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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Justin GarsonUniversity of Texas at Austin

Paul GriffithsUniversity of Queensland

Cory JuhlUniversity of Texas at Austin

James JustusUniversity of Texas at Austin

Phillip KitcherColumbia University

Ian NybergUniversity of Texas at Austin

Anya PlutyinskiUniversity of Utah

Sherrilyn RoushRice University

Laura RuetscheUniversity of Pittsburgh

John StachelBoston University

William WimsattUniversity of Chicago

iii

The ilosophy Science

An Encyclopedia

Sahotra Sarkar Jessica Pfeifer

EDITORS

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS

Justin Garson, James Justus, and Ian Nyberg University of Texas

New York London

Published in 2006 byRoutledge Taylor & Francis Group 270 Madison AvenueNew York, NY 10016

Published in Great Britain byRoutledge Taylor & Francis Group2 Park SquareMilton Park, AbingdonOxon OX14 4RN

2006 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLCRoutledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

International Standard Book Number-10: 0-415-93927-5 (Hardcover) International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-415-93927-0 (Hardcover) Library of Congress Card Number 2005044344

No part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now knownor hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permissionfrom the publishers.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The philosophy of science : an encyclopedia / Sahotra Sarkar, Jessica Pfeifer, editors.p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-415-93927-5 (set : alk. paper)--ISBN 0-415-97709-6 (v. 1 : alk. paper) -- ISBN 0-415-97710-X (v. 2 : alk. paper)1. Science--Philosophy--Encyclopedias. I. Sarkar, Sahotra. II. Pfeifer, Jessica.

Q174.7.P55 2005501'.03--dc22 2005044344

Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com

and the Routledge Web site at http://www.routledge-ny.comTaylor & Francis Group is the Academic Division of T&F Informa plc.

Dedicated to the memory of Bob Nozick, who initiated this project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction xi

List of Contributors xxvii

A to Z List of Entries xxxiii

Thematic List of Entries xxxvii

Entries AM 1

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE:AN INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of science emerged as a recognizablesub-discipline within philosophy only in the twenti-eth century. The possibility of such a sub-disciplineis a result of the post-Enlightenment disciplinaryand institutional separation of philosophy fromthe sciences. Before that separation, philosophicalreflection formed part of scientific researchas,indeed, it mustand philosophy was usually guid-ed by a sound knowledge of science, a practicethat gradually lost currency after the separation.In the nineteenth century, philosophical reflectionon science resulted in a tradition of natural philos-ophy, particularly in Britain (with the work of Mill,Pearson, Whewell, and others), but also in conti-nental Europe, especially in Austria (with Bolzano,Mach, and others). What is called philosophy ofscience today has its roots in both the British andthe Austrian traditions, although with many otherinfluences, as several entries in this Encyclopediarecord (see, for instance, Duhem Thesis; Poincare,Henri).

This Encyclopedia is intended to cover contem-porary philosophy of science. It is restricted to con-ceptual developments since the turn of the twentiethcentury. Its treatment of major figures in the field isrestricted to philosophers (excluding scientists, nomatter what the extent of their philosophical in-fluence has been) and, with very few exceptions(notably Chomsky, Noam; Putnam, Hilary; andSearle, John), to those whose work is distant enoughto allow historical appraisal. Conceptual issuesin the general philosophy of science (including itsepistemology and metaphysics) as well as in thespecial sciences are included; those in mathematicshave been left for a different work. This Introduc-tion will provide a guided tour of these conceptualissues; individual figures will only be mentionedin passing.

Historically, the themes treated in the Encyclo-pedia are those that have emerged starting with theperiod of the Vienna Circle (see Vienna Circle),

including the figures and developments that influ-enced it (see Bridgman, Percy Williams; DuhemThesis; Mach, Ernest; Poincare, Jules Henri). Thework of the members of the Vienna Circle provide alink between the older natural philosophy, especial-ly in its Austrian version, and the later philosophyof science, which borrowed heavily from the con-cepts and techniques of the mathematical logicthat was being created in the first three decades ofthe last century (see Hilbert, David; Ramsey,Frank Plumpton; Russell, Bertrand; see also Ayer[1959] and Sarkar [1996a]). The new set of doc-trinesor, more accurately, methodscame to becalled logicalpositivism and, later, logical empir-icism (see Logical Empiricism; see also Sarkar[1996b]).By the1930s these viewshad spreadbeyondthe confines of Vienna and had attracted allegiancefrom many other similarly-minded philosophers(see Ayer, A. J.; Quine, Willard Van; Reichenbach,Hans). Two attitudes were widely shared within thisgroup: a belief that good philosophy must be con-versant with the newest developments within thesciences (see Rational Reconstruction), and arejection of traditional metaphysics imbued withdiscussions with no empirical significance (seeCognitive Significance; Verifiability).Some members of the Vienna Circle also took the

so-called linguistic turn (see Carnap, Rudolf) andviewed scientific theories as systems formalized inartificial languages (Sarkar 1996c). Arguably, atleast, this work lost the prized contact with thepractice of science, and this development contri-buted to the eventual rejection of logical empiricismbymost philosophers of science in the late twentiethcentury. However, a number of the original logicalempiricists, along with many others, rejected thelinguistic turn, or at least did not fully endorse it(see Neurath, Otto; Popper, Karl Raimund; Reich-enbach, Hans). The tensions between the two viewswere never fully articulated during this period, letalone resolved, because the Vienna Circle as an

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institution and logical empiricism as a movementboth came under political attack in Europe with theadvent of Nazism. Most of the figures involved inthe movement migrated to the United Kingdomand the United States. In the United States, manyof the logical empiricists also later fell afoul ofMcCarthyism (see Logical Empiricism).In the United States, Nagel probably best exem-

plifies what philosophy of science became in theperiod of the dominance of logical empiricism.The discussions of Nagels (1961) Structure ofScience typically include careful formal accountsof conceptual issues, but these are supplementedby detailed nonformal discussions in the spiritof the tradition of natural philosophythis bookmay be viewed as a summary of where logicalempiricism stood at its peak (see Nagel, Ernest).However, starting in the late 1940s, many of thetheses adopted by the logical empiricists cameunder increasing attack even by those committedto keeping philosophy in contact with the sciences(Sarkar 1996e). (The logical empiricists had explic-itly advocated and practiced intense self-criticism,and many of these attacks came from within theirrankssee Hempel, Carl Gustav.) Some of thiscriticism concerned whether cherished doctrinescould be successfully formulated with the degreeof rigor desired by the logical empiricists (seeAnalyticity; Cognitive Significance).However, the most serious criticism came from

those who held that the logical empiricists hadfailed to give an account of scientific confirmationand scientific change (see Confirmation, Scien-tific Discovery, and Scientific Change, below).Feyerabend, for one, argued that the logicalempiricists had placed science under an inadmissi-ble rational straitjacket (see Feyerabend, Paul). Asphilosophy of science took a distinctly historicalturn, analyzing the development of science in in-creasing historical detail, many felt that the logicalempiricists had misinterpreted the historical pro-cesses of scientific change (see Hanson, NorwoodRussell; Kuhn, Thomas). Kuhns (1962) Structureof Scientific Revolutions, originally written for anencyclopedia sponsored by the logical empiricists,was particularly influential. By the mid-1960s logi-cal empiricism was no longer the dominant view inthe philosophy of science; rather, it came to beregarded as a received view against which philo-sophers of science defined themselves (Suppe 1974).However, this interpretation of logical empiricismignores the disputes and diversity of viewpointswithin the tradition (see, especially, Logical Empir-icism), arguably resulting in a caricature ratherthan a responsible intellectual characterization.

Nevertheless, for expository ease, the termreceived view will be used in this Introductionto indicate what may, at least loosely, be taken tobe the majority view among the logical empiricists.

Scientific realism and various forms of natural-ism, sometimes under the rubric of evolutionaryepistemology, have emerged as alternatives to thelogical empiricist interpretations of science (seeEvolutionary Epistemology; Scientific Realism).Meanwhile, science has also been subject to femi-nist and other social critiques (see Feminist Philos-ophy of Science). Kuhns work has also been usedas an inspiration for interpretations of science thatregard it as having no more epistemologicalauthority than knowledge generated by othercultural practices (see Social Constructionism).However, whether such work belongs to the philos-ophy of science, rather than its sociology, remainscontroversial. While no single dominant interpreta-tion of science has emerged since the decline oflogical empiricism, the ensuing decades have seenmany innovative analyses of conceptual issues thatwere central to logical empiricism. There has alsobeen considerable progress in the philosophicalanalyses of the individual sciences. The rest ofthis Introduction will briefly mention these withpointers to the relevant entries in this work.

Theories

The analysis of scientific theoriesboth their formand contenthas been a central theme within thephilosophy of science. According to what has be-come known as the received view, which was de-veloped in various versions by the logical empiricistsbetween the 1920s and 1950s, theories are a con-junction of axioms (the laws of nature) and corre-spondence rules specified in a formalized ideallanguage. The ideal language was supposed to con-sist of three parts: logical terms, observationalterms, and theoretical terms. Logical claims weretreated as analytic truths (see Analyticity), andwere thought by many to be accepted as a matterof convention (see Conventionalism). Observation-al claims were also thought to be unproblematic,initially understood as referring to incorrigiblesense-data and later to publicly available physi-cal objects (see Phenomenalism; Physicalism; Pro-tocol Sentences). The correspondence rules weresupposed to allow the logical empiricists to givecognitive significance (see Cognitive Significance;Verifiability) to the theoretical portion of the lan-guage, by specifying rules for connecting theoreti-cal and observational claims. In their extremeversion, these correspondence rules took the form

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION

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of operational definitions (see Bridgeman, PercyWilliams). One goal of such attempts was to distin-guish science from non-science, especially what thelogical empiricists derided as metaphysics (seeDemarcation, Problem of).

Starting in the 1960s, the received view encoun-tered anumber of problems. Even earlier, difficultieshad arisen for the correspondence rules, whichtook various forms over the years as a result ofthese problems. Initially understood as explicitdefinitions, they were later treated as partial defini-tions, and in the end the theoretical terms weremerely required to make a difference to the obser-vational consequences of the theory. One centralfocus of the criticism was on the observation-theory distinction (see Observation). It was arguedthat the theoretical and observational portions oflanguage are not distinct (Putnam 1962; Achinstein1968; see also Putnam, Hilary), that the distinctionbetween entities that are observable and those thatare not is vague (Maxwell 1962), and that ob-servations are theory-laden (Hanson 1958; seealso Hanson, Norwood Russell; Observation). Inaddition, there were problems ruling out unintend-ed models of theories, which became a sourceof counterexamples. In hindsight, it is also clearthat the problem of demarcating science fromnon-science was never fully solved.

More recently, a number of philosophers havequestioned the important place given to laws ofnature on this view, arguing that there are scientifictheories in which laws do not appear to play asignificant role (see Biology, Philosophy of; Lawsof Nature). Others have questioned not the occur-rence of laws within theories, but whether any ofthese entities should be conceptualized as linguisticentities (which is quite foreign to the practice ofscience). Still others have wondered whether thefocus on theories has been an artifact of thereceived view being based primarily on physics, tothe detriment of other sciences. As the receivedview fell out of favor, starting in the 1960s, anumber of philosophers developed various ver-sions of what is known as the semantic view oftheories, which understands theories as classesof models, rather than as linguistic entities specifi-able in an axiomatic system. While not with-out its problems, the semantic view seemed tobring philosophical accounts of theories more inline with the practices of scientists and has be-come the generally accepted view of theories(see Scientific Models; Theories). Nevertheless,there is at present no consensus within the disci-pline as to how theories should be philosophicallycharacterized.

Scientific Models

Models are central to the practice of science andcome in a bewildering variety of forms, from thedouble helix model of DNA to mathematical mod-els of economic change (see Scientific Models).Scientific models were regarded as being of peri-pheral philosophical interest by the received view.Little philosophical work was done on them untilthe 1970s, with Hesses (1963)Models and Analogiesin Science being a notable exception. That situationhas changed drastically, with models probably nowbeing the locus of evenmore philosophical attentionthan theories.Two developments have contributed to the bur-

geoning philosophical interest in models:

(i) The Semantic Interpretation of Theories. Thedevelopment of various versions of the se-mantic interpretation of theories has putmodels at the center of theoretical work inscience (see Theories). For many proponentsof the semantic view, the received viewprovided a syntactic interpretation of the-ories, regarding theories as formalized struc-tures. Scientific models are then supposed tobe construed in analogy with models in for-mal logic, providing semantic interpreta-tions of syntactic structures. The semanticview inverts this scheme to claim that mod-els are epistemologically privileged and thattheories should be regarded as classes ofmodels. The various semantic views havemade many contributions to the under-standing of science, bringing philosophicalanalysis closer to the practice of science thanthe received view. Nevertheless, almost allversions of the semantic view are at leastpartly based on a dubious assumption ofsimilarity between models in logic andwhat are called models in science.

(ii) Historical Case Studies. How dubious thatpresumed similarity has been underscoredby the second development that helped gen-erate the current focus on scientific models:the detailed studies of the role of models inscience that has been part of the historicalturn in the philosophy of science since the1960s. That turn necessitated a focus onmodels because much of scientific researchconsists of the construction and manipula-tion of models (Wimsatt 1987). These stud-ies have revealed that there are manydifferent types of models and they have avariety of dissimilar functions (see ScientificModels for a taxonomy). At one end are


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models of data and representational materi-al models such as the double helix. At theother are highly idealized models (see App-roximation), including many of the math-ematical models in the different sciences.Some models, such as the Bohr model ofthe atom (see Quantum Mechanics) or thePauling models of chemical bonds (seeChemistry, Philosophy of ), are both math-ematical and accompanied by a visual pic-ture that help their understanding and use(see also Visual Representation).

At present, no unified treatment of the varioustypes and functions of scientific models seems pos-sible. At the very least, the rich tapestry of modelsin science cannot entirely be accommodated to therole assigned to them by the semantic interpretationof theories or any other account that views modelsas having only explanatory and predictive func-tions. The ways in which models also function astools of exploration and discovery remain a topic ofactive philosophical interest (Wimsatt 1987).

Realism

A central concern of philosophers of science haslong been whether scientists have good reason tobelieve that the entities (in particular the unobserv-able entities) referred to by their theories exist andthat what their theories say about these entitiesis true or approximately true (see Realism). Inorder for theories to refer to or be true aboutunobservable entities, they must actually be claimsabout these entities. This was denied by many logi-cal empiricists, building on concerns raised byMach, Duhem, and Poincare (see Mach, Ernest;Poincare, Henri). As noted above, the logicalempiricists were interested in providing cogni-tive significance to theoretical terms by attemptingto reduce theoretical claims to claims in the obser-vation language. Even when this proved impos-sible, many nevertheless argued that theoreticalterms are simply convenient instruments formaking predictions about observable entities, rath-er than claims about unobservable entities (seeInstrumentalism).Because of the difficulties with theory-observa-

tion distinction discussed above (see Observation;Theories), this view fell out of favor and wasreplaced with a milder version of anti-realism. VanFraassen (1980), for example, argues that whileclaims about unobservables might have a truthvalue, scientists only have good reason to believein their empirical adequacy, not their truth. Such a

view might broadly be understood as instrumental-ist in the sense that the truth of theories does notunderwrite the functions they serve. There are twomain arguments provided in support this version ofantirealism. First, given the problem of underde-termination raised by Duhem and Quine, there willalways be more than one rival hypothesis compati-ble with any body of evidence (see Duhem Thesis;Underdetermination of Theories). Therefore, sincethese hypotheses are incompatible, the evidencecannot provide adequate reason to believe thatone or the other theory is true. Second, some haveargued that history provides evidence against be-lieving in the truth of scientific theories. Given thelarge number of theories once thought true inthe past that have since been rejected as false,history provides inductive evidence that sciencescurrent theories are likely to be false as well (seeLaudan 1981).

There have been a number of responses to thesearguments, including attempts to show that theproblem of underdetermination can be solved,that anti-realism depends on a distinction betweenobservable and unobservable entities that cannotbe sustained, and that the realist need only claimthat theories are approximately true or are gettingcloser to the truth (see Verisimilitude). In addition,arguments have been provided in support of real-ism about theories, the most influential of which isPutnams miracle argument (see Putnam, Hilary).There are various versions of this argument, butthe central premise is that science is successful(what this success amounts to varies). The conten-tion is that the only way this success can beexplained is if scientific theories are approxima-tely true (see Abduction); otherwise the success ofscience would be a miracle.

This argument has been criticized in three centralways. First, Fine (1986) criticizes the miracle argu-ment for being viciously circular. Second, somehave argued that science is in fact not very success-ful, for reasons outlined above. Third, it is arguedthat the success of science does not depend on itstruth, or perhaps does not even require an explana-tion. Van Fraassen (1980), for example, has arguedthat it is not surprising that scientific theories arepredictively successful, since they are chosen fortheir predictive success. Therefore, the success oftheories can be explained without supposing theirtruth. Others have responded that this would not,however, explain the predictive success of theoriesin novel situations (e.g., Leplin 1997).

Due to these problems, other forms of realismhave been defended. Hacking (1983), for example,defends entity realism. He argues that, while


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scientists do not have good reason to believe theirtheories are true, they do have good reason tobelieve that the entities referred to in the theoriesexist, since scientists are able to manipulate theentities. Others have attempted to defend a moreradical form of anti-realism, according to which theentities scientists talk about and the theories theyinvent to discuss them are merely social constructs(see Social Constructionism).

Explanation

In an attempt to avoid metaphysically and episte-mically suspect notions such as causation (see Cau-sality), Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) developed acovering law model of explanation: the deductive-nomological (D-N) account (see Explanation;Hempel, Carl). Rather than relying on causes,they argued that scientific explanations cite thelaw or laws that cover the phenomena to beexplained. According to the D-N model, explana-tions are deductive arguments, where the conclu-sion is a statement expressing what is to beexplained (the explanandum), and the premises(the explanans) include at least one law-statement.Often statements about particular antecedent con-ditions from which the explanandum can bederived. Initially developed only to cover ex-planations of particular facts, the D-N modelwas expanded to include explanations of laws,such as the explanation of Keplers laws by deriv-ing them from Newtons laws of motion (alongwith particular facts about the planets). To ac-count for explanations of particular events andlaws governed by statistical laws, the inductive-statistical (I-S) and deductive-statistical (D-S)models were developed (Hempel 1965). Accordingto the D-S model, statistical laws are explained bydeductively deriving them from other statisticallaws. However, statements describing particularfacts cannot be deduced from statistical laws. In-stead, according to the I-S model, the explananscontaining statistical laws must confer a high in-ductive probability to the particular event to beexplained. In this way, the covering law modelof explanation was able to link explanationwith predictability (see Prediction) and also makeclear why the reduction of, say, Keplers laws toNewtons laws of motion could be explanatory (seeReductionism).

In the ensuing years, these accounts ran into anumber of problems. The covering law modelseemed unable to account for cases where scientistsandnon-scientists appear to be giving perfectly goodexplanations without citing laws (see Biology,

Philosophy of; Function; Mechanism; Social Scien-ces, Philosophy of ). Several counterexamples weredeveloped against the D-N model, including thepurported explanation of events by citing irrele-vant factors, such as the explanation of Joes failureto get pregnant by citing the fact that he took birth-control pills, and the explanation of causes by citingtheir effects, such as the explanation of the height ofa flagpole by citing the length of its shadow. Deduc-tive relations, unlike explanatory relations, can in-clude irrelevant factors and need not respecttemporal asymmetries. The I-S model also encoun-tered difficulties. According to the I-S model, im-probable events cannot be explained, which runscounter to many philosophers intuitions aboutsuch cases as the explanation of paresis by citingthe fact that a person had untreated syphilis. More-over, developing an account of inductive probabilityproved difficult (see Inductive Logic; Probability).Attempts to provide an adequate account of lawswithin an empiricist framework also encounteredproblems. According to Hempel and Oppenheim,laws are expressed by universal generalizations ofunlimited scope, with purely qualitative predicates,and they do not refer to particular entities. Theproblem is that there are accidental generalizations,such as All pieces of gold have a mass of less than10,000 kg, that satisfy these conditions. Lawsappear to involve the modal features that Humeand the logical empiricists were intent on avoiding;unlike accidental generalization, laws seem toinvolve some sort of natural necessity. The dif-ficulty is to develop an account of laws thatmakes sense of this necessity in a way that doesnot make knowledge of laws problematic (see Lawsof Nature).In response to these problems, some have

attempted to rescue the covering-law model bysupplementing it with additional conditions, as inunificationist accounts of explanation. Accordingto these accounts, whether an argument is explana-tory depends not just on the argument itself, but onhow it fits into a unified theory (see Unity andDisunity of Science). Scientists explain by reducingthe number of brute facts (Friedman 1974) or ar-gument patterns (Kitcher 1989) needed to derivethe largest number of consequences. Others havedeveloped alternatives to the covering law model.Van Fraassen (1980) has defended a pragmaticaccount of explanation, according to which whatcounts as a good explanation depends on context.Others have developed various causal accounts ofexplanation. Salmon (1971) and others have arguedthat explanatory and causal relations can be under-stood in terms of statistical relevance; scientists


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explain by showing that the explanans (a causalfactor) is statistically relevant for the event to beexplained. Salmon (1984) eventually rejected thisview in favor of a causal mechanical model, accord-ing to which explanations appeal to the mechan-isms of causal propagation and causal interactions(see Mechanism). Along with the development ofvarious causal accounts of explanation have comenumerous accounts of causation, as well asattempts to develop a better epistemology for caus-al claims through, for example, causal modeling(see Causality).

Prediction

Traditionally, prediction has been regarded asbeing as central to science as explanation (see Pre-diction). At the formal level, the received view doesnot distinguish between explanation and predic-tion. For instance, in the D-N model, the conclu-sion derived from the laws and other assumptionscan be regarded as predictions in the sameway that they can be regarded as explanations.While prediction is generally taken to refer to thefutureone predicts future eventsphilosophically,the category includes retrodiction, or prediction ofpast events, for instance the past positionsof planets from Newtons laws and their pre-sent positions and momenta. (On some accountsof hypothesis confirmation, retrodiction is evenmore important than forward predictionseeBayesianism.)The D-N model assumes that the laws in ques-

tion are deterministic (see Determinism). Statisticalexplanations are also predictive, but the predictionsare weaker: they hold probabilistically and canonly be confirmed by observing an ensemble ofevents rather than individual events (see Confirma-tion Theory). Interest in statistical explanation andprediction initially arose in the social sciences in thenineteenth century (Stigler 1986; see also SocialSciences, Philosophy of the). In this case, as wellas in the case of prediction in classical statisticalphysics, the inability to predict with certainty arisesbecause of ignorance of the details of the systemand computational limitations. A different type oflimitation of prediction is seen when predictionsmust be made about finite samples drawn from anensemble, for instance, biological populations (seeEvolution; Population Genetics). Finally, if thelaws are themselves indeterministic, as in the caseof quantum mechanics, prediction can only be sta-tistical (see Quantum Mechanics). The last case hasgenerated the most philosophical interest because,

until the advent of quantum mechanics, the failureto predict exactly was taken to reflect epistemolog-ical limitations rather than an ontological featureof the world. That the models of statistical expla-nation discussed earlier do not distinguish betweenthese various cases suggests that there remainsmuch philosophical work to be done. Meanwhile,the failure of determinism in quantum mechanicshas led to much re-examination of the concept ofcausality in attempts to retain the causal nature ofphysical laws even in a probabilistic context (seeCausality).

Prediction, although not determinism, has alsobeen recently challenged by the discovery that thereexist many systems that display sensitivity to initialconditions, the so-called chaotic systems. Deter-minism has usually been interpreted as an ontolog-ical thesis: for deterministic systems, if two systemsare identical at one instant of time, they remain soat every other instant (Earman 1986; see Determin-ism). However, satisfying this criterion does notensure that the availableand, in some cases, allobtainableknowledge of the system allows pre-diction of the future. Some physical theories mayprevent the collection of the required informationfor prediction (Geroch 1977; see also Space-Time).Even if the information can be collected, pragmaticlimitations become relevant. The precision of anyinformation is typically limited by measurementmethods (including the instruments). If the dyna-mical behavior of systems is exceedingly sensitiveto the initial conditions, small uncertainties in theinitial data may lead to large changes in predictedbehaviorchaotic systems exemplify this problem(see Prediction).

Confirmation

Humes problemhow experience generates ration-al confidence in a theoryhas been central to phi-losophy of science in the twentieth century andcontinues to be an important motivation for con-temporary research (see Induction, Problem of ).Many of the logical empiricists initially doubtedthat there is a logical canon of confirmation.Breaking with earlier logical traditions, for manyof which inductive logic was of central importance,these logical empiricists largely regarded confirma-tion as a pragmatic issue not subject to usefultheoretical analyses. That assessment changed inthe 1940s with the work of Carnap, Hempel, andReichenbach, besides Popper (see Carnap, Rudolf;Hempel, Carl Gustav; Popper, Karl Raimund;Reichenbach, Hans). Carnap, in particular, began


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an ambitious project of the construction of a logic ofconfirmation, which he took to be part of semantics,in the process reviving Keynes logical interpreta-tion of probability. Early versions of this projectwere distant from the practice of science, being re-stricted to formal languages of excessively simplifiedstructures incapable of expressing most scientificclaims. Later versions came closer to scientific prac-tice, but only to a limited extent (see Carnap,Rudolf ). Whether or not the project has anyhope remains controversial among philosophers.Although the relevant entries in this Encyclopediarecord some progress, there is as yet no quantitativephilosophical theory of confirmation (see Confir-mation Theory; Inductive Logic; Probability).

Meanwhile, within the sciences, the problem ofconfirmation was studied as that of statistical in-ference, bringing standard statistical methods tobear on the problem of deciding how well a hypo-thesis is supported by the data. Most of thesemethods were only invented during the first halfof the twentieth century. There are two approachesto statistics, so-called orthodox statistics (some-times called frequentist statistics) and Bayesianstatistics (which interprets some probabilities asdegrees of belief). The former includes twoapproaches to inference, one involving confidenceintervals and largely due to Neyman and E. S.Pearson and the other due to Fisher. These havereceived some attention from philosophers but,perhaps, not as much as they deserve (Hacking1965; see Statistics, Philosophy of ). In sharp con-trast, Bayesian inference has been at the center ofphilosophical attention since themiddle of the twen-tieth century. Interesting work points to commonground between traditional confirmation theoryand Bayesian methodology. Meanwhile, within thesciences, newer computational methods have madeBayesian statistics increasingly popular (see Statis-tics, Philosophy of ), for instance, in the computa-tion of phylogenies in evolutionary biology (seeEvolution). Bayesian inference methods also havethe advantage of merging seamlessly with contem-porary decision theory (see Decision Theory), eventhough most of the methods within decision theorywere invented in an orthodox context.

Philosophically, the differences between ortho-dox and Bayesian methods remain sharply defined.Orthodox methods do not permit the assignment ofa probability to a hypothesis, which, from the per-spective of most Bayesians, makes them epistemo-logically impotent. (Bayesians also usually arguethat orthodox inferential recipes are ad hocsee Bayesianism.) Meanwhile Bayesian methods

require an assignment of prior probabilities tohypotheses before the collection of data; for theorthodox such assignments are arbitrary. However,in the special sciences, the trend seems to be one ofeclecticism, when orthodox and Bayesian methodsare both used with little concern for whether con-sistency is lost in the process. This situation callsfor much more philosophical analysis.

Experimentation

The logical empiricists focus on the formal rela-tions between theory and evidence resulted inAnglo-American philosophers neglecting the roleof experimentation in science. Experimentationdid receive some philosophical treatment in thelate nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, inparticular by Mill, Mach, and Bernard (see Mach,Ernest). In twentieth century Germany, two tradi-tions developed around the work of Dingler andHabermas. It is only in the past three decades thatexperimentation has received more attention fromAnglo-American philosophers, historians, andsociologists. Since then, there have been a numberof careful analyses of the use of experiments bypracticing scientists, with historians and sociolo-gists focusing largely on the social and materialcontext of experiments and philosophers focusingon their epistemic utility.From a philosophical perspective, the neglect

of experimentation was particularly problematic,since experimentation seems to affect the very evi-dential relations empiricists were interested in for-malizing. Whether experimental results are goodevidence for or against a hypothesis depends onhow the results are producedwhether the dataare reliably produced or amere artifact of the exper-imental procedure. Moreover, this reliability oftencomes in degrees, thereby affecting the degree towhich the data confirms or disconfirms a hypo-thesis. In addition, how data are produced affectswhat sorts of inferences can be drawn from thedata and how these inferences might be drawn.As Mill argues, Observations, in short, withoutexperiment . . . can ascertain sequences and coexis-tences, but cannot prove causation (1874, 386).How experimental results are obtained can alsoaffect whether replication is necessary and howstatistical methods are used. In some cases, statisticsis used to analyze the data, while in others, it isinvolved in the very production of the data itself(see Experimentation; Statistics, Philosophy of ).One of the central issues in the philosophy of ex-

perimentation is what experiments are. Experiments


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are often distinguished from observations in thatthe former involve active intervention in the world,whereas the latter are thought to be passive. How-ever, it is unclear what counts as an intervention.For example, are the use of sampling methods ormicroscopes interventions? There are also ques-tions about whether thought experiments or com-puter simulations are real experiments or if theymerely function as arguments. Moreover, it is notalways clear how to individuate experimentswhether it is possible, especially with the increasinguse of computers as integral parts of the experimen-tal set-up, to disambiguate the experiment from theanalysis of the data.Another fundamental issue is whether and what

epistemic roles experiments can play (Rheinberger1997). They are purportedly used in the testing oftheories, in garnering evidence for the existence ofentities referred to by our theories (see Realism), inthe creation (and thereby discovery) of new phe-nomena, in the articulation of theories, in thedevelopment of new theories, in allowing scientiststo observe phenomena otherwise unobservable(see Observation), and in the development andrefinement of technologies.Whether experiments can reliably serve these

epistemic functions has been called into questionin a number of ways. First, sociologists and histor-ians have argued that social factors affect or evendetermine whether an experiment confirms ordisconfirms a theory (see Social Constructionism).It is also argued that experiments are theory-laden,since experiments require interpretation and theseinterpretations rely on theories (Duhem 1954).Whether this is a problem depends in part onwhat use is made of the experiment and whatsorts of theories are neededthe theory being test-ed, theories of the phenomena being studied butnot being tested, or theories about the experimentalapparatus being used. As Hacking (1983) and Gali-son (1987) both argue, experiments and experimen-tal traditions can have a life of their ownindependent of higher-level theories.The theory-ladenness of experimentation also

raises questions about whether experiments can beused to test hypotheses in any straightforwardway no matter which level of theory is used, sincepredictions about experimental results rely on aux-iliary hypotheses that might be called into question(see Duhem Thesis). Experiments are also purport-ed to be practice-laden, relying on tacit know-ledge that cannot be fully articulated (Collins 1985;see also Polanyi 1958). According to Collins, thisleads to problems with replication. The reliabilityof experiments is often judged by the ability of

scientists to replicate their results. However, whatcounts as replication of the same experiment isoften at issue in scientific disputes. Since, accordingto Collins, tacit knowledge (which cannot be madeexplicit) is involved in the replication of experi-ments and even in judgments about what constitu-tes the same experiment, adjudicating thesedisputes on rational grounds is problematic. Col-lins, in addition, questions whether there can beindependent grounds for judging whether an exper-iment is reliable, which he calls the experimentersregress.Whether an experimental procedure is reli-able depends on whether it consistently yields cor-rect results, but what counts as a correct resultdepends on what experimental procedures aredeemed reliable, and so on (Collins 1985; for areply, see Franklin 1994). Experiments also typicallyinvolve manipulation of the world, often creatingthings that are not naturally occurring, which hasled some to question whether experiments representthe world as it naturally is. At one extreme are thosewho argue that experimentation actually constructsentities and facts (Latour and Woolgar 1979;Pickering 1984; Rheinberger 1997; see also SocialConstructionism). Others argue that experimentscan produce artifacts, but that these can be reliablydistinguished from valid results (Franklin 1986). Amilder version of this worry is whether laboratorysettings can accurately reproduce the complexities ofthe natural world, which is exemplified in debatesbetween field and experimental biologists. The effectof interventions on experimental outcomes is evenmore problematic in quantumphysics (seeQuantumMeasurement Problem).

Scientific Change

Scientific change occurs in many forms. There arechanges in theory, technology, methodology, data,institutional and social structures, and so on. Thefocus in the philosophy of science has largely beenon theory change and whether such changes areprogressive (see Scientific Change; Scientific Prog-ress). The primary concern has also been with howscientific theories are justified and/or become ac-cepted in the scientific community, rather than howthey are discovered or introduced into the commu-nity in the first place. Over the years, there havebeen various notions of progress correlatedwith thedifferent goals scientific theories are purported tohave: truth, systematization, explanation, empiricaladequacy, problem solving capacity, and so on.(Notice that if the focus were on, say, technologicalor institutional changes, the goals attended to might


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be very different; for example, does the technologyhave greater practical utility or is the institutionalchange just?)

Traditionally, scientific change has been thoughtof as governed by rational procedures thatincrementally help science achieve its goals. Forthe logical empiricists, the aim of scientific theorieswas to systematize knowledge in a way that yieldstrue predictions in the observational language (seeTheories). As such, science progresses through thecollection of additional confirming data, throughthe elimination of error, and through unification,typically by reducing one theory to another ofgreater scope. To make sense of these sorts ofchanges, the logical empiricists developed accountsof reduction, explanation, and inductive logic orconfirmation theory (see Confirmation Theory; Ex-planation; Inductive Logic; Reductionism; Unityand Disunity of Science). Others, such as Popper,offered a different account of theory change. Popperdefended an eliminativist account much like Mills,whereby science attempts to eliminate or falsify the-ories. Only those theories that pass severe testsought to be provisionally accepted (see Corrobora-tion). This was also one of the earliest versions ofevolutionary epistemology (see Evolutionary Epis-temology; Popper, Karl Raimund).

As discussed in the previous sections, theseaccounts ran into difficulties: Quine extendedDuhems concerns about falsification, criticizedthe analytic/synthetic distinction, and raised ques-tions about the determinacy of translation (seeDuhem Thesis; Quine, Willard Van; Underdeter-mination); Popper and Hanson argued that obser-vations are theory-laden (see Hanson, NorwoodRussell; Observation; Popper, Karl Raimund);there were problems with Carnaps inductivelogic; and so on. Partly influenced by these diffi-culties and partly motivated by a concern thatphilosophers theories about science actually fitthe practices of science, Kuhns The Structure ofScientific Revolutions (1962) challenged the wayphilosophers, historians, sociologists, and scientiststhought about scientific change (see Kuhn, Thom-as). He argued that scientific change is not in gen-eral cumulative and progressive, but developsthrough a series of distinct stages: immature science(when there is no generally accepted paradigm),normal science (when there is an agreed upon par-adigm), and revolutionary science (when there is ashift between paradigms). Kuhns notion of para-digms also expanded the focus of scientific changebeyond theories, since paradigms consisted, notjust of theories, but of any exemplary bit of sciencethat guides research. While the development of

normal science might in some sense be incremental,Kuhn argued that the choice between paradigmsduring a revolution involves something like a Ge-stalt shift. There are no independent methods andstandards, since these are paradigm-laden; thereis no independent data, since observations areparadigm-laden; and the paradigms may not evenbe commensurable (see Incommensurability). Con-sequently, paradigm shifts seemed to occur in anirrational manner.The responses to Kuhns influential work took

two very different paths. On the one hand, stronglyinfluenced by Kuhn, members of the StrongProgramme argued that scientific change ought tobe explained sociologicallythat the same socialcauses explain both good and bad science.Others (e.g. Latour and Woolgar 1979) went fur-ther, arguing that scientists in some sense constructfacts (see Social Constructionism). Focus on thesocial aspects of scientific research also led todevelopments in feminist philosophy of science,both in the close analysis of the gender and racialbiases of particular sciences and in the developmentof more abstract feminist theories about science(see Feminist Philosophy of Science).The other, a very different sort of response,

involved a defense of the rationality and progressof science. There were attempts to show that com-peting scientific theories and paradigms are notincommensurable in the sense of being untranslat-able. Davidson (1974) argues the very idea of aradically different, incommensurable paradigmdoes not make sense; others (e.g., Scheffler 1967)argued that sameness of reference is sufficient toensure translatability, which was later buttressedby referential accounts of meaning (see Incommen-surability). The rationality of scientific change wasalso defended on other grounds. Lakatos devel-oped Poppers ideas in light of Kuhn into his meth-odology of scientific research programs (seeLakatos, Imre; Research Programmes); and Lau-dan (1977) argued that progress can be made senseof in terms of problem solving capacity. Anotherapproach to showing that scientific change is pro-gressive can be found in realism. Rather than argu-ing that each change involves a rational choice,defenses of realism can be seen as attempts toestablish that science is approaching its goalof getting closer to the truth (see Realism). Ofcourse, anti-realists might also argue that scienceis progressing, not toward truth, but toward greaterempirical adequacy.More recently, there have been attempts to deve-

lop formal methods of theory choice beyond confir-mation theory and inductive logic (see Bayesianism;


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Statistics, Philosophy of ). There have also beenattempts to model discovery computationally,which had been thought not to be rule governedor formalizable. Some of these try to model the wayhumans discover; others were developed in order tomake discoveries (e.g., data mining), whether ornot humans actually reason in this way. As a nor-mative enterprise, such modeling can also be usedas a defense of the rationality of scientific discoveryand, therefore, scientific change (see ScientificChange).Perhaps the longestlasting influence in the phi-

losophy of science of Kuhns influential work hasbeen to encourage philosophers to look more close-ly at the actual practices of the various sciences.This has resulted in a proliferation of philosophiesof the special sciences.

Foundations of the Special Sciences

The logical empiricists believed in the unity of sci-ence (see Unity of Science Movement). However,the theme was interpreted in multiple ways. At oneextreme were views according to which unificationwas to be achieved through hierarchical reduction(see Reductionism) of sociology to individualpsychology (see Methodological Individualism),psychology to biology (see Psychology, Philosophyof ), biology to physics and chemistry (see Biology,Philosophy of ), and chemistry to physics (see,Chemistry, Philosophy of ); for an influentialdefense of this view, see Oppenhiem and Putnam(1958). At the other extreme were those who be-lieved that unification required no more than to beable to talk of the subjects of science in an inter-personal (that is, non-solipsistic) languagethiswas Carnaps (1963) final version of physicalism.Somewhere in between were stronger versions ofphysicalism, which, for most logical empiricists andalmost all philosophers of science since them,provides some vision of the unity of science (seePhysicalism).Perhaps with the exception of the most extreme

reductionist vision of the unity of science, all otherviews leave open the possibility of exploring thefoundations and interpretations of the specialsciences individually. During the first few decadesof the twentieth century, most philosophical atten-tion to the special sciences was limited to physics;subsequently, psychology, biology, and the socialsciences have also been systematically explored byphilosophers. In many of these sciences, most nota-bly biology and cognitive science, philosophical

analyses have played a demonstrable role in thefurther development of scientific work (see Biology,Philosophy of; Cognitive Science; Intentionality).

Physical Sciences

The first three decades of the twentieth century sawthe replacement of classical physics by relativitytheory and quantum mechanics, both of whichabandoned cherished classical metaphysical princi-pals (see Quantum Mechanics; Space-Time). It istherefore not surprising that many philosophersinterested in scientific philosophy (see LogicalEmpiricism) did significant work in this field. Inparticular, Popper and Reichenbach made impor-tant contributions to the interpretation of quantummechanics; Reichenbach and, to a lesser extent,Carnap also contributed to the philosophy ofspace-time (see Carnap, Rudolf; Popper, KarlRaimund; Reichenbach, Hans). In both quantummechanics and relativity, philosophers have paidconsiderable attention to issues connected withcausality and determinism, which became problem-atic as the classical world-view collapsed (seeCausality; Determinism). Arguably, Reichenbachswork on space-time, especially his arguments forthe conventionality of the metric, set the frame-work for work in the philosophy of space-timeuntil the last few decades (see Conventionalism).Reichenbach also produced important work on thedirection of time.

Several philosophers contributed to the clarifica-tion of the quantum measurement problem (seeQuantum Measurement Problem), the concept oflocality in quantum mechanics (see Locality), andthe nature and role of quantum logic (see Putnam,Hilary; Quantum Logic). Meanwhile, many physi-cists, including Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg, andSchrodinger, also produced seminal philosophicalwork on the foundations of physics (see alsoBridgman, Percy Williams; Duhem Thesis). Theonly consensus that has emerged from all thiswork is that, whereas the foundations of relativitytheory (both special and general) are relativelyclear, even after eighty years, quantum mechanicscontinues to be poorly understood, especially at themacroscopic level (see Complementarity).

Perhaps because of the tradition of interest inquantum mechanics, philosophers of physics, start-ing mainly in the 1980s, also began to explore theconceptual structure of quantum field theory andparticle physics (see Particle Physics; QuantumField Theory). However, one unfortunate effectof the early focus on quantum mechanics and


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relativity is that other areas of physics that alsodeserve philosophical scrutiny did not receive ade-quate attention, as Shimony (1987) and others haveemphasized. (See the list of questions in the entry,Physical Sciences, Philosophy of.) Only in recentyears have philosophers begun to pay attention toquestions such as reductionism and irreversibi-lity in kinetic theory (see Irreversibility; KineticTheory) and condensed matter physics (see Batter-man [2002] and Reductionism). One interestingresult has been that the question of reductionismwithin physics is now believed to be far morecontentious than what was traditionally thought(when it was assumed that biology, rather than thephysics of relatively large objects, presented a chal-lenge to the program of physical reductionismseeEmergence).

Finally, beyond physics, some philosophical at-tention is now being directed at chemistry (seeChemistry, Philosophy of ) and, so far to a lesserextent, astronomy (see Astronomy, Philosophyof ). As in the case of macroscopic physics, thequestion of the reduction of chemistry to physicshas turned out to be unexpectedly complicated withapproximations and heuristics playing roles thatmake orthodox philosophers uncomfortable (seeApproximation). It is likely that the future willsee even more work on these neglected fields andfurther broadening of philosophical interest in thephysical sciences.

Biology

Professional philosophers paid very little attentionto biology during the first few decades of the twen-tieth century, even though the advent of genetics(both population genetics and what came to becalled classical genetics [see Genetics]) was trans-forming biology in ways as profound as what washappening in physics. Professional biologistsincluding Driesch, J. B. S. Haldane, J. S. Haldane,and Hogbenwrote philosophical works of someimportance. However, the only philosopher whotried to interpret developments in biology duringthis period was Woodger (1929, 1937), betterknown among philosophers as the translator ofTarskis papers into English. Philosophers paid solittle attention to biology that not only the evolu-tionary synthesis (see Evolution), but even theformulation of the double helix model for DNA(see Reduction), went unnoticed by philosophers ofthose generations (Sarkar 2005).

All that changed in the 1960s, when the philo-sophy of biology emerged as a recognizable entity

within the philosophy of science. The first questionthat occupied philosophers was whether mole-cular biology was reducing classical biology (seeMolecular Biology; Reductionism). Initial enthusi-asm for reductionism gave place to a skepticalconsensus as philosophers began to question boththe standard theory-based account of reductionism(due to Nagel 1961; see Nagel, Ernest) and whethermolecular biology had laws or theories at all(Sarkar 1998). In the 1970s and 1980s, attentionshifted almost entirely to evolutionary theory (seeEvolution), to the definitions of fitness (seeFitness) and function (see Function), the natureof individuals and species (see Individual; Species),the significance of adaptation and selection (see Ad-aptation and Adaptationism; Population Genetics),and, especially, the units and levels of selection. Phil-osophical work has contributed significantly to sci-entific discussions of problems connected to units ofselection, although no consensus has been reached(see Altruism; Natural Selection). Besides evolution,there was some philosophical work in genetics (seeGenetics; Heredity and Heritability).As in the case of the philosophy of physics,

the last two decades have seen a broadening ofinterest within the philosophy of biology. Someof the new work has been driven by the realizationthat molecular biology, which has become most ofcontemporary biology, is not simply the study ofproperties of matter at lower levels of organization,but has a conceptual framework of its own. Thisframework has largely been based on a conceptof information that philosophers have found high-ly problematic (see Biological Information). For-mulating an adequate concept of biologicalinformationif there is oneremains a task towhich philosophers may have much to contribute(see Molecular Biology).There has also been some attention paid to bio-

diversity (see Conservation Biology), ecology (seeEcology), immunology (see Immunology), anddevelopmental biology, especially in the molecularera (see Molecular Biology). Neurobiology hassometimes been approached from the perspectiveof the philosophy of biology, although philosophi-cal work in that area typically has more continuitywith psychology (see Psychology below andNeurobiology). Philosophers have also argued onboth sides of attempts to use biology to establishnaturalism in other philosophical areas, especiallyepistemology and ethicsthis remains one of themost contested areas within the philosophy of bio-logy (see Evolutionary Epistemology; EvolutionaryPsychology). Some philosophers of science have


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also interpreted the philosophy of medicine as be-longing within the conceptual terrain of the philos-ophy of biology (Schaffner 1993). Finally, work inthe philosophy of biology has also led to challengesto many of the traditional epistemological andmetaphysical assumptions about science, aboutthe nature of explanations, laws, theories, and soon (see Biology, Philosophy of; Mechanism).

Psychology

Philosophy and psychology have an intimate his-torical connection, becoming distinct disciplinesonly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-turies. Even since then, many of the topics coveredby psychology have remained of interest to philo-sophers of mind and language, although the routetaken to address these questions might be verydifferent. However, while philosophers of sciencedid address concerns about the human sciencesmore generally (see Social Sciences below), it isonly in the last twenty years or so that philosophyof psychology has developed as a distinct area ofphilosophy of science.The intimate connection between philosophy

and psychology can be seen throughout the historyof psychology and the cognitive sciences morebroadly. In an attempt to make psychology scien-tific, Watson (1913), a philosopher, founded beha-viorism, which dominated the field of psychologyfor the first half of the twentieth century (see Be-haviorism). This view fit well with empiricistattempts to reduce theoretical claims to those inthe observational language by providing operation-al definitions (see Hempel 1949; see also Bridge-man, Percy Williams; Theories; Verificationism).However, the combined weight of objections fromphilosophers, linguists, and psychologists led to thedemise of behaviorism. These criticisms, along withdevelopments in mathematical computation (seeArtificial Intelligence; Turing, Alan) and the influ-ential work of Chomsky (see Chomsky, Noam;Linguistics, Philosophy of ), resulted in the cogni-tive revolution in psychology; it became generallyagreed upon that psychological theories must makereference to internal representations (see Intention-ality; Searle, John). These developments also led tothe creation of the interdisciplinary field of cogni-tive science, which included psychology, linguistics,computer science, neuroscience, and philosophy(see Cognitive Science).Philosophers of psychology have been broadly

interested in foundational issues related to the cog-nitive sciences. Among the topics of concern arethe content of representation, the structure of

thought, psychological laws and theories, andconsciousness, each of which is briefly discussedbelow:

(i) The Content of Representations. One centralquestion is what fixes the content of repre-sentationsis content determined by inter-nal features of the agent (e.g., conceptualrole semantics), features of the externalphysical environment (e.g., causal and tele-ological theories), or features of the externalsocial environment? There are also debatesabout whether the representations arepropositional in form, whether they requirelanguage (see Linguistics, Philosophy of ),whether some are innate (see Empiricism;Innate/acquired Distinction), and whetherrepresentations are local or distributed (seeConnectionism).

(ii) The Structure of Thought. The nature ofcognition has also been a topic of dispute.Some argue that human cognition takesthe form of classical computation (seeArtificial Intelligence; Cognitive Science);connectionists argue that it is more similarto parallel distributed processing (seeConnectionism); and more recently otheraccounts have been proposed, such as dyna-mical and embodied approaches to cogni-tion. Also at issue is whether the cognitivestructures in themind/brain aremodular (seeEvolutionary Psychology), whether cogni-tion is rule-governed, and whether some ofthe rules are innate (see Chomsky, Noam;Innate/Acquired Distinction).

(iii) Theories and Laws. Questions have beenraised about the nature of theories in thecognitive sciences (see Neurobiology),about whether there are psychological orpsychophysical laws (see Laws of Nature),and about how the theories and laws indifferent areas of the cognitive sciences re-late, such as whether psychology is reduc-ible to neurobiology (see Neurobiology;Physicalism; Reductionism; Superveni-ence). In addition, there is disagreementabout how to interpret theories in the cog-nitive scienceswhether to interpret themrealistically, as an attempt to represent howthe mind/brain actually works, or merelyinstrumentally, as a means of saving thephenomena or making predictions (seeInstrumentalism; Realism). Moreover, theproblems of reflexivity and the intentionalcircle discussed below, alongwith difficulties


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peculiar to the various areas of the cognitivesciences, raise questions about the testabilityof psychological theories (see Neurobiology;Psychology, Philosophy of ).

(iv) Consciousness. There has been a resurgenceof interest in consciousness (see Conscious-ness; Searle, John).There havebeen attemptsto clarify what consciousness involves inits various senses, as well as debates abouthow to explain consciousness. To this end, anumber of theories of consciousness havebeen proposed, including higher-order the-ories, neurological theories, representationaltheories, and various non-physical theories.

Social Sciences

Philosophical interest in the foundations of thesocial sciences has a long history, dating back atleast to Mills influential work on the socialsciences. Some foundational issues have also beensystematically discussed by social scientists them-selves, such as Durkheim (1895/1966) and Weber(1903/1949). Around the middle of the twentiethcentury, the social sciences again received seriousphilosophical attention. The focus was largely ontheir being human sciences and the philosophicalissues this raised. More recently, philosophers havedirected their attention to the different socialsciences in their own right, especially economics(see Economics, Philosophy of ).

A central focus of discussion is whether the so-cial sciences are fundamentally different from thenatural sciences. Logical empiricists attempted toincorporate the social sciences into their models forthe natural sciences (see Unity of Science Move-ment). Others have argued that the social sciencesare unique. This has framed many of the debateswithin the philosophy of the social sciences, a num-ber of which are briefly discussed in what follows(see Social Sciences, The Philosophy of ):

(i) AreThere Social Science Laws? Laws playedimportant roles in empiricist accounts ofexplanation, theories, confirmation, andprediction, but it is unclear whether thereare laws of the social sciences (see Laws ofNature). Social phenomena are complex,involve reference to social kinds, and re-quire idealizations. As a result, manyargue that generalizations of the socialsciences, if they are laws at all, requireineliminable ceteris paribus clauses. Othersargue that the social sciences ought noteven attempt to create generalizations or

grand theories, as social phenomena areessentially historical and local.

(ii) Do Social Scientific Theories Yield TestablePredictions? Because of the complexity ofsocial systems, social scientific theories re-quire idealizations. Given the nature of theseidealizations, deriving empirical predictionsfrom social scientific theories is difficult atbest (see Prediction). As a result, many arguethat social scientific theories are not testable.This is exacerbated by the reflexive nature ofsocial science theories: the very act of theo-rizing can change the behavior one is theo-rizing about. Moreover, if human action isexplained by agents desires and beliefs, so-cial scientists seem to be caught in an inten-tional circle, making it difficult to derive anytestable claims (see Rosenberg 1988).

(iii) Is the Methodology of the Social SciencesDistinct? Given that social sciences involvehumans and human behavior on a largescale, experimentation has not played a sig-nificant role in the social sciences (see Ex-perimentation). There are also many whoquestion whether the social sciences can benaturalized. Some argue that understandingsocial action is essentially a hermeneu-tic enterprise, distinctly different from thenatural sciences.

(iv) What Are the Ontological Commitments ofScientific Theories? Beginning with Milland, subsequently, Durkheim and Weber,there have been debates as to whether socialscientific theories are reducible to theoriesabout individual behavior (see Methodolog-ical Individualism). Moreover, after Nagelsinfluential account of intertheoretic reduc-tion, it has been argued that social phenom-ena are multiply realizable, and therefore,social science theories are not reducibleto lower-level theories (see Emergence;Reductionism; Supervenience). Additional-ly, given that social scientific theories in-volve idealizations, there are questionsabout whether these theories ought to beinterpreted realistically or instrumentally(see Instrumentalism; Realism).

(v) What Is the Nature of Social ScientificExplanations? Some, such as Hempel(1962), have argued that social scientificexplanations are no different than in thephysical sciences. Others, however, havequestioned this. If there are no social scien-tific laws, then social scientific explanationcannot be captured by the covering law


xxiii

model (see Explanation). Social sciencesalso often rely on functional explanations,which, while similar to biology, seem to bedifferent from explanations in physics (seeFunction). Others, following Winch (1958),have argued that social sciences explain ac-tion, not behavior, which requires under-standing the meaning of the action (not itscauses), and therefore must include theactors intentions and social norms. More-over, some have argued that actions aregoverned by reasons, and are therefore notsusceptible to causal explanation, a viewthat was later convincingly refuted byDavidson (1963). An alternative account ofhow beliefs and desires can explain actionshas been formalized in rational choice theo-ry (see Decision Theory), although there arequestions about whether such explanationscapture how people actually behave, ratherthan how they ought to behave.

(vi) What Is the Relationship Between SocialScience and Social Values? There has alsobeen concern with the connection betweensocial values and the social sciences. Taylor(1971), for example, argues that social theo-ry is inherently value-laden, and Habermas(1971) argues that social theory ought toengage in social criticism.

Concluding Remarks

Philosophyof science remainsavibrant sub-disciplinewithin philosophy today. As this introduction hasdocumented, many of the traditional questions inepistemology and metaphysics have been broughtinto sharper profile by a focus on scientific knowl-edge. Moreover, philosophical engagement withthe special sciences has occasionally contributedto the development of those sciences and, as philo-sophers become more immersed in the practice ofscience, the number and level of such contributionscan be expected to increase. The trend that philo-sophers of science engage all of the specialsciencesnot just physicswill also help producea more complete picture of the growth of science, ifnot all knowledge, in the future.With few exceptions (e.g., Demarcation, Prob-

lem of and Feminist Philosophy of Science) theentries in the Encyclopedia are not concernedwith the social role of science. But, as science andtechnology continue to play dominant roles inshaping human and other life in the near future,philosophers may also contribute to understanding

the role of science in society. Moreover, in someareas, such as the environmental sciences and evo-lutionary biology, science is increasingly under ill-motivated attacks in some societies, such as theUnited States. This situation puts philosophers ofscience, because of their professional expertise,under an obligation to explain science to society,and, where ethically and politically appropriate, todefend the scientific enterprise. How such defensesshould be organized without invoking a suspectcriterion of demarcation between science and non-science remains a task of critical social relevance.The Encyclopedia should encourage and help suchefforts.

JESSICA PFEIFERSAHOTRA SARKAR

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xxvi

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Alexander, Jason London School of Economics, United Kingdom

Armendt, Brad Arizona State University

Backe, Andrew Independent Scholar

Barrett, Jeff University of California at Irvine

Bechtel, William Washington University in St. Louis

Bouchard, Frederic University of Montreal, Canada

Bradie, Michael Bowling Green State University

Brown, Joshua University of Michigan

Byrne, Alex Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cat, Jordi Indiana University

Craver, Carl Washington University in St. Louis

de Regt, Henk W. Vrije Universiteit, The Netherlands

Dickson, Michael Indiana University

DiSalle, Robert The University of Western Ontario, Canada

Downes, Stephen University of Utah

Eckardt, Barbara von Rhode Island School of Design

Eells, Ellery University of Wisconsin-Madison

Elga, Adam Princeton University

Ewens, Warren J. University of Pennsylvania

Falk, Raphael The Hebrew University, Israel

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Fetzer, James University of Minnesota

Fitelson, Branden University of California at Berkeley

Folina, Janet Macalester College

Frigg, Roman London School of Economics, United Kingdom

Garson, Justin University of Texas at Austin

Gillies, Anthony University of Texas at Austin

Glennan, Stuart Butler University

Grandy, Richard Rice University

Gregory, Paul Washington and Lee University

Griffiths, Paul University of Queensland, Australia

Hajek, Alan California Institute of Technology

Hall, Ned Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Halvorson, Hans Princeton University

Hankinson-Nelson, Lynn University of Missouri at St. Louis

Hardcastle, Gary Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania

Hardcastle, Valerie Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Hartmann, Stephan London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom

Hochberg, Herbert University of Texas at Austin

Hodges, Andrew University of Oxford

Hooker, Cliff A. University of Newcastle, Australia

Hull, David Northwestern University

Irvine, Andrew University of British Columbia, Canada

Joyce, Jim University of Michigan

Juhl, Cory University of Texas at Austin

Justus, James University of Texas at Austin


xxviii

Kamlah, Andreas University of Osnabruck, Germany

Kincaid, Harold Center for Ethics and Values in the Sciences

Koertge, Noretta Indiana University

Larvor, Brendan University of Hertfordshire, United Kingdom

Laubichler, Manfred Arizona State University

Leplin, Jarrett University of North Carolina

Lipton, Peter University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

Little, Daniel University of Michigan-Dearborn

Lloyd, Elisabeth Indiana University

Loomis, Eric University of South Alabama

Ludlow, Peter University of Michigan

Lynch, Michael Cornell University

Lyre, Holger University of Bonn, Germany

MacLaurin, James University of Otago, New Zealand

Magnus, P. D. State University of New York at Albany

Majer, Ulrich University of Goettingen, Germany

Martinich, A. P. University of Texas at Austin

Motterlini, Matteo University of Trento, Italy

Nagel, Jennifer University of Toronto, Canada

Nickles, Thomas University of Nevada, Reno

Niiniluoto, Ilkka University of Helsinki

Noe, Alva University of California at Berkeley

Nyberg, Ian University of Texas at Austin

Odenbaugh, Jay University of California at San Diego

Okasha, Samir University of Bristol, United Kingdom


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Perini, Laura Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Pfeifer, Jessica University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Piccinini, Gualtiero Washington University in St. Louis

Plutynski, Anya University of Utah

Pojman, Paul University of Utah

Radder, Hannes Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Ramsey, Jeffry Smith College

Ratcliffe, Matthew University of Durham, United Kingdom

Richardson, Alan University of British Columbia

Roberts, John University of North Carolina

Rosenkrantz, Roger Independent Scholar

Roush, Sherrilyn Rice University

Ruetsche, Laura University of Pittsburgh

Sandell, Michelle Independent Scholar

Sankey, Howard University of Melbourne, Australia

Sarkar, Sahotra University of Texas at Austin

Shapere, Dudley Wake Forest University

Sigmund, Karl University of Vienna, Austria

Simchen, Ori University of British Columbia, Canada

Sober, Elliott University of Wisconsin-Madison

Stachel, John Boston University

Stadler, Friedrich K. University of Vienna, Austria

Stanford, P. Kyle University of California, Irvine

Stoljar, Daniel Australian National University

Stoltzner, Michael Institute Vienna Circle, Austria


xxx

Sundell, Tim University of Michigan

Suppes, Patrick Stanford University

Tauber, Alfred I. Boston University

Thornton, Stephen P. University of Limerick, Ireland

Vineberg, Susan Wayne State University

Wayne, Andrew Concordia University, Canada

Wilson, Jessica University of Toronto, Canada

Wilson, Robert A. University of Alberta, Canada

Wimsatt, William The University of Chicago

Witmer, D. Gene University of Florida


xxxi

A TO Z LIST OF ENTRIES

A

AbductionAdaptation and AdaptationismAltruismAnalyticityAnthropic PrincipleApproximationArtificial IntelligenceAstronomy, Philosophy ofAyer, A. J.

B

BayesianismBehaviorismBiological InformationBiology, Philosophy ofBridgman, Percy Williams

C

Carnap, RudolfCausalityChemistry, Philosophy ofChomsky, NoamClassical MechanicsCognitive ScienceCognitive SignificanceComplementarityConfirmation TheoryConnectionismConsciousnessConservation BiologyConventionalismCorroboration

D

Decision TheoryDemarcation, Problem ofDeterminismDuhem ThesisDutch Book Argument

E

EcologyEconomics, Philosophy ofEmergenceEmpiricismEpistemologyEvolutionEvolutionary EpistemologyEvolutionary PsychologyExperimentExplanationExplication

F

Feminist Philosophy of ScienceFeyerabend, Paul KarlFitnessFunction

G

Game TheoryGenetics

xxxiii

H

Hahn, HansHanson, Norwood RussellHempel, Carl GustavHeritabilityHilbert, David

I

ImmunologyIncommensurabilityIndividualityInduction, Problem ofInductive LogicInnate/Acquired DistinctionInstrumentalismIntentionalityIrreversibility

K

Kinetic TheoryKuhn, Thomas

L

Lakatos, ImreLaws of NatureLinguistics, Philosophy ofLocalityLogical Empiricism

M

Mach, ErnestMechanismMethodological IndividualismMolecular Biology

N

Nagel, ErnestNatural SelectionNeumann, John vonNeurath, OttoNeurobiology

O

Observation

P

ParsimonyParticle PhysicsPerceptionPhenomenalismPhysical Sciences, Philosophy ofPhysicalismPoincare, Jules HenriPopper, Karl RaimundPopulation GeneticsPredictionProbabilityProtocol SentencesPsychology, Philosophy ofPutnam, Hilary

Q

Quantum Field TheoryQuantum LogicQuantum Measurement ProblemQuantum MechanicsQuine, Willard Van

R

Ramsey, Frank PlumptonRational ReconstructionRealismReductionismReichenbach, HansResearch ProgramsRussell, Bertrand

S

Schlick, MoritzScientific ChangeScientific DomainsScientific MetaphorsScientific ModelsScientific ProgressScientific RevolutionsScientific Style


xxxiv

Searle, JohnSocial ConstructionismSocial Sciences, Philosophy of theSpace-TimeSpeciesStatistics, Philosophy ofSupervenience

T

TheoriesTimeTuring, Alan

U

Underdetermination of TheoriesUnity and Disunity of ScienceUnity of Science Movement

V

VerifiabilityVerisimilitudeVienna CircleVisual Representation


xxxv

THEMATIC LIST OF ENTRIES

Biology

Adaptation and AdaptationismAltruismBiological InformationBiology, Philosophy ofConservation BiologyEcologyEvolutionFitnessGeneticsHeritabilityImmunologyIndividualityInnate/Acquired DistinctionMolecular BiologyNatural SelectionPopulation GeneticsSpecies

Epistemology and Metaphysics

AbductionAnalyticityApproximationBayesianismCausalityCognitive SignificanceConfirmation TheoryConventionalismCorroborationDecision TheoryDemarcation, Problem ofDeterminismDuhem ThesisDutch Book ArgumentEmergenceEmpiricismEpistemology

Evolutionary EpistemologyExperimentExplanationExplicationFeminist Philosophy of ScienceFunctionIncommensurabilityInduction, Problem ofInductive LogicInstrumentalismLaws of NatureLogical EmpiricismMechanismsObservationParsimonyPerceptionPhenomenalismPhysicalismPredictionProbabilityProtocol SentencesRational ReconstructionRealismReductionismResearch ProgramsScientific ChangeScientific DomainsScientific MetaphorsScientific ModelsScientific ProgressScientific RevolutionsScientific StyleSocial ConstructionismSupervenienceTheoriesUnderdetermination of TheoriesUnity and Disunity of ScienceUnity of Science MovementVerifiabilityVerisimilitudeVienna CircleVisual Representation

xxxvii

Physical Sciences

Anthropic PrincipleAstronomy, Philosophy ofChemistry, Philosophy ofClassical MechanicsComplementarityIrreversibilityKinetic TheoryLocalityParticle PhysicsPhysical Sciences, Philosophy ofQuantum Field TheoryQuantum LogicQuantum Measurement ProblemQuantum MechanicsSpace-TimeTime

Principal Figures

Ayer, A. J.Bridgman, Percy WilliamsCarnap, RudolfChomsky, NoamFeyerabend, Paul KarlHahn, HansHanson, Norwood RussellHempel, Carl GustavHilbert, DavidKuhn, ThomasLakatos, ImreMach, ErnestNagel, ErnestNeumann, John vonNeurath, OttoPoincare, Jules Henri

Popper, Karl RaimundPutnam, HilaryQuine, Willard VanRamsey, Frank PlumptonReichenbach, HansRussell, BertrandSchlick, MoritzSearle, JohnTuring, Alan

Psychology and Mind

Artificial IntelligenceCognitive ScienceConnectionismConsciousnessEvolutionary Psychol

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