Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 181416 November 11, 2013MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION,Petitioner,vs.ROBERT H. CULLEN,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1dated July 10, 2007 and Resolution2dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86614. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the September 9, 2005 Order3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 58 in Civil Case No. 03-1018; while the assailed resolution denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corporation (MPMCC) and Meridien Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI).The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium Unit No. 1201 of the Medical Plaza Makati covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 45808 of the Register of Deeds of Makati. Said title was later cancelled and Condominium Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the name of respondent.On September 19, 2002, petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. Jose Giovanni E. Dimayuga, demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and assessments amounting toP145,567.42. Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he had been religiously paying his dues shown by the fact that he was previously elected president and director of petitioner.4Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that respondents obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI.5Consequently, respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the 2002 election of petitioners Board of Directors.6Respondent thus clarified from MLHI the veracity of petitioners claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the same had already been settled.7This prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a delinquent payer despite the settlement of the obligation. Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Hence, the Complaint for Damages8filed by respondent against petitioner and MLHI, the pertinent portions of which read:x x x x6. Thereafter, plaintiff occupied the said condominium unit no. 1201 and religiously paid all the corresponding monthly contributions/association dues and other assessments imposed on the same. For the years 2000 and 2001, plaintiff served as President and Director of the Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corporation;7. Nonetheless, on September 19, 2002, plaintiff was shocked/surprised to receive a letter from the incumbent Corporate Secretary of the defendant Medical Plaza Makati, demanding payment of alleged unpaid association dues and assessments arising from plaintiffs condominium unit no. 1201. The said letter further stressed that plaintiff is considered a delinquent member of the defendant Medical Plaza Makati.x x x;8. As a consequence, plaintiff was not allowed to file his certificate of candidacy as director. Being considered a delinquent, plaintiff was also barred from exercising his right to vote in the election of new members of the Board of Directors x x x;9. x x x Again, prior to the said election date, x x x counsel for the defendant [MPMCC] sent a demand letter to plaintiff, anent the said delinquency, explaining that the said unpaid amount is a carry-over from the obligation of defendant Meridien. x x x;10. Verification with the defendant [MPMCC] resulted to the issuance of a certification stating that Condominium Unit 1201 has an outstanding unpaid obligation in the total amount ofP145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002, which again, was attributed by defendant [MPMCC] to defendant Meridien. x x x;11. Due to the seriousness of the matter, and the feeling that defendant Meridien made false representations considering that it fully warranted to plaintiff that condominium unit 1201 is free and clear from all liens and encumbrances, the matter was referred to counsel, who accordingly sent a letter to defendant Meridien, to demand for the payment of said unpaid association dues and other assessments imposed on the condominium unit and being claimed by defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;12. x x x defendant Meridien claimed however, that the obligation does not exist considering that the matter was already settled and paid by defendant Meridien to defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;13. Plaintiff thus caused to be sent a letter to defendant [MPMCC] x x x. The said letter x x x sought an explanation on the fact that, as per the letter of defendant Meridien, the delinquency of unit 1201 was already fully paid and settled, contrary to the claim of defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;14. Despite receipt of said letter on April 24, 2003, and to date however, no explanation was given by defendant [MPMCC], to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff who is again obviously being barred from voting/participating in the election of members of the board of directors for the year 2003;15. Clearly, defendant [MPMCC] acted maliciously by insisting that plaintiff is a delinquent member when in fact, defendant Meridien had already paid the said delinquency, if any. The branding of plaintiff as delinquent member was willfully and deceitfully employed so as to prevent plaintiff from exercising his right to vote or be voted as director of the condominium corporation; 16. Defendant [MPMCC]s ominous silence when confronted with claim of payment made by defendant Meridien is tantamount to admission that indeed, plaintiff is not really a delinquent member;17. Accordingly, as a direct and proximate result of the said acts of defendant [MPMCC], plaintiff experienced/suffered from mental anguish, moral shock, and serious anxiety. Plaintiff, being a doctor of medicine and respected in the community further suffered from social humiliation and besmirched reputation thereby warranting the grant of moral damages in the amount ofP500,000.00 and for which defendant [MPMCC] should be held liable;18. By way of example or correction for the public good, and as a stern warning to all similarly situated, defendant [MPMCC] should be ordered to pay plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount ofP200,000.00;19. As a consequence, and so as to protect his rights and interests, plaintiff was constrained to hire the services of counsel, for an acceptance fee ofP100,000.00 plusP2,500.00 per every court hearing attended by counsel;20. In the event that the claim of defendant [MPMCC] turned out to be true, however, the herein defendant Meridien should be held liable instead, by ordering the same to pay the said delinquency of condominium unit 1201 in the amount ofP145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002 as well as the above damages, considering that the non-payment thereof would be the proximate cause of the damages suffered by plaintiff;9Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.10MLHI claims that it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, raises the following specific grounds for the dismissal of the complaint: (1) estoppel as respondent himself approved the assessment when he was the president; (2) lack of jurisdiction as the case involves an intra-corporate controversy; (3) prematurity for failure of respondent to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies; and (4) the case is already moot and academic, the obligation having been settled between petitioner and MLHI.11On September 9, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision granting petitioners and MLHIs motions to dismiss and, consequently, dismissing respondents complaint.The trial court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific performance filed by respondent clearly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.12As to petitioner, the court held that the complaint states no cause of action, considering that respondents obligation had already been settled by MLHI. It, likewise, ruled that the issues raised are intra-corporate between the corporation and member.13On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Contrary to the RTC conclusion, the CA held that the controversy is an ordinary civil action for damages which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts.14It explained that the case hinged on petitioners refusal to confirm MLHIs claim that the subject obligation had already been settled as early as 1998 causing damage to respondent.15Petitioners and MLHIs motions for reconsideration had also been denied.16Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court based on the following grounds:I.THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT, OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT DECLARED THE INSTANT CASE AN ORDINARY ACTION FOR DAMAGES INSTEAD OF AN INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY COGNIZABLE BY A SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURT.II.THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL WHILE RAISING ONLY PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW.17The petition is meritorious.It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.18Also illuminating is the Courts pronouncement in Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc.:19Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. x x x20Based on the allegations made by respondent in his complaint, does the controversy involve intra-corporate issues as would fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court or an ordinary action for damages within the jurisdiction of regular courts?In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy, the Court uses two tests, namely, the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.21An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.22Thus, under the relationship test, the existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations makes the case intra-corporate.23Under the nature of the controversy test, "the controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation."24In other words, jurisdiction should be determined by considering both the relationship of the parties as well as the nature of the question involved.25Applying the two tests, we find and so hold that the case involves intra-corporate controversy. It obviously arose from the intra-corporate relations between the parties, and the questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the corporation.26Admittedly, petitioner is a condominium corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, charged with the management of the Medical Plaza Makati. Respondent, on the other hand, is the registered owner of Unit No. 1201 and is thus a stockholder/member of the condominium corporation. Clearly, there is an intra-corporate relationship between the corporation and a stockholder/member.The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than the title of the complaint.1wphi1Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner against respondent as well as the validity of petitioners act in preventing respondent from participating in the election of the corporations Board of Directors. Respondent contested the alleged unpaid dues and assessments demanded by petitioner.The issue is not novel. The nature of an action involving any dispute as to the validity of the assessment of association dues has been settled by the Court in Chateau de Baie Condominium Corporation v. Moreno.27In that case, respondents therein filed a complaint for intra-corporate dispute against the petitioner therein to question how it calculated the dues assessed against them, and to ask an accounting of association dues. Petitioner, however, moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that since the complaint was against the owner/developer of a condominium whose condominium project was registered with and licensed by the HLURB, the latter has the exclusive jurisdiction. In sustaining the denial of the motion to dismiss, the Court held that the dispute as to the validity of the assessments is purely an intra-corporate matter between petitioner and respondent and is thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court. More so in this case as respondent repeatedly questioned his characterization as a delinquent member and, consequently, petitioners decision to bar him from exercising his rights to vote and be voted for. These issues are clearly corporate and the demand for damages is just incidental. Being corporate in nature, the issues should be threshed out before the RTC sitting as a special commercial court. The issues on damages can still be resolved in the same special commercial court just like a regular RTC which is still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intra-corporate disputes filed before it.28Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:x x x xb) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; andc) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships, or associations.29To be sure, this action partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate controversy, the jurisdiction over which pertains to the SEC. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has been transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as Special Commercial Courts.30While the CA may be correct that the RTC has jurisdiction, the case should have been filed not with the regular court but with the branch of the RTC designated as a special commercial court. Considering that the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58 was not designated as a special commercial court, it was not vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.31The CA, therefore, gravely erred in remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.Indeed, Republic Act (RA) No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners Associations, approved on January 7, 2010 and became effective on July 10, 2010, empowers the HLURB to hear and decide inter-association and/or intra-association controversies or conflicts concerning homeowners associations. However, we cannot apply the same in the present case as it involves a controversy between a condominium unit owner and a condominium corporation. While the term association as defined in the law covers homeowners associations of other residential real property which is broad enough to cover a condominium corporation, it does not seem to be the legislative intent. A thorough review of the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee would show that the lawmakers did not intend to extend the coverage of the law to such kind of association. We quote hereunder the pertinent portion of the Bicameral Conference Committees deliberation, to wit:THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). Lets go back, Mr. Chair, very quickly on homeowners.THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Ang sa akin lang, I think our views are similar, Your Honor, Senator Zubiri, the entry of the condominium units might just complicate the whole matters. So wed like to put it on record that were very much concerned about the plight of the Condominium Unit Homeowners Association. But this could very well be addressed on a separate bill that Im willing to co-sponsor with the distinguished Senator Zubiri, to address in the Condominium Act of the Philippines, rather than address it here because it might just create a red herring into the entire thing and it will just complicate matters, hindi ba?THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). I also agree with you although I sympathize with them---although we sympathize with them and we feel that many times their rights have been also violated by abusive condominium corporations. However, there are certain things that we have to reconcile. There are certain issues that we have to reconcile with this version.In the Condominium Code, for example, they just raised a very peculiar situation under the Condominium Code --- Condominium Corporation Act. Its five years the proxy, whereas here, its three years. So there would already be violation or there will be already a problem with their version and our version. Sino ang matutupad doon? Will it be our version or their version?So I agree that has to be studied further. And because they have a law pertaining to the condominium housing units, I personally feel that it would complicate matters if we include them. Although I agree that they should be looked after and their problems be looked into.Probably we can ask our staff, Your Honor, to come up already with the bill although we have no more time. Hopefully we can tackle this again on the 15th Congress. But I agree with the sentiments and the inputs of the Honorable Chair of the House panel.May we ask our resource persons to also probably give comments?Atty. Dayrit.MR. DAYRIT.Yes I agree with you. There are many, I think, practices in their provisions in the Condominium Law that may be conflicting with this version of ours.For instance, in the case of, lets say, the condominium, the so-called common areas and/or maybe so called open spaces that they may have, especially common areas, they are usually owned by the condominium corporation. Unlike a subdivision where the open spaces and/or the common areas are not necessarily owned by the association. Because sometimes --- generally these are donated to the municipality or to the city. And it is only when the city or municipality gives the approval or the conformity that this is donated to the homeowners association. But generally, under PD [Presidential Decree] 957, its donated. In the Condominium Corporation, hindi. Lahat ng mga open spaces and common areas like corridors, the function rooms and everything, are owned by the corporation. So thats one main issue that can be conflicting.THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). Ill just ask for a one-minute suspension so we can talk.THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Unless you want to put a catchall phrase like what we did in the Senior Citizens Act. Something like, to the extent --- paano ba iyon? To the extent that it is practicable and applicable, the rights and benefits of the homeowners, are hereby extended to the --- mayroon kaming ginamit na phrase eh...to the extent that it be practicable and applicable to the unit homeoweners, is hereby extended, something like that. Its a catchall phrase. But then again, it might create a...MR. JALANDONI. It will become complicated. There will be a lot of conflict of laws between the two laws.THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Kaya nga eh. At saka, I dont know. I think the --- mayroon naman silang protection sa ano eh, di ba? Buyers decree doon sa Condominium Act. Im sure there are provisions there eh. Huwag na lang, huwag na lang.MR. JALANDONI. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be best if your previous comments that youd be supporting an amendment.1wphi1I think that would be --- Well, that would be the best course of action with all due respect.THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Yeah. Okay. Thank you. So iyon na lang final proposal naming yung catchall phrase, "With respect to the..."32x x x xTHE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). xxx And so, what is their final decision on the definition of homeowners?THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA).We stick to the original, Mr. Chairman. Well just open up a whole can of worms and a whole new ball game will come into play. Besides, I am not authorized, neither are you, by our counterparts to include the condominium owners.THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI).Basically that is correct. We are not authorized by the Senate nor because we have discussed this lengthily on the floor, actually, several months on the floor. And we dont have the authority as well for other Bicam members to add a provision to include a separate entity that has already their legal or their established Republic Act tackling on that particular issue. But we just like to put on record, we sympathize with the plight of our friends in the condominium associations and we will just guarantee them that we will work on an amendment to the Condominium Corporation Code. So with that we skipped, that is correct, we have to go back to homeowners association definition, Your Honor, because we had skipped it altogether. So just quickly going back to Page 7 because there are amendments to the definition of homeowners. If it is alright with the House Panel, adopt the opening phrase of Subsection 7 of the Senate version as opening phrase of Subsection 10 of the reconciled version.x x x x33To be sure, RA 4726 or the Condominium Act was enacted to specifically govern a condominium. Said law sanctions the creation of the condominium corporation which is especially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective units.34The rights and obligations of the condominium unit owners and the condominium corporation are set forth in the above Act.Clearly, condominium corporations are not covered by the amendment. Thus, the intra-corporate dispute between petitioner and respondent is still within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court and not the HLURB. The doctrine laid down by the Court in Chateau de Baie Condominium Corporation v. Moreno35which in turn cited Wack Wack Condominium Corporation, et al v. CA36is still a good law.WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 10, 2007 and Resolution dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86614. The Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58, which is not a special commercial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-1018 is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Let the case be REMANDED to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for re-raffle purposes among the designated special commercial courts.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 141833.March 26, 2003]LM POWER ENGINEERINGCORPORATION,petitioner, vs.CAPITOL INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION GROUPS, INC.,respondent.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:Alternative dispute resolution methods or ADRs -- like arbitration, mediation, negotiation and conciliation -- are encouraged by the Supreme Court.By enabling parties to resolve their disputes amicably, they provide solutions that are less time-consuming, less tedious, less confrontational, and more productive of goodwill and lasting relationships.[1]The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review onCertiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the January 28, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals[3](CA) in CA-GR CV No. 54232.The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The parties are ORDERED to present their dispute to arbitration in accordance with their Sub-contract Agreement.The surety bond posted by [respondent] is [d]ischarged.[4]The FactsOn February 22, 1983, Petitioner LM Power Engineering Corporation and Respondent Capitol Industrial Construction Groups Inc. entered into a Subcontract Agreement involving electrical work at the Third Port of Zamboanga.[5]On April 25, 1985, respondent took over some of the work contracted to petitioner.[6]Allegedly, the latter had failed to finish it because of its inability to procure materials.[7]Upon completing its task under the Contract, petitioner billed respondent in the amount ofP6,711,813.90.[8]Contesting the accuracy of the amount of advances and billable accomplishments listed by the former, the latter refused to pay.Respondent also took refuge in the termination clause of the Agreement.[9]That clause allowed it to set off the cost of the work that petitioner had failed to undertake -- due to termination or take-over -- against the amount it owed the latter.Because of the dispute, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (Branch 141) a Complaint[10]for the collection of the amount representing the alleged balance due it under the Subcontract.Instead of submitting an Answer, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss,[11]alleging that the Complaint was premature, because there was no prior recourse to arbitration.In its Order[12]dated September 15, 1987, the RTC denied the Motion on the ground that the dispute did not involve the interpretation or the implementation of the Agreement and was, therefore, not covered by the arbitral clause.[13]After trial on the merits, the RTC[14]ruled that the take-over of some work items by respondent was not equivalent to a termination, but a mere modification, of the Subcontract.The latter was ordered to give full payment for the work completed by petitioner.Ruling of the Court of AppealsOn appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and ordered the referral of the case to arbitration.The appellate court held as arbitrable the issue of whether respondents take-over of some work items had been intended to be a termination of the original contract under Letter K of the Subcontract.It ruled likewise on two other issues: whether petitioner was liable under the warranty clause of the Agreement, and whether it should reimburse respondent for the work the latter had taken over.[15]Hence, this Petition.[16]The IssuesIn its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:AWhether or not there exist[s] a controversy/dispute between petitioner and respondent regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Sub-Contract Agreement dated February 22, 1983 that requires prior recourse to voluntary arbitration;BIn the affirmative, whether or not the requirements provided in Article III [1] of CIAC Arbitration Rules regarding request for arbitration ha[ve] been complied with[.][17]The Courts RulingThe Petition is unmeritorious.First Issue:Whether Dispute Is ArbitrablePetitioner claims that there is no conflict regarding the interpretation or the implementation of the Agreement.Thus, without having to resort to prior arbitration, it is entitled to collect the value of the services it rendered through an ordinary action for the collection of a sum of money from respondent.On the other hand, the latter contends that there is a need for prior arbitration as provided in the Agreement.This is because there are some disparities between the parties positions regarding the extent of the work done, the amount of advances and billable accomplishments, and the set off of expenses incurred by respondent in its take-over of petitioners work.We side with respondent.Essentially, the dispute arose from the parties ncongruent positions on whether certain provisions of their Agreement could be applied to the facts.The instant case involves technical discrepancies that are better left to an arbitral body that has expertise in those areas.In any event, the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract does notipso factodivest the courts of jurisdiction to pass upon the findings of arbitral bodies, because the awards are still judicially reviewable under certain conditions.[18]In the case before us, the Subcontract has the following arbitral clause:6.The Parties hereto agree that any dispute or conflict as regards to interpretation and implementation of this Agreement which cannot be settled between [respondent] and [petitioner] amicably shall be settled by means of arbitration x x x.[19]Clearly, the resolution of the dispute between the parties herein requires a referral to the provisions of their Agreement.Within the scope of the arbitration clause are discrepancies as to the amount of advances and billable accomplishments, the application of the provision on termination, and the consequent set-off of expenses.A review of the factual allegations of the parties reveals that they differ on the following questions: (1) Did a take-over/termination occur?(2) May the expenses incurred by respondent in the take-over be set off against the amounts it owed petitioner? (3) How much were the advances and billable accomplishments?The resolution of the foregoing issues lies in the interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement.According to respondent, the take-over was caused by petitioners delay in completing the work.Such delay was in violation of the provision in the Agreement as to time schedule:G. TIME SCHEDULE[Petitioner] shall adhere strictly to the schedule related to the WORK and complete the WORK within the period set forth in Annex C hereof.NO time extension shall be granted by [respondent] to [petitioner] unless a corresponding time extension is granted by [the Ministry of Public Works and Highways] to the CONSORTIUM.[20]Because of the delay, respondent alleges that it took over some of the work contracted to petitioner, pursuant to the following provision in the Agreement:K.TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT[Respondent] has theright to terminate and/or take overthis Agreement for any of the following causes:x x xx x xx x x6.If despite previous warnings by [respondent], [petitioner] does not execute the WORK in accordance with this Agreement, orpersistently or flagrantly neglects to carry out [its] obligations under this Agreement.[21]Supposedly, as a result of the take-over, respondent incurred expenses in excess of the contracted price.It sought to set off those expenses against the amount claimed by petitioner for the work the latter accomplished, pursuant to the following provision:If the total direct and indirect cost of completing the remaining part of the WORK exceed the sum which would have been payable to [petitioner] had it completed the WORK, the amount of such excess [may be] claimed by [respondent] from either of the following:1.Any amount due [petitioner] from [respondent] at the time of the termination of this Agreement.[22]The issue as to the correct amount of petitioners advances and billable accomplishments involves an evaluation of the manner in which the parties completed the work, the extent to which they did it, and the expenses each of them incurred in connection therewith.Arbitrators also need to look into the computation of foreign and local costs of materials, foreign and local advances, retention fees and letters of credit, and taxes and duties as set forth in the Agreement.These data can be gathered from a review of the Agreement, pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:C. CONTRACT PRICE AND TERMS OF PAYMENTx x xx x xx x xAll progress payments to be made by [respondent] to [petitioner] shall be subject to a retention sum of ten percent (10%) of the value of the approved quantities.Any claims by [respondent] on [petitioner] may be deducted by [respondent] from the progress payments and/or retained amount.Any excess from the retained amount after deducting [respondents] claims shall be released by [respondent] to [petitioner] after the issuance of [the Ministry of Public Works and Highways] of the Certificate of Completion and final acceptance of the WORK by [the Ministry of Public Works and Highways].x x xx x xx x xD.IMPORTED MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT[Respondent shall open the letters of credit for the importation of equipment and materials listed in Annex E hereof after the drawings, brochures, and other technical data of each items in the list have been formally approved by [the Ministry of Public Works and Highways].However, petitioner will still be fully responsible for all imported materials and equipment.All expenses incurred by [respondent], both in foreign and local currencies in connection with the opening of the letters of credit shall be deducted from the Contract Prices.x x xx x xx x xN.OTHER CONDITIONSx x xx x xx x x2.All customs duties, import duties, contractors taxes, income taxes, and other taxes that may be required by any government agencies in connection with this Agreement shall be for the sole account of [petitioner].[23]Being an inexpensive, speedy and amicable method of settling disputes,[24]arbitration -- along with mediation, conciliation and negotiation -- is encouraged by the Supreme Court.Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind.[25]It is thus regarded as the wave of the future in international civil and commercial disputes.[26]Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between the parties would be a step backward.[27]Consistent with the above-mentioned policy of encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods, courts should liberally construe arbitration clauses.Provided such clause is susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, an order to arbitrate should be granted.[28]Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration.[29]Second Issue:Prior Request for ArbitrationAccording to petitioner, assumingarguendothat the dispute is arbitrable, the failure to file a formal request for arbitration with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) precluded the latter from acquiring jurisdiction over the question.To bolster its position, petitioner even cites our ruling inTesco Services Incorporated v. Vera.[30]We are not persuaded.Section 1 of Article II of theoldRules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration indeed required the submission of a request for arbitration, as follows:SECTION. 1. Submission to Arbitration -- Any party to a construction contract wishing to have recourse to arbitration by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) shall submit its Request for Arbitration in sufficient copies to the Secretariat of the CIAC; PROVIDED, that in the case of government construction contracts, all administrative remedies available to the parties must have been exhausted within 90 days from the time the dispute arose.Tescowas promulgated by this Court, using the foregoing provision as reference.On the other hand, Section 1 of Article III of thenewRules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration has dispensed with this requirement and recourse to the CIAC may now be availed of whenever a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future controversy to arbitration, in this wise:SECTION 1.Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction An arbitration clause in a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of a construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit an existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction, notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration institution or arbitral body in such contract or submission.When a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC.The foregoing amendments in the Rules were formalized by CIAC Resolution Nos. 2-91 and 3-93.[31]The difference in the two provisions was clearly explained inChina Chang Jiang Energy Corporation (Philippines) v. Rosal Infrastructure Builders et al.[32](an extended unsigned Resolution) and reiterated inNational Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals,[33]from which we quote thus:Under the present Rules of Procedure, for a particular construction contract to fall within the jurisdiction of CIAC, it is merely required that the parties agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitrationUnlike in the original version of Section 1, as applied in theTescocase, the law as it now stands does not provide that the parties should agree to submit disputes arising from their agreement specifically to the CIAC for the latter to acquire jurisdiction over the same.Rather, it is plain and clear that as long as the parties agree to submit to voluntary arbitration, regardless of what forum they may choose, their agreement will fall within the jurisdiction of the CIAC, such that, even if they specifically choose another forum, the parties will not be precluded from electing to submit their dispute before the CIAC because this right has been vested upon each party by law,i.e., E.O. No. 1008.[34]Clearly, there is no more need to file a request with the CIAC in order to vest it with jurisdiction to decide a construction dispute.The arbitral clause in the Agreement is a commitment on the part of the parties to submit to arbitration the disputes covered therein.Because that clause is binding, they are expected to abide by it in good faith.[35]And because it covers the dispute between the parties in the present case, either of them may compel the other to arbitrate.[36]Since petitioner has already filed a Complaint with the RTC without prior recourse to arbitration, the proper procedure to enable the CIAC to decide on the dispute is to request the stay or suspension of such action, as provided under RA 876 [the Arbitration Law].[37]WHEREFORE, the Petition isDENIEDand the assailed DecisionAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 144074.March 20, 2001]MEDINA INVESTIGATION & SECURITY CORPORATION and ERNESTO Z. MEDINA,petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROMEO TABURNAL,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NGONZAGA-REYES,J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the Resolution dated June 2, 2000 dismissing the petition for being filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period and the Resolution dated July 12, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58968.Respondent Romeo Taburnal was hired by petitioner corporation as security guard on September 8, 1996 and was assigned to one of its clients, Abenson, Inc. at Sta. Lucia Grand Mall.On September 5, 1997, the client requested that respondent Taburnal be relieved due to violations pursuant to the Service Contract such as reporting late for duty, below standard performance of duties, and exceeding the maximum six (6) months duty in the company.In view of his replacement, respondent Taburnal filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal claiming for separation pay, non-payment of legal/special holiday and overtime pay, underpayment of 13th month pay and cash bond and tax refund.On April 29, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering the reinstatement of respondent Taburnal without loss of seniority rights and the payment of full backwages and salary differentials.Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction.The Motion for Reconsideration thereto was denied.Herein petitioners filed a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition outright for having been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period or on the 67th day per its Resolution on June 2, 2000.The Court of Appeals ruled that the petition was filed on the sixty-seventh (67th) day since petitioners received on November 10, 1999 the Order dated August 26, 1999 of the NLRC and the Motion for Reconsideration thereto was filed of November 19, 1999.Copy of the order denying the said motion was received by petitioners on April 3, 2000, while the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals on May 31, 2000.The Court of Appeals did not discuss the merits of the petition.Hence, the petition raising the following grounds:THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WAS FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.PUBLIC APPELLEES COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN THEY DISMISSED THE PETITION, THEREBY AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER FELIPE P. PATI WHICH AWARDED MONETARY CLAIMS AND OTHER RELIEF NOT PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT, IN GRAVE ABUSE OF THEIR DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.PUBLIC APPELLEES GROSSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION, WHEN THEY HELD APPELLANT ERNESTO Z. MEDINA JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH APPELLANT MISCOR, INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO THAT EFFECT.Petitioners main contention is that their petition forcertiorarifiled with the Court of Appeals was within the 60-day reglementary period pursuant to Rule 65.They insist that when the assailed Order was received on April 3, 2000, the petition filed on May 31, 2000 was the 58th day, citing Section 1, Rule 22 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and Article 13 of the Civil Code.In his Comment, private respondent Romeo Taburnal alleges that he is aware that Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure was later amended, which amendment took effect on September 1, 2000.He insists however that the petition filed with the Court of Appeals was not yet covered by said amendment.Private respondent further avers that Article 223 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure provide that appeal is the proper remedy for a party aggrieved by a decision of the Labor Arbiter and the filing of a petition forcertiorariwith the NLRC by petitioners is definitely a wrong remedy.A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended by the Resolution of July 21, 1998) took effect on September 1, 2000 and provides, to wit:SEC. 4.When and where petition filed. --- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution.In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.Contrary to the position of respondents that such amendment should not apply in this case, we have ruled in the cases ofSystems Factors Corporation and Modesto Dean vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 143789 (promulgated on November 27, 2000)andUnity Fishing Development Corp. and/or Antonio Dee vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 145415 (promulgated on February 2, 2001)that the amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC wherein the sixty-day period to file a petition forcertiorariis reckoned from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration should be deemed applicable.We reiterate that remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes.[1]Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.[2]The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws.[3]The above conclusion is consonant with the provision in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that (T)hese Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.The other issues raised by petitioners should be addressed and resolved by the court below.WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and July 12, 2000 are hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149692.July 30, 2002]HEIRS OF SPOUSES JULIAN DELA CRUZ AND MAGDALENA TUAZON, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact and co-heir, VIRGILIO C. ALVENDIA,petitioners, vs.HEIRS OF FLORENTINO QUINTOS, SR., namely, FLORENTINO QUINTOS, JR. and GLORIA QUINTOS BUGAYONG,respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45filed by petitioners seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution dated May 29, 2001of the Court of Appeals[1]which dismissed their petition for reviewof the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (Branch 38) on the ground that the petition was filed out of time; and, the Resolution dated August 29, 2001[2]denying theirmotion for reconsideration.Sometime in 1996, petitioners filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan an action for reconveyance with damages[3]against respondents alleging,among others, that they are the children of the late Ariston dela Cruz, who was the only forced and legal heir ofhis deceased parents, Julian dela Cruz and Magdalena Tuazon who died intestate; that sometime in 1897, Magdalena Tuazon purchased from Herminigildo and Filomena Tiong a certain parcel of land located at Heroes Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan consisting of605 square meters and since thenrespondents and their predecessors had been in continuous occupation and adversepossession of the subjectland; that sometime in 1987,private respondents predecessor Florentino Quintos, Sr., filed an application for the judicial registration ofa certain landwhich included petitioners land; that the land registration court granted Quintos application and decreed the land in Florentino Quintos nameandOCT No. 22665 was subsequently issued; that OCT No. 22665was partitioned into four separate lots and petitioners land was covered by TCT No. 173052;thatrespondents subsequently filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 4118) for illegal detainer against petitioners for the latters refusal to vacate the subject land which resulted in petitioners ejectmentfrom the subject property.Respondents filed their answer with counterclaim, alleging that the subject land hadalways belonged to respondents late father Florentino Quintos, Sr., who in turn inherited the same from his mother, Dolores Tuazon; that the affidavit evidencing petitioners ownership of the subject land was not attached to the complaint; that respondents predecessors merely tolerated petitioners possession of the subject land; that petitioners never filed their opposition to respondents application for registration despite knowledge thereof; that the land registration case which was the basis for the issuance of OCT No. 22665 in the name of the predecessor of respondents wasa proceeding inremwhich bound all persons whether notified or not.On January 29, 1999, a decision[4]was rendered by the MTC declaring petitioners as the legal owners of the land covered by TCT No. 173052 and ordering respondents to convey to petitioners the subject land and to pay damages to petitioners.[5]Respondents filed their appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan (Branch 38).On January 19, 2000, the RTC[6]reversed the decision of the MTC dismissing the complaint, declaring respondents as the absolute owners of the subject land and ordering petitioners to pay damages to respondents.Petitioners filed their motion for reconsiderationwhich the trial court denied in a Resolution dated March 8, 2000.[7]On April 18, 2000, petitioners, through counsel, filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a motion for extension of time to file a petition for reviewwhich she subsequently filed on May 2, 2000. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for review for being filed out of time since the certification issued by Postmaster Elizabeth I. Torio of Dagupan City Post Office and the affidavit of Ricardo C. Castro, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court show that the trial courts Resolution dated March 8, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration was received by the secretary of petitioners counsel onMarch 16, 2000, thus the filing of the petition was filed 28 days late.Petitioners counselfiled herComment to respondents motion to dismiss alleging thatwhen she arrived in her office on April 3, 2000, she found copies of pleadings and correspondence including a copy of the trial courts Resolution dated March 8, 2000 denying her motion for reconsideration; that she thought that these pleadings and correspondence were all received on April 3, 2000; that upon receipt of respondents motion to dismiss, she confrontedher secretary who told her that the envelope containing the Resolutionwasonly opened on April 3, 2000 and her secretary could not recall if the Resolutionwas among those she received on March 16, 2000.On May 29, 2001, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners petition for review for being filed out of time. It found the explanation given by petitioners counsel unconvincing since she failed to give the reason why the envelope was opened only on April 3, 2000; that counsels secretary did not even admit that she actually received the said Resolution; that it is the counsels duty to adopt and strictly maintain a system that efficiently takes into account all court notices sent to her and she failedto instruct and remind her secretary on what should be done with respect to such notices and processes. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated August 29, 2001.Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:1)The appellate court rejected and refused to consider the valid reason submitted by the petitioners counsel for the apparent delay in the filing of the petition for review with said court; hence the dismissal of the petition was tainted with grave abuse of discretion;2)Granting, arguendo, that there is a basis for the dismissal of the petition, the appellate court should have applied the principle of liberal construction of the Rules pursuant to Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 RCP), considering the valid and meritorious case of petitioners.3)In either case, it is respectfully submitted that the appellate court has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in dismissing outright the petition for review as to call for the supervision of this Honorable Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.[8]We deny the petition.Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, provides that the petition shall be filed and served within 15 days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.[9]In the instant case, it has been established that the resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision was received by the secretary of petitioners former counsel on March 16, 2000, thus the last day of the 15-day period within which to file the petition for review with the respondent court was March 31, 2000. Considering that counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with the respondent court only on April 18, 2000, the judgment of the RTC subject of the petition for review had already become final and executory.Consequently, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time since it has no more jurisdiction to entertain the petition much less to alter a judgment.This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.[10]The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.[11]The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.[12]The party who seeks to avail ofthe same mustcomply with the requirement of the rules.Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.[13]We agree with the CA when it found that the reason advanced by petitioners former counsel, which is that she received the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration only on April 3, 2000 as she found it on her table on the same date, unacceptable. The negligence of her secretary in failing to immediately give the trial courts resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration upon receipt to the counsel and the negligence of counsel to adopt and arrange matters in order to ensure that official or judicial communications sent by mail would reach her promptly cannot be considered excusable.The Court has also often repeated that the negligence of the clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.[14]The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client because otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit so long asnew counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not be sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.[15]Petitioners claim that there should be a liberal construction of the rules of procedure in order to effect substantial justice and appeal to this Courts exercise of equity jurisdiction.We are not persuaded.There is no showing in this case of any extraordinary circumstance which may justify a deviation from the rule on timely filing of appeals.As held in the case ofTupas vs. CA:[16]Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. (Limpot vs. CA, 170 SCRA 369)xxxxxxxxxFor all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law.We said in an earlier case, and we repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions.Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law aslong as it remains in force.The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists- and is now still reverently observed- is `aequetas nunquam contravenit legis. (Aguila vs. CA, 160 SCRA 359)At any rate, we find no reversible error committed by the RTC in dismissing petitioners complaint for reconveyance against respondents.Petitioners claim of ownership was based on the affidavit of Herminigildo and Filomena Tiong executed on November 9, 1926 which stated among others that they were the former owners in common of the subject parcel of land which they sold to Magdalena Tuazon (petitioners predecessor in interest) on or about the year 1897.However, such affidavit was not accompanied by any instrument showing the sale between the Tiong spouses and Magdalena Tuazon.By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership,[17]thus it cannot serve as the basis of ownership of the petitioners.Moreover, the RTC found that there was no tax declaration or title in the name of the Tiong spouses to evidence their ownership of the subject land.On the other hand, respondents ownership of the subject land was by virtue of a land registration case where the land registration court found sufficient the well documented evidence submitted by applicant Florentino Quintos, Sr. ( respondents predecessor in interest ) to prove their ownership of 2,048 sq. meters lot which included the subject land.In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence.He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.[18]The RTC had correctly ruled that petitioners failed to show sufficient proof of ownership over the subject land covered by TCT No. 173052 so as to entitle them the return of the same.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolution dated May 29, 2001 and Resolution dated August 29, 2001 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 144294.March 11, 2003]SOLEDAD CHANLIONGCORAMOS, FRANCISCO D. CHANLIONGCO, ADELBERTO D. CHANLIONGCO, ARMANDO D. CHANLIONGCO and FLORENCIO D. CHANLIONGCO,petitioners, vs.TERESITA D. RAMOS, Spouses TERESITA and EDMUNDO S. MUYOT, Spouses VEDASTA and FLORENCIO M. DATO, LORETO MUYOT, Spouses TERESITA and ELMER SOLIS, LICERIA TORRES, Spouses CORAZON and VICENTE MACATUNGAL, Spouses PRECILLA and CRISOSTOMO MUYOT, and Spouses CARIDAD and SALVADOR PINGOL,respondents.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:Well-settled is the rule that a final judgment is immutable and unalterable. The only exceptions to this rule are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-callednunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review onCertiorari[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the July 31, 2000 Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 29507 which denied petitioners Motion to Set Aside the CA Decision[3]dated September 28, 1995.The assailed Resolution disposed as follows:Finding the opposition of [respondents] to be well-taken, the [Court herebyDENIESthe Motion].[4]The FactsPetitioners are children of the late Paulino V. Chanliongco Jr., who was the co-owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-G of Subdivision Plan SWO No. 7308.Situated in Tondo, Manila, it was co-owned by him, his sister Narcisa, and his brothers Mario and Antonio.By virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion C. Mendoza had sold the lot to herein respondents on different days in September 1986.Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the validity of the sale, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[5]a Complaint[6]for interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims.The RTC upheld the sale insofar as the share of Narcisa was concerned.It ruled that Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the other co-owners, because the Special Power of Attorney had been executed in favor only of her mother, Narcisa.On appeal, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC.It held that while there was no Special Power of Attorney in favor of Adoracion, the sale was nonetheless valid, because she had been authorized by her mother to be the latters sub-agent.There was thus no need to execute another special power of attorney in her favor as sub-agent.This CA Decision was not appealed, became final and was entered in favor of respondents on August 8, 1996.[7]On April 10, 1999, petitioners filed with the CA a Motion to Set Aside the Decision.They contended that they had not been served a copy of either the Complaint or the summons.Neither had they been impleaded as parties to the case in the RTC.As it was, they argued, the CA Decision should be set aside because it adversely affected their respective shares in the property without due process.In denying the Motion of petitioners, the CA cited the grounds raised in respondents Opposition:(a) the Motion was not allowed as a remedy under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) the Decision sought to be set aside had long become final and executory; (c) the movants did not have any legal standing; and (d) the Motion was purely dilatory and without merit.[8]Hence, this Petition.[9]The IssueIn their Memorandum, petitioners raise this sole issue for the Courts consideration:x x x [W]hether the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners Motion and allowing its Decision dated September 25, 1995 to take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners and passing petitioners property in favor of respondents, hence without due process of law.[10]The Courts RulingThe Petition is unmeritorious.Main Issue:Entitlement to SummonsIt is well settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law;[11]and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land.[12]The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of (1) clerical errors, (2) the so-callednunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.[13]To determine whether the CA Decision of September 28, 1995 is void, the failure to implead and to serve summons upon petitioners will now be addressed.[14]To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to determine whether the action isin personam,in remorquasi in rem.The rules on the service of summons differ depending on the nature of the action.An actionin personamis lodged against a person based on personal liability; an actionin remis directed against the thing itself instead of the person;[15]while an actionquasi in remnames a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation.[16]The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property in question.[17]Specifically, it forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which of them owned the property.Essentially, it sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed against the personal liability of any particular person.It was therefore a real action, because it affected title to or possession of real property.[18]As such, the Complaint was brought against the deceased registered co-owners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino and Antonio Chanliongco, as represented by their respective estates.Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino.They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because the latter was represented by an executor or administrator.[19]Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been made parties.Furthermore, at the time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of Court were still in effect.Under the old Rules, specifically Section 3 of Rule 3,[20]an executor or administrator may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended.[21]The present rule,[22]however, requires the joinder of the beneficiary or the party for whose benefit the action is brought.Under the former Rules, an executor or administrator is allowed to either sue or be sued alone in that capacity.In the present case, it was the estate of petitioners father Paulino Chanliongco, as represented by Sebrio Tan Quiming and Associates, that was included as defendant[23]and served summons.[24]As it was, there was no need to include petitioners as defendants.Not being parties, they were not entitled to be served summons.Petitioner Florencio D. Chanliongco, on the other hand, was impleaded in the Complaint, but not served summons.However, the service of summons upon the estate of his deceased father was sufficient, as the estate appeared for and on behalf of all the beneficiaries and the heirs of Paulino Chanliongco, including Florencio.We also note that the counsel of petitioners, Atty. Felino V. Quiming Jr., is a partner of the law firm that represented the estate of the deceased father.Hence, it can reasonably be expected that the service upon the law firm was sufficient notice to all the beneficiaries of the estate, including Petitioner Florencio D. Chanliongco.WHEREFORE, the Petition is herebyDENIEDand the assailed ResolutionAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005]SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA,petitioners, vs.SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:The petitioners, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners of a parcel of land, with a house constructed thereon, located in Paraaque, Metro Manila (now Paraaque City) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 134391 issued on February 24, 1998.[1]On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero, executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[2]in which the former sold the property to the latter for the price ofP940,250.00 payable in six (6) installmentsviapostdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the property.It appears in the MOA that the petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners.On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a Complaint[3]against the respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages. The petitioners alleged therein that, they did not transfer the property to and in the names of the respondents as vendees because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in payment for the purchase price of the property were dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite demands therefor.The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:a. The sale/Memorandum of Agreement (Annex A,supra) be declared null and void, rescinded and with no further force and effect;b. Defendants, and all persons claiming right under them, be ordered to immediately vacate the subject property and turnover its possession to the plaintiffs;c. Defendants, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay the plaintiffs:i.P10,000.00 monthly, starting 01 October 1997 until complete turnover of the subject property to the plaintiffs, as reasonable compensation for its continued unlawful use and occupation by the defendants;ii.P200,000.00 moral damages;iii.P200,000.00 exemplary damages;iv.P250,000.00 attorneys fees and litigation related expenses; andv. the costs of suit.Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for.[4]The petitioners declared in their complaint that the property subject of the complaint was valued atP6,900,000.00. They appended copies of the MOA and TCT No. 134391 to their complaint. The case was eventually raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground,inter alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action.On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action and not a personal one; hence, it should have been brought in the RTC of Paraaque City, where the property subject matter of the action was located, and not in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where the petitioners resided. The respondents posited that the said court had no jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action because it was located in Paraaque City.[5]In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages and attorneys fees is a personal action and not a real action; hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside. They averred that while their second cause of action for the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action, the same may, nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their causes of action for damages, conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.[6]By way of reply, the respondents averred that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court applies only when one or more of multiple causes of action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts, and the other or others are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, and the venue lies therein.On February 9, 2000, the trial court issued an Order[7]denying the motion for lack of merit. It found merit in the petitioners contention that Section 5(c), Rule 2 was applicable.Meanwhile, the case was re-raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. In a Motion[8]dated December 20, 2000, the respondents prayed for the reconsideration of the trial courts February 9, 2000 Order. On October 16, 2001, the court issued an Order[9]granting the motion and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It ruled that the principal action of the petitioners was a real action and should have been filed in the RTC of Paraaque City where the property subject matter of the complaint was located. However, since the case was filed in the RTC of Bulacan where the petitioners reside, which court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, it must be dismissed.Hence, the present recourse.The petition has no merit.The sole issue is whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The resolution of this issue is, in turn, anchored on whether Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court invoked by the petitioners is applicable in this case.Under the said Rule, a party may, in one pleading, assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party subject to the conditions therein enumerated, one of which is Section 5(c) which reads:Sec. 5.Joinder of causes of action. -- (c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; Explaining the aforequoted condition, Justice Jose Y. Feria declared:(c) Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial Court, the action should be filed in the Regional Trial Court. If the causes of action have different venues, they may be joined in any of the courts of proper venue. Hence, a real action and a personal action may be joined either in the Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located or where the parties reside.[10]A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other which causes the latter injury. The essential elements of a cause of action are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect ones right; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs right.[11]A cause of action should not be confused with the remedies or reliefs prayed for. A cause of action is to be found in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the prayer for relief. It is the substance and not the form that is controlling.[12]A party may have two or more causes of action against another party.A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of action in a complaint. The question of the joinder of causes of action involves in particular cases a preliminary inquiry as to whether two or more causes of action are alleged.[13] In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged, the main thrust is whether more than one primary right or subject of controversy is present. Other tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on the other, whether the same evidence would support the other different counts and whether separate actions could be maintained for separate relief;[14]or whether more than one distinct primary right or subject of controversy is alleged for enforcement or adjudication.[15]A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies. The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has stated more than one cause of action. The prayer may be an aid in interpreting the petition and in determining whether or not more than one cause of action is pleaded.[16]If the allegations of the complaint show one primary right and one wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods, elements of injury, items of claims or theories of recovery are set forth.[17]Where two or more primary rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder of causes of action.After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so because the petitioners, as plaintiffs in the courta quo, had only one cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latters refusal to pay the first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to the petitioners the possession of the real property, as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the respondents. The claim for damages for reasonable compensation for the respondents use and occupation of the property, in theinterim, as well as moral and exemplary damages suffered by the petitioners on account of the aforestated breach of contract of the respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes of action.[18]The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account of the respondents breach thereof and the latters failure to return the premises subject of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents eviction therefrom is a real action.[19] As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located, namely, in Paraaque City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:SECTION 1.Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their complaint in the said RTC, venue was improperly laid; hence, the trial court acted conformably with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISIONSPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ and CRISTINA AGRAVIADOR AVISO, P e t i t i o n e r s, -versus-ANTONIO HERMANO, R e s p o n d e n t. G.R. No.147417Present: PUNO, Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA and CHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.Promulgated: July 8, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.: This is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution[1]of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioners original action forcertiorariunder Rule 65 for being filed out of time. Assailed as well is the Resolution[2]dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:On 27 April 1998, petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor and Milagros Perez filed a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio Hermano before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 224.[3] On 15 May 1998, respondent (then defendant) Hermano filed his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On 17 January 2000, respondent Hermano filed a Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 28 February 2000. This Order was received by petitioners on 21 March 2000. On 23 March 2000, petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on 25 May 2000 and received by petitioners on 18 June 2000. On 17 August 2000, petitioners filed an original action forcertioraribefore the Court of Appealsimputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing the complaint against respondent Hermano. On 19 October 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed Resolution dismissing the petition forcertiorarifor having been filed beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended. On 02 March 2001, the second assailed Resolution was promulgated dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals holding that:From the time petitioners received the assailed Order on March 21, 2000 and filed their motion for reconsideration, four (4) days had elapsed. On June 18, 2000, petitioners received the denial of their motion for reconsideration. When the instant petition was filed on August 17, 2000, a total of 63 days had elapsed.A.M. No. 00-2-03-50 further amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the New Rules on Civil Procedure states that the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, Order or Resolution and in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.Viewed from its light, the assailed Orders had already attained finality, and are now beyond the power of this Court to review.[4]Aggrieved by the foregoing ruling, petitioners are now before us assigning the following MANIFEST AND/OR SERIOUS ERROR COMMITTED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE PETITIONERS FILED THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE IT AND CONSEQUENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE APPRECIATION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, WITH ITS FINDING OF FACT NOT BEING BORNE BY THE RECORD OR EVIDENCE, AND THUS ITS CONCLUSION IS ENTIRELY BASELESS.[5]According to petitioners, following the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, their petition was filed on the 60thday, thus, within the reglementary period. Respondent insists, on the other hand, that the petition was filed on the 61stday while the Court of Appeals had declared that the petition was filed on the 63rdday.We agree in the position taken by petitioners.Admittedly, at the time petitioners filed their petition forcertiorarion 17 August 2000, the rule then prevailing was Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 effective 01 September 1998, which provides: Sec. 4. Where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, or if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted.If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial.No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied) However, on 01 September 2000, during the pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals, Section 4 was amended anew by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC[6]which now provides: Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution.In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied)Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file the petition starts to run from receipt of notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if one is filed.[7]InNarzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission,[8]we described this latest amendment as curative in nature as it remedied the confusion brought about by Circular No. 39-98 because, historically,i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition forcertiorari. Curative statutes, which are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements, by their very essence, are retroactive.[9] And, being a procedural rule, we held inSps. Ma. Carmen and Victor Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge Benito Legarda[10]that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent.Consequently, petitioners had a fresh period of 60 days from the time they received the Order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration on 18 June 2000. When they filed their petition with the Court of Appeals on 17 August 2000, exactly 60 days had elapsed following the rule that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included.[11] Hence, there can be no doubt that the petition was filed within the reglementary period for doing so and it was reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in not giving said petition due course.However, instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals which would only unduly prolong the disposition of the substantive issue raised, we shall resolve the petition originally filed therein.Petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals on petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 the lone issue of:WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Hon. Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 224, Quezon City] HAD PLAINLY AND MANIFESTLY ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS AGAINST RESPONDENT ANTONIO HERMANO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-98-34211.[12]Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano should not have been dismissed from the complaint because: (1) He did not file a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and, in fact, his Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial was filed almost two years after he filed his Answer to the complaint; (2) There was no misjoinder of causes of action in this case; and (3) There was no misjoinder of parties.The case filed by petitioners against respondent Hermano and the other defendants, namely Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras and Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele, was one for Enforcement of Contract and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-34211 and raffled to Branch 224.Petitioners presented three causes of action in their complaint, the first for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., the second for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into between petitioners and respondent Hermano and the third for damages against all defendants.For the first cause of action, petitioners allege that sometime in November 1997, they entered into a Contract to Sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through Zenie Sales-Contreras, for the purchase of five (5) parcels of land in the total amount of Nineteen Million One Hundred Four Thousand Pesos (P19,104,000.00). As part of their agreement, a portion of the purchase price would be paid to them as down payment, another portion to be given to them as cash advance upon the execution of the contract and another portion to be used by the buyer, Zescon Land, Inc., to pay for loans earlier contracted by petitioners which loans were secured by mortgages.Re-pleading the foregoing in their second cause of action, petitioners con