IIIWednesday 10th February, 2010

by Fr. Vimal Trimanna CSSR

Ever since President MahindaRajapaksa expressed hiswish to call a fresh presiden-tial election in November2009 (even when there were

still two more years to complete his firstmandate), one could clearly notice a newenthusiasm, a resurgence in our localpolitics, especially in elections. Duringthe year or so prior to that, politics andeven elections had become somethinglethargic, simply because there was onlyone party, namely, the ruling party thatwas continuing to amass votes at eachpassing provincial council election. Onthe one hand, most of our people hadtaken it for granted that since the unex-pected victory over the 30-year old LTTEterrorism under the bold political lead-ership of President Rajapaksa, hisundisputed popularity was such that hewould win any and every election tocome in the near future. In fact, his callfor an early presidential election itselfwas a clear sign of his own confidencein this popular belief. On the otherhand, having led his party to continuousdefeats (including at two presidentialelections) the unpopularity of the mainOpposition challenger, RanilWickremesinghe, mainly due to hisopposing the military action against theLTTE (and also due to his unilateralentering into a peace treaty with themurderous Tigers in 2002) was such thatit was a foregone conclusion that hewould never win an election in the nearfuture. This is not a mere opinion but afact, as election after election had con-vincingly demonstrated, andWickremesinghe himself was at lastaware of it, as demonstrated by the factof him not coming forward as candidateat the recent presidential election.However, a few die hard UNPers, espe-cially those belonging to the higher ech-elons in Colombo and other urban areasof our country had always been hopingagainst hope to unseat MahindaRajapaksa from Presidency though themajority of the country had been soclearly sending the very opposite mes-sage, and that too, repeatedly, at eachand every recent election. In such a con-text, the announcement of the retiredArmy Commander, General SarathFonseka of his intention to contest thepresidential election was unbelievablegood news for them. The support extend-ed to Fonseka by the JVP (who till therecent presidential election werebelieved to have had an excellent grass-roots organization, especially in vil-lages, to woo the voters) was further per-ceived by such people as a sure fillip tothis ‘good news’. They who were almostdead in the local political scene, all of asudden got galvanized as if theyreceived a new lease of life, and began tobelieve that at last their dream of defeat-ing the seemingly invincible MahindaRajapaksa at any cost, had finally cometrue. The enthusiasm generated duringthe past three months over the presiden-tial election has to be understood withinthis undeniable local political context asa whole.

Two main rumoursOne of the specific characteristics of

this presidential election was theamount of rumours that were diffusedespecially by the suddenly stimulatedsupporters of the joint-opposition candi-date. Supported by the anti-government

media and the modern electronic mediaespecially the e-mails and SMS system,these people (who were branded by thegovernment as the katakatha brigade,most of whom are the elite fromColombo and other urban areas) beganto propagate that this was going to bethe closest presidential election ever.This was the main rumour numberone, with its own ramifications andvariations. Of course, the fact that itwas the very Army Commander (whohimself was mainly instrumental in thestrategic military planning and innova-tive field action in the recent victoryover the LTTE) who had come forwardto challenge the President, gave enough

substance to such rumours. But whatthese rumours deftly eliminated werethe basic ground facts such as that thewar was won under the vital, indispen-sable political leadership of theCommander-in-Chief, the President(amidst tough opposition, both local andforeign), and as a consequence, the lat-ter’s popularity had reached a peak (asconsistently demonstrated recently byelection after election at the provincialcouncil level). These rumour-mongersalso smartly began to exaggerate andhighlight the alleged corruption andnepotism of the Rajapaksa family, whicheventually became the main rumour

number two (and the rumour that wasmost diffused), again, with its own rami-fications and variations. Of course,some of the rumours linked to this mainrumour number two may have had someelements of truth, but the exaggerationsand fantastic variations added to them,made them interesting and easily dif-fusible, thus, creating a world complete-ly based on hear-say, and devoid of anylogical or rational content. As usualwith a rumour and the dynamics of itspropagation, in this case, too, most ofthe urban rumour-mongers and theirrecipients (who themselves became inturn rumour-mongers, as it happenswith any rumour) never bothered to ver-

ify the source nor the truthfulness ofthe contents. Some of the bizarre thingsthat were circulated before, during andeven after the election, are clear proof ofthis point. For example, before the elec-tion, i.e., during the period that led up tothe election, it was widely rumouredthat the President’s brother, BasilRajapaksa had bought among otherstrategic items the influentialSwarnawahini local television channel,but repeated denials by the managementof that very television channel were nottaken seriously. Then, during the elec-tion, it was rumoured that the govern-ment was using the security personnel

such as the Navy to transport filled bal-lot boxes in its efforts to rig the electionsand the police had caught such a vehicle.The denial by the Navy authorities ofany such malpractice was not heeded atall (interestingly, just two days prior tothe elections, the very arrest of personsclose to the Pettah main bus-stand, withsome 28,000 ballot papers markedagainst the Swan-sign of Fonseka, werehushed up, and ignored by theserumours). Then, after the final resultwas declared, it was rumoured (withbizarre variations to the main story!)that just after the counting began, BasilRajapaksa had himself entered forceful-ly the Elections Commissioner’s office,

had imprisoned the ElectionsCommissioner, and then, had taken con-trol of issuing the results himself, andthus, had completely manipulated theresults using computer gimmicks (whatthe JVP leader SomawansaAmarasinghe later called “a computerjillmart”). Not only e-mails and SMSmessages on phones, but even promi-nent members of the Alliance thatbacked the retired-General Fonseka,such as Ranil Wickremesinghe andMangala Samaraweera, (and SarathFonseka himself), openly expressed thisopinion thus, further strengthening thisrumour. How on earth such an alleged

computer gimmick was possible wasnever explained by these rumour-mon-gers nor by those who were gullibleenough to swallow them. Nor was it evermentioned that according to the existingelection regulations, the ballot papershad to be counted manually, and thatsuch counting and repeated countingswere indeed done at this election, atmany of the centres of counting, andthen, the results (with the signedapproval of the party representativesand other responsible returning-offi-cers) were fed into the computers.Moreover, how such a huge majority ofnearly two million votes could be manu-factured by any imaginable computergimmick has never been explained byanybody up to the time of writing thisessay. The other vital fact that both thelocal and international official observershad given a verdict of a generally freeand fair election was also convenientlyignored by these rumour-mongers andtheir gullible victims. What I have men-tioned above are only a selected instanceeach of rumour-mongering before, dur-ing and after the presidential election,on the part of the rumour-mongers ofthose who backed the joint-Oppositioncandidate.

The aim of this essay is to demon-strate how rumours create an imaginedworld which is totally cut off from reali-ty, and how some frustrated people takerefuge in such an imagined world, andhow when finally reality strikes hardsuch imagined fantasy worlds, those peo-ple who have created and lived in suchimagined worlds, find it extremely hardto get out of them and face reality. Thisis precisely what happened at the recentpresidential election. To begin with, therumours propagated by the supportersof the joint-Opposition candidate did nothave a credible or rational base, asVictor Ivan (no sympathizer of theRajapaksa government) so convincinglypointed out in a fine piece in the Ravayanewspaper on December 27, 2009. Thosewho created and diffused those rumours,and especially those who were gulliblein believing them, believed that such animagined world created by thoserumours were true or real, and so, obsti-nately refused to enter into any rationalinquiry into their veracity. Thus, if andwhen a rumour was countered byground facts, they did not hesitate to cre-ate yet another rumour and take shelterbehind it. [As the old dictum goes, whena lie is told again and again, those whotell the lie unconsciously begin tobelieve that their lies are true.Whenever such lies are proved to be nottrue, the liars find shelter behind fur-ther lies.]. Consequently, they began tolive in that imagined, non-realistic worldwhich was exclusively based onrumours, and their imaginations evenreached the fairy-tale or fantasy level.The continuous reluctance to accept themore than obvious ground facts, includ-ing the final official result of the elec-tion that gave a landslide victory to thePresident, made such people get furtherinto a secure, fairy-tale, fantastic world.Of course, they began to fantasize evenbefore the election that there wouldsurely be rigging. But ironically, insteadof their candidate losing, in case suchrigging were to really take place, theybegan to fantasize that their candidatewould win handsomely!

The Daily Yomiuri/ANN

The meeting of financial leaders of theGroup of Seven industrial powers thatwas held in Iqaluit, Canada, last week

gave the impression that the G-7 has reacheda turning point, in that the latest meeting didnot release a joint communique for the firsttime in 12-1/2 years.

The G-7 meeting originates from an unof-ficial meeting of the Group of Five leadingindustrialized nations.

This financial meeting boosted its pres-ence in 1985, when the G-5 nations — Japan,Britain, France, the United States and WestGermany — signed the Plaza Accord, inwhich they agreed to depreciate the US dollar.

Since then, the G-7 meeting has main-tained its position as the most influential inter-national economic conference by repeatedlyissuing communiques concerning exchangerate fluctuations and economic policy man-agement.

But the G-7’s roles started being handeddown to the framework of the Group of 20nations, which include China and India, afterthe global financial crisis in the autumn of2008. The G-7 is expected to become an unof-ficial meeting at which ministers of leadingcountries can exchange views frankly.

But it will be difficult for the large G-20 toswiftly respond to emergencies, includingrapid fluctuations in exchange markets. Theroles of the relatively agile G-7 will remainimportant.

Risks linger in Europe

What the G-7 must do now is stabilize theglobal economy, which was hit hard by thefinancial crisis, and contribute to formulatinga framework to prevent a similar crisis.

The global economy has emerged fromthe crisis, but there has recently been grow-ing concern over the reemergence of eco-nomic and fiscal deterioration in some

European countries, including Greece. While industrialized countries are suffer-

ing from unemployment and worsening fiscalconditions, there are fears about the possibledevelopment of economic bubbles, whichcould burst, in high-growth emerging coun-tries into which massive amounts of fundsare flowing.

The imbalance in the global economyattributable to emerging countries’ exportdrives also needs to be corrected.

Given the circumstances, CanadianFinance Minister Jim Flaherty, who chairedthe latest G-7 meeting, pointed out in hissummary statement that G-7 countries shouldcontinue to employ stimulus measures and at

the same time start envisaging exit strategies,thereby returning their crisis response to thatmounted during normal circumstances, andrestoration of fiscal health.

While this all makes sense, the G-7 meet-ing failed to spell out what each countryshould do in concrete terms.

Minister must know ropes As for the issue of China’s cheap yuan,

financial chiefs and central bank governors ofthe G-7 countries simply reiterated what theysaid at the previous G-7 meeting: that it isdesirable for China to pursue a flexibleexchange policy. They did not show anydetermination to improve the situation.

As for the stringent financial regulationsproposed by the administration of U.S.President Barack Obama, the G-7 countriesalso agreed to move in the direction oftougher regulations, though they did notcome up with concrete measures in thisregard. If the G-7 contents itself with being amere talking shop, it will inevitably sink fromview.

In many cases, the post of the Japanesefinance minister, who attends G-7 meetings,has been filled by politicians who do not nec-essarily have much expertise in financial andfiscal matters and who tend to have relativelyshort terms in office, making it difficult forthem to have in-depth discussions with expe-rienced European and U.S. financial chiefs.

In the new G-7 era, the Japanese financeminister should be selected from amongexperts in economic policy and have abun-dant experience.

Continued on page IV

G-7 remains key framework

In this photo released by China’s Xinhua News Agency, Canada’s Finance Minister Jim Flaherty, sitting at center, his counterparts andcentral bank presidents from the Group of Seven (G-7) major industrial countries pose for a family photo during their meeting inCanada’s Arctic city Iqaluit. (AP)

Rumourreality &

Ranil Wickremesinghe, Sarath Fonseka and other opposition leaders at a pre-election press conference

Recent presidential polls: