rsa 090617 webcast slides

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Online Fraud Trends in 2009 and Beyond Featured Presenter: Sean Brady, Senior Product Marketing Manager, RSA Where does RSA see fraud going? The Trends: Phishing Fast-Flux Trojans Blend of Phishing and Trojans Fraud as a Service (FaaS) Attack on Multi-Factor/OTP Authentication Resolution? Agenda: 

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8/8/2019 RSA 090617 Webcast Slides

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/rsa-090617-webcast-slides 1/47

Online Fraud Trends in 2009 and Beyond

Featured Presenter: 

Sean Brady, Senior Product Marketing Manager, RSA

Where does RSA see fraud going?

The Trends:

Phishing Fast-Flux

Trojans

Blend of Phishing and Trojans

Fraud as a Service (FaaS)

Attack on Multi-Factor/OTP Authentication

Resolution?

Agenda: 

8/8/2019 RSA 090617 Webcast Slides

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Where Does RSA See Fraud Going?

8/8/2019 RSA 090617 Webcast Slides

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The Fraud Trends

Phishing

Risk

Sophistication

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An Ongoing Problem

Phishing continues essentially unabated

The number of phishing attacks detected by RSA in 2008grew 66% over 2007

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The Fraud Trends

Phishing

Fast-Flux

Risk

Sophistication

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Proprietary proxy networkreplaced with Asprox

Fast-flux: Investing In the Infrastructure

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Mother ship movedto new bulletproof

hosting

Fast-flux: Investing In the Infrastructure

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User’s machines alsoinfected by malware

Fast-flux: Investing In the Infrastructure

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The Fraud Trends

Phishing

Risk

Sophistication

Fast-Flux

Trojans

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Trojans Are Here to Stay

No differently than any pieceof software, Trojans and

Trojan kits continue to evolve Infrastructure will improve,

similar to phishing

Automated Command &

Control failover Easy evasion of Anti-Virus

Can even now “grab

balances” so fraudsters don’thave to manually checkbalances

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The Fraud Trends

Phishing

Risk

Sophistication

Fast-Flux

Trojans

Blend of Phishing & Trojans

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Trojan Ecosystems and Infrastructure

Command & ControlBot-Herder

Infection / Update Drop Zone

Victim’s PC

Less than 25% of infectedPCs are protected by AVapplications. Even lesseffectively protected against

the specific threat.

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Blend of Phishing and Crimeware

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Blend of Phishing and Crimeware

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Blend of Phishing and Crimeware

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The Fraud Trends

Phishing

Risk

Sophistication

Fast-Flux

Trojans

Blend of Phishing & Trojans

Fraud-As-A-Service (FaaS)

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Growth in Outsourcing

Centralized Trojan Infection Services

Ready-made procurement of Trojan packagesHTML Injection Kits

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Infection Services Get Widespread

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Infection Services Get Widespread

Non Exclusive Infection$23 per 1k infections

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Infection Services Get Widespread

Exclusive Infection$130-270 per 1k infections

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Use Only Reviewed Trojans

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Easy to Use

Use Only Reviewed Trojans

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Customer service was

outstanding

Use Only Reviewed Trojans

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Downside: control panelIn Russian

Use Only Reviewed Trojans

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Product 9/10

Service 9/10

Use Only Reviewed Trojans

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Phone Banking Fraud is Live and Kicking

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Fraud as a Service

Trojan Hosting Infection

OUT

Harvesting

Fraudster

IN

$299 per monthSaaS Subscription

CredentialsMy

AccountReports

User Name Password

Beatles60 abc123

Abba70 bcd234

Queen80 cde345

Everyone in the room can do itWho in the room can do it?

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The Fraud Trends

Phishing

Risk

Sophistication

Fast-Flux

Trojans

Blend of Phishing & Trojans

Fraud-As-A-Service (FaaS)

Attack on Multi-Factor/ OTP Authentication

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Attacking Multi-Factor Authentication

Static Methods(older

approaches) Target token

serial numbers

Strong socialengineering

aspect Collection of

event-based andscratch cardmethods (iTan,for example)

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Trojan uses a combination of techniques in order tocircumvent strong authentication:

HTML injection Blocking user traffic to the bank’s website

A proxy installed on the victim's PC

How the attack works Attacker steals information required for the transaction

authentication, using HTML injection

Attacker can choose to use/not use the victim’s PC as aproxy to perform the transaction.

Trojan MITB without Session Hijacking

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Page Injection

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Page Injection

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Trojan MITB with Session Hijacking – Zeus (WSNPoem)

Javascript injected using HTML injection

S

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Trojan MITB with Session Hijacking – Zeus (WSNPoem)

Javascript injected using HTML injection

MITB transfer to a static money mule

T j MITB i h S i Hij ki

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Trojan MITB with Session Hijacking – Zeus (WSNPoem)

Javascript injected using HTML injection

MITB transfer to a static money mule

MITB transfer to a dynamic mule

T j MITB ith S i Hij ki

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Trojan MITB with Session Hijacking – Zeus (WSNPoem)

Javascript injected using HTML injection

MITB transfer to a static money mule

MITB transfer to a dynamic mule

MITB transfer completed – No service message displayed

T j MITB ith S i Hij ki

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Trojan MITB with Session Hijacking – Zeus (WSNPoem)

Javascript injected using HTML injection

MITB transfer to a static money mule

MITB transfer to a dynamic mule

MITB transfer completed – No service message displayed

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Mule Accounts Recovery

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Mule Accounts Recovery

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Mule Accounts Recovery

M l A R

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Mule Accounts Recovery

M l A t R

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Mule Accounts Recovery

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Resolutions?

Phishing

Risk

Sophistication

Fast-Flux

TrojansBlend of Phishing & Trojans

Fraud-As-A-Service (FaaS)

Attack on Multi-Factor/ OTP Authentication

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Technical

Infrastructure

Cash OutFraudster 

Layers of Security

Harvesting

Fraudster

Operational

Infrastructure

CommunicationFraud forum / chat room

User Account

Tools Hosting Delivery Mules Drops Monetizing

TransactionMonitoring

IdentityVerification

Authentication

AntiPhishing/

Trojan

Detection

Shut Down

Blocking

Intelligence

E l Ri k f A i i

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Dynamically adjusted security based on:

Real time risk assessment (multiple fraud predictors, deviations user profile,Fraud Network matching and link analysis)

Organization’s risk policies

Evaluate Risk of Activity

F M I f ti

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For More Information

RSA Special Online Fraud Report: What to Expect in 2009 and Beyond

RSA Online Fraud Intelligence Report: May 2009Subscribe to the RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report

Resources