risks in rescue

7/29/2019 Risks in Rescue

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RISKSin Mountain Rescue

Charley Shimanski

Mountain Rescue Association

www.mra.org


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Charley Shimanski

Mountain Rescue Associationwww.mra.org

2008, Charley Shimanski/Mountain Rescue Association All rights reserved

COVER PHOTO: Photo courtesy How ard Paul.
http://www.mra.org/http://www.mra.org/http://www.mra.org/


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Mountain Rescue Association www.mra.org

Objective ..........................................................................................................1

Introduction.....................................................................................................1

Part 1 Mother Nature ...................................................................................1Weather Prediction/Forecast Skills for the Rescue Leader ......................................................... 1Rockfall ..........................................................................................................................................3Icefall..............................................................................................................................................4Lightning........................................................................................................................................4

Avalanche.......................................................................................................................................5Weather and Aviation Support......................................................................................................5

Part 2 Physical Elements............................................................................. 7Equipment ..................................................................................................................................... 7

Physical Conditioning....................................................................................................................8

Physical Skills ................................................................................................................................8Rescue Techniques ........................................................................................................................9Emergency Medical Providers.......................................................................................................9Experience in the Environment ....................................................................................................9Food, Water, and the Rescue Mountaineer ................................................................................10Sleep (yes, sleep!) ........................................................................................................................10

Part 3 Mental Elements..............................................................................12Mission Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 12Hazard Recognition..................................................................................................................... 13Situational Awareness? ............................................................................................................... 14

Adaptability and Flexibility......................................................................................................... 16

Deviation from the Established Plan .......................................................................................... 16Working Outside the Normal Comfort Zone ............................................................................17Judgment and Rescue Leadership ...............................................................................................17Triage and Dispatch..................................................................................................................... 18Teamwork .................................................................................................................................... 19Knowledge of Resources Available.............................................................................................. 19Knowledge of When the Rescue is over ...................................................................................... 19

Part 4 Emotional Elements........................................................................21Ego................................................................................................................................................ 21

Who Comes First?........................................................................................................................ 21

Part 5 External Influences......................................................................... 23Public and Official Pressure ........................................................................................................23Subjects Friends and Family ......................................................................................................23Media............................................................................................................................................24Other Outside Influences ............................................................................................................24The Subjects Emotional and Psychological State ......................................................................25

Conclusion .................................................................................................... 26


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The Mountain Rescue Association, a national non-profit membership association dedicated to

saving lives through rescue and mountain safety education, has developed this program to beused by any organization that may be required to respond to a backcountry rescue operation.

At the conclusion of this course, students should be able to:

1. Identify how mother nature, physical elements, mental and emotional elements, andexternal influences contribute to risk in rescue operations;

2. Understand other external hazards affecting risks in rescues, and;3. Understand methods to reduce risk on the basis of the elements presented.

This program would not have been possible without the kind assistance of many mountaineersand rescuers. Our thanks to all whom offered assistance.

Charley Shimanski is President and Education Director for the Mountain Rescue Association, anational organization of rescue mountaineers. A 20-year veteran of ColoradosAlp ine RescueTeam, Charley has participated as a field member and Incident Commander for hundreds ofrescues among Colorados highest peaks.

The author of the Mountain Rescue AssociationsHelicopt ers in Mounta in Rescue Operationsmanuals and co-author of theAv alanche Rescue Operations manual, Charley has consultedrescue mountaineers, mountain guides, and climbers throughout the world, from Israel toChina, from Kilimanjaro to Aconcogua. Charley is a frequent speaker at meetings of theInternational Technical Rescue Symposium, The National Association of Search and Rescue, the

Wilderness Medical Society, and the Mountain Rescue Association.

This program is dedicated to Terry Leadens.


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P a r t 1 M o t h e r N a t u r eRisks in Mountain Rescue 1

In the past decade, there has been adramatic increase in popularity of mountainrecreation. Advances in equipment andskills have made it possible formountaineers to delve further and higherinto the backcountry. And with theincreased interest in adventure, there lies anincrease in the need for qualified rescuemountaineers. Each year, backcountryusers will make decisions that result inaccidents. Whether by bad decision makingor by simple bad luck, backcountry users

will often need the assistance of qualified

rescue mountaineers. And while it is criticalthat rescue groups work to fine-tune theirskills at rescue operations, it is equallyessential that rescuers have a clearunderstanding of risk assessment andhazard evaluation.

When it comes to rescue operations, time isof the essence. For this reason, riskassessment skills must be well developed

before the rescue begins. Rescuers must beaware that they are not invincible, and that

one can never eliminate all risks.

Rescuers must also be aware of theirpotential to lose their attention to detailonce theyve been involved in search andrescue operations for many years.

Fam i li a r i z a t i on , and p r o l onged

e x p o s u r e w i t h o u t i n c id e n t , l ea d s t o a

l o s s o f app r ec i a t ion o f r i s k

Dr. Ken Kam ler Mt. Ev erest expeditionphy sician , 1996

We hope this training material will assistyou in learning risk assessment skills priorto the actual rescue operation.

We have broken risk factors in rescueoperations into five major factors. Theyare:

Mother Nature Physical Elements

Mental Elements

Emotional Elements

External Influences

Each of these factors will be discussed indetail. In addition, profiles of accidentsduring actual mountain rescue operations

will be included.

Whether you are out on a simplebackcountry adventure or participating in acomplex rescue operation, Mother Natureoffers risk factors to all situations.Lightning, avalanche, rockfall, severestorms, and whitewater issues are allelements that must be considered by rescuemountaineers. Whether experienced or

novice at rescue work, the rescuer musthave assessment skills beyond that of theordinary backcountry enthusiast.

WeatherPrediction/ForecastSkills for the RescueLeader

An essential skill for any rescue leader is the

ability to understand weather forecasts andtheir effect on rescue operations. Certainlynot all rescue leaders can be schooled inmeteorology and weather forecasting, butthey do need to know the basics. Essentialinformation is also available to most rescueunits in the continental United States fromqualified weather service offices although



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P a r t 1 M o t h e r N a t u r eRisks in Mountain Rescue 2rescuers should know what to ask from the

vast atmospheric tools available.

Qualified rescue leaders must quickly assess

the current weather conditions and obtain aweather forecast from forecasters withsophisticated computer forecast models.

Any rescue team must include in theirResource Directory any phone numbers for

weather service forecasters and avalancheforecast centers. The accessibility of cellulartelephones makes it possible for rescueleaders to obtain such forecasts directlyfrom their base of operations. Some rescueleaders may even seek such forecasts fromtheir cellular telephone while en route to the

rescue.

In the absence of cell phones, a rescueleader should develop a means of obtaininga forecast through his/her local lawenforcement authority, generally thedispatcher of the local sheriff or state police.This must be worked out in advance, as partof the rescue teams pre-plan.

Rescue leaders should speak directly to theweather service forecaster, who can give up-

to-the-minute forecasts for specific altitudesand locations. One must not rely on pre-recorded forecasts, hot lines, ornewspaper/radio/television forecasts.

Weather forecasts are necessary not only forthe well being of rescuers in the field, butalso for the safety of any air operations thatmay take place. Helicopter and fixed-wingpilots will be acutely interested in weatherforecasts when they are dispatched to thescene. Equally important, the prudent

rescue leader will take into considerationthe current and forecasted weather whenconsidering whether or not to utilizeairborne resources.

Weather and the Rescuer inthe FieldHypothermia is the most common cause ofaccidental death in the mountains. It

results when the body loses more heat thanit can generate. Hypothermia often results

when an individual is unprepared for thecold that confronts him/her. In fact, the

state with the most reported cases ofhypothermia is, believe it or not, Florida!The reason is simple. Floridians aregenerally unprepared for cold weather.Hypothermia is especially dangerous forrescue mountaineers, since it impairs yourmost important asset and survival tool -

your brain.

Effective dressing is the simplest way toavoid hypothermia in the dynamic weatherof the mountains. Rescue mountaineers

must be aware that the most effective way todress is by "layering". This method has

been proven, not only on Mount Everest butin the cold northern regions of Alaska as

well. Layering simply means wearing onething over another over another overanother you get the idea.

The advantage of the layering system is thatone can add and remove protection from theelements in small increments, thus

balancing heat generation with heat loss. In

addition, layering traps dead air foradditional weight-free insulation.

The body is a source of heat, which you wantto retain within your clothing. It is also asource of moisture, in the form ofperspiration that, in many situations, must

be kept away from the skin due to thecooling effect of evaporation. For thisreason, the layers of clothing near your bodyshould be thin and porous to hold in heatand wick away the perspiration. Middle

layers should be thicker in insulating qualityto hold in more heat, yet be able to dissipatethe moisture further away from the body.

Wool and synthetic pile are effective for thispurpose, since most of their insulatingquality is retained when wet. Finally, theouter layers should be thick enough toprevent heat loss and still protect the innerlayers from the external elements. The mosteffective outer layer is completely



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P a r t 1 M o t h e r N a t u r eRisks in Mountain Rescue 3waterproof, yet allows water vapor(perspiration) to escape. Most conventionalrain-gear does not allow water vapor to

breathe, thus the body's perspiration is held

within the layers of clothing.

Through practice, you can learn to add andremove layers of clothing at just the righttimes. The rule of "befores" applies here.

You should remove a layer of clothes beforeyou begin to sweat, add a layer before youget cold. Eat before you get hungry, drink

before you get thirsty. By doing so, you canbalance the amount of your body's heatgeneration with heat loss. Conserve yoursweat, not your water!

Weather RecognitionWhile focusing on the actual rescueoperation, rescuers and rescue leaders mustkeep an eye on the sky. Sudden stormscan often be predicted in mountainousterrain without the help of forecasters.Rescuers must pay attention todevelopments above the ground. As cloudsget bigger, darker, and lower, the storm is

building.

The build up of clouds in the sky can oftenbe used to predict storms in the mountains.One must pay attention not only to thenumber of clouds in the sky, but also totheir rate of growth and speed of movement.Focus on one particular cloud, and watch itsrate of growth over several minutes.

Rescuers should also be familiar with theuse of barometers/altimeters, and how theycan be used to predict local weather. Theuse of an altimeter and/or barometer can

help the well-equipped rescue mountaineerand aid in weather forecasting.

RockfallRockfall is certainly one of the morehazardous conditions that face rescuers inthe mountains. While we must be alert andaware that we can trigger rockfall during

technical rescue efforts, experienced rescuemountaineers will know that naturalrockfall is most common during the springor after rainstorms.

Natural rockfall can often lead to disaster inthe mountains. One small rock breakingloose can lead to a large rock avalanche,

which can cause dangerous consequences.

Natural rockfall is common followingfreeze-thaw cycles in the spring. Rockfall

will often occur in the warm afternoonfollowing a normal cold spring evening.This is often aggravated by wet conditions inthe day or days preceding the event.

Many fatal rockfall accidents occur whenmembers of a party trigger the event. Forthis reason, rescuers should always wearUIAA approved helmets, and should equipany rescue subject with a helmet as well.Litter shields, designed to protect thesubjects face from rockfall, are also anessential element of any mountain rescue.

One significant risk of rockfall is thatrescuers' ropes could be cut in the impact of

rock against rock. The other risk is that ofrock striking rescuers and/or victims.

On March 7, 200 1, a group of ran gers

from Ar ches N ational Park w ere

perform ing techn ical rock rescue

training. A rock estim ated betw een 30-

and 40 -feet fell nearly 300 feet from the

top of a cliff. It broke into sm aller pieces

on its w ay dow n, causing a loud noise.

Tw o park em ployees were injured.

An drew Fitzgerald w as knocked to the

ground by flying debris and suffered ahead injury a nd m ultiple lacerations;

Lee Kaiser, w ho w as not am on g t he six ,

injured his leg slightly w hile try ing to

get awa y from the flying rock.

Fitzgerald w as treated for his injuries,

secured t o a litter, low ered over th e side

of a 100 -foot cliff to a second team , then

tran sported a quarter-m ile cross-

country to a w aiting am bulance.



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Rain ha d fallen off and on for several

day s prior to the training session. The

rain-weakened condition of the

sandston e, an existing crack in the rock,and freeze-thaw conditions typ ical of

late winter in the area are thought to

have been the prim ary reasons for the

natu ral release.

IcefallClimbing, and rescuing, is far morehazardous on ice than on rock. This islargely because ice is generally less stablethan rock. Icefall is a hazardous situation

for rescue professionals as well as climbers.Rescuers who work in areas popular amongice climbers must be aware of the objectiveand subjective hazards associated withrescues in these circumstances. Climbersand rescuers on ice are using tools that aregenerally very sharp. Between the ice axes,crampon points, and ice tools, there aremany items that can cause serious injury inthe event of a fall.

Ice on the sunny side of a mountain is more

prone to decay at certain times of the year.Spring conditions are also much morehazardous, and routes with horizontalcracks are showing the early signs ofcollapse. Warm temperatures cause icestructures to be more hazardous and alsomore prone to decay. Runoff on ice routesis a good indication that the hazard of icefallis increasing. Helmets are of coursemandatory, and a good line of defenseagainst small pieces of falling ice.

On March 24, 1998, tw o rescue

m ountaineers from Las Vegas Metro

Police Depart m ent (LVM DP) Search an d

Rescue had just descended from a f rozen

w aterfall where they ha d been engaged

in an ice climbing tra ining. They w ere

on Echo Face near the Cathedral Rock

area. Sudd enly, in a freak accident,

thousand s of pounds of ice fell on them .

The ice narrow ly m issed a rescue team

volunteer, an d k illed R ussell Peterson,

an eight-y ear veteran of the police

departm ent and the Search and Rescue

Team.

Peterson, a v ery experienced beloved

m em ber of LVMPD, had been on

countless SAR m issions for their SAR

team over the years. He w as killed

imm ediately. His partner hiked two

hours to notify au thorities.

LightningAlthough we hear more on the news aboutsuch weather disasters as hurricanes,

avalanches, tornadoes and flash floods, noelement of Mother Nature takes more liveseach year than lightning. Between 1940 and1981, an average of 185 Americans werekilled each year by lightning. Of all the

weather hazards in the mountains, lightningkills the most (source: National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration).

Lightning is a very dangerous yet somewhatavoidable hazard of mountaineering. With asmall degree of understanding of the

electrical energy of a lightning strike, themountaineer can better reduce the risk ofdeath or injury.

Lightning almost always occurs inconjunction with a thunderstorm. In fact,the frequency of the lightning can usually bedetermined by the intensity of thethunderstorm. In a well-developedthunderstorm, strong updrafts anddowndrafts create an intense electrical field.The upper section of the storm builds up astrong positive charge, while the lowersection develops a negative charge.

Whereas the ground is normally negativelycharged, the strong negative charge of thestorm induces a positive charge on theground as the storm passes overhead. Anelectrical charge begins to accumulate in

buildings, trees and other tall objects.When the difference between the charges isgreat enough, the insulating atmosphere



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P a r t 1 M o t h e r N a t u r eRisks in Mountain Rescue 5between the cloud and ground isinsufficient, and an electrical connection ismade. The result...a lightning strike.

The basic dangers of lightning are not onlythat of being the subject of a direct strike,

but of being in the path of ground currentsas the electrons flow to the location of anearby strike.

This text is not intended to teach lightningsafety. For further details on texts in thisarea, see the Reference Guide in the back ofthis manual.

AvalancheRescue leaders in mountainous terrain musthave an acute understanding of avalanchehazard. Again, one should use localavalanche forecasters, and have telephonenumbers for such forecasters within theResource Directory. Rescuers need basicavalanche training to be able to competentlyrecognize and negotiate avalanche hazard.

Avoiding avalanches is certainly easier thansurviving them.

On Jan uary 25, 1982, 17 year-old Hug hHerr a nd 20 year-old J eff Bat zer

climbed Hu ntington Rav ine on the

northeast side of Mt. Washington w ell

know n for its extrem e weather.

Descen ding in a w hit eou t, th ey

m istakenly w ent by w ay of the vast

w ilderness of the northeast ridge, not

the southeast ridge as they had thought .

Albert Dow , an inst ru ctor at the EM S

Clim bing School in Nort h Conw ay , and

Michael Hartr ich w ere par t of N ew

En gla nds Mountain Rescue Service sen t

to look for Herr and Batzer. Dow and

Hart rich found t he lost clim bers tr ail.

W hile the tw o w ere searching, a 3-foot

slab avalanche ran dow n a 30 -degree

slope and overtook the pair. 70-feet

w ide and 100 -feet long, the avalanche

buried Dow comp letely.

Hart rich, m ostly buried , w as able to

reach his radio and call for help. W ithin

25 minu tes, two rescuers arrived to dig

out Hartrich. 90 m inutes after the

accident they found Dow . There w as nosign of there hav ing been any

respiration w hile buried an d CPR

produced no result s. It w as apparent

from his obvious in juries t ha t he had h it

a num ber of trees.

This text is not intended to teach avalancheawareness or avalanche forecasting. Forfurther details on texts in this area, see theReference Guide in the back of this manual.

Weather andAviation Support

Rescue leaders must have an acuteunderstanding of how weather affects theuse of aviation support in the mountains.

Weather, combined with altitude andterrain, will all affect the usefulness ofhelicopters in search and rescue operations.

All aircraft are limited in their working

altitude (called service ceiling), which canchange based on the temperature andhumidity

Turbulence may be a serious problem to apilot; therefore mornings are usually the

best time for flights because there is lessturbulence than with afternoon heating bythe sun. Cumulus clouds indicateturbulence and strong updrafts anddowndrafts. Also, there are oftendowndrafts over the middle of a valley, andsuch currents may be dangerous at highelevations because of reduced engine power.Conversely, updrafts often exist over ridgesor on the sunny side of ridges. Leeward sideof ridges may have severe downdrafts.

Visibility is a serious problem for helicopterpilots. Fog and rainy conditions can lead toreduced visibility, often in just a matter of afew minutes.



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Septem ber 12, 1997 wa s the fifth day of a

search for 73 year -old John Devine, w ho

w ent on a hike in Olym pic National

Park. 150 people from a dozen rescuegroups, including several from Canad a,

a CAP plane, an d 5 h elicopters, w ere

used to a ssist in the rescue.

On that fifth da y of the search, a Bell

205 A1 helicopter was rented from a

privat e com pany in Eugene Oregon .

The helicopter attem pted to pick up

rescuers from the peak at the end of

their assignm ent.

Acciden t r eports reveal, Th e pilotadv ised the SAR personnel to load quick,

as he had no intentions of spending th e

night there the helicopter perform ed a

vertical takeoff in the obscuration.

According t o the rem aining SAR

personnel, they lost sight of t he

helicopter about 50 feet agl. They

continued to hear the helicopter

through out its clim b, im pact, and as it

fell dow n th e sid e of th e m ounta in Th e

sound of the tum bling helicopter w as

described by severa l witnesses as that ofan av alanche and caused several SAR

person nel to tak e cov er .

W itnesses reported that the w eather

conditions in the accident ar ea w ere

instrum ent m eteorological conditions

(IMC) with very low ceiling an d

visibility less than 1/ 4 m ile in fog. The

National Tr an sportat ion Sa fety Boa rd

determ ines the probable cause(s) of this

accident as follow s: the pilot's

intentional flight into know n adversew eather conditions in m ountainous

terrain.

Eig ht peop le w ere on boar d w hen it

crashed Thr ee rescuers died (although

w itnesses report that m any m ore w ould

have died were it not for the expert care

by rescuers on scene w ho w ere waiting

for their tu rn to be evacuat ed w hen th e

helicopter return ed).

Killed in the accident were Kevin

Johnston (35) p ilot , Tary n Hoov er (31)seasonal em ployee of Olym pic National

Park, and R ita McMahon (52) President

of West Coast Search Dogs. Five

rescuers on board suffered injuries,

some serious.


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P a r t 2 P h ys i ca l El em e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 7

There are a great number of physicalelements that contribute to risks in rescueoperations. By physical elements, we referto elements related to the physical well

being of the rescuer and the understandingof the physical components of the rescuesystems being used.

EquipmentA rescue mountaineers personalmountaineering equipment must be inexcellent condition. The rescuer mustassure that all personal equipment is ingood working order and is suitable for allpossible weather conditions. Personalrescue equipment should be lightweight,functional and fully integrated.

Certainly all rescue members must have astrong awareness of the physicalcomponents of the rescue system to be used.Familiarity with equipment is essential, as is

an understanding of the appropriateness ofthe equipment to be used. Actual rescueoperations should not be the time forrescuers to learn equipment and techniques.

A well-prepared rescue team will haveregularly scheduled classroom and fieldtrainings to assure that each rescuer has thenecessary understanding of and experience

with complex technical systems. TheReference Guide in the back of this manualshould provide assistance in locating textsthat teach technical rescue operations. Still,

there is no substitute for actual experienceand fieldwork.

An experienced mountain rescue team hasgained the skill of breaking each rescuedown into small components. By doing so,the goal of the rescuers is to master everyindividual component.

Rescue team leaders must also assure thatequipment is periodically tested before itgoes in the field. This may mean testingequipment at the trailhead (such as

avalanche beacons) or testing equipmentperiodically at the rescue team headquarters(such as warm IV set-ups and O2regulators). Checklists should be developedfor testing equipment at the headquarters,and the team should have a qualifiedEquipment Manager to assure this isaccomplished. The lives of rescuers andsubjects depend on this.

Equipment Managers must also assure thatlogs are kept when any equipment such as

ropes are used in any situation, rescue ortraining. It is essential that these logs arefrequently reviewed and that ropes areretired when they have been usedextensively. In addition, ropes and othertechnical equipment must be inspected afterthey have been used for any purpose.Routine inspections and equipmentturnover need to be managed by a rescueteams Equipment Manager. For example,ropes and slings should be retired after five

years, even if they are still brand new.

On Aug ust 12, 1995, a climber brok e his

ank le in a fall just 900 feet from the top

of Mt. Rainier. His tw o compa nions

returned to Camp Muir, stating t hey left

the injured climber w ith all their extra

food, w at er , and clothin g. Par k officials

w ere concerned that the injured climber

had been left alone by h is partners,

especially given tha t the subject w as

erroneously r eported as being shocky.

Tw o rescuers set out for the injuredclimber at 7:00 p.m . At 11:25 p.m ., one

of the rescuers radioed that they w ere at

12,900 feet, that it w as cold and w indy,

and although they w ere having

crampon pr oblems, they w ould

continue. They expected to reach the

injured climber by 1:00 a.m .



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P a r t 2 P h ys i ca l El em e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 8All a tt em pts to con ta ct t he tw o rescuers

after that last transm ission w ere

un successful. A second rescue team

reached the injured climber at 5:00

a.m .; although the initial tw o rescuershad never arrived.

La ter t he next d ay , a clim bin g p ar ty

found a n NPS ice axe and p ar t of a

cram pon at t he 13,00 0-foot level on the

W inthr op Glacier. The bodies of

rescuers Sean H. Ry an (23) a seasonal

climbing ra nger w ith 11 ascents of the

peak, and Philip J. Otis (22), a St udent

Conservat ion Association aide w ere

found 1,000 feet below tha t location .

They ha d fallen to their death.

The rescuers reported having cram pon

problem s, a nd g iven that p art of a

crampon w as found at the spot where

they presum ably fell, it is clear that

equipment failure was contributory

cause of this tragedy .

Physical

ConditioningSince many mountain rescue operationsoccur deep in the backcountry, rescuersshould be in peak physical condition. Theymust avoid the tendency to think they areinvincible because they have a MountainRescue patch on their jacket. Rescuesubjects are counting on the rescuer havingthe ability to sustain a long approach to therescue, followed by the difficult, oftenphysically exhausting rescue itself.

Rescuers must prepare for rescues as theyactually begin. An experienced rescuer whohas just been called to a difficult rescue willoften spend the time en route eating somefood and drinking water. While the rescuersare actually on the trail, they must stopperiodically to drink water and, whennecessary, eat more food. A rescuer racingto the scene on an empty stomach is a

hazard to him/herself as well as the rest ofthe operation.

Rescuers must be careful not to exhaust

themselves in the approach to the rescuescene. Rushing to the scene hauling heavyequipment while full of adrenaline canresult in rescuers who have no reserves forthe actual rescue effort. For this reason, a

wise rescuer will look for opportunities torest during the approach and throughoutthe rescue efforts.

Physical SkillsWhile it is important that rescuers

understand the physical components ofrescue systems, it is equally important that arescuer also understand the physical skillsnecessary to engage in the rescue operationitself. In a vertical rescue operation on a big

wall, rescuers on the litter must haveexperience with such operations. This willinclude the knowledge of how to maneuver alitter on vertical walls as well as how tomaneuver oneself around (and potentiallyon top of) the litter itself.

While vertical rescue operations areexhausting to the litter attendants, low- tomoderate-angle technical rescues can bemore exhausting. In the vertical situation,the weight of the subject, rescuers andequipment are generally fully loaded on theanchors above. In the low- to moderate-angle evacuation, this weight is oftentransferred to the arms and legs of litterattendants. In this situation, rescuers musthave the upper- and lower-body strength tosustain long evacuations. Rescuers withexperience are often prepared for thephysical requirements of such operations.

Adrenaline-laden novices, on the otherhand, may be unprepared. Again, periodicfield training by the rescue team will helprescuers understand the physical skillsnecessary to complete the operation. It isthen up to the rescuer him/herself to assess

whether he/she is up to the task.



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P a r t 2 P h ys i ca l El em e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 9Rescuers must know their limits. It isessential that a rescuer take breaks whennecessary. Rescuers should be careful notto:

Stay on the litter too long

Search too long

Manage the incident too long

For this reason, judgment is an essentialskill of the rescue mountaineer.

Rescue TechniquesControl of the subject by rescue teamsduring a technical rescue is essential. A

technical rescue is not the time to teach thesubject how to rappel, Jumar or climb.Rescue teams must not allow the subject tocontrol their own ascent or descent, even ifthey are a climber or mountaineer. Allsubjects of a technical rescue should beplaced on systems independent of thesubject's control.

Whenever possible, rescue teams shouldapproach a subject of a technical rescuefrom above rather than from below. This

reduces the risk of additional rock and/ordebris falling on the rescuers, eitheraccidental or intentional, by the subject(s).Rescue teams approaching from above must

be careful to choose a line that does notplace the subject in danger of rockfallhim/herself.

Finally, all rescuers must be skilled at thetechniques their team uses for rescueoperations. Frequent team practices areessential to team members becoming

comfortable with their equipment andtechniques.

Emergency MedicalProviders

When there appears to be a conflict betweenthe evacuation (technical) and medical(EMS) personnel, the highest level of EMS

should take precedence in matters of patientcare, but must defer to the technical rescueexpert with issues of technical safety andevacuation abilities. After all, rapid

transport to an advanced medical facility isoften the highest priority. The subject isusually stable dead or alive. Dont let theevacuation come to a halt to providemedical care unless that medical care isnecessary and the patient is truly life-or-death.

When it comes to helicopter evacuations, itis generally preferable to use a Basic LifeSupport Rescue Team Member on anexternal load (short haul, long line, cable

hoist, or helicopter skid ride) rather than anambulance or other non-wilderness rescueteam Advanced Life Support provider withno experience in external loads.

Experience in theEnvironmentRescue mountaineers should bemountaineers first, rescuers second.Experience in mountaineering is essential

so that the rescuer understands from his orher experience in the mountains. Since theearliest days, mountaineers haveapprenticed under experienced mentors,and they gain experience from everymountaineering adventure. This experienceleads to an increase in confidence, andincreased abilities to deal with adversity onthe mountains.

For example, does the rescuer understandthe rest step, a special technique used inmountain climbing designed to put theminimum amount of strain on the legmuscles while climbing? Is pressure

breathing a technique that the rescuer nowonly knows, but has practiced until it

becomes second nature. Efficiency ofmovement and judgment only come fromextensive experience.



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P a r t 2 P h ys i ca l El em e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 10At the same time, highly experienced rescuemountaineers must be aware thatexperience can also lead to lack of attentionto details. Dr. Ken Kamler, a doctor on Mt.

Everest in 1996, notes that Familiarization,and prolonged exposure without incident,leads to a loss of appreciation of risk.

On May 23, 1977, tw o climbers began a n

attem pt to climb the Yosemite Buttress

in Yosemite National Park. Ultim ately,

one of the climbers fell and injured

himself, and the other called for help.

He w as told that r escuers w ould be

com ing in the morning.

Six rescuers started w alking up anestablished trail up Yosemite Falls trail

at 3:30 a.m . the following m orning in

search of the ill-prepared r ock climbers

w ho had cried out in the dark . For an

unkn own reason, experienced Yosem ite

rescuer Jack Dorn w alked off a w ell-

w orn path and plunged 400-60 0 feet to

his death. He had been w earing a

porta ble ta pe player at the tim e of the

accident.

Food, Water, and theRescue MountaineerThe rescue mountaineers lunch, it is oftensaid, begins just after breakfast. A well-fedmountaineer can survive extreme weatherconditions and long hard climbs better thanone with no extra calories to burn. This isalso true for rescue mountaineers. Rescuersmust remember that adrenaline oftenreduces ones appetite. Like a mountaineerat extreme altitudes, a rescue mountaineermust make certain to eat on occasion, evenin the absence of an appetite. Energy barsare valuable in this regard.

Rescuers must avoid dehydration. Frequentstops to drink water are critical to the rescuemountaineers ability to sustain a longrescue operation. You can monitor yourhydration level by monitoring your urine -

urine needs to be clear and copious tocarry off the by-products of serious physicalexertion.

Sleep (yes, sleep!)While we pay great attention to our need forfood and water, we must also pay closeattention to our need for sleep. As much asadrenaline can kill ones appetite, it can alsoeffect ones desire to sleep. With anincrease in sleep deprivation comes andecrease in ones ability to think and reason.Risk assessment is all about reason, and yet

we too often neglect what may be one of themost dangerous aspects of SAR work.

The solution to this problem is not a simpleone. Rescue teams cannot call for naptime in the midst of a SAR mission.Therefore, it is important for rescue teamsto have an adequate number of qualifiedrescuers so that the rescue leader can rotateindividuals and allow rescuers to havesufficient rest time.

Most rescue mountaineers are in goodphysical condition, and can easily sustain

working in the field for 24-48 hours withoutsleep. The risk to rescue operations is notthat rescuers might physically collapse.Rather, the grater risk is the gradual loss ofmental alertness that results from sleepdeprivation. Mental acuity is the key to thesubjective evaluation of risk. Whenever arescuer is exhausted, their mental guard isdown.

This is also important for rescue commandpersonnel when a rescue is completed.Should rescuers be allowed to get behindthe wheel of their car late at night to drivehome after a long and difficult rescueoperation?

On May 2, 1994, Lisa Hann on w as

w orking as Incident Comm ander for the

State of Virginia. She wa s leading a

m assive search for a m issing five y ear-

old boy lost in the moun tains. She



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P a r t 2 P h ys i ca l El em e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 11

w orked all day and throughout the

night.

On a bright , clear m ornin g on May 3,

Lisa left to dr ive hom e. Less th an anhour a fter she left, she fell asleep behind

the w heel, struck a tree and w as killed.

Lisa H annon w as post hu m ously

aw arded the NASAR State Awa rd for

Virginia that y ear.


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P a r t 3 M e n t a l Ele m e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 12

There are a number of elements related tothe mental health of the rescuer that should

be considered when evaluating risks inrescue operations.

Mission AnalysisThe first actions by rescue team membersand team leaders are the Mission Analysisduring which an initial plan is developed.This often occurs long before the rescuersare at the scene of the emergency oftenstarting as soon as the initial dispatchoccurs. Mission analysis is the ability todevelop short term, long-term andcontingency plans, as well as to coordinate,allocate and monitor resources.

Risk AssessmentThe most essential skill for the rescuemountaineer is the ability to recognize andevaluate risks inherent in mountain rescue

operations. Risk management is a holisticprocess. All your decisions will be based onthe integration of both subjective thoughtsand objective physical parameters. Gooddecision-making is brought about bygathering sufficient information andevaluating it with knowledgeable person(s).It takes many years of experience in anyfield to gain the skill of recognizing risk, letalone knowing what to do with thatinformation. In mountain rescues, therescuers are generally called to the scene ofan accident where risk assessment by thesubject already led to the need for therescue.

What is Decision Making? In the CrewResource Management program of their

Aircrew Coordination Training, the UnitedStates Navy defines effective decision-making as the ability to use logical and

sound judgment to make decisions based onavailable information.

This includes:

Assessing the problem Verifying information

Identifying solutions

Anticipating consequences ofdecisions

Informing others of decision andrationale

Evaluating decisions

Risk assessment is the core of this program,and rescuers must pay great attention tothis essential element. For example, is ahelicopter proposed for the rescue? If so, isit necessary? Has the rescue leader trulyconsidered the danger of airborne rescueoperations? If the subjects injuries areindeed life threatening and the survivabilitydepends on immediate evacuation, thenhelicopter resources might indeed beindicated. If, on the other hand the subjectscondition is stable and the use of ahelicopter will accomplish no more thanreducing a 12-hour carryout to a 1-hourevacuation, prudence might dictate the

carry out is the most risk-free alternative.

In the case of technical rock rescues,rescuers must have the skills necessary toevaluate the situation. Is the slope stable?

Are the proposed anchors suitable for theoperation? Is there an alternative to thetechnical rescue?

With body recoveries, rescue leaders mustconsider carefully any risks proposed. Inthis case, a helicopter recovery might not be

warranted. In fact, any dangerous rescueoperation involving a body recovery must becarefully evaluated. Remember, in this case,time is NOT of the essence. Once rescuersknow their subject is deceased, everythingin the recovery operation should slow down.

Body recoveries in avalanche rescues arecertainly not the time to put rescuers at risk.



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P a r t 3 M e n t a l Ele m e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 13Remember that the hazard is already veryreal, since an avalanche has obviouslyoccurred. Rescuers should consult withavalanche forecast experts before racing to

an avalanche with a known deceasedsubject. The use of helicopters to retrievedeceased subjects should only be consideredif a ground-based recovery would putrescuers at great risk. Even then, accidentscan happen

On June 16, 1975, rescuers from

Yosemite National Park w ere called to a

climber w ho had fa llen 150 feet on El

Capitan. Ranger Dan Sholly wa s the

fir st to th e su bject, Peter Barton, w ho

had sustained fatal injuries. In lieu of avery difficult evacuation over

treacherous cliffs, Sholly called for a

UH-1 Huey helicopter from the San

Joaquin Valley s Lem oor e N av al A ir

Station.

On board the helicopter w as a crew of

six. Shortly after hoisting the dead

climber into the helicopter, one of the

tw o engines quit. The chopper rolled to

the right side in a spiral descent t hat

included two 360-d egree turn s. Itcrashed into the trees, app roximately

500 -60 0 feet below t he original rescue.

Alt hough th e decea sed subject an d t he

helicopter w ere burned, nobody on

board w as seriously hurt.

Rescue leaders should constantly questiontheir mission progress. Analyzing thesituation, leaders should constantly evaluatetheir image of the mission.

Hazard RecognitionStatistics show that many people experiencesome anxiety when they fly on a commercialairplane. Still, if you boarded a jet atrandom every single day, it would be 26,000

years before you would be involved in amajor crash... and even then, the odds are

you would survive.

Recognition of the difference between realand imagined hazards is important for boththe rescue leader and the rescue member.

Rescuers in mountain rescue operationsmust have the ability to recognize the realhazards present in their environment.Certainly Mother Nature provides most ofthese hazards, as mentioned earlier. Theability to recognize avalanche hazards isessential in the winter environment. In thesummer, recognition of storms likely toproduce lightning is important as well, sincerescuers are often working in closeproximity to each other and near the top ofa mountain, a dangerous situation in any

electrical storm.

Rescue mountaineers on board fixed-wingand rotary-wing aircraft should understandthat everyone on board is an extra set ofeyes and ears. Rescuers should neverassume the pilot or crew has seensomething that the rescuer sees. Apparentlyobvious safety hazards are not alwaysobvious, and communication with the pilotis essential when a hazard is identified. In80% of helicopter accidents someone on

board saw something that looked out ofplace - but said nothing to the pilot -thinking it was not their place, or that thepilot was aware of the hazard. In oneparticular accident, a passenger noticed thatthe fuel gauge read empty. The passengersaid nothing. The ship later ran out of fueland crashed. Rescuers must know how touse the aircrafts intercom system - and not

be afraid to use it when a hazard exists.

Experience leads to greater ability to

recognize hazards. For this reason, hazardevaluation should be left to those mostexperienced rescue members.

Experienced rescue leaders know thatnumerous hazard elements can compoundupon themselves to produce a dangeroussituation. For example, an electrical stormin the spring, preceded by rain, during afreeze-thaw cycle could compound the



18/35

P a r t 3 M e n t a l Ele m e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 14hazards of lightning and rockfall to createan even more dangerous situation. Manyaccidents occur when a series of thingscompound upon themselves, so when there

appears to be a sign of some seriespresenting itself, it is not inappropriate tostop the rescue and reevaluate the hazard.Break the chain when you realize thatelements are starting to compound uponthemselves, pause for a moment andreevaluate the situation.

On June 25, 1994, rang ers from Rocky

Mounta in National Park w ere

conducting a rescue of a fallen climber

in the area of Halletts Peak . W hile

shuttling tw o additional rescuers to ahelispot r eported to be betw een 11,800

feet an d 12,4 60 feet , a Bell 206A

helicopter crashed at 8:49 p.m . (just

before dark ).

The accident investigation determined

that the original load calculation w as in

error and a new one w as never

completed follow ing a refueling

operation just prior to t he accident

(Helispot coordinator arg ued w ith the

pilot about the load calculat ion , but th epilot w as allow ed to fly an yw ay s). As

rescuers pushed to complete their

m ission prior to sunset, the pilot had

attemp ted the high altitude landing w ith

a helicopter that w as 700 lbs. overgross.

As th e pilot lost tail rotor effectiveness ,

he augur ed the helicopter into the

ground an d fortunately all personnel

survived the crash.

The incorrect load calculation,

argum ent between flight crew m embers,loss of nat ural light, and a hurried pilot

w ere all contributory causes of this

accident.

Ken Phillips, Grand Canton National ParkSAR Coordinator developed 12 Standard

Aviation Questions That Could Save YourLife. Although these questions were

developed for aviation, they can apply tomost any rescue scenario.

1. Is the flight necessary?

2. Who is in charge?3. Are all hazards identified and have

you made them known?4. Should you stop the operation due

to:a. Communications?

b. Weather?c. Turbulence?d. Personnel?e. Conflicting priorities?

5. Is there a better way to do it?6. Are you driven by an overwhelming

sense of urgency?7. Can you justify your actions?8. Are there other aircraft in the area?9. Do you have an escape route?10.Are any rules being broken?11.Are communications getting tense?12.Are you deviating from the assigned

operation or flight?

Phillips concludes this list with When indoubt dont!

SituationalAwareness?

Situational Awareness refers to the degreeof accuracy by which ones perception of hisor her current environment mirrors reality.Situational awareness is a key component torisk assessment.

For over 30 years, situational awareness hasbeen used in military, civil, commercial andaerospace applications. Situationalawareness requires the human operator toquickly detect, integrate and interpret datagathered from the environment.

There are three stages of situationalawareness

1. The perception of the relevantinformation



19/35

P a r t 3 M e n t a l Ele m e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 152. The comprehension and

interpretation of that information3. The projection of their states into the

future

The first stage, perception, requires thatyou are persistent in your observation. YogiBerra once said, You can observe a lot by

just watching. He must have beenreferring to situational awareness.

The second stage, comprehension andinterpretation, requires you to have andutilize your training and experience.Training is a key component of teachingSAR workers, but experience is the key to

understanding how to best utilize thattraining.

The third stage, projection into the future,is the stage where you put it all together!

For example, if you want to know if it isgoing to rain, dont look for rain. Look forCLOUDS! If you look for rain youll onlyknow that rain is coming when it arrives. If

you look for clouds, you can anticipate thepossibility of rain before it occurs. The third

stage tells us that you need some training toknow WHAT TYPES of clouds cause rain. Asudden build-up of cirrus clouds vs.cumulonimbus clouds can make a bigdifference in your prediction.

The United States Navy has identified sevenkey factors that reduce situationalawareness. They are:

1. Insufficient or poorly communicatedinformation

2.

Fatigue / Stress3. Task Overload4. Task Underload5. Group Mindset6. "Press on Regardless" Philosophy7. Degraded Operating Conditions

The Navy further suggests ten ways toprevent the loss of situational awareness:

1. Actively question and evaluate yourmission progress

2. Analyze your situation3. Update and revise your image of the

mission4. Use assertive behaviors when

necessary;5. Make suggestions6. Provide relevant information

without being asked7. Ask questions as necessary8. Confront ambiguities9. State opinion on decisions/

procedures10.Refuse unreasonable requests

Overconfidence and/or a lack of situationalawareness are two key factors that lead toskilled people getting into trouble in the

backcountry.

Listed below are a number of useful tips tokeep in the back of your head during SARmissions:

1. If something doesnt look or feelright, then it probably isnt right

2. Watch out when you are busy or

bored3. Old habits are hard to break4. Expectations can impede awareness5. Things that take longer are less likely

to get done right6. Dont rely on reliable systems7. Dont get too excited if an emergency

occurs. Thats when youll makepoor decisions.

8. Prevention is the best way to avoidbackcountry emergencies, andSituational Awareness is the best

form of prevention there is.

Fatigue can impair your abilities Later inthis program, we will discuss the effect offatigue on situational awareness.



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Adaptability andFlexibility

Adaptability and flexibility are important insearch and rescue operations. Key toadaptability and flexibility is the rescueleaders ability to anticipate potentialproblems, and then recognize andacknowledge any meaningful change in thecircumstances of the rescue operations.

When a change is considered, rescue teammembers and rescue leaders must be carefulto study and evaluate the risk of alternatives

before rushing into any deviation from theestablished plan.

Deviation from theEstablished Plan

As important as adaptability and flexibilityare, one of the common causes of rescueaccidents occurs when the rescue teamdeviates from an established plan. The tail

wagging the dog theory can occur when thecircumstances of a rescue change and teammembers alter the plan to accommodate thechange. While altering plans is unavoidablein search and rescue missions, it can lead todisaster because it often leads to makingchanges in great haste inviting mistakes.

Whenever the rescue plan is altered, rescueleaders and rescue members mustreevaluate the risk and hazards beforeaccepting the proposed variation.

In his study on fatigue and SAR, RobertKoester of the Virginia Department ofEmergency Services notes that the typical

error of a sleep-deprived subject iscompletely forgetting to perform a task asopposed to incorrect performance. Thinkabout that completely forgetting toperform a task? Scary when you considerthe importance of our knots, our harnesses,our subject tie-ins. Grand Canyon NationalPark submitted this accident report thatunderscores how complacency kills

During Septem ber 1996 Tra vis H ull w as

demonstrating a tw o-point anchor

system, constructed of w ebbing w ith a

single carabiner. This dem onstrationw as being condu cted for juven ile

par ticipants of the N orth Am erican

Wilderness Academy training course.

The anchor system ha d been constructed

by t he participants, checked by the other

instructors and then checked by Tra vis

Hull.

Travis intended to dem onstrate how one

poin t of a tw o-poin t load -d ist ribu ting

anchor could fail and the entire system

w ill not have com plete failure. Hepulled out a knife an d w ent t o cut one

piece of w ebbin g t ha t w as an an chor

poin t ext ension. The w ebbin g t ha t he

intended to cut w as completely beyond

his norm al reach and he accidentally

severed the piece of w ebbing that

attached his seat harn ess to the anchor

system. He fell backw ards and suffered

a fata l fall to the creek below .

Hull w as not on ly a m em ber of the

Shasta County SAR Team , but also theleader of the Mounta in Rescue Unit. He

w as considered to be extremely

kn ow ledgeable in rigging t echniques

and his peers considered him ultra-

conservative in relation to the issue of

safety . He w as a certified instr uctor in

technical rescue and sw ift wa ter

techniques.

The night before the accident Hull had

becom e engaged to be m arried. This

accident illustrat es how every rescueprofess ion al need s to be con stan tly

thinking a bout their actions during an

operation.

In his report, Robert Koester also notes thaterrors are not typically seen if the subject isgiven unlimited time to complete a task.Instead, errors begin to occur when the staff



21/35

P a r t 3 M e n t a l Ele m e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 17members are forced to generate severaltasks within a short period of time.

We should remember this effect of sleep

deprivation when it comes to the end of therescue as well. Exhausted rescuers are atgreat risk when they get behind the wheel oftheir own car after the rescue is terminated.

Working Outside theNormal ComfortZoneOver the decades, many rescue accidents

have occurred when the rescuers workoutside their normal comfort zone utilizing techniques that they have neverpracticed or working with agencies with

whom they have never worked. For thisreason, it is critical that rescue teams trainoften with agencies with which they might

work in the field. Equipment andtechniques should be practiced repeatedlyto avoid an accident resulting from lack ofexperience.

On Decem ber 9, 1989, 9 year-old Debbie

Baisa fell in th e Fra nklin Mounta ins

outside El Paso Texas. She had sprained

her ank le. Six rescuers from t he police

Mounta in Rescue Team reached t he girl

at dusk. They strapped her in a

Thom son litter an d tried, unsuccessfully,

to carry h er dow n the steep slope on

foot . Due to the late hour, and falling

tem peratur es, the El Paso EMS Division

requested a MAST helicopter from Fort

Sam Houston, Texas. They requested a

hoist extraction.

Once over the scene, the helicopter crew

determ ined the area unsuitable for

landing, due to the slope and terrain. A

m edic w as low ered 50 feet by hoist,

w here he evaluated the patient. The

m edic then notified the pilot that the

Stokes litter and patient w ere ready for

the hoist opera tion. The litter

imm ediately began to spin, and at 30-

feet above the gr ound, the sp in w as

uncontrollable. The patient w as ejected,

feet fir st , fr om the lit ter. She su ffered

head an d interna l injuries, a fracturedpelv is and several fractu red r ibs . She

spent four months in a body cast.

Alt houg h the Ar m y and police rescue

team had m et to review the Army rescue

equipm ent, the pilot later stated that

tw o groups had never practiced the hoist

operation they attem pted that night.

Upon a thorough stud y of the accident,

an investigation board found the

follow ing factors con tr ibu ted t o the

accident:

1 - The litter assem bly w as incomp lete,

and w as lacking a foot board,

2 - The m ountain rescue team only

secured the patient in the litter loosely

for g roun d t ra nsport,

3 - The Flight Medic w as not fam iliar

w ith the litter, which turned out to have

unacceptable aerodynamic properties.

The slitter w as a solid Thom son litter,

y et she called it a S tokes litt er. The

m anu facturer guidelines for the littersuggest a ta g line should be used dur ing

hoist operations.

4 - The US Arm y Aeromedical Center

had not made firm r ecomm endations

regard ing the use of tag lines to prevent

the spin that occurred during t his

incident.

Until the m edic w as lowered, rescuers

on the ground had prepared to load the

litter in a one-skid loading. This ma y

have led to their loosely securing thepat ien t. They also h ad n o direct ra dio

contact w ith the helicopter.

Judgment andRescue LeadershipJudgment is one of the most importantelements to avoiding risk in mountain



22/35

P a r t 3 M e n t a l Ele m e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 18rescue operations. Once youve recognizedthe hazards and assessed the risk, it is your

judgment that will lead to whatevermodifications you make to the rescue plan.

Being prepared in all areas leads to betterdecision-making. It will reduce risk andresult in the highest safety factors.

Assessing risk means knowing whatcomponents to evaluate, and how tomeasure the associated hazard.

Leadership is an important asset to anyrescue operation. Many rescuemountaineers have the ability to lead; yet allneed the ability to work under the

leadership of another rescue member.

Rescue leaders must be acutely aware of therisks and hazards presented by the rescueenvironment. A good rescue leader will not

work on the actual rescue systemhim/herself, but will stand back to managethe entire situation. Often, the rescueleader will have one or more deputies,each of which has a unique set of individualand management responsibilities.

While rescuers should not blindly followinstructions without first evaluating theinstruction to determine what safety issuesmight be jeopardized, rescue members mustfollow tasks assigned by the leader. Theleader is relying on the rescue members tocomplete the assigned task, and then ask foranother task. In the accident below, a pilotchose not to follow instructions from rescuecommand, and it resulted in a fatality.

In early -Augu st , 1988, Chicag o

Sportsw riter Keith Reinhardt, a noviceand som ewhat fearful hiker, attem pted

to climb the steep and heav ily w ooded

slope of Pendleton Mounta in, north of

Silver Plum e Colorado. He took only a

can of soda. He never return ed.

Rescuers searched for Rein ha rdt for

seven days. Involved in the search were

groun d personnel from four stat es, six

helicopters and tw o fixed-w ing aircraft

from the Civ il Air Pa tr ol.

On the fifth day of the search, a Civil Air

Patrol Cessna 182R fixed-wing aircraftpar ticipat ed. Due to a larg e num ber of

search and rescue helicopters operat ing

that day , and the gusty w inds, the SAR

In ciden t Com m and requ est ed th e fixed-

w ing pilot to m aintain an altitude above

13,000 feet MSL. For unknow n reasons,

the pilot descended w ell below the

13,00 0-foot level during his flight. It is

estimat ed that he was flying at 11,00 0

feet w hen it crashed. NTSB reports

indicate A passen ger rep orted that

the pilot said I d ont like t he feel of t his.A p ar am edic sa id the passenger also

related that they had hit a downdr aft.

A helicopter p ilot fly ing in th e area said

that the w inds w ere not conducive for

fix ed w ing f light s, especia lly in th e

trenches.

Rescuers w ere im m ediately flow n to the

site by Arm y Chinook helicopter, w here

they rescued the passenger, w ho

survived the crash num erous despite

serious injuries. The pilot, TerryLeadens (40 ) of Franktow n Colorado

died in the crash. The National

Transportation Safety Board

determ ined the probable cause(s) of this

accident a s follows: W eather eva luation

In ad equat e - p ilot in com m and;

Airspeed In adequate - p ilot in

com m and; Altitude In adequate - pilot

in comm and.

Rescue lea ders at t his acciden t w ere

aw are of the w inds, and had giveinstructions to the pilot that ha d not

been follow ed.

The m issing hiker w as never found.

Triage and DispatchIt is accepted in the emergency responsefield that appropriate triage and dispatch



23/35

P a r t 3 M e n t a l Ele m e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 19decisions are critical to the survivability ofthe victim or victims. Poor or no triageeasily results in increased liability to theagency, but more importantly, it results in

poor or inappropriate or incompleteresources sent to the victims.

There is little written of triage and dispatchfor a mountain rescue or technical rescueincidents, and it is for this reason that

Appendix A is included as a resource.Appendix A is the Mountain RescueAssociations Triage and InformationGuideline.

TeamworkSolo rescues (1 or 2 rescuers heading intothe field without waiting for more help) can

be extremely dangerous. For this reason,only experienced Rescue Technicians should

be permitted to proceed with accessing asubject in technical terrain alone. Eventhen, he/she should access, stabilize, andawait the rest of the team.

Most rescue teams have numerous ranks,divisions that identify specific skill levels.

These ranks frequently include supportrank, rescue rank and qualified rank (inincreasing order of skills). Many teams willonly allow their most experienced rescue orqualified members to consider going in thefield in very small groups.

No one should be deployed into the fieldalone or to return from the field aloneexcept under extremely favorablecircumstances (good radio, weather,experience, short travel, etc.)

Separating from the team and/or doing atask other than that assigned can result in

big problems. This type of freelancing isgenerally dealt with very severely amongprofessionally acting teams and agencies

because of the hazards involved.

All team members must follow IncidentCommand System (ICS) concepts.

Knowledge ofResources AvailableRescue teams must have adequateadditional resources available to them. Therescue teams leadership must have anawareness of those resources, and how theyare called to respond. This awareness mustinclude an awareness of not only the skills

but also the limitations of those resources.

These resources include:

Additional rescue teams in thesurrounding area

Search dogs Medical resources

Airborne Resources includingmed-evac services

The prudent rescue team will have acarefully developed Pre-Plan, whichincludes resource lists and call-outprocedures.

Most important, rescue teams shouldfrequently engage in joint trainings with

these resources. This will assure that bothgroups understand the skills and limitationsof each other. By so doing, neither group

will have an unrealistic expectation of theother.

Knowledge of Whenthe Rescue is overThe mission (rescue OR search) is neverover until:

1. Each subject has been given adocumented medical evaluation onscene (even if brief or documentedas a refusal).

2. The local law enforcement agencyhas interviewed the subject(s).

3. Each subject has been interviewed asto the technical aspects for theteam's mission report and for a



24/35



report to The American Alpine Club(AAC) Accidents in North AmericanMountaineering. Each personshould also be given an AAC

Accident report if this involvedclimbing or mountaineering.

4. All gear is stowed.5. A debriefing has been done.6. A Critical Incident Stress Debriefing

(CISD) is considered and plannedfor by the command staff.

Rescuers must beware of prematurecancellation pages, shutdown ordemobilization. A mission response shouldcontinue, and personnel should not leave a

mission before all personnel from allagencies are safely out of the backcountry,including helicopters that are transportingpersonnel.

It is always a difficult question of when to"call" the mission (when to suspend orpermanently terminate a search). Clearly,missions should be suspended wheneverthere is the presence of unsafe conditionsfor rescuers. In addition, searches are oftensuspended when the rescue teams are

unable to locate the subject and all areashave been covered repeatedly.

Finally, once a mission has been completed,teams must be concerned about the well

being of the rescuers who now return totheir normal lives. Teams should considerusing the buddy driving system, orsuggesting that team members rest beforedriving home from a mission when tired.

The buddy driving system includes having

buddy drive in front or behind and talk toyou on a "talk" channel on the radio to keepyou awake.

Critical Incident Stress Debriefings (CISD)are a valuable resource for rescue teamleaders. All rescuers are at risk ofexperiencing what psychologists refer to as atraumatic incident one that may includeexposure to catastrophic events or an

unsightly scene. Rescuers may experienceone or more of many reactions, includingphysical, emotional, cognitive, or behavioralsymptoms. Some people experience these

symptoms immediately while at the scene.Others may not experience anything for aperiod of weeks or months. For all rescuemembers, a CISD should be considered andscheduled as early as possible.


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P a r t 4 E m o t i o n a l E le m e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 21

Several emotional elements add risk torescue operations. These elements are noteasy to recognize, but can be verydangerous.

EgoCertainly rescue mountaineers have healthyegos, or they would not have put themselvesin a profession requiring the ability to deal

with such extreme circumstances. Theexistence of such healthy egos can be a greatadvantage to any rescue team. It can also bea great hazard.

Rescue leaders must assess the rescueoperation and ask whether or not egos areleading to decision-making that may not beprudent. Are rescuers proposing a technicalrescue operation when there is an easier

way out? Has the team asked for ahelicopter when the patients condition doesnot warrant inclusion of such a dangerous

element?

To a great extent, the rescue leader shouldbe the ego monitor. Individual membersshould also monitor themselves. Rescuersmust avoid joining the dead heros club.

One time to seriously consider whether egosare involved is when television cameras arepresent.

Who Comes First?In the urban rescue environment, it hasoften been said, the subject comes first.This has not been the case for mountainrescue environment. Many mountainrescue teams have established prioritiesrelative to the rescue team and its subject.Often it is said that:

1. My safety comes first2. My teammates safety comes second3. The subject comes third

This is necessary in the mountain rescuecommunity because of the numeroushazards present to both the individualrescuer and his/her teammates. Only byfocusing on these priorities first can aqualified rescuer focus on the needs of thesubject.

Go FeverOn January 27, 1967, three U.S. astronauts

were tragically killed in a cabin fire aboardthe Apollo spacecraft at Cape Canaveral.They had been performing final tests justdays prior to their scheduled earth orbit.

In the months that followed the fire,specialists concluded that the spaceprogram was moving too quickly in the raceto land a man on the moon. At that time,and even today, Launch Control engineersseek a go or no go for every aspect of thecountdown, even during tests in the days

before. During the actual launch, thecommunications is as follows:

Launch Control Engineer Resp onse

Booster GO!

Retro GO!

Netw ork GO!

Recovery GO!

And all of this is followed by: LaunchControl, this is Houston, we are GO forlaunch.

The investigation following the Apollo

disaster revealed that the astronauts, whoprivately mentioned concerns about the newspacecraft to each other and their wives, hadnot mentioned the concerns to theirleadership. A new term was created todefine what was the cause of this tragicaccident. The term was Go Fever.


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P a r t 4 E m o t i o n a l E le m e n t sRisks in Mountain Rescue 22

Hazards recognized by the Apollo Iastronauts were not made known to theleadership. Had they been, the highly

volatile 100% oxygen environment in the

cabin of the spacecraft would likely havebeen changed, as it had been in militaryaircraft many years earlier.

Rescuers must be equally aware of theirdesire to move quickly in a rescue operation.Often, hazards are not recognized when thefocus is on speed. A hero mentality canoften lead to disaster, as rescuers do nottake the time to thoroughly assess thehazards present in the rescue environment.Each and every rescue leader and rescue

member must be capable of saying No Goat any time.

Along these lines, rescue leaders whoengage in back country rescue operationsmust realize that the subject is usuallyalready stable - dead or alive. RescueFever must be avoided at all costs.

On October 14, 1968 , Climber J im

Madsen (20) and four oth ers w ent t o the

top of El Capitan to go to the aid of tw oclimbers w ho had been on the Dihedral

W all since Oct. 9. Mad sen and anoth er

climber plann ed to rappel dow n from

the summ it to Thanksgiving Ledge and

m ake contact with the climbers from

there. They established a rappel anchor,

and M adsen began his rappel w ith five

ropes, tw o pairs of Jum ars, carabiners

and pitons, a radio, and tw o thermoses

of hot soup.

Madsen tied a k not in the en d of his11m m rope, and r app elled using a 2,2

and 2-carabiner brake system . As he

rapp elled dow n, he lost his rappel and

slipped off t he end of th e rope an d fell to

his death. He fell 2,500 feet. Rescue

Fever w as sited as on e cause of the

accident.

The original climbers in need of help

stated they w ere all right and they

fin ished the clim b under there ow n

pow er.


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P a r t 5 E x te r n a l In f lu e n c e sRisks in Mountain Rescue 23

There are several external influences thatcan increase hazard and lead to disaster inrescue operations. Awareness of theseexternal influences is critical to riskevaluation.

Public and OfficialPressureOften, there may be pressure from themedia, the general public or other officialagencies to deviate from a rescue plan. Inthis case, the Incident Commander and/orrescue leader must remember that ourresponsibilities are as follows:

1. My safety comes first2. My teammates safety comes second3. The subject comes third

Nowhere in this equation does the pressurefrom public or other agencies come in to

play.

An example of such pressure would be whenan avalanche closes a major highway withthe possibility of subjects in the debris field.

While highway officials might pressurerescuers to first assure there are no subjectsin the avalanche debris on top of thehighway (so that they can begin plowing thedebris to open the road), avalanche rescuersmight be more focused on the toe of theslide path and other likely burial areas away

from the road. If an accident occurs whichcrosses a roadway, there may be significantpressure to open the road as soon aspossible. Snow removal equipment willgenerally be brought to the scene quickly,often sooner than the rescue personnel arecapable of declaring the area clear ofsubjects. The highway departments

urgency to reopen the road should besecondary to the avalanche rescue efforts.

Any responsibility to quickly reopen the

roadways is secondary to our responsibilityto the subject. Still, we must understand theresponsibility of highway personnel who areunder extreme pressure from theirsuperiors to see that the road is reopened asquickly as possible. Clear and frequentcommunication with these authorities canensure that both the SAR personnel and thehighway personnel clearly understand eachother's objectives.

Subjects Friends andFamilyFamily members or friends of a rescuesubject may also exert pressure on rescueleaders. It is often difficult to deal withdistraught family members or friends whiletrying to effect a successful rescue. In thiscase, rescue leaders should assign a teammember to act as liaison between theleadership and the family or friend. Therescue leader must insulate him/herself

from pressures exerted by these individuals.

Often, the Incident Commander and/orSheriffs Deputies will keep family membersor friends away from the scene. In the eventthat family members or friends do arrive atthe scene, the Rescue Leader should seekthe assistance of the Incident Commanderto get a qualified individual to accompanythese individuals so that the Rescue Leadermay continue his/her function. Thisindividual should be competent in areasrelative to the emotions that the family orfriends are feeling. This person shouldconstantly monitor the condition of thefamily members or friends, and be preparedto evacuate them if their emotional orphysical conditions warrant this.

Family members should be briefed earlyand often.



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MediaIn the event of rescues with media attention,it may be difficult to keep the media away

from the accident site. Allowing media tothe site does not give them Carte Blanche -establish and enforce guidelines for themedia.

The decision to allow the media to theaccident site is made only after the absolutesafety of the area is determined. Allowingthe media to the site does not necessarilypresent a problem if the rescue leader iscareful to rope off an area beyond which themedia is not allowed. Furthermore,

isolation of the reporting party or any otherfamily members from the media isimportant. These family members orfriends must know that the decision to talkto the media is theirs.

The decision to allow the media to the site isoften made by the Incident Commanderand/or Sheriff's Deputies, with the inputfrom the rescue leader. Remember that themedia is our friend, especially the TVstations that provide helicopters for search

activities during all seasons.

Rescue teams should establish strictprotocol regarding whom among the teamshould speak with the media. Unfortunatesituations involving miscommunication canoccur when any team member is allowed tospeak with the media.

Other OutsideInfluencesRescuers must be aware of any other outsideinfluences that can cause problems during arescue operation. In the rescue accidentdetailed below, the initial rescue effort of acrashed commercial helicopter wasundertaken by the helicopter operatorthemselves. The helicopter operator chosenot to call for search and rescue,presumably to downplay the initial crash

On Septem ber 10, 1999, a flight-seeing

helicopter had just finished a glacier

landing in th e Juneau Ice Field w ith five

flig ht -seeing p assen gers. Th e aircraf tw as flying through a m ountainous

valley w here radio signa ls w ere blocked.

On its w ay back to the Juneau Airport,

the pilot encountered localized light

snow shower and flight light

conditions w hich r educed his forw ard

visibility and his ability to recognize any

topograp hical features on the ice surface

or the mountains around him. The

helicopter slow ed from 110 t o 75 knots,

and th en struck the snow -covered ice

field, slid about 150 feet , and n osed over.Alt hough th e helicopter w as dest roy ed

on a 150-foot long w reckage path, the

pilot and p assen gers all survived. The

crash destroyed the antenna e, mak ing

the radio and ELT inoperable.

Realizing t ha t one of their helicop ters

w as overdue, the base m anager

contacted other aircraft in the area.

An other helicopter com pan y, w ith a n

FAA check pilot on board, spotted t he

m issing helicopter on the ice through th eappr oaching storm . Seeing all 6

passengers sta nding outs ide the

helicopter, the pilot rad ioed t hat they

appear ed to be all right an d it looked

like they had a mechan ical. W hat he

thought w as the rotors of the aircraft

w ere actually the skids of the overturn ed

helicopter.

Based on th at inform ation , the base

m ana ger dispatched a sm all utility

helicopter w ith a pilot and a m echanic tothe scene. This aircraft encountered the

exact flat light circum stan ces as th e

fir st aircra ft , and h it t he snow as it

searched for the first crash site. Both

escaped unhu rt. The crash sites were in

a deep glacier valley at 560 0. The

m ounta ins again blocked radio signa ls.

W ith no w ay to contact the second

aircraft, the base manager w aited for 30



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P a r t 5 E x te r n a l In f lu e n c e sRisks in Mountain Rescue 25m inutes and then dispatched a third

utility helicopter to support the other 2.

The third helicopter found and picked up

the pilot an d m echanic of the second

crashed helicopter. At that tim e, they allelected to search for th e original m issing

helicopter . The third helicopter also

encoun tered th e sam e flat light

conditions an d struck the un seen snow-

covered ice field in full view of the first

surv ivors. It slid about 50 feet, nosed

over , and rolled to the left. All 4

occupan ts survived. They dug a snow

cave and prepared to wait out the storm .

The first aircraft surviv ors built an igloo

using the surviva l kit rubber container

as a m old.

Af ter losin g con ta ct w ith the th ird

helicopter, the base ma nager conta cted

the Alaska State Troopers, and a search

w as initiated. A comm and post was

activa ted. Fixed base opera tors, Coast

Guard, 4 helicopter com pan ies, Juneau

Mounta in Rescue, SEADOGS, Civil Air

Patrol, FAA, the hospital and t he fire

departm ent w ere all involved in the

ensuing r escue effort, w hich took place

in extremely d ifficult weatherconditions. The Air Operations

Manager sen t several H elicopters into

the area, but w eather pushed them back.

Juneau M ounta in Rescue w as airlift ed

to 4,200 and began t heir clim b. They

found t he fir st crash site in the dar k

shortly before 11:00 p.m . that n ight.

At fir st light th e follow ing m orning, 4

helicopters from 4 compa nies wa ited on

the ice at 4,00 0 und er the storm for the

w eather to break. A Coast Guard HH -60helicopter arrived, a nd it rescued the six

survivors of the initial crash by hoist.

The Coast Guard and another flight-

seeing helicopter rescued the rem aining

crash victim s from the other tw o flight-

seeing aircraft.

The base m ana ger w as recognized for

his support and effective m anagem ent of

the Air Operations division of th e

In ciden t M anag em ent Team . Mem bers

of the rescue team w ere awarded the

Coast Guards second highest na tional

m edal for heroism . The compa ny hassince redesigned the antenna sy stem on

the A-Star series aircraft to allow for

m anual operation; radar altim eters

have been installed; an d each pilot

carries a handheld rad io.

The Subjects

Emotional andPsychological StateAs with any emergency medical situation,rescuers must maintain close personalcontact with the subject. As such, thesubjects emotional and/or psychologicalcondition may exert pressures on rescuers.In this case, rescuers must maintain a clearfocus on the rescue operation and the rescuesystems employed, and avoid letting thesubjects state distract them from the hazardassessment of other factors mentionedabove.

Rescuers should be aware that a patientscondition may worsen upon the arrival andcare administered by the rescuersthemselves. Once referred to as RescueShock, it was assumed that a subjectsefforts to fight to stay alive are reduced asthe subject feels the rescuers will save theday. In fact, research indicates that thepatients condition may, in fact, worsen dueto the treatment given, and not due to the

patients mental state. For example, ahypothermic patient may go into ventricularfibrillation (V-fib) due to the increasedactivity and movement that results whenrescuers arrive. Rescuers must understandthe underlying reasons why a patientscondition may worsen upon their arrival, inorder that they may protect against it.



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Rescue team members should alwaysconsider the possibility that their subjectmay have a mental illness or behavioralissue that would be exacerbated during the

stress of being lost or stranded, or bymissing their medications. This also appliesto those on non-behavioral medicationssuch as insulin/glucose, which can lead to

bizarre or aggressive behavior. There arereal cases of rescuers being injured andevacuated from injuries incurred as a resultof subjects throwing rocks at them.

Rescuers should also consider that a subjectmay be a suspect in a crime or may have a

weapon

risks in rescue

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