rolls-royce v. rolls royce rizzy opinion.pdf
TRANSCRIPT
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY
ROLLS-ROYCE MOTOR
CARDS LIMITED
and ROLLS-ROCE MOTOR CARS
NA, LLC,
Civ. No. 15-04 17
KM
Plaintiff
OPINION
V.
ROBERT D.
DAVIS,
dba
ROLLS ROYCE
RIZZY,
Defendant.
KEVIN
MCNULTY,
U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiffs, Rolls-Royce
Motor
Cars Limited and Rolls-Royce Motor
Cars
NA ,
LLC, together
“Rolls-Royce” ,
bring this
suit against
defendant Robert
D.
Davis
a/k/a “Rolls Royce
Rizzy” related to infringement
of Rolls-Royce’s
trademarks. Plaintiffs
assert claims
for trademark
dilution,
trademark
infringement, and
unfair
competition/false designation of
origin under the
Lanham
Act,
15
U.S.C.
1051 et seq. Plaintiffs also assert claims under New
Jersey statutory and common law.
Dkt.
No . “Cplt.”
Before the
Court is
plaintiffs’
unopposed
motion
for default
judgment
Dkt.
No. 9 .
For
the
reasons discussed
below, I
will
partially grant the
motion
for default judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Rolls-Royce Motor
Cars
Limited
is
a
company
organized
under
the
laws of
England with
its
principal place
of business
in England.
Cplt.
¶
3
It distributes Rolls-Royce
vehicles
to
Rolls-Royce Motor Cars NA , LL
Id.
Rolls-Royce
Motor
Cars
NA ,
LLC
is
a
Delaware limited liability
company with
its
principal place
of
business in
New
Jersey.
Cplt.
¶
4 It is
responsible for
the
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w
hol
esal
e distr
ibuti
on
o
f Roll
s-Ro
yce veh
icles
th
roug
hou
t
the U.S
.
I
cL
De
fend
ant
Dav
is
r
esid
es
in G
eorg
ia. He
is a m
usic
ian w
ho
“
reco
rds o
ffers
, an
d
se
lls h
is
mus
ic un
der the
stag
e
n
ame ‘
Roll
s R
oyce
R
izzy
.”
Cp
lt.
5
R
olls
-Roy
ce M
oto
r
Ca
rs
Li
mite
d ow
ns thre
e U
.S. regi
stere
d
t
r de
m rk
s
re
leva
nt to
th
is ac
tion—
tw
o “RO
LLS
-RO
YCE
” tr de
m r
ks
Reg. N
os. 32
5 19
5
3
148
743
an
d
o
ne “R
R
Ba
dge
” trad
ema
rk
Reg
. No.
197
089
. Cp
lt.
1
0
Ro
lls-
Royc
e
M
oto
r
Car
s N
A, L
LC is
li
cens
ed to
use
the tr
dem
rks
in
co
nnec
tion
w
ith the
di
strib
utio
n and
s
ale
of Roll
s-Ro
yce ve
hicl
es. C
plt.
1
2
T
he
RO
LL
S-RO
YC
E
tr
dem
rks
ha
ve bee
n
us
ed
in
th
e U
.S. in
co
nne
ction
wit
h
automobiles
since
1935;
the
RR
badge
has been
in
use since
1905.
Cplt.
13-
1
4
Pla
intif
fs alleg
e th t
the
se tr
dem
rk
s are “
fam
ous
an
d
d
istin
ctiv
e” and
t
h t o
ne
way
R
olls
-Ro
yce ma
kes
us
e
of
th
e
mark
s is b
y licen
sing
t
hem
.
Cp
lt.
18
,
1
5
P
laint
iffs all
ege th
t Da
vis
re
cord
s
a
nd s
ells
mu
sic
und
er the stag
e n
ame
“R
olls
Ro
yce Rizz
y” a
nd
th
t
he
adv
ertis
es h
is m
usic
unde
r
th
t
nam
e
on
his
YouT
ube
ch
anne
l.
Cplt
.
19
T
hey also c
onte
nd
th t
D
avis sell
s s
hirts t
h t
co
ntai
n the
wor
ds
“T
eam Rol
ls R
oyc
e”
thro
ugh his
onlin
e
store
http
://ro
llsro
ycer
izzy.
spre
adsh
irt.c
om.
Id.
The
y
a
lso al
lege
th
t h
e
ma
kes us
e
of
the
RR
Ba
dge.
S
ee
Cplt
.
22
Plai
ntiffs se
nt D
avis mul
tip le ce
ase
an
d
des i
st
le
tter
s
re
que
sting th
t h
e
s
top
u
sing
the
s
tage
nam
e “R
olls R
oyc
e
R
izzy
” an
d
ins
truc
ting him to
di
scon
tinu
e a
ny othe
r u
se o
f
pla
intif
fs’ mar
ks. Cp
lt.
20
Pla
intif
fs c
onte
nd
th
t
Davis
has
n
ever
thel
ess c
onti
nued us
ing th
eir
m
arks—
fo
r
e
xam
ple
by
p
ostin
g
a phot
ogra
ph
on In
stag
ram
wear
ing a
“
Team Ro
lls
Roy
ce” sh
irt
an
d
a
ca
p
di
splay
ing
the
RR
ba
dge.
C
plt.
2
2
Pla
intif
fs
als
o al
lege th
t
Dav
is
p
osted
ref
eren
ces
to
this law
suit
o
n
I
nstag
ram
.
Dkt.
No
. 9
-2
16 H
e
c
ontin
ues to u
se
th
e
sta
ge
nam
e “
Roll
s R
oyc
e
R
izz
y.”
Dk
t.
N
o.
9-2
17
Pla
intif
fs
do
n
ot
requ
est
any
mo
ney dam
age
s. Ra
ther
the
y
as
k
the
cour
t
for a
pe
rma
nent
inj
uncti
on
rest
raini
ng Dav
is
from
usin
g
thei
r tr
adem
ark
s.
They
also
ask the Court
to
order defendant
to
remove
any such
tr dem rks
f
rom
hi
s
us
ines
s
and
web
site
and file
wi
th
the
Cou
rt
an
o
rder
set
ting
for t
h his
2
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compliance.
See Dkt.
No.
9-4
pp.
2-3)
II. DISCUSSION
A. ntry
of
Default
Judgment
“[Tjhe entry of a
default judgment is
left
primarily
to
the discretion of
the
district court.” Hritz v.
Woma Corp., 732 F.2d
1178,
1180
3d
Cir.
1984) citing
Tozer
v.
Charles
A.
Krause
Milling Co.,
189 F.2d 242, 244 3d
Cir.
1951)).
Because the entry of a
default
judgment
prevents the
resolution of
claims
on
the
merits, “this
court
does
not favor entry of defaults
and default
judgments.”
United
States
v.
55,518.05
in
U S
Currency,
728 F.2d
192,
194 3d Cir.
1984).
Thus,
before entering default
judgment, the Court must
determine whether
the
“unchallenged facts
constitute
a
legitimate cause of
action”
so
that
default
judgment
would
be permissible.
DirecTV,
Inc.
v.
Asher, Civ. No.
03-1969, 2006
WL
680533, at
1
D.N.J.
Mar.14, 2006) citing Wright,
Miller,
Kane,
1OA
Federal
Practice and
Procedure:
Civil 3d
2688, at
58—59 63).
“[D]efendants are
deemed
to
have admitted the
factual
allegations of the
Complaint
by
virtue of
their default, except those factual allegations related
to
the amount
of
damages.”
Doe
v. Simone,
Civ.
No. 12-5825,
2013
WL
3772532,
at
2
D.N.J.
July
17,
2013). While
“courts must accept the
plaintiffs well-
pleaded factual allegations as
true,” they “need not accept
the
plaintiffs
factual
allegations regarding
damages as true.” Id. citing Chanel,
Inc. v.
Gordashevsky,
558
F.Supp.2d 532, 536
D.N.J. 2008)).
Moreover, if
a
court
finds
evidentiary support to be
lacking, i t may order
or
permit a plaintiff
seeking
default judgment to
provide additional
evidence
in
support of the
allegations. Doe, 2013 WL
3772532,
at
2.
1. Prerequisites
Before a court may
enter
default
judgment against a
defendant, the
plaintiff
must have properly
served
the summons and complaint,
and
the
defendant
must
have failed
to
file an answer or
otherwise respond to the
complaint
within
the
time provided
by
the
Federal Rules, which
is
twenty-one
days.
See Gold Kist, Inc. v.
Laurinburg
Oil Co
Inc.,
756
F.2d
14, 18—19 3d
Cir.
3
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19
85 ; FE
R.
Civ
. P.
12
a .
Here
,
D
avis w
as prop
erly
s
erve
d
and
has faile
d
to
resp
ond
to
t
he
com
plai
nt.
See
D
kt.
No
.
9
-2
1
0)
De
fend
ant’
s tim
e
t
o
r
espo
nd to the
co
mpla
int h
s lo
ng sin
ce
exp
ired
.
A
ccor
ding
ly,
am sa
tisfi
ed th t
th
e
prer
equi
sites
to
filin
g
a
de
fault
ju
dgm
ent a
re
met.
Se
e
G
old
Kist
,
In
c., 75
6
F.2d
t
18—
19.
2.
Def
ault judg
men
t f ct
ors
mu
st now
ev
alua
te th
e
follo
win
g
thr
ee
fa
ctor
s:
1)
wh
ethe
r
th
e
par
ty
su
bjec
t to
d
efau
lt
h
as
a
m
erit
oriou
s
d
efen
se 2)
th
e pre
judic
e suf
fered
by
the
party
seeking
default
and
3)
the culpability
of
the party subject
to
default.
D
oug Bra
dy Inc. v
. N
.J. Bld
g.
L
abor
ers
S
tate
wide Fu
nds
250
F.R
.D. 17
1, 177
D
.N.J
.
20
08
cit
ing Em
cas
co
Ins.
Co
.
v
Sa
mbri
ck,
83
4 F.2
d
7
1, 74 3d
C
ir.
1987
. Thes
e
f
acto
rs w
eigh i
n fav
or of
e
ntry o
f
a
defa
ult
ju
dgm
ent
as to
cer
tain
of
p
lain
tiffs’ a
llege
d
c
ause
s
of act
ion .
a.
eri
torio
us Def
ense
As to
the first
factor
am disadvantaged
of
course
by
the
lack
of
any
su
bmis
sion
b
y
th
e defe
nda
nt but
w
ill
re
view
t
he
r
ecor
d th
t is
befo
re me.
See
C
oach
,
In
c.
v Ba
gs
A
cces
sorie
s
C
iv.
No. 10-
2555
20
11 W
L 1
882
403
t
D.N.
J.
M
ay
17,
2
011
“Be
caus
e
the D
efen
dant
s di
d
n
ot
res
pond
th
e C
our
t
ca
nnot deter
min
e whe
ther the D
efen
dants
had
me
ritor
ious de
fens
es
t
h t a
re
no
t ref
lecte
d
i
n the
reco
rd.”
. Ac
cept
ing the
factu
al
al
lega
tions
a
s
true
as
m
ust
a
m sat
isfied
th
t
pla
intiff
s
h
ave
st
ated cer
tain
of the
ir
c
laim
s for r
elief
.
find
th
t
p
lain
tiffs are
e
ntitl
ed
t
o
ju
dgm
ent on the
ir
clai
ms
for
trad
ema
rk
dil
utio
n und
er fede
ral a
nd
stat
e
law
C
oun
ts
a
nd IV
). My
inde
pend
ent
revie
w
of
the
re
cord
has
n
ot rev
eale
d
a
ny re
ason
to bel
ieve th t
thes
e cla
ims
a
re
le
gall
y f
lawe
d
or
th
t the
re is
a
m
erito
riou
s
d
efen
se to
t
hem
. Se
e
Do
e, 20
13
WL
37
725
32
at
5.
will
decl
ine
to
gran
t
p
lain
tiffs ju
dgm
ent
a
s
t
o th
eir
rema
inin
g
cl
aims
.
4
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Trademark
Infringement
Unfair Competition
and
False Designation
of Origin
Under
the
Lanham
Act
Section
32,
15
U.S.C.
Section
1114 1 :
1
Any
person
who
shall,
without
the consent of
the
registrant--
a
use
in
commerce
any
reproduction,
counterfeit,
copy,
or
colorable
imitation
of
a
registered
mark
in
connection
with
the sale, offering
for
sale, distribution,
or advertising
of
any
goods or
services
on
or
in
connection
with which
such
use
is
likely
to
cause
confusion, or
to
cause
mistake, or
to
deceive
Shall be liable in
a
civil
action
by
the
registrant
15
U.S.C.A.
§
11
14 1 a .
Furthermore,
the Lanham Act
Section 43 a
proscribes unfair
competition
or,
as
the statute
refers to
it, “false
designation of
origin”
or
“false description.”
15 U.S.C.A.
§
1125 a .
The
statute
provides
that:
1
Any
person who, on or
in connection
with any goods
or
services,
or any
container for
goods, uses in
commerce any
word,
term,
name,
symbol,
or device,
or
any
combination thereof,
or
any
false
designation
of
origin, false
or
misleading
description
of
fact, or
false or
misleading
representation of
fact,
which—
A
is
likely
to cause confusion,
or to
cause
mistake,
or to
deceive
as
to
the
affiliation,
connection,
or association
of
such person
with
another person,
or
as
to
the
origin,
sponsorship,
or
approval
of
his
or her
goods,
services, or
commercial
activities
by
another
person
shall
be liable
in
a civil
action by
any person who
believes
that
he
or
she
is
or is likely
to be
damaged
by
such
act.
15 U.S.C.A.
§
1125 a 1 A .
To
state
a claim
for
trademark
infringement,
15
U.S.C.
§
1114 1 ,
and
unfair
competition/false
designation
of
origin,
15
U.S.C.
§
125 a 1 ,
under
the
5
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L
an
h
am A
ct, a
p
lai
nt
iff
m
u
st
sh
ow
th
re
e ele
m
en
ts
:
“
1 )
it ha
s
a v
alid a
n
d l
egall
y
pr
ot
ec
tab
le
m
ar
k;
2)
it
owns
th
e
m
ar
k; an
d 3)
t
he
d
efe
nd
nts
us
e
of th
e
m
a
rk
to
ide
ntify
goo
ds
or
se
rv
ic
es
c
us
es
a l
ikeli
hood
o
f
co
nf
us
io
n.”
A H
Sp
or
ts
we
ar
,
In
c.
v.
Vict
oria
’s
Sec
ret
Sto
res,
I
nc.,
2
3
7
F.3d
19
8,
21
0
3
d
Cir.
2
000)
“W
e
m
ea
su
re
fe
de
ra
l tr
de
m
r
k
i
nf
rin
ge
m
en
t, 15
U.S
.C.
1
114
,
a
n
d
f
ed
er
al
un
fa
ir
c
om
p
eti
tio
n, 15
U.S.
C.
1
25 a
) 1)
A),
by
ide
n
tic
al s
tan
d
ard
s”
;
See
al
so
Cha
nel,
Inc
.
v.
Mato
s,
Civ. No
.
14
-3
50
9,
2
01
5
W
L 4
77
30
7
2,
a
t
*
10
n.6
D.
N.J. Au
g. 13
,
2015
)
“C
ourts
in t
he T
hi
rd
Ci
rcu
it
co
ns
id
er
cla
im
s
for
tr
ad
em
a
rk in
fr
ing
e
me
nt
an
d
fo
r fa
lse
d
e
sig
na
ti
on
o
f
ori
gin
u
nd
e
r an i
de
nt
ica
l
standard.”
citing
A H
Sportswear .
A
plaintiff bears the burden
of
proving
th
es
e ele
m
en
ts
.
A
s
to the
f
irs
t
ele
m
en
t,
p
lai
nt
iff
s
h
a
ve
alle
ged
o
wn
e
rsh
ip of
th
re
e
tr
d
em
r
ks
an
d
p
rovi
de
re
g
ist
rat
io
n
nu
m
be
rs
a
nd
th
e
da
te
of
re
gi
str
at
ion
for
ea
ch
.
See
C
plt.
10)
Plai
ntiff
s
alle
ge th
t
th
e r
eg
ist
ra
tio
ns “wer
e du
ly a
nd
l
egall
y is
su
ed
,
a
re
v
alid
an
d su
bs
is
tin
g, a
nd ar
e
inc
o
nte
st
ab
le pu
rsu
nt
to
15
U.
S.C.
160
5.”
I
d.
11)
The
y h
av
e
als
o
p
rovi
ded
th
e
c
er
tif
ica
te
s of
r
eg
ist
ra
tio
n.
S
ee D
kt.
N
o.
1
1) A
“ce
rtific
ate
of
registration issued
by
the United
S
ta
te
s P
ate
nt
a
nd
Tr
ad
em
a
rk
O
ffic
e
c
on
st
itu
te
s pr
im
a fa
cie
e
vide
nce
of
th
e
v
alidi
ty a
nd ow
n
ers
hi
p of a
d
is
pu
te
d
m
ar
k.
” C
oach
,
In
c.
v. C
osm
etic
Ho
use
C
iv.
No.
1
0-
27
94
,
2
011
WL 1
21
13
9
0,
*2
D
.N.J.
M
ar.
29
201
1) ce
rtific
ate
o
f
re
gi
str
at
ion
by
U.
S.
P
ate
n
t
a
nd
Tr
ad
em
a
rk Offi
ce
is
su
ff
ic
ien
t
t
o
e
sta
bl
is
h
t
he
f
irs
t an
d s
ec
on
d e
le
me
nt
s of
tra
de
m
ar
k
in
fr
in
ge
me
n
t a
nd
un
fa
ir
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
cl
aims
).
As
su
ch
,
a
m
s
ati
sf
ied t
h
t th
e f
irs
t t
wo e
le
m
en
ts
are
m
et.
A
s
to t
he
th
ir
d
e
lem
e
nt
, a
“lik
elih
ood
of con
fusio
n”
ex
is
ts
w
h
er
e
“c
on
su
m
er
s
vi
ewin
g t
he
m
a
rk
wou
ld p
ro
ba
b
ly as
su
m
e
th
t t
he
pr
od
uc
t
o
r
servi
ce
it
re
pr
es
en
ts is
as
so
ci
ate
d with
th
e so
ur
ce
o
f
a
di
ffe
re
nt p
ro
d
uc
t
or
serv
ice id
en
tif
ie
d
by
a si
mi
la
r m
a
rk
.”
Co
ach,
2011
W
L 12
11
3
90
, at
*3
q
uo
tin
g
Ford
M
otor
C
o.
v. Su
mmi
t
Moto
r Pro
ds.
Inc
. 93
0 F
.2
d 2
77
,
2
92
3d
C
ir. 19
91))
.
C
o
ur
ts c
on
si
de
r a v
ar
ie
ty of f
ac
tor
s w
he
n as
se
ss
ing w
h
eth
e
r
tw
o
m
a
rk
s
are
likely
to
cause consumer confusion.
In
this Circuit these factors include,
ut
a
re
n
ot
li
mi
te
d t
o
6
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1 )
the
degr
ee of
sim
ilarit
y betw
een
t
he
o
wne
r’s
mar
k
an
d the
a
lleg
ed
inf
ringi
ng
mar
k;
2)
t
he
st
reng
th
o
f
th
e ow
ner’
s
m
ark;
3)
t
he
pric
e
of
t
he
g
oods
a
nd
oth
er fac
tors
ind
icati
ve of
the
c
are
and
a
ttent
ion exp
ecte
d of co
nsum
ers w
hen m
akin
g a
purc
hase
;
4
)
th
e leng
th
of tim
e the d
efen
dant
has
use
d the
ma
rk
wi
thou
t
evid
ence
of ac
tual
c
onfu
sion
ari
sing;
5)
t
he
in
ten t
of the
defen
dan
t
in ado
pting
the ma
rk;
6 ) th
e ev
iden
ce of
act
ual
co
nfus
ion;
7) wh
ethe
r the
g
oods
,
th
ough not com
petin
g, are
marketed through the
same
channels
of
trade and advertised
th
roug
h
t
he
s
ame
me
dia;
8)
th
e exte
nt
to
w
hich
th
e
t
arge
ts
of
the
p
arti
es’ s
ales e
ffor
ts
are
the sam
e; 9
) the
rel
ation
ship
of
th
e
g
ood
s
in
the
min
ds o
f
c
onsu
mer
s
beca
use o
f
the sim
ilar
ity of
f
unct
ion;
1
0) othe
r fa
ctor
s
s
ugge
stin
g tha
t
th
e
con
sumi
ng
pub
lic
migh
t exp
ect
the
pr
ior
own
er to
man
ufac
ture a
pr
odu
ct
in
the defe
nda
nt’s m
ark
et,
or
tha
t
he
is
like
ly
to
ex
pan
d
in
to
t t
market.
Free
dom C
ard,
I
nc. v. JP
Mo
rgan Ch
ase
Co.,
43
2
F
.3d
4
63,
471
3
d
Ci
r.
2
005
qu
otin
g
Inte
rpac
e Co
rp.
v.
L
app, In
c., 7
21 F
.2d
460, 4
63
3d
C
ir. 19
83 .
The
Thir
d
Circ
uit
has “r
epea
tedl
y ins
isted
that the
La
pp
fact
ors
a
re
n
ot
to be
m
ech
anic
ally tall
ied,
b
ut ra th
er t
t they
are
t
ools
to gu
ide
a qua
litat
ive
de
cisi
on.” A
H
Sp
orts
wear
,
Inc.
,
237
F
.3d
at
216
. Rev
iewi
ng
th
ose
fa
ctors
,
find
that
they
point
in
bo
th
d
irec
tion
s. O
vera
ll, c
ann
ot f
ind th
at defe
nda
nt’s
u
se of
th
e a
llege
dly infr
ingi
ng ma
rks i
s
li
kely
t
o ca
use c
ons
ume
r
con
fusi
on.
“
The
sin
gle mos
t
im
port
ant fac
tor
in de
term
inin
g likel
ihoo
d
of
co
nfus
ion
i
s ma
rk
s
imil
arity
.” Id. Ma
rks
are co
nfus
ingly sim
ilar if
“ord
inary
con
sum
ers
w
oul
d
li
kely co
nclu
de t
t
[the tw
o pr
odu
cts]
sh
are
a
co
mm
on s
ourc
e,
affil
iatio
n,
c
onn
ectio
n,
or spo
nsor
ship
.” Id
. q
uotin
g Fis
ons H
ortic
ultur
e, Inc
.
v
.
i o
ro
In
dus.
, I
nc., 30 F
.3d 4
66, 4
77
3d
C
ir. 19
94
. W
here the
g
ood
s
o
r
s
ervi
ces
are
no
t
in
d
irect c
omp
etitio
n, as
is t
he
ca
se
here
, th
e deg
ree
of
7
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si
mi
la
rit
y
r
eq
u
ire
d
to
p
rov
e
li
kelih
ood
of co
nf
us
io
n
is h
ig
he
r
th
n
for
s
im
ila
r
pro
d
uc
ts. Kos
Ph
arm
.,
In
c. v.
A
n
drx C
orp.
,
36
9 F.
3d
7
00
,
7
13 3
d
C
ir.
2
004
c
it
ati
on o
mit
ted .
He
re,
Roll
s-Ro
yce
h
as
de
mo
n
str
at
ed
t
h
t
Dav
is
is
u
si
ng
m
ar
ks
—
no
t jus
t
s
im
ila
r to—
bu
t,
in
fa
ct, i
de
nt
ic
al to
th
e
ir ma
rk
s.
The
refor
e,
th
is el
em
en
t w
eig
hs
st
ro
ng
ly
in
f
avor
o
f pla
intif
fs.
Pla
intif
f
a
lso
al
leges
th
t
th
e
m
ar
ks ar
e “
fa
mo
u
s
a
n
d
di
st
inc
ti
ve
.”
Cplt
.
1
8 T
o ev
a
lua
te
th
is
fac
to
r,
a
co
ur
t
m
u
st “ex
ami
ne: 1
th
e m
a
rk
’s
di
st
inc
ti
ve
ne
ss
or
co
nc
ep
tu
al s
tre
n
gth
th
e in
he
re
nt fe
at
ur
es
of th
e m
a
rk
an
d
2
it
s
c
om
m
e
rc
ial st
re
ng
th fa
ct
ua
l evid
enc
e
of
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce rec
ogni
tion
.”
Freedom
Card,
Inc.,
432
F.3d
at
472 citation
omitted .
“The
co
nc
ep
tu
al
s
tre
ng
th
o
f
a
m
a
rk i
s m
e
as
ur
ed b
y cl
as
sif
yi
ng
th
e
m
a
rk
in
on
e o
f
f
ou
r
c
ate
g
or
ies r
an
g
ing
from
t
he
s
tro
n
ge
st
to t
he
we
ak
e
st: “
1 a
rb
itr
ar
y or
fan
c
ifu
l
s
uc
h
as
“K
OD
AK”
;
2
s
ug
ge
st
iv
e
su
ch
as “C
OPP
ERT
ON
E” ;
3
d
es
cr
ipt
iv
e
s
uc
h as
“SE
CU
RIT
Y
CEN
TE
R” ;
a
nd 4
ge
neri
c
su
c
h as
“D
IET
CH
OCO
LA
TE
FU
DGE
SO
DA
” Id
.
To d
e
ter
m
ine
co
m
m
er
cia
l
s
tr
en
gt
h, c
ou
rts
e
xa
mi
ne the
ma
rk
et
pl
ac
e re
co
gn
it
ion
of
th
e
tr
ad
em
a
rk
.
f
ind
th
t Ro
lls-R
oyc
e’s
marks
are
conceptually
strong.
They
appear
to
fall
i
nt
o th
e
s
tro
ng
es
t
c
on
ce
p
tua
l c
ate
go
ry of
a
rb
itr
ar
y or f
an
cif
ul m
a
rk
s. Se
e
Pro
Foo
t,
Inc. v.
MSD
Co
ns
um
e
r C
are,
Inc.
, Ci
v.
No.
1
1-
70
79
,
2
01
2
WL
22
6
29
04
,
at
*8
D.
N.J.
u
ne
14,
2
012
”A
rbitr
ary
or
fan
cifu
l
m
ar
ks u
se
ter
m
s
t
h
t
ne
ith
er
d
es
cr
ib
e
no
r
s
ug
ge
st
a
ny
th
in
g a
bo
ut the p
ro
du
ct
; t
he
y b
ea
r no lo
gica
l
or
su
gg
es
ti
ve
r
el
ati
on
to
th
e a
c
tua
l c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ics
o
f th
e go
ods
.” .
T
he
m
ark
s ar
e
c
er
ta
inl
y n
ot d
es
cr
ip
tiv
e or
gene
ric; a
t
t
he
very
le
as
t
th
ey
a
re s
ug
ge
sti
ve
pe
rh
ap
s
“R
olls
”
we
akly s
ug
ge
st
s th
e id
ea
of
wh
e
els
o
n
p
av
em
e
nt
,
bu
t
it
is
also
som
eon
e’s
nam
e .
W
ith re
sp
ec
t to
c
om
m
e
rc
ial s
tre
ng
th
,
p
la
in
tif
fs
alle
ge t
h
t t
he
m
ar
ks
a
re
“w
ell
kn
o
wn
an
d
u
ni
qu
e
a
n
d
ar
e
id
en
tif
ie
d
b
y
the
pu
bl
ic
sol
ely
wi
th
Plai
ntiffs
a
nd
th
ei
r pr
od
uc
ts a
nd
servi
ces.
”
Cplt
.
1
7
Pla
intif
fs
ss
ert
th
t
the
m
a
rk
s
ha
v
e
b
ee
n
u
se
d
f
or n
ea
rly
a
c
en
tu
ry
aro
u
nd
t
he
worl
d, an
d t
h
t t
he
y sp
en
d
“l
arge su
m
s
of m
one
y
for
wo
rldw
ide
ad
ver
tising
”
of
th
e
ir pro
d
uc
ts.
Id.
8
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Co
mm
ercia
l
str
eng
th
is
a
lso
imp
lied
by
pl
ainti
ff’s
alleg
atio
ns
th t
th
ey
lic
ense
t
heir
m
arks
.
Cplt.
15
W
hile
sp
ecifi
c fig
ures wo
uld
help
to su
ppo
rt
plain
tiffs
’
con
tent
ions
for
ex
amp
le,
sal
es num
ber
s,
co
mpa
ny
va
luati
on, etc.
,
I
will
a
ccep
t
th t
th
e
Ro
lls-R
oyc
e
m
ark
s
hav
e com
merc
ial viab
ility.
As
to
th
e th
ird fac
tor purc
hase
rs’
car
e
an
d so
phist
ica ti
on ,
I
find th
t
t
his
fa
ctor p
oints
in fav
or of
Da
vis.
See Sa
bins
a
Corp. v
Cre
ative Co
mpo
unds
,
LL
609 F.3d
175
,
1
86
3d
Cir. 201
0 n
otin
g
th t
“cou
rts have fo
und ther
e
is
no
t
a
stro
ng
like
liho
od
of
c
onfu
sion
[w
]her
e
the re
leva
nt pro
duct
s
a
re
ex
pens
ive, or the
buy
er
cla
ss con
sists
of
so
phis
tica
ted or pro
fess
iona
l
pur
chas
ers”
inte
rnal q
uo ta
tions
a
nd
cita
tion omit
ted .
Roll
s-Ro
yce
veh
icle
s
are
hig
h-en
d,
luxu
ry ca
rs th
t
ar
e e
xpen
sive
proh
ibiti
vely
so
for
mo
st
of
the
g
ene
ral pu
blic
.
Ac
cord
ingl
y,
mus
t ass
ume t
h t
indi
vidu
als in
t
he
ma
rket to
pur
chas
e such
vehi
cles exer
cise
a
hig
her s
t nd
rd of car
e th n
t
he
a
vera
ge
co
nsum
er
an
d
w
ould t
here
fore b
e
le
ss
su
scep
tible
to con
fusio
n by D
avis
’s
use
of
th
e
m rk
s
In
r
egar
d to the
fifth fac
tor, D
avi
s’s i
nten
t
in
usi
ng
th
e ma
rks, I
find
th t
this
factor
points
in
both directions
but
ultimately
favors
Davis.
“Plaintiffs
alleg
e th
t
Da
vis
“int
ends
by
h
is
una
utho
rized use
of
the
Rol
ls-R
oyce
mark
and
RR
Ba
dge to trad
e off
th
e
goo
dwi
ll
of Pl
ainti
ffs’
bus
ines
s.” Cplt.
25
agr
ee
th t
pla
intif
f
app
ears
to
hav
e
in
tent
iona
lly used ex
act
r
eplic
as
of plai
ntiff
s’
mar
ks to
prom
ote
his
mu
sic
car
eer.
In
ad
ditio
n,
th
e
ev
idenc
e
sup
port
s
pla
intif
fs’
c
onte
ntio
n
th
t Da
vis
c
onti
nued
to
do so
even af
ter
pl
ainti
ffs
in
form
ed him
of thei
r
o
wne
rsh i
p. See
C
plt.
2
0-22
am
a
lso
in
clin
ed to agre
e
th
t Dav
is
in
tend
ed
to
ben
efit
f
rom
the
repu
tatio
n
an
d
h
igh-
end luxu
ry
ima
ge
of
Rol
ls-Ro
yce
,
i.e.,
their
“goodwill”
ass
ume
t
his
is w
hy
he ado
pted
the
ir
The
fou
rth and s
ixth fa
ctor
s
a
re the
leng
th
of time
the defen
dan
t
ha
s used
the
m
ark
w
itho
ut evidence
of act
ual c
onfu
sion
arisi
ng
and
the evidence
of
act
ual
confusion.
Th
oug
h
evidence
of a
ctual co
nfusi
on
is
no
t re
quir
ed,
su
ch evidence is
“highly
pro
bativ
e
of
a likeithood
of confusion.”
Sa
bins
a
Corp., 609
F.3d
at 187. The
reco
rd does no
t
con
tain
evidence
relat
ing
to
ei
ther
factor.
This may be
be
caus
e
p
laint
iff
has
not had th
e opp
ortun
ity to cond
uct
discovery as
to
actu
al
c
onfu
sion du
e
to Davis’s
lack
of
appearance
in
this
case. In any event,
do
not grant
these
factors
weight
in my
an
alysi
s.
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mark
s a
nd not
a
l
esse
r bran
d of vehi
cle . How
eve
r,
“[a]
defe
ndan
t’s mer
e
inte
nt
to
copy”
w
ithou
t
“int
ent
to
c
onfu
se
cu
stom
ers” is n
ot enou
gh to fin
d
in
plain
tiffs
fa
vor. Sab
insa
Corp.,
60
9 F.3d
t
187
e
mph
asis
in
ori
gina
l
int
erna
l
qu
otat
ions and
cita
tion
o
mit
ted .
Pl
ainti
ffs
have
no
t d
emo
nstra
ted
th t
Dav
is
int
ende
d to
ca
use
con
fusio
n
abou
t
his
re
latio
nshi
p
wit
h Ro
lls-R
oyce
.
In
ad
ditio
n, D
avis
post
ing
ab
out
the
litig
ation on so
cial m
edia wo
uld seem
to
u
nder
u t
th t a
rgum
ent
.
Se
e
D
kt.
No. 9-
2
16
T
her
efore
,
b
ecau
se p
lain
tiffs
h
ave
no
t d
emo
nstra
ted
a
n
inte
nt
to c
onfu
se,
fin
d t
h t this
fa
ctor
lea
ns
s
light
ly
i
n
fa
vor
of Da
vis.
T
he
seve
nth,
eigh
th,
a
nd ninth fa
ctor
s ad
dres
s
the
“n
atur
e of the
s
ervi
ces
p
rovi
ded,
t
he c
usto
mers targe
ted, an
d th
e
me
thod
s used to
rea
ch
th
ose
cu
stom
ers.”
Prim
epoi
nt,
L.L.C.
v P
rime
Pay
,
Inc.,
5
45
F.
Sup
p. 2d 426
,
444
D.
N.J.
2
008 add
ressi
ng th
ese
fac
tors to
geth
er .
T
hes
e
f
acto
rs
w
eigh in
Dav
is’s
favo
r.
T
he
“
grea
ter
the s
imila
rity
in
adve
rtisi
ng
a
nd
m
ark
eting ca
mpa
igns
, the
gre
ate r th
e l
ikeli
hood
o
f
c
onfu
sion
.”
Chec
kpo
int Sy
s., Inc.,
26
9
F.
3d
t
288—89.
“Wh
en
th
e p
artie
s
ta
rget t
heir sales
eff
orts to the sam
e
gr
oup
o
f
c
onsu
mer
s,
there
is
a greater
likelihood
of
confusion
between
two
marks.” Sabinsa
Corp.,
609 F
.3d t 188.
Th
e pa
rties
op
erate in
en
tirel
y
s
epar
ate ind
ustr
ies
a
nd
of
fer
dissi
mila
r
pr
odu
cts
and se
rvic
es.
T
her
e is no ev
iden
ce
th
t
the
pa
r ties tar
get
their
sale
s effo
rts to
th
e sam
e m
ark
et
s
egm
ent,
or t
h t
th
e p
arti
es
use th
e
sam
e
me
thod
s
of pro
moti
on
to
targe
t
thes
e
co
nsum
ers
;
i
n fa
ct,
th
e
e
vide
nce
t
ends
to
p
oint
in the o
ppo
site dire
ctio
n. See
Dkt. Nos.
1-2;
9-
2
Ex. 7
-8 .
O
vera
ll, the
se
fa
ctors
do
not
lead m
e to
beli
eve
th
t Da
vis’s use o
f
th
e
mark
s
w
oul
d ca
use
con
sum
er conf
usion
.
U
pon revie
w
of
the
relev
ant
fa
ctors
, find th
t
p
laint
iffs
h
ave not
estab
lish
ed
a
l
ikeli
hood
o
f
co
nfus
ion
du
e
to Da
vis’
s
use
of
the m
ark
s.
The mos
t
like
ly
risk o
f
c
onfu
sion
,
in
my view,
is
t
he ris
k th
t
a
cons
ume
r
m
ay
b
elie
ve
th
t the
re
is
an “
asso
ciati
on,”
“spo
nsor
ship
,”
o
r relat
ions
hip of “app
rov
al”
b
etwe
en
R
olls
Royce a
nd Da
vis.
15
U.S.
C.A.
1125 a 1 A .
Fo
r exam
ple
,
Davis’s
actions
could lead
an
unsuspe ting
consumer
to
believe
he
has
obta
ined perm
issi
on
fro
m
Rol
ls-R
oyce
to
us
e their mar
ks,
or
pe
rhap
s
e
ven
th
t
10
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mark
r
egar
dles
s
of
th
e p
rese
nce
or a
bsen
ce
o
f ac
tual
or
likel
y
con
fusi
on
of com
petit
ion
or of a
ctua
l
econ
omi
c in
jury
.
15
U.S
.C.
12
5 c
1 . The
sta
tute
defin
es a
fa
mou
s
ma
rk as
a
mar
k
t t is
“
wide
ly
re
cogn
ized
by
th
e g
ene
ral c
ons
umin
g pub
lic
of
the
U
nite
d
State
s
as
a
d
esig
natio
n
of
s
ourc
e of
t
he goo
ds or
serv
ices
of the
m
ark
’s
ow
ner.”
12
5 c
2
A .
Fu
rther
mor
e
S
ectio
n
12
5 c
2
B defi
nes
“
dilut
ion b
y bl
urrin
g”
as
“
asso
ciatio
n a
risin
g from
th
e
sim
ilarit
y be
twe
en
a m
ark o
r
trad
e nam
e
and
a
fam
ous
m
ark t
ha t
imp
airs
th
e dis
tinc
tiven
ess o
f t
he fam
ous mar
k.”
S
ectio
n
125
c 2
C def
ines
“
dilut
ion by
tarn
ishm
ent”
as an “
asso
ciati
on
arisi
ng
f
rom
the similarity between a
mark
or
trade name and a famous
mark
t t
harms
th
e
rep
utati
on of
the
fam
ous ma
rk.”
“T
he
fede
ral
caus
e of act
ion f
or
tra
dem
ark dil
utio
n
gran
ts
extra
prote
ctio
n to str
ong
wel
l-rec
ogni
zed ma
rks
even
in
the
ab
senc
e
o
f
a
likel
ihoo
d
of
cons
ume
r
con
fusio
n—
the
c
lassi
cal te
st f
or
trade
mar
k infri
ngem
ent
—if
the
de
fend
ant’s
us
e
dim
inish
es or
d
ilute
s
t
he s
tron
g iden
tifica
tion
valu
e
asso
ciat
ed
wi
th the
p
lain
tif fs fa
mou
s m
ark.”
Tim
es M
irr
or
Ma
gazi
nes I
nc.
v
Las
V
egas
Sp
orts
N
ews
L
.L.C
., 212 F
.3d
1
57, 16
3
3d
Cir. 2
000
. Th
e
T
hird
Circ
uit
has
pr
ovid
ed
t
t
a
pla
intiff m
ust p
rov
e
the
follo
win
g elem
ents
to es
tabli
sh
a
prim
a
fa
cie cl
aim
un
der th
e
fe
dera
l
dilu
tion s
tatu
te:
The p
laint
iff i
s
the
o
wne
r
o
f
a
ma
rk
that q
uali
fies as a
“
famo
us”
m
ark
in
light
o
f the
tot
ality
of t
he ei
ght f
acto
rs li
sted
in
12
5 c
1 ,
2.
T
he
def
enda
nt is
mak
ing co
mme
rcia
l u
se
in
i
nters
tate co
mme
rce
of a
mark
or
trad
e
na
me
3
.
De
fend
ant’
s
use
beg
an
afte
r
th
e
pla
intif
fs m
ark be
cam
e
fam
ous
and
4. De
fend
ant’
s us
e caus
es
d
ilut
ion
b
y
less
ening
th
e
ca
paci
ty
of t
he
plain
tiffs
ma
rk
t
o iden
tiiy
an
d di
sting
uish
g
ood
s
o
r se
rvic
es.
Id.
A
s
dis
cuss
ed
sup
ra p
lain
tiffs
have
prov
ided e
vide
nce
of th
e firs
t
ele
men
t.
2
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That evidence
consists
of
trademark
registrations establishing ownership
of
a
valid and
legally
protectable
mark.
See
Cplt.
10-11;
Dkt.
No . 11; see also
Coach,
2011 WL 1211390, at
*2 .
As
to whether
the
marks
are famous
under
15
U.S.C.
§
125 c) 1),
find
th t
they are.
The Third
Circuit has considered the
following
factors when determining whether a
mark
is
distinctive or famous:
A
the
degree
of
inherent
or
acquired
distinctiveness of
the
mark;
B
the
duration and
extent
of
use
of
the
mark in
connection
with
the
goods
or services
with
which the mark is used; C
the
duration
and extent
of
advertising
and publicity
of
the
mark;
D
the
geographical extent
of
the
trading
area
in which
the
mark is used;
E the
channels of
trade
for
the
goods
or
services with which the
mark
is
used;
F the degree
of
recognition
of
the
mark in
the
trading
areas and
channels
of
trade used by
the
mark
owner and
the
person against whom the
injunction
is
sought; G the n ture
and extent
of
use
of
the
same
or similar marks
by
third parties.
Id.
citing
15
U.S.C.
§
1125 c) 1) A)- H)).
take
judicial
notice
th t
the name
“Rolls-Royce”
is
well
established
and
very
well
known. Plaintiffs’ marks are distinctive, as
outlined
in the
preceding
section discussing infringement,
supra.
In
addition,
plaintiffs allege
th t
they
have
spent
“well over three
qu rters of
a century
producing
goods
and
rendering services recognized
in
the United
States
and throughout
the
world
to
be
of
the highest
quality.”
Cplt.
¶
16
They
ssert th t
they have
“continuously”
used
the
ROLLS-ROYCE
marks and RR
Badge
since
1935
and
1905,
respectively.
Cplt.
12-13)
As
a
result, plaintiffs
say, their
tr dem rks
“have become
well
known
and
unique and
are
identified
by
the
public solely
with
Plaintiffs
and their products and services.”
Cplt.
¶
17
Plaintiffs contend
th t
they
“enjoy
an exceedingly valuable reputation”
around
the
world
both
with
pur h sers of
their products as
well
as other
members of the public.
Cplt.
¶
18).
In
sum,
plaintiffs
allege
th t
their trademarks
are “famous
and
distinctive.” Id .
¶
19 note th t Davis’s choice
to use
Rolls-Royce’s marks
to
13
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prom
ote
his m
usic
c
aree
r
w
ould itse
lf
ten
d t
o co
rrob
orat
e
pla
intif
fs’
po
int.
In
sh
ort,
fin
d
th
t t
he
mar
ks are fam
ous w
ithi
n
t
he
m
ean
ing
of the
sta
tute
.
The
se
cond
el
emen
t
is
de
fend
ant’s
use
of
the
mar
k “in
in
terst
te
com
me
rce.”
Se
e T
ime
s
M
irr
or
M
agazines,
Inc.,
212 F.3d
at
163.
Even in
the case
o
f a def
ault
judg
men
t, the
re
m
ust
be so
me s
how
ing,
bu
t
t
he
“q
uant
um
of
co
mm
ercia
l
act
ivity
need
ed
to
dem
ons
trate
in
terst
te com
me
rce
is
no
t
gre
at,”
C
oach
,
Inc.,
2
011 WL
18
8240
3,
t
4
Con
gress
inten
ded t
o
regu
late to
the
Con
stitu
tion
al limit
.
See
15
U.S
.C.
1
127 “
The
wo
rd
‘c
omm
erc
e’
m
ean
s al
l
com
me
rce w
hich
m
ay lawf
ully be
regu
lated
by
Co
ngre
ss” . Thu
s,
ev
en an
ntr
s
tate
in
fring
eme
nt
may
be
reac
hed u
nde
r
th
e
La
nha
m
A
ct
if it
h
s
“a
s
ubst
nti
l ef
fect,
e
cono
mic
or ot
herw
ise,
upo
n
p
lain
tiff’s
i
nter
state us
e
of
the
m
ark
.” See
McC
arth
y
on Tra
dem
arks
2
5:56
.
H
ere, p
lain
tiffs al
lege t
h t
D
avis
is
a m
usi
cian
,
th
t h
e em
ploy
s
the
s
tage
na
me “
Rolls
Roy
ce R
izzy
,”
th
t
h
e
a
dver
tises h
is rec
ordin
gs und
er
th
t nam
e o
n
h
is
Yo
uTu
be
ch
ann
el,
a
nd th
t
he
se
lls
“
Tea
m
R
olls
Ro
yce”
sh
irt s
in
his
on
line sto
re. C
plt.
¶
9
Thes
e
a
ctivi
ties,
by
the
ir
v
ery
n tu
re
in
volv
e
in
ters
t te c
omm
erce
.
also am
satisfied
th t
the third element
of
plaintiff’s
prima
facie
case
of
dilu
tion is me
t. A
cco
rding
to
pla
intiff
s, D
avis
bega
n
usin
g
th
eir tr
dem
rk
s
a
fter
th
e m
arks
beca
me
f
amo
us.
Se
e
C
plt.
¶
1
6, 20
-23
. T
he rec
ord
s
uppo
rts
su
ch
a
co
nten
tion
.
T
he
ma
rks hav
e been r
egis
tered
sin
ce 1
905
and
193
5, and
pla
intif
fs’
alle
gatio
ns
ab
out D
avi
s’s misu
se
of the
mark
s
stem
from
co
ndu
ct in
201
4.
Se
e
Cp
lt.
13
-14,
19
-22
Fin
ally,
find th
t th t
t
he four
th elem
ent
,
t
h t
“D
efen
dant
’s
us
e
c
ause
s
dilu
tion
by l
esse
ning th
e capa
city
o
f
the
plai
ntiff
s
m
ark
to id
enti
fy
and
dist
ingu
ish
good
s or
serv
ices,
”
is m
et.
Ti
mes M
irro
r
Ma
gazi
nes,
21
2
F
.3d
t
1
63.
D
iluti
on oc
curs w
hen
t
here
i
s
“b
lurr
ing” or “ta
rnish
ing
”
o
f the
t
radem
ark
.
Wo
rld W
rest
ling
Fed’
n E
ntm
’t
I
nc. Big
Do
g Ho
ldin
gs,
In
c.,
280 F. Sup
p.
2d
41
3,
4
41
W
.D
. Pa.
200
3 .
Bl
urrin
g occ
urs wh
en de
fend
ant’
s
us
e
of
the
m
ark
“cau
ses th
e id
entif
ying
feat
ures o
f pla
intiff
’s ma
rk
to
bec
ome
vagu
e an
d
les
s
distinctive.”
Id.
citing
Times Mirror
Magazines
Inc.
Las
Vegas
Sports
News,
212
F.3
d 157
,
16
3
3
d
Cir.
2
000
.
De
fend
ant’
s
use
of
th
e m
ark
les
sens
14
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plaintiff’s
ability to
use the mark to
“serve as
a
unique identifier” of
its product.
Id.
Tarnishment
“occurs
when the
effect of
defendant’s use of
a
mark is
to
dilute
by
tarnishing
or
degrading
positive
associations
of
the
mark and
diluting
the
distinctive
quality
of
the mark.”
Id. at
442
citing
McCarthy
on Trademarks
and
Unfair
Competition
24.95 .
“A mark
is
tarnished, therefore, when
it
is
improperly
associated with
an
inferior or
offensive
product or
service
presenting
a danger
that
customers
will
form
unfavorable associations
with
the
mark.”
Id.
at 443 emphasis
in
original
quoting
Avery Dennison Corp.
v.
Sumpton,
189
F.3d
868,
881
th
Cir. 1999
internal quotations
and
citation
omitted ;
See also Hormel
Foods
Corp. v. Jim
Henson
Prods.,
Inc.,
73
F.3d 497,
507 2d
Cir.
1996 ”The
sine qua non of
tarnishment
is
a finding
that plaintiffs
mark will suffer negative
associations through defendant’s
use.” .
Here,
plaintiffs
base their
dilution
claim on
allegations
that
they have
“suffered damage to
the goodwill
associated with their
ROLLS-ROYCE
trademark
and
RR Badge.”
Cplt.
¶
32
Plaintiffs
assert that
they have
a
“valuable reputation” in
the
U.S.
and
around
the
world,
and
they argue
that
if
defendant’s
actions continue,
he
will
“irreparably
harm
Plaintiffs
and the
goodwill they enjoy under their
marks.” Dkt.
No.
9-1
pp.
4-5
This
appears
to
be a
claim based on
tarnishment.
find that plaintiffs
have sufficiently
alleged
their tarnishment claim.
Specifically,
plaintiffs
have
submitted materials
from Davis’s
social
media
account, advertisements,
and promotional
materials that reflect
language and
imagery
that
could create
negative associations with plaintiffs’
products.
Hormel,
73 F.3d at 507. For
example,
plaintiffs
have submitted an
advertisement
for
an
event “hosted
by
Rolls Royce
Rizzy,”
entitled
“Call
of
Booty,” which features
a scantily-clad
woman and
advertises
a
“Booty
Shaking
Contest.”
Dkt.
No. 1-2
p.
14
Plaintiffs
have submitted
other
materials
that
promote
“Rolls
Royce
Rizzy” and reference
his
“hit
singles” entitled
“Gah
Damn”
and “Hoe in You.” Dkt. No.
9-3
p.
62
The
apparent cover
of
Davis’s album,
also
advertised
under
the name
“Rolls Royce Rizzy,” is
named
“Pimp’n”
and
features
a
parental
advisory
for
explicit
lyrics. Id .
p.
73
Under
these facts,
15
g g
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find t
ha t pla in
tiffs
ha
ve m
et
the
fo
urth
e
leme
nt
of
the
ir pr
ima
fa
cie case
o
f
dilu
tion
und
er
a
tar
nish
men
t
theo
ry.
In
add
ition
,
“C
our
ts in
th
is
dist
rict
have
foun
d
liab
ility
und
er fe
dera
l
law
to
b
e su
ffici
ent
to
esta
blish
liab
ility
u
nde
r
state
law.” Coach, Inc.
v.
Cosmetic
H
ous
e, C
iv. No
.
10-2
794,
201
1 WL
1
2113
90,
at 5
D.N
.J.
Mar
.
29,
2
011
; S
ee
als
o 80
0-JR C
igar
, I
nc. v.
GoT
o.co
m,
Inc
.,
43
7 F.
Su
pp.
2
d 2
73,
29
4
D.N
.J.
2
006
“
Dilu
tion
claim
s
un
der Ne
w
Jers
ey law a
re su
bjec
t to
the
sam
e
co
nsid
erati
ons a
s
feder
al d
ilut
ion
cl
aims
.” .
A
ccor
ding
ly,
w
ill
ente
r defa
ult
jud
gme
nt
as
to
p
laint
iffs’ c
laim
o
f fede
ral
trade
mar
k
dilu
tion
un
der the
La
nham
A
ct C
oun
t
I , as
w
ell as
Ne
w
Jer
sey
law
Coun
t
IV
.
i
ii.
Unju
st en
rich
men
t
U
nder
New
Jers
ey
la
w,
t
o
e
stab
lish
unj
us t
enri
chme
nt, a
p
lain
tiff
mus
t
sho
w
1
“that
de
fend
ant
re
ceiv
ed a
bene
fit”
a
nd
2
“tha
t rete
ntion
of that
be
nefi
t w
itho
ut
pay
men
t w
oul
d b
e
unj
ust.”
VR
G Co
rp.
v.
G
KN Re
alty
C
orp.
, 1
35
N.J.
539,
554
1994
internal citations
omitted ;
Alboyacian
v.
BPProds.
N.
Am.
,
C
iv.
No.
01-5
143,
20
11 W
L5
8730
39,
at
D.
N.J. No
v. 22,
20
11 .
P
lain
tiffs
alle
ge
in
ve
ry
ge
nera
l
te
rms
t
ha t
Dav
is
“
is ma
king
u
se
of, an
d
profi
ting
fro
m,
Plai
ntiff
s’
RO
LLS
-RO
YCE
and
RR B
adge
ma
rk w
itho
ut
perm
issi
on
from
P
laint
iffs.
”
Cpl
t.
60
How
ever
, plai
ntiff
s
have
n
ot
s
et
for
th
any
fact
s
estab
lish
ing that
Da
vis
has pr
ofite
d
as
a m
usi
cian
as
a
dire
ct re
sult
o
f his
use
of the
Ro
lls-R
oyc
e
ma
rks
a
s
op
pose
d
to
his ta
len t
o
r bus
iness
acu
men
; n
or
ha
ve
they
alleg
ed any
fac
ts
su
gges
ting
to
w
hat
d
egre
e
or in
w
hat
am
ou
nt
th
ey
b
elie
ve
Da
vis
ha
s
be
en
un
justl
y enri
ched
;
nor
ha
ve
th
ey
st
ated
how
a ben
efit
was
co
nfer
red
on
defen
dan
t
with
the
e
xpec
tatio
n of pa
yme
nt.
In
add
ition
,
no
te
that plai
ntiff
s
are not
re
ques
ting m
onet
ary
da
mag
es
in
this
a
ctio
n,
on
ly inj
unct
ive
rel
ief. See
D
kt. No
. 9
p
.
8
Ac
cord
ingl
y,
I
w
ill not
e
nter d
efau
lt ju
dgm
ent
as to
plain
tiffs
’ cl
aim
of
un just
enrichment,
which
in
any event
is
superfluous.
Count
VII .
16
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17/22
b. P
reju
dice
s
uffe
red
b
y t
he
p r
ty seek
ing
de
fault
Sec
ond,
am
per
suad
ed th t
plain
tiffs wou
ld
s
uffer pre
judi
ce if defa
ult
ju
dgm
ent wer
e den
ied. D
avi
s was pr
oper
ly se
rved
over
a
year
a
go,
ye
t fa
iled
t
o
ppe r
or defend
himself
in
any manner. See
Team
ste
rs Pe
nsio
n
F
und
of
Phi
lade
lphia
V
icin
ity
v
. Am.
H
elper
, Inc
.,
Ci
v.
No
. 11-
624,
20
11
WL
472
9023
,
t
*
4
D
.N.J
. Oc
t.
5, 201
1 ;
D
kt.
N
o. 9-2
10. Giv
en d
efen
dant
’s c
ontin
ued
infri
ngem
ent and
refu
sal
to
r
espo
nd
t
o
the c
omp
laint
othe
r
th
n poki
ng
fu
n
t
it
on so
cial m
edia
,
fin
d
th
t
pla
intif
fs
w
ould
s
uffer on
goin
g harm
a
nd
pre
judi
ce
if
a
de
fault
jud
gme
nt
were d
enie
d.
See
D
kt. No
.
9
-2
17
Plain
tiffs
h
ave
b
een pr
ejud
iced by
d
efen
dant
’s fa
ilure
to
answ
er
be
cau
se t
hey h
ave
in
curr
ed add
ition
al cost
s
and
atto
rney
s’ fees
asso
cia t
ed
with
pro
tecti
ng
their
righ
ts and be
caus
e
D
avis
’s fail
ure
to app
ear h s
im
ped
ed plai
ntiff
s’ a
bilit
y
to
proc
eed
in
th
is ac
tion
, incl
udin
g it
s a
bilit
y
to
ga
in
ac
cess
to
rel
evan
t dis
cove
ry.
It wo
uld b
e ineq
uita
ble to
a
llow
D
avis
to
p
reclu
de p
laint
iffs’
requ
este
d
relie
f b
y
s
imp
ly
fai
ling
to
a
ppea
r.
c.
Culpability
of
the
p rty sub ject
to default
T
hird
,
b
sent
any
evid
enc
e
to
th
e
c
ontr
ary,
“
the
De
fend
ant’
s
fai
lure
to
a
nswe
r evin
ces t
he D
efe
ndan
t’s cu
lpabi
lity i
n
its
def
ault.
The
re is
n
othi
ng
bef
ore the C
ourt
to
sho
w
th t
the
Defe
ndan
t’s
f
ailur
e
to
file a
n ans
wer w
as
n
ot
will
fully
ne
glige
nt.” Te
ams
ters
Pe
nsio
n
Fu
nd
of Ph
ilade
lphi
a
Vi
cinit
y,
2
011
WL
47
2902
3,
at
*4
c
iting
Pr
uden
tial In
s. C
o. of
A
mer
ica
v
.
Tay
lor,
C
iv. No.
08—
2
108, 200
9 WL 536
403
t
*1
D.
N.J.
F
ebru
ary
27
, 20
09 f
indi
ng
th
t whe
n
t
here
is noth
ing
be
fore
the
cou
rt
to
sugg
est an
ythin
g oth
er t
h n
th
t
t
he
d
efen
dan
t’s willf
ul
n
eglig
ence ca
used
the defe
ndan
t to
fa
il
to
file
an
an
swer
, the
defe
ndan
t’s
con
duct
is culp
able a
nd
warr
ants d
efau
lt
ju
dgm
ent
. D
efen
dant
w
as
s
erve
d with
the
c
omp
laint
back
on
n
u ry
16
, 20
14. See
D
kt. N
o.
9-
2
10 Def
enda
nt ha
s no
t
res
pond
ed.
Aga
in,
note th
t it
is cle
ar th
t
Dav
is
is
aw
are
of
p
lain
tiffs’ s
uit
ba
sed
on
his
soc
ial m
edia a
ctivi
ty. See
D
kt. N
o. 9-2
16
The
obvious conclusion
is
th t
Davis
is
culpable
for
this
failure
and unable
to
offe
r
a
pla
usib
le
de
fens
e.
17
Case 2:15-cv-00417-KM-JBC Document 13 Filed 03/11/16 Page 18 of 22 PageID: 189
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18/22
A
cco
rding
ly,
fi
nd
th
t
t
he
en
try
o
f a de
faul
t
judg
men
t
is
appr
opri
ate
as
to C
ount
s
I
and
IV .
B. R
eme
dies
Pl
ainti
ffs
re
ques
t
th
t
the
C
ourt
ente
r
a
p
erm
anen
t
inju
ncti
on
aga
ins t
Davi
s
enjo
ining
h
im
f
rom
an
y
fur
ther
us
e
of th
eir
ma
rks.
T
he S
upre
me C
ourt
req
uire
s,
in g
ener
al,
th
t
any
p
lain
tiff
se
ekin
g
a
perm
ane
nt in
junc
tion
sho
w
1
th
t it
h
s
suff
ered
an
irrep
arab
le
in
jury;
2 t
h
t rem
edie
s
a
vaila
ble
at
law
, s
uch
as m
onet
ary
da
mag
es,
are
in
ade
quat
e
to
compensate
for
th t
injury ;
3
that, considering the balance
of
h
r s
hips
bet
ween
t
he
plain
tiff
and
de
fend
ant,
a
re
med
y
in
e
quity
is war
rante
d;
and
4
th
t the
pu
blic
inter
est
w
oul
d no
t b
e
disse
rved
by a
pe
rma
nent
in
junc
tion
.
eBa
y,
I
nc. v.
M
erc
Exch
ang
e,
LL
C,
547
U.S
. 388
,
391
200
6
cit
ation
s
om
itted
.
The
Co
urt
ma
y
issu
e
a
pe
rma
nent
inju
nctio
n
in th
e
co
ntext
o
f
a
de
fault
ju
dgm
ent
wh
ere
t
hese
re
quire
men
ts
are
m
et.
Se
e
C
oach
, In
c. v
.
Oc
ean
Po
int
Gifts,
Civ.
No.
09-42
1
5,
2010
WL
2
521
444,
at
*1
0
D.N
.J.
u
ne 14,
20
10 .
The
La
nham
Act
in
pa
rticu
lar
co
ntain
s
a
s
pecif
ic
statu
tory
auth
oriza
tion
f
or
perm
ane
nt i
njun
ctive
r
elief
to p
reve
nt
or
restr
ain
t
rade
mark
d
ilutio
n.
15 U.S.
C.
§
111
6 a