l~~A~,,~·-.;~r;.;~{,.·''{' ·:;,~r!G~ : .. <~~~-.:/::·:I' .•..•. · .. ,{· ... ·_ ..... _-' . .• '.' ). i'" •. ·:; '_ ..

·, ~ -\ ~. . .. ' ~ 1- · .· ... ·,, ~ ;_ :-. AToMic .. EN·E'Rc;·v- ·coM~fssioN-~ · . :· ·. · ;> ·.. ·_-. · . -.~ .. !'· --.~ •.• ·~ l;:t~-· .. l .: ,-~: •• • .- .'•' • ~· - ..::~ -.1 '!'~- .... ~ •• -.- ·.,.· .... ~:: ~ •• ). •.••• • • • •• ~ ·.: ,,.····' :· • • . • ' -. ,; . ii1ff,' : ..... >:. ' : : _ _., ;:. /: :-... ~IR~CTP~ATE ___ ?Y>~.E;G\:.l~To~.v;._o".'~R~i:·<:>~~ "- ·. .'. :. :-· : . "~ ·~. :· :.·

..

:· -r:.·:

. '• . ·;..... .

,.··.;_ ·.·,;.~ ·;~--~ .. --,.~:. .'•. . ~· _·._ . f ·:·· . ... -• :"I~--',' '. • _,: :'; :··.·: ,' • • ~- .• ;

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· - .. ~'··,-::·. ·. -~,·-: ~~1th"Bd~ Coinpaily.' _·::_. ·'.;."·· .. -_._. '_ ·~·. :: .. ._ ._.:-: > .' : .. DOcket t~o·;· -50-237 ~ ... .. ": An',N:~, Mr. Byron tee.- J~.-. ._.,_ '. ·,'::·, .· . ., - , -. _ · . ._ · ,,. ·. ·· ... Do.cke,t. No .•. 50:-249 ....

>j'.; _'.<\·.'.;'::~~r~~rmfu~ ·~3<:~>ei :.;'.·'.'. (··;; :,.:"·;_.:.'. ::·)-.·~ ...•. ; ::··.·• · ...• •;: •···•• .·:'. •·•·.:; · .. • · ·· : .. > .. ,,·.>·:· ·: · · ·- 'l'h,ts · Tet;eta "·eo .the ·~eeti~ :c.~~c't~ ·by .Me$ets. '~a ·arui Brmm' ot~·titis ': .. ~\ ... ·:: .~. ·.:} ' _:,. .. ·.office ·,on oJii.ne· ·14~ u. · 1s-20, 22:• :.imd. aS_; i~.73 •· of. acd.vf·t:tes ,at Dresden .-: ·. ·'. ' ..

:- . ~. :.· ;·. · ··, . ·Ufil.ta 2"· and·:3· Q1Jtbori~~·. by ABC ·0peratifi8.1.iceuse.s :No. :nPR~19 ~rid No·.· DPR..;2S, ' · . ·,:· .. ; :,·__ ' ·. ·and co .. )!b,e-ctJ.a_eUssloQ of ()Ur ·fiild,~llSs ·b~d,·by· ~he trlspe.C:tot@with Mir. Morris,.'. · . /: ' . · >. ':·. · Assistant- su~tan -~ujlertn~elldent··-· and memh.1$lJ:$· of hie ~~&ff· at t~e- con-: .· · . · ·• · .· · ·

~ .· ">": " · : .. · cl.t.ud.0n of. the '~pecUc>n en. j~ .. 2·2':8iid_ i?~.an.d durlqg· st;1bsequ~t tel:epho~ ·, .. '. :: ... ··:· · .. e~r~~loni;f._: ~-copy, of our:rePOJ:t'o.f_.thi~:.~¢t~onis encioaecf~ . ·' ..

··:~::/r':f;:·f '.> ~~-·~~·-~~:the ~~ti~;.:m.-c:t·d~.e~be&'~;·,~he e~~lo~~a .: ' ·.·.' .. : ·~.: · .. <".~.: ..... 1napect1on report·~: 'Within.#1ese:~e.a8·~ ·:~h~ tpspectS:on·'contd.~te~ .. of · ....

. . " ., .. · ' se:le.c.Uve· examtnati~ ·of. p~oced.Ureri :Gd ·representat1.ve .. records ~<~terrlewa . : · · 9;~:-:"·.·<-o::;,> wt:th pumtz.,~s~1·; ·ancf.«;>bs~~~ons: .. l>y the ·~peet~s··. · · :. · ... : . ,'' :· ·

:> :··. :,.\ .. · · .· ·~. inSi>~~t~::~~l~~~;:-~ ·~~·~~~~--9£···;;0,# ~~rt~~i~ ·~~ti~~ tclten ~ .. .- ,_,., · ·.: .... :~·· ,:_ :.\ ::·•in response t:~ ·-tile. ·J,lO:mr·entorc~t-· i.etter 41i~ed .March :.20~ ·191a •. -~· to

_.; ···'., .. ,'..;'°-\>-: ·,,_ . the .itt?mS .of ~¢~llanc.e: identU.tett. i.Jl·~o~t letter of· ~~h· .·21.·$ J:~)1..3.; .. ·

.·.:-:.::·· '.'·/>.::<" .. ~~~ ~e· ~= .. ~tl\~~.~~~t~.~ ·-:··~~t: ~~~~r~ .. · -~_··. ·_, _·: · .... ;··::·, .: > .· ··. -.-~ -, . - . 1-··.. .' .~118 thiO ~ection; f.t was f0$.d :~¢ certain ·of y<>ur activities .. ,

':·:: .. :· . -·:. :_:.·~ao~iJ,lt~d With" Units .2 ~ 3 appear· to·~be·. ~ viqJ4t:l_on:-.of.:.A:Cc· i'eciuire:... .. · . · .· ·: · · .;:.(.>:-: ~t8.· .Tlie·:.items-·mid :fe$ereh.ce.s~. ~o ·:tile::':p~t~inet;t requir~t;s ·are: U.s.ted ,: .. '~ ;,_ ·. '.. c~ •·. it.t 'the~ ericlotive 'to. this ·-ietter. . .. . . . ·, ' . .. · . .-' - .: ·.~ ·~ . . .· ~ .' .. , :~ :·.-,· .. ·. ·;_ .' :: . ....... 1··._ ..• , -~~: .. ~•· .:·~~>.· '~. :_·,·., .··:i .. _ .. ·. ,. .° . .'~I .: , .... -.·. · .. · '·.'lb~ let@r~:is· a ·not:lcte'-bf'.~olaticn.,i._s~cit tc),.yau· .Pursuant ~ the ·provtsion11:

~;· < .. , ... :- ··: ., .·.-·~~.:section. 2 •. 20.(of. the= ;~¢:'·s··"IlUle~;_-ot··Prae~ice,0 :Part:: 2• 'fU:le ;1.0_,. ·. : ·::: ·~' .... ::: ·:··;.:.··:·.Code.: of- recte~fll ~~liitt<ms. ·.-·Section-·.2~201 .. requires you·~ :s~btid.t. to this ·· .. ~--~-. ·. '-· ·.<·: ·.- ·:of(lee Within" ~ty' (20)" ~ys of: .. yout Z:flcei.pt of' ·thiS :ttotiee·, a wit ten ·.-.:_"··. _;. -; ·: :. · :·stat~t or ;e;q,~ti.C>n"in· rep1y>1n~u4~ns: ·:_Cl)· cor;rectJ.Ve. steps which .'.-. ·.:::··~,~~ <:· ~-. ·iurve .been,t:akenby :y<,u~.· .~·· the.r>eliuJ.ts'.ttcht~;· :C2) corr~tive ·steps··:· ··' · .·: <· ,., .,-.;:.WtliCh rill be t~ ~·avoid t'urthel:·viola~~ous;· en&! (3) -tbe··date·when · .: .: .... ·.' .·, ••• : < full:.CQmpitance' -~11 'J>e ach1eve4.·:-· ~h- -a, s .. tat~nt Or eXp~tion sh0uld . . .

. . -·. _ . - . ~e pravlded for eacb:of 1'tems 1.-th~ou'gh 6· •. " It¢1u;7- .was. desc.ribed' in your · - .,'" ... ·_ ·.. .. · .... : letter .to tlhfS .. D~ecto:r&te· of, Ucensiila·· -clSted Aprii . ~1, 1973·. B8¢e~ on, . ·. . . -'-~ ·} ~-.. :~ ·: ... :':' : : our' ezam'tnatiot\G: of--~; act4.0ni(to: ,cotrecc, :a00 prwert1: recurrenCie'·"of 'this_ .. . . :7;:·.;,.·>:.:: ·.' ~.::·:Vf.o,.atlon$ ~tem 1; 1e ~tdereet· te86J:~ .. and ··Elf?·· r~ly. to ·thi~: 1>.~tifiett~ion: .... · : • · ·' ._ '.:.:', ·:·,~~. ·. ·f.S 1'"'"Uired. _ . ·. ·:~·:·' .. :-:·.~ '.·. \·"' ,·~·: - ·,.··. . _,. · . '.. ·,,., · ·' .· · ·· "·.,. .,;

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., ',~_ • .,,,-~· ... _ ... -·· . ,·. !··. ~-:~ .. -... "-':.._:: .. :~.·:"' .. : • ··-~ .,...- • ..·-: ; •• -,~,. .... .;._. -~ ••

·. ~:: :'.:·· :.: : .... · ~nweal'th EdiaoJ;i eornpa~y :. .'. .. . >< · "·.<. ,!·'. :". ·.: - · ·, .• ·· ·,, ·'.:. · :· ·· '

License' No. DPR-19 :and ;No• DPB, •• ;::as \ '.. . . ::., ·,·· · · · · ·. · ' ',.,. • '''' • _.. J ~

. . . . . ' . . . ' . ..~. . .. . . '' . ·, , ' . . . - ... , \. . Certd.n. aciti.vities under ·yoUT ··licenses. id~ntified below appear to. be in· ·. ·

·· violation of AEC requirements. :" · ' · · . . . . , . · · · ' · . _· · • ' • ' :.·· -~ • • • ' ' '~·, • ' ' . • ·• • • ~ . '. . I ' • • '• .:,· - ' • .• <

'. .. " :_;:; .... . : -::: .. These a~~ent: vioi~tt~~ .al:~: ·~ci~rd.~~t~~f 'to ·b~ :·of '·~t~gQfy ti~ $ev.~ri ty; " . '." .. ·::;·

· ·. · '.·:;-':..="·.;·.::. ··~i~>.·.T~c~·Speclf~cati~n·{~s'.~.;4~etat:~"·~h~t pressur~::$wi~~es .. · :·: , ·=. '. :-.. :

· .:· . .. . . = .. ~· w!.lich mOnitor·:.tha.:pct.~, core ,spray,. t1rui JlPCI dis~rge:.lines. · · · · , . . ·; ···" · · · ·. ·to a$9µre, that::they: are ftal.1. ·of .. wat~r, shall· be· fµtfotionally · ·"

· .. ; .. \~'.:': . '·teated .each .montl.l ':and. cal'ibrated'."°every: thete mOtlths. ': ... ; .· ' • • ·.~~-~~ • •• ~: • • '; •• t • ·~'4 • • • 'l•' n' • • ,'_ .-·· • : ..._: '~,, ·,: '. ',:.:· . • •' • > .... ' • ','' , •• I • -, ::,,.'·.-.,./ -•• ,

.. '. ':·' · · . Contrary.' ··to ·the: above.- tlie: shave -t~st:s ·were riot·.:'pe~f~giea fo~ ·the .•. : · · ...... · i·>:.-.. · VD.it 2:· or .·1Jnit ··3: Hl>CI d~scharg~· .lines~ J!urthermpre, ,pre$sure. :· ·

··': ... · ·:. . , · SWic:ches are not· prOvtded · .. in the HPCI' dis.charge .:tines ·for this · ~ · :~ -. .;~n'o.ee; '. . ,. . .·. · . " .: " · : . .... ~ ·. ·. : ... · · " • · : . . ·

:,, . "<J. :;~:··.-:· "i:, .. , /; ~ . T$~,.~~ :~~cµlici:ltton ~.~.~-.~. t:atatt?s ·that each partt~:ly ':or fully ·. · · · w±thdr~"cont:~o1 roa be exer.c1sea ilt 1east_ once A~ch 1:ieek~ · . : .. , · ·:·· · ·

. . . .... ' ... \ ";, -··-" .·:: >~·.' ; '• . '• ..

... . ~ .: ._ ·1 ...... _.

- . ,· "•

.· .·. ... ' - ; .. :.;, ,.

... ,'• .---

' . . . ...

. . . · ~ COntt~ ·t.o .th~· above. ·unJ.t 2 ... co1itro1 to.d .dr~v~s were·'no_t·· exercised .. · .. · •. ; ."··· . _ dtir.· J.lt. o .. the.·• t,reek' Of M.,_. 28·~ .. 1913.o _.:. · ,; __ : . · . ' . . . . .·: ·. .. .. ·. · · ··,:·· ••.. c:> "~" p '. .

':·'. :.··:·:.) ::· '..: :~3. Tecliui~~ Sp~~ificat~~ .4~3.n sfate~---t~~t the ... ~ta~us".of ~abb 'control ~od. . . . acCumul.at9r' pre~sure. and ·level.. al~ .. shall be cheeked each _'shift. .

· •• , '_' .. ••• d. ::~~~a~ to::·"the ~bov~~:, t~ u~~."2 al~ We~e ,n0t. ~h~c~ed .~n .· . , , . ' . · ,·~t.ft Nq~ :· ~·:·'.Apr11 .. 3Q~.;·19.73t and· 'Shift .. No~".6 c:iri: ~ay: 4.~and: 2Q; .1973.

: · : ;; :· " .. 4 ~ . ·:Te~cru: ... ~p~c~ic~t~ci~~~ .1:.&:reqti.~r~s: .t~·t .. a. ~unctio~f.test. ~{·~the_ · •. ·· ... · ' . APRM .. 15 .pereen~ t.;Jcrmn:be--perfo~4 ~efe>re each-.f:Jttlrtup'.. and. the'.Blgh · · ··· · ·nu.x IBM' calibration be perfQ'rmed·'every ~~utdown. · · ·

> , ·· .. ;\=~~ ~~.i!:~°:i~~~:=n:! ~:::,~tnfM:~!:.irm;:b~~\9; .. : : .... 1973. ·and the· IRM .cillibration 'te.St was no~. performed dunng·the··Unit 3 ..

,_'/ ··. · · ·shutd0wn .on March· 4, 1973.. . · · ... ·. .. · .. · : . .·· · · · ·

. · .... :.:~· ·' .".·.A;. ~t~~clil>~P.~i.£iea~i~.-4·' .. 6,~A .. i ~~Quir~s. t~t::~h~· re~ct~r ~e~sel. sheU ~· .. · ~.-t~ratlire.)$:·.pel'.citmently· ~~cpr4e4_eit·15 minut.a"'interv.als .. dur.tng ·

· ~tup · afuF c0ol~o_,;n·.. ".. · · ..... , . · · · · · · ·

'•·· ........ ,:. , . . . : .. '. Co~~r~. t~ ~he ~~~~, . .th.e tJ~·t: ··2·. reactrir: v~s~~~· sb~ll t~ratures ... ,

:::,,·,, · .. . tJere not recorded .for an is.;..h~r ped,.od during the March 2s~26, 1973, ... .' ''-,'.">:··.'.·.: ··COoldoWil. ·. ·, ·· .. ·· .. .- ·.:. · ... ·· ..... -: .' . . .· .. :·· ·.' . ·,-.·.·>.·~.-.

··,. ~ ~~~· . • : ... ... • • ••• '-' .... ' ·.,¥ .. ;, • ...... ' .. ..,._ . ' ·' ' •• ·,. ' < >:h(:'. .... ~.;·,< . :-;: ... ,_ .. : ·~~ . . . , . ' . .. . '

:: '.

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·.-

1 ·.- ..... ~ •• !~, - ~·· .; . : . _.'.: -

··,· ··- ' '. ''\··-, . ·~·-.~_(. ~ . ·~.. . .... . '.'

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-... •'

-. . ~-·.: '. · · >:~,:· . ": ·,·IiC' addit 10n ':to" the- ~hove~ 11,lattei;s -~::·the ·'illBpectori(. examined _during': our \ :~\: ·:, "-"' < --~:~.: -:. :: ...

~ ·;2t::~;::;;::::t~~~:~.~l.tj,;f ~~~:2~:~·'.~; ,~~'.~0~1~:i~~~£.itJ:Jt'~~M°:1

~0r:;:: ~12;\i·I:~:< "'. -, · _. :: -:/" .. ·-_ ·,t_~":. Ac.~iobs" reg~ii~tr:'eec;_Ondafy.,\~Onttii-~fCcobtrol, ·def:)eribed.: ·1~ your_,;. >-i·'·>:·.:-_ :·J:,:

/_,./·}K;·;·F~(.:f mt.0;·;~~~~~}i~~Ir~~tt';}~'!;)~,~}~\;~!~~ t~ ·1~·~?:;~tt :77??.. ·.'.· :~:!:E· :-..: .. - _.".· :-" ·:. 2· ... Impl~tat~9n,'.of·.:~1d~it.toriil. D;onito~lM":t:eq~ire~ts' ~ttgg-.Unit· 2 · .\:\· 'f.· _ .. ·.; . ,·

.. >~f ;~;:.:·f.-.~~;~~tt~;:m~~~-,~~:r;;,~~m~t~;~~.r;:· ~drr·f~e~!.~;r: ·.1~t~;:·~,~>rX-

. - ' .. «--;;, ~:-: We have no-'fur:ther .~atious:on-.tbese>items:ac·.·thiS·'t:1me.· ·~··:«;'- -'·· .. · :-' - ,'.:.-.;· · . . ··-: .c: .: · • ..... :'• "".r~.~·~:~~:· ., }:~·-.,~· .. , ~. " :• .~·~· :·:.·:~~·~: -:··.::~;~:--··' .··:: • -:~~,;·;~" -=~·, .. ~':'\''~'/';.~>.'~·~(~' ,'(_;!-/~' :!·~·. ~'l~,~~·-~:~;.~\.-.~.~~~-, 1•: ··'••;:·~.:::I''.~:~· .. ,..:;· ... ~:~•'", \. ··.~) .. : ·'··) ··>1~ '.acc~r~an.Ce· Witii:;seti,tton ·:2.~'19.0.-.:0£- .tli_e:'-AEC'os:?-'iull:es-·'pf~.~ract:1e:e·/•<,i>art: 2, .·~_,>:·_.: '. .. :. /·':: ·

• • I • • ' < ~ ' • • \ • • • ' • •JC' ' • • f' ~ ' • 1 ' ' i • • , , 1 ~ ' , • • f , • f .- • •

/'. ·.- -~ ·-,· .. :··:·Title io·, Co4e .of,·.Feoeral."Regul~~ione',; .. a·;'._copy of. ··this· letter .. :with 'the . · .· .- ·:· .· « "-.., · ...... ~ .. ; ~ ~: .. ~ .. -:-.~;;:~. enc~c>sed·" in6p~ction ~ rep6rt"· :WU.1 :·t>~·,'P~l:qceci ·1':1.ri· .th~ ';&:c 's.:.Fil'b1ic_:·D<>culllSnt: -:· . '.. · ... '. _;;:: .. .. -. \ "

J ,' --, "' "-... _.,.;_ • ' ' • • l • ~ 1 • ·• " ' • " ' • > • 1

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. -[·;~;A.,. _,._<·;_ :~: .·:-._ ROo1li. '. ', '.lf ·'ti1e inspection · repol".t · ~con; ta~ d~~o~tion ... w'4ich· y<>u ::9r your· ·.- 1 ·: : : .": .• : ..

~ ·:':·,;· ·;_{: ~-~'. .. : .. -.:. ~.:4o~tr .a¢tcn:s« .b·eii:ev.e.;" '.:to -:be-' propriEi~ri ·~>~~:ls '.'oili~essarY, .. ·tha~: ,.1ou· .. subtrii t .. ·. · · / "· ·· ;:: ... ·;· · ... . ' .~:: ... : .·:,:. .... :. :·:~ .. ~- Wt'itten:app~iea~ion tp. tbis·.'off~ce·~· within' 20.:~aya·:--of-~t.il~'-~da~~ '_of.-:,,_·· ... ··.·.-.·· ...... ·:.

·; .;_'\. ~-~«~>_tht,s · le~t¢r; ,req#esting .:tJvit. ·su~'.~nf9m,ati~·"b·e "w;itiihlf1d;;from:;puQl!c· · .. _ . ·;·~,'.::·.>-_·:- ·: .-": '·. ·:~:. ·:;·:/. '}:~·-.'.'dtsclo~ul:e; · .. :1£:-:~uch~:·an~·rippli~~icsµ·:·t$.:s"1h~tted~ .. :~t~ must '.j;~~i.fy'_ the'. :· '· ':,';'/'• .. · " ,.9 .:.,-;.:.'.:'. --:.-_~~~~s · fo~ · x.Th.1~if-~n£~~t~on'.i~.·-·~~~~-mti~.'..-~~ ~·e:· .. P.i.~t>~ie .. tan.; .mi<l .. -~_li~~~ b~ · --:·~ '.·' -.. ._: _.;··: .. · ... · ·,

--.:'.', .. '. .. · .•. .-,pr~pared ~o,~that::pt'op~;le.t.~ ~nforQl:Btion 14en.t;$..f~C4>11:3 ·conti1;Lined-_·in',a . , · .: . .-: .. /::_.~'·.·? : -~ :·:·.:·separate par.i:'.10.f.: ·ti..e-.:-d.c>·~~t:, si~~e :·t:ha'·,application ,. ¢tcl;u~i'ng·, t~is.: .. , ~- · , .,, .. '.- .-:,: · · . :.«':~.:~._'.. ~·:-:>- :_:.-. :·: . .'se~,ara,t~:· \l~~t/:~~l'-"~~p'·i>e~.·p~~d.;':i~:::·tli~,'.:P~b.*~c·:DQ~-~~.-J;ie~ .... :· ·If·w173::. ;::'. '.::.',: ·-.'.·· :. ;._ .. ' . :·: ~-.-.: .. >:·'do'.not re'cei-ie:-mi :·appllcatiOn."tQ witbho.ld,.~tnfo.rmat'iQn·~ .. or··.·ar~-lio.t.>otber:;.;:.,:(:~ :.·),' ·.:-_'· : .. :"> " ::.:~:.~ .. :><Wise· c0nt~cced. ,~tlt1~·/ thE(~t>e't?t.t. .t.~.,--t1,iiie "~tiotl"~ t~ ~ ~n~tosea· report. : ·<·: > . ,. /-'/\.> :.:.::« ·: ..

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· '•. _.~.::-:.. .-.· ·:.Will pe ·.pl.aCed .. in' the'·PUb:lic- D~c~~t::'.Roem with:. ~~.c;Opy"of'<J:~s"-l~~ter. /:·. -_-_<. :·: :-,c·"· .- ~ . -_;:~~~;:.<<:;:-· .. :;_·,~-~··".; "·: ... ·· 1 ..... 1 .~~r~J ":·.~\~·.···;··~~ .. ·: ....... \::~'"'.1..'",:i.,:' ... ~~::>1):~,~·!:;~::.".~~i.-.~~-·.,· .... ,;·;,.,"'_,}:··.__..~~~.-::, .. ~.-.,:·'\· .. _:_~"''·.:··,-:·<1:~:.~--.:--,·,..·:.f.::.1:.,··

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· · ' :·;:.. · :, .:·~ont~ary ,to: ~e "ab~e, 'um.t: ·,2.':s~c~ndE:i.ff ·c9?ta1nme*~'; i~tegrity was~ "not>·.:,.:,:,\· - : , ·..,:nu,ifut~ned- ~.: APril 19:,~ .,:973{ 4µ.rµig -d1aasserilb1y· o( ·:the u111c·.3,. m'ain:·<.·_:·~· ~::\~. :~~-., .

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u.· S. ATOMIC.ENERGY COMMISSION DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS

REGION III

RO fospection Report. No~ 050-237 /7.3-03· RO Itrspectibn· Report No·. 050,..249/7-3-04

. Licensee: · .. Conmonweal th Edison Company P~ O. Box 767. . Chicago, Illinois, - 60690 ·

Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2·and·3 .

. · Morr:is; Illinois

L{censes No. DPR-19 . and No. DPR-25

Category : .· C

. ~' . Type of Licensee: •. GE~ BWR; 809 Mwe

' '

· ''.fype ·Of In~p:~ctiori: · ·•· 'Ro~tin~;· Unarinounc;ed

bates of Inspection: ·June 14, 15,·18-20, 22 and 25,.1973

' Dates of Previous Inspection: .·. M~rch 28.:,,29, 1973 (Unit' 2) .·.·April 17 ~ 19-20, and·.

, . ·23-25, 1973 . (Unit 3)

- 'Pdncip4L Inspector: ._-.!;.~/{;-- .•... · . ' . . -.... .

~~·'. Accoinpany~ng,Tnspectots: G. Fiorelli (June 18-19,: 1973)

~ .' ·_.

:#'1~~.k. H. C. Dance ,Cju~e 25; i973)

· Other Acc'onipanying Personnel:. J. ca;-son, DOL. (June 25, 1973)

.· .. ~~-~-·.·.· ... ··· Rev.ie~~~ :Sy: . H •. ,c •. Daµce, $~;;zeactor Inspector

· ·::Re.actor· operi:iuoils ih-.anch '' ·.· .. ·'' ... . .

"'

"· . ·:.-.-·.'

. : ....

···:· ..

. .. :··

·.,

··f'-· 7-73 (Date)

'!(t'73 . ( ate)

.· f"_.;,1-73 (Date)

t-7-73 ·· (Date)

,~

,,I . ,,·

"

; .

.·· .. , .... · ..

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Enforcement. Action

A .. Technical·· Specification 4.5~H.4 states that pressure switches which monitor ·the LPCI, core spray, . and .HPCI discharge iines, to assure that . they .a~e full ·of water, shail be functionally tested each .month and

.. calil:>rated every three mont:h~.. .

Contrary fo the above, the above tests were rio.t performed for the Unit 2 or Unit 3 HPCI discharge lines~- Furthermore, pressure

.. ·switches <?-re not provided in the. HPCI discharge lines for this purpose. (I>aragraph 8.e.)

B: · TechniCal ·Specification 4. 3 .A. 2: states that each partially or. fully . withdraw c<:>nt:rol rod be. exercised at least once each week.

·Contrary to. the above, Un{t 2 · contro_l rod drives were not exercised during the week- of May 28,. ·1973~ (Paragraph 4.h,.)

·c ... Technical' Specifica_tion _4.3 .. D states that the status ·of_ 'each control

·1:.

.. ·rod a:·ccurilulator pressure· and. level alarm shall be checked each shift.

Contr~ry to th.e ·abqve, the Unit 2 alarms were riot checked on Shift No. 5, April 30, 197,3, and Shift·No. 6~ .on i1ay 4 and 20, i973. · (Paragraph 4.h.)

. D. Technical Specification 4; L.A. requires that a functfonal test of the . APRM ·15 percent s,cram be perfonri°ed .b~fore each. startup and the ~iigh ·Flux IRM cal~bration_ be. performed every shutdown~ . ..

C~ntrary ~o the above' APRM functional t.ests were not performed before 'the Unit 2 startup.which took place on January i3, 197.3, and

, · .. February 19, .1973 ~-·and the .:IRM calil:>ration. ·test was not performed during '._ the ·unit. 3 ·shutdow on March 4, 1973 ~ (Paragr:aph 4. h-.) · . ' ' . . . .

: E'. •. Technical Specif;i..cad.on '4; 6 .A.I .requires· that. the r~act<;>r vessel shell temperature '.be permanently" recorded .at. l5 minute intervals during. heatU:p and. _cooldciwn_ ..

·"· •,.

. . Contrary· .t~- °the abbve; ·the l)nit -2 reactor vessel shell temperatures were ribt recor.ded for ari · 18~hour peri:od during the· March 25.:..26, 1973, cooldoWn;. (Paragraph 3. a.) .

·" F ~ · :Technital __ Specification. 4 ~ 6~.~ G{2. requires .a. r:eactor coolant sample· be -'.tit.ken and ariaJy~ed ev~ry; four. hpurs_. ~Or :CC>nductivi ty and chloride . cont~~L-. . . . . . . . .. . . . ··. . . . "' . . . . .

·:·', ..

· .. ····.· .~ ..

2

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·· .. :

. I

).

·'

Contrary .to the above, on June .6, 1973, the interval between the Unit 3 reactor coolari.t samples ·was five hours and twenty minutes. (ParagraI_>h 3.a.) ·

· G. Technical Specification 3. 7. C states that secondary conta.inment shall be maintained during· all _modes of .plant operation.

Contrary to the above,.Unit 2 secondary containment maintained on April. 19, 1973, during disassembly of steam' isolati.On valve arid the turbine stop valves.

integrity was npt the Unit 3 main (Paragraph 7.d.) ·

. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items

A~ The corrective actions listed in the licensee's response to the RO:HQ . enforcement letter dated March 20, 1973, were reviewed during this inspection. The items are consid.ered resolved .. (Paragraphs 2.a, 3.a, 3 ~ b , 3 , g ~ and 4 • c-)

B. The corrective actions taken by the l_icerisee concerning the items of noncompliance identified in our letter of .March 27, 1973, were reviewed during this inspection. The .items are considered resolved. (Paragraph 2.a, 2.b, and 9)

Unusual Occurrences

A. Isolation condenser. inlet valve 1301-1 found inoperable .. (Paragraph 3.f)

· B. ··Isolation condenser.- hi-.,.condens~te flow switch set point drift. (Paragraph 3. c)

. . . . ·· .c. Mai_n steam line high temperature sensors set point drift. (Paragraph 3. h)

D. High reactor pressu~e ~witches ~et point drift. _(Paragraph 3.h)

E .. Main steam line low pressure switches set point drift. (Paragraph 3.h)

F. LPCI and core spray permissive reactor low pressure switches set point drift~ (~ar~g~aph 8.b)

G. HPCI prima'ry· steam ·isolation valve ·2301-.~5 failed to open. · (Paragraph 8.a(l))

H. LPCI crosstie valve 1501-32A failed to open. (Paragraph 8.a(i)) .,

. I. LPCI inspection valve 1501~22B valve ·stem bending. (Paragraph.8.a(2))

- 3 -

J. LPCI loop select circuitry A P switch inoperable. (Paragraph 8. c)

K. LPCI containment· cooling HX service water outlet valve 1501-JA failed to open. (Paragraph .8.a(J))

L. HPCI steam·supply valve stem b~nding. (Paragraph 8.a(2))

M. Apparent upcoupling indication on three CRD's. ·(Paragraph 4.a(l))

Other'Significant Findings

A.· Current Findings

1. Unit 2 continues operating at approximately 100 percent power with ··a stack·gaseous release rate between 10,000 to 15,000 uCi/sec.

Unit 3 has operated up to 100 percent power following its first . ~ ' . . . refueling outage and is in the process of preconditioning its fuel pellets for ~ore.than one rod sequence. Its stack release rate at approximately 100.percent power has beeri in the range of. approximately 12 ,000 uCi/sec. .. ·

2. Both units continue oper.ation .with their recirculation crosstie line valves shut. They have operated in this condition since initial plant startup. The iicensee does not know when .an evaluation and r¢solution to ·the problem will.be forthcoming from General Electric .

. ·(Paragraph 3 .c) · ·

3. · . The licensee experienced a wiring reversal on two of the four ASCO valv~s in two CRD 's of Unit 2.. . The amphenol connectors are being colo:r coded to reduce the possibility of a smiliar occurrence. (Paragraph 4.b)

4. Dtiring the inspection of Unit 3 torus..:..drywell vacuum breakers the licensee identified some initial installation deficiencies. The deficien:cies were corrected. All planned modifications to the valves were n~t performed dtiri.ng the outage. (Paragraph 7. b)

5. F~llowing several failures of motor·operated valves to open or close as required, the licensee is finally performing a survey to deter­mine the present ~ettings Qf ~he ~alve operator torque switches and compare against manufacturer recommended.torque settings in ft-lbs. (Paragraph 8.a.(l)) ·

6. Although .the Technical Specifications require the functional testing an.d calibration of pressure switches in the discharge line of the HPCI system no ·suc:;:h ~witches exist at the plant. (Paragraph 8 .e)

.4

r

.,.

e.

B. Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items:· None

Management. Interview

The following subjects·were discussed on June 2.2, 1973, with Messrs. F. Morris, Assistant. Station Superintendent; A. Ro~erts, ·Supervising Engineer, Technical Staff; C ~ Sargent, Engineer; and E .. Budzec.howski, QA Engineer.

·A. The .inspector questioned the wiring reversal experienced on the ASCO connectors of two Unit 2 CRD' s. · . The inspector requested to· see the . SRB review of the .deviat.ion· and was informed that the Deviation. Report had not been completed and th~ SRB had.not.reviewed the event yet. On June 29, 1973, the l.icensee informed the inspector that the SRB ha·d completed a review of the event:; and had not been able to associate

.the wiring reversal with any recorded maintenance activities. The SRB recommended that the connect·ors be color coded. The licensee ~ stated th.e e:verit wiil be reported ·in the next- seini-annual report. (Paragraph 4. b) · ·

. .

B •. The inspector stated that numerous deficiencies were found in the Unit 3 iorus-to-drywell vacuum bre~kers and he questioned the status

c.

D.

of the Unit 2-vacuum breakers and the reportability of these deficiencies.

The lfrensee stated that Unit 2 counter weights are 10 pounds. each .for . a totai of 20.pounds per assembly, while Unit 3 now has 25 pounds per

assembly; the. difference having an inf;j,ignificant effect in. the operation of the valves .. The s¢ats for Unit 2 vacuum. breakers will be inspected

· · during the ·next. refueling outage;· ... The licensee plans to include a 9escription of the pr:ohl~s and their resolutions in their vacuum breaker ·leak test report to Licensing.due July 25, 1973. (Para.graph 7. b) · · · ·

The inspector informe~ the licensee that in connection with containment ·isolation valves hi,s definition of.valve "operability" includes acceptable leakag~,.and requested the.licensee to review his present definition which only considers valve motion. · On July 3, the license .informed the inspector. the. matter had been. referred to the company headquarters for resolution. ·

The inspector stated that although. he noted progress in the efforts to reduce the number of motor· operated valve malfunctions~ the p~ogress was slow. Specifically, during the review, it was noted that only recently had charts been obtained .. to.correlate torque switch settings to recommended t:o,rque ·_val:Ues,. although. these problems . have been occurring

·'·

for at least the last two years. In addition, he felt ·that all safety related valves, not just those on the ECCS system, ·should be checked to determine if. the settings were correct. ·The licensee stated the intent was to check ~11 ECCS and primary.containment isolation valves and issued·instructl.on to include the isolation valves in the Action Item. The licensee·alsb stated that the program has top priority ·in an effort to reduce. the number of failures. 'The inspector noted that no control

· system, such as ,an internal "Modification Approval Form," is required to change '-the torque_ switch settings. It appears that in the past if a·valve leaked the close.directioP, setting would be increasedto ensure tight closing,·or'if it ·was stuck clo~ed the op~ning setting would be inc.reased or the closing- setting· reduced without· any technical justifi­cation or an in.depth investigation into the problem to ensure the correct s~tting was used. The licensee stated that a method to control changes to ,torque switch setting~ would: be generated. (Paragtap~ 8.a)

E. The ins~ector stated that the licenseei~ action~ concerning the no~­compliance items identified in ·our lette.r of March 27, 1973, were reyieW:ed and that he had .. no further. questions• at this. time. (_Paragraphs_i.a, 3.a, 3.b, 3~f, and 4.c)·

F. The inspector. stated that the licen~e~ 's act:tons to correct. the first· five items ·Of noncompliance identified in the Headquarters lettE?r of enforcement dated .March 20; 1973, were revi.ewed and that he hB:d no further questions at this time. (Paragraph 2.a, 2.b ~nd 9)

. . . . On June 25,. 1973,·the inspector met with Mr. Morris and.stated that he

.hadno further quest~ons on the remaining noncompliance items involving documentation associated with the installation of the Unit 2 main steam flow restricfors. ·The. inspectqr stated that most of the i.tems could

.. have been elii;n:lnated- by a more thorough review of the requi_rements by the Ucensee p;rior · to the ·job. The licensee acknowledged the comment .. · (?aragrap~ 3.g)· · · .

G. The inspector stated that the increase in reactivity noted on Unit 2 .would be compared with the submi't:tals to DOL. Subsequently in telephone conversations, the licensee was"informed that the shutdown margin trends were nonconservative to ·predicted 'values :and less than those rep·orted to DOL. · The licensee stated that the trends although ~onC:onservative from the submittal .are gradual, well within_ the allowable shutdown margin, and in. their view did not-constitute significant variations from predicted values. -The licensee ·also stated that the reactivity aspect.s had been reviewed by the corporate off.ice and in· conjunctio~ with. RO :III' s question, would: be r.eported to· DOL. . . . . . .

10~9. I J

H. The inspector·stated that a review.of Units 2 and 3 surveillance records and of the management system of controlling and scheduling of surveillance ·testing was performed_and we had the following comments:

1. The computer sytems used in the control and.scheduling of surveillance testing appears to be a very good tool i11 the manage­ment of that activity.

2. Considerable improvements in the control, procedures and docu­mentation of surveillance tests required by Technical Specifications was noted when compared to the performance of this activity a year ago.

3. -The 1-M surveillance test results are not always reviewed by the . I-M Foreman or the Instrument· Engineer. · For the system to be consi·dered satisfactory, a program of review similar to that utilized by the operations performed surveillance (QCP Procedure 10-52.1) should be in effect for the sunreillance items performed by the I-M's.

·. 4. A system for documenting changes to procedures involving I-M ·surveillance testing was noted .. It could not be determined, ·however, how these changes.wouid be finally incorporated in the procedures .

. The licensee indicated that the changes to 1-M surveillance . procedures were being processed. The changes are sent to the · Teclinical Staff Superv.isor who. then. processes· the changes through the riormal channels.

5. The inspector said that an apparent item of noncompliance exists i'n. that· the Technical Specifications require pressure switches in the HPCI discharge headers. The licensee. stated that the switches exist only in the·. LPCI and core spray systems.

6. With respect _to the review of the records, it was noted that several requirements could not be located or were not performed as follows:

a.

b.

c ..

Unit ·2 CRD weekly exercise for the week of May 28 to June 3 could not be located.

Uni~ 2 CRD accumulators pressure and level alarms were not checked oI1ceper spift ori April 30, May 4 and May 20, 1973.

Tlie Uni"t 2 APRMhi flux (15 percent) scram functional test was · not performed· during the· startups of January 13 and February 19,

197j. . .

- 7

d. The Unit 3 !RM calibration was hot performed during the unit shutdown of March 4, 1973.

e. Unit J·reactor, coolant samples were not taken on the ;required four hour frequency on June 6, 1973;

f. The Unit 2 rea~tor vessel.shell temperature was not recorded during an 18-hour interval during ·the March 25-26, 1973, cooldown.

I. The inspector stated that a.review of some licensee commitments to Licensing appear to lack management attention as noted by the following examples:

.. 1. Letter to DOL on March 7, 1973, about circuit design deficiencies called for administrative controls.

On June 15, 1973, controls were found to be in effect only on the standby liquid ·control system and not planned on the other three systems until brought up ·by the inspector. ·

2 •. Letter to DOL of May 31, Unit: 3 Reactor Low Pressure Setting Drift, called for examination of the mici::oswitch support bracket bolts· during· future surveillance inspection.·

A functional test ~as performed June 13 on both units. An examination was not made.

3. Letter to DOL April 27, Secondary Containment Integrity Violation, stated "Request for Equipment Qut :of Service" forms will include

·secondary containment ihtegrity check space.

As of June 20, this was not the case. The licensee subsequentiy informed the inspector the procedure modifications had been completed. .The inspector stated that with the modification, no response would be required of the violation notice.

J •. On June 25, 1973, the proposed Unit 2 fuel shipme~t· was.discussed with Mr. Morris, Assistant Station Superintendent. !tis under-

· stood that additio~al analysis of the cask and crane movements are to be submifted to the Direc~orate of Licensing. (:Paragraph 10)

- 8

:,:

REPORT.DETAILS

1. Personn'el Contacted

F. Morris, Assistant Station Superintendent A. Roberts,. Supervisory Engineer, Technical Staff

· .. G. Abrell, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 D. Scott, Operating Engineer, Unit 3 R. Bishop, Engi~eer, Technical Staff T. Suchocki, Engineer, Technic.al Staff R. Williams, Engineer, Technical Staff C. Sargent,·Engirieer, Technical Staff L. Dimmock, Engineer, Technical Staff R •. Meadows,· Engineer, Technical Staff

· . T. Lang, En~ineer, Technical Staff · M. Turback, Engineer, Technical St~ff

D. Adani, Engineer, Technical Staff L. Noreng, Chemist, Radia~ion Protection R. Cozzi, Engineering Assistant, Surveillance W. Hildy, Instrument Engineer R. Mefford,. Instrument Foreman· R. Thomas,• Contror and ·Instrument Technician N. Jackiw, QC Engineer,. Technical Staff. E •. Budzechowski, QA Engineer . J. Gr6th ,· Engineer, Station Construction·

Additi·on:al personnel present on ,June 25 Crane review:

· N. Skarshang, Project Engineer~· GE ·c. Goodner, Project Engineer, GE · M:. · Oropeza, S&L St:ruC:tural Engineer

· W. Duke~ CE, M&S Engineering ·

. .

2. ·· . Organization · artd AdminiStration

a. R~~~o~s~ ~~: Items. ~f Non~ompliance - Units 2 and 3

··. . . .

1.

. !

The correctivemeasures to items of noncompliance outlined in the licensee'' s letters (Lee to Kruesi) of April 16, 1973, and .(L~e t.o. Grier). of May. 4· and 43, · 19.73, were inspected. Instructions given to plant personnel r.egarding prompt reporting of abnormal. occurrences; the need to maintain adequate safekeeping of 'surveillance .test· results; the importance of proper modification review and.adherence· to the QA Manual procedures; and the· importance of paying ·attention to control room annunciators, in part.:fcular the chimney saiµ.ple flow abnormal alarm, were stated to have lieen given verhally. ··In ad'dition:, the following findings were noted. .. . . . . . .

I

· .. · .· ....

(1) Prompt Notification .of CE Company's Management of Abnormal Occurrences

T~e inspector does not agree with the licensee's position on the.definition of what constitutes "Prompt" notification of abnormal occurrences as stated -in their letter.of May 4,

. 1973;. however,· during this ·inspection, it was noted that the . licensee has improved his system of reporting the occurrences· to the Manager of Production. The licensee is now promptly transmitting the informatfon to his headquarters by telecopier.

(2) Lack ·Of Safety Evaluations' for Changes in Plant Operations as Described in FSAR .

The licensee has issued a modification to Chapter 30, Administrative Procedure QCP 5"'-5i-'l (pages 10; lla and 11) which should ·

. ensure that all pro~edure changes are reviewed for possible conflict with the .Final Safety .Analysis Report and ensure that ·1~ case the change.modifies the FSAR, a safety. evaluation is performed. .

(3) Control of Surveillance Procedures

During .March 1973 the licensee reissued all system procedures including the sunreillance procedures~ In addition, Chapter 30 proce4ure QCP 5-SLl controls.the·revision and distribution process'of new procedurEis or changes to existing procedures. This should 'eliminate the possibility of someone using an ohsolete procedure to operate t.he plant; ·

(4) Timely Subulittal of Reporti;;' to. AEC

The licensee has· since issued the Unit 2 and 3 startup test :reports to the Directorate of_ Licensing;. In addition, the last semi-annual report was s:ubmitted within the Technical Specification requirements; ;.

New Chapter 30 procedure QCP 16-51.l and 52.1 cover the responsibilities and methods for handling the Action Item

.. program. ·. It is expected that al.). futur~ licensee commitments . to. the .A:Ec will' be strictly' .foll'owed-up' through the. use of the ·Actiori.Item program~

(5) Re.tention of Surveillance Results: .·· '

1'he inspector not'ed that the licensee has instituted a· "sign-:-out" control system for the d·ata ·sheets of completed

. surye'illance· results as 6ne ·metho'd to reduce the probability· · of losing the da_ta· sheets"~

·...;, 10 -

e.

b. Surveillance Testing

(l)_ Genera-! Program - Units 1, 2 and 3

. An examina.tion of the general pro~ram provided the .fo_llowing significant information:

·-.(a) ·'

The D-1, D-iand D-3 surveillance to include all 'surveillance tests Specifications of the fa~ilities~

test program is designed specified. in· the Technical

@The prog~am tias be_en- computerized ~nd p~ovides. such printout · as testing schedule, group responsibilities, summary test

•completion informat~on, summary overdue testing information.

(c) The overall program control and scheduling responsibility has b'een assigned to the surveillance engineer.

_(d) _Testing status irifor1I¥1tion is ·provided the eng~nee_r _ ea~h Monday morning· and schedules _by the surveillance engineer •.

surveillance then established

(e) It was noted ,_during an examination of selected I-M completed test· records .. that a >special procedure change form was being used to document necessary changes in procedure. This technique appeared to be implemented in_ a formal fashion and a che_ck of several changes on .the change form with the -"used"- proce~ure confirmed _agreen).ent.

It_ was sta~ed by licensee representatives that these change forms· are µl_timately incorp_orated into the procedure. The change form noted _had not ··as yet _been prdce'ssed. ..

(f) Signifi6ant improvement was noted in the quality of test procedures u_sed du:riiJ.g the D-:-3_ Spri11g refueling outage of

. 1973. as compared wit'tr 'those- used during _the D-2 reftieling -outage conducte'd during S_prin,g of 1972. · -

. · (2) ·Review' of Audit

(a) ·Review and audit guidance is provided by administrative and ·- _ -· - · q~ality _c~ntrol procedures. AD. element of ambiguity as to

assignment of· the respon_sibility for independent reviews of · · I'.'"".M _surv_eillance test I"esults_ :wa~ noted. - _Based .on a selected

audit :e>f I'-M ~es_t >_records .it Jll:as ·not~d tgat the review of ...

. ~ ;

... . '.

:..._ 11

···.:

. _,· /0?9 I I (r; ., .•'.

I-M tests by someone· other than-th~ person performing the work was random. I~M test reviews by the surveillance test engineer or operating engineer- (required to review operations test results) are not intended by the system.

(b) QP No. 12-51 appears to require the instrument .engineer to perform calibration and adjustment of station instrutnentation. There is no provision for review of results. _

3. Reactor Coolant System

a. Technical Specifications-Surveillance-Requirements -·unit 2

Item

Thermal limi ta­t ion during heatupsand cooldown.

-Coolant Chemistry

Tis Regufrement Period of -Review

The following tempera- 3/24-26/73 tures are to be re-corded at 15 minute intervals (1) Reactor vessel shell (2) Reactor vessel sheil

flange· (3)-Recirculation loops

A and B

A sample -of-reactor -5/73 & 6/73 coolant shall be taken

. at leas_t every 96 hrs - and' analyzed for -radioactivity. - -

Isotopic analysis of 1/73-4/73 a -S-ample. of reactor coolant shall be made at least once per month~

During startups and 3/73 at steaming rates be-

' low 100,000 pounds per hpur, a sample of reactor coolant shall be taken' every four hours and analyzed for conductivity and chloride content.

12 -

,, '.

Remarks

For a period of about IS hrs (1) was not recorded during the cool_dow.

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

~· ,""."'.

Coolant Leak~ge

Area. monitors . for high. tempera­ture

.safety Valves

Relief Valves

At 7.100 ,000/hr steam- 5/73 & 6/73 Satisfactory rates a reactor coolant· sample shall ~e taken at

_ .least every 96 ·hrs and· · analyzed for chloride ..

ion content and con­ductivity.·

Reactor coo.lant system 3/73 leakage shall be checked by the sui:np and a:i.r

·.sampling system and ·recorded at least once per day.

No requirement. 1/73-4/73

At. least half of all · • 1972 re-safet·y valves are .to fueling· be bench.checked each ref~eling outage.

. Ail relief valves. shall be c~ecked for set ~re~sure each refueling

· outage.

- 13 -

1972 re­fueling

Satisfactory. Constant Air Monitor filter results as per CE ltr of 4/16/73. Shift Engineer noti­fied of the .CAM results; graphed

.for trends.

Operational information only­variat ion in alarm setpoint +45°-5° from specified set point.

One valve from each pair for the four ranges replaced with bench checked valve; each valve has metal tag for correla­tion of N2 popping pressure to steam pressure .

Satisfactory

r.

Jet Pumps

Reactor Pressure

Reactor Wa,ter · ·. Level.

Operability checked daily by verifying that the· following

·do not occur. simul­taneously (l)..? l~ percent !low imbalance ·between A and. B loop with ptimps at same speed.

.4/9-15/73

-: (2) The indicate~ value · .of core flow rate varies

. from the value derive_d from loop flow measure­ments by more than 10%. (3) The diffuser to lower plenum:diHerential pressure reading on an individual jet pump varies from the mean of all jet pump differential . prea'sures by more ·than 10%. .

(i) Hi pressure scram 3/73-6/73 ~ 1060 psig.· Frequency

of functional· test-not· less than:l·month or greater than 3 months. Minimum· frequency calibr'cition- of insfru~ ment_ is'· 3 months.

Satisfactory

Observed flow imbalance on .6/22 was 3% with (1) ~15%; (2) & (3) are not verified daily ..

Observed·D/P difference of 4 instrumental jet pumps was < 3% on 6/22.

Satisfactory

Functional test and calibration· at 1 month

. frequency.

(2) Sustained hi pressure and.initia~ don of isolation co~denser op'eratio1i'

4/3/73 and · Satisfaetory 6/11/73

.61070 psig for · 15 sec . ·. Fr~quency. of·. functional· test-not · ...:..1 ~o. ·o~· 7 3 mo. ·

(1) Low water level 3/73-6/73 scramz 1 inch (143 inches ab.ove fu·ei.) Frequency of functional test-not < 1 mo. or

:::io- 3 mo. Calibration . _of instruments every 3 months.

- 14

Satisfactory

Setpoint at·+ 12 inches

·'

·.Main Steam L~ne·

~ ·. '

... ~ .

(2) Low-Low water level 1/73-6/73 at .2 83 in. above top of fuel ·(setpoint-.?9 i~.).

: Fr~quen:cy ·of functional. test-not:<. 1 .mo. or > 3 mo. Calibration

of instruments on~e/ 3 months •.

Satisfactory

(1) Hi radiation 1/73-6/73 Satisfactory. scram· at ~ 7 x normal. full power background, and main steam line isolation. ·

. Frequency of functional· test .... not <. 1 mo. oi ;>.

· 3 'mo .. Instrument .. calibra­tion once/3 mos·.

Sensor~· 'calibrated every . refueling . outage

(2) MSIV cfosure · · tiuie 01ice/ quarter, . at. 3 T ~ 5 sec.

(3) MSIV ~~ercised · · twice/week~

· (4) MSIV. closure scram at 10% from full open more than onevalve functional test frequency < l.· mo. or> 3 mo.

(5) MSIV closure due to stea.Jn tunnel high

· temp. ' Instrument · functional test and.·

. calibration to be done . every refueling out­

age •.. s~.tpoin~ ~ 2ooop.

'·'.

- 15 -

1972 re­fueling. 4/18/73

2/11 and 4/29/7.3

2/73.

1/73-6/73

)/28/73·

Observed readings on 6/22 were ~

· 250 units on the four meters, powet( level ...- · 90% •

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory. · All left at 190:-. 0

195 F, one found at 168°F and re­set to 190.5°F •

·, ..

· (6) MSIV closure due 1/73-6/73.

.Isolation Con:­denser

to high steam. flow,. 120% of rated. ~ . Ftµlctional test per-formed, with a frequency of not <. 1 mo. or> 3 mo. Calibration of instru-

. men ts performed qri.ce/3 · months.'

SurveP.larice · shaJl be performed as follows:

(1) Daily check.of shell side.water and temperature.

(2) Each. refueling outage·simulated. automa'tic iictuati6n

. cmd ·functfonkl test shall be .performed.

(3) Calibrat~ ~eri.t .. ~ine monit.ors . . ..

quarterly.

(4) ·rnstriimentaticm tests.

. . .

·. ' ..•...... ·.··. ·. '

4/9:,..16/73

4/72

3/73-6/73

Satisfactory. Restrictor D/P vs. flow test performed 11/72 and curves cal­cuiated for 965, i015, .1065 psig. 1065·psig curve used for D/P set point ~ 120%.

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory; · See react.or pressure.

b.. · Technical Specifications Sureveillance ·Requirements .... Unit 3

Item

Coolant Ch~istry

. •

• • '<.

·, .· ·. ·. :. ·, ' .

T/S: Req~irement.

A sample .. of reactor 'coolant shall be taken at :lea:s't every.·

. 96 hrs and. analyzed .. for radioacti'Vity

·Period

· 5/73 and 6/73

Remarks

Satisfactory

Isot(>pic analysis of . 1/73-4/73 Satisfactory a sample of reactor

. coolant. shall be . made at . • ...

least.once per·month.

- 16 ...

. '· J. ~ . •;. !'I~· •• ,. - , '. ~ .~. ' . ' •

.•

. .q .

Coolant Leakage

·Area monitors for high temperature

During startups and at 6/1-18/73 . s tecimin'g r'ates below

Samples taken on 6/6 at 0840 and again at 1400, ._ 100, 000 pounds per hour,

a. sample of reactor . coolant shall be take_n every 4 hours and ~n~lyz.ed.for' con-

: ductivity and . chlorid'e c.ontent.

No l'.'.equirement

5 hr :20 min . sample frequency.

Satisfactory

Satisfactory. Constant air . monitor.filter results as per CE ltr of 4/16/73. Shift Engineer

· notified of the CAM results;

·graphed for trends<

1/73:...4173 . Operatio_nal information only­variation in alarm +6° -1s0

from specified . set point.

Safety Valves· ·. At least half of all 1973 re­fueHng

One valve from each pair for the 4 ranges replaced with bench checked valve-each valve has metal tag for correlation of

' . ~ .

Sl:lfety va:j.ves are to be bench ·checked·_. ~ach r~fueling outage~--

.·,:

- 17 -

. .....

N2 popping pressure to steani

.. pressure ..

;.

Relief Valves

· Jef Pumps

· Reactor ·.:Pre~~ure ;,.r , ·' • . . ~:

'·.

'.··,

..... ,

·::.·_.·:

All relief valves shali b7 ~hecked

:for set pressure

1973 re- Satisf aciory · f.ue ling , .

each refueling. outage·. . .

. ·Operability checked daily by verifying ·that t;he following do

'i/5~12/73 ~ Satisfactory

not oc'cur s·i~ultaneou'sly·:

. (1) _ _ 15%.flpw im.balarice. between-A and Bloop with pumps at same speed.

(2) The indicated value pf: core flow·. rate varies

.from the value derived :_from loop flo:w measure-

-ments bY more than io%.

· {3)_:The_ ~iffuser tri lower .plenum differential·· pre~sure reading on·an individual ·jet · pump . vari~s trom .the ni~an _()f .. all- Jet pump'- differential pre~~tirE'.~ by more' -than 10% ~

(1) Hi· pressure scram·· ... ·· 3/i3~6/73 : _-L )_o6Q Psig. ·_ .. : .. · Ffequency of~. functional

. test-not ·~ 1 mo;. cir . ·) 3 mo~ Minimum·.

·frequenc.y for: catibra,­. don· of. inst:rume,~nt is:· ·· j mos.·'

. . . . . .

Observed flow imbalance ori 6/22 was 2%.

With (1)<15%; (2) and (3) are not verified · daily.

· Observed D/P difference of. 4 instrumental jet pumps was . 3% 6/22.

Satisfactory •.

Functional test and calibration

·at 1 month frequency· ..

(2) Sus ta~ned hf . 3/73~6/73 Sati~factory pressure and i~itiation · of·fsolati,9n cdndenser

.. ', operation s 1070 psig . for .15 'sec. Frequency of ·functional test-not .. · < 1 mo. or > 3 mo~ . .

.Cal;ibratio1_i of i.nstr~~. men ts .oric.e/3 mos. · ·

·- '

,·

•

Rea~tor Water Level (1) Low wa;er ieve1 · 3/73-6/73 Satisfactory

Main Steam Line. · Isolation· . ·

scram? 1. inc.h (143 inches above .active

: fuel.) · Frequency of· functioria1.test.;.:not

<. 1 mo. - or .> 3 mo . ·. C~libration-of i~strt1-.· . men ts every 3 . mos •

(2) I.ow-low water level 3/73:..;.6/73 at > 83· in. above top·.

·. of fuel (setpoint-59 in. ) · Frequency· of · functional test-not < 1 mo or ) 3 mq.

Calibration of·. ins trti­ments once/3m~s~

(1) Hf radiation scram 3/73.-6/73 at'~ 7 _ x normal full

-power bac1:cground ·, and Main s teain line · · isolaUo~~ .

Frequency 'of . functional·· test..:.. not (- 1 inc>. or.> 3 mo. Instrument: calibration·· .

. once/3 mo. Sensors . . .

. calibrated every ' refueling outage •.

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

(2) MS!V Closu.re time once/quarter 3 S T

2/11 and Satisfactory

~ 5 sec.

(3) MSIV exercised twiceiweek. · ·

{4}MSIV closure scram a:t 10% from '·full open·· more tha~ one valve. Fu~ctional test frequency : < 1 mo. or ·">3mo~. ·

19

5/29/73

2/73 Satisfactory

1/73-6/73 Satisfactory

Isolation Cori-:- -denser

· (5) MSIV closure' due to 3/73 · · steam tunnel high temp.· Instrument -functional· test and calibration to

- be done every refueling - outag~ •. Setpoint b 200°F.

(6) MSiV closure que to i·/73-6/73 _high steam flow, '

6 120% of rated. Functional test·perfornied with a frequency of .not < 1.- mo. or :> 3 mo.

Calibration of_· instru­ments pedormed_ once/~ 3 mos. - ·

- Sut'Veillance shall be performed as follows:·

·(1)- Daily check. of_ shell side water level and.tempera­ture~·- ·

(2) Eac;:h refueling outage- simulated -automatic- and -functional test shall be p~rf9rmed.

{3) . Calil;>rate vent -line monitors quarterly.

(4) Instrument. tests.

2/5~12/73

5/11/73 -

-3/73 and 6/73

c. Outstanding Commitine_nts - - -

-Satisfactory. 9 switches found .> 200°F,; CE ltr

-3/26; all left 190°-195°F_

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

_Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory, See reactor pressure.

The stat_us of the: fo].iowipg outstanding commitments was reviewed 'during -the June 1973 inspection.

- 20 -

(1) Flow element calibration test .at 50 percent after restrictor replacemerit in main steclµl lines for Unit 2.

(2) Isolation cond~nser steam isolation set point of.~ 20 psi, set point vs. percent flow~

· (3) FSAR amendment on the len,sth ·of tim~ isolati.on condenser. canhe us~d .wiFhoutuncovering the tubes and before makeup

'water is 'neede~. '

(4) Recirculation pumps crosstie line.not in use.

(5) Management rev:Lewof>pri.mai::y system leakage.

·. Results· of the Review

Item (1)

·.The flow eiement ca.li·bration of: new restrictorS· in. main st·eam lines for Unit 2 w~s perforined on November 8, 1972, at 0, 10, 30~ .50 and 80 per~ent power. The 'pres~mre, mass flow,. and D/P were recorded at . the various power levels ... · The. data was used· to

· calculate.D/P for various steam flow rates at constant pressure and a.· curve constructed, D/P vs. flow rate. Three curves were constructe<l:, forp:i;essures o~ 965. psig, 1015 psig and 1065 psig. The high steam· flo\Y {~ 120 percent rated)· MSIV closure set point is derived from th¢ 1065 psig'D/P: vs. flow. This setting is in the conservative direction as ~the set point is reached at a smaller mass flow tate as.pressure decreases.

Items (2) and (3) "·

The isolation condt;mser high steam flow lsolatfon set point deter­mination arid the FSAR amendment evaluation have been referred to· GE •. The engineering evaluation of the set point determination completed by CE .do~s not agree with GE's original figures.

Item 4

The recirculation croSstie iirie valves are shut arid the procedure has caution not to'op~n the valves .for one pump operation. The Dresden si.te h~s been operating with the valves shut due to a pump vibration proqleiri at higher f lOw rates in single pump operating mode. At 'the time 6£ the inspection the Dresden site

•, had no.t received an answer on a request for evaluation of the . . problem by GE. . The QU~d_:Ci ties site. has. comple.ted a test of . pump vibration ·with the crossde 1ine valves open which the Dresden site is reviewing :and evaluating at.this time.

21 -:-'.

·.,. ··10~9. ~

. I

Items

.To implement the management day-to-day review of reactor coolant _system leakage as monitored by air sampling systems, the inspector verified that the data from the d"aily CAM filter count is reviewed by the:shifi Engineer. These data points ~re graphed during the w:eek and an al_ert point is specified. The licensee stated that

_the alert point would be added to the data sheet for the Shift Engineer review was included in the licensee's April 16~ 1973, letter (Lee t'? Kruesif. ·

d! . Locking Devices on Barton Ll P Switches

The locking deviCe i11st·allation on Barton A p· switches to reduce the set po~nt .drift was. appro:icimately 8.0 ·percent complete on June 18, 1973. The remaining six switches (two switches. on Unit 2 and four .on Unit 3)·are ~obe:replaced when the locking devices arrive at the Dresden s~te. ·

. .

one switch, with the locking device installed, drifted out of limits.· since the locking devices .have been instalied. The event was.revif;!wed·by the .SRB and reported to the Directorate of Licensing on May·2s,· 1973; as required by the Technical Specifications.

· e. R~lief Valve Modificatio~

A problem was· experienced at anoth~r .site using· electromatic. relief valves.similar: to the valves at the Dresden site. The

. pilot valve was. he'!d. open .by a sma:li piece of broken lock wire and caused ·the relief valve. ~o blow .. down in an uncontrolled

·manner ..

The relief.valves on Dresden 3 were.modified during the·l973 refueling outage; Unit 2.reliefs :are:to be modified during

... the next. refueling. . +be. modification consists of removal. of. the cap screw and lock wire that secure the disc locking device to the disc and drill~ng a hole through the disc to receive the

· . bolt. . The nut and bolt .secure the. disc locking device as before. The.licensee stat~d that modifi.cad.on is stron&er than the original.

Replacement specifications!

Bolt B~7 material .Nut Cotter pin.

. ~·

9/16" 12 UNC-3A THD by 3" 9/16" 12 UNC-2A.THD .castle nut 5/32" byi 1/4".

.22

..

f .· Valve Operator 'Breaker Thermal Overloads

g.

. On June 6, the Unit 2 isolation .. condenser inlet primary iso.lation valve, 1301-'l, wasdiscovered to be inoperable due to the thermal overloads being in the tripped position and in.the manual reset mode.· During the RO inspection, a spot check of breakers for Primary Containmen.t Isolation System (PCIS) and Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) mo.tor 9perated valves was made with the · thermal overloads as the main point.of interest.

The breaker cubic:j._e door has an interlock to prevent the door · being opened with·the breaker closed. A screw driver or similar tool is required to override the interlock so that the thermal overloads :·.c~tt be visually inspected. Of the breakers· inspected one was ofo,;erved to liave the thermal overloads set for manual reset. A list· of ''as-installed" thermal overload settings was provided showing il of.56 breakers have overloads set ori manual reset for each unit. The licensee stated, verified by a spot. check of ·the list, that all overloads had been· checked and c.onJirmed to have reset prior to June 18.

The thermal overloads are modules. that are added to the breakers and are in. electric parallel with the indicating lights in the control room.· At the time 9f the inspection an engineering evaluation was underway so that an improper valve iight indication"wmild be. evident in the control room if either the break.er was not cl~sed or the thermal overload was open. The automatic re:setinode of the-qnaloyerload i.S accomplished by the addition of a wire clip· .. to hold the. reset lever in the reset position so that when the overload:cools it resets.

Main Steam Line Repair Records : - Uriit 2 . '

In response.to the ~o:HQ.enforcement letter' dated March 20, 1973, the licensee stateq their po~ition and corrective action in a. letter dated April 16, 1973.. The licensee acknowledged that documentation of· the work was deficient in .several areas. Review of· the .matter with. the responsible contractors was stated to hav~ been v~rballyaccording toa site representative. In addition,.the following specific findings referenced in the above letters were .no.ted: . . .

. (1) ltemF.l..:. &iaiograph'D~nsity and Filler Metal Notch

Site. correspondence from the piping installation contractor .. dat~4 January io,: 1973 ~· s·tate~· that two independent certified

.23 -

·,.. . ~ '

'

Level III. examiners were able to 0satisfactorily review and interpret' the ··radiographs' of the eight ·prima:rJ main steam. line welds~ . According to ·the licensee, the piping con­tractor is review was followi,ng the Nov~mber- 2, 1972, RO inspection ... The letter also .added that a .300 watt high irite_nsity viewer was·, brought to the .site for· this job.

·Regarding _the filler metal .. to ·bi;tse metal. notch, an independent laborat'6ry rep,ort stated that on November 3,

.1972, 'the' welds were reground pri_or to ul.trasonic exami­. nation •. Th~s item is corisidereci r~solved •

. (2) Ttem 'F. 2 ..;. Weid Rod Contr~l : . . . . . . .

The liceti~ee' s letter. states that ·the control electrode weld. rod' was le'ft at the work, site' following the last weld. Improvement ·in. rod weld co~trol was indic.ated to· the inspector. Reinainiilg welc1ing of'pressuie sensing lines. did not involve coated ele.ctrodes. Two audits involving weid rod control

' were noted to have been performed during the course of the work on Octpbe~ 23 and· 3i; ·1972, by the iicensee ._ This .matter is resolved.

(3).Item F.3 - Opticai. Inspection

This tequi-rement in the job· specifications was overlooked. -~he licensee stated that this requfrement would normally be, and should have been, eri,tered on· the weld history data sheet in use.·. Other exami~ation of the welds, according to the licensee's records, ·indicated that on November 3,, 1972, the eight steam line welds were reground, as required for ultra­sonic irtspectibn .and were examined by magnetic particle

. examination. by a i.evel II Technieian •. No deficiencies were. noted. In addition~ the ultra.sonic baseline inspection of the 4A and _4B'welds on each steam line was performed by the li(:ensee .. The available .data sheets indicated the welds were free· ~f detec.table 'indications·. This matter is resolved.

. . • I '

(4) Item G -· Soluble ·Purg~ Dams and Glues

·The lic~ns~e s~ates· that .the specification applies to stainless steel surfaces and the main steam iine in this application is carbon 'steel. The inf')pector concurred, but indicated that

. the flow element.venturi.was of stainless material. The ·. p~rge ·,dam was' not 'appli~d directly. to the' stainless material. ·The licen~·ee·was .foui:ld to',have·initLi'ted ·a.Deficiency Report

' .. ~. . \.,

- 24

on November 2, 1972, documenting the obtaining of GE approval, required by the· specifications, for use of. the purge dam and glue.· Certifications of the paper and glue chemical analysis were. obtained from another facility which was the source of the material, according to the licensee• .This report indicated the paper contained 27 ppm of chlorine and the glue 2.8_ppm. Flushing of these steam lines would dilute and flush any chlorine concentration toward the main condenser. The licensee.stated that an analysis reportedly conduct~d by the station prior·to the above use Gould riot

. ' be located. This matter is resolved.

(5) Miscellaneous

During the above review it was noted the. licensee had issued a Deficiency Report documenting the fact that the piping drawings utilized and marked."preliminary" were approved arid in final form for installation. The licensee was also noted to have documented the placing of weld numbers or symbols on welds. This was.confirmed _by reviewing approximately 30 of 100 weid data sheets utilized ihthis repair.

h. Unusu~lO~currences

On March 24, 1973, Dresden Unit 3 found ~ine of the sixteen main steam line high temperature sensors that operated above the · Technical Specifi<;:ad.ons limit of· ~ f,00°F. A report on this event.was made to Licensing ori April 4, 1973. On June 18, the inspector revieweq .·instrumentation records that indicated all main steam liri.e high temperature sensors for Unit 3 had been set

. at 190° - 195° on March 29. On March 28, 1972, Unit 2 high · temperature sensors had also been checked; none were found . > 2Q0°F, although one switch was found to operate at 168°F. The sensors had· been set. to operate. at 1900 - 195°F "as left. II

On Apri.l 13, 1973, Dresden Uni~ 3 found t~o of the four sustained high reactor pressure""switches that operated above the Technical

· Specitication lim:f,t -~ 10.70 psig for 15 seconds.. A report was made to Licensing on April.19 of this.event. The review of instrumentation.records by the inspector indicated that the above switches were reset to 1064 psig. The pressure switches were bei~g calibrat-~d on a monthly interval to determine the frequency·pf future calibration;·April to June's data showed no significant· .c~arige ·in. set point.

- •25

:L

On April 9, 1973, ·a. main steam line pressure switch for Unit 3 was found to operate below th_e Technical Specification limit of 850· psig. · Licensing :was r10ti.fied of this event on. April 17. . Review of. site records indicated that the installed switch was reset to 872 psig .and ox:i May 2,. the switch was replaced and set

. at 872 psig. .

Instrument Drift ·

The i.icens~e indicated that so far the results of the laboratory ·tests performed to determine the.cause of instrument drift have been inconclusive. · The. tests in progress involves a Meletron pressure switch and a Barksdale pressure sw1tch connected to the Unit 2·maix:i steam line. A review of data obtained so far indicat~s that since April 10, 1973, .the Meletron switch has drifted down as .much as 14 psi, but has regained 12 psi of this change in two ~cinth_s •. Since April 10, 1973, the Barksdale switch set point increased 4 psi and then decreased 34 psi and. appeared to be stable at 'the. time of the inspection. The licensee also stated that apl<;>t of·the four. pressure switches in the.main steam line.for Unit 2 appear to show the drift: to be seasonal.

.. The plot. was not available for. the inspector to review.. The Instrument ~ngineer indicated that: he has not seen_ any data from .tests supposedly being. performe-d by the instrument manufactl,lrers.

The Fenwal temperature switches in the area of the HPCI steam lines of Unit' 2 are scheduled ·f<;>r a calib\ation check using steam during the next.unit outage~.- The manufacturer has concurred that thfs •type o.f test ~ould·· be. an acceptable· check on .the set p_o:fo.t of the switch. . . .

Th~ instrulile~tati·o~ ·us~ci for checking. the. set points are of + 0. i percent accuracy .. arid are checked . in the range to be used by. a dead weight test before e_ach set point check. . . . . .

A.program has been developed and scheduled to .be in use by the . end of 1973 to calibrate and document checks performed on test instrumentation in.ainor:e .formal manner.

4. Reactivity ancl.:Power·Controi

.a. Controi Rod Drives """ Units 2 and 3

.· (1) Apparent UJ1coupling of Three. Control Rod Blades . . - . . . . .

· On February 19, 1973, Unit Z. experforiced>the apparent uncoupling of three. control ro_ds from. their respective drives during a

- 26 -

. : ··.

··.·. . r. unit .startup. The CRD' s in· question were B...::6 ,· K-,-8. and L-11. The event.was reviewed by the SRB apd reported to ·the Directorate of Licertsing on March.' 13', 1973 ..

·.The three CRD's were.replace4 during an.outage late .in' March and disassembled. for inspection in an effort to. determine. the ~a~i:;e oi the malfurictiori. During a site visit on April 17, 1973, the ~'nspecfoi;s interviewed.Commonwealth Edison Company·

. personnel inv9lv~d in the qisassembly and inspection of the <three CRD's in question .. In addition~ the three drives and

components in question were inspected.· The-- following is a summary of the :f;ndings: . .

(a) The determination of whether the·inner screen was in place or not was made by measuring from the top of the CRD housiri.g:flange to. the top of the· uncoupling rod, a distance of over 14.fe~t. The·lic~nsee did not know what was the. margin of. erro~ of° such a measuremeri.t ..

.. .

(b) The licen~ee did not know_if the irivestigating engineer. from GE had fir~t tried to ·pull out .the inner screen to

. see :i.f it wa~ unlocked~ before' he rotated it.. .The· licensee· stated that. the.GE engineer had said that.by rotating the iririer screen· lie could feel if it was locked. ·

(c). Using a n~w inner screen ~nd. stop piston., it was determined . that the inri~r screen can move upwards approximately i/4"·

- . before die locking spring contacts the bottom_·of .the notch in the spud.· Therefore_, of the reported 5/8'; displacement in'· orie o( the CRD inner s~reens, 2/8" could. have been the normal play in the equipment·. Whether the additional 3/8"

· .fs within the :error of the measurement, as stated in item ·, 1, is. not .known.

(d)·The bend. in the springs was in the CRD. axial direction, to~ard.the conti::'ol'rod, and appears to· be as a result of instaliatiori~ ·

• Statiqn management stat'ed that their. bperatirig experience. withth~.CRD posf_tion indi~ating.system.and overtravel alarm circuits hai;; been go.ad. Ol;ltside of a few periodic failures of ind.iCating. lights or reed ·swi'tches,. the· reliability of the ~ system-has been.excellenL ·No problems have been experienced with theovertravel alarm circuit• Station·mari.agement indicated that~ 'to their kno~Iedge, no· indications of apparent rod

. . . ~-27 _,

'>·,_

'. ~ .:

.. i . . •' . :

uncoupling had been.experienced prior to February 19, 1973~ .· e~c;ept following mainte~ance on a p_articular CRD •.

. A review of the station procedures·showed that:

(a) Chapter 31, -Genera:! Plant Operating Procedures, proc~dure C, step Le, requires the opera~or to perform a coupling integrity check' whenever he fully withdraws a control rod durl.ng his _approach to critical. The results of.these

'' checks are riot recorded.

(b) Chapter 38, procedure 300"-S-l, Revision 0, dated February 1973, requires that coupling integrity be verified for each rod following ~.refueling outage. The licensee ·stated the procedure applied following maintenance on a CRD in between refueling outages. This procedure supplies. data sheets to record the results of the test. The inspector reviewed the records and verified that following the Spring 1972 refueling outage, the .licensee didperfqrm ~ coupi:tng integrity check

·of all CRD 's on MB.y 17, 1972, and the results were satis­factory.-·

(c) Chaptet 32, Systems Procedures; procedure 30d-S-l, step B, ' does not .require verification of coupling _integrity cjuring

the_weekly:exercising of control rods. . . ~ . .

' . (d) Chapter 32, procedure 300-AN-IV, covers the actions required

·of· the operator. if _an indication of uncoupling is observed. The procedure requires the operator to try to re-latch the drive and. to move the· drive t.o the full-out position to determine if his ef(or.t was successful. If the drive is latched,. the' ope'rat6r can: continue normal operation;

'otherwise, he is ii;istructed to move it to the full-in position .and disarm. it.· He must then rearrange the core. pattern. as per·instruction:s.froni.thenuclearenginee:i:'.

(e) None. of the above 1llend.6ned proc~dures require station management nptifieation.

Th~ inspector observed Mr~. J. ·Sullivan, Nuclear Station .. Operator, perform roci uncoupling checks _whenever a rod

wa_s withdrawn following fuel cell loading during the Unit 3 refueling outage.· Duririg a subsequent interview,

·Mr. Sulliv~n stated he always verifie.d rod coupling when­ever a rod reaches its full out pc;>sition, has never e~pe~ienced an uncoupled' rod indication, and he is not

. aware· .. of 'any .. previous in,dicat::i.on of' rod uncoupling. except for .the three which. occurred on February 19, 1973. He was

'. ·,..

·."'- 28 .- ' . ~ : .

aware of :the .requirements in the previously described procedures. He also. ·stated that in the event he ever. experienced ·a rod uncoµpling indication he woµld inform

·the. ~h~ft Engineer immed.iately, whe.thet the procedure called for it or not ..

· Dur.ing .this ii\spect:lon the licensee stat·ed that complete disassembly of the·three CRD's has·been conipl,eted, and no additional information as to .the caus·e. found: . A final

.: report describing the results of the disassembly and · inspection is being prepared for submittal to the Direct:orate

of Licensing. · · · .· ·

b. CRD Wiring Reversal - Unit 2

On May 7, 1973, during a Unit.2 weekly exercise of the CRD's. two d·r·ives, E-12. and G-10, would. not. withdraw after being inserted approximately two notches. The investigation revealed that the control leads to two of the' four ASCO valves in the CRD hydraulic

. ·control unit for e~ch dr:!-ve·had been reversed. The licensee stated that the drives.had operated normally during a unit startup

.l on April 30, and therefore, the mixup had to·occur during th~ ·.following seven days~ The licensee also stated that the records

indicate no maintenance work was performed on the units during that week, therefore, it. has no explanation as to how the wires were reversed. ;The amphenol'connectors are often disconnected during certain maintenance activities •. The SRB reviewed the event and has recowriended that. the an'lphenol conne.ctors be color coded as a m~ans to red::ce the possibility of a simil~r.recurrence.

c. .CRD Housing Support Inspection ~ Units 2 an'd 3

The corrective measu.re to an· item of noncompliance. outlined in the licensee's letter (Lee to Grie1:) dated April 16, 1973, was examined. The maintenance pr(?cedure for CRD removal has been revised .to include a step .for the inspection of .the CRD housing support system following its reassembly arid. sign-off indicating proper installation; As no.ted .in paragraph. 4, Technical Specifications. Surveillance Require-

. ments, the licerisee. documented the results of the inspection' as required, following di~ replacement of three CRD' s o~ Unit 2 in March 1973 arid ·seveJi):::RD's on Un:i.t 3 during its first refueling outage.

';•

.. d. CRD Interference Problem :-- Units 2 and 3

The licensee stated that they have.received an Operating Experience Report from GE, requesting that testing be performed to determine

. if the rods which following a scram settle back .to positi6n "02" may be experiencing. control rod'-to-fuel ·channel interference .

. . The licensee has identified the. drives on Unit- 2 which do not. go to "00" after·a scram and is waiting for an outage to conduct the test. The licensee feels that based on prior drive history, the problem with Unit ~ C~D's (no drives in Unit 3 are involved)

·is .due t9·worn out seals and not due to mechanical·interference.

e ... Shutdown Margin Tests

(1) Unit 3

Foll()wing the refueling outage of Unit 3 the licensee conducted tests to determine the minimum shutdo~ margin availabl~.with the strongest operab.le control rod withdrawn and all other operable rods fully inserted.· According to the licensee the data supplied by General Electric indicated the strongest individual rod to be E-14. The core keff wi.th E-14 fully · withdrawn was calculated to be 0.9902. For the case of E.:..13 :fully withdrawn, it is 0.9845 and for K.:_9 it is 0.9829. For the combination of E..:.14 withdrawn to position "42" and E-13 partially withd.rawn until criticality ~$ achieved' the shut­down margin,· based on the calculated worth of. ·the partially withdrawn rcid µotches, is 1. 9 percent AK. The .minimum

.shutdown margin of 1.5 percent .l1 K was obtained for the combination. of rod K...:9 ·fuliy withdrawn and J:.:9 partidly withdrawn. Reactor coolant temperature was 148°F and

·149°t:· respe~t{vely,.for the later two tests.

(2) Unit 2

The licensee has performed.shutdown margin tests for Unit 2 with the following results (three p~rcent worth' rod case):

5/4/72 11/11/72 . 6/6/73 .

.·,.

' ..... · . ;

Fuel Cycle History

·Beginning of Core 3 ~·2600 Mwd/t ... -;=:::; sooo. MWd/t .

J·

30

·'

SDM

2 .49% A K 2.47% AK 2.28% AK

'.

The licensee indicated this data has been given to·General Electric and a corrected curve of Keff versus exposure for the one rod stuc.k case is being reissued for Dresden 2 and Quad:...Cities. The old cur:ve showed that the Keff di~ not increase above·. the . original BOC value. From. the data so ·far obtained it is obvious the Gd poison is being depleted at a faster .rate .than· the equivalent fuel burnup. The licensee had not received the new curve·from GE as of the last day of this·· inspection.

f. · Reac.tivity Arionialies Unit 2

As indicated in paragraph 4.h., the licensee·performs a comparison of the expected rod configuration versus the actual configuration at least monthly. A review of Unit 2 data showed that the actual number of rod notches inserted has always been higher than the predicted number (by.GE) but within the .number equivalent .to.one percent tJ · K. · . . .

On January ·27, 1972, the licensee submitted Proposed Modification . No. 72-1 to the Dresden :FSAR to permit operation of Unit 2 core with a complete fuel loading containing Gadolinia as a means of supplementary reactivity control. In the application the licensee made reference to ttie Quad:...Cities FSAR, Amendments 9 and 10, stating that .the nuclear characteristics were covered by such amendments. As a result of questions generated by the Diiectorate

·of.Licensing concerning statements and figures supplied in Ainendment No .. 9, the licensee submitted Amendment No. 12 to the Quad-Cities FSAR with .a new figure of stuck rod shutd~wn margin ·versus core average exposure~ In addition, the licensee stated that> "the calculational.methods which are employed in analyzing the shutdow margin are conservative, •i and that, "if any error exists it will only occur in the negative direction .. " Such state­ments imply that the.values of :shutdown margin as a function of core average·exposure ·given in the figure of Amendment No. 12 will not be redu~ed. The measured values, although still larger than required, are less than predicted by the submitted figure·.

In a telephone conv~rsation on July 10, i973, the licensee stated that·i:he reactivity· trends in.reactor cores containing gadolinia would be submitted tn a report to.DOL.

g. Scram Reactivity Limitations·- Units 2 and 3

· Site·personnelare·;iwci.re that operation of Units 2 and 3 is to be .restrkted on:ce the Unit 2 fuel _cycle 3 core average exposure

.·.

·.··· - 31- -

( I

,-.

h~

reaches approximately 1500 MWD/T and Unit 3 fuel cycle 2 core reaches 750 MWD/T .. As of June 22, 1973, the cores had reached an average exposure of approximately 5000 MWD/T for Unit 2 and approximately 22 M.WD/T for Unit 3with approximately 450 MWD/T per unit hcing :1ccHmul:lt~d m<'nthl.y ... Th~ )ltC"n~er~ h~s nnt ri:>•~ei.\'P.J any guidanc~ frL>m -it:> hettdqu.:11·.td·s (U' tht'> \:e11t't'.;:at i;1,.;,1:tcl,:· Company as to what steps it must take to continue operation

·beyond the previously stated·average exposure limits.

Technical Specifications Surveiliance Requirements

' The performance of surveillance tests as required. by the Technical Specifications was reviewed as i\oted below:

Unit 2

Item

. Exercise . of Control rods

Inspe~tion CRD housing support system

Rod worth mini­mizer oper~t:i.o~

:Fupctional test ·of RBM

Scram times.·

·t./s Requirement

. Weekly

After reassembly

Prior to reactor start

Prior. to withdrawal of· rods in limiti~ng · control rod. pattern . and daily thereafter

50% of all ~ads at 16.weeks intervalS

:-, .

_; 32.

Period Inspected

4/30/73-6/24/73

After in-· stallation of 3 CRD in Marchl973

1973

4/30-6/3/73

·a/31/72-:­·4/4/73 .

Results

Records missing for week 5/28-6/3

Satisfactorily performed 3/28-30

Satisfactory

No limiting . control rod patterns utilized

Satisfactory. Max~· scram times for 4/4/73 10% ii:lserted-

0. 63 sec 50% inserted­

. 1. 90 sec 90% inserted-

3. 36 ·sec

Control rod accumulators check of pressure and level alarms

Reactivity anomalies. · Rod · configuration at . specific power. operating condi.tions compared to expected based on corrected base data

25 CRD, at full reactor pressure, following any outage > 72 hrs at 1 wk,

2 wk. 4 wk. 8 wk and 16 wk intervals

Once per shift

At least every equivalent full power month. Limit. of actual to.expected shall not exceed 1% AK_

Peak heat flux.· Paily checked, A.i>RM scram and rod block: settings calculated

Functional. test of .Each refueling outage. mode switch in "shutdo'wn" _,

Functional test of manual scram

Every three·months

- 33 -

5/11/72-r;;,/i5/73

4/30/73'-5/20/73

1973

4/30/73-. 5/20/73

Second refueling

1/1/73-5/31/73

Satisfactorily performed. Max avg time for 95% inserted-2. 87 sec

. Max. deviation any rod from · mean·for 90% inserted was 0.68 sec

Shift 115 missed check 4/30/73 Shift· 116 miSsed check 5/4/73 and 5/20/73

Satisfactory. Actual rod inventory (notches. inserted) is always larger than predicted, but well within the.411 notches stated by GE to be equivalent to 1% A K

Satisfactory

Satisfactorily performed 2/26/72

Satisfactory

Functional t~s~ of · IRM high flux ·and.· inoperative settings

Before each startup but no more·often than weekly

Functional test Weekly . of APRM high flux, inope.rative and doWl)scale setting~

Functional test Before each startup of .APRM high flux 15% scram

Calibratiori·of APRM output signal ligainst heat balance

Calibr~tion·of APRM flow bias

Unit 3

Exercise ·of· withdrawn control rods

shutdown margin test with ~trongest rod · fully withdraWn_

Every_7 -days

'. Every refu~ling

·outage.

Weekly

Followitig core alteration. Demonstrate.sub-· criticaiity by at least 0.25% A k

- 34 ._

4/16/73-. 6/17 /73

. 4/30/73-6/3/7'3 .

1/1/73-,

. 1/1/73-

1/73-:S/73

5/28/73-. 6/17 /73

Following refueling 1973 ...

Satisfactory. License~ per­_forins weekly

Satisfactory

Test not per.:.. formed for start­ups on 1/13/73 (following 2 20-hr outage after -"""""13 days operating) and 2/i9/73 (following a 5~5 hr outage after 33 days operating) ·

Performed- daily using process computer~ Gain adjustments made ·as directed by nuclear engineer

.Licensee performs.monthly

Satisfac.torily performed

Satisfactory; Minimum shut­down margin 1.5% l1 r<

.~ ...

Coupling integrity First withdrawal rollowi_ng refueling outage

Inspection CRD .. housing support

··system

Rod worth rilini­nii.zer operation

Source range channels courit ·.

.rate

Functional test of RBM

Scram times

After reassembly ·

Piior to reactor ·start

. . ... At ·least 2 channels have count rate ·> ,--3 .cps ··

Prior to withdrawal of rods in limiting· control rod pattern and .. daily thereafter

After e~ch ref~eling outage

·so% of all "rods at +6· week intervals.·

. . ... ~. ·' .

35·..:.. . I .

·1973 outage Satisfactorily performed 5/25-29

After in-· stallatiori of 7 drives removed· during out­age

Since start of · fuel cycle II·

Satisfactorily performed ·

Satisfactory

Since beginning fuel cycle II .

Satisfactory of

Since beginning of fuel cycle II

5/7.3

8/5/72-11/14/72

No limiting control rod patterns .in use

Satisfactory. .Max. scram times were: 10% inserted­

.• 48 sec 50% inserted..;. 1.13 sec

90% inserted­· L 9 S sec

Satisfactory. Max. scram times 10% inserted-. 0. 80 sec 50% inserted­!. 80 _sec

90% inserted-3 .17 sec

Control rod . accumulator check of pressure and level alarms

Reactivity · anomalies.

Rod.configurations at specific power

·operating .con­.ditions compared

· to expected .

· · Peak, heat: · flux · checked, APRM scram and rod block settings

· calculated

25 CRD at full reactor pressure, following any outage 72 hrs , at 1 wk, 2 wk, 4 wk' 8 wk and 16 wk interval.a.

Once/shift

Following refueling outage obtain base. data

Daily

.. · Functional test ·of · Every refueling mode switch in outage · "shutdown"

Functional test of manual scram.

Functional test of IRM high · flµx and

. ·inoperative ·settings

Every 3 months

Before each startup. but· not more o~ten than.weekly

-36-'

5/9/72-, 6/7 /73

6/4-10/73

5/26-6/20

6/4-10/73

First re­fueling·

1/1/73-: 4/30/73

. 4/16/73-. 6/17 /73

Satisfactorily performed. Max.

·avg for 90% inse.rted 3. 51 sec Max deviation any rod from mean 0.71 sec

Satis~actory

Satisfactory. Initial cold critical predic­tions supplied by manufacturer was 23. rods. Actual was 33 rodsi 10 notches. 100%.power pre­diction on hand. Power escalation not completed. Data being given to GE to correct base data.

Satisfactory·

Satisfactory. performed 4/18/73

Satisfactory. •

Satisfactory. · Licensee performs weekly

·,,

•

,. .

..

Functional test . Weekly of APRM high flux, inoperative and downscale settings_

.Functional test of · Before each startup APRM high flux 15% scram

.Calibration of. IRM Every shutdown but by heat balance not more often than

weekly

Calibration of Every 7 days 'APRM output . signal again:st heat baiance

Calibration of APRM flow bias

5. Core and Internals

Every refueling outage

a. Fuel Pellet Conditioning - Units 2 arid 3

6/4-10/73 Satisfactory

12/21/72-· s/30/73

12/72-:-5/30/73

12/72-6/14/73

Satisfactorily performed :

Not performed during shutdown of 3/4/73

Performed daily using process computer . Gain adjustments made as directed by nuclear ·engineer

1/73-6/73 Licensee performs monthly

At the request ~f the General.Electric Company the licensee is preconditioning the fuel pellets of both Units 2 and 3 cores as another step in continuing efforts.to reduce or eliminate fuel failures. A pellet is considered to be preconditioned to a s·peciffc power in kw/ft. if it. has operated at that power for 12 consecutive hours follow'ing an increase to that power at a rate of no't greater than 0 .08 kw/ft/hr above the base power of 8 kw/ft ..

Operating brde'r 43-73 dated May 24, 1973, states how this preconditioning is supposed to take place for the case of Unit 3. In_ general, the reactor power is· increased to approximately SO percent with the recirculation flow.at minimum. -Power is held there for a period of 24 to 36 hours to achieve "equilibrium

.xenon" conditions. The power is then increased using recirculation flow at a rate- of 4 mw~/hr until maximum recirculation flow is

· .. obtained, or one has to_stop.for.some reason. The power is then

-3 7

.10~9. <t3

. ,

6.

b.

. .

held constant for 12 hours and that establishes an envelope under which power changes can then occur without rate of change limita­tions. imposed by fuel considerations. This process must be repeated every time rod sequence is.changed or rods ·withdrawn which would subject ''new" fuel pellets t.o specific power levels where the linear. heat. generation rate exceeds 8 kw/ft. The lic.ensee indicated

·that the fuel pellets·suppoi::edly have a "memory" of approximately .12 months. to this annealing process'. at which point the' operation 'has to be ~epeated foi all. pellets;

~et Pump Inspection - Unit 3

· The inspectors reviewed some of the video tapes the licensee · ·.'recorded during the inspection of Unit 3 jet pump restrainer

'gate bolt assembly and beam-bolt asse~bly for jet pumps No. ll and 18. As previousiy reported by the licensee; ·the restrainer gate assembly bolt• for jet pump No •. llwas loose due to the fact that its keeper had not been tack welded to the gate. The licensee expressed the opinion .that this occurred during the disassembly of that .. jet· pump in 197i. to retrieve a welding dam which had been ie~t.in the ·system and was blocking the flow path.

: I. . . . . .

The cracked tack weld for bolt keeper ori jet pump No. 18 was.· clearly visible. The repair work and as l.eft condition of the two jet. pumps restrainer: gate bolt assemblies were also viewed.· Although the tack welds appeared satisfactory there is no way . of telling if hair lin.e c~acks exist since the only non-destructive

·:l,nspection l?ossible is. through.the use of a TV underwater camera .. . . . ' . . .

Power Conversion Systems

Feedwater.ControlModification· Unit 3

In accordance with Special Report No. 19., Revision 1, dated Aprii 18, 1973, the licensee completed.th~ modification of reactor water level -

. feedwater flow controls.· Tests performed on June 11, 1973, at 50 percent r·eactor .power for proportional bal',ld .settings. of· 50, 40, and 30 percent indiCate'acceptable response. The proportional band was left at 50 percent. . The auto. leyel coptrol reduction to .15'i duri.ng a scram was electrieally tested satisfactorily ·prior to' reactor startup ..

7. Containment

a. Oxygen Sampling Valves ~ Unit 3

As noted in the ·licensee's letter to· Licensing dated January 26, 1973, the oxygexi sampling .valves 'for Unit 3 were lubricated during this refueling outage~ .. ·T~e work 'was coinpl~.ted on March 15, 1973.

38

.. ·

b. Drywell ~ Torus Vacuum Breakers - Unit 3 . . .

During the outage .the licensee inspected the tortis-to-drywell vacuum breakers andnoted that the discs were not.seating properly. Upon disassembly, it.was noted·that due to corrosion in the disc-to-disc arm joint the disc was unable to align itself w~th the seat. The disc arm is.made of_ carbon_ steel while the shaft was an _integral part.of the cast Cl-luminum _disc. During disassembly of the disc-to­disc arm assembly_the aluminum shaft failed at the base of the threaded area. The licensee dye checked the remaining 11 discs and. found ·cracks in-two other discs'in the disc-to-disc hub region. Severe porosity.was found in three other cases. The licensee pro~eeded _to modify the assemblies as follows: .

(1) The disc.shafts· were cut and the discs drilled.

(2) New shafts of 304 stainless steel were manufactured with threads ·at both ends.

(3) The sh.aft is inserted thrqugh· the aluminum disc and a nut is placed at_ the bottom of disc and tack welded to the shaft ..

. ·The .shaft goes through the disc. arm joint and is secured by a nut at the top. The nut is locked with double set screws.

The seats were inspected.and noted to have lost their resiliance. In addition; the material appeared to be silicone rubber instead of ethylene-:-piopyiene'. . _Material samples were sent for ~nalysis I

to determine· their composition. New seats made of ethylene­propylene with· a rating_ of 340F for six hours, were installed on ~11 v_acuum breakers. ·The licensee found that the counter weights being.used (two per unit, one on each arm) w~re 25 lbs each instead of the 10 lbs supposedly supplied.· The assembly was modified by removing one arm and .one.counterweight. The.remaining arin has been.moved ·to 10° from vertical (used-to be 30°) and the weight set a.t approximately 15" above the shaft center.

The modifications were reviewed and performed in accordance with Commonwealth Edison_ C_ompany. Quality Assurance Manual. procedures.

The shaft seal bushings were. not modified during. this. o.utage. The licensee planned to install a new design: bronze bushing on one valve during the ~utage to test its performance~ but the parts were made to.incorrect dimensions and could not be installed. The inner chevron packing modification was not performed either. The installati.cm of limit sw:it°ches to _permit instant detection of

_39

" ~··

valve operation in the control room is still in the design stage.

At the time of the ipspection, the licensee was operating with one vacuum breaker (1601-33D) wired clOsed. The valve will not fully. cl.ose when the counter arm is turned approximately 20° or less~ The weekly test of the remaining 11 valves continues to be performed satisfactorily. ·

Following completion of the modifications, the licensee performed a · leak test of. the vacuum breakers by pressurizing the drywell with air to 28.5" H20 on·May 25, 1973. The initial torus pressure was 0.6" H20, level at -4", and temperature was 70°F. After 10 minutes, the drywell pressure had decreased to 28.30" HzO arid the torus was 0.72" H20. After 15 minutes, it was 0.79" H20 in the torus. Quad-:-Cities Special ReportNo. 4 states that a 2.511 ·H20 increase in torus pressure after 10 minutes, when the drywell is at approxi­mately one psi above the torus, is the equivalent of approximately a one., inch orifice between drywell and torus. Based on the results obtained, the Unit 3 drywell-to-torus leak path is.well below the one inch. orif i~e equivalent. · · ·

c. · Torus RinS. ·Header · - Unit 3

d.

The inspector reviewed.the design modification performed on the Unit .3 torus ring header during the outage. The "as found" force required to release the weight on the original 14 vertical straps supporting the header ranged from 7380 lbs to 24,6000 lbs. New straps· of ASTM A-36,. 1/2" thi~k by 3'' wide were custom made for

. each support after ti~e header h~d been hydraulically lifted with · a force· of 8500 lbs. The "as left" weight on each support ranged

from 9350 lbs to 8365 lbs~ Once the vertical supports.were completed the horizontal distance.from the header to the torus support was measured and·the hdrfzontal straps made. All existing holes on the s11pport ends were reamed to.one inch. Ail new holes, two per strap, were drilled. The.bolts used were one inch diameter, 8 unc x 3 1/2" length, ASTMA A-325 type 1038H, with. approximately 1 9/16" smoqth shank. The nuts were one inch heavy nuts of ASTM. A-:325 ·also.· The inspectors verified that all brackets had been installed and all bolts.were.double nutted.

·All. sei_smi<;:: hydraulic shock absorb.ers had the correct fluid level (b~tween half to ,tull).

S~condary·coritairtment Violation

On April 19, 1973, the lice.risee violated secondary containment integrity for l!' period. of approximately s.ix hours when an outboard

. MSIV .was disas.sembled for 'insp.ection .while. the. turbine stop valves

- 40 .-

... . ,. I .

(>

were also disassembled.· The licensee attributed the event to the .fact that both· jobs had been authorized without a check being .made to determine if containmen.t integrity would be. affected .

. ·The event was reviewed by the SRB during its 4 71st meeting and reported to the· Dfrectorate of° Licensing. ~)ti AprU 27. J97.1. ·As of June .. 21, 1973, the licensee had not in..:orporated a change to his Equipment Outage Checkoff. List to .include secondary contain­ment integrity check. On June 27, 1973, the licenseeinformed .the inspector that it. had completed the modification to the ''Equipment Outage Checkoff List" by adding a checkoff space to ensure a review is made .to ·determine whether primary or secondary containmerit·integrity will be affected by each.equipment outage being processed. · ·

8. ECCS

a. Motor Operated Valve Problem - Units 2·and 3

.(1) Torque Switches

The licensee continues t~ experience ptobiemswith the operation of motor operated valves. : On February 22, 1973, Unit 2 LPCI valve 1501-32A failed to open after being cycled closed. The iicensee's investigation blamed incorrect torque switch settings for· the occurrence~· The event was reviewed, by the SRB at its 450th meeting and' reported t:o the· Directorate of Licensing on March. 23, 1973.

On March. 15, 1973, Unit 2,.HPCI valve 2301-5 failed to open after being cycled .closed •. Again incorrect torque switch.

·settings were blamed. The SRBreviewed. the event at its 466th meet:f:ng· and a report· to Licensing'was submitted on April 12, 1973.

According to the licensee, as. of approximately two months ago they did riot have a way to correlate the torque switch settings with the torque in ft-lbs required to open and close the valve. Since then, they have obtained the charts from the limitorque manufacturer for the different types of torque switches in use

. . ·. ' ' . . (different springs)~ Froin t.he charts. and the Bill of Material for each.valve the licensee. is.liow able to determine.if the

· . torque 'being· app.lied is what the. manufacturer reconnnended.

While reviewing. the. charts· and data available,· the inspeetor noted that:· ·

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. ·J

·:.

(a) Some operators. appear to ·be supplied with torque switches ~hich can demand greater. torque than the motor cart supply. Therefore, the possibility: of making a setting which could c;ause .the-·motor to burn up appears to exist. For example, the SMB/HMB-3 operator can only supply a maximum of 1200 ft-lbs while its torque. switch could be' se.t to de-energize at2;000 ft-lbs~

(b) As-of June 22, 1973, the: licensee did not know what the switch settings were for'the motor· operated valves in use at the site. A member of the technical ·staff indicated a work order was in. existence to record the present values of all torque switch settings so that a comparison with the recommended settings could be_inade. Further investigation revealed that an Action Item, 73-124-DR, exists to obtain such settings but was limited to c~ver only the valves in the ECCS system. During the exit .interview, station ma.Ilagement"issued instructions to correct the Action Item to include also al+ primary containment isolation valves.

(c) The.: licensee has no method, administrative or otherwise, to control changes made to the torque switch settings of valves in.safety systems. Since such settings f}ffect the torque applied.to the valve they have the same effect as if the motor was'.bei11g replaced with a different size, the latter being subject to the ''Modification Approval" requirements ·of Commonwealth _Edison Com:Pany's QA.Manual.

· (2). Bent Valve Stems.

'The licensee ~as experienced 'deformation-of a ·few valve stems as noted below. On April 7, 1973, Unit 3 LPCI valv.e 1501-22B jalnmed .in midtravel·as a re$ult .of .a.bent stem. Following replacement of the stein_ the vajve experienced a similar failure on May28, 1973'. Both cases have qeen reviewed by the SRB and

·reported t'o the· Directorate of Li~censing ort ~Y 4, 1973,. and June 14, 1973 •.

The failures were determin~d to be caused by an inoperative brake ass~mbly in the valve operator. The stems and brake ·assembly were 1'.".eplaced with the. saiµe original kind and the

.. . . . ~ . . . . valve tested .satisfactorily." . ·

On June.8; l973,-Unit 3 HPCivalve 2301-3failed to open completely~· · The valv·e, has been manually 'opened to ensure systein operabfli ty ~ . ·The event was reviewed by the SRB at its .

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.· 49lst meeting and reported to the. Directorate of Licensing on June.14, 1973. ·As of·June·22, _1973, the licensee was awaiting a ··unit outage during which the valve stem could be replaced

• and the cause identified. ·

(~)Valve.Position ·Feedback Problems

· Failures of the Unit 2 LPCI containment cooling heat exchanger ·service water outlet valve 1501"'.'"3A were experienced·. on February 23, 1973 and March 30, 1973. The valve failures to

.. open were reviewed by the SRB at its 450th and 468th meetings arid ·reported to the Directorate of Licensing as required by the Technical Speci.fications. An· evqluation of the design has been completed and the licensee is initiating a modification to change the valve position feedback resistor from the present 270°_ circular potentiometer,. where the center. tap or finger is rotated by a geared shaft on the valve operator. The new design consists of a slide wire potentiometer attached-to the valve stem.with the finger being stationary. The modification which includes ·the valve~ in both Units 2 and 3 is being sent to the Station Electrical Department for rev;l.ew and approval. At this time the licensee does not know when the· modification, if approved' will be completed.

b •. LPCI a~d· Core Spray Reactor Low Pressure Switch

On May 24 , the l.icensee . found that the setpoint on one of the two reactor low pressure Meletron· switches had drifted above the Technical Specification limit •. The drift was caused by the loosening of the twci.bolts which hold the micro switch, internal to the pressure switch, in position.· The event was reviewed by the SRB during its 468th meeting and reported to the Directorate of licensing on May 31, 1973. The licensee performed a functional test on the switches. for both units on .June 13' 1973. but failed to examine the bracket support bolt:s for tightness, as committed in its letter to DOL An Action Item e~isted to inodify the sur-Veillance check off sheets to include such examinations, but the licensee·has not completed the. chang~ because it wants to. include o.ther checks which .it feels shouid also be p~rformed on a routine basis ..

c, LPCI .Loop"seiec~ .Circuitry,A P Switch. Failure

On February 20, 1973;- Unit 2 experienced a barton AP switch failure on the LPCI 'loop. select cir.cuitry. The'. failure was caused by a loose screw on the micro switch actuating arm. The event was revie~ed by theSRB·at its 448th·meeting and reported to the

Directorate of Licensing on March 19, 1973. On June 19, 1973, the inspector v~rified that fingernail polish had been applied to the threads. of both screws in the actuating arm to prevent them from vibrating loose. Licensee records indicate the screws were tight during surveillance testing performed in April 1973.

d. HPCI Turbine .;._ Units 2 and 3

The licensee.stated they have not experienced any unusual vibration or p·ressure variations on the turbine exhaust discharge piping such as was experienced by TVA at Browns Ferry. The Dresden design · includes vacuum.breakers on the line inside the torus which should eliminate the pressure pulsations caused by. condensing steam. The vacuum breakers are downstream of the isolation check valves.· The exh.;iust line discharges under water without a condensing sparger.

ECCS Surveillance Testing

The following is a compilation of testing completion information obtained through review of completed test records. No deviations froin Technical Specification requirements were noted with the exception of items 4g and 4h of the t.able. The Technical Specifications imply the t:unctional test and calibrati.on is required of the pressure switches in .the HPCI di~charge line. No switches are installed in the HPCI. dis charge line • ·

(1) Core Spray (Each Subsystem)

Item . · ·Required Frequency

(a) Simulated automatic Each re~ueli:ng outage . actuatfon t:·est (I,....M)

(b) Flow rate te~t· (each subsystem) ?- 4500 gpm

···at 90 psig

Each refueling outage

(c) . Pump operability Monthly

, (d) Motor operated vaives Monthly

(e) c. S. header ll P Daily instrument check

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Period Inspected

D-2 4/29/72 D-3 5/22/73

i>-2 5/18/72 D-3 5/14/73

.D-2 5il~/73 D-3 5/14/73

.· D-2 5/18/73 b-2 5/14/73

D-2 4/30-5/6/73 D-3 4/30-5/6/73

•

~·

II

(f) C. S. .header 4 P Ever}' three months instrument calibration (I-M)

(g) c~s. header d p iristruinent tes.t (I:...M)

.·Every three months

(h) Logic ·system functiorial·Each refueling , test (I-M) · · · ·

(i) .Prior to pump test vent disch~rge piping and observe water · flow at highest point

(j) Pressure switches monitoring·discharge line functional iest (I-M)

(k) Pressure switches ·monitoring discharge .line.calibration (I-M)

(2) LPCI

·.··. (a) Simulate.d automatic .actuation test (I-M)

(b) Fiow rate test. · 3 pumps ~ 14 ,.500 gpm at 20 psig

. . .

(c) ).~Ump operal:>ilil:y ..

(d) Motor operated valves

(e) ·Logic system functional,(I-M)

·Monthly and. after . . maintenance

Monthly·

Every·. three months

Each refueling outage

.·Each refueling outage

· Monthly

Monthly J .

· Ea.ch refueling outage

*·Incorporated as.s~eps ·in the procedure.

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D-2 1/15/73-4/ 4 /73

n-3 l/J ."i /7 J-4j 417j

D-2 1/15/73-4/4/73

ti-3 1/15/73-4/4/73

· D'.'"2 4/23/72 D-3 5/10/73

D-2 D-.3

D-2

.D-3

D-2

D-3

* *

5/7 /73-6/7 /73 5/7 /73-6/7 /73

5/7 /73-. 6/7 /73 5/7/73 6/7/73

. n-2 4/29/72 D-2 5/23/73

D-2 4/17/72 D-3 1/14/73

D-2 5/18/73 D-3 5/13/73

D-2 5/18/73 D-3 5/13/73

· D-2 4/24/72 D-3 5/20/73

/O(l~ 11 1

.a (. ; 1}' ,,

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(f) Prior to pump test vent discharge piping and observe water flow

Monthly and after maintenance

·. (g) Pressure switches Monthly · .. ·monitoring discharge

lines functional test (I-M) .

(h) .Pressur~ switches Every three inonths monitoring discharge lines calibration ·(I-:-M)

(3).Containment Cooling- Subsyste~ .Service Water

(a) Pump operability Every three months·

(b) Valve operab.ility. .Every three months

(c) Flow rate test, each After maintenance and ·pump· • . :? 3500 gpm at· .every three months· 198 psig

(4) HPCI

(a) Simulated automatic Ea.ch refueling outage actuation test (I-M)

(b) Flow rate test .Z... 5000 Each refueling ·outage at: system pressure of 1150 psi~ tb 156 psig

..

(c) ·Pump· operabii:i.:ty Monthly

..

(d) Mot.or operated valve Monthly operability·

(e) Logic system Each refueling ·outage functional (l-M).

*Incorporated as.steps in the procedure.

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D-2 D-3

* *·

D-2 6/7 /73 D-3 6/7 /73

D-2 5/7/73-6/7 /73

D...;3 5/7 /73 6/7 /73

D-2 1/10/73 D-3 1/14/73

. D-2 1/10/73 D-2 1/14/73

D-2 1/10/73 D-3 1/14/73

D-2 8/5//'2 D-3 5/23/73 .

D-2 5/19/72 D-3 2/23/73

ti-2 5/19/73 D-3 5/24/73

D-2 5/19/73 D-3 5/29/73

D-2 4/29/72 . · D-3 5/24/73

_(f) If suction is lined up to torus, vent. disch~rge piping and observe water flow

(g) Pressure switches · mord to ring discharge line functional test (I-M)

Monthly

Monthly

(h) Pressure switches _Ev~ry three months monitoring discharge line calibration. (I-M)

(5) ·Automatic Pressure Relief. Subsystem

(a) Simulated auto Each operating initiation which opens .··cycle · ail pilot valv~s

(b) Manually open each valve with reactor at low pressure until thermocoupJ_e indicates fluid.flowing

(c) Logic system functional (I-M).

9. ~lectrical Sy~tems

Each operating cyCle

Each refueling outage

a. Response to Item of Noncompliance . .

D-2 5/19/73 ti-3 5/23/73

Not completed

D-2 Not completed

D-:-2 4/28/72 D-3. 5/12/73

D-i 5/8/72 D-3 5/28/13

.D-2 2/28/7 2 ti-3 4/28/73

. The inspector verified that ·the_ surveillance data sheet 9800-S-l, for the ·battery bank tests for-Units 2 and 3, was modified in April 1973 tq, include eritries·'for ~11 Technical Specification Requirements. ·

b. · Essential Services Power Supplies

The essential services power supplie_s and control. of associated. breakers. from the control room were reviewed during the June 1_973 inspection.

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The two unit'$ have similar electrical supply schemes with crossties between buses 3_4-1 and 24-1. Emergency diesel (ED) 2/3 servers either bus 33-1 or 23-1 (Unit 3 buses are 30 series.and Unit 2 are 20 series).

A switch on each control panel must be operated to cross-connect the Unit 2 and 3 electrical supplies. The Unit 2 (Unit 3) essential services buses·23-l (33-1) and 24-1 (34-l)·are supplied from 23 (33) and 24 (34), respectively. Buses 23 (33) and 24 (34) can be supplied frqm either transformer T21 (T31) or 1'22 (32) via an automatic throw-over switch. -The bus supply breakers and essential equipment controllers can be operated from the control room.· ED 2/3 controls are on the Unit 2 CQ!ltrol panel.

A functional test is to be completed each refueling shutdown for EG starting and pickup of ECCS loads. Tests were completed satis­factorily during. April 1973 for Unit 3 and May 1972 for Unit 2 ~ccording to site records.

10. Proposed Fuel Movements - Unit 2

The inspector accompanied Mr. J. Carson, DOL, in a review of the proposed spent fuel shipment from Unit 2 later this year discussed in the submittal to DOL dated May 31, 1973. Additional information was indicated irt the following areas: ~tr~ss analysis associated with the failure of one side.of the yo~e, potential for crane gear or rope ·failure, de.tails of the crane's two mechanical brakes,. results of the initial load tests performed on the crane, and the procedure to be utilized for.the above fuel cask movements. The licensee stated that .an engineering review of .the above matters would be pursued.

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