running head: feminist neuroimaging...

Running head: FEMINIST NEUROIMAGING 1

Feminist Critiques of Neuroimaging Sex/Gender Difference Research

Rebecca Fritz

Program of Gender Studies

University of Notre Dame

May 3, 2018

FEMINIST NEUROIMAGING

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Abstract

Many neuroscientists have used the neuroimaging technology of today in an attempt to

discern the neurological differences between men and women. However, neuroimaging

sex/gender difference research often ignores the input of scholars in the humanities, social

sciences, psychology, etc. This review brings together the fields of feminist scholarship and

neuroscience by reviewing feminist critiques of this research. Ambiguous definitions of sex and

gender as well as the entrenchment of stereotypes and preconceptions skews neuroscience

towards a limited understanding of sex/gender categories. Further, low sample size, prevalence

of false positives, within-group analysis, and publication/citation bias decrease the reliability,

validity, and statistical power of these studies. Finally, results are interpreted in such a way that

the influence of neuroplasticity goes largely unaccounted for, and structure and function are

assumed to be directly related, causing a restricted and essentialist view of sex/gender. Further

integration of gender knowledge into neuroscience may ameliorate these weaknesses.

Keywords: sex/gender, neuroimaging, publication bias, neuroplasticity


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Introduction

The rapidly flourishing field of neuroscience has seen immense growth in recent decades.

With the development of functional magnetic resonance imaging machines, scientists’

knowledge about the brain is more expansive than ever before, and continues to grow. Recently,

this field of scientific inquiry has set its sights on a common debate: differences between men

and women. Many neuroscientists have used modern technology to try to discern the

neurological differences between men and women. Typically, these studies require men and

women to be exposed to the same stimuli, while neuroimaging (NI) technology gathers data on

their brain activity during exposure. For clarity, this specific field of neuroscientific inquiry will

be referred to as “NI sex/gender difference research” throughout this review. A discussion of the

use of “sex/gender” is provided as one of the first topics in the body of this review.

Neuroscience (broadly) and NI sex/gender difference research (specifically) largely

ignore the input of scholars from the humanities, social sciences, psychology, etc. In particular,

gender studies and feminist scholars have developed a large body of work on gender, sex, other

intersecting identities, and their differences that reflect the power structures of our society. While

the broader movement of feminism contains countless definitions of this term within it, a

generally feminist approach to science is one that carefully considers the constructed nature of

gender categories and uses knowledge of these categories to evaluate both the ideas that society

and culture glean from them, and their intersection with the human element of scientific inquiry

(Valentine, 2008).

Given that neuroscience is enamored with determining neurological sex/gender

differences, it seems logical that such inquiry should include input from the fields of academia

that focus specifically on understanding sex and gender. Thus, the paper will review critiques


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grounded in feminist theory and gender studies of neuroscience research practices within the

field of NI sex/gender difference research. The critique will be broken up into two sections:

definitions and preconceptions, and interpretations of results. In first section, the review will

cover definitions of sex and gender, biases that affect the research questions that get asked, the

prevalence of false positives, the danger of small sample sizes, the use of within-group analyses

to make conclusions between groups, and publication/citation bias. The second section will

discuss why NI sex/gender difference research must carefully consider the principle of

neuroplasticity and work to challenge the assumption of a causal relationship between neural

structure and function/behavior.

Feminist Critiques

Definitions and Preconceptions

Definitions of sex and gender. Feminist scholars highlight one main critique of

neuroscientific research on sex/gender differences that is rooted in an analysis of the

methodology employed in neuroscience studies. A thorough review of the critiques of

neuroscientific methodology in these studies must begin with questioning terms used by

neuroscientists. Nikoleyczik (2012) rightfully points out a major flaw in a number of cognitive

science and neuroscience studies regarding sex and gender: The studies themselves frequently do

not define the terms sex and gender. This may be because “gender” and “sex” are commonly

understood to be self-explanatory, though feminist scholars and scholars of sex and gender

would strongly disagree (Nikoleyczik, 2012). According to Nikoleyczik (2012), most papers that

study sex/gender-based neurological differences not only fail to define the terms “sex” and

“gender,” but also use these terms interchangeably and often prioritize an explanation related to


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hormones or evolutionary theory over an understanding of gender as a powerful and influential

socio-cultural concept.

Feminist scholars and social scientists alike often take a social constructivist approach to

understanding sex and gender. Nikoleyczik (2012) provides a feminist, social constructivist view

of gender as “a cultural inscription on the naturally sexed body” (p. 234). That is to say, gender

is not a naturally occurring phenomenon, but is created by culture and imposed on individuals by

culture (Nikoleyczik, 2012). Sex, too, can be considered to be socially constructed; feminist

scholars argue that sex is neither a determinant of gender nor completely separate from

conceptions of gender (Nikoleyczik, 2012). While some feminist scholars disagree on the exact

definition of sex (Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012; Nikoleyczik, 2012), the general consensus is

that sex is irrevocably influenced by cultural definitions of gender (Jordan-Young & Rumiati,

2012); the medical categorization of physical anatomy is rendered meaningless without careful

consideration of how gender may impact these definitions and categories (Nikoleyczik, 2012).

To be sure, the terms “gender” and “sex” are difficult (perhaps impossible) to fully separate, and

similarly difficult to define in such a way that all parties fully agree (Nikoleyczik, 2012).

However, within feminist academic circles, scholars agree that these terms have distinct

meanings and must be treated as distinct concepts (Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012).

According to gender and feminist scholars, sex is considered to be a constructed category

based on anatomical features, such as the presence of a penis, while gender refers to “culture-

bound conventions, roles, and behaviors” (Nikoleyczik, 2012, p. 234). Furthermore, gender is

multi-dimensional and performative; gender identity, how one perceives oneself within the

gender binary, and gender expression, how one presents oneself according to preset cultural

expectations of specific genders, are two ways in which gender may be manifested. In the field


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of NI sex/gender difference research, it is not clear which dimension of gender is meant when the

term “gender” is used (Nikoleyczik, 2012). Gender and feminist scholars argue that both

categories are informed by social and cultural values and a heavy reliance on a binary system.

However, without an understanding of the distinction between gender and sex, the research

questions posed by sex/gender-difference neuroscience lack a comprehensive and culturally

conscious perspective, allowing for vague and sometimes misleading results. Within the

biological and medical scientific community, one’s gender is often assumed to follow from one’s

sex category, which is not always an accurate assumption.

This assumption is also known as essentialism, or the claim that “there are natural kinds

whose members share a common essence” (Haslam & Whelan, 2008, p. 1297). In the case of

gender, an essentialist perspective is one that treats sexual anatomy as a signifier for a certain

category – gender – and the members of that category share deep-seated similarities because of

this observable external similarity (Haslam & Whelan, 2008). Neuroscientists in NI sex/gender

difference research often employ an essentialist perspective in their work, which is demonstrated

by the collapse of the distinction between sex and gender. By failing to provide adequate

definitions of the terms, neuroscientists suggest that sex and gender are interchangeable and thus

indistinguishable from one another. This reduces gender to mere anatomy and limits possible

knowledge about the nuances of gender and sex as complex sociocultural constructs.

While I understand and advocate for a separation of the definitions of sex and gender, the

treatment of these concepts by neuroscience makes it incredibly difficult to utilize appropriately

nuanced and accurate definitions of these terms while reviewing the current literature. To avoid

further confusion on this matter, the term “sex/gender” will be used throughout this review when

referring to studies that are focused on discerning the differences in brain activity and patterns


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between men and women, because the research that will be critiqued fails to provide operational

definitions for these crucial terms.

Biases influencing empirical inquiry. Included in this broad topic of methodological

critique is an analysis of the specific research questions that are developed, and for what purpose.

In the neurological research of sex/gender differences, researchers have a tendency to prioritize

questions that emphasize possible disparity of responses between men and women (Roy, 2012).

While this may indeed be a critique applicable to science on the whole, it is especially important

to acknowledge the the implications of this tendency when the brain is the focus, considering the

sensitivity of discussions of sex/gender and gender. In her recent article, “Neuroethics, Gender

and the Response to Difference,” Roy (2012) argues that scientists interested in doing this work

must identify what their true goal is in pursuing this knowledge. Roy (2012) makes an important

distinction between conducting research to explore sex/gender-based neurological difference for

the sake of attaining a greater understanding of individual difference, or for the sake of creating a

divide between men and women. To drive her point home, Roy (2012) considers the historical

19th-century practice of phrenology, which was a specific study of the brain that relied on skull

size to determine one’s intelligence, character, and mental capacity. This pseudoscience allowed

for racist and sexist beliefs to be supported by medical research, thereby legitimizing the practice

of discrimination against certain races (Roy, 2012). White Europeans, who were responsible for

the introduction of phrenology, based their inquiries on a preconception that non-white and non-

male individuals were less capable and less intelligent than their white male counterparts. Thus,

the claims borne of this discipline focused on skull size were used to denigrate other races.

The characteristics of the producers of scientific and empirical knowledge have remained

largely unchanged; the field of neuroscientific research is still composed primarily of white men,


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as are a number of other fields of scientific inquiry. Thus, Roy (2012) has reason to be concerned

that new technologies for studying the brain could be used as tools of oppression for already

marginalized groups, such as women. Evidence proclaiming significant differences between

female and male brains has the potential to crystallize notions of female inferiority (Bluhm,

2013; Roy, 2012). The example of phrenology illustrates how scientific research (whether or not

it is truly scientific, so long as it is held up as scientific fact) can and will be used in service of

the machinery of white heteropatriarchy, particularly if said scientific research is created by the

society’s privileged groups, which it often is.

In this way, neuroscience cannot be considered to be untouched by social and cultural

factors. Despite the tendency to hold up the natural sciences as a paragon of objectivity, “the

facts, theories and practices that emerge from brain research are always cultural and historical

products, with particular political and economic trajectories” (Vrecko, 2012). That is to say,

neuroscience is and always will be colored by sociocultural, human factors (Vrecko, 2012). For

example, the pervasive nature of gender scripts, or how we expect individuals to act based on

their gender presentation, affects neuroscientific research as much as it affects interpersonal

interactions. In this review, NI sex/gender difference research is recognized as a product of

cultural and historical understandings of what certain anatomical features mean for an

individual’s gender identity, and by extension, their specific strengths, weaknesses, personality

traits and so on.

For example, in a number of studies examined by Roy (2012), researchers explored the

neural-based responses to visual sexual stimuli in men and women (Gizewski et al., 2006;

Hamann, Herman, Nolan, & Wallen, 2004; Takahashi et al., 2006). In these studies, participants

were separated into male and female groups, which clearly demonstrates that the studies


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themselves relied on the prevailing assumption that men and women respond differently to visual

sexual stimuli (Roy, 2012). The studies did not question the previously constructed groups or the

preconceptions of the researchers (Roy, 2012). For example, Gizewski et al. (2006) claim in their

introduction that men respond more strongly to visual erotic experience “according to common

experience” (p. 102). To be fair, Gizewski et al. (2006) also cite a number of scientific articles to

support their assumption. However, the inclusion without questioning of a source that - as it is

presented - seems to rely solely on anecdotal evidence indicates that Gizewski et al. (2006) are

not interested in questioning the stereotypes and assumptions that the previous literature has

passed down.

Another study described by Roy (2012) serves as an example of how preconceptions can

cause researchers to interpret results in a way that is more favorable to normative cultural

understandings of sex/gender. Takahashi et al. (2006) posited their study as a way to understand

domestic violence, which is undoubtedly an important global issue that should be addressed

(Roy, 2012). Results indicated that men show more activation in the hypothalamus and

amygdala, which the authors claimed to be centers of production of sexual and aggressive

behaviors (Roy, 2012). The brain areas referenced as the cause of male aggression – the

hypothalamus and the amygdala – serve a number of purposes in the brain. For example,

scientists widely recognize the amygdala as also responsible for the fear response; however, this

interpretation was left out of the analysis of the the study’s results. Roy (2012) criticized the

study, arguing that they failed to contribute any new meaningful information to the discourse

surrounding domestic violence. Instead, the study in question served to uphold the problematic

and dangerous stereotype that men have an innate tendency toward violence (Roy, 2012). Studies

such as the ones that Roy (2012) examined suggest that male aggression/violence is biological, a


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claim allegedly supported by the activation of the amygdala and the hypothalamus when jealousy

is experienced. When men are seen as “biologically” aggressive and violent, that behavior is

often excused, which puts women and gender/sexual minorities at risk. Thus, the researchers’

division of participants into sex/gender categories with differences justifies the dominance of a

specific sex/gender in cultural and social settings.

According to the critique presented by Roy (2012), neuroscientists’ obsession with

discovering neurological sex/gender-based differences does not bode well for women or

gender/sexual minorities, groups that are often marginalized to begin with under the regime of

white patriarchy. A number of consequences can be imagined here; neuroscientific research has

the capacity to influence legislation, reify cultural norms, and even shape personal

understandings of selfhood (Vrecko, 2010). In the previously given example of domestic

violence, results indicating “natural” male aggression may afford perpetrators of abuse the

benefit of the doubt, or legal advantages that may not be deserved. Since the research questions

themselves guide the course of scientific discovery, feminists have critiqued the frequent use of

division of the sex/genders in the development of neuroscientific inquiry. In the specific field of

NI sex/gender difference research, division by sex/gender category lends itself well to a cultural,

political, legal, and social reinforcement of preexisting stereotypes and roles.

False positives. Questions about the use of divisive language in research aside, feminist

scientists and scholars have also offered a number of other critiques of this field’s

methodological approach. Like any field of empirical research, neuroscience is capable of

producing errors. One such error is the Type I error, or a false positive. A false positive occurs

when researchers incorrectly reject a null hypothesis: in other words, when statistical

significance is found for a result when there is no true difference, or the result is due to chance


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(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). False positives are, according to Simmons et al.

(2011), quite costly mistakes. Once false positives are found, they persist throughout the

literature, often causing further research into a fruitless inquiry and wasting time and resources

(Simmons et al., 2011).

A psychologist known for writing on the intersections of gender and neuroscience,

Cordelia Fine, regularly provides critique of NI sex/gender differences research. Her work

integrates gender knowledge with a comprehensive understanding of statistics and data analysis,

making her critiques less philosophical than those posed by critics discussed thus far. Fine’s

perspective focuses on the specific methodologies used in the design of studies and the analysis

of results, as well as the factors that influence publication. Fine (2013) suggests that false

positives may be a large issue in sex/gender-difference neuroscientific research. NI sex/gender

difference research often seeks to discover one specific difference between men and women, and

its inquiries are fairly easily imagined and tested (Fine, 2013). Fine (2013) reminds consumers of

neuroscientific NI sex/gender difference research that the conventional measure for statistical

significance indicates that five out of one hundred significant results occur due to chance. As

Fine (2013) puts it, “if twenty researchers routinely test for sex differences then, even if there is

no real difference between the populations, one researcher will find a statistically significant

difference” (p. 371). That is to say, in the field of NI sex/gender difference research, where

evidence based on small sample sizes is used to claim a significant difference between the

sex/genderes, the result of a single study is not necessarily reliable (Fine, 2013). Fine (2013)

argues that the prevalence of false positives is not as widely recognized and attended to within

the field of NI sex/gender difference research as it perhaps should be, in the interest of upholding

the integrity of the research.


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One explanation for the occurrence of false positives in NI sex/gender difference research

is presented by Hyde (2014), who discusses at length the statistical analyses often utilized in NI

sex/gender difference research. For context, Hyde (2014) favors the idea of identifying gender

similarities: the hypothesis that the genders are more alike than they are different deserves to be

tested, and researchers should focus on discovering similarities instead of difference. A number

of theories support this idea. For one, while some evolutionary scientists may argue that the

process of sexual selection naturally creates gender differences, the strength of natural selection,

a genderless process, outweighs that of sexual selection (Hyde, 2014). Sociocultural and

cognitive social learning theories suggest that as social and cultural conditions improve for

marginalized genders, all genders will feel more comfortable pursuing gender-unconventional

pathways and skills (Hyde, 2014). Thus, it will be important in the future to test extensively for

gender similarities, as these theories expect to see the similarities grow (Hyde, 2014).

Unfortunately, the statistical methods used in NI sex/gender difference research rely on the

scientific convention of searching for difference, producing evidence that the genders are more

different than they are alike – the opposite of the gender similarities theories (Hyde, 2014). The

predominant method takes a linear combination of a number of variables, which, according to

Hyde (2014), yields results that are difficult to interpret and whose difference is maximized. This

maximization of difference in a specific statistical method is one example of how false positives

may occur within NI sex/gender difference research.

Sample size. Sample size is another factor that makes studies particularly vulnerable to

false positives (Rippon, Jordan-Young, Kaiser, & Fine, 2014; Simmons et al., 2011). Small

sample sizes make results difficult to generalize to the larger population and renders the

statistical power of the study in question much lower than if the sample size were larger (Rippon


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et al., 2014). In the context of NI sex/gender difference research, the gender similarities theories

as well as measured empirical data suggest greater similarity between the genders than difference

(Hyde, 2014; Rippon et al., 2014). Given this well-supported conclusion, researchers must

consider the amount of overlap between the genders (Rippon et al., 2014). Considering the

amount of overlap between the genders, the effect measured in most cases will likely be marginal

(Rippon et al., 2014). Thus, a large sample size is necessary to adequately measure reliable

differences (Rippon et al., 2014).

In order to illustrate the prevalence of small sample sizes in the field of NI sex/gender

difference research, Fine (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of sorts. The study involved

searching several databases for articles whose titles included the phrase “sex difference” in order

to investigate the typical sample sizes for different studies in NI sex/gender difference research.

Fine (2013) collected thirty-nine articles that fulfilled her criteria. After careful analysis of the

studies’ sample sizes, she found that the average number of males included in the studies was

19.0 and that the average number of females included in the studies was 18.5 (Fine, 2013). In

studies that made sex-by-age comparisons, greater sample sizes were required for statistical

analysis, so the average number of male and female participants increased to 32.7 and 26.3,

respectively, among these studies (Fine, 2013). In studies that examined sex-by-group effects,

the mean sample sizes were 11.9 males and 11.4 females per subgroup (Fine, 2013). When Fine

(2013) eliminated the sex-by-group and sex-by-age comparative studies, the mean sample sizes

for studies that looked solely at sex/gender comparisons were 13.5 and 13.8 for male and female

participants, respectively.

Fine (2013) argues that the sample sizes used in this research endeavor are insufficient to

generalize to the larger population. According to her analysis, “the majority of studies had (a


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mean of) fifteen or fewer participants of each sex in each of their groups of interest” (Fine, 2013,

p. 374). Fine (2013) also found that it was equally as likely for a study to have fewer than ten

participants as it was for a study to have greater than twenty participants, regardless of the nature

of the comparison. Given that these studies are representative of the field of NI sex/gender

difference research, as they all referred to sex/gender differences as their primary topic in the

title of the article, it may be concluded from Fine’s (2013) analysis that the sample sizes used to

assess sex/gender differences neurologically may not be sufficient to draw significant

conclusions that apply to the general public.

Within-group analyses. Another statistical failing of the field of sex/gender differences

research is its reliance on within-group analyses (Bluhm, 2013; Rippon et al., 2014). Within-

group analyses determine average measures of a variable in the groups that are tested and

compare the average measures, instead of comparing between groups directly (Bluhm, 2013).

Researchers in the field of sex/gender difference neuroscience often conduct within-group

analysis and report differences between sex/genders based on this analysis, when no direct

comparison has actually been made between the groups (Bluhm, 2013; Rippon et al., 2014). For

example, a NI sex/gender difference study claiming a significant difference may show that in the

male group tested, there was a level of activity in a certain brain area that reached significance,

while in the women no significant activity was found (Bluhm, 2013). In this case, the

neuroscientists have assumed that, because that brain area was significantly active in men and

not in women, that brain area is more active in men than in women in a certain situation (Bluhm,

2013). This may or may not be true, depending on the degree of significance in both groups;

their activity levels may actually be quite similar (Bluhm, 2013). This kind of analysis disguises


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differences within groups and produces statistical significance when it may not be accurate to

claim (Bluhm, 2013).

When variability within groups is minimized or masked altogether, understandings of the

groups are limited. It is a restrictive approach not only to sex/gender, but science as well. The

findings of such studies are destined to generalize, producing limited knowledge about the

research question. Furthermore, the failure to base claims of group differences on a comparison

between groups is irresponsible and misleading. Within-group analysis may also be a

contributing factor to the prevalence of false positives within the field of NI sex/gender

difference research.

Publication and citation bias. Even after studies have been conducted and reported on,

the method by which this information is published and circulated is biased towards a certain kind

of result. Fine (2013) notes the problem of publication bias in the field of NI sex/gender

difference research; very few studies reporting no difference between groups – including the

sex/genders – are published in academic journals or held up as important discoveries. Instead, an

analysis of the literature suggests that the field is significantly more interested in reporting on

difference between the sex/genderes (Fine, 2013). It is, after all, the field of NI sex/gender

difference research, not sex/gender similarity research. At any rate, this publication bias only

serves to reinforce the preexisting hypothesis that there are significant neurological differences

between men and women, instead of approaching the inquiry of sex/gender difference

holistically and also allowing for the dissemination of studies that discover no significant

difference, but instead significant similarity, especially when differences are expected (Fine,

2013).


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It has recently been shown that none of the differences found in the field of NI sex/gender

difference research have been consistently repeated (Wallentin, 2009, cited in Dussauge, 2012).

Clearly, the field has trouble demonstrating reliability – likely for all of the reasons discussed

thus far. This fact also suggests that the evidence of the field of NI sex/gender difference

research could simply reflect a haphazard assortment of differences found, as a result of the

publication bias in favor of studies that claim statistically significant differences between the

sex/genders.

A deeper dive into this phenomenon reveals that publication bias is, in a way, cyclical in

nature. Fine (2013) claims that once a certain study is published and becomes part of the

accepted literature on the topic, other researchers may cite it in ways exaggerate the magnitude

of the major finding of the study. In the specific example of NI sex/gender difference research

and publication bias, researchers looking to use previously published studies as citations may

focus on evidence within a study that supports the idea of neurological sex/gender differences,

instead of acknowledging other findings that illustrate or support neurological similarities

between men and women (Fine, 2013).

Independent of her sample-size meta-analysis, Fine (2013) investigates one such study by

Shaywitz et al. (1995) by considering closely how the study has been cited by other researchers.

To be clear, the study by Shaywitz et al. (1995) found statistical evidence of sex/gender

differences in the functional organization of the brain with regards to phonological processing –

that is, the comprehension of spoken and written language. However, the study also revealed no

difference between men and women with regards to brain activity for orthographic and semantic

processing (Shaywitz et al., 1995). Orthographic processing refers to the use of the visual system

to form, store, and recall words, and semantic processing refers to the mental relationships


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formed between words based on their definitions. Furthermore, several meta-analyses were

conducted that presented compelling evidence regarding gender differences in phonological

processing contradictory to the Shaywitz et al. (1995) study. In her investigation into publication

and citation bias, Fine (2013) determined that the Shaywitz et al. (1995) study had been cited

ninety-two times in a two year period, and that seventy-five of those citations could be included

in Fine’s analysis. Studies were excluded if they were not written in English, if they

misrepresented the premise or inquiry of the study, or if they did not use the results of the

Shaywitz et al. (1995) study to speak about gender/sex/gender specifically (Fine, 2013).

The investigation revealed that only three of the seventy-five citations referred to the

failure to find sex/gender differences in orthographic and semantic processing in the Shaywitz et

al. (1995) study (Fine, 2013). To the authors’ credit, several studies did clarify that the

sex/gender difference applied specifically to phonological processing (Fine, 2013). However, the

remaining citations neglected to report the overwhelming absence of significant differences in

the study, and instead focused on the small section of the study that did, in fact, report difference

(Fine, 2013). The exposure of these practices suggests that even after the influence of publication

bias, there is a kind of citation bias, which is enacted when other scientists and researchers

choose specific results to highlight in their own studies (Fine, 2013). At times, this may result in

a misrepresentation of the evidence gathered in the original study. In the case of sex/gender

differences, this citation bias creates a cycle where researchers depend upon previous findings of

difference, however weak they may be, to fuel their own inquiries and conclusions about

neurological sex/gender differences. This cycle upholds traditional understandings of gender and

forces neurological research to remain constricted by the gender and sex binary, which, in

essence, is to remain constricted in a system of patriarchal power.


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A system that depends on a binary of both sex and gender necessarily upholds the

dominance of one group over another, while erasing any variability of the categories it has

created. Patriarchy is fueled by the subjugation of other sex/gender categories, just as white

supremacy relies on the disenfranchisement of people of color (and in fact, these two systems are

intimately linked). That is to say, dominant groups under white patriarchy hold a vested interest

in creating clear and distinct gender boundaries, because it simplifies the process of maintaining

power. When groups are clearly divided, they are easier to control.

Interpretation of Results

The feminist and methodological critiques of neuroscientific research with specific

regards to sex/gender differences have been presented and explained above, but this is not the

extent of scholarly critique. Although feminist scholars are by no means the only academics in

the business of critiquing neuroscience, a significant portion of feminist critique centers on the

interpretation of the research in question: specifically, NI sex/gender difference research.

Interpretations of scientific results are often informed by a pre-existing theory, that

carries with it certain assumptions. The following section will discuss which theories are

employed in interpretations of NI sex/gender difference research, which are not, and what

assumptions these theories rely upon. The theories discussed are that of neuroplasticity and the

relationship between structure and function.

Neuroplasticity. The first of the critiques of interpretation relates to a failure to take

neuroplasticity into account when researching neurological sex/gender differences. The concept

of neuroplasticity – a widely accepted phenomenon amongst neuroscientists – indicates the brain

will be responsive to the influences of the environment (Fine, Jordan-Young, Kaiser, & Rippon,

2013; Kraus, 2012). Neuroplasticity is the notion that the brain has the capacity to change over


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the course of one’s lifespan (Kraus, 2012). The brain responds to environmental factors and life

experiences, and adjusts accordingly. Feminists hold up this principle of neuroscience as an

opening for critique of NI sex/gender difference research. In terms of gender and sex,

neuroplasticity suggests that the gendered and sexed components of one’s environment shapes

one’s brain; thus, neuroscientists should be critical of results that indicate neurological

differences based on biological sex, since those differences could be created by the individual’s

experience living in a gendered and sexed body (Fine, Jordan-Young, Kaiser, & Rippon, 2013;

Kraus, 2012). Again, this point does not belong solely to gender and feminist scholars, but it is a

consistent with feminist critique.

If the brain has the capacity to change over the course of one’s life in response to specific

experiences and exposure to any given stimuli, then it becomes incredibly difficult to determine

whether any neurological activity can be determined solely by biological factors associated with

sex/gender. In this way, the principle of plasticity challenges deterministic brain studies, or those

that link brain structure or function in a specific scenario to a constructed identity such as gender,

sex/gender, race, etc (Kraus, 2012). Kraus (2012) emphasizes that the concept of plasticity

suggests the importance of the influence of social structures on the brain; human growth and

development should not be seen as completely determined by neurological and biological agents

and processes but also influenced by the social and environmental factors at play. Focusing too

much on the importance of biology in understanding gender bolsters the essentialist perspective

that neuroscience currently holds regarding gender.

In another critique centering on plasticity, Fine (2013) compares the reliance on fMRI

studies to produce reliable knowledge about neurological sex/gender differences to taking a

picture with a camera. Just as no information can be gleaned from a “snapshot” of the past, no


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information can be gleaned from fMR images about what factors occurred in the past to shape

the brain in this specific way (Fine, 2013). Thus, the use of imaging studies to conduct NI

sex/gender difference research necessarily ignores the principle of neural plasticity. At present,

neurological studies of sex/gender differences based on imaging have no way of accounting for

the effects of past experience on brain development and function.

In fact, many feminist scholars argue that the significant results that may be produced in

NI sex/gender difference research are a result of an individual living in a gendered and

sex/gendered environment (Fine, 2013; Fine et al., 2013; Kraus, 2012). Per the definition of

gender from Nikoleyczik (2012), which argues that gender is inscribed on the body, feminist

scholars argue that gender may also be inscribed on the brain through gender-related

experiences. To support this idea, Fine (2013) draws on the example of stereotype threat.

Stereotype threat can be defined as a phenomenon that indicates individual performance on

certain tasks is influenced by the prevalent stereotypes about that individual’s identity (Fine,

2013). For example, young girls perform better on mathematical tasks when the task de-

emphasizes the stereotype that girls are bad at mathematics (Fine, 2013). Were there to be

neurological imaging NI sex/gender difference research done on these young women, it is quite

possible that there would be a significant difference in the brain activity of those girls who were

exposed to the stereotype and those who were not. Given an all-female sample, if differences in

mathematical ability were found, it would be clear that these differences were not due to

sex/gender. However, NI sex/gender difference research often excludes the possibility that

individuals’ brains may be affected and shaped by factors other than biological sex by not

designing research that explores the effect of plasticity.


21

To further illustrate this point, scholar Ginger Hoffman describes brain activity as ever-

changing and impermanent (Hoffman, 2012). She writes that when a person shifts their gaze

from one object to another (for example, when shifting one’s gaze from one’s computer to one’s

desk drawer to look for a pencil), that person’s brain activity looks different (Hoffman, 2012).

Based on this example, Hoffman argues that “assessing brain activity at any given point in time

in no way implies that that activity will be there forever, or even a long time” (Hoffman, 2012, p.

34). This echoes previous discussions of plasticity; it is clear that many feminists and

neuroscience researchers do not find the current model of measuring brief neural patterns in

response to specific stimuli to be an accurate or reliable method for researching neurological

sex/gender differences. According to Hoffman (2012), a wealth of research indicates that

environmental differences in childhood and early development have the ability to promote as

well as inhibit brain development. Hoffman (2012) concedes that the brain may not be infinitely

malleable, and that this question is one to be explored further by neuroscientific research.

However, a difference shown in an fMRI study does not imply any sort of fixedness (Hoffman,

2012).

Assumed relationships between structure and function. Similar to the reductive nature

of ignoring properties of neuroplasticity, the field of NI sex/gender difference research also

assumes a linear connection between brain structure and human behavior or function (Jordan-

Young & Rumiati, 2012; Roy, 2012). In her article, “Neuroethics, Gender and the Response to

Difference,” Roy (2012) advocates for a more complicated understanding of the human brain.

Roy’s (2012) critique rests on the idea that neuroscientists in this field ignore the principle of

neuroplasticity; she warns against assuming that differences in anatomy suggest differences in

behavior. In other words, when neuroscientists ignore the importance of neuroplasticity in


22

understanding gender, they encourage an understanding that brain function is determined by

brain structure. Roy (2012) argues that instead, neuroscientists should entertain – and even

explore – the notion of a more complex relationship between structure and function, suggesting

NI sex/gender difference research studies that explore how multiple structures may be linked to a

specific function, or how multiple functions may be linked to a specific structure.

Similarly, Jordan-Young & Rumiati (2012) work to dismantle the “hard-wired” paradigm

that permeates popular understandings of NI sex/gender difference research. The authors argue

that the paradigm is unethical and misleading for a number of reasons, including the argument of

neuroplasticity discussed above. The “hard-wired” paradigm presents human behavior as a direct

output of neural activity in specific brain structures heavily – and perhaps solely – shaped by

biological sex (Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012). In this way, the paradigm reduces possible

relationships between sex/gender and behavior to an overly-simplistic, linear, and essentialist

connection. By considering the brain to be “hard-wired,” neuroscientists also assume gender to

be “hard-wired” in a way that drastically limits the range of human expression and experience.

Furthermore, when brain structure and function are assumed to be directly related,

reverse inferences are often made. According to Rippon et al. (2014), reverse inferences occur

when “activation in particular brain regions is taken to equate to a specific mental process and,

by extension, differences in activation can be taken to indicated differences in ability or

efficiency” (p. 8). In other words, reverse inference allows one to map stereotypes onto measured

effects (Rippon et al., 2014). Thus, the assumption of a direct relationship between structure and

function increases the likelihood of the field of NI sex/gender difference research to be used to

reinforce stereotypes and disenfranchise certain groups.


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Conclusions

The field of NI sex/gender difference research, a growing area of neuroscience, aims to

explore possible neurobiological bases of sex/gender in humans. For a topic that deals with

complex, sensitive topics such as sex and gender, it is shocking how little knowledge from

gender and feminist scholars – the academics who spend their time, energy, and resources

conceptualizing sex and gender in responsible and comprehensive ways – is incorporated into the

field. Integration of these fields, or at least dialogue between them, would allow for more

responsible science in the area of NI sex/gender difference research.

Feminist scientists and scholars critique NI sex/gender difference research on the basis of

definitions, preconceptions, and interpretations. First, neuroscientists typically fail to

differentiate between sex and gender (Nikoleyczik, 2012), two terms that have quite different

meanings within the field of gender studies (Jordan-Young & Rumiati, 2012). Neuroscientists

also use surprisingly small sample sizes in these studies, which leaves the research more

vulnerable to false positives, or Type 1 errors (Fine, 2013; Rippon et al., 2014). Within-group

statistical analyses presented as comparisons between groups misrepresent measured differences

as more meaningful than they may actually be (Bluhm, 2013). Finally, even after the studies are

developed, conducted, and written up, publication is more likely to be afforded to studies that

present difference instead of similarity (Fine, 2013; Hyde, 2014). The same pattern of focusing

on differences holds true for citations as well (Fine, 2013).

Feminist scientists and scholars also point out that NI sex/gender difference research

ignores neuroplasticity as a possible explanation for differences between the sex/genders (Kraus,

2012). An understanding of neuroplasticity suggests that behavior and function cannot be

essentialized to one’s assigned sex at birth, since the brain constantly changes and grows in


24

response to life experience (Kraus, 2012). Furthermore, the same idea – that biological and

anatomical qualities serve as the reasons for certain behaviors or brain function – upholds the

neuroscientific assumption that brain structure is directly related to function. A more complex

understanding of the relationship between structure and function would be a more responsible

and comprehensive approach to grasping concepts of neurological function (Roy, 2012).

Given the historical and continuing obsession with determining differences between the

sexes, it is understandable that neuroscience as a field of inquiry is interested in addressing these

differences. However, neuroscientists have a responsibility to treat this problem with care, and

could learn a great deal about the relationship between the brain and sex and gender if they

consider the perspectives of the scholars that devote their career to studies these categories.

Inclusion of gender knowledge in sex difference research has the capacity to inform the field in a

constructive and positive way that allows for responsible science to be produced within the

setting of a white, capitalist patriarchy.


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