changing demandsof social management. The manner in which they achieve capacity, autonomyand organizational integrity depends on two things: the type of politicalregime that exists in a state and the character of administrative organization.For simplicitys sake, we can reduce both types of regime and of administrativeorganization to two basic forms and from this derive four basic types of stateformation that can be used to describe modern states in general, the Russianstate in its Tsarist, Soviet and contemporary forms in particular, and the formof state that it has been struggling to develop over the last decade.

Regimes, the systems of rule that endure beyond the life span of anyparticular politicians government, can be classified as either absolutist orconstitutional, the character of administrative organization can be classifiedas either patrimonial or bureaucratic.6 A regime is absolutist where bothexecutive and legislative power is combined in the person of a ruler or a setof institutions, and constitutional where legislative powers are dividedbetween the executive branch of government and a representative assembly.Administrative organization is patrimonial where office holders are selectedthrough patronage as clients of a ruler, or as clients of one of the rulersclients, and possess the ability (and sometimes the right) to use state resourcesfor personal ends. This is called proprietary officeholding. Bureaucraticorganization, in contrast, exists where the appointment of officials is imper-sonal and formal regulations govern administration so that there is no pro-prietary officeholding.

Combining these ideas about regime and state organization we can pro-duce four classifications of state formation: constitutional-bureaucratic, abso-lutist-patrimonial, absolutist-bureaucratic and constitutional-patrimonial.The basic characteristics of these four forms of state are laid out in Table1.1. Constitutional-bureaucratic, absolutist-patrimonial and absolutist-bureaucratic state forms correspond respectively to modern consolidateddemocracies such as exist in countries such as the USA and WesternEurope, Tsarist Russia (and other states where monarchs have ruled in con-junction with aristocratic elites), and the Soviet Union (and other twentiethcentury dictatorships such as Democratic Kampuchea under Pol Pot andcommunist China). Describing the generic types of constitutional-bureau-cratic, absolutist-patrimonial and absolutist-bureaucratic state will enableus to see how stable modern political systems work, the strains that develop-ment puts on absolutist-patrimonial states, and the inherent problems ofabsolutist-bureaucratic states. This is important first, because Russia hasgone from absolutist-patrimonialism, through an absolutist-bureaucratic

4 The Russian problem

Table1.1State

form

ationsan

dtheircharacteristics

Constitutional-bureaucratic

Absolutist-patrimonial

Absolutist-bureaucratic

Constitutional-patrimonial

Mostpreva

lentform

ofstatepow

erInfrastructural

Despotic

Despotic

Non

e:thepossibilityof

infrastructuralpow

erdevelop

ingisblocked

by

patronag

e,but

constitution

alconsiderations

limitdespotic

pow

er

State

autonom

yRelative

Highbutnot

embedded

Highbutnot

embedded;

constrained

byideological

imperatives

governing

bureau

cratic

behav

iour

Relativebutnot

embedded

becau

seof

patronag

e

State

capacity

Highan

dsustained

Highforsimple

tasks,but

declines

iftasksbeforethe

stateconflictwithelite

interests.

Highforasm

allnumber

ofsimple

tasks,otherwise

low

anddeclines

ascomplexity

ofsocial

man

agem

entincreases

Low

State

orga

nizational

integrity

Highas

integrityis

ensuredbyshared

bureau

cratic

norms

Low

anddim

inishes

further

ifstatetasks

becom

emorecomplex

Highwherecomplian

cewithan

dstateordersis

enforced

bycoercion

,decliningas

propensity

touse

violence

declines

Low

,withtension

between

constitution

alnormsan

dthepracticeof

patronag

e

Reliance

oncoercion

Low

Frequent

Highforsocial

and

political

control

Variable

andinconsistent

use

ofcoercion

;coercion

isoftenusedforpersonal,

rather

than

state,

goals

Abilityto

gather

resources

from

societyov

ertimefor

redistribution

and

provision

ofpublicgo

ods

Highan

dconstan

tov

ertimebecau

seextraction

isroutinized

and

negotiatedbetween

stateofficialsan

dsociety

Low

aspersonal

networks

divertresources

totheir

ownuse

Highbutdecliningov

ertime.

Resou

rces

are

gathered

usingcoercion

sotherearenostrong,

positiveincentivesfor

citizensto

beproductive

Low

aspersonal

networks

divertresources

totheirow

nuse

state formation, and is now trying to construct a modern democratic systemakin to the constitutional-bureaucratic state formations of the West. Second,describing these three types of state formation enables us to develop two ideasof state strength: we will be able to see that only the constitutional-bureau-cratic state is strong over time because it is more adaptable, but that abso-lutist state formations can be strong because they can achieve specific tasksquite well at certain historical junctures. Realizing this, we can say somethingabout our fourth form of state formation, constitutional-patrimonialism. Thisis an unstable type of state formation. Its evolution to the constitutional-bureaucratic type is not guaranteed because politicians may decide that theshort-term strength of an absolutist state is better suited to their interests andto dealing with problems of social management and the provision of security.

The chief difference between constitutional-bureaucratic and an absolutisttype of state formation is in the prevalent form of state power. All stateformations have both despotic and infrastructural powers, but which formof power is most prevalent differs widely.7 This means that the nature of stateautonomy, capacity and organizational integrity also differ considerably. In aconstitutional-bureaucratic state formation infrastructural power is more pre-valent than despotic power. Infrastructural power exists where there is across-penetration of state and society so that decision making is not isolatedfrom social concerns. The states decision-making powers are created by anegotiation of its functions, rights and responsibilities that is carried outprimarily through the interaction of the executive branch of governmentand representatives of social groups in legislative assemblies. A state withinfrastructural power is thus not isolated from society, but nor is it dominatedby any particular interest from within society, or by society as a whole to thepoint where officials cannot sometimes take action that they think necessary.8

The state and its autonomy are embedded in society, and the states power isexercised evenly over all of the territory of the state and is not effectivelychallenged in any part of its territory.9 Within the territory for which it claimsto make rules, a state with infrastructural power can thus work to satisfy thecommon interest or general will that was mentioned above. The general willis defined imperfectly and redefined by elections, debate, lobbying, socialprotest etc., which work through the constitutional division of responsibilityfor legislative activity between executive and representative assembly. Ofcourse, social inequality does have an impact on policy: the economicallypowerful have more chance of making their interests heard than the poor;the state takes action to preserve an economic system in which there are socialdivisions; the reproduction of social division with the connivance of the statenaturally favours the rich. The states embedded autonomy is thus relative:there is only fairly strong, rather than an absolute, institutional differentia-tion of formal collective decision making from the overall system of inequal-ity, rather than an absolute differentiation.10

Relative state autonomy is facilitated by the complexity of the moderndemocratic state and their organizational integrity. State officials and depart-

6 The Russian problem

ments might share concerns with social groups that they deal with on aregular basis. For example, farmers may be close to bureaucrats from aministry of agriculture, or bankers might have common cause with civilservants from a finance ministry. But the complexity of a democratic stateprevents any one interest from dominating the whole: state officials may thusreflect social interests in constitutional-bureaucratic systems, but they gener-ally do not do this at the cost of bureaucratic neutrality in the state at large.Moreover, there is a social expectation that state officials will work accordingto legal norms that are neutral. This means that there is coincidence betweenthe organizational norms of the state and social norms. This organizationalintegrity is not perfect state officials fall from grace just like the rest of us but where it breaks down, the polity itself at societys demand rectifies it.Corruption, for example, is prosecuted and rectified through the regulation ofthe bureaucracy by law. Organizational integrity, like autonomy, is thereforenever absolute, but private interests do not break it down finally or irrevoc-ably.

State autonomy and organizational integrity facilitate state capacitybecause the orders that emanate from the state are viewed as generallybeing legitimate and are implemented. Capacity is also constantly underreview in a constitutional-bureaucratic state formation and what the statedoes and what society does is negotiated between them and by such thingsas elections changing what society asks the state to do through its electedpoliticians. The need for coercion is therefore low since the state does notgenerally demand more of its citizens than they are prepared to do. The needto coerce bureaucrats is also relatively low. They require supervision, butorganizational integrity and the social legitimization of power facilitate thepractical aspect of policy implementation, the actual process of getting thingsdone. Orders are respected as they are passed down bureaucratic hierarchiesand both those who give orders and those who seek to fulfil them expect thatbureaucrats will obey the orders given them. Since state orders are acceptedas legitimate, the range of supervisory tasks that bureaucrats have to under-take is limited and the ability of the state to gather resources to create capa-city is great. Since the responsibilities of the state are defined by negotiation,society accepts that resources have to be passed over to the state on a regularbasis in order that it may fulfil its responsibilities. Infrastructural power thusensures that the extraction of resources from society by the state is efficientand that the state can expect a regular, routinized flow of resources fromsociety that can be deployed to ensure security and welfare for society.11

There is also less waste of resources since the state does not have to use alarge part of the revenue it collects to coerce resources from its citizens in thefuture. All this means that in comparison to other state formations, adminis-tration in a constitutional-bureaucratic state formation is able to encompass awider range of tasks without stretching the capacities of state officials.Alternatively, if such stretching occurs, the constitutional order facilitatesreconsideration of bureaucratic and social responsibilities so that either

The Russian problem 7

state capacity is increased by the provision of more resources, or responsibilityis passed from state to society so that the state is not overloaded.

Finally, the durability of constitutional-bureaucratic states has beenincreased by their ability to regulate their relations with other constitu-tional-bureaucratic states cheaply. Military force plays little part in the rela-tions between constitutional-bureaucratic states, which can coexist in asituation of democratic peace.12 Their effective systems of administrationenable them to make international agreements and expect that those agree-ments will be implemented without recourse to military threats. Shareddemocratic norms also enable them to believe that other constitutional-bureaucratic states are trustworthy. Resources can thus be directed towardsa narrower range of security threats from other types of state, and interna-tional agreements can be made between constitutional-bureaucratic statesthat spread the cost of ensuring security, or that help to manage such thingsas international economic relations.

Infrastructural power thus enables constitutional-bureaucratic states to beflexible and to adapt, whilst helping them to direct resources with relativeefficiency to deal with social management and security problems. In contrast,despotic power, which prevails in absolutist types of state formation, createsrigidity. Despotic power exists where there is a high degree of centralization ofdecision making so that most of society is excluded from decision making.Consequently, a state (of whichever type) in which despotic power prevailsover infrastructural power is isolated from the society that it administers andin large measure relies on coercion to manage society. How this occurs inabsolutist-patrimonial and absolutist-bureaucratic state formations is verydifferent so that they have different forms of state autonomy, capacity andorganizational integrity, and different problems in recreating these features ofthe state.

Absolutist-patrimonial states are administered through networks of perso-nal affinity and loyalty created by patronage. Most often, these states aremonarchical and dominated by aristocracies, who share control over legisla-tive activity. The basic form of patronage in such states is between monarchand aristocrat, with the aristocracy in turn having clients dependent uponthem. State autonomy in such systems is high because policy making is exclu-sively the preserve of the monarch and the noble elite. There is little sub-stantive difference in a state organized by patronage between state andpersonal interests; the will of the despot is declared to be the same as thegeneral will of the states subjects as in Louis XIV of Frances famous dictumthat letat, cest moi (I am the state). Proprietary officeholding in absolu-tist-patrimonial states therefore starts at the top. It spreads through the rest ofthe political system because monarchs, in the absence of developed modernbureaucracies, have to rely for administration on the small number of peoplein society with the skills to act as administrators because of military prowess,social standing, financial resources etc. These people in return for obedienceto the monarch demand privilege and security of status in face of the mon-

8 The Russian problem

archs arbitrary authority, and the best way to achieve this security is to takepersonal possession of political office so that it is held by right and can bepassed on to ones heirs.13

States with this mixture of patrimonialism and absolutism are most success-ful when the tasks before them are relatively straightforward: they can overseebasic agricultural production, tax agrarian surpluses and use this tax to sup-port noble privilege and a simple military machine under noble command.Managing such tasks does not require a complex bureaucratic organizationbeyond patronage networks organized around individuals and that stretchfrom court to village. Nonetheless, this form of administrative hierarchy oftenlacks organizational integrity because of disputes about the rights and dutiesof patrons and clients. Such disputes are common in this type of state becausethe exercise of power is often arbitrary and violent as the will of the monarchchanges, and the states control over its territory is often limited. An absolutistrulers control over the state is only as good as their ability to coerce all of theirclients to obey their instructions and implement their orders throughout theterritory of the state. Since an absolutist ruler may be far away and commu-nications between capital and province are generally poor in underdevelopedsocieties, proprietary officeholders have much scope to implement policy asthey please. Moreover, both state capacity and organizational integrity maydecline if an absolutist-patrimonial state is required to undertake tasks thatrequire technical skills not possessed by the aristocracy, or if internationalcompetition requires that the state do things that run counter to the interestsof the patronage networks that are its main administrative resource. In suchcases as we will see how in Chapter 2 when we look at the failure of Tsarismas an absolutist-patrimonial state formation the state may become increas-ingly inefficient at managing the tasks before it. Traditional officeholdinggroups resist the spread of meritocracy, or the state may fall behind its com-petitors as patronage networks resist policies that are needed to modernizeand match rivals.

A strong despot or monarch might attempt to override opposition and forcethe pace of change. However, the despots chances of success are often limitedbecause it is difficult to gather resources for modernization and because it isdifficult to accommodate political reform within an absolutist-patrimonialsystem. Much of the states revenue in an absolutist-patrimonial state is dis-tributed to the networks that the despot relies on for support and it is difficultto divert monies to new purposes. Political reform is often half-hearted.Attempts to expand political participation through the creation of legislativeassemblies or to build up greater infrastructural power by developing moremodern forms of bureaucratic administration are compromised where despotsmaintain substantial powers of appointment to public office or control legis-lative activity to the detriment of representative assemblies. The result ofreform in absolutist-patrimonial state formations, therefore, is often mixed.Reforms may have to be coerced and where they fail, or are only partiallysuccessful, the state remains enfeebled and social control increasingly becomes

The Russian problem 9

a matter of coercion since the absolutist-patrimonial state does not have themachinery to manage the demands generated by international competition ordomestic change.

Absolutist-bureaucratic states differ from absolutist-patrimonial states inthat they organize the exclusion of the mass of society from legislative activityand decision making by vesting power in bureaucratic organizations. Modernbureaucratic organization is founded on impersonal principles that aredeemed to be rational and therefore of best service to society. In absolutist-bureaucratic states, what is deemed rational is generally the product of anideology, of a set of ideas about how the world works and how it should workif properly ordered; ideology is, in other words, a guide to the construction ofa better, more perfect society.14 In an absolutist-bureaucratic state, the defi-nition of ideology and how its prescriptions should be implemented to trans-form society is the prerogative of the bureaucracy. This ensures a high degreeof state autonomy in an absolutist-bureaucratic state: the mass of society isexcluded from decision making because it does not possess the knowledgenecessary to guide social development as officials of the state do. But althoughofficials interpret ideology, they are not free to interpret it suit its own mate-rial interests; they are also one of its subjects since the ideology of an absolu-tist-bureaucratic state claims to define everything, even the position andfunctions of state officials.15 Consequently, the absolutist-bureaucratic stateshould not become the possession of an individual or class in the same manneras an absolutist-patrimonial state; officeholding should not become proprie-tary. The role of ideology also makes absolutist-bureaucratic states very dif-ferent to constitutional-bureaucratic states. In the latter, what is deemed bestfor the sake of social, economic and political organization is deduced throughpolitical contest and the clash of interests and summarized in legal norms towhich all are held accountable, even state officials. In absolutist-bureaucraticstates, there is no such accountability. State officials know best and otherforms of ensuring that the regulation of social life is carried out impersonally with regard to the general good of society and not in the advantage of a smallnumber of individuals such as the law are secondary to ideological con-siderations.

The desire to create a perfected society under bureaucratic tutelage issupposed to create a particular form of infrastructural power. Social accep-tance of ideology and participation in the construction of a perfect societyshould lead to the mobilization of the people and the direction of their ener-gies towards fulfilling policy without great bureaucratic effort. The paradoxof absolutist-bureaucratic states, however, has been that creating infrastruc-tural power based on mobilization has never developed without coercion.Despotic power has thus always been more prevalent than infrastructuralpower in absolutist-bureaucratic states despite the claims that such stateshave made about popular participation. The ideology of an absolutist-bureaucratic state projects a vision of a perfect society and the means towardsit rather than actual social needs or aspirations. An absolutist-bureaucratic

10 The Russian problem

state will try to manage this dissonance between ideology and social needs byindoctrination (persuading the population that their actual desires arereflected in official ideology), but it will also use terror to destroy socialgroups that it deems to be in opposition to its new society, or that it considersto have no place in such a society. Since ideology in an absolutist-bureau-cratic state claims to interpret and judge the entire social world and theactions of individuals therein, the range of actions, thoughts and social posi-tions that can be classified as deviant and punished as being dangerous to thegood of society is potentially very wide. Violence both real and threatened is thus integral to absolutist-bureaucratic states to an extent that is far beyondwhat is normal in absolutist-patrimonial states.

However, violence is not just inflicted on enemies of the perfect society to beby bureaucrats. Officials too are coerced when they fail to implement policiesthat are deemed essential by political leaders, or as organizational integritybreaks down. An absolutist-bureaucratic state ought to have a large degree ofcapacity and organizational integrity since its officials are supposed to workto common ends as defined by its ideology. However, as will be noted fromTable 1.1, capacity and organizational integrity in an absolutist-bureaucraticstate are not always high. Certain tasks are fulfilled with ease because they aredeemed necessary for political reasons and resources can be diverted to themwithout social complaint and progress closely monitored. Examples of thiswould be the USSRs rapid development of nuclear weapons and a spaceprogramme because of the political prioritization of these projects and theirconsequent funding regardless of cost. However, and in the main, state offi-cials have too many tasks in an absolutist-bureaucratic state because ideologydemands the regulation of aspects of social and economic life to a degreebeyond that found in other state formations. Moreover, many of the multipletasks before a bureaucrat in absolutist-bureaucratic states are difficult to fulfilproperly because they demand high levels of resources that the state cannotprovide. This results from the fact that the absolutist-bureaucratic state exer-cises a high degree of control over economic life and takes so much from thepopulation that it creates few incentives for its citizenry to be productive, andbecause the range of activities that the state has to take on stretch the econ-omy too far.16 A corollary of this is that an absolutist-bureaucratic state has tocoerce resources from its citizenry and uses up a considerable proportion ofthe resources that it accumulates in developing an administrative capacity incoerce further resources from its population.

The overloading of bureaucracy with regulatory tasks and the inefficientcollection of resources means that officials are often unable to reach the goalsthat are set for them by political authorities. This means that capacity isnearly always a problem in absolutist-bureaucratic states since not all ordersemanating from political authorities can be fulfilled; more is sought of officialsand they achieve less; state officials have to choose which state orders to fulfiland which they may ignore safely. In trying to compensate for this lowcapacity, an absolutist-bureaucratic state creates high penalties for non-

The Russian problem 11

compliance with state orders; non-compliance with orders is, after all, abetrayal of the perfect society that is being built for the good of human-kind and therefore deserving of harsh punishment. Coercion is thus cen-tral to the character of absolutist-bureaucratic state formations not onlywith regard to society, but also to manage political relations within thestate itself. But this reliance on coercion also erodes the character ofabsolutist-bureaucracy since it attacks bureaucratic impersonalism. Thefear of failure and punishment leads officials to seek some protectionfrom censure by making alliances with other politicians. This weakensorganizational integrity since it creates political loyalties that rival thoseto the state and ideology. Alliances can be used by officials to protectthemselves as they pick from the wide range of demands made of themby political leaders and implement only those that they think centralauthorities will check up on. This selective implementation of policyand protection also has the effect of making officeholding less impersonaland more proprietary; what policies are implemented is a matter forindividual decision and the search for protection from censure leads topatronage and clientelist relations between bureaucrats. It also weakensthe territorial control of the state because as in an absolutist-patrimonialstate, the implementation of central directives and laws will be unevenacross the territory that the state nominally controls.

The response of an absolutist-bureaucratic states central political autho-rities to failure to implement its instructions is sometimes reform, sometimesterror against bureaucrats deemed to be disloyal. Whatever the method, theresult is usually the same; both the dovetailing of reform with ideology andthe forced compliance with ideology created by terror limit the effectiveness ofefforts to improve state capacity. Reforms very often do not deal with thesource of a problem for ideological reasons; fear of repression creates furtherinformal bonds between officials desperate for some protection. Moreover,capacity and organizational integrity are subject to decline overtime. Likeabsolutist-patrimonial states, absolutist-bureaucratic states can find it diffi-cult to modernize and manage social complexity. This is because ideologymay adapt at a slower rate than social evolution and a bureaucracy trained toconform to an ideology may lack the technical skills needed to adapt to newchallenges. Again, shifting resources to modernization can prove difficultbecause certain areas of spending by the state have to be protected for ideo-logical reasons, and because changes in policy increase the economic demandsmade of citizens without necessarily increasing their incentive to be produc-tive.

States with absolutist forms of power thus suffer from problems of adaptingto change. Consequently, and despite the fact that both absolutist-patrimonialand absolutist-bureaucratic state forms have dominated human history, theseforms of state power have historically been weak in the longer run. Absolutist-patrimonial states have been overtaken by states that manage to developinfrastructural power. Absolutist-bureaucratic states have become less efficient

12 The Russian problem

as their organizational integrity is worn away by patronage and the politicalwill to use terror is weakened by bureaucratic connivance. States with despoticpower, in whatever form that it takes, have thus been less able to adapt tochange than those with infrastructural power created by constitutionalism andbureaucracy. Constitutional-bureaucratic state formations have failed in thepast and been replaced with other types of formation such as when WeimarGermany collapsed in the early 1930s to be replaced by Nazi dictatorship.However, where such constitutional-bureaucratic state formations haveexisted for some time they can develop a facility to endure as in the USAand the United Kingdom and this type of state formation has becomeincreasingly common over time, as democracy has developed across the globe.

Does this mean that constitutional-bureaucratic states are strong and theabsolutist states are weak? If we take strength to equal survival then theanswer to this question is yes. However, we should bear in mind that abso-lutist states can be strong too and that developing absolutism and patronage,rather than constitutionalism and bureaucracy, can enable political leaders toresolve some of the problems of social management and international compe-tition that face a state, especially if they do not have the resources necessary tobuild up bureaucracy, the skilled personnel necessary to staff it, or the timeneeded to create impersonal administration. As a result, constitutional-bureaucracy might not always be seen as the best solution to the problemsof our fourth type of state formation, constitutional-patrimonialism. This typeof state formation is a hybrid system. Neither form of state power is welldeveloped within it. The constitutional regime checks despotism since it forcessome negotiation over access to decision making, but at the same time therewill be an imbalance in power between executive and legislature so thateffective social control over the state is compromised. State autonomy willbe relative, rather than high as in an absolutist system, but it will not beembedded since patrimonial practices will mean that proprietary office-holders use the powers of the state for private ends and public trust in poli-ticians and political institutions are low, and social willingness to comply withstate orders is weak. A corollary of this is that politicians are often unwillingto honour constitutional norms because their power is based as much onpatronage as it is on popular support channelled through a representativeassembly, or direct elections to executive office. Indeed, control over patron-age can often be turned into electoral support by using the states resources tobuy political support from the powerful. Since this happens at a regional, aswell as at national, level, the territorial basis of state power is undermined bythe development of regional fiefdoms where national laws and directives areoften unfulfilled as regional elites please themselves and use office for personalgain. Infrastructural power in such a system can only be weak. State capacityand organizational integrity remain low since policy implementation becomesa matter of choice and convenience, and powerful social groups can pressureofficials for policies that suit them, and corrupt them to get exemptions fromthings like taxation, or to receive favours from the state. In turn, this makes it

The Russian problem 13

difficult for the state to act in the public good, command social respect andprovide services to the public. Social management is thus haphazard, andthere is always the danger that coercion will have to be used in the absence ofmore pacific means of regulating society and political disputes.

Constitutional-patrimonialism is thus an inherently unstable type of stateformation because laws and bureaucratic impersonalism regulate competitionbetween elite groups and society only weakly and are subverted. How coun-tries with such systems may develop is uncertain. Some states that have beenconstitutional-patrimonial in form have developed into constitutional-bureaucratic states through slow processes of transformation, such as theUnited Kingdom.17 Elsewhere, constitutionalism, bureaucracy and patri-mony have coexisted for shorter historical time periods before some shockto the polity has enabled bureaucracy to begin to gain an upper hand overpatrimonialism. An example of this would be modern Italy, which has beenundergoing a legal revolution against political patronage and corruption overthe last decade. Common to both these cases, however, was the fact that aconstitutional regime was secure. Either no one had an interest in seeingabsolutism return or the power to force such a return, and/or external com-mitments and alliances guaranteed the constitutional regime.18 This, how-ever, is not always the case in cases of constitutional-patrimonial stateformations. Constitutional-patrimonial state formations may endure whilstthe political, social and economic conditions develop that may create consti-tutional-bureaucratic state formations. But this may take a long time, if ithappens at all. A danger thus exists that some form of absolutism may becomeattractive to politicians because in the short term it helps them deal with animmediate problem of social breakdown, economic failure, or because itsimply suits their interests to hold on to power by eliminating their rivalsthrough repression and the abandonment of constitutionalism.

Unfortunately, the country we are interested in modern, post-communistRussia is closer to a constitutional-patrimonial state formation than it is to aconstitutional-bureaucratic one. The state is weak and barely able to supportdemocracy, let alone to deepen and consolidate it by promoting a uniform,impersonal administration across the territory of the Russian Federation. TheRussian state has had difficulty adapting to changing circumstances becauseof a lack of resources and has not been able to stabilize the national economy,fund itself, or provide some welfare to its citizens. Consequently, there hasbeen no real safety-cushion for democracy. Since the state is weak and unableto enforce a common set of rules throughout Russia, the rules that it makesand the institutions that make them are held in low esteem. Distributionalconflicts over who gets what from the state have not been kept separate fromarguments about how politics is ordered and what progress has been achievedin building democracy is constantly threatened by politicians seeking someshort-term advantage for themselves and their followers.

Most of the rest of this book is concerned with these failings of the con-temporary Russian state. They are discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 to

14 The Russian problem

5. This discussion needs to take place in context, however, and that is pro-vided in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we will look at the failures of the Tsaristand Soviet states. Both of these states were absolutist, although in very dif-ferent ways. Their despotism did not mean that they were always weak. For atime they were able to create effective organizations, coerce resources fromthe population and sustain the rule of the Romanovs and the CPSU.However, as absolutist states they were less able to adapt to the pressuresto which they were subject. A combination of international competition, theeffects of modernization, ideological rigidity, leadership intransigence andorganizational inflexibility exhausted any earlier signs of state strength thatthey had exhibited. As the pressures on them mounted, both failed dramati-cally.

Chapter 3 examines domestic political developments under PresidentYeltsin to see how Russia tried to cope with the legacies of Soviet collapseby building a new political order. It argues that Yeltsin did not develop apolitical strategy to cope with these problems. Instead, he placed his hopes inan economic strategy (rapid commercialization followed by privatization; thedetails of these policies can be found in Chapter 4), and in the emergencypowers that he had been granted after the failed coup of August 1991. In theabsence of a political strategy, and given the wide range of political problemsfaced by the new regime, Yeltsins emergency powers were not enough toensure political stability whilst economic transformation was carried out.Yeltsin became embroiled in a battle over the Russian Constitution andthe powers and responsibilities of the presidency and the legislatures.Although Yeltsin was to win this battle with the forced closure of the parlia-ment in October 1993 and the introduction of a new Constitution inDecember 1993, he compromised control over government and policy andthis set a pattern for politics under the new Constitution. Yeltsin ruled Russiaby dividing his opponents and creating a confusing array of institutions. Thisincreased Yeltsins personal importance in the Russian political system sincehe was able to mediate between rival interests and institutions, but it meantthat the Russian state became permeated by interest groups so that it lostautonomy; policy formulation and implementation was weakened as statecapacity was compromised and organizational integrity broke down.Officeholding became proprietary and patronage rife, and the 1993Constitution gave too much power to the President, especially as politicalparties are weak, and the representative assembly, the Duma, could not exertgreat influence over the executive.

One consequence of these political failures was the continued weakness ofeconomic reform in Russia. This is detailed in Chapter 4. The reform plansadopted after the collapse of communism in 1991 were very ambitious andtheir success was never guaranteed. However, as political turmoil and com-petition grew, economic reform became impossible to carry out as the refor-mers intended. Chapter 4 details the economic plans of the reformers andtheir failures and how they produced a new hybrid form of economy. This has

The Russian problem 15

been named a virtual economy by some observers since it is an economybased on barter rather than monetary exchange. The nature of this economyand the new forms of social inequality and power it has produced are ana-lysed, as are the Russian governments efforts to deal with it. These effortswere unsuccessful for both political reasons and because of the weakness of theRussian economy in the international economic system. The state was tooweak to act as the guarantor of economic reform and could not gather enoughtaxes to meet its own debt repayments. The result was the collapse of therouble in August 1998 and the default on debt repayments. Ironically, thiscrisis left the Russian economy in what seems to be a healthier state since ithas witnessed some growth in industrial output and GDP since August 1998.However, appearances are deceptive in Russia and the chapter argues thatRussia is still in a weak position w