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The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 1

Running head: Engaging the Enemy

Engaging the Enemy

Michael R. Vest

Jeff Codner

Terrorism – Motivations and Adversaries SMGT 424

August 10, 2012


Abstract

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party or the PKK is a terrorist organization that started in 1974,

gained notoriety in 1978, and was classified as a terrorist group by much of the world by 2006.

The PKK started out with the intention of helping the Kurdistan people fight the Turkish regime

for a free nation in which to live. They started out as nonviolent but eventually moved towards

violence as a tool for freedom. They mainly operate out of Turkey but have operations in Europe

and the Middle-East. The PKK has become more of a criminal syndicate than an organization

fighting for freedom. Much of their income comes from criminal activates that have now been

seized by nations that were once their allies. As the PKK moved into the realm of being

classified on many countries “terrorist list”, the PKK came face-to-face with anti-terrorism

tactics that put them into place. What was once an organization of 26,000+ has now been

dwindled down to a membership of less than 5,000 in 2012. Even parts of this 5,000 are victims

of PKK kidnapping that force individuals to fight for the PKK as members are killed off in

battle. Finally, we will look at what strategies a security manager can take against an

organization like the PKK in hardening their facilities. The PKK is still a formidable foe but its

end is near unless something drastic occurs to change their course of action, otherwise the PKK

will be around but more as a thorn than as an entity to be recognized.


Engaging the Enemy

Introduction

The Kurdistan Worker’s Party or the PKK as it is commonly known is a terrorist

organization that has been around since 1974 and continues to conduct battle operations in

Turkey, Europe, and the Middle-East. The PKK is an organization that has a colorful history

throughout its years in action. Today we will look at the organization and it terrorist

classification along with its history and base of operations. We will further look at how the

organization’s finances, motivations, and ideology have created enemies across the world.

Finally, we will look at their tactics and locations of attacks and methods of anti-terrorism that

have been successful against the group, and see where the future of the PKK is headed in the

future.

The PKK and its classification

Although the PKK has been in operation since 1974 and originally founded as more of

freedom fighters then terrorist, they did not become an officially identified terrorist group until

around the 1990s (Foundation of American Scientists, unknown). In 2006, Iraq finally added the

PKK to their terrorist group list (Zalman, unknown). Today, they are known as one of the

bloodiest terrorist groups in existence based upon their actions throughout their inception.

The PKK follows more of the leftist-wing philosophy in that they believe in fighting for

the right of the people over an oppressive or corrupt government. They have focused on bringing

down a government so that a new one can be introduced that is more in lines for the Kurdistan

people (Martin, 2013). Following initially a Marxist-Leninist roots, the PKK has strayed from its

initial roots and has focused on more of becoming a Nationalist Dissident group. A National


Dissident group typically believes in being the champion of a people that have distinguished

their culture, religious, ethnic, or racial heritage (Martin, 2013).

The PKK has also been awarded the “terrorist group” designator because its tactics have

changed from their initial guerilla tactics to more terroristic tactics. As one follows the actions of

the PKK, one can see that the PKK is following more of a subrevolutionary terrorism mindset

and practice. A subrevolutionary terrorism mindset is where a group focuses on the threat or use

of political violence aimed at changing various aspects of a popular political system but not

having the full intent of destroying the system (Martin, 2013).

The history of the PKK shows an organization that once followed peaceful measures to

achieve their goals but eventually strayed into the realm of violence that escalated to tactics that

are now associated with the designator “terrorism tactics”. It is these tactics that has helped the

PKK to achieve a “terrorist group” designator in many countries across the world to a point that

their true mission is hindered. This is a hard pill to swallow when one looks at its early history of

the PKK and follows it path to becoming a terrorist group.

PKK Organizational and Developmental History

The PKK was originally founded in 1974 by Abdullah Ocalan and a small group of

radical followers that were primarily of Turkish Kurds decent. The organization did not obtain

official notoriety until 1978. At the peak of its membership, the PKK had over 26,000 members;

however, with the arresting of its leader in 1999 and the takeover of hard-liner militant

leadership, the PKK has only been able to maintain about 4,000 to 5,000 members. It is even

believed that the membership numbers are more around 1,000 or less.

The initial belief of the PKK followers was a Marxist-Lenis that believed in the seeking

the right for an independent state for the Kurdistan people (Bruno, 2007). The initial start of the


PKK movement was typically non-violent and used tactics such as rallies at colleges and other

public locations; however, there were members of the group that believed that violence was the

only answer to establishing a Kurdistan state that would be free of the oppression of the Turkish

government.

The PKK stayed off of the radar until 1984. During this time, the PKK primarily focused

on consolidating its resources and powerbase in preparation for actions. It was during this time

that the PKK took small actions against Turkish Security Forces and forced their leader to seek

refuge in Syria during the 80’s. It was during the 80’s that the violent actions of the PKK

escalated and started to erupt and generated an estimated toll of 30,000 casualties against the

Turkish forces and government.

During the 198o’s while the PKK leader was taking refuge in Syria; Syria supported the

PKK in its war against the Turkish government. The Syrian’s used the initiative to pressure

Syrian Kurds to join the PKK and take part in its anti-Turkish campaigns (Zalman, unknown).

Syria also provides the PKK a place of sanctuary and provided training camps around the

country to train future PKK members in the war against the Turkish regime.

It was also during the 1980’s that the PKK used the time to build its resources and

powerhouses. They were able to establish sanctuary and military training camps thanks to the

support of the Syrian government and its campaign against the Turkish regime. This allowed a

mutual agreement between the Syrian government and the PKK because they appeared to be

focused on the same mission of freeing the Kurdistan people from an oppressive Turkish

government. The training camps were primarily located in what was Syrian controlled part of

Lebanon. It was also during this time that the PKK started to shift its belief from a leftist secular


ideology to a more Islamic belief (Terrorism, National Consortium For The Study of Terrorism

and Responses To, Unknown).

During the 1990’s the PKK started to vamp up its attacks against Turkish resources and

tourist assets in an effort to destroy the Turkish regime. The PKK changed its tactics in the 90’s

against the Turkish regime and moved from a rural-based insurgent operation to a more urban-

based operation and launched a series of attacks that have put the casualty estimate as high as

30,000 (Kurdistan Commentary, Unknown). It was during this time that the Turkish government

issued a capture notice for the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. Abdullah Ocalan was

captured in 1999 and was imprisoned with a life sentence verse being executed and becoming a

martyr for the PKK cause. His arrest was major blow to the organization and not only weakened

the organization; it may have changed the path of the PKK forever. Shortly after his arrest, the

PKK agreed to a cease fire. This lasted until around 2004 until the group was overtaken by a

hard-liner militant wing that renounced the cease fire agreement. To prove its point, the new

PKK struck across many borders and waged war in the eastern and western Turkey border.

The PKK has continued to operate in today’s environment and has again changed its

operations style. While it continues to wage war using terrorist tactics like car bombings and

kidnapping, they have also ventured into the realm of legal politics. With the venture, the PKK

changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and proclaimed

a commitment of nonviolence activities in support of the Kurdish rights (Pike, 2004). It was also

indicated by the PKK that its militant group would not be disbanded because of the need for self-

defense and its rights to protect its citizens.

The PKK/KDEK continued to engineer political proclamations in 2003 while still

supporting the militant group of the PKK and refusing to surrender arms. It was this action that


caused the United States to declare the PKK a “terrorist group” in 2004 (Pike, 2004). In recent

years the PKK has changed its name back to the PKK and has tried to use political means to

resolve their issues with the Turkish government. In 2006, the PKK agreed to a unilateral cease

fire that slowed the intensity of fighting between the Turkish forces and the PKK; however,

attacks still continue to this day and now have gained attention of many countries that have the

ability to extinguish this group from existence.

PKK Base of Operations and Sanctuary

The PKK primary base of operations is within the Turkish borders; however, they have

expanded their operations locations into areas of the Middle-East and Europe. They primarily

focus their actions within the borders of Turkey because of their fight to free the Kurdistan

people from an oppressive Turkish government.

In its early years, the PKK garner support from allies such as Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Syria

allowed the PKK to house operations and training camps within its borders without the fear of

being turned over to the Turkish government. This was mainly due to the fact that Syria was

conducting on ongoing battle with the Turkish government and realized the PKK was a benefit to

their mission. Because they focused on the same belief of “freeing the Kurdistan people”, the

PKK and Syria worked well together.

While PKK primarily focuses on committing acts of violence in Turkey, they have

ventured out to Europe and the Middle-East (Cakan, 2012). In recent actions, the PKK has

started to lose some of its sanctuary support from countries like Syria and Iraq and are now

seeing these same countries that once protected them are now hunting them down (Kurdistan

Commentary, Unknown).


The PKK has, at this point, left American assets alone in the area of the Middle-East.

This is a fact based upon evidence that shows the PKK understands the repercussions of

attacking a U.S. assets and the force it would bring down upon them. This is a risk they are not

willing to take even as the U.S. looks at providing resources to Turkey and Iraq to hunt down the

PKK that are holed up in the mountains of the Iraq borders (Zakaria, 2011).

In Europe, the PKK primarily focuses their efforts of recruiting and organizing

demonstrations for the cause of the PKK. Europe at one time allowed the PKK to flourish within

its borders and it now has a foothold within the European culture. Most of the criminal activities

of the PKK in Europe are focuses on starting riots and the random kidnapping of executive

business personnel for random in support of their cause.

In the areas of the Middle-East, the PKK operates in Iraq and has been known for

assassinations and kidnappings within this area. They have also created problems for the Iraq

government in certain area of operations because of the resentment created when the Iraq

government changed their stance against the PKK in 2006 (Zalman, unknown).

Because of their limited operating area, the PKK had to select means to finance their

operations that would fit their needs and mission area.

PKK Finances and Support Services

Because the PKK is a small organization compared to other terrorist organizations,

financial and supporting backing has limited activates to their area of operations in Turkey,

Europe, and the Middle-East. The PKK started off and as an insurgent group of freedom fighters

that made most of it’s financing through common criminal activities. The PKK operate in

various fields of criminal activists to include kidnapping, drug trafficking, human trafficking,

extortion, a propaganda wars and recruiting (Laciner, 2008). The PKK have been known to


kidnap highly wealthy business professionals and hold them for random to gather cash and

support for their operations.

The PKK has many financial institutions in the European theater that are used to launder

their money from their illegal transactions. They have office in Belgium, Denmark, and other

Western European cities that are shell corporations used to filter finances and support to the

organization (Laciner, 2008). They also control the majority of the drug and human trafficking

business in Europe.

They are an organization that has been using the digital media as a support source for

their cause and mission. They are one of only a few terrorist organizations to own their own

hotspot satellite that provide its own television channel to the public (Laciner, 2008). France and

the UK have banned the channel after a years-long battle with Turkey over the channel and it

broadcasting. The PKK has also been able to create and build “logistical stores” that allow the

filtering of money through virtual stores that pose as legit businesses and are used to filter money

from one country to the next.

There are many countries that support the PKK in unofficial ways. For example, after the

arrest of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, documents that were found indicated that Greece has

been supporting the PKK and many of its activates. Greece claimed they only had supported the

PKK prior to being declared a “terrorist group” but the evidence dictated differently (Laciner,

2008). Another example of indirect support was the request for the “death penalty” to be

removed after Ocalan was caught. Removal of the “death penalty” was the only way he would be

extradited to Turkey for trial. In fact, at the time, the Italian government didn’t see Ocalan as a

“real terrorist: but as a freedom fighter (Laciner, 2008).

PKK Motivations, Ideology, and Purpose


What drove the PKK into existence? What makes the PKK the organization they are

today? It is there motivation and ideology that drive them. As we discussed earlier, the PKK

originally focused on a Marxist-Leninist belief and wanted a free state for the Kurdistan people

within the Turkish state. This initial belief was used as the driving factor in the creation of the

group in 1974 and finalized in 1978. It was the PKK’s belief that they could provide the

Kurdistan peoples a better society than what was being provided by the current Turkish regime.

As the years progressed, the PKK changed their beliefs to more of a Kurdistan

Nationalism and focused on becoming an independent state. The changes in their beliefs were

influenced by factors like the changing regime in Turkey, the many revolutions that were

occurring, and as their tactics changed, their perception to the world public as an organization.

As the PKK aged, it garnered support for its purpose of a free state for Kurdistan people. The

organization appealed to women because they could stand up and fight against a male dominated

society and achieve rights for their families (Damon, unknown).

The overall visions of the PKK become corrupted after the capture of their leader in

1999. While the organization was down, a militant wing came in and overtook the PKK

organization and changed its direction to a more organization business that an organization that

was willing to fight for the people. As the PKK changed roles, it became an organization that

was stating a “free state for Kurdistan” but in reality was focusing on running the organization

like a business (Laciner, 2008). Because much of their financial support came from illegal

activities, they became more like an organized crime syndicate that a free fighter for the people.

As they moved their attacks from military and government personnel to civilian

personnel, they began to lose the public and their support. The one thing that is ironic about the

PKK and its belief is that the original leader of the PKK, Abdulla Ocalan still has quite a bit of


influence over the organization. In many cases, countries have used him to draft cease fires

between the PKK and opposing governments.

PKK Adversaries

The PKK’s primary adversaries are the Turkish government and its officials (Cakan,

2012). The PKK’s primary goal is a free state for the Kurdistan people and they are willing to

use any and all means necessary to secure that goal. In the beginning, the PKK had support from

neighboring countries like Syria, Iraq, and Iran; however, because of their actions since

inception, many of their allies have now become their enemies.

During the 1990’s the Turkish formed an alliance with Israel in an effort to go after the

PKK after several attacks from 1992-1999 (Guseynov, 2011). During this time, the PKK and

Turkish skirmishes were at their peaks and the PKK had not been established as a “terrorist

organization”.

Many of the battles the PKK fight are in the western and eastern areas if Turkey. They

typically target government officials and military operations; however, they have been known to

target commonly visited tourist areas in hope of destroying the economic market that is gained

by these industries in Europe and Turkey. In 2004, the U.S. declared the PKK as a “terrorist

organization” and convinced Iraq to declare them as a group in 2006 (Zalman, unknown).

In areas if Iraq, the PKK have been engaged by forces that have all but eradicated the

PKK camps that are within the mountain ranges. The U.S. has looked at providing support and

aide in an effort to remove the PKK from the area of Iraq but have come short of providing direct

military support in eradicating the group (Zakaria, 2011).

PKK Locations of Attacks and Tactic Employed


The PKK started off and a nonviolent organization until 1978. In 1978, the PKK started

resorting to violence and guerilla tactics against Turkish forces to engage their mission of

freedom for the Kurdistan people. The primary tactics of the PKK were bombs, assassinations,

kidnapping, and extortions. As stated earlier, their primary area of operations is in the Turkey

region. The PKK is in contact skirmishes with the Turkish forces and normally entails high death

counts (Cakan, 2012).

In 2006, the PKK was suspected of setting off three bombs that killed British tourist and

injured 21 Turkish locals (Zalman, unknown). In 2006, the PKK took credit for using land mines

in Igdir, Turkey that injured 17 people (Zalman, unknown). During the 1980’s, The PKK were

known to target Kurdish village that were armed by the Turkish government as a retaliation

against the PKK.

The PKK has operations in Iraq that use guerrilla tactics to hit villages and military

outposts in an effort to disrupt operations. It is this disruption that has the U.S. considering

offering military weapons to Turkey for the elimination of the PKK (Zakaria, 2011).

Often many of the PKK skirmishes in the Turkish realm are combat driven with groups

of armed fighters taking on Turkish soldiers. In some cases, the Turkish military have employed

Special Forces to engage the PKK, often driving the PKK back due to lack of quality training

and sufficient firepower of Special Forces.

In many of their kidnapping schemes, the victim is normally released after receiving a

ransom or taking items from the victims. In a few cases, the PKK stopped and kidnapped ten

individuals, only to release all of them after keeping two of the individual’s passports.

PKK Anti-Terrorism Success Tactics


While the PKK has been a thorn in the side of the Turkish government since 1974, there

have been several successful anti-terrorism tactics used against the PKK to reduce the impact the

organization is doing to the area. As you might recall, the main source of the PKK is through

criminal activities such as drug trafficking, logical stores, and other money laundering

businesses. These strings to the organization are now starting to be squeezed to the point it is

hurting the PKK.

Because of their involvement with Europe’s drug trade industry, the European

government has been able to attack the PKK at the source of their income. It is believed that the

PKK drug trade brings in around $200 million dollars a year into the PKK coffers. With the

corporation of many governments, the PKK financial centers are being locked down. In a recent

operation, the European governments were able to seize several large bank accounts of the PKK

in several European countries (Laciner, 2008). The United States has been able to become

involved on a support-side of the equation by supplying equipment and intelligence that is being

used to eradicate the PKK (Zakaria, 2011).

As with most organizations that are a guerilla force in nature, a strong military presence

has hindered the PKK from gaining movement. This along with their our tactics have created an

environment in which the PKK is now looked upon by the world as a terrorist organization verse

a group that is fighting for a just and noble cause. Many groups, like the PKK, lack the

background to accomplish their mission to a success. For example, the PKK has now reverted to

kidnapping individuals for recruitment into the PKK. Their media stations have been shut down

in Europe and other countries limiting their ability to spread their call for help.

Also, the PKK has progressed from an organization that wanted freedom to an

organization that is more like a drug cartel and using the “freedom for Kurdistan’s” as a banner


to operate their business. As with business of this nature, many law enforcement tactics are

enough to keep the PKK in check in certain areas. The PKK has also lost the support of its public

and many are providing information to local officials for their action. Turkish forces have started

using Special Forces to augment the normal forces during and incident. In this case, the Special

Forces typically drive the PKK back at a great loss.

With a branding of a “terrorist organization”, the PKK now has the world against them.

Because of the designator, the PKK is limited to where it can go for operations, recruitment, and

sanctuary. The world applies different rules for terrorist groups. It is the rules that have allowed

governments to be able to engage the PKK on a different battlefield. Even the Kurdistan people

have moved on to better groups that actually support their cause and this causes the PKK to lose

support for its mission. The best example is the political side of the PKK. Although the PKK is

involved in the legal side of the game by playing in politics, they have little to no respect from

any nation as the PKK attempts to achieve their goal through political means.

The best tactic being used today is one in which the organization has damaged itself to

the point of no return. They are an organization that even the people they fight for don’t believe

in them.

PKK Future

The PKK is an organization that may have started off with good intentions, however,

when they changed their tactics and drifted into the realm of subrevolutionary terrorism and

decided to become a group that practiced dissident terrorism their path was drawn and it has

continued to make life difficult for them to succeed. With its membership in a decline and having

to resort to kidnapping for membership to replace those lost on the battlefield, the outlook for the

PKK looks bleak.


The PKK will be around for many years as a splinter organization until someone decides

to finally press with the initiative to eradicate the party. This may be a hard cause due to the

power the original leader of the PKK still has over the Kurdistan people. In the future, if the

PKK wants to succeed, it is going to have to change its tactics and policies and establish itself as

a group that truly wants peace and an independent nation for Kurdistan people. Even with the

political means in place, the radical elements of the PKK hurt the organization to a point of no

return.

PKK Facility Fortification

While the PKK had a worthy cause and ideology when it was formed by four radical

members in 1974, showed a maximum membership of around 26,000+ in the 90’, to its reduced

size of less than 5,000 in 2000, the PKK is still a formidable foe for security managers. Because

the PKK has chosen to use tactics that are out of the norm, security mangers must be able to

rethink their security posture when dealing with the PKK.

Because the PKK has become more of an organized criminal terrorist organization,

security mangers need to address one major point when designing a security system for facilities

that are working in areas that have a PKK presence. That point is that most adversaries want to

have at least an 80% chance of success before they will act (Garcia, 2008). They are out to

accomplish a mission and, as a terrorist organization, want to make their attacks count. They are

going to pick targets that are easy and provide that 80% and better chance for success.

The first thing in designing a system for the PKK is to gather information and conduct a

risk assessment and risk analysis of the organization, your location, and the assets you are in

charge of protecting. The PKK tends to uses bombs, kidnapping, demonstrations, riots, and

sabotage as some of their techniques to render their war against the Turkish government (Pike,


2004). Gathering information about PKK activity within the area of operations is going to be

essential for creating a successful defense. As a security manager, you need collect PKK

statistics on their various attacks and activities both the successful ones and the unsuccessful

ones. The unsuccessful events may help give information as to what tactics are working in a

certain area of operations.

Next, security mangers should take the information gathered on the groups and known

associates and design a security systems that uses a “Defense-In-Depth” concept (Fennelly,

2004). By utilizing a defense in depth approach to securing the facility, the security manager will

not only be able to build a boundary that is hard to navigate on the terrorist part but it also creates

and environment that allows for instant changes as tactics change without rendering the entire

security system defenseless.

When designing a Defense-In-Depth design, the security manager should picture the

castles of old with moats, watch towers, guards, hidden passages, and wood/iron gates. While all

of these items may have appeared as extravagant items to peasants, it was a massive defense

system meant to prevent enemies from overtaking the castle and is still effective today.

Security managers need to start with defense from the outside in. Remember that your

goal to maximize that 80% success rate in your favor and not the PKK. Think of building a

prison from the outside-in just like in the movie Wraith of the Titans. By building the design

from outside-in, one can secure the facility to a point of extreme hardening to a relaxed

hardening as necessary.

Starting at the outside of the barrier is going to be the initial deterrents and alerting

system. Examples of items used at the barrier level are razor wire, chain link fence, guard towers,

moving patrols, isolated drive paths, and aesthetic devices like potted plants that are actually


filled with concrete unknown to the outsider. It is at this level that detection is going to be

essential to overall success. It is at this level that you want to initially get indications of a

problem. Remember that the PKK often inside riots and demonstrations in many countries. The

outside barrier needs to be able to handle this type of scenario. Response time to any gate

incident should be less than two to five minutes by the appropriate security forces (Garcia,

2008). By having a force that displays a rapid and consistent response time with varying types of

force deterrents provides a sliver of uncertainty in a potential PKK attempt at attacking the outer

facility perimeter.

Because the PKK are known for building and using explosives, the installation of

explosive detecting devices at various locations around the facility can help deter the potential of

explosives. Moving patrols that use explosive/drug dogs are effective around the parameter

because the animal not only can indicate potential problems, they are an effective tool when

released upon a potential criminal that has infiltrated the outer barrier.

At this level there needs to be a focal point for personnel and vehicles coming into the

facility. This not only allows for closer checks but it also allows be to place highly specialized

security personnel like separated or retired Special Operations Forces at those location in case

something does occur. I can also use background checked locals at these checkpoints. By using

locals, I can create a perception of cooperation between the community and the facility. In the

case of the PKK, the hiring and using if Kurdistan nationals would be a positive asset to security.

By using local nationals, the chances of an incident are slightly decrease during times of riots

and demonstrations by the PKK.

As we move to the next layer inside of the perimeter, security procedures and practices

need to change and become more focused. They need to focus on slowing down an assailant until


security forces can respond. This layer should be designed in a way that it complements the out

layer of the perimeter by using tactics and devices that can take up the security job in the event

the outer line is compromised (Garcia, 2008).

Because of the nature of the PKK, it can be assumed that the outer barrier will be

compromised. Factors such as using local nationals and sympathizers are a constant in a security

scenario working in a foreign country. The PKK has been known to infiltrate facilities by posing

as workers or by kidnapping individuals only to release the victims after removing their

credentials. At this level or protection, the path to the facility needs to become narrower and

institute more of a delay in reaching the facility. Remember that the goal at each level is to allow

time for detection, deterrence, and detainment by security forces as needed (Fennelly, 2004).

At this level, you may start to see security tools as movement sensors around certain

areas of the facility. The use of close circuit television may be implemented to offset the moving

patrols and other established security countermeasures. It would not be uncommon to concrete

barricades that must be maneuvered around in a vehicle. This obstacle not only prevents a

vehicle from accelerating fast, it also limits the area of an explosion of the vehicle contains

explosives. Because the PKK have been known to uses vehicle explosives, extra vehicle security

measures must be taken at this level to ensure the security of the facility.

Checkpoints at this level may have an increase presence of security forces and patrol

dogs. Establishing random inspections at this level helps to reduce the chances of a potential

threat getting though from the outer barrier. The use of locals this level should be used as an

exception and not the rule. This eliminates the factor of a local being able to aide a PKK

operative through the first and second lines of defense.


At this stage of the barrier, lighting becomes a factor. Starting at this point, the lighting

and other essential systems need to be on an alternate power supply source and maintain a

secondary backup power generation in the case power is cut the outside perimeter devices.

Thermal sensors should be placed in areas that are not visited by personnel on a daily basis.

These sensors along with other sensors like motion sensors can be used to detect variations in the

environment and alert the monitoring station for review using CCTV or by physical patrols.

At the next level, we are focusing on entering the facility. At this stage of security, the

use of man-traps is highly recommended due to the nature of their ability to isolate an individual

as necessary (Garcia, 2008). Man-traps also act as a barrier between the inside of a facility and

the outside. In the case of a PKK suicide bomber, the man-trap can reduce the amount of

collateral damage if the person is caught and detonates the device early.

Another tool to consider at this stage of protection is using biometric devices to allow

entry into a control point prior to entering the facility. This could be a thumbprint devices to a

full retina scan of individuals. Alternately, a badging system could be instituted at the entrance if

further security measures are in place elsewhere in the facility.

User awareness comes to play at this point. Personnel recognition can be the difference

between a PKK member infiltrating a facility and the individual getting caught. Security training

is a must for personnel working at this level. The facility should also have training armed

security guards. The guards at this post should be highly trained personnel on all tactics to

include the use of deadly force. Have security dogs in the entrance facility also adds additional

assets in the event that something occurs.

Depending upon the severity of the PKK presence, the facility management should have a

daily duress word for entry control. By having a duress word that changes daily, the PKK would


have an extremely hard chance of getting past the entrance because they would not know what

the word is and it would allow for an individual to identify that they are under duress without

alerting the assailant until the event could be remedied. Establishing an authorized personnel

roster is essential to controlling access to the facility. By using a control roster, security can add

an additional check of all individuals entering and leaving the facility. This roster would be

extremely important in the event that key member is kidnapped. The roster would be able to

verify if and when the member left the building. This would reduce the chances for a fake

kidnapping response if a member is still within the building and the group was indicating that

they had the individual.

There needs to be a detailed security map of all rooms within the facility. Key personnel

need to be identified due to extra security that would need to be provided to them because of the

kidnapping threat the PKK poses. The monitoring station at the front would also have access to

all CCTV activity within the building and perimeter and have the ability to lock down the facility

at the first sign of trouble. The building should contain no glass below fifteen feet and the walls

should be concrete and steel reinforced for blast protection. If glass is to be used, it should be

explosive rated to reduce the amount of shrapnel that would be created by the initial explosion.

At the inner level of the design is where one will have the most security. This is typically

inside of the building after one has passed through all of the barriers. This is the work

environment; however, security is still a function that must be maintained while allowing

individuals to work unhindered. Devices such as badges and biometric scanners are tools that can

be used with the facility to control movement through controlled access areas. Building safe

rooms for certain high profile individuals within their offices can provide a quick protection is

the case of an event within the facility where a kidnapping might occur while using a another


event as a diversion. Building and personnel safety comes into play at this level. Many building

must have doors that auto unlock due to fire regulations. This provides ample time for a PKK

operative to gain access to the building as necessary. Some buildings are using a locking fire

door that is on a timer once it goes off (Garcia, 2008). By using this door design, security can

meet fire codes and also be able to evaluate the alarm quickly to address the nature of the alarm.

Security education and training needs to be a lifestyle of the facility staff. Security is

every ones responsibility. As stated earlier, the PKK likes to target top executives for ransom.

This is where education, training, and special security practices come into play. All top

executives need to have a personal security team. Each member the team needs to be assigned to

specific individuals and the exec and team members need to know each other personally and

professionally. This cooperation will be essential for the survival of the executive.

The team should be separated or retired Special Forces Operatives. These individuals

have been trained to operate under pressure and typically will keep the executive safe. Drivers

for the executive will need to be certified and trained in defensive driving for personnel

protection. Each member of the executive’s staff needs to have an extensive background check to

identify any red flags. Driving plans need to be varied along with meetings. By varying the

driving routes and meeting location and times, the chances of a successful kidnapping are

reduced. Most successful kidnapping can be ties back to compliancy such as always driving the

same route on Wednesday or picking up your child at the same time from school.

Defense-In-Depth is the model to follow for success. We have looked at an example of a

Defense-In-Depth design that might be used against the PKK. It is not all inclusive. It is made to

change as the threat changes; however, by using s Defense-In-Depth strategy when designing a

security system you will decrease that target mark of 80% success rate that is needed for an


adversary. In the case of the PKK, due to its small size from times past, a facility that does not

provide at least an 80% chance of success improves it chances of not being a statistic of the

PKK.

Conclusion

We have looked at the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or the PKK as it is known among

countries. It was an organization that started off with a belief of freeing a nation of Kurdistan

people and over time became a terrorist group verse a hero. The PKK is a leftist terrorist group

that has a rich history of a dream created by four radical individuals to a following of almost

26,000+ at its peak during the 90’s. We saw how the PKK tends to operate with the borders of

Turkey primarily but have perorations in Europe and the Middle-East.

It has been the progress from nonviolence to terroristic violence that has caused the PKK

to not only lose its countries of sanctuary like Syria and Iraq, but we have seen their finances

from drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion dwindling up as their assets are seized under the

guise of “terrorist activities”. While the PKK is primary focused on fighting the Turkish regime,

the PKK is losing ground as allies have become enemies and their ideology has changed from a

Marxist-Leninist belief to a hard-liner militant military agenda.

As the PKK stays focused mainly in Turkey, attacks have occurred in Europe and other

Middle-Eastern areas. As the PKK fights to survive, many nations are now providing the support

needed to eradicate the PKK from existence. This is one of the main reasons the PKK chooses

not to engage America targets in the Middle-East. It is a known fact that to cross America will be

the demise of the PKK and as such, the PKK stay focused on their objective of being more of a

terrorist criminal syndicate that a force that is fighting for a nation for free Kurdistan people.


Finally, we looked at how security managers might secure their facilities using a

Defense-In-Depth strategy against the PKK.

The PKK was an organization that was founded on a dream and became a nightmare as it

gained in support and popularity only to be crushed by its own actions and being classified as a

“terrorist organization”.


References

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