rivers of conflict or rivers of peacere.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/rivers of conflict...

ORF SEMINAR SERIESVOLUME 1 ISSUE 13 NOVEMBER 2014

RCA HES FE OR U

R N

E D

V A

R T

E IOS B NO

OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION

Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: Water Sharing between India and China

Prof. Pranab Kumar Ray

OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION

Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: Water Sharing between India and China

2014 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may bereproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF.

About the Author

Prof. Pranab Kumar Ray is Director, Centre for Hydro-Meteorological

Research, Kolkata. He taught at Presidency College from 1976 until his retirement

in 2008. He has worked in the field of river network development and integrated

water resource management on principles, management structures and

implementary designs for several river basins in India as well as for trans-boundary

rivers. He has experience with river regulation activities and related interventions by

Europe and USA in developing countries. Prof. Ray has worked on land-use and

water resource planning in the context of climate change for the last four decades.

He is currently working on formulation of an organisational structure for trans-

boundary integrated water resource management in South Asia.

ll natural elements of the Earth's system are limited by their

presence in space and time. This applies particularly to clean Awater, critical for growth and survival. Availability of water is

slowly reducing and will be more erratic in the near future when demand

for it will very likely surpass availability in time and space. Sovereign

states in all probability will move towards intense utilisation of their

territorially defined water resources, leaving little for downstream

neighbours. This scenario is appearing to be ominously true in the trans-

boundary river basins of South Asia. It is therefore worthwhile to

scrutinise water sharing between India and China. The Indus and

Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river systems, along with the upper Kosi and the

Karnali, are central in this regard.

India and China can put to planning and management a vast amount of

water between them. An amicable arrangement of water utilisation and

their basin-wise integrated management will bring economic success to

both countries. A friendly settlement relating to water resources of

trans-boundary river systems is urgently needed between India, China

and their neighbours Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh. India and

China are the two major stakeholders for water resources of South Asia

and can help uplift the economies of these smaller countries. The two

can show the way forward for friendly integrated water management and

develop unique precedents of rational practices for mutual upliftment

through sharing and peaceful use of water.

www.orfonline.org 1

Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: Water Sharing between India and China*

Introduction

*Lecture delivered at a conference organised by the Kolkata chapter of ORF on 15 February 2014.

The Domain for Planning and Management

India and China do not share any rivers exclusively between them; all

trans-boundary rivers of India and China are also shared with other

neighbours. The Indus and Sutlej systems are shared by India, China and

Pakistan, while the most resource-rich trans-boundary river of all, the

Brahmaputra, is shared between India, China, Bangladesh and Bhutan.

The Kosi, Arun, Barun and Karnali rivers are shared by China, Nepal

and India and are part of the Ganga system. For all such rivers, China

happens to be the upper riparian state. India is a middle riparian state for

the Brahmaputra system. Bhutan is the upper riparian state for a

significant subsystem of basins within the Brahmaputra system, while

Bangladesh is the lower riparian state for the Brahmaputra.

China and India, being upper and middle riparian states in these two

mega systems, face the issue of integrated management and water

sharing under a unique situation. Upper riparian states are generally slow

to respond to matters of integrated water management, although

exceptions can be found as in the case of India and Pakistan. India

happily and successfully shared waters of the Ravi, Chandra Bhaga and

Jhelum with Pakistan, although India has upper riparian status for these

rivers. China, too, has shown a positive attitude for water management in

many domains; for example, it is equally agreeable to sharing water in the

Ganga-Mekong system. But uniformity is a rare virtue in geopolitics,

particularly in the context of India-China relations. The deep chasms

created by the confrontation in the 1960s are receding now and a new

phase of bilateral warming is gaining momentum. While a long legacy of

complex mind blocks and irreversible misconceptions overshadows

concerns of mutual interest in the labyrinth of the geopolitics of South-

Southeast Asia, the ground is today ripe to explore possibilities of

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org2

integrated water management mechanisms between these two Asian

nations.

India and China are coming closer with greater economic cooperation

between them. But the walls of the past remain, currently reflected in the

political segregation both nations still sometimes practice, such as India's

refusal to allow China to join the South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation (SAARC). China is the leading pivot of power in Asia and

likely to be the second biggest power in the world in the future, given its

phenomenal economy and military power base. An in-depth evaluation

is needed to formulate a strategy of coping with Chinese dominance

while keeping national interests safe. The core bilateral issues of a border

dispute and a trade deficit should be settled, followed by joint water

resource planning and management for mutual benefit. In the coming

decades water politics will dominate in South Asian countries, with India,

China, Nepal and Bangladesh in the forefront. Issues are certainly

bilateral now, but there are chances of multilateral dialogue in the future.

Therefore, formulation of a policy for integrated basin water

management among the larger neighbours of the region and active

involvement should be a priority.

Of the three trans-systems, the biggest is the Yarlung-Tsangpo basin,

running through four countries—China, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh.

China has the largest spatial share of the basin—51.1 percent of the 1.73

million square km, but generates only 29 percent of the total basin

discharge because of Tibet's cold desert climate. The Yarlung-Tsangpo

originates from a lake called Tamlung in the Angsi Glacier

(Chemyungdung Glacier is not the actual source) and flows

approximately 1,217 km in Tibet, where the total annual precipitation of

rain and snow together varies between 25 and 65 cm. The amount of

www.orfonline.org 3

Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace:

precipitation decreases towards southwestern Tibet, where the cold

winter brings snowfall. This has resulted in some 11,000 glaciers and ice

fields. The Tibetan plateau experiences a rise in mean daily temperature

from mid-March to June due to the northerly movement of the

Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and the Heat Equator towards

30 degrees north. With an increase in daily maximum temperature,

glacial ice and ice caps start to melt, rejuvenating the discharge of the

Tsangpo and its tributaries. If the annual hydrographs of the Yarlung

Tsangpo and its tributaries like the Lhasa or the Wang Chu are

considered, they all display a steady rise in discharge between mid-March

and mid-July. The increase from March to mid-June is caused by the

melting ice; thereafter, it is due to the summer monsoon rains from mid-

June to early August. The average flow of the Yarlung Tsangpo in

southern Tibet is only 1,980 cubic meter per second (cumec), while its

tributaries record an even lower figure—between 275 cumec (Lhasa) and

110 cumec (Wang Chu). On entering India as the Siang and further on

called Brahmaputra—the son of Brahma—the river is flush with

potential. The average discharge in Assam reaches 16,240 cumec and

further decreases to 19,300 cumec in Bangladesh. Peak discharges stay

above one million cumec. Such a phenomenal rise in capacity is due to a

high average rainfall (more than 275 cm annually) in Bhutan, Arunachal

Pradesh, Assam and other Northeastern states of India, where the main

channel is endowed with large amounts of discharge from several

tributaries such as the Subansiri, Sankosh, Manas, Jiavarali and Teesta.

The Indian section of the basin, covering 34.2 percent of basin area,

contributes 39 percent of the total discharge. Equally significant is the

contribution from Bhutan. This mountainous state covers 6.7 percent of

the total basin area but generates 21 percent of the system output.

Bhutan, therefore, will need to be a nodal partner in the context of

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org4

integrated water management of the Yarlung-Tsangpo-Brahmputra-

Jamuna system. India and Bhutan jointly generate 60 percent of the total

discharge and should command key roles in water management in

eastern India, including the water situation of Bangladesh. The positive

synergies between India and Bhutan at present should be an important

aspect for consideration in an India-China-Bhutan perspective. Being

the lower riparian state, Bangladesh may feel the most vulnerable in this

scenario.

India, as the middle riparian state, has several advantages over China as

well as lower riparian Bangladesh. The Indian part of the basin of the

Brahmaputra is the most resource-rich in terms of volume of discharge

that can be used for irrigation, hydropower generation and water

transport. Bhutan, a mountainous country with moderate demand for

consumable use for its vast runoff, could allow outflow into the Indian

section of the basin in Assam. As far as China is concerned, India should

enter into a dialogue for securing 20 percent of the environmental flow

(EF) down the channel of the Brahmaputra. It should be noted here that

China, using 80 percent of the discharge generated within Tibet, cannot

cause water scarcity of any nature in the Indian part of the basin. But to

secure 20 percent of the discharge down the Brahmaputra at Pasighat

(where the river enters the country), India should have year-round

hydro-meteorological data of the Yarlung-Tsangpo basin. Presently,

India has access to only discharge data of the Tsangpo during the

monsoon period for flood forecasting purposes. Treaty arrangements

should be pursued to obtain hourly hydrograph and rating curve of the

Brahmaputra in order to ensure a 20 percent EF on a daily basis instead

of a monthly/yearly average flow. The issue of integrated water

management of India-Bangladesh trans-boundary rivers has developed

more as a political than a hydro-engineering problem. Delay in moving

www.orfonline.org 5


towards a viable management agreement will worsen the situation. India

and Bangladesh can move in a number of sectors for solutions through

planning.

The most important of such sectors is agriculture, where both India and

Bangladesh need adequate water for irrigation between October and

May, when absence of rain generates demands for water. The problem

of supplying water can be addressed through innovative water storage

solutions such as channel barrages, weirs and effective recharge plans all

over the Brahmaputra plains of the two countries. This will also enrich

the groundwater—or 'blue water'—which can supplement surface

storage for irrigation.

India and Bangladesh should also embark on planning for all the 54

trans-boundary rivers of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Barak system. Both

countries should free themselves of mental blocks and avoid engaging

on a single water issue such as water sharing of the Teesta or the Barak

(Tipaimukh) dam. The framework for trust building between the two

countries could begin with an arrangement for transparent data sharing,

mutual evaluation of data, ensuring 20 percent EF for all trans-boundary

rivers and completing basin-wise hydro-climatic survey for future

engagements. India and Bangladesh, with an average of 200 cm annual

rainfall, can adequately provide for the needs of their farmers with

proper basin-wise water resource planning and management. Planning

for power and water transport could be integrated into the task of water

management.

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org6

The second domain for river sharing is the Indus system. India, China

and Pakistan are the main stakeholders, with some presence of

Afghanistan. Among these four states, India and Pakistan were

successful in executing the Indus Water Treaty, 1960, which has

withstood the test of time and has caused only some minor problems.

Both India and China are fairly silent about their plans for this river.

India, under the Indus Treaty, can use the waters of the three western

tributaries of the Indus, while the other two tributaries, the Jhelum and

Chenab, as well as the Indus waters, can only be used for non-

consumable purposes. The upper course of the Indus covers only 10

percent of the total basin area, while Pakistan's share is about 60 percent

www.orfonline.org 7


and India commands about 22 percent. The point to be noted is that all

five rain- and snow-fed tributaries of the Indus receive their water from

the southern slopes of the Himalayas, which are more bountiful than the

dry plateau areas of Tibet and equally dry areas of Pakistan. Afghanistan,

with only eight percent of basin area, is not an important resource

provider to the Indus basin system.

India is usually silent about utilising the full potential of the Indus waters

for non-consumable purposes. Sections of the Indus, the Shyok and

other small but resource-rich tributaries, which pass through deep

gorges and are fed by snowmelt, have large hydropower potential. Waters

of the upper Indus and Sutlej are very much on the radar of water-

deficient western Tibet. As with the Brahmaputra basin, India is in a

situation where it can move towards greater non-consumable use of the

Indus system.

Need for Sharing

The Yarlung-Tsangpo sections as well as the upper Indus and Kosi-Arun

basins are spread over Xizang Zizhiqu Province (Tibet) of China. In

future, the existing India-Pakistan, India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh

bilateral water sharing principles should be broadened to achieve an

integrated water treaty: India and China would be significant partners

while the other neighbours within these basins would be amalgamated

into regionally accepted treaties.

China will, in the immediate future, utilise both the Yarlung Tsangpo and

upper Indus and upper Sultej systems for hydropower generation as well

as for canal irrigation. So far the chain of dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo

has attracted Indian attention, but the upper Indus and upper Sutlej

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org8

waters are equally lucrative for irrigation in northwestern Tibet and in

Chinghai, Sinkiang and Suchow provinces. Similarly, the upper Kosi,

Karnali and Barun may be connected to the Lhasa River for augmenting

the flow of upper Tsangpo. Such gains for China would cause extreme

losses to Indian interests unless a policy is developed among all

stakeholders on integrated water resource management that is

strengthened by treaties.

Broader Indian interests are linked to its larger neighbours and to its own 1

'eight sisters' and the Ganga basin states of Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh,

Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. Water needs of

SBWANAMM and the Gangetic states can only be ensured if

multilateral water management plans are clearly adopted within the

framework of a South-Southeast Asian Water Treaty between China,

India, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh

(CIPNABB).

Integrated water management will become crucial due to effects of

climate change. The Yarlung Tsangpo, Indus, Sutlej and Kosi are all

snow-fed rivers. In another three to five decades, the amount of snowfall

will decrease, as will the supply of snowmelt waters from the upper

courses of these rivers. But the demand for water will increase. This rise

in intensity of water demands in Tibet and China will also increase their

consumption of the discharge, affecting the flow of the lower sections

of these major rivers in India. Integrated basin water management can

reduce the negative impacts of climate change.

www.orfonline.org 9

1. Sikkim, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam, West Bengal and Bhutan (an independent state but a core nation for India's Look East Policy.) [SBWANAMM]


Some Misconceptions

Transparent and logical evaluation will clear many misconceptions.

Myth 1: The Brahmaputra will go dry if China builds dams on it.

Being the upper riparian state for the Indian Brahmaputra system,

if China does indeed builds dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the

river in Assam may dry up.

• This is a misconception. The upper Tsangpo basin is dry land

with annual rainfall of only 40-60 cm. The amount of

discharge generated in upper Tsangpo is thus only 22 percent

of the total discharge of the Brahmaputra basin. India is rich

in rainfall—annual precipitation is 250 cm on average—and

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org10

WATER RESOURCE DOMAINS FOR GBB SYSTEM

INDIAMYANMAR

there are 400-450 cm rainfall zones spread over large areas of

the basin. Therefore, the Indian part of the basin generates 67

percent of the total discharge, and 11 percent is generated in

Bangladesh. Dams built in China consequently cannot

deprive India or Bangladesh of the huge water resources of

the Brahmaputra. This aspect should be comprehensively

deliberated upon in India and Bangladesh.

Myth 2: There is not enough water in the Brahmaputra system.

• The utilisable water of the Brahmaputra system is estimated

to be a mere four percent of the total discharge. This is

because of the very high speed of the discharge and its sheer

volume. But this amount of utilisable flow can be significantly

increased by developing higher capacity reservoirs and

transferring excess water to drought-prone areas. Transfer of

water during flood peaks will not decrease water availability

for Bangladesh. There are many apprehensions in Bangladesh

about proposed river linking projects. With transparent

diagnostic survey and planning papers, such apprehensions

can be laid to rest.

Myth 3: Runoff discharge from hydroelectric projects decreases

lower channel flow.

• This is another area where deep distrust has been created.

Runoff discharge from hydropower stations with booster

discharge dams will not destroy lower riparian ecosystems in

any way. Misconceptions like these should be rebutted with

proper analysis of discharge data. Such projects abound in

www.orfonline.org 11


Sikkim today and will also emerge in large numbers in

Arunachal, Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam and West Bengal.

The suspicion over the Tipaimukh and Upper Teesta projects

should be properly allayed through vox populi.

The Policy

The policy should take care of the interests of millions of people of

South and Southeast Asia and their requirements of fresh water for their

daily needs. It should also take into account water needs for food

production, animal husbandry, forestry, industrial requirement,

navigation and healthy ecosystems. This will require Integrated Basin

Water Management (IBWM) with policies and tools for developing and

raising sustainable water utilisation. Not only should there be treaties for

sharing discharge of rivers, these agreements should also accommodate

all aspects of water use by communities. The most important issue is to

meet demand for water in seasonal and spatial scarcity modes within the

Tsangpo-Brahmaputra and Ganga-Indus basin systems. Hydro-

meteorological conditions of these three mega-systems vary widely,

both in potential resources and the demands made on them. The policy

should encompass all aspects related to integration of inputs, outputs

and delivery schedule, keeping in mind sustainability and ecosystem

requirements.

A Logical Framework for IBWM

The basic logic of this policy is to deliberate the need for water sharing

and then to arrive at an equitable share for each basin and sub-basin in

India, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan (ICPABB).

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org12

This will require the following steps:

I. Evaluation of hydro-meteorological and sectoral demands of all basin

management units comprising of the constituent countries. India

should evaluate the data matrix of major basins across its

states using the principle of need-based equity. Bangladesh,

Bhutan and Nepal should do likewise. This will ensure the use

of need-based equity as a principle for running water as well

as 'blue water' below for integrated surface-subsurface water

management plans.

II. Execution of inter-state and intra-state basin water sharing be governed

by two apex commissions. These commissions will be

autonomous bodies with their terms and references

formulated jointly by concerned nations for the inter-state

basins and by the Indian Parliament for intra-state basins. The

moderating platform for the intra-state basin commission

should comprise representatives from the Ministries of

Water, Agriculture, Industry and Water Transportation, while

the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Environment

of all pertinent sovereign neighbours should be represented

in the international apex commission. The regulatory

authority of the intra-state apex commission should be the

Supreme Court of India, while for inter-state basins, the

Supreme Court of each member country by rotation should

control all affairs. The national apex commission should have

under its control all State River Boards.

III. Transparency in data sharing and development of required data matrix

on the lines of the Monsoon Experimental Programme, MONEX.



This is the ultimate necessity. India and China, along with

their basin neighbours, should organise such a Core Data

Agency (CDA).

IV. Peaceful and amicable settlement of disputes. Both bilateral and

multilateral disputes should be settled amicably through

down-to-system evaluation and be mitigated by the apex body

initially and later by the designated Supreme Court in the case

of inter-state basin disputes and by the Indian Supreme Court

for intra-state ones.

V. Sustainable water uses and their implementation as the main theme of

water treaties.

Actions Forward:

• Review the conditions for arriving at a memorandum of

understanding (MOU) for IBWM among five neighbours (China,

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org14

APEX

Monitoring ExecutionDevelopment of

Basin Plans

New Agenda

Development of Water Management

Policy

INTERNATIONAL

NATIONAL

Country

Creation of Basin Authorities COMMISSIONS

Review

Review

Assessment of Basin wise ResourcesDebate

State

Integrated Basin Water Management System

Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh) under the international

apex commission. Replicate such MOU for Indian states. .

• Develop fabrics for IBWM treaties with both national and

international partners.

• Evaluate basin-wise water resources for all utility sectors.

• On the basis of utilisable resources, arrive at equitable

distribution formulae, keeping in mind multiple needs and

prospects.

• Execution will be the exclusive right of sovereign states within

their geographical areas. However, formulate norms for

inspections, arbitration and peaceful resolution of disputes for

intra-state rivers, execution of management plans should be

jointly carried out by water-sharing states. Monitoring,

arbitration, etc. will be through a national commission and the

Supreme Court of India.



Discussant's Comments

Ecologically informed statements, not sensationalism, will

benefit China-India water cooperation

Prof. Jayanta Bandyopadhyay

Adviser, Water Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA

Professor (Retired) IIM Calcutta, India

Introduction

Prof. Ray has addressed the complex issues related to Himalayan rivers

both in the regional context of South Asia and in the broader context of

Southeast Asia and China with impressive knowledge. He has shown

great ability to identify details, particularly quantitative ones. Such

maturity and openness of ideas have made the discussions very rich. It is

a reflection of how we are addressing the matter nationally. However,

there is slow progress in addressing the issues related to management of

trans-boundary river systems.

If we look at India's Draft National Water Policy of 2012, a document of

about 30 pages, we see that very little space has been dedicated to

Himalayan rivers and addresses only generalities. Himalayan rivers

account for 70 percent of the total river water flow of the country but

receive very little attention in policy discourse in the public domain.

Thus, there is a problem in conducting research on this 70 percent and

publishing scientific work, because there is restricted access to detailed

hydrological data. We must understand river water in its quantitative

aspect, in its ecological details and its economic use. There is therefore a

need for data and discourse in the public domain.

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org16

The other difficulty is that India, in spite of participating in the

preparation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-

navigational Uses of International Watercourses, abstained from voting

on it. So, in the case of Himalayan rivers, we face the difficulty that there

is no institutional framework for addressing international waters. In the

case of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin, a large part of the basin

belongs to China, but a large share of the Himalayan water flows

through India and then goes to Bangladesh. The average annual

precipitation in the trans-Himalayan region is about 300-400 mm and in

fact decreases to 100-150 mm at locations further north. Also, we have

not discussed the Ganga in detail; the only river discussed in this forum

has been the Brahmaputra. From the point of view of river basin issues,

we must take the Yarlung Tsangpo/Siang as one of the tributaries of the

Brahmaputra, for which Pasighat can be taken as a convenient starting

point. A number of rivers meet near Pasighat and create the

Brahmaputra. They include the Burhi Dihing, the first from the east,

then Lohit, Dibang and Dihang, which is the name of the

YarlungTsangpo as it crosses into India.

A public perception that the Brahmaputra will dry up as a result of some

hydropower projects at the Tsangpo Bend in China, though unfounded,

could make us enquire into not only what is happening in Siang or

upstream at the Tsangpo Bend, but also see what is happening in the

BurhiDihing, Debang, Lohit, etc. The series of tributaries—the

Subansiri, Manas, Sankosh, Teesta and all other 30 to 40 tributaries of

the Brahmaputra draining the southern aspect of the

Himalayas—contribute about 80 percent of the flow of the

Brahmaputra as it leaves India. Except the Dihang, all of the other rivers

drain the southern aspect of the Himalayas. There is a small upstream

part of the Lohit in Myanmar, but it is not very important in terms of the



totality of the river. The contribution of the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet to

the annual flow of the Brahmaputra at Bahadurabad is about 20 percent.

This contribution rises at the time of lean flow and drops significantly

during the monsoon peak flow.

When we look at interventions in the rivers, it is not only a question of

the totality of the water content. There is the question of having a

reliable hydrograph of the river, because while the total flow may remain

the same, periodicity may change due to interventions upstream. We

need to have a friendly approach to structural interventions even in the

case of hydropower plants. In India, we need to understand what China

is planning to do with the Zagmu Dam, which has been cleared by the

People's Council of China, and the three others in the pipeline. Further

downstream on Siang (in India), at least three dams are under

construction. The contribution of the Dihang to the flow of the

Brahmaputra at Pasighat will be determined by the release from the last

of the dams on the Dihang. So, the dams in India on the tributaries to

Brahmaputra will be more directly responsible for the hydrograph of the

Brahmaputra at Pasighat.

The impact of the dams within India has been quite drastic. For example,

the daily hydrograph of the Lohit looks like the annual hydrograph of

monsoon rivers, as the base flow is very low. But at about 5 pm, the flow

peaks because power generation starts. Then it looks comparable to the

annual hydrograph of the river during May or June, when the flow

increases. The flow comes down at about 10 pm, when the hydropower

generation is stopped. This is a 360-time compression of the annual

hydrograph of the downstream flows. As a result, there is a tremendous

environmental impact on the tributaries of Brahmaputra. This also

impacts the Assam flood plains along the banks of the Brahmaputra,

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org18

because of the series of hydropower stations from the Burhi Dihing to

the Lohit all the way up to the Teesta. Our hydropower dams are

providing electricity, but due to the rather limited nature of the

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, notable

environmental damage is expected to take place in the river ecosystems.

For example, in the current EIA process, there is a spatial limit of 10 km.

A hydropower plant can make the riverbed dry over a much longer

stretch because of tunneling. In case of cascade plants, this impact will

be observed over a longer stretch but the impact is formally studied

within a 10 km limit. There is a need for strategic environmental

assessment which takes the entire river basin as the spatial basis for

assessment. EIA in its present format is thus incomplete and

unscientific.

Going back to the engineering interventions at the Tsangpo Bend, they

are very lucrative for China in terms of hydropower generation but are

not very economical as water transfer projects. This area is the world's

single largest hydro-potential source of about 45,000 MW. Hydropower

is now more important for India and China, where new economic

demands require more CO -free energy sources. China is likely trying to 2

benefit from the large total drop available at the Tsangpo Bend in order

to meet these demands.

On the question of water transfer, media reports have appeared on the

dangers to the Brahmaputra drying up in case of a physical transfer of

water from the structures being built at the Tsangpo Bend to the

northern plains of China. There is great need of water in the North

China Plain, but China is not an economically foolhardy country. It has a

sound process for project feasibility assessment and its investments are

based on pragmatism. If water is to be taken from the YarlungTsangpo



at the Great Bend, it must be done so from three major river

basins—Yangste, Mekong and Salwin. The economic feasibility of

physical transfer of water from Yarlung Tsangpo to the northern plains

is very low.

On the other hand, generating hydropower is a lucrative possibility. This

possibility is being pursued not only by China but also by India in the

downstream parts of the Yarlung Tsangpo, i.e., the Siang and Dihang. So

when we talk about sharing the Brahmaputra, quantitative transfer, if it

were to take place, would not affect the Brahmaputra in any significant

way. Hydropower plants at the Tsangpo Bend would change the

downstream hydrograph, but since India also has five major hydropower

stations downstream on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the final effect on the

hydrograph of the Brahmaputra at Pasighat would come from the last

hydropower station above Pasighat, which is in India. India must also

accept that building hundreds of hydropower projects on the tributaries

of the Brahmaputra will have a very significant impact on this great river.

I heard Prime Minister Narendra Modi say in his first campaign speech in

New Delhi on 19 January 2014 at Ramlila Maidan that China is stopping

the flow of the Brahmaputra. In reality, China has very little ability to do

so. Hydrological realities must be the basis for making such statements.

The other aspect is related to Bangladesh. A Bangladesh-India initiative

named Ecosystems for Life, organised by the International Union for

Conservation of Nature, is trying to assess the depth of water in the

Hooghly, Padma and Meghna rivers the Hilsa fish require to swim in

freely from the Bay of Bengal. Several decades ago, the Hilsa used to

travel a long way up the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna river basin, which

is not the case today. Instead, the Hilsa is now moving to the Irrawadi in

Myanmar in large quantities. So, river water is not only important for

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org20

irrigation or power generation, it is also a source of cheap protein. In a

country where poverty and food security are major concerns, we must

think of not only allocating water for growing paddy and wheat but also

about making food, including fish, available by river waters.

Multi-Dimensional Challenges

This brings us to the multi-dimensional challenges of water

management in the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. We have a long

way to go, and it is necessary to collaborate with both downstream

Bangladesh and upstream China so that the water future of all three

countries is secure. Also, whatever requirements of water downstream

players have must be accepted by their upstream neighbours like India,

as far as Tibet is concerned, or Bangladesh, in relation to India and

China. In the field of international relations, river waters have become a

difficult, complex and challenging topic, and in the coming years, we will

see more breakthroughs from communities, academics, diplomats and

engineers in making sure that our Himalayan rivers provide us water

security, security from floods during the monsoon and security in the

production of food. We have to focus on open, amicable and informed

sharing of rivers. There has been great progress in proposing and

initiating an open type of management, such as that for the river

Mekong, where China was initially a non-participant but is today an

observer and could become a member of the Mekong River

Commission in due course.

So, we can hope that in the near future there may be an agreement to

cooperate in the management of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna,

which would look after the interests of the people across the basin. We

should adopt a comprehensive approach; in the coming decade or so, we

—



must arrive at a river basin-based solution and not one of dividing rivers

at various points.

South Asia needs to have its own variety of water diplomacy, because we

have ignored, underestimated and paid no academic attention to the

issue of sharing river waters of South Asia. This task has to be

undertaken by people across professions. Water diplomacy is a new

interdisciplinary approach to complex and sensitive issues in river basins

where all stakeholder interests and dimensions are addressed. Let me end

here by again congratulating Prof. Ray for his comprehensive

presentation on a complex subject.

Q&A Session

Q: A joint study by the Asian Development Bank Institute and the

Asian Development Bank found that by 2017, the demand for

water in India, China and Southeast Asian countries will rise to

triple or quadruple the current figures. It also showed that the

present groundwater condition in both China and India is bad. In

that scenario, there might emerge serious conflicts between

countries sharing common river waters. I am hopeful this will not

happen, given, for example, the Greater Mekong Region, which

is riding on the success of Greater Mekong Regional

Cooperation, where the Southeast Asian countries of China,

Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia are being

connected through energy, roads, railways, waterways, etc. Taking

a comprehensive view of the entire infrastructure involved is

better than taking a focused view on water alone. China is not a

part of the Mekong River Commission, but it participates

through the Mekong Region Infrastructural Commission. China

ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org22


is set to host an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meet later

this year. This could be good opportunity for discussing water

issues. India had a successful water agreement with Pakistan in

the 1960s brokered by the World Bank, so why not a treaty with

China? A river-based treaty like Greater Mekong Region or the

Greater Tumen Initiative is needed. What is the likelihood of a

water treaty involving the Brahmaputra and Ganga?

A: There has been work done on South Asian rivers as a whole.

Regarding the Brahmaputra, riparian countries Bhutan, India,

Bangladesh and China should address the river as a whole. The

Ganga and Brahmaputra systems are quite different from each

other.

However, studies have been done and China was possibly not

taken into consideration; dams and water sharing was an issue in

India-Bangladesh relations. We have been getting flow data from

Army sources for around five to seven years. Now, with

technological advancement, particularly satellite imagery, is the

data generated good enough to understand the matter? They are

using outdated data concerning the Teesta River as well. India

and China are both reluctant to cooperate. Still, India is now

changing its mindset; regional thinking has come into play. Both

speakers have made the point that we do not need to worry about

the diversion of water from the Yarlung Tsangpo but that there

are environmental concerns because of the hydropower plants.

Q: How do these environmental concerns affect India?


ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org24

A: The environment is affected by humans, and has always been

changing. The fall of the Harappan and Mesopotamian

civilisations has been linked to bad environmental strategies. We

are concerned about these things and it is pertinent to remember

that run-of-the-river logic is not a panacea in itself. It also applies

to Tipaimukh. If the power generation is for peak power, the

generator needs to work, say from 5.30 pm to about 10 pm. With

satellite imagery we can glean some kind of data about bank

erosion and changes in the river course. But satellite imagery is

not yet very reliable for river water discharge information.

Q: Are big dams serving the needs of the country, especially when

local opposition has prevailed in recent times (e.g., the damming

of the river Narmada; the dams being built in the Northeast)?

A: Post-independence, both Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and

Chairman Mao had great faith in large dams as tools for

economic advancement and food security. In India, we have built

a number of dams. Many dams were built on the Himalayan

rivers, starting with the Bhakra Dam. In the case of China,

Chairman Mao wanted to stop the flooding of the Yellow River.

And both countries relied on Russian dam building technology.

So, the dam Sangmenxia on the Yellow River was built by the

Russians. However, it did not achieve the task of sediment

management, because of the failure to recognise the role of

sediment in the management of dams in Europe. In our water

policies, we have a lot to say about the water flow but nothing

much to say about millions of tonnes of sediment. The sediment

is as much a part of the flow in Himalayan rivers as the water. The


Yellow River is the densest carrier of sediment, and the Ganga-

Brahmaputra the largest carriers of annual sediment load.

China and India, to start with, did not have any internal

knowledge of modern river management systems. Both

borrowed European technology, particularly from the Russians.

But the Chinese built an indigenously designed dam at Xiao Lang

Di, downstream of Sanmenxia, which has done much better at

excluding sediments. Indians have not yet paid attention to

sediment exclusion. Hydropower could become a high carbon

dioxide producing technology if 20-25 years down the line, dams

are to be cleared of sediment by truck transporting. As opposed

to European heritage of hydrology, the South Asian challenge is

to develop a water science for high sediment flows.

Q: Does the United Nations have any treaties that could be

appropriated for this region? What should our framework treaty

be?

A: Our water policies and laws are based on the original British

system. We have not progressed from there. Europeans have

evolved, but we have not. We have to develop our knowledge on

the basis of which the new approach to river management can

evolve. The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational

Use of International Watercourses, put to vote in 1997, has a

tremendous amount of material that can make a positive

conceptual contribution, which any local level arrangement can

use. Even if countries do not want to sign the UN convention, a

lot of expertise has gone into drafting the UN convention, which

can be put to our own advantage. When a Brahmaputra-based


ORF Seminar Series

www.orfonline.org26

organisation is to be formed, for instance, ideas could be

borrowed from the convention without actually going to the UN.

Just because we have not signed the convention, we should not

ignore it.

Chair's Remarks

Prof. Rakhahari Chatterji, Adviser, ORF, and a former Professor,

Department of Political Science, Calcutta University, thanked the

speakers for focusing on a very interesting, important and urgent issue.

He felt the matter of water diplomacy will increasingly occupy an

important place in the discourse on joint river systems.

Observer Research Foundation20, Rouse Avenue, New Delhi-110 002

Email: [email protected]: +91-11-43520020 Fax: +91-11-43520003

www.orfonline.org

Observer Research Foundation is a public policy think-tank that aims to influence formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed and productive inputs, in-depth research and stimulating discussions. The Foundation is supported in its mission by a cross-section of India's leading public figures, academics and business leaders.

rivers of conflict or rivers of peacere.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/rivers of conflict...

Documents