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IPCS Research Papers

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2008, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies is notresponsible for the facts, views or opinion expressedby the author.

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS),established in August 1996, is an independent think

tank devoted to research on peace and security from aSouth Asian perspective.

Its aim is to develop a comprehensive andalternative framework for peace and security in theregion catering to the changing demands ofnational, regional and global security.

Address:B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor

Safdarjung EnclaveNew Delhi 110029INDIA

Tel: 91-11-4100 1900, 4165 2556, 4165 2557,4165 2558, 4165 2559

Fax:(91-11) 4165 2560Email: [email protected]

Web: www.ipcs.org


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CONTENTS

Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 4

A Short History .................................................................................................................... 2

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation.................................................. 6

Peoples War Group (PWG)................................................................................................. 7

Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) & Communist Party of India (Maoist) ...................... 11

About the Author ................................................................................................................ 14

Recent IPCS Publications ..................................................................................................14


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Executive Summary

In order to understand the current phase of

Naxalism, we need to understand different

aspects of organizational transformation

that have occurred within the Naxal

movement, since the genesis and current

phase of the movement is a reflection of

continuity and change. To understand its

continuity over the decade, one has to

understand its dynamics of change, just as to

understand the changing nature of the Naxal

movement, one has to understand the

factors responsible for its continuity. And

this reestablishes the dynamic character of

the movement.

The characteristic feature of the Naxal

movement is its disorganized character

which led to some interesting formulations,

quite uncommon in the history of

MovementOrganizations (MO)1.The

fragmented character of the movement gave

rise to a plethora of possible trends andgroupings and thereby, paved the way for

new avenues of organizational conflict. Due

to its fragmented character, the movement

1Historically socio-political movements whetherextremist, revolutionary or peaceful, operatethrough organizations which are known as

Movement Organizations. The movementorganizations are mostly characterized as loosely

structured, decentralized and prone to politicalchallenges and counter cultural practices.

witnessed the comeback of many past

leaders and cadres from oblivion. This

aspect of Naxal organizational politics is

important to understand, as it enabled the

reemergence of a whole range of questions

that were assumed to have been resolved

once and for all.


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A Short History

To understand the genesis of the Naxalmovement, one needs to locate it within theframework of the Communist movement inIndia. To be more specific, any study onthe Naxal movement cannot overlook theimportance of the rise and fall of the

Telangana Movement (1946-51), sinceTelangana will always remain the gloriouschapter in the history of peasant strugglesfor Indian communists. In fact, it was the

first serious effort by sections of thecommunist party leadership to learn fromthe experiences of the Chinese revolutionand to develop a comprehensive line forIndias democratic revolution. On the otherhand, the experience in Telangana alsofacilitated the growth of three distinct lines

within the Indian communist movement.The line promoted by Ranadive and hisfollowers, rejected the significance of theChinese revolution, and advocated the

simultaneous accomplishment of thedemocratic and the socialist revolutions,based on city-based working-classinsurrections. The group drew inspirationfrom Stalin and fiercely attacked Mao asanother Tito.

The second line mainly professed andpropagated by the Andhra Secretariat, drewheavily on the Chinese experiences and theteachings of Mao, in building up the struggle

of Telangana. The Andhra leadership, whilesuccessfully managing to spearhead themovement against the Nizam, failed totackle the complex question of meeting thechallenge of the Government of India. TheNehru government embarked on the roadto parliamentary democracy, conditioning it

with reforms like the abolition of theZamindari system. All these objectiveconditions facilitated the dominance of acentrist line, put forward by Ajay Ghosh

and Dange. This line characteristicallypointed out the differences between Chinese

and Indian conditions and pushed the partyalong the road to parliamentary democracy.

In 1957, the Communists succeeded informing a government in Kerala, whichhowever, was soon overthrown.

Additionally, following the India-China war,the party split into two during 1964 Communist Party of India (CPI) andCommunist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI

[M]). While the CPI preached the theory ofpeaceful road to non-capitalistdevelopment, the CPI (M) adopted thecentrist line. Though there were seriousdifferences on ideological and tacticalgrounds, both the parties went ahead withtheir parliamentary exercises and formed theUnited Front government in West Bengal.

In the backdrop of such organizationalupheavals within the Indian Communist

movement, an incident in a remote areatransformed the history of left-wingextremism in India. In a remote villagecalled Naxalbari in West Bengal, a tribalyouth named Bimal Kissan, having obtaineda judicial order, went to plough his land on2 March 1967. The local landlords attackedhim with the help of their goons. Tribalpeople of the area retaliated and startedforcefully recapturing their lands. Whatfollowed was a rebellion, which left one

police sub inspector and nine tribals dead.Within a short span of about two months,this incident acquired great visibility andtremendous support from cross sections ofCommunist revolutionaries belonging to thestate units of the CPI (M) in West Bengal,Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu andKashmir.

Though the United Front Government of

West Bengal, headed by the CPI (M) wasable to contain the rebellion within 72 days


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using all repressive measures possible, theseunits had a formal meeting in November1967, as a result of which the All IndiaCoordination Committee of CommunistRevolutionaries (AICCCR) was formed in

May 1968. Allegiance to the armed struggleand non-participation in the elections werethe two cardinal principles that the AICCRadopted for its operations. However,differences cropped up over how an armedstruggle should be advanced and this led tothe exclusion of a section of activists from

Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, ledrespectively by T. Nagi Reddy and KanhaiChatterjee.

On the question of the annihilation of theclass enemy, the Kanhai Chatterjee grouphad serious objections, as they were of the

view that the annihilation of the class enemyshould only be undertaken after building upmass agitations. However, a majority in the

AICCCR rejected this and the AICCCRwent ahead with the formation of theCommunist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in May 1969. This led Chatterjeeto join the Maoist Communist Centre

(MCC). The CPI (M-L) held its firstcongress in 1970 in Kolkata and CharuMazumdar was formally elected its generalsecretary.

Since then, both the CPI (M-L) and theMCC continued with their respective formsof armed struggle for the next couple ofyears. During this period, Charu Majumdarbecame the undisputedNaxalite guruand

with the organizational skills of Kanu Sanyal

and Jaghal Santhal, the movement spread todifferent corners of the country. Thecountry witnessed the euphoria of a Maoistrevolution. However, it was far more short-lived than expected. What was generallyperceived by Indian as well as ChineseCommunist revolutionaries as the finalenactment of the revolution, in reality,proved to be no more than a dress rehearsal.

As hundreds of CPI (ML) cadres lost theirlives, and thousands were put behind bars,

the movement witnessed confusion, splitsand disintegration. Charu Majumdars

larger-than-life image also had its negativeimpact, for after his death in 1972, thecentral leadership of CPI (ML) virtuallycollapsed.

The history of the Naxal movement post-Charu Mazumdar, is characterized by anumber of splits, brought about bypersonalized and narrow perceptions aboutthe Maoist revolutionary line and attemptsat course-correction by some of the majorgroups. Even Kanu Sanyal, one of thefounders of the movement, could notescape this. He gave up the path of"dedicated armed struggle" by 1977 andaccepted parliamentary practice as a form of

revolutionary activity.

It was during 1974 that an influential groupof the CPI (ML), led by Jauhar (SubrataDutt), Nagbhushan Pattnaik and VinodMishra, launched a major initiative, whichthey termed course-correction. This grouprenamed itself the CPI (M-L) Liberation in1974, and in 1976, during the Emergency,adopted a new line that called for thecontinuation of armed guerilla struggles

along with efforts to form a broad anti-Congress democratic front, consisting evennon-communist parties. The group alsosuggested that pure military armed struggleshould be limited and there should begreater emphasis on mass peasant struggles,in an attempt to provide an Indianized

version of Marxism-Leninism- Maoism.

However, during the next three years, themovement suffered further splits withleaders, such as Kondapalli Seetharamaiah(Andhra Pradesh) and N. Prasad (Bihar)dissociating themselves from the activitiesof the party. This led to Prasad forming theCPI (M-L) (Unity Organization) andSeetharamaiah started the People's WarGroup (PWG) in 1980. WhileSeetharamaiah's line sought to restrict theannihilation of class enemies, the PWG'semphasis was on building massorganizations, not developing a broaddemocratic front.


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Since then, the principal division within theNaxalite movement has been between thetwo lines of thought and action, as advancedby the CPI (ML) Liberation and the PWG.

While Liberation branded PWG a group of

"left adventurists, the PWG castigated theLiberation group as one of the "revisionists"imitating the CPI (M). On the other hand,the growth of MCC as a major armed groupin the same areas, created the scope formultifarious organizational conflicts amongthe Naxal groups. Liberation took atheoretical stand of correcting the pastmistake of completely rejectingparliamentary politics. On the other hand,PWG and MCC completely rejected the

parliamentary democratic system ofgovernance and vowed to wage peoples

war for peoples government. In theprocess, while the Liberation groupregistered its first electoral victory in Biharin 1989; Naxalite factions such as the CPI(M-L) New Democracy, the CPI (ML) S.R.Bhajjee Group and the CPI (M-L) UnityInitiative, emerged in the state.

The following years witnessed certain

distinct phenomena in the history of theNaxal movement. First, the intra-organizational conflict and rivalry amongdifferent groups touched several highpoints, resulting in the loss of a considerablenumber of cadres of rival groups. Secondly,despite the large-scale inner conflicts, there

were always ongoing efforts at various levelsto strive for unity. Thirdly, 1990 onwards,the affected state registered a considerableincrease in the number of violent incidents

and at the same time, a considerable changein the policy approach of the governmentwas also witnessed. While the Naxalmovement has mostly been characterized byfragmented groups and innumerable splits;successive governments at the national andstate levels were never able to follow auniform approach to deal with the problemof Naxalism, thus, leading to a markedimpact in the growth of the Naxalmovement.

There are three broad currents of the Naxalmovement. For reasons which will becomeobvious from the following discussion, thispaper will examine the Communist Party ofIndia (ML) Liberation, Peoples War Group

(PWG), Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)and the Communist Party of India (Maoist).It will examine the circumstances in whichthese groups were formed, their ideologicalbases and programmes, and the similaritiesand dissimilarities between them. The paper,in particular, will look into different aspectsof organizational politics in relation to theseMaoist organizations and try to locate theirimpact on the course of the contemporaryNaxal movement.

The following are the main issues on whichthere appear to be considerable differencesamong the Naxal groups and which areprimary causes of conflict between them.

The analysis of the first phase (1967-71) of the Naxalite movement andthe line of annihilation that wasfollowed

The position that armed struggle isthe principal form of struggle andthe armed guerilla squad, theprimary unit of struggle

Since the principal form of struggleis armed struggle, the entire activityof the agrarian struggle should beunderground

Whether the contradiction betweenfeudalism and the Indian masses isthe principal contradiction in Indiansociety or whether India hasemerged as a capitalist state andhence, the contradiction betweencapitalism and general public is theprincipal contradiction

Whether it would be prudent toform a united front with variousforces and movements like the dalit,


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farmers, ethnic and regional, andecological movements etc.2

However, these are not the only issues;several other issues pertaining to ground-

level reality and control of territory arecrucially linked to the functioning ofNaxalite organizations.

2Prakash Louis, People Power: The Naxalite

Movement in Central Bihar(New Delhi:Wordsmiths, 2002) p. 277.


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Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)Liberation

Historically, the origin of CPI (ML)

Liberation dates back to 1974. However, thepost-emergency phase of 1977, when mostleaders of the Communist movement werereleased from jail was the time when theactivities of Liberation first came to notice.

The Party Central Committee (PCC), in amove to unite the splinter groups whichowed their origin to CPI (ML), called ameeting during 30 January-2 February 1981.However, the meet did not deliver expectedresults. From this point onwards whereas

the PCC group goes on to becomeirrelevant and splits up into various factions,the M-L movement begins to polarizebetween the Marxist-Leninist line of CPI(ML) (Liberation) and the anarchist line ofCPI (ML) (People's War).3

During 1982,the Indian People's Front(IPF) was launched in New Delhi at anational conference. In due course, IPFbecame the party's open political platform,

actively intervening in national politics.Same year, the Third Party Congress tookplace at Giridih, Bihar, where the issue ofparticipation in elections was finalized. Thisshift in the outlook of CPI (ML) Liberationproved to be vital in designing thesubsequent course of activity of the Naxalmovement. The Liberation group, accordingto Bhatia, considers itself the true inheritorof the CPI (ML) legacy, its political line haschanged dramatically from that of the

original CPI (ML).4

With this strategic shift in functioning, theCPI (ML) Liberation recorded its firstelectoral victory under the banner of theIPF in 1989 and Ara (one Lok SabhaConstituency in Central Bihar) sent the first

3Thirty Years of Naxalbari, an un-datedpublication of CPI (ML) Liberation.

4Bela Bhatia,Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar,Economic and Political Weekly, April 9 2005.

"Naxalite" member to Parliament.5In a

special conference convened in July 1990,the party decided to resume openfunctioning. This decision was formalized atits fifth Congress in December 1992. In1994, the Indian Peoples Front wasdisbanded. The Election Commissionrecognized the party in 1995, and since thenthe CPI (ML) has been contestingsuccessive elections at national and statelevels.

The CPI (ML) Liberation, thoughfunctioning over ground within theparliamentary democratic setup, has notcompletely disbanded the path of armedrebellion. The Party does not rule out thepossibility that under a set of exceptionalnational and international circumstances, thebalance of social and political forces mayeven permit a relatively peaceful transfer ofcentral power to revolutionary forces. But ina country where democratic institutions are

based on essentially fragile and narrowfoundations and where even small victoriesand partial reforms can only be achievedand maintained on the strength of massmilitancy, the party of the proletariat mustprepare itself for winning the ultimatedecisive victory in an armed revolution. Apeople's democratic front and a people'sarmy, therefore, remain the two mostfundamental weapons of revolution in thearsenal of the Party.6This again points to

the dilemmas within the ultra leftmovement, which is very often reflected, inthe unpredictable character of the Naxalmovement.

5History of Naxalism, Hindustantimes.com

6A Party document of CPI (ML) Liberation titledThe General Programme.


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Com. Johar, with the leadership falling intothe hands of Vinod Mishra, they beganbetraying the Indian revolution. As part of aconspiratorial plan, a once revolutionaryparty was gradually changed into a

revisionist party, like the CPI and CPM. Thearmed resistance struggles against the statesattacks, taking place under the thenleadership of Liberation, was ended. Thearmed struggle to crush the feudal privatearmies was made a secondary task. In this

way, they diverted the entire group awayfrom the basic path outlined by the unifiedCPI (ML), and particularly of its founder,Com. CM that of protracted peoples war

into becoming agents of the ruling

classes, by surrendering them to theparliamentary path. They converted theCom. Johar-led Liberation, from being arevolutionary movement, into a legalist,reformist and parliamentary movement; andchanged the underground organization intoan open opportunist and revisionistorganization.9

The above two official statements of thePWG clearly suggest that the birth of PWG

which resulted from a split within the CPI(ML-Liberation) was on account of thedynamics of conflict among a host of itscadres. For a considerable period after itsbirth, PWGs activities were chiefly limitedto Andhra Pradesh, while the CPI (ML)Liberation continued to hold its turf inBihar. It was during this period that anotherorganization came into existence on 1

January 1982. It was named the Communistparty of India (ML) Party Unity, which came

into existence due to a merger between CPI(ML) Unity Organizations and Centralorganizing Committee CPI (ML). Hereafter,left-wing extremism in India witnessed someof the worst-ever conflicts which againforced many organizations to take a positionand adopt new tactics. Bihar has alwaysremained a strong battleground of Naxal

9Sharvan, the then Secretary Bihar State

Committee of CPI (ML) Peoples War, in an

interview given to Peoples March, Volume 2, No.3, March 2001.

operations and ironically, in Bihar, most ofthe clashes were between CPI (ML) PartyUnity and CPI (ML) Liberation.

When these conflicts were taking a toll on

the cadres on both sides, anotherdevelopment was simultaneously takingplace. In August 1998, Party Unity merged

with CPI (ML) Peoples War Group and thegroup came to be known as Peoples War.The merger of the two parties is theculmination of the unity process whichbegan in March '93 and continued for overfive years during which differences onseveral political, ideological andorganizational questions were resolved

through thread-bare discussion.10

The statement continues, The emergenceof the united Party -- the Communist Partyof India (Marxist-Leninist) [People's War] --does not mark the completion of theprocess of unification of the genuinecommunist revolutionary forces in India.

The newly Unified Party will continue itsefforts in right earnest to achieve thisunification. We also call upon the other

genuine revolutionary elements in thevarious M-L parties in India who are beingled astray by both right and left opportunistleadership, to fight against these deviationsand rally under the banner of the UnitedParty. The United Party pledges itself toavenge the death of thousands of martyrs

who fell in the course of the ongoingdemocratic revolution in India paved withblood by these martyrs until their cherishedgoals are accomplished. This is the era of

Revolutions.

11

With this merger, the PWG became a forceto reckon with in Bihar and in other areas

where PU had a presence. Furtherdevelopments suggest that with the merger,the element of armed rebellion of the Naxalmovement became stronger, while on the

10Peoples War literature titled Joint Declarationby Communist Party of India (ML) Peoples War

and CPI (ML) (Party Unity), August 1998.11Ibid.


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other hand, with its parliamentary practices,Liberation was loosing its turf to PWG.Liberation, which once controlled the wholeof central Bihar, was now loosing itsterritory and supporters to PWG and MCC.

Not only in Bihar, but also elsewhere,Liberation was systematically shrinking onthe map of Naxalite politics. By advocatingelectoral methods and not being able tomake an impressive mark, the Liberations

way of movement became weak and thePWGs armed operations started gainingmomentum.

So while the Liberation, with its changedmodus operandi was being reduced to a

small political party, the PWG in the sameperiod, managed to register its presenceoutside Andhra Pradesh and graduallygained strongholds in different areas ofBihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand,Chattisgarh, and Maharashtra. While theconflict between PU and Liberation madeboth groups suffer the loss of considerablenumbers of their cadres; as already stated, italso resulted in the merger of PU and PWGand ultimately the violent consolidation of

the movement.

The formation of Peoples War also resultedin tactical changes in several aspects of theNaxal movement in general. In our agendafor a new democratic revolution, there aretwo aspects -- the agrarian revolution andfight for nationality.12This statement showsthe amount of organizational change

witnessed by the Naxal movement in allthose years. In 1967 it started in the name of

agrarian revolution, which gradually tookthe stance of replacing the parliamentaryform of government; but the question ofnationality was never raised. This reflectsthe pattern of conflict between PW andLiberation. By questioning nationality, PW

wanted to make it clear that it wanted abroad revolutionary pattern and while land

12Interview of Muppalla Lakshmana Raoalias

Ganapathy,the then head of theCommunist Party

of India-Marxist-Leninist People's War.http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/oct/07gana.htm

to tillers could be a programme, it could notbecome the sole agenda of the revolution.

Between 15-30 November 1995, the PWconducted an All India Special Conference

in some unknown locality of Dandakaranya.There, it adopted two important partydocuments. The Party Programme asadopted in the Conference reads, India is asemi-feudal, semi-colonial society; here theNew Democratic Revolution (NDR) has tobe completed victoriously paving way to theSocialist Revolution and to advance towardsthe ultimate goal of Communism. TheIndian people are weighed down by threebig mountains: feudalism, imperialism and

comprador bureaucrat capital; these are thetargets to be overthrown in the presentstage of NDR.

The four major contradictions in thepresent-day Indian society are: thecontradiction between feudalism and thebroad masses; the contradiction betweenimperialism and the Indian people; thecontradiction between capital and labourand the contradiction within the ruling

classes. While the first two are fundamentalcontradictions to be resolved through theNDR, the contradiction between feudalismand the broad masses is the principalcontradiction at the present stage. India is amulti-national country--a prison-house ofnationalities and all the nationalities have theright to self-determination includingsecession. When NDR is victoriouslycompleted, India will become a voluntaryand genuine federation of all national

people's republics.

13

The second document, which was adoptedin the conference, was the document on the'Strategy and Tactics'. It reads, The political

13This report on the Special conference was posted

in a website (www.cpimlpwg/repression.html)which claimed itself as the unofficial website ofPW. The website has been withdrawn. During its

existence the site claimed it to be the unofficialwebsite of PWG. But during my interaction with

many PW rank and file I found that it was no lessthen their official website.


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strategy to be pursued in the present stageof NDR in India is one of forming a broadunited front of all the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist forces--the working class, thepeasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the

national bourgeoisie--under the leadershipof the working class to overthrow thecommon enemies--feudalism, imperialismand comprador bureaucratic capital. Themilitary strategy or the path of IndianRevolution is the path of protracted people's

war i.e., liberating the countryside firstthrough area wise seizure of powerestablishing guerilla zones and base areasand then encircling the cities and finallycapturing power throughout the country.

The unevenness in the economic, social andpolitical development of Indian society callsfor different tactics i.e., forms of struggleand organization, to be pursued in differentregions of the country, while the politicaltactic line throughout the country remainsthe same. In urban areas the political andmass work should be carried out observingutmost precaution and the organizational

work should proceed keeping in view thelong-range perspective. Caste is a peculiar

problem in India; and appropriate forms oforganization and struggle should be evolved

vigorously to fight out untouchability, castediscrimination and to finally root out thecaste system. The tactics of boycott ofelections have to be pursued for a long timein the prevailing conditions in India; andparticipating in parliamentary and assemblyelections under any pretext only weakensthe class struggle.14

These two documents, containing differentorganizational aspects of PW, make a clear-cut demarcation for the issues pertaining toorganizational conflict between theLiberation and PW. The Peoples War, onthe basis of its assessment of the peopleslevel of preparedness for an armed struggle,discarded annihilation of class enemies asthe only form of struggle and stressedinstead, on floating mass organizations. Itestablished several front organizations.

14Ibid.

During the 1980s, the Radical StudentsUnion and Rayatu Kuli Sangham emerged asorganizations with an impressive massfollowing and most of the PWGs presentbase and political cadres developed through

that practice. However, during the 1990s,the growth of militarization became thecharacteristic feature of the PWG. Theformation of Peoples Guerrilla Army(PGA), special guerrilla squads, Permanent

Action Team (PAT) and Special ActionTeam (SAT) were the distinctive features ofPWG activities for quite some time, beforeit merged with MCC to form the CPI(Maoist).15

15In response to a government decision to launch

coordinated action against the Naxalites by policeforces of the various Indian States affected byNaxal violence, the PWG formed the PGA, itsmilitary wing in December 2000 by reorganizing

its guerrilla force. The PGA functions under asingle operational command, the Central Military

Commission. In the Indian State where the PGAhas a presence, there is a State MilitaryCommission and in special guerrilla zones there isa Zonal Military Commission. A Regional MilitaryCommission supervises a group of State MilitaryCommissions or Zonal Military Commission Each

Regional Military Commission reports to theCentral Military Commission. All armed cadre of

the PWG are organized under the PGA. Ref:People's Guerrilla Army,

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terror

istoutfits/peoples_guerrilla_arms_left_wing_extremists.htm


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Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) & CommunistParty of India (Maoist)

The next important group within the broad

spectrum of the Naxal movement is theMaoist Communist Centre (MCC). It standsapart from a number of organizations, since,conventionally speaking, it was never a partof the CPI (ML), which many claim as themother of all Naxal organizations. TheMCC, while supporting the Naxalbaristruggle, did not join the CPI (ML) becauseof some tactical differences and on thequestion of Party formation.16The MCC

was formed on 20 October 1969, around

the same time that the CPI (ML) wasformed, although during those days it wasknown as Dakshin Desh. It was in 1975 thatthe group renamed itself the MaoistCommunist Centre. In 2003, MCC merged

with the Revolutionary Communist Centreof India-Maoists (RCCI-M) to form theMaoist Communist Centre-India (MCC-I).

Right from its inception, the MCC stood fortaking up armed struggle as the main form

of resistance and waging a protractedpeople's war as the central task of the party.

This position of the MCC has beenrepeatedly expressed and emphasized in amultitude of Maoist literature. This armedrevolutionary war is the war of the armedpeople themselves; it is 'Protracted People's

War' as shown by Mao Tse Tung. Theconcrete economic and political conditionof India leads to the very conclusion thatthe path shown by the great leader and

teacher, Mao Tse Tung, the path of theChinese Revolution, that is, and to establisha powerful people's army and people'smilitia and to establish dependable, strongand self-sufficient base areas in thecountryside, to constantly consolidate andexpand the people's army and the baseareas, gradually to encircle the urban areasfrom the countryside by liberating thecountryside, finally to capture the cities and

1630 years of Naxalbari, p.36.

to establish the state system and political

authority of the people themselves bydecisively destroying the state power of thereactionaries -- this very path of theprotracted People's War is the only pathofliberation of the people of India, the path of

victory of the new democratic revolution."17

Communist Party of India (Maoist)

The Naxal movement in India entered yetanother phase of organizational

transformation with the merger of two ofthe principal armed organizations, viz.Peoples War (PW) and the MaoistCommunist Centre of India (MCC-I), whichresulted in the formation of the CommunistParty of India (Maoist). The formation ofthe unified Communist Party of India(Maoist) is a new milestone in the history ofthe revolutionary communist movement ofIndia. A unified Maoist party based onMarxism-Leninism-Maoism is a long

delayed and highly cherished need of therevolutionary minded and oppressed peopleof the country, including all our ranks, andalso all the Maoist forces of South Asia andinternationally. Now, this long-aspireddesire and dream has been transformed intoa reality.18 This statement, made by thefirst Secretary of CPI (Maoist) Ganapathy,assumes a great deal of importance as it

17

Red Star, Special Issue, p. 20. Red Star is theEnglish language organ of the MCC, as quoted by

Aloke Banerjee in a pamphlet titled Inside MCC

Country,dated June 2003. Red Star was theEnglish language organ of the MCC. Also quotedin MCC India Three Decades Leading Battalionsof the Poor,http://www.awtw.org/back_issues/mcc_india.htm.

Though it denies but many treat this as theunofficial organ of the Revolutionary

Internationalist Movement (RIM.)

18Ganapathy, in an Interview given on the on the

occasion of the formation of CPI (Maoist).

Peoples March, Vol. 5, No.11-12, November-December 2004.


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reflects the organizational politics that wasgoing on all these years between these twoorganizations representing the Naxalmovement.

The improvised aim of the CPI (Maoist) asannounced on the occasion of its formationis to establish a compact revolutionary zone,stretching from Nepal to Bihar to AndhraPradesh and beyond. While continuing theirpursuit of a peoples democracy; theultimate aim of the CPI (Maoist) is to seizepower throughprotracted armed struggle.

The press statement, issued on the event ofannouncing the merger, stated, Theimmediate aim and programme of the

Maoist party is to carry on and complete thealready ongoing and advancing NewDemocratic Revolution in India as a part ofthe world proletarian revolution byoverthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudalsystem under the neo-colonial form ofindirect rule, exploitation and control.

This revolution will remain directed againstimperialism, feudalism and compradorbureaucratic capitalism. This revolution will

be carried out and completed througharmed agrarian revolutionary war, i.e.protracted people's war with the armedseizure of power remaining as its central andprincipal task, encircling the cities from thecountryside and thereby finally capturingthem. Hence, the countryside as well as thePPW (Protracted People's War) will remainas the 'center of gravity' of the party's work,

while urban work will be complimentary toit.19According to the same press release,

the CPI-Maoists will still seek to unite allgenuine Maoist groups that remain outsidethis unified party."20

19Maoist-Influenced Revolutionary Organizations

in India available at

20Maoist-Influenced Revolutionary Organizations

in India available at

It is important to examine the significanceof the merger, particularly when earlierattempts had been unsuccessful. In fact, themerger is largely being seen as a result of thegradual convergence of views of these two

groups on areas such as the role of theparty, approaches to revolution andadoption of strategies and tactics. In theformative years, Charu Mazumdar andKanhai Chatterjee represented twoirreconcilably different lines and approachesto revolution. At the time of the formationof the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) CPI-ML in 1969, the DakshinDesh (the earlier form of the MCC),remained opposed to the process due to

sharp differences with the CPI-ML overissues such as the formation of a communistparty, existence of revolutionary massstruggle and preparedness of the people toparticipate in it.

The joint press statement released by theerstwhile General Secretaries of PW andMCC (I) highlighted the essence of themerger. In the past history there weremany splits within the M-L movement. But

splits are only one side of the coin; thebrighter side was that there were continuousefforts to unify the revolutionaries. The CPI(ML) (PU), though it had its origins inBengal, it spread and strengthened byunifying several revolutionary groups. TheCPI (ML) (PW), though it originated in

Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, it unifiedwith revolutionaries in almost all the stateswhere it was working. The MCC too, hadoriginated in Bengal, unified many

revolutionaries groups in it in many Statesand became the MCCI.21This statementunderlines the continuous process oforganizational politics within the broadspectrum of the Naxal movement, whichresulted from organizational conflict.

Looking back, the need for a joint, unifiedplatform was felt by the leadership of both

21Ganapathy, in an Interview given on the on the

occasion of the formation of CPI (Maoist).

Peoples March, Vol. 5, No.11-12, November-December 2004.


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the parties as early as 1981. The PW andMCC began unity talks from their very firstmeeting in 1981. However, the reason forthe delay in the process was the lack ofcontinuity of leadership. The arrest of

Comrade Kondapally Seetaramaiah (KS),the leader of the PW, and later the internalcrisis of the PW and split in the CentralCommittee (CC) delayed the unity processfor several years. In the early eighties, theMCC lost its two top leaders Comrades

Amulya Sen (AS) and Kanhai Chatterjee(KC), which had some negative impact,resulting in further delay in the unityprocess.22

However, this is not to suggest that theformation of the CPI (Maoist) was the finalstage of the Naxal movement. As oneofficial Maoist document puts it,Revolutions never proceed in a straightline. The history of all successful revolutionsshows this. The path is zig zag, there are upsand downs, there is victory and defeatrepeated a number of times.....before final

victory. Of course, there is no final victoryuntil the stage of communism is reached.23

The above-mentioned analysis makes theforceful plea that since the Naxal movementis essentially a political problem, it needs tobe examined from the perspective oforganizational politics.

From the above discussion we can derivethe following conclusions. First, the historyof the Naxal movement is the history of acontinuous process of organizationalconflicts, splits, and mergers. Second, the

movement essentially representssimultaneous, though not necessarilypeaceful coexistence of many streams; andlooking from this angle, the movement canbe said to have its presence in all parts of

22Ibid.

23State Repression, this is the title of the documentwhich was posted at www.cpimlpwg/repression.html. The website now has

been withdrawn. During its existence the siteclaimed it to be the unofficial website of PWG. But

during my interaction with many PW rank and fileI found that it was the official website.

the country. Third, the growth of the Naxalmovement is closely linked with the ongoingprocess of organizational conflict. This isbecause the ultimate political objectivebehind all organizational exercise, as

reflected by the statements of various seniorNaxalite leaders, is to build a leftistalternative and mobilize people againstincreased imperialist intervention and pro-imperialist policies pursued by the uniongovernment, in support of revolutionary

war based on the Chinese leader, Maostheory of organized peasant insurrection.Similarly, the history of the naxalmovement, right from its first phase of1967, demonstrates that even if there has

been a continuous evolution in terms oftheir understanding of the Indian situation,the focus of the movement, its character,and the fighting capabilities and financialresources of these groups; they haveremained more or less consistent as far astheir core ideology is concerned.

Barring the Liberation, they all reject theparliamentary system of governance and

want to bring about a fundamental change

in the nature of the Indian state. For this,they have adopted the strategy of protractedarmed struggle, which entails building basesin rural and remote areas and transformingthem first into guerrilla zones and thenliberated zones, besides area-wise seizuresand encirclement of cities and finally, theseizure of political power and achievementof nation-wise victory. Fourth, the history ofthe movement so far, has been the historyof conflicts and splits. However, one cannot

deny that its history is also one of mergers.24

24For more information on integrated checkposts,

see the website of the Ministry of Home Affairs(http://mha.gov.in/BM_Div/BM_IntCheck(E).pdf).


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About the Author

Dr. Rajat Kumar Kujurteaches Political Science at the Gangadhar Meher Junior College,

Sambalpur, Orissa. He can be reached at [email protected].

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