DOMESTIC AND INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTIONRULE 99 – ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS

RULE 100 – RESCISSION AND REVOCATION OF ADOPTION

1. ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003(re: development of Philippine adoption laws; nature of adoption proceedings; exception to rule on the non-applicability of dura lex sed lex)

Facts:

A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. The trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.

Years later, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities and that respondent was indifferent towards petitioner and would only come to see her once a year.

Prior to the institution of the case, RA No. 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads: "Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code."

The trial court dismissed the petition.

Issue:

WON the subject adoption may still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 and WON the adopter’s action had prescribed.

Ruling:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the action for rescission of the adoption decree,

having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of R A8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

However, an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

2. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ZENAIDA ELEPANO, Presiding Judge of RTC Kalookan, Branch 128 and CORAZON SANTOS PUNSALAN, G.R. No. 92542, October 15, 1991(re: nature and purpose of adoption)

Facts:

The private respondent Corazon Santos Punsalan filed a verified petition for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXXVIII praying that after due notice and hearing, the minors Pinky Gonzales Punsalan, the daughter of her full blood brother, and Ellyn Mae Punsalan Urbano, the daughter of her full blood sister, be declared her daughters by adoption for all intents and purposes. However, private respondent filed a "MOTION FOR TAKING OF DEPOSITION" on the ground that she received an urgent call from the United Nations Office in Geneva, Switzerland requiring her to report for work, so much so that she will not be able to testify at the hearing of her petition yet to be scheduled by the respondent judge. The respondent judge

granted the motion and ordered that notice of the taking of the deposition be furnished to the OSG (the only known oppositor in the case). The private respondent's deposition was taken. Despite notice, no representative from the OSG appeared to oppose the taking of the deposition.

The OSG, however, subsequently filed an "Opposition to the Deposition", averring that Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court allows deposition by leave of Court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or property subject of the action. Since the jurisdictional requirement of publication has not been complied with, the OSG goes on to argue, the lower court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. The respondent judge denied the said Opposition. The respondent judge granted the petition for adoption

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:

WON the jurisdictional requirement of publication should be complied first to allow the deposition taking in adoption proceedings.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

While it is true that in an action in personam, personal service of summons within the forum or voluntary appearance in the case is essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, in an adoption case which involves the status of a person, there is no particular defendant to speak of since the action is one in rem. In such case, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is a non-essential condition for the taking of a deposition for the jurisdiction of the court is based on its power over the res, to render judgment with respect to such "thing" (or status, as in this case) so as to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection against the right so established. (Banco Espanol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Greg Alba vs. de la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49).

Indeed, publication of the scheduled hearing for the petition for adoption is necessary for the validity of a decree of adoption but not for the purpose merely of taking a deposition. In taking a deposition, no substantial rights are affected since depositions may or may not be presented or may even be objected to when formally offered as evidence at the trial of the main case later on.

In the instant case, We find no abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge in allowing the taking of private respondent's deposition. Due to urgent and compelling reasons beyond her control, private respondent could not be present to testify at the trial of the main case for adoption. The OSG, however, was notified of the scheduled taking of the deposition, as well as of all the hearings of the petition for adoption, but the OSG chose not to attend ALL the said hearings, without explanation. The OSG, therefore, has no reason to invoke lack of procedural due process.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of the child and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. (Santos et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al. 16 SCRA 353). In the instant case, the record shows that private respondent's adoption of the minors shall redound to the best interests of the latter.

3. ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) PRESIDED OVER BY HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, G.R. No. L-30576, February 10, 1976(re: construction of adoption laws; applicability of dura lex sed lex)

Facts:

a) Sometime in May, 1967, a child, less than a week old (only 3 days old) 7 was given to petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan with the aforementioned espouses appearing in the records of said baptism as the parents of said child;

b) Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the infant from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the maintenance and support of her child; 

c) In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the adoption petition, gave the written consent required by law; 

d) Learning, from the testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez that the natural mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive, the court then pressed upon the witness to reveal the identity of said mother. The witness refused to divulge the same on the ground that there existed an

attorney and client relationship between them. She had been instructed by her client not to reveal the latter's identity. She could not now violate such privilege communication. 

Petition was dismissed by the trial court;The principal reason given for the dismissal of the petition was that ... the consent given in this petition Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the express requirement of the law. 3

Rationalizing its action respondent Judge said:

Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides that the written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:2. The guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.

"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is couched in mandatory terms by the word SHALL be necessary, and it enumerates the persons who will give the consent to the adoption in the order as follows: parents, guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be adopted.

It is admitted by witness Velasquez that she knew the identity of the mother who gave her the child. This being the case, the proper person who is supposed to give the parental consent to the adoption should first be, in the order of preference, the parent or the mother herself. 4

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court, dated June 27, 1968, dismissing petitioners' petition to adopt the minor, Colin Berry Christensen Duncan.

Issues:

1. WON the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in this case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give such consent.

2. WON Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed custodian of the abandoned waif may be considered as the guardian under Art. 340 or the person standing in loco parentis of said infant contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

1.) Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly described by law may be considered here as legally capable of giving the required written consent. They are:

Under Art. 340 of the Civil 'Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted" while the other one is that mentioned in Section 3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing it as each of the known living parents "who has not abandoned such child." The father's consent here is out of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.

Since the person whose written consent to the adoption (Atty: Corazon de Leon Velasquez) is assailed by the trial court as being unauthorized and had consequently caused the rejection of the petition, this Tribunal will now look into her alleged authority or lack thereof to give the controverted consent.

Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition, undisputedly declared as only three days old then, was turned over by its mother to witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The natural and unwedded mother, from that date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in court which started in mid- year of said 1967, and up to the present, has not bothered to inquire into the condition of the child, much less to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. In short, this parent is the antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is not insane Or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child." We are convinced that in fact said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. This Court has previously declared that abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child. 12 Applying this legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in this case can be declared, as she is hereby declared, as having abandoned her child with all legal consequences attached thereto.

Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown parent, there appears to be no more legal need to require the written consent of such parent of the child to the adoption.

2. It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands of Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire need of someone who could give it protection and sustain its delicate and fragile life. Atty. Velasquez was under no legal compulsion to accept the child and to extend to it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there had been no showing that the identity of the natural mother was made known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen fit to present herself before the

court despite the public notice given to the proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian of said infant.

“Dura lex sed lex”

The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious social problems, should be given the widest attitude of sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist — with a modicum promise of a useful and constructive existence.

If we are now to sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned particularly to said spouses, and worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on all other children who might be similarly situated. It is Our view that it is in consonance with the true spirit and purpose of the law, and with the policy of the State, to uphold, encourage and give life and meaning to the existence of family relations.

4. HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998(re: construction of adoption laws; substantial compliance rule; parental consent in adoption proceedings; meaning of abandonment)

Facts:Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody

of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.

Issue:

WON the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.

Ruling:

Yes.

Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims.Meaning of Abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe their

children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the parent’s presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary affection.

5. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994(re: effect of non-observance or non-conduct of adoption proceedings)

Case:

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992.

Facts:

Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.

The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar before the RTC of San Pablo City. They alleged that,

4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir.

On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate.

The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter; and

(4) School Records. She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents’ petition for letters and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.

On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by the Court of Appeals declaring that Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for the appointment of an administrator of the intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, denied; said petition and the proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration in accordance with law and the Rules. In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.

Issue:

WON the appellate court erred in finding that Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez.

Ruling:

No. The petitioner’s evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their own

true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that she was really their daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.

The evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been married for ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to refer her to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his sister for a number of years. There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy and the youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through law school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence in Parañaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age and weak physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be interested in material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There were also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is also true with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician who used to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the baby came from, and "she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell about it".

The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye,

and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of that baby.

Petitioner’s birth certificate with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the informant is highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who was already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife attending?

At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not come around doing so either because he was too busy or for some other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

6. RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L. VELOSO, G.R. No. L-43955-56, July 30, 1979(re: how to prove adoption; applicability of the rule on evidence of pedigree)

Facts:

Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestate, he was survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis and his two adopted twin daughters, Nora de Leon and Irma Lazatin. One month after Mariano's death, Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened.

Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow, Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a & holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust Company which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her husband, respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death. Private respondents then filed a petition to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis. Days after having learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will therein. Upon the order of the probate court, the safety deposit box was opened, at which time it was found to be empty, because prior thereto respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its contents. Seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin as an admitted illegitimate child. Under the same date, Ramon filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box, Whereupon, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr. Petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis.

Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of Margarita de Asis at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption in his, favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present. Photographs were also intended to be presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing that petitioner’s real name is "Renato Lazatin." Respondent court first reserved its ruling on private respondents' objections to the admission of petitioner's evidence but when petitioner could not present evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court discontinued the hearing on the ground that Renato and Ramon Sta. Clara do not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence of any judicial proceeding where the adoption of the parties above named were taken up by any court. Neither do the evidence tend to establish the presence of any record of a proceeding in court where the adoption of the above named persons was held. The evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a recognized natural child which, however, is not the legal basis for which Renato and Ramon seek to intervene in this proceedings.

Issue:

WON Renato’s petition successfully established his status and WON his evidence is admissible to prove his pedigree.

Ruling:

Court ruled in the negative. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does not give rise to

a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. Petitioner’s evidences fail to show that at one time or another a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order approving his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. 9 Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. 10 Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the child.

The court further ruled that pedigree testimonies, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expression of persons who must know the truth but before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a branch thereof, must ordinarily be established by competent evidence.

Secondary evidence may also be admissible where the adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is indispensable. Petitioner's supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified to a brother of the deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have witnessed that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption was really made, the records thereof should have existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced.

Thus, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly

intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.

7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994(re: joint adoption by husband and wife)

Facts:

On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen on August 19, 1988, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a twelve (12) year old minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. They got married on June 4, 1981. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.

Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.

Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, the trial court granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law. 

Issue:

WON Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt;

Ruling:

No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, privaterespondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition foradoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

Under the Family Code, joint   adoption   by husband and wife is mandatory.   This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation.   As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. 11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life. 12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases. 13 Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.Petition is GRANTED.

8. ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) PRESIDED OVER BY HON. JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, G.R. No. L-30576, February 10, 1976(re: parental consent in adoption proceedings)

Facts:

A child, less than a week old (only 3 days old) 7 was given to petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt, by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan.

Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the infant from the child's unwed mother who told the former never to reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the maintenance and support of her child.

In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the adoption petition, gave the written consent required by law.

The Court dismissed the petition due to the fact that it fell short of the express requirement of the law that “the written consent of the parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted” shall be obtained. Since it is admitted by Atty. Velasquez that she knew the identity of the mother who gave her the child, the proper person who is supposed to give the parental consent to the adoption should first be, in order of preference, the parent or the mother herself. However, Atty. Velasquez could not reveal the identity of the mother because it would violate the privileged communications between attorney and the client.

Issue:

WON the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in this case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give such consent.

Ruling:

Yes. When the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands of Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire need of someone who could give it protection and sustain its delicate and fragile life. Atty. Velasquez was under no legal compulsion to accept the child and to extend to it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there had been no showing that the identity of the natural mother was made known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen fit to present herself before the court despite the public notice given to the proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian of said infant. It was she who had actual. physical custody of the infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant which otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown into some garbage heap as had often happened to some unwanted illegitimate babies. The least this Court could do to recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to extend, as it hereby extends, to her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child.

The Court is convinced that, in fact, said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. This Court has previously declared that abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the child. 

The ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become serious social problems, should be given the widest attitude of sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy.

9. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR ROSSANA E. CRUZ. ROSALINA E. CRUZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. L-20927, July 26, 1966(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)

Facts:

The petitioner, Rosalina E. Cruz, of 39 years of age, is the childless wife of Francisco de la Cruz and is a resident of Zamboanga. Francisco de la Cruz gave his consent to the adoption by his wife, in an affidavit attached to the petition, and also testified thereabout. The minor child sought to be adopted was born on 26 December 1959 and recorded in the local civil registrar's office as Rossana Esperat Bucoy ; but said child was baptized on 19 September 1960 as Rossana E. Cruz , already following the surname of the would-be adopting parent, who reared and took care of the girl since birth, and who has developed a strong maternal love for her. The child's parents by nature, Lucilo Bucoy and Ana E. Bucoy, that aside from their written consent, they testified in court on their consent to the adoption.

The court, in an order on 11 January 1962, set the petition for hearing and directed the publication of the order once a week for three consecutive weeks in the "Zamboanga Times".

The child's name in the petition for adoption, and as published in the newspaper, is Rossana E. Cruz, her baptismal name, instead of Rossana E. Bucoy her name in the record of birth; thus oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines claims that "the lower court erred in taking cognizance of the instant petition for adoption despite the fact that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of a substantial defect in the petition and the published order of hearing".

Issue:

WON jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption has been complied with.

Ruling:

No.

The name of a person as recorded in the civil register, and not his baptismal name, is, for legal purposes, his real name, baptismal names having never been legally recognized, nor the practice of using baptismal names sanctioned by the law (Chomi vs. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004). It follows, therefore, that the use of the baptismal name of the child to be adopted, instead of its name in the civil register, would countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon.

A proceeding in adopting is a proceeding in rem (Ellis, et al. vs. Republic, L-16922, 30 April 1963; Van Matre vs. Sankey 148 III. 536; 36 NE 628) in which notice is made through publication (Sec. 4 of former Rule 100, now Section 4 of Rule 99) to protect the interests of all persons concerned (3 Moran 534, 1963 Ed.). Said interests will not be protected if the notice by publication does not carry the true name of the child to be adopted because the persons to be served by the notice have the right to expect the use of the child's officially recorded name. The defect, in the present case, amounts to a failure of service by publication, and the court a quo acquired no jurisdiction over the case (Cf. Yuseco vs. Republic, L-13441, 30 June 1960).

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby reversed; and the petition for adoption dismissed, but without prejudice to reinstituting the proceedings in conformity with law

10. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)

Facts:

On September 21 1988, spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed a petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered: declaring the child Michael C.

Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purpose, dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and that the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."

The case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed the adoption of the minor, being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.

Issue:

Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption even if the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child?

Ruling:

Yes. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption. The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.

11. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992(re: jurisdictional requirements in petition for adoption)

Facts:

Dissatisfied with the decision of CA on February 20, 1990 which affirmed in toto the decision of RTC of Legaspi City granting the petition of private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.

On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the RTC of Legaspi City.

The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General, of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.

Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in the proceedings.

On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the minor child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.

Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision.

Issues:

1. WON CA erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and

2. WON CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles.

Ruling:

The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.

Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. We further apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of errors.

Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. We do not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.

The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their enactment.

Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only procedural steps taken after their enactment.

The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises.

The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by

subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same.

Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;

3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;

4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT;

5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON CONDAT since birth;

6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own, exercising therein the care, concern and diligence of a good father toward him;

7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.) 18

xxx xxx xxxThe foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then

obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.

We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.

In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial compliance with the statute. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.

In determining WON to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of

grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed.

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.

The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, We are of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life."

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

12. MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992(re: parental authority during trial period)

Facts:On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a complaint for damages was filed against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

Respondent spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, the spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. The CA dismissed the appeal having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition

Issue:

WON the natural parents of Adelberto are liable for the damages sustained by Jennifer Tamargo.

Ruling:

This principle of parental liability is a specie of vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed negligence where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc

spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. To hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

13. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and guardian of her minor children, BERNARDO GO and JESSICA GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Branch XI, G.R. No. L-32181, March 5, 1986(re: adoption strictly personal between adopter and adoptee)

Facts:

Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition. Leonor also filed her reply to the opposition admitting the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that

substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court and that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu also filed its motion to dismiss averring that the petition seeks to change substantial corrections and not merely clerical ones as they do involve citizenship and status of the minors and their mother. Lower court denied their motions and ordered the lower court to make the necessary correction. The Republic of the Philippines appealed by way of petition for review.

Issue:

WON the lower court erred in ordering the correction the petitioner’s citizenship and civil status of her minor children.

Ruling:

The court ruled in the negative. Corrections involving matters such as civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed provided the proper suit is filed. The persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are- (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to- (l) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". The fact that the Civil Registrar opposed the petition sought to be corrected and was actively prosecuted, such proceedings became adversary in nature. The court was of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and

publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action. To follow the Solicitor Gen’s argument that Rule 109 is not the appropriate proceeding without any advice as to what the correct proceeding is or if such proceeding exist at all would result in manifest injustice.

14. PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS vs. GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA, G.R. No. L-23828, February 28, 1966(re: adopted child as intestate heir of adopter)

Facts:

A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners’ care and custody. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. After due publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the adoption.

Subsequently – eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.

Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso.

The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio.

Issue:

WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement proceeding.

Ruling:

No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.”

Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children had abandoned them

15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992(re: name of the adopted child)

Facts:

Private respondent, at two and a half years old was together with his sister was adopted by Spouses Wong, naturalized Filipinos. Private Respondent sought to have his Chinese surname changed to that of his natural Filipino parents upon reaching the age of twenty-two. He alleged that the use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life. The lower court’s decision granting the petition was affirmed by the appellate court.

Before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General argued that the reversion of petitioner to his old name violates Arts.341and 365 of the Civil Code which require an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify

him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.

Private Respondent contended that he did as the law required, I.e, upon adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being already emancipated, he can now decide what is best for and by himself. His adoptive mother consented to the petition for change of name and made it clear that it would not affect the legal adoption.

Issue:

WON an adopted child can change his surname from that of his adopter to that of his natural parents.

Ruling:

YES. While it is true that under Art. 365 of the Civil Code, an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, which is, that of parent and child. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and his/her adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than an object of the proceeding.

The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption. Under the circumstances, there could be no possible confusion as to the Private Respondent’s legal status or adoptive paternity and his successional right.