road to the manifestos: the final mile

ROAD TO THE MANIFESTOS:

THE FINAL MILE

ROAD TO THEMANIFESTOS:

THE FINAL MILE

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Con

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CHAPTER ONE Introduction 6

by Tim Allan

CHAPTER TWO The most unpredictable government ever 10

by Tom Mludzinski and Sam Sharps

CHAPTER THREE Lessons from last time (1) 18

by Hugo Sutherland

CHAPTER FOUR Lessons from last time (2) 26

by James O’Shaughnessy

CHAPTER FIVE What might be different 36

CHAPTER SIX What’s on the table 42

CHAPTER SEVEN Red lines and promises 48

CHAPTER EIGHT Who is at the table? 54

CHAPTER NINE The permanent government 64

by Sam Sharps

CHAPTER TEN What it means for you 70

by Ben Thornton

CHAPTER ELEVEN Working with you 76

CHAPTER ONE Introduction 6

by Tim Allan

CHAPTER TWO The most unpredictable government ever 10

by Tom Mludzinski and Sam Sharps

CHAPTER THREE Lessons from last time (1) 18

by Hugo Sutherland

CHAPTER FOUR Lessons from last time (2) 26

by James O’Shaughnessy

CHAPTER FIVE What might be different 36

CHAPTER SIX What’s on the table 42

CHAPTER SEVEN Red lines and promises 48

CHAPTER EIGHT Who is at the table? 54

CHAPTER NINE The permanent government 64

by Sam Sharps

CHAPTER TEN What it means for you 70

by Ben Thornton

CHAPTER ELEVEN Working with you 76

Contents

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

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Intr

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In the run up to the 2010 election, Portland

published its guide to the next five years. We

called it Cameron’s Britain. We did so knowing

that while events can always throw you, it was

pretty clear who was going to be the next Prime

Minister. And aside from a few days where nobody quite seemed

to know what would happen next, we never worried very much

about the title of our document. Finally Portland’s Sam Sharps

and Ben Thornton have sketched the scene in Whitehall during

an election, and drawn some lessons for anyone who has a stake

in the outcome.

Five years on, the future is very cloudy indeed. We could

speculate what Cameron’s Britain might look like in 2020, or

Miliband’s, or perhaps someone else. But predicting who will

end 2015 as Prime Minister is not an easy call. The outcome in

May is as uncertain as any election in living memory, save to

say we may well have a second hung parliament in a row for

the first time in more than a century.

So those outside the Westminster negotiation rooms need

to understand what the result might mean, how the parties will

then behave and where a deal might be done to form a government.

To help bring some clarity to the situation, we’ve worked

with ComRes to flesh out seven post-election scenarios. Some

are more likely than others, but each is possible. We have spent

some time sketching out what they might mean for the parties

and for policy.

Our own James O’Shaughnessy was right at the centre of

the negotiations last time. His account of the negotiations,

published here for the first time, gives a view from the

Conservative camp. The Liberal Democrats and Labour already

have their authoritative versions in the public domain, in the

words of Andrew Adonis and David Laws. We have rounded up

here the key lessons to be drawn from their respective books

(both worth a read and available in all fine bookshops…).

Together these three give us about as comprehensive account

of the coalition negotiations as you could want.

Tim

Alla

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anag

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Dir

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ortl

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The question then is whether history will be repeated. To

see what a fresh round of negotiations would look like, we have

drawn some initial lessons about how the process might differ,

before looking at some of the big issues up for discussion.

We’ve then rounded up early indications from the parties as to

their priorities and pledges, to give a feel for where the points

of connection might happen, and where there will be

differences to overcome. We’ve also taken a look at the people

who will be involved. Finally, Portland’s Sam Sharps has

sketched the scene in Whitehall during an election.

All of this represents a handbook for anyone trying to

make sense of the post-election period. For those looking to

get the best outcomes after 2015, there is much more work to

do. We would be delighted to talk to you about how Portland

can help you achieve those goals.

CHAPTER TWO

The most unpredictablegovernment ever

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In 2013 Portland outlined seven possible

outcomes of the election. All remain possible,

though some of course are more likely than

others, and the shape of the next government

remains more unpredictable than ever before.

What we do know is that no one will be sweeping

into Downing Street on the crest of huge public

popularity with a clear mandate for government.

The election won’t have a ‘winner’ but more of a

‘lucky runner-up’. The party sitting on the

government benches could have as little as 33% of the vote.

The electoral arithmetic requires about 320 seats to form

a bare majority (once Sinn Fein non-attendance and speaker

and deputy speakers are taken into account) and 326 for an

absolute majority (of one). The arithmetic of building a

majority by coalition is made easier in the sense that each seat

added to the governing side by the junior party reduces the

size of the opposition by one as well.

The complicating factor this year is the status of Scottish,

Welsh or Northern Ireland parties. In the past it may have been

straightforward to do a deal which propped up a majority.

Now, in the wake of the Scottish referendum and with English

votes for English laws on the horizon, the formation of a

government with a substantial number of non-English MPs

will be more problematic. Ultimately, electoral arithmetic

might well trump ill-defined theories of legitimacy, but at the

very least ministers will find themselves with more questions

to answer than in the past.

Outright Labour winThis remains the most likely ‘clean result’, requiring no

negotiation with other parties. To deliver a workable majority

Labour government, Ed Miliband probably only needs around

33-35% of the vote. This implies a steady result in Scotland in

the face of SNP pressure and gains from the Liberal Democrats

and the Conservatives, to add at least 70 MPs to the total.

Sam

Sha

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Ass

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Por

tlan

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Tom

Mlu

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Com

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Questions of legitimacy will though remain in the air. It is

plausible that the result could be achieved on a record-low

postwar share of the popular vote for the majority governing

party (Tony Blair in 2005 managed 35.2%, while at least

polling higher than Michael Howard’s Conservatives). Although

no doubt Labour ministers would put on a thick-skinned

performance, their mandate to govern would be under

constant scrutiny.

This is exacerbated even further by the political mood

after the referendum in which the nationalist parties,

particularly in Scotland, feel emboldened. And if votes on

English laws are restricted to MPs from English constituencies,

governing will become a much more complicated affair with

the very real possibility that Labour holds a UK majority but

only a minority in English constituencies.

Outright Conservative winTo achieve this result, as Portland noted two years ago, David

Cameron would need to pull off an unprecedented gain on the

share of the vote that took him to power. It is worth

remembering that in 2010, the Tories had a 7 point margin of

victory over an unpopular Labour Party led by Gordon Brown,

yet that was still not enough to win a majority.

Indeed, since January 2011 there have been over 1,500

polls and just five have shown a Conservative lead of more

than two points. While exact calculations for how far ahead the

Tories need to be are made ever more difficult by UKIP, the SNP

and others, David Cameron’s party has not had anywhere near

large enough a lead needed for a majority since the post-

election honeymoon in 2010. He and his party would need a

net gain of 23 seats coming from the Liberal Democrats,

Labour and even UKIP, all the while having to hold off both the

UKIP challenge in the dozen or so seats which they are likely to

be competitive, and Labour’s advances in a number of

marginal seats.

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All of which sounds extremely challenging but could just

conceivably be achieved if the Labour vote collapses and the

Tory offer seems particularly compelling. Another financial

shock, for instance, might just work for the party better trusted

to look after the economy.

Labour/Liberal Democrat coalitionIf Labour wins thirty or so more seats, to reach 280-290 MPs, it

would need a coalition partner with between 40-50 seats for a

slim but working majority. Only the most optimistic Liberal

Democrats expect such a good result, even with a strong

ground campaign in incumbent seats.

The difficulty for Lib/Lab enthusiasts is that the aggregate

number of seats between the two parties will remain fairly

steady, and this might leave their combined MPs short of a

majority. In other words, the closer Labour gets to a majority,

the more it has to be assumed it enfeebles the Lib Dems.

The signs for the Liberal Democrats are quite poor in all

respects. Looking overseas to countries with more experience

of coalitions paints a depressing picture for the Liberal

Democrats as junior coalition parties tend to be chewed up and

spat out by their senior partners. The nearest parallel can be

found in Germany. In 2009, the FDP (Germany’s Lib Dem

equivalent) won a strong 14.6% of the national vote, and went

into coalition with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s larger Christian

Democratic Union (a centre-right party). At the following

election, their share fell nearly ten points to just 4.8%, despite

Merkel’s government being relatively popular.

Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalitionA renewed coalition between the two current governing parties

is conceivable even if, in the face of a small Labour revival and

UKIP threat (plus possibly a few Scottish Lib Dems gave way to

the SNP), they lost an aggregate 32 seats.

In theory, the Liberal Democrats could make an offer to

either party – if all else remained broadly the same, 50 Lib

Dems could side with, say, 280 Labour or 280 Conservatives to

form a majority. But such a fine balance relies on the Lib Dem

holding on to almost all of their current seats, or the majority

of Lib Dem losses to be to the Conservatives.

Traditionally in these circumstances it would fall to the

Ulster Unionists (and now the DUP) to provide enough support

in Parliament. The Conservatives have a better chance of such

a deal passing off without huge controversy in that they will

almost certainly have an English majority.

The grand coalitionIndeed, the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland parties could

well take on greater significance in the next parliament. Should

Labour fall just short of an overall majority (say around the 310

mark) it could find enough common cause with the SNP, Plaid

and maybe a couple of likeminded others to cobble together a

coalition, if nothing else as a means of pressure on the Lib

Dems in negotiations. The price the nationalists would extract

for such a deal would be hefty (another referendum?), and the

stability of the ensuing government would be undermined by

questions of legitimacy in England.

An outcome we largely discounted in 2013 was that of one

UKIP MP (the existence of which at that time seemed unlikely)

joining the Conservatives in a broad right coalition. Should

UKIP surge to half a dozen or more MPs in 2015 and win

traditional Labour seats, they could just about take the Tories

over the line, at least on a confidence and supply basis. But

again, their demands for such a deal may well be high.

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Minority Labour or Minority ConservativeLasting minority governments have very little precedent in the

UK, although the SNP managed a term of minority government

in Scotland from 2007–2011 (with only 36% of seats). It is

feasible that in the event of a decent Labour or Conservative

showing at the election, say 310 seats, they could rely on a

degree of consensus or a rolling programme of issue-based ad

hoc coalitions to maintain a functioning executive.

The difficulty of course would be getting anything done

except the bare minimum. Governing a minority would require

the Prime Minister to exert total control over his or her

Parliamentary party (almost inconceivable in the case of the

Conservatives, and unlikely in the case of Labour), while

knowing that every vote was still on a knife edge and the Prime

Minister and Foreign Secretary might be required in the lobby

on any given day. A return to the 1970s where sick MPs had to

be wheeled into the House to vote would bring significant and

unwelcome uncertainty.

With the Prime Minister in 2015 facing several more years

of difficult decisions over spending and public services, while

having been elected on an ambitious policy programme, a

Parliamentary minority is an incredibly weak platform for

government. This therefore seems a sub-optimal solution, but

could be one that the larger party declares as an option in

pursuit of a better deal with a coalition partner.

The one circumstance in which this might change is a

minority overall but a majority in England, coupled with a new

convention barring MPs from constituencies outside England

from voting on English affairs. Such a circumstance is not

impossible for the Conservatives to pull off.

ConclusionWhile we do not know which scenario we will see as a result of

the General Election, it is clear that the next government will

not have an easy ride. Whether it is in coalition and keeping

partners happy while managing their own party or juggling the

difference between their leads in the UK and England, the

Prime Minister will not only have to oversee the implementation

of further significant cuts but also try and keep their

government together. No easy task, made more difficult by an

uninspiring victory which most likely faces the ‘winner’.

“There’s no point asking experts… no one knows what’s going to happen…

to predict the next general election, you may as well play pin the tail on the donkey”

Nigel Farage

CHAPTER THREE

Lessons from last time (1)

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B ritain has a proud history of strong,

stable, majority governments. As

politics tutors up and down the country

teach their students, our electoral system is

designed to produce a clear winner. More often

than not, the party that wins the most seats takes the prize.

Many of our European neighbours accept coalition government

and the often protracted negotiations that lead to their

formation as a matter of course, but we tend to resort to

coalition only at times of national emergency.

So the 2010 general election presented something new. It

was a new experience for our politicians, for the monarchy and

for the civil service. Covering the process was a new challenge

for the media. And understanding what was going on was new

to all of us as onlookers.

David Laws and Andrew Adonis – two of the lead actors in

this drama – reflect in their books on how a climate of intense

uncertainty gripped the nation. The unelected prime minister,

Gordon Brown, clung on to office, desperate to negotiate a deal

with the Lib Dems to keep his party in power. All the while, his

main challenger, David Cameron, whose Conservative Party

had somehow failed to win a majority, sought to gain power by

whatever means through negotiations with the same party.

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“Labour should have fought with every sinew in 2010 to retain power. To give up power

voluntarily because you are tired of government and it is all too difficult is a

betrayal of the people you serve. In politics, exhaustion and attrition need to be

overcome, not indulged.” Andrew Adonis

Despite his party performing well below the levels expected in

the run-up to the election, this thrust the Lib Dem leader, Nick

Clegg, squarely into the position of kingmaker over a frenzied

five days of negotiations.

At the heart of this process were Mr Laws and Lord

Adonis. Although neither was a household name, each was

known within his party for thoughtful policy work. Architects of

their own party’s manifestos and among the most trusted

acolytes of their respective leaders, both played crucial roles in

the negotiations and have gone on to write highly informative

books reflecting on this curious state of affairs and the

foundations of the Conservative-Lib Dem Coalition.

There is an element of catharsis about the Laws account.

Written only months after the election, it is a reflection on the

‘22 days in May’ that saw his own political career move so

swiftly from triumph to disaster. He leads with a heavy amount

of context, focusing from the outset on the run-up to the

election, on how the Lib Dems had prepared for the possibility

of coalition negotiations, and on his role in this. His is a

considered analysis of the different personalities involved in

the negotiations and the policies they debated over from all

three sides – Labour, Conservative and Lib Dem.

In contrast, although also written shortly after the events,

Adonis waited for three years to publish his account. His ‘5

Days in May’ is more fast-paced, energetic and immediate in its

reflections than Laws. What’s more, he is able to provide a

fascinating and unique insight into the characters at large in

Gordon Brown’s Downing Street during his final days in power

and the machinations of the defeated prime minister himself. A

consistently engaging feature of the book is Adonis’s willingness

to pass comment on characters he was surely aware he would

have to work with again in future. His openness and sincerity

lends credence to his conclusions on why negotiations turned

out as they did. Less engaging are the concluding chapters in

the updated copy of his book, which read first as an attack on

the Lib Dems’ ‘shift to the right’, second as a report card on the

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coalition government after three years, and third as a clear

message to Ed Miliband, setting out a blueprint for Labour to

follow to win the election outright in 2015.

Interestingly, given their public comments at the time,

one of the fundamental disagreements between Laws and

Adonis lies in their assessment of the parliamentary

arithmetic in May 2010 – the building blocks for a coalition.

A running theme of Laws’s book is his lingering doubt that the

seats were there to produce the progressive alliance of the

Left that so many of his party’s supporters would instinctively

have favoured, which Nick Clegg was evidently open to, and

which Adonis and the Labour side clearly felt was possible.

Laws’s reflections on his conversations during the early days

of the negotiations with his predecessor as the MP for Yeovil

and Lib Dem grandee, Paddy Ashdown, are particularly

instructive. Unsurprisingly, given his political leanings,

Ashdown pushed heavily at the time for negotiations with

Labour and the smaller parties on the Left. But Laws was

clearly of the view that a coalition of this kind would prove too

challenging to deliver and would not succeed.

Adonis’s reflections on what he calls ‘Lab-Libbery’ come

to a rather different conclusion. He, Gordon Brown and Peter

Mandelson quickly came to the view after the election that a

rainbow alliance of virtually all the parties besides the Tories

could produce a working government. He claims that Nick

Clegg agreed that this was possible. But Clegg’s pre-election

commitment to negotiate first with the party with the largest

“WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH A CAMPAIGN: NOW WE HAVE

A COALITION. UNTIL TODAY, WE HAVE BEEN RIVALS:

NOW WE ARE COLLEAGUES. THAT SAYS A LOT ABOUT

THE SCALE OF THE NEW POLITICS WHICH IS NOW

BEGINNING TO UNFOLD. THIS IS A NEW GOVERNMENT

AND A NEW KIND OF GOVERNMENT.”

David Cameron

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number of seats and votes had opened the door to a possible

Tory-Lib coalition. David Cameron’s ‘big, open, comprehensive’

offer to the Lib Dems followed and negotiations became all

about personality and which party – Labour or the

Conservatives – was prepared to do more to find common

ground with the Lib Dems.

As both accounts convey well in different ways, this was

the Conservatives. Laws is particularly scathing in his criticisms

of the Labour negotiating team. His obvious respect for Adonis

and Mandelson and for their intentions to look seriously at

negotiating a Lab-Lib coalition does not go far enough to mask

his contempt for the other members of the team in this

context. At no stage during his account is the reader left with

the impression that Harriet Harman or either of the Eds,

Messrs Balls and Miliband, were prepared to cede the ground

necessary to form a coalition government. Financial matters –

absolutely key to discussions given the country’s parlous

economic situation – were almost entirely off limits. Neither

Balls nor Miliband were prepared to negotiate in the absence of

Alistair Darling – a serious problem. All the while, the

Conservatives and Lib Dems were engaging directly and

effectively on policy issues and making genuine progress. The

Conservatives had put together a strong and serious team that

included heavyweights George Osborne and William Hague,

and Laws goes so far as to state that “the sense of urgency and

seriousness that was present during our talks with the

Conservatives was never quite present during our discussions

with the Labour team.”

Adonis does not shirk from accepting this in his updated

account. He devotes a few pages of analysis to “Labour

fatalism” and reports that in May 2010 “the party was

exhausted, demoralised, almost leaderless, with many

ministers and MPs anxious to escape into opposition and stay

there for a good while recuperating.” Implicit in this is his view

that Labour had been unprepared for the serious task of

negotiating a new government. Without the prior groundwork

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and consideration of the likely issues and discussion points,

negotiations were never likely to succeed. Negotiating a

coalition government requires patience, a positive approach

and the mutual understanding that both sides are prepared to

make concessions, if necessary. Coming off the back of

thirteen years in power, the incumbent Labour Government

had significant baggage that the Conservatives did not.

And the major element of that baggage was Gordon

Brown himself. Ultimately, Adonis concludes that had Brown

resigned the Labour leadership the Friday morning after the

election he would have given the Lab-Lib Dem negotiations

more of a chance. His would have been the major power play

and the defining moment, rather than Cameron’s ‘big, open

and comprehensive’ offer to the Lib Dems that came later that

day. As it was, Brown’s insistence in the first few days of

negotiations on staying on and playing a role in the formation

of a new government before stepping down as Labour leader

later in the year pushed Clegg further towards the

Conservatives. Laws charts Clegg’s frustrations with Brown’s

erratic behaviour, including increasingly desperate phone calls

during negotiations, and makes frequent reference to the

‘Gordon Brown problem’. The Lib Dems were acutely aware

that Labour had been rejected by the electorate and with the

Conservatives offering them more in any case – including, most

importantly, on electoral reform – Laws presents the

Conservative-Lib Dem coalition that emerged as the only

logical choice. What was clear to him and the other Lib Dem

negotiators towards the end of those five days in May was

anything but clear to those on the outside.

With May 2015 fast approaching, Britain has come to

understand a bit more about coalitions – how they come about

and how they work in practice. If anything, with UKIP’s rise, the

unpopularity of the Lib Dems, the predicted gains for the SNP

in Westminster and the implications of all this for our two

traditional parties of government, our politics is perhaps on

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the verge of being more pluralistic than ever before. What

seemed so unusual back in 2010 could soon become the norm

and different teams could well be required to negotiate a new

government come the 8th May. Both Laws and Adonis shed

invaluable light in their accounts on how the process worked

last time and the main issues different parties have to grapple

with. They will again become required reading in the months

leading up to next May.

CHAPTER FOUR

Lessons from last time (2)

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A s the General Election approaches,

what might the next Government look

like? After dabbling in coalition, is

Britain heading for another one? And if so, who

will be doing the negotiating?

David Cameron didn’t go into the 2010 general election

looking for a coalition, though he certainly prepared for that

possibility. Despite a deeply unpopular Prime Minister, the task

facing the Conservatives was very hard. As it was, the Tories

added over a hundred seats – their biggest gains for 80 years

– but couldn’t form a majority. By planning for this eventuality,

Cameron was able to realise his deep ambition to enter No 10

as Prime Minister.

The run-up to the election had been dominated by

leaders’ debates, skewing the campaign. No one theme or

policy issue came to the fore or dictated the agenda. Political

campaigners rued the lack of rough and tumble and the

tendency of seemingly minor events to dominate the news

cycle, but the effect was a relatively stable period (Clegg-mania

notwithstanding) that produced a result much as was predicted

before the campaign proper began.

It is in exactly circumstances like this that David Cameron,

sometimes nicknamed the ‘essay crisis PM’, thrives. Having joined

the election team in CCHQ at around 7am, he took counsel from

George Osborne, Steve Hilton and Andy Coulson and then

retired for a quick sleep. Later that day he would make the “big,

open, comprehensive offer” to the Lib Dems that changed the

post-election dynamic and gave the Tories a real shot at power.

The experience of coalition negotiations have been

extensively written about and are reviewed by Hugo Sutherland

elsewhere. My first contribution to the negotiations was when I

was I had to pass on an policy paper I had drafted in a swift,

hushed meeting with a civil service official outside the Treasury.

In a John Le Carré-style document swap, I passed over the paper

that had been stuffed in my jacket’s breast pocket, avoiding the

press gang piled up outside the Cabinet Office.

Jam

es

O’S

haug

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Later on, I would join the main negotiating teams in order

to thrash out some of the specific policy details, focusing on

domestic issues while my colleagues Rupert Harrison and

Denzil Davidson focused on economic and European issues

respectively. My primary reaction to the negotiations was how

friendly they were – even the most calculating members of

each team, George Osborne and Chris Huhne, were getting

along famously.

There were two reasons for this spirit of positivity. First,

both parties had been out of power a long time – a very long

time in the Lib Dems’ case – and were desperate to make

something work. The other reason is that both were well-

prepared, knowledgeable about each other’s positions, and

willing to compromise. From the Tories’ side this was because of

the assiduous and highly secretive work done by Oliver Letwin

during the campaign. Squirrelled away in total isolation in a

backroom of CCHQ, he had done the policy comparison work on

his own, drawing up red lines and potential negotiating points.

He essentially merged the two parties’ manifestos, thinking

about areas of common cause or difference and working out

the maths needed to create a working coalition. This set the

tone for the first years of the Coalition, which will be viewed by

history as a period of extensive and radical reform.

Things are likely to be different if coalition negotiations

are needed in the event of a hung parliament again in May.

With five years of coalition experience under their belts,

negotiations between the Conservatives and Lib Dems will be

more hard-nosed. The atmosphere will be much less optimistic.

Agreeing a fresh deal is likely to take longer as the parties

grapple with the electoral maths and wrangle over government

posts. Dealing with the deficit would remain the priority and

this would dominate everything.

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And this will have to be the case from the Labour side, too.

Where in 2010 the pressure was on Cameron, if Ed Miliband’s

woes continue and Labour look like failing to win enough seats

to win a majority, they will have to think more seriously about

coalition. Will they negotiate with the Lib Dems? It seems

certain that Nick Clegg’s head will be the price of any

agreement between the two. Will they look to a broad-based

coalition bringing in a number of the smaller parties? Will they

consider a confidence and supply agreement with the SNP,

who have already indicated they could be open to a deal with

Labour on these lines?

With the election result so uncertain, each side will be

very thoroughly prepared for a variety of potential outcomes.

Researchers and policy advisers in three main parties have

been ‘coalition-testing’ all policies and future commitments as

part of election planning for months. Every decision made will

take the possibility of continued or a new coalition into account

and the emphasis will be squarely on how another deal would

work in practice.

Like it or not, the leaders of our political parties are

having to accept the new reality of a more pluralistic approach

from the electorate and an increasingly important role played

by the smaller parties such as UKIP. The challenge this time

would be the need for greater democratic discussions within

their own parties than in 2010 for both the Conservatives and

Labour. It remains doubtful whether the Parliamentary

Conservative Party would back another coalition. Labour may

be more willing, but only marginally.

For the Lib Dems, despite their woeful polling and Nick

Clegg’s negative approval ratings, they will be focused on being

the kingmakers again. Even if they wake up on 8 May having lost

twenty seats, the arithmetic could mean that they still play a

vital role. Led by Danny Alexander, the Treasury chief secretary,

their policy experts will be preparing for all possibilities.

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The roles needed in a negotiating team

As negotiations last time demonstrated, there are certain

functions that need to be fulfilled in a coalition negotiating

team. We can expect that each team will again be made up of at

least four people who all bring something slightly different to

the team, some of whom might perform more than one

function. What is certain is that the following four functions

have to be accounted for:

1. The money personSomeone with a thorough understanding of the finances, how

the Treasury works and the financial impacts of policy decisions.

2. A representative of the leader’s officeA trusted lieutenant to communicate each party leader’s views,

highly likely to be the Chief of Staff.

3. A representative of the partySomeone with excellent relationships within the party,

respected and able to communicate with different wings of the

party equally well.

4. The policy brainSomeone who knows all the policies inside out and has

prepared for all possibilities on crucial negotiating points.

30 /

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What will the line ups be?

ConservativesWhile far from certain, our best guess is that the

Conservatives negotiating team would be:

The money person

George Osborne for definite, the only choice and a key part of

the negotiating team in 2010. A firm friend of the Prime

Minister and the party’s key strategist. As Chancellor, the man

who understands the Treasury and what can and can’t be done

better than anyone.

A representative of the leader’s office

Could be the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff, Edward Llewellyn,

as in 2010. While Llewellyn is expected to step down from the

role after May, he could stay on to oversee negotiations.

A representative of the party

Michael Gove. With William Hague stepping down as an MP, this

role is likely to be filled by Gove. As Chief Whip – popular with

MPs, peers and party members alike – and a Cameron

confidante, he is ideally placed to take on the role.

The policy brain

Oliver Letwin will certainly be involved in some way. The party’s

main ‘policy brain’ and importantly, ‘Lib Dem-friendly.’ Another

person who could be involved here is Jo Johnson, head of the

Downing Street Policy Unit and the man charged with coming

up with ideas for the party’s election manifesto.

Less

ons

from

last

tim

e (2

)

LabourThe Labour team is more difficult to predict. Like the

Conservatives in 2010, Labour will be going all out to win

the election and gain a majority. Entertaining coalition

will be a last resort to secure power. There’s a personal dynamic

too. The party is under periodically troubled leadership and Ed

Miliband will not want people involved who could be future

rivals for his position. As things look at the moment, the team

we could expect to see would be:

The money person

It’s hard to look beyond Ed Balls. Central to Labour policy

making, with a lengthy Treasury background and now a term as

Shadow Chancellor under his belt.


Lucy Powell has taken on a pivotal role for Ed Miliband and

Labour’s 2015 campaign. Trusted by Miliband, and his first

Chief of Staff, as an MP she is again a key figure in his team.


Much like with Balls, it’s hard to look beyond Harriet Harman. A

Labour big-hitter and Deputy Leader of the party, we can

expect her to demand to be part of any negotiations.

The policy brain

Lord Stewart Wood could take on this role – Miliband’s closest

aide and ally, and crucially, his ‘ideas’ man. He has been heavily

involved in coordinating Labour’s election manifesto. Another

candidate for this role might be Torsten Bell, a Labour

strategist in ‘team Miliband’ who has long been focused on

policy development. And we shouldn’t discount Andrew Adonis

who played an influential role last time and could be called

upon to do so again.

32 /

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Liberal DemocratsThe easiest team to predict in many ways, given that their

chance of remaining in government rests on negotiating

a new coalition. Nick Clegg went public early this year with the

team of five he has picked to prepare for negotiations. With no

Chris Huhne – a key member of the 2010 negotiating team – and

Andrew Stunnell unlikely to play such a prominent role again, we

can expect a negotiating team to reflect the names in Nick

Clegg’s announcement:

The money person

Danny Alexander as Treasury chief secretary, a trusted ally of

Clegg, a veteran of the 2010 negotiations and a man who has

worked well with the Conservatives before.


Johnny Oates could play an important role here as chief of

staff to Nick Clegg and one of the most influential party

voices. Another option could be Lynne Featherstone who is

a trusted Clegg ally and a part of the team picked to prepare

for negotiations.


Highly likely to be Steve Webb. Particularly popular with the

left wing of the party, he would bring balance to the team and

has performed an important role already in this parliament,

serving throughout as Minister of State at the Department for

Work and Pensions.

The policy brain

This will certainly be David Laws. Central to negotiations, and

planning for negotiations last time, he will again perform this

function. Ideologically to the right of his party, he is particularly

popular with the Conservatives.

Less

ons

from

last

tim

e (2

)

ConclusionWhat’s sure is that this will be a fascinating and unpredictable

election. The closer we get, the less likely it looks that the

Conservatives or Labour will get the majority they are after.

With UKIP and the SNP looking set to take seats from both

the Conservatives and Labour, we could be headed towards

hung parliament territory again. The number crunchers will be

busier than ever as the votes come in, with a number of

different scenarios possible.

If we do get another hung parliament, we can expect

longer, more protracted negotiations than in 2010. But our

media won’t stand for negotiations over a number of weeks as

is often the case in other European countries. Discussions will

be transactional rather than trust-based, personalities will be

crucial, and securing key government posts will be paramount.

CHAPTER FIVE

What might be different?

36 /

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ifest

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ileW

hat

mig

ht b

e di

ffer

ent?

In typically British form, there was no reliable guide to what

happened after the 2010 election.

Various precedents were wheeled out, and experts

opined on what might or might not be expected according to

convention or political pressure. But the three things that most

influenced the form of negotiations last time were:

• the feeling that the Conservatives had earned the right

to be in government, even if they had not won outright;

• the perceived necessity to calm international markets

at a difficult economic time; and

• the eventual petering out of ‘Cleggmania’ and the

sudden adjustment to a smaller Liberal Democrat

parliamentary force.

None of these may apply in 2015.

First, in 2010 the Liberal Democrats adopted a doctrine that it

would negotiate first with the party which won the most seats.

In 2015 that may or may not be the party with the most votes:

the ‘side closest to winning’ might be open to interpretation.

Second, the international bond markets are not seen to be

so threatening now, and international examples suggest

periods of negotiation are not hugely destabilising.

And third, the giddiness of 2010 has given way to a more

sober Liberal Democrat party, which is braced for losses and

will be planning accordingly.

So once again, the process is pretty much open to be made

the way the participants would like it. We can though still predict

a few ways in which things will be different this time around.

THE HUNG PARLIAMENT CONTINGENCY STILL RELIES

UPON CALL “THE GOOD CHAP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT”

- THAT GOOD CHAPS OF BOTH SEXES KNOW WHERE THE

UNWRITTEN LINES ARE DRAWN AND DO NOT PUSH

MATTERS TO THE POINT WHERE THEY CROSS THEM.

Peter Hennessy

PreparationAll three partners have had plenty of time to consider how they

would like to play negotiations, and to anticipate their opposite

numbers’ strategies.

Importantly, all three will have written their manifestos

with an eye to how they will play out in coalition talks. In some

cases this will have emerged as a clearly-signalled red line

which they will be able to make clear is non-negotiable. In

others, the parties might have left things out of the manifesto

to give them maximum room to manoeuvre.

Time

With some of the pressure off, the talks could go on for much

longer this time. While both the major parties will want to

pressure those with whom they are negotiating to seal the

deal, the Liberal Democrats will know that they are by far the

most realistic chance of either the Conservatives or Labour to

form a majority.

So as much as the Tories and Labour might threaten to

govern as a minority or put together a grand coalition

elsewhere, the Lib Dems will be hoping to set their own pace

– and extract as much as they can along the way.

DetailAlthough the manifestos might be shorter on detail, the form

of the final agreement might be lengthier. Assuming the next

coalition partners are aiming to deliver another five-year

government, the Lib Dems in particular will be conscious of the

danger of running out of policy halfway through. While there

was a mid-coalition review of sorts in 2013, it did not really

result in any new policy, and the negotiating dynamic was by

that stage pretty much extinguished.

Of course, no government can predict five-year priorities

with total confidence and ministers will have to spend their

time dealing with the unexpected. But we can probably expect

a fuller agreement with longer-term ambitions.

38 /

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The power brokersThe role of the civil service in the process is, in true British

style, subtle, ill-defined and influenced by the personality of

those involved. While trying hard to avoid accusations of

political interference, Whitehall will do its best to nudge parties

together and facilitate a harmonious discussion.

But whereas Gus O’Donnell was very focussed on process

in 2010, down to arranging meeting rooms and discreet routes

by which they could be run, his successor Jeremy Heywood is

more inclined to ‘fix’. Mr Heywood might be tempted to play a

more constructive role, still respecting impartiality but finding

ways to bring the parties together to form a workable platform

for government. Given what is at stake, this could be the most

important role he ever plays.

Wha

t m

ight

be

diff

eren

t?

“I think it contradicted what a lot of people thought would be coalition, which would be, ‘oh, it’s mushy, they’re not going to do very much, you know, they won’t be able to do

anything’. We’ve seen with this government that you could criticise them for many things,

but actually you couldn’t criticise them for lack of action.”

Gus O’Donnell

CHAPTER SIX

What’s on the table

42

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fina

l mile

Wha

t’s

on t

he t

able

The 2015 manifestos will represent both a set of

offers to the electorate and the opening gambit in

coalition negotiations. Although, as we have already

seen, all sorts of outcomes are possible, the main strategising

has naturally been done by the three big Westminster parties,

expecting the big decision to be whether the Liberal

Democrats go with the Conservatives or Labour.

During 2014, the parties showed their hand to varying

degrees. The Liberal Democrats published a full pre-

manifesto. Labour concluded its policy forum with a formal

statement of policy. The Conservatives remain the last to set

out a programme, held back in part by the pressures of being

in government but also the freedom afforded by a more

relaxed party constitution. However, there are sufficient

public statements, party conference promises and long term

policy goals to give a strong hint of what the Tory platform

will look like.

Collectively, this gives us a decent impression of how the

parties line up. Any policy agreement will include a number of

detailed pledges, but any negotiation will have to open with a

set of headline issues.

“By fighting you never get enough, but by yielding you get more

than you expected.” Dale Carnegie,

How to Win Friends and Influence People

Responsibility and control Demands around departmental posts will probably be driven by

the Liberal Democrats. One big question for them is what their

leader does in a future coalition government. If the Lib Dems are

this time negotiating three rather than four or five cabinet

posts, they might first insist that all of these have a

departmental purview. Nick Clegg has maintained that he made

the right decision in 2010, taking up the Deputy Prime Minister

role that gives him with wide-ranging interests but little formal

power. But he might insist this time that he should receive a

proper job as a means of securing a greater legacy – Secretary

of State for, say, Education.

Additionally, the Liberal Democrats have already briefed

that they might ask for full control of one or more departments.

Even where a Lib Dem secretary of state has been in place for

the past four years (in DECC and BIS), the Conservatives have

ensured that the department is balanced with a senior minister,

meaning that a fully-fledged liberal departmental agenda is

difficult to establish. Of course, all departments have to cope

with the oversight of the Treasury, and the checks on their

activity through cabinet committees, but establishing a little

liberal bastion in Whitehall might still be quite appealing.

LeadershipA feature of the 2015 election is that all three major party

leaders have been in place for nearly the entire Parliament, but

all three have low personal ratings and seem to lead

discontented parties. In 2010, the Lib Dems made a feature of

their negotiation with Labour that Gordon Brown would have

to make way. Such an ultimatum from them is not likely this

time, but such will be the atmosphere within the parties that

succession plans for Clegg, Cameron or even Miliband might

yet be an implicit or explicit part of the discussions.

44

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EuropeIt is nearly inconceivable that a government containing

Conservative ministers could get away with not holding a

referendum on EU membership in 2017. So this is likely to be

a non-negotiable plank of the Tory offer. However the

protocols for campaigning in the referendum would then have

to be worked out.

Depending on the outcome of reform discussions, the

official government position in the referendum could be to stay

in the EU, in which case whipping would presumably be

suspended to allow Tories to fight for an exit, presumably with

no Lib Dems of any consequence joining them. Or the official

position could be to leave, at which point the Liberal Democrats

would have to break from the Government and campaign with

the opposition, taking a relatively small number of

Conservatives with them.

This implies a need for clear visibility of three things: the

circumstances in which the Government will reach an official

position on ‘stay’ or ‘leave’; the protocol for how the

government can function during a hugely divisive campaign;

and the consequences for the coalition if the public rejects the

government’s official view.

For Labour, the calculation is rather different. With no

commitment to a referendum, any discussion about Europe may

touch on reform and an anti-UKIP strategy, but the issue can be

safely relegated down the agenda – unless the party is forced

into promising a referendum in the later stages of the election.

Wha

t’s

on t

he t

able

DevolutionImmediately after the cross-party effort to win the Scottish

independence referendum, devolution emerged as a dividing

line between the parties. Quite apart from the issues of

legitimacy in forming the coalition, the uncertain settlement

means that there could be a lot to play for. Tory insistence on

English votes for English laws could leave Danny Alexander’s

post as Chief Secretary looking anomalous, for example,

while the Liberal Democrats could Labour push for greater

English devolution. Big constitutional issues of this sort would

normally only be sorted through cross-party consensus, but

with so much at stake and electoral arithmetic so finely

balanced, the parties will be tempted to fight for any

advantage they can.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Red lines and promises

Roa

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the

man

ifest

os: t

he fi

nal m

ile4

8 /

49

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line

s an

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ive

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re

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and

spen

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Cre

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s on

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le e

nerg

y.

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sing

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se B

uild

ing

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lord

s

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,00

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omes

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yers

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% d

isco

unt.

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urag

e m

ore

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nts

onto

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e m

arke

t w

ith

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ht t

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uy

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cati

on o

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mes

for

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st-t

ime

buye

rs.

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ld a

t le

ast

200

,00

0 h

ouse

s a

year

by

20

20.

Will

legi

slat

e to

pro

vide

long

er-t

erm

le

ts w

ith

pred

icta

ble

rent

s.

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ld 3

00

,00

0 h

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s a

year

.

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le o

verc

row

ding

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ince

ntiv

isin

g so

cial

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lord

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ber

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ts u

nder

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ng t

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up

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er p

rope

rtie

s fo

r la

rger

fam

ilies

.

Ben

efits

No

incr

ease

in w

orki

ng a

ge b

enefi

ts

for

two

year

s, a

ffec

ting

tho

se r

ecei

ving

JS

A, t

ax c

redi

ts, a

nd c

hild

ben

efits

.

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rai

ses

in c

hild

ben

efit

at 1%

unt

il 20

17. R

epea

l the

‘bed

room

tax

’. Fr

eeze

ben

efits

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y as

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t of

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age

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h ta

x in

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t a

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w c

ard

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athe

r th

an

imm

edia

te D

WP

san

ctio

ns.

Issu

eC

onse

rvat

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ate

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depe

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ld b

udge

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afte

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rita

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mem

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hip.

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igra

tion

to

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at

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hear

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nego

tiat

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wit

h th

e EU

. Mig

rant

acc

ess

to b

enefi

ts t

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rthe

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stri

cted

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mit

men

t to

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hol

d a

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rend

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re is

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tre

aty

tran

sfer

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pow

ers

to

Bru

ssel

s.

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s on

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t ch

ecks

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ay t

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op m

igra

nts

from

ove

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eedo

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n Vo

catio

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rain

ing

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ndar

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ucat

ion

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e m

illio

n ap

pren

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ded

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enefi

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nd

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ange

of

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to e

nsur

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peop

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o on

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rent

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hip

as g

o to

uni

vers

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uire

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hers

to

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to

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uara

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ildca

re f

rom

8am

to

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. Com

puls

ory

sex

and

rela

tion

ship

ed

ucat

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ll sc

hool

s. R

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m o

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x tr

eatm

ent

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rant

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ploy

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and

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nd t

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r of

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ree

equi

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nt H

ighe

r A

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ps.

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Nat

iona

l Col

lege

s to

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iver

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gh le

vel v

ocat

iona

l ski

lls.

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tect

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edu

cati

on b

udge

t fr

om

cuts

. Gua

rant

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ualifi

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ers

and

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re c

urri

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et b

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nden

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pert

s in

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e sc

hool

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mie

s an

d fr

ee s

choo

ls.

Env

iron

men

t R

enew

able

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rgy

No

firm

pol

icy

as o

f ye

t, b

ut h

ave

oppo

sed

the

furt

her

expa

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n of

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shor

e w

indf

arm

s.

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k ‘c

omm

unit

y ow

ned’

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ewab

le

ener

gy a

nd in

vest

in r

esea

rch

into

en

ergy

sto

rage

and

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nsm

issi

on.

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lly-b

indi

ng d

ecar

boni

sati

on

targ

et, l

arge

ly t

o be

ach

ieve

d by

a

focu

s on

ren

ewab

le e

nerg

y.

Hou

sing

Hou

se B

uild

ing

Land

lord

s

100

,00

0 n

ew h

omes

for

first

-tim

e bu

yers

at

a 20

% d

isco

unt.

Enco

urag

e m

ore

tena

nts

onto

th

e m

arke

t w

ith

Rig

ht t

o B

uy

and

the

allo

cati

on o

f ho

mes

for

fir

st-t

ime

buye

rs.

Bui

ld a

t le

ast

200

,00

0 h

ouse

s a

year

by

20

20.

Will

legi

slat

e to

pro

vide

long

er-t

erm

le

ts w

ith

pred

icta

ble

rent

s.

Bui

ld 3

00

,00

0 h

ouse

s a

year

.

Tack

le o

verc

row

ding

by

ince

ntiv

isin

g so

cial

land

lord

s to

red

uce

the

num

ber

of t

enan

ts u

nder

-occ

upyi

ng t

heir

ho

mes

, fre

eing

up

larg

er p

rope

rtie

s fo

r la

rger

fam

ilies

.

Ben

efits

No

incr

ease

in w

orki

ng a

ge b

enefi

ts

for

two

year

s, a

ffec

ting

tho

se r

ecei

ving

JS

A, t

ax c

redi

ts, a

nd c

hild

ben

efits

.

Cap

rai

ses

in c

hild

ben

efit

at 1%

unt

il 20

17. R

epea

l the

‘bed

room

tax

’. Fr

eeze

ben

efits

onl

y as

par

t of

a

pack

age

wit

h ta

x in

crea

ses.

Impl

emen

t a

yello

w c

ard

syst

em r

athe

r th

an

imm

edia

te D

WP

san

ctio

ns.

Red

line

s an

d pr

omis

es…

CHAPTER EIGHT

Who is at the table

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Who

is a

t th

e ta

ble

Liberal DemocratsThe Liberal Democrats are the only party to have

formally announced their negotiation team. Seemingly

the new kids in 2010, supporting Nick Clegg this time will be a

team which after five years looks like seasoned government

warriors.

Danny Alexander MP

The Chief Secretary will once again play a key role, and

has already begun the process of drawing up a list of

non-negotiable issue, something the party will be asked

about in the election campaign. Closely tied in to the

Osborne austerity plan during his time in the Treasury,

his majority in Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey is a

healthy 8,700 but he may yet face a fight to keep out the SNP.

David Laws MP

At the heart of the talks in 2010 before a very short stint

as minister, resignation and eventual recall to government,

Mr Laws is Chair of the Manifesto Working Group and

will play a pivotal role again in 2015. As a free market

and social liberal, Laws was always seen as more closely

aligned with the Conservatives than much of the party.

Avoiding accusations that he is already lining up a deal with the

Tories, he has stated the party will not ‘pre-negotiate’ a future

coalition by watering down the Lib Dem manifesto.

Sal Brinton

Baroness Brinton steps into Tim Farron’s shoes as party

President in 2015. She has already underlined the

importance of a structured decision making process in a

future negotiation, where the negotiating team

frequently communicate and consult with the

parliamentary party, Federal Executive and Federal Policy

Committee. She has also backed the idea of forming a special

Federal Conference to debate and vote on the way forward.

These suggestions should give additional influence to the

party’s grassroots.

Steve Webb MP

Without ever gaining a great public profile, Steve Webb

has built a reputation as a strong and capable minister

within DWP, gaining respect across the political

spectrum. This credibility, coupled with a strong intellect

and grasp of the issues, will make him a key part of

negotiations. Traditionally linked to the left of the party, he is on

record recognising the alienation of many supporters during

the coalition years and is likely to push for a distinctive and

radical liberal policy contribution to the next programme for

government rather than a broad compromise.

Lynne Featherstone MP

The Hornsey and Wood Green MP has been a minister

throughout the coalition years without ever making

the Cabinet table, providing a campaigning force

through her work in equalities and international

development. She has not been without controversy,

with her attack on journalist Julie Burchill and more recently

her opposition to allowing a visa for ‘dating guru’ Julien

Blanc. But overall this experience may give her a good insight

into how to build a platform with broad populist appeal.

“I remain of the view that the worst outcome next year would be either a Conservative or Labour only government – because only the

Lib Dems can anchor the country in the centre ground.”

Nick Clegg

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ConservativesThe Tory negotiation team will, like the party’s policy

platform, emerge nearer the time of the election, and

the party leadership may well deny the need for negotiations

right up to election day. But we can see some early stages of

how the blue side will line up.

George Osborne MP

Considered support to the main Conservative lead of

William Hague in 2010, Mr Osborne was undoubtedly the

architect of the programme for government, aided by a

broad agreement with Nick Clegg and David Laws on the

need for a smaller state. This time around, he may have

half an eye on future leadership of his party as well as the

legacy of his time as Chancellor. His Budgets have demonstrated

a real radicalism and in the few instances where he has been

drawn into social issues he has shown a liberal streak. So his

personal preferences might draw the Tories in interesting new

directions if he is given scope to lead negotiations.

Jo Johnson MP

Mr Johnson has achieved the feat of playing a hugely

influential role without ever raising his personal profile.

In 2013 he was appointed by David Cameron as

Parliamentary Secretary at the Cabinet Office to help

develop the 2015 Tory manifesto with Minister for

Policy Oliver Letwin. He also heads the Policy Unit for

Number 10. He will have a view on Britain’s place in the world:

as a Financial Times journalist he regularly extolled the

benefits of EU membership and as a former New Delhi

correspondent, he understands the challenge posed to

Britain by the emerging economies.

Who

is a

t th

e ta

ble

Ed Llewellyn

David Cameron’s Chief of Staff was part of the

negotiating team in 2010. His connections to the Liberal

Democrats proved useful and may do so again, having

worked for Paddy Ashdown when the former party leader

was High Commissioner to Bosnia. These connections

have occasionally proved too much for some Conservatives –

and friends of Michael Gove have loudly questioned his loyalties

– but he remains trusted by David Cameron.

Oliver Letwin MP

Although Letwin will not be the principal overseer of the

manifesto this time around, he will likely play an

influential role in coalition negotiation. The Minister of

State in the Cabinet Office works across departments to

ensure the smooth running of the coalition and is

reportedly behind some of the key messages that unite the two

parties. Reputed to enjoy high degree of trust with Danny

Alexander, he is edging into elder statesman territory and while

he will not be a front line election campaigner he will be a

steady head in putting a policy platform together.

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LabourAs James O’Shaughnessy says earlier in this book, the

Labour line-up is difficult to predict, although we can

anticipate a few candidates.

Ed Balls MP

Ed Balls ends the Parliament with an improved reputation

following a mildly disastrous leadership bid and years of

mockery over his command of Twitter. He remains the Tories’

main target in reminding voters of Labour’s economic track

record and his personification of the style and strategy of

the Brown years was a negative in negotiations in 2010. But Mr

Balls earns his place at the table first by his widely recognised

weight in policy, and second by improving relations between him

and Nick Clegg. His thorough understanding of reputational and

financial impacts of policy decisions will be critical to negotiations.

Douglas Alexander MP

Never a very high profile Labour figure, and with a Scottish

accent which could become increasingly problematic in

discussions of national government, Mr Alexander is

nonetheless likely to land a key role in negotiations. Following

the Scottish referendum, he was quick to warn parties that

voters want change, and will be conscious of the threat to Labour

north of the border. But he is also leading the Labour campaign for the

UK to stay in Europe, which represents the party’s best and only hope

to generate some business support for a Labour-led administration.

Lord Adonis

Despite having spearheaded the Labour drive in 2010 to

form a Lab-Lib Dem coalition, and being one of Ed’s

closest policy advisers, Andrew Adonis may play a more

backroom role this time round. Newsnight reported in

April that Lord Adonis met with Clegg’s chief of staff

Jonny Oates and Lib Dem donor Neil Sherlock, to discuss

‘mutual concern over Europe’.

Who

is a

t th

e ta

ble

Lucy Powell MP

Lucy Powell played a key role in Ed Miliband’s leadership

campaign in 2010 and is known to be a deeply trusted

ally. Her promotion to the shadow cabinet was though

the cue for some disquiet in the Labour ranks, made

worse by a leaked strategy document. Only an MP for

three years, she has displaced some old hands and owes her

position to her closeness to Ed Miliband, a leader otherwise not

surrounded by loyalist MPs.

Harriet Harman MP

Labour’s deputy leader for eight years and a thirty-year

veteran of parliament, Harriet Harman has served

through Labour’s ups and downs, remaining something

of a target for right wing journalists throughout. But her

experience and reach within the party should position

her well to construct and sell a deal to any sceptical party

members. She will also be the most senior and accomplished

woman involved in the negotiations – line-ups on all sides will

be very male-dominated.

Lord Stewart Wood and Torsten Bell

The brains behind the Miliband

operation, these two men are

responsible for policy and strategy and

will do much of the translation into a

programme for government, but may

leave the political deal-making and

relationship-forging to others.

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The other playersA whole cast of characters could become involved in the

discussions after the next election. However, two in particular

are most likely to be seen and heard as May progresses.

Nicola Sturgeon MSP

In her first speech as party leader, with big electoral

gains on the horizon, Ms Sturgeon ruled out any

possibility of coalition with the Conservatives, promising

that “the SNP will never put the Tories into

government”. When it comes to Labour, nothing has

been ruled out. Having highlighted the tactical benefits of

partnering with a Labour government who depended on SNP

votes, Ms Sturgeon was clear about her top three areas of

negotiation: more devolution; a “rethink” of austerity; and the

future of Trident weapons on the river Clyde. Unspoken in all of

this is the leverage the Scottish Government can apply on the

issue of a future referendum.

A more modern and less dramatic performer than her

predecessor Alex Salmond (who might yet reappear as a

Westminster MP), Mrs Sturgeon still represents a formidable

political figure, as proven by her unanimous selection as party

leader. Her positioning so far is cooperative, but she has a

strong tribal streak and feels empowered to drive a very hard

bargain if given the chance.

Who

is a

t th

e ta

ble

Nigel Farage

Whether UKIP ends up with one seat or ten (and a lower

number is still probably more likely), Nigel Farage is

likely to be in high demand for media comment after the

election. Whether he is in a position to influence the

shape of the next government is a different question.

Farage recently said he would “do a deal with the Devil”, or

even Ed Miliband’s Labour, if it got him what he wanted – an

in-out EU referendum. Perhaps recognising the implausibility

of a UKIP secretary of state, he has alluded to a confidence and

supply arrangement instead of a full-blown coalition deal in the

event of a hung parliament, where his party would back ad hoc

measures such as the Budget, but not hold ministerial posts.

“There will be a barrowload of SNP MPs after the general election. Whether it’s a small wheelbarrow or a big wheelbarrow

will depend on the Scottish people. Right now it looks pretty big.”

Alex Salmond

CHAPTER NINE

The permanent government

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D uring an election campaign, the civil

service can get a bit forgotten about.

But its relationship with the political

process is, for those of us on the outside, worth

thinking about. Handled in the right way,

understanding and beginning to engage with civil servants

during a campaign can have benefits later on.

The very top of the civil service will have prepared for

what happens next. By convention, every official opposition

gets the chance to meet senior civil servants and outline its

programme for government. For two elections in the first

decade of the century, this convention was politely respected

with no expectation of William Hague or Michael Howard

bothering the Number 10 decorators. But in 2010 the prospect

of change was very real and it was much more important for

Whitehall to understand the policy platform that a Cameron

government would implement.

Even then, much of this was confined to a small number of

officials behind closed doors. For most of the civil service, the

normal business of government goes on through election

campaigns. Ministers continue to have functions which the

department is there to discharge. And they remain ministers

until the Queen invites someone to form a government, who

then in turn makes the new appointments.

Sam

Sha

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The

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“What the Civil Service wants, and I always compare it to a rather stupid dog, it wants to do what its master wants and it wants to be

loyal to its master and above all it wants to be loved for doing that.”

Richard Mottram, 2002

This means that the machinery of government must

remain in place, and in theory it has plenty of work to do. The

reality, though, is that the pace of life slows substantially. With

political masters out on the campaign trail, the demand for

policy analysis, speeches, briefing and correspondence dries

up. The work done to support parliamentary activity also stops.

What’s more, pre-election purdah means that much of

what the government wants to do is not possible. Big policy

announcements can only be made by consensus with the

opposition, meaning this is a rare occurrence. Even public

appearances by officials at conferences or external meetings

pretty much stop (although sensible officials interpret these

rules with some common sense – nobody ever won or lost an

election because a civil servant gave a presentation to

fourteen people in a hotel suite).

So government departments do what any office would do

in the circumstances: take things easy, catch up on admin,

bond as a team and watch things unfold.

During the rest of the electoral cycle, many civil servants

pay remarkably little attention to party politics. But during an

election campaign, officials will read the papers pretty closely

(online or buying their own; budgets no longer stretch to

copies in the office). Typically, they exhibit three emotional

responses to what they see.

First, weariness. Cynical officials with years of experience

of how difficult the business of government can be tend to look

at party political promises with an unforgiving eye. Often the

work of special advisers (or ‘teenage scribblers’ as I often

heard them called), these pat solutions for long-standing

problems are met with some scepticism. This can usually be

ironed out once these ideas become proper government policy,

but there is always a period of tutting at the impracticality of

what is in the manifestos.

Second, trepidation. Incoming ministers and special

advisers like to complain about departments’ tendency to

amass power, claim budget and extend missions. This can be

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massively irritating to political leaders who would much prefer

their department did a few things really well and for less

money, and left unchecked it represents Whitehall at its worst.

But at the same time, this is an entirely natural response

which politicians would do well to understand. If you work in a

department, you would like to know whether that department

will still be there the week after the election. You want to feel

that the work you do is recognised, and to know that you will be

given the tools to do it to a really high standard. At heart, civil

servants want to feel their work is important. And politicians

should consider what the opposite might look like. A

department which is eager to rush to its own demise, or at

least meekly accepts any reduction in its importance, is

unlikely to provide a strong backing to its secretary of state.

The third, more positive emotion is excitement. The

arrival of new ministers, or an entire new government, can be a

big moment of energy for civil servants. New faces, new ideas

and a fresh start can provide a really positive atmosphere. This

is even the case where the policy these ministers bring is a

total reversal of what has gone before. On occasion, civil

servants feel very attached to a particular policy, and feel

defensive about its deconstruction. But on the whole, they are

remarkably adaptive to changes in direction, and will be quite

happy to spend a period undoing their own work.

All of which is worth knowing about and understanding. In

each case, the civil service is waiting to follow where its

political masters lead. But amidst all of this, there are some

things the civil service can do that politicians cannot.

Where something major is in view that will require

significant government effort, but is not yet an urgent priority,

Whitehall is occasionally better equipped than Westminster to

gear itself up. Some issues are very deliberately postponed

until after the election, meaning political engagement is

impossible. But in a quiet way, officials can anticipate the big

issues and at least plan to face them, even if making decisions

The

perm

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is a way off. Talking to them will not produce big decisions but

can lay the ground for how decisions are framed some way in

the future.

So election year is an opportunity to take stock, prepare

and adapt – whether defensively or proactively. Civil servants

can seem over-formal, or mistrustful or even just shy. But the

period before the election provides a genuine opportunity to

help the civil service help you in the period afterwards.

CHAPTER TEN

What it means for you

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In 2010 there was reasonable certainty

about the outcome of the election. David

Cameron was expected to become Prime

Minister, but it was going to be close.

As a result, campaigning, particularly in

marginal seats, dominated the first half of 2010. At the same

time, all parties had written and locked their manifestos well in

advance of the election being called. Many will remember that

during this period, instead of developing policy the

Conservatives had a dedicated team, led by Francis Maude and

Oliver Letwin, preparing their policies and shadow teams to

execute their plans once in Government.

The impact was that from the January of 2010 onwards, it

became increasingly difficult for businesses to gain time with

stakeholders. And that if they did, the opportunity to influence

had often passed.

Today, the situation looks similar but amplified. The

opportunity to genuinely influence manifestos, unless you are at

the centre of a major political issue, has passed. Already, MPs,

advisers and political staff are out campaigning in their own

constituencies and in the many marginal seats around the country.

But this doesn’t mean this will be a quiet period for

Portland or our clients. Instead, we have a clear view of the

areas our clients should be focusing on to make the most of the

next four months and prepare for the next government –

whatever colour or shape it takes.

Ben

Tho

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As a minimum, here are the five things those responsible for

their organisation’s political relations should be thinking about:

1. Understand the red linesMuch of the major parties’ policy has now been aired, and all

three have started to signal the areas which may or may not be

up for negotiation during any coalition talks. When thinking

about your own pre and post-election plans it will be vital to

have a clear understanding of likely policy and where each

party’s red lines will fall. This means anticipating the parties’

deliverables and tradeables, and where they might give

ground, and then the forces that will drive them once in power.

2. There may be final opportunities to influence

Although the manifestos are now largely complete, there will

be some final opportunities to engage where you are either at

the heart of a critical debate or emerging issue, or have

something truly compelling to offer. While most will be busy

campaigning, we now know with some certainty who is likely to

be in the room and advising around the edges during any

coalition negotiations. If you have a strong case to make, and

your issues touch on the parties’ priorities there are still

opportunities to do business with this group.

3. Whitehall mattersDon’t forget the importance of the civil service. Officials won’t

commit to much, but should be prepared to listen to you so

they are in the picture before their new ministers arrive. They

are also now developing the briefing books which will be

handed to new ministers on day one of the next government

outlining their assessment of manifesto policy and how it can

be implemented.

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4. This will be a campaign of ‘650 general elections’

Given the uncertainty about the result of this election,

campaigning in seats across the country will be harder than

ever. While your organisation may not be of national

importance, this doesn’t mean you won’t get pulled into a local

campaign by candidates looking for every opportunity to score

points over their rivals. And while meeting your local PPCs will

become increasingly difficult, don’t lose sight of how the

political landscape may be changing in the communities where

you do business.

5. Plan beyond the 7th of MayAs soon as the next Government is in place, a new phase in UK

public affairs will begin. You have an opportunity now to

consider and prepare not just how you will use the first 100

days of the next Government, but what you want to defend

against or achieve during the next Parliament.

This is the sort of thinking and planning we deliver for our

clients every day. Our senior team is unparalleled in UK public

affairs, and our consultants across the team are experienced

practitioners delivering quality execution, analysis and advice.

We would be delighted to discuss this work and what it means

for your organisation in more detail.

Wha

t it

mea

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or y

ou

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Working with you

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If you want to be confident about what the next political year

holds for you, you need to understand where you stand.

But you also need to understand where politics is going and

the people who will make a difference. Portland’s insight and

understanding of the UK political scene is unparalleled. Our team,

drawn from the highest levels of Westminster, Whitehall and Fleet

Street, designs and implements communications programmes for

businesses and organisations across all sectors of the economy.

Our top team of advisers includes:

Tim AllanTim founded Portland in 2001 after a career spanning

business and political communications. He spent six years

working for Tony Blair in Opposition and then in 10 Downing

Street. He was a key media adviser during the 1997 election

campaign and then served as Deputy Press Secretary in

Number 10 during the early period of the Blair government.

Following that he was appointed Director of Corporate

Communications at BSkyB plc, responsible for corporate and

financial communication during the launch of digital television

in the UK.

Alastair CampbellAlastair, who was Tony Blair’s long-time Press Secretary

and senior adviser, is one of the country’s foremost

experts on leadership, communications and strategy. As

the Prime Minister’s Press Secretary and later Director

of Communications and Strategy, he was responsible for

modernising the Government’s communications structures

and approach.

He was involved in every area of policy, travelled

extensively with Mr Blair and established close relations with

many world leaders. Since leaving Government, he has forged a

successful career as an author, broadcaster, public speaker and

adviser to senior business figures on leadership and strategy.

Kitty UssherKitty Ussher provides economic and policy analysis to

Portland and its clients. A former Treasury Minister, she is

now a research fellow at the Smith Institute, an associate

at the Centre for London, a member of The CityUK’s

Independent Economists’ Panel and a co-founder of

Labour in the City.

Kitty was an MP from 2005 to 2010, and her government

experience also included three years as special adviser to the

Department of Trade and Industry from 2001 to 2004.

George Pascoe-WatsonGeorge spent 22 years on The Sun and was Political

Editor for five years, widely regarded as one of the

most influential jobs in the UK media. He is a regular

panelist on BBC Question Time, Sunday AM, Sky News,

BBC News Channel, Any Questions, The Week in

Westminster and Five Live.

He is a former chairman of Parliamentary Lobby

Journalists. GPW advises clients on all aspects of media

handling, crisis management and campaigning, providing

formidable insight into the political world.

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you James O’Shaughnessy

James is Portland’s Chief Policy Adviser. He was

Director of Policy for David Cameron for four years,

2007-2011. He was responsible for drafting the

Conservative Party’s 2010 general election manifesto,

co-authored the Coalition’s Programme for Government,

and played a leading role in managing the Coalition

Government’s policy programme.

Prior to working in Downing Street, James was Director of

Policy and Research for the Conservative Party between 2007

and 2010, and before that Deputy Director at the think tank

Policy Exchange.

Mark FlanaganMark Flanagan is Portland’s Senior Partner for

Content and Digital Strategy.

He joined Portland from Downing Street, where he

was Head of Strategic Communications, working for

both the Labour and Coalition Governments.

Since joining Portland he has advised clients on digital

and social media communications. Prior to his political career

Mark worked in radio, most recently as Managing Director of

LBC (Europe’s biggest commercial newstalk radio station) from

2002–2005.

During 2015 we will be working with clients to deliver the right results for them.

If you would like to discuss how we see your situation, and how we might help, please get in touch.

[email protected]

www.portland-communications.com

@PortlandComms

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London1 Red Lion CourtLondonEC4A 3EBt: +44 (0) 20 7842 0123f: +44 (0) 20 7842 0145

New York437 Madison Avenue4th FloorNew York, NY 10022t: +1 212 415 3036

Washington, DC1717 K Street NWSuite 900Washington, DC 20006t: +1 202 787 5758

Nairobi4th Floor, Cavendish Building14 Riverside DriveNairobi, Kenyat: +254 (0)20 4231 528

[email protected]

@PortlandComms

road to the manifestos: the final mile

Documents

sam sharpschapter

unpredictable government

permanent government

key lessons

final mile2

final mileroad

final milecontentschapter

final mileintroductionin