Risky States and Risky BehaviorAndrew J. Enterline

Review by Andrew J. Enterline

Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico

Enforcing Cooperation: Risky States and Intergovernmental Management of Conflict. Ed-ited by Gerald Schneider and Patricia A. Weitsman. New York: St. Martin’s Press,1997. 337 pp., $49.95 (ISBN: 0-312-16290-1).

With the afterglow of the Cold War long dissipated, the interstate system appearsincreasingly unruly. Although the frequency of interstate conflict has declined inthe 1990s (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1996), the tendency for weak, or “risky,”states to challenge international regimes and coalitions is increasing. In EnforcingCooperation: Risking States and Intergovernmental Management of Conflict, GeraldSchneider and Patricia Weitsman lead a group of scholars in exploring this phe-nomenon, a subject that has come under increasing scrutiny in the literature(see Diehl 1997; Maoz 1996). Their goal is to formulate strategies for managingstates that are currently “risky” and to moderate conditions that stimulate “riskybehavior.”

Enforcing Cooperation has three sections. The first, which contains chapters bySchneider and Weitsman, Samuel Barkin, Raimo Väyrynen, and John Conybeare,investigates the origins of risky states. Setting the theoretical tone for the book intheir chapter, Schneider and Weitsman define “risky states” as those that exhibit atleast one of four characteristics: (1) they “have a propensity to pursue goals whichmost other states morally condemn,” (2) they “might try to behave ‘irrationally’ toreach their goals,” (3) they may be “situated in a dangerous strategic context suchas a rivalry or conflict-prone region,” or (4) they may “have a propensity to employforce domestically and internationally” (pp. 4–5). Schneider and Weitsman arguethat risky behavior may emerge at the individual, national, dyadic, regional, andsystem levels of analysis. At each level of analysis, risky states present different secu-rity problems for “multilateral action.” Given that neorealism and neoidealism failto identify appropriate strategic interactions between multilateral agencies andrisky states, Schneider and Weitsman analyze “the logic of the multilateral mecha-nisms which are used to deal with risky states” (pp. 9–10).

In his chapter, Barkin suggests that “countries that do not conform to acceptednorms of legitimate sovereignty generally pose a greater risk to internationally sta-bility” (p. 19). Tracing the basis of sovereign legitimacy from the Treaty ofWestphalia (1648) to the present post–Cold War system, Barkin replicates previouswork (Barkin and Cronin 1994) demonstrating that the norms upon which legiti-macy is based have evolved considerably. He concludes that the current efforts ofWestern states to impose norms grounded in domestic civil liberties has resulted ina transitional period containing “more risky states than most periods of post-Westphalian history” (p. 31).

Väyrynen similarly argues that “a profound normative change is under way inworld politics” (p. 43), and that the realist approach is incapable of explaining for-eign policies grounded in normative rather than physical force. The norms of the

Mershon International Studies Review (1998) 42, 355–359

© 1998 The Mershon Center at The Ohio State University.Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.

international system are a function of powerful states in that system, Väyrynen sug-gests, and thus the “riskiness of states to the international order becomes a relativematter” (p. 52). As the system’s norms evolve through hegemonic, cooperative,and decentralized phases, risky behavior by states varies as well.

Finally, building on ideas formulated in earlier work on alliances (Conybeare1992), Conybeare proposes that riskiness is a “behavioural characteristic that astate ‘supplies’ to potential partners, exhibited by high variation over time in theinternational policies of that state” (p. 60). Conceptualizing states as financialassets, Conybeare confirms hypotheses that states exhibiting highly variable for-eign policies are compelled to offer greater resources to potential allies, and thatrisk-acceptant states prefer forms of cooperation in which payoffs and variability ofeffort by contributing states are high. Last, Conybeare finds that “states subject toexogenous environmental risk will seek to rely relatively more on the arms of theirallies than on their own efforts” (p. 76).

In the second section of Enforcing Cooperation, several scholars develop early-warning indicators of risky states. Drawing on the literature outlining alliance-choice models (for example, Morrow 1987; Singer 1989), Volker Krause and J.David Singer use patterns of alliance commitments to identify risky states. Theyinvestigate whether alliance commitment affects the conflict propensity of states,and whether differences in the nature of the alliance (bilateral versus multilateral)affect the likelihood that states will honor these commitments. Krause and Singerfind that “states in bilateral alliances have a significantly increased likelihood ofbeing involved in armed conflict as the original belligerents . . . and of honouringtheir alliance obligations” (p. 100).

In their analysis of third-party involvement in ethnic conflicts, a subject ofincreasing concern in the comparative and world politics literatures (Davis andMoore 1997; Gurr 1994), David Carment, Patrick James, and Dane Rowlandsargue that risky states are more likely to intervene in other states to “support eth-nic insurgencies unilaterally,” and to meddle in the domestic political processes ofneighboring states (p. 106). Employing a partial equilibrium model of “interve-nor” states, they draw two primary conclusions. First, “when ethnic insurgenciesbecome strong, a state external to a conflict is less likely to intervene to ‘tip thebalance’ in favor of the minority” (p. 127). Second, “a credible commitmentresulting in intervention is difficult to sustain even under conditions of power dis-parity” (p. 127).

Based on their previous research on enduring rivalries (Goertz and Diehl1993), Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl suggest that an analysis of “risky dyads” will“provide a better path to understanding the behavior of the risky states” (p. 132).Goertz and Diehl claim that enduring rivalries—dyadic, longitudinal, militarizedcompetitions—contain the majority of risky states in the interstate system. Theyargue that extant analyses of enduring rivalries have failed to consider overlappingrivalries, and that conflict management strategies based on the assumption ofindependence among rivalries may be faulty. Goertz and Diehl find that “rivalrylinkage” has a significant, although inconsistent, effect on the “basic rivalry levels”of enduring rivals (p. 156).

Finally, Henrik Sommer investigates the impact of the democratization of SouthAfrica, beginning in 1990, on interstate rivalries in southern Africa. Sommerhypothesizes that South Africa’s rivals had been at “increasing risk of conflict”since 1965, but the democratization of South Africa subsequently dampened therisk of conflict (p. 166). In conclusion, he finds “indications that some of the rival-ries have ended in the region,” a development that he attributes to the end of theCold War and South African democratization (p. 181). Sommer’s findings have

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implications for the current debate regarding the link between democratizationand interstate conflict (see Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Ward and Gleditsch 1998).

In the third and final section of Enforcing Cooperation, five chapters examinepotential international responses to risky states. In the first of these chapters,Jacob Bercovitch and Patrick Regan examine the impact of interstate mediationon risky states. They hypothesize that mediation will be more likely in disputesbetween states at risk (e.g., enduring rivals), and that mediators will resort to spe-cific strategies to achieve greater settlement rates. Contrary to their expectations,they find that risky states are equally likely to experience mediation as nonriskystates (p. 197). In addition, risky states employ mediation strategies that are similarto nonrisky states and enjoy a rate of success that “is not greatly affected by thenature of their risk orientation” (p. 199).

Katherine Barbieri takes a different tact, examining the impact of trade link-ages on the propensity of states to engage in interstate conflict. Drawing on theo-ries that are supportive and theories that are critical of the liberal proposition thattrade reduces conflict, Barbieri highlights the nuances of the economic depend-ence and interdependence debate. In particular, she formulates hypothesesdesigned to test the impact of trade salience and symmetry on the propensity ofinterstate conflict between 1870 and 1985. Barbieri concludes that her “study pro-vides little empirical support for the liberal proposition that trade promotes peaceand suggests instead that economic interdependence increases the likelihood thatdyads will engage in militarized disputes” (p. 227). Barbieri’s findings represent afirm challenge to recent analyses identifying a negative relationship between eco-nomic interdependence and interstate conflict (Oneal and Russett 1997).

George Shambaugh shifts attention back to multilateral arenas, investigatingthe strategies that international organizations can employ to obtain compliancefrom risky states. Using the Central European countries, the People’s Republic ofChina, and Taiwan as case studies, Shambaugh outlines the incentives for coopera-tion and compliance, as well as the impact of expectations and domestic concerns.He argues that these factors affect the likelihood that membership in an interna-tional organization will moderate the behavior of risky states. Shambaugh con-cludes that states will become less risky in order to gain admittance intointernational organizations, and that “denial of membership or grants of member-ship to their rivals may increase their propensity for risky behaviour” (p. 258).

In a similar vein, Laura Neack examines attempts by the United Nations (UN)to manage the behavior of risky states through peacekeeping operations. She dis-cusses the role of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War, when such efforts wereintegral to the maintenance of the “pro-Western international system” (p. 265),and during the post–Cold War period, when UN involvement has greater inde-pendence “as a conflict management medium” (p. 271). Neack concludes that“when conflict involves one or more risky states or parties, peacekeeping rarelysucceeds in facilitating short-term reconciliation that leads to long-term conflictresolution” (p. 263), a finding that supports earlier conclusions by Diehl (1994).

In the volume’s final chapter, Schneider and Weitsman explore ways in whichmultilateral institutions can be modified to improve governance in a risky interna-tional environment. They identify four strategic problems in international affairs:(1) risky states may still attempt to “exploit the willingness of the international com-munity”; (2) individual states may send different signals to the risky state; (3) riskystates may exhibit low levels of rationality; and (4) efficient oversight mechanismsare difficult to design and maintain (pp. 290–291). Despite these problems, Schnei-der and Weitsman argue that a multilateral approach to the problems posed by riskystates is superior to policies based on unilateral action (p. 292).

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Taken as a whole, Enforcing Cooperation exhibits several weaknesses. First, thedefinition of “risky” is imprecise. “Risky states” are originally defined by Schneiderand Weitsman as those states that “have a propensity to employ force domesticallyor internationally” (p. 4), an approach that seems too general to be helpful. Yet,the editors also seem to associate risky states with classic notions of “rogue” or“pariah” states—such as Iraq, North Korea, and South Africa. Furthermore, severalcontributors analyze “risky behavior”—that is, the propensity to use militarizedforce abroad—rather than “risky states.” As Barbieri aptly explains, “it is often diffi-cult to classify states as risky or non-risky, since a state’s propensity to use force mayvary across time and across relationships” (p. 202).

Second, Enforcing Cooperation does not develop a general model of risky states.Thus, it remains unclear under what conditions such states emerge, endure, anddisappear from the interstate system. Nor do Schneider and Weitsman formulate aframework that effectively harnesses the information contained in the individualchapters. Thus, the contributors tend to address parochial questions rather thaninforming or building an overarching model of risky states.

Finally, Schneider and Weitsman’s treatment of the “irrationality” of elites inrisky states is confusing. They define irrationality in terms of states being “per-ceived to conduct policies which are volatile or uncertain” (p. 4). Several con-tributors suggest that their analyses inform this dimension of risky states. However,the authors are primarily concerned with variations in behavior rather than ration-ality in the traditional sense of the term. Ultimately, one wonders whether Schnei-der and Weitsman consider elites in risky states to be irrational because theysystematically make suboptimal choices, or because they lead risky states.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, Enforcing Cooperation is an ambitious projectthat should appeal to a broad range of world politics practitioners and scholars.Several of the contributions discuss the strengths and weaknesses of current theo-rizing in the world politics literature and suggest novel revisions. The authorsemploy methods ranging from qualitative historical analysis to survival models. Inessence, reading this volume is akin to perusing a set of related journal articles.Despite its faults, Enforcing Cooperation is a trove of theory, hypotheses, researchdesigns, findings, and unexplored research questions. Although one suspects that“risky states” will not be the primary rubric under which world politics will be stud-ied in the future, the questions and issues raised in this volume certainly requirefurther consideration.

References

Barkin, J. S., and B. Cronin. (1994) The State and the “Nation”: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sover-eignty in International Relations. International Organization 48:107–130.

Conybeare, John A. C. (1992) A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances. Journal of Conflict Resolution36:52–85.

Davis, David R., and Will H. Moore. (1997) Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and For-eign Policy Behavior. International Studies Quarterly 41:171–184.

Diehl, Paul F. (1994) International Peacekeeping. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Diehl, Paul F. , ed. (1997) The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl . (1993) Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Pat-

terns. International Studies Quarterly 37:147–171.Gurr, Ted R. (1994) Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System. Inter-

national Studies Quarterly 38:347–377.Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. (1995) Democratization and the Dangers of War. International

Security 20(1):5–38.Maoz, Zeev. (1996) Domestic Sources of Global Change. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

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Morrow, James D. (1987) On the Theoretical Basis of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes. InternationalStudies Quarterly 31:423–438.

Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. (1997) The Classical Liberals Were Right : Democracy, Interde-pendence, and Conflict, 1950–1985. International Studies Quarterly 41:267–293.

Singer, J. David. (1989) System Structure, Decision Processes, and the Incidence of International War. InHandbook of War Studies, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Wallensteen, Peter,and Sollenberg, Margareta. (1996) Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, andPeace Agreements, 1989–96. Journal of Peace Research 34:339–358.

Ward, Michael D., and Kristian S. Gleditsch. (1998) Democratizing for Peace. American Political Sci-ence Review 92:51–62.

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