Risk Analysis Paper

Dr. Michael Burch

By Nash Jones

PSC 320

Due 12/17/14

Security Issues of North Korea

Introduction

The state of North Korea has a problematic history and a plethora of external and internal

security issues. Food is scarce, and has been for nearly twenty years. South Korea, an ally of the

United States, is constantly at odds with its brother to the north and is often the source of

political pressure for reform. The UN has made numerous attempts to access North Korea’s

infamous reeducation camps, which themselves could be the spark that ignites change. The

growing black market and increased criminal regulation—rather than government regulation—

thereof threatens to undercut and destroy the state’s control of the economy. If North Korea is to

survive and achieve a level of stability common to first-world nations, it will have to provide

solutions to these problems. In the first part of this paper, I will set the framework for each of

these problems and explain in detail why they are so important to the security and stability of

North Korea. Then, in the second half, I will focus on what I believe to be the most important

problem, food security, and how it affects North Korea and other countries around the world.

Finally, I will propose how we can research and test the idea that North Korea’s food security

problem is related to its heavy spending on nuclear testing and its military.

Security Issues

First, we should look at North Korea’s biggest, and quietest, problem: Famine. Ever

since the beginning of the 1995 famine, North Korea has had a chronic food shortage problem.

The initial causes of this famine were torrential flooding followed by extended drought that

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destroyed forty percent of North Korea’s usable farm land (Ramsay Liem, Silent Famine in

North Korea). Snow levels were low that year, preventing water from returning to the stricken

land (Liem, Silent Famine) Although work has been done in the way of farming technology to

improve arability of land, such as irrigation and land reclamation, North Korea is still at the

mercy of foreign aid in order to make ends meet in terms of food.

Food continues to be one of the greatest human security issues in North Korea for several

reasons. First, as part of Kim Il Sung’s philosophy of self-reliance states, North Korea works to

provide all of its own food. This attempt at isolationism may work in countries with plenty of

fertile farmland, but in a country with less than twenty percent arable land, it is nearly impossible

(Liem, Silent Famine in North Korea). This fact, along with the ongoing famine, would make

trade an essential part of obtaining the necessary food to maintain a healthy population.

According to a study done in 1998, children in the DPRK had experienced significantly stunted

growth when compared to the growth rates of other children around the world (Katona-Apte

&Mokdad, 1998; WFP 1998). What this means for North Korea today is a generation of adults

and teenagers who will be significantly weaker and physically less capable than their peers

around the world. The sanctions and ban on trade that many states and organizations—the US,

the UN, and the EU, for example—have imposed on North Korea have left it with only China as

a reliable trade partner. However, even Chinese support for North Korea is waning due to its

insistence on testing nuclear weapons (Council on Foreign Relations, China-North Korea

Relationship).

The second reason for the ongoing famine is North Korea’s refusal to commit to

denuclearization in exchange for food aid. While civil society in the form of NGOs, such as the

World Food Program (WFP), have intervened where governments have not, even they have their

limits. Many of these programs rely directly on governments to donate money and resources to

aid impoverished countries. The US, having one of the world’s largest economies, was also one

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of North Korea’s largest financiers until 2008. That year, North Korea failed to follow through

on its end of the bargain. It refused to continue its breakdown of nuclear weapons, and

government sponsored aid promptly ceased (Mark Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin of the

Congressional Research Service, Foreign Assistance to North Korea). From this point forward,

all aid went through NGOs. In 2009, North Korea demanded that US NGOs shut down and

leave, declining further aid (Jong Moo Lee, International and South Korean NGO’s Assistance

to North Korea and Cooperative Measures).

North Korea, however, is not the only nation in South East Asia with problems in food

security. According to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, nearly 805 million people

world-wide are considered undernourished (UN FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World

2014). According to this same study, Eastern Asia alone comprises twenty percent of the world’s

undernourished. However, while other countries, such as neighboring South Korea, have made

progress to reform their food distribution markets, North Korea has insisted on holding strong to

communist economic distribution. This, in addition to refusing aid from NGOs, has dramatically

increased the proportion of malnourishment that North Korea carries.

Food is a critical component to the survival of any nation. Psychologist Abraham

Maslow developed a hierarchy of needs in 1943 that continues to be useful to this day. At the

base and most important level of this hierarchy are the physiological needs necessary for

survival. Chief among these is food. It is literally impossible for any state to survive long without

a food supply adequate to accommodate at least some percentage of its citizens. Ironically, Kim

Jong Un, much like his father, skips to the next most important level—safety. By focusing on

military spending and construction of nuclear weapons, the DPRK leaves itself open to the

possibility of having a potential uprising. At the moment, North Korea enjoys a surprising level

of internal stability. However, should famine levels rise to the point of mass starvation even in

Pyongyang, it is a very real possibility that those with nothing left to lose will rise up in an

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attempt to acquire necessities. While national security is vital, especially to authoritarian states

with multiple powerful enemies, there must be a balance between military security and provision

of basic goods and services. I will discuss this connection between military spending and food

security in greater detail in the second half of this paper.

The second major security issue we should observe is North Korea’s ongoing feud with

South Korea. Ever since the Armistice that put the Korean War on hold, North Korea and South

Korea have almost always been at odds with each other. North Korea, being communist, is

backed by its close neighbor, China, while South Korea remains an ally of the United States.

Although the majority of the fighting ceased with the war, there is still the occasional flare up in

military activity. One recent example of this is the sinking of a South Korean ship, the Cheonan,

off of the coast of Baekryong Island (United Nations Security Council South Korea Letter and

Cheonan Report). Relations between the two nations have been mixed, with alternating gestures

of cooperation and retaliation for supposed signs of disrespect. For example, both nations agreed

to reopen the Kaesong joint industrial zone, an important factory to both nations, in September

2013 (BBC Timeline). Only six months later, in March of 2014, North Korean drones were found

crashed in South Korea (CNN, “South Korea Investigates Two Suspected North Korean

Drones.”). This back and forth type of relationship is symbolic of the instability that plagues

North Korea. I believe that part of the reason that North Korea is unwilling to forge permanent

alliances with its southern counterpart is that the Kim family fears losing absolute control of the

government should it allow even the smallest sign of democratization to exist. They also fear that

permanent bonds with the south would lead to a slow integration into a unified and free Korea. It

would start with gestures of humanitarian aid, and quickly descend into human rights

investigations into nuclear weapons and the reeducation camps. It is likely that Kim Jong Un

fears that this would lead to him being removed from power, effectively ending the Democratic

People’s Republic of North Korea.

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Ironically, it is North Korea’s lack of foreign relations with South Korea that has fueled

the South’s aggression towards North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons. Even China, a

communist nation and ally of North Korea, enjoys normalized relations with South Korea. This

is in spite of communism, support of North Korea, and most importantly, China’s possession of

nuclear weapons. The Kim family’s paranoia that the rest of the world is out to get them is what

is keeping North Korea from developing stable relations with any nation outside of China. Even

a permanent sign of peace, such as loosening of border restrictions or legitimate trade

agreements would go a long way in promoting the idea of a greater Korean peace. However, if

current trends hold true, even these minor signs of cooperation are unlikely.

The third major security issue that North Korea faces is a human security issue created by

its notorious reeducation camps. These camps are often likened to the Nazi concentration camps

in both cruelty and function. They are used to house criminals, spies, and political dissidents.

During their time in the camps, prisoners work towards producing goods used by the public, as

well as endure incredibly harsh living conditions. Torture is a common tool used to force

compliance, and prisoners are often left on their own to find ways to scavenge for food. Due to

the secrecy that surrounds North Korea’s inner workings, the only accounts available to work

with are those given by escapees and survivors. The camps themselves constitute a major human

rights violation that has been a major concern to the UN for some time now. Over the past

decade, we have learned more and more about the camps from survivors. As this knowledge

grows, so too does the negative international attention they receive from the UN and media.

However, in addition to the UN’s resolve not to violate state sovereignty when possible, as well

as the fear of armed backlash, there is one thing that keeps the UN from conducting their

investigation into North Korea. That one thing is China.

Due to their own fear of being investigated for human rights violations, China is unlikely

to support a UN led investigation into a close ally (The Economist, “Humanity at Its Worst”).

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With human rights violations being an incredibly serious offense, it is unlikely that China will be

willing to entangle itself in a precarious situation in which it stands to be condemned by the

global community. However, there is always the possibility that China will seek to distance itself

from its unstable ally and allow investigations in order to promote its status as an important actor

in world governance. This is most likely to occur if North Korea begins to draw negative media

attention that implicates China as being either complicit or indifferent towards the actions of its

ally. This kind of attention would harm China’s image of being an emerging first world power,

and would result in them allowing for an investigation in order to clear their name. As

allegations of human rights violations against North Korea build and sanctions by the UN

become more likely, it is entirely possible that China will stand aside and allow North Korea to

be punished in order to avoid similar allegations.

A human rights violation and the sanctions imposed because of it against North Korea

could be catastrophic. In addition to crippling its already unstable economy, increased sanctions

could lead to further action against them. Should this happen, as stated previously, it is incredibly

likely that China would switch sides, leaving North Korea to shoulder all of the blame. At best,

this will mean even greater restrictions on aid to North Korea’s destitute citizenry. At worst, it

could result in China taking over administrative and functional control of the state in order to

preserve a divided peninsula and curb international backlash over China’s support for the DPRK

(Victor Cha of the New York Times, “China’s Newest Province?”). While this seems

unrealistic, it may end up as a lesser of two evils in the eyes of the international community.

The fourth major security issue that North Korea faces is its growing black market and

illegal activity. This system, which exists outside government control, threatens to give rise to a

middle class that demands certain rights and privileges. The North Korean black market activity

can account for nearly eighty percent of the average family income, and is only expected to grow

larger over time (Yeon-mi Park of the Washington Times, “The Hopes of North Korea’s Black

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Market Generation”). Most smuggling occurs on the China-North Korea border and involves

everything from foodstuffs to media to narcotics. The instability and incapability of the state run

markets prevents the state from being able to provide these goods or a means for the common

person to afford them, necessitating that they be brought in from abroad. However, because these

items are acquired illegally, they work to financially undercut the state and create the possibility

that the government will be unable to use food and necessities as a means to control and

subjugate the public. Without this control, the state may possibly see the uprising of a middle

class that demands basic rights and protections, much as China has in recent years. Additionally,

the decrease of taxable product could lead to potential decline in the state’s funds, leading to an

inability to control the market, an essential part of the communist system.

Evidence of black market growth and exact data on its economic impact is hard to find

due to North Korea’s unwillingness to present information to the western world. What we do

have is often the result of information provided by escapees, or information received in exchange

for aid. However, there is some indication that capitalistic tendencies created by the black

market. According to information provided by the Asia Times, the communist economic

principles still existed but were not heavily enforced in the early 2000’s, leading to a time of

economic growth (Asia Times, “It’s Not All Gloom and Doom in Pyongyang”). This success led

to temporary reforms, with partial legalization of the open market. These reforms were short

lived, however, and were revoked by the government in 2005. This governmental retaliation

lasted until the currency reform in 2009, which ended in catastrophic failure, and resulted in the

government lifting some bans on free enterprise (Asia Times, “It’s Not All Gloom and Doom in

Pyongyang”). Whether or not these reforms last, however, have yet to be seen. If the Kim family

wants to maintain control of the state, these reforms are necessary. China has shown us that there

is, to put it one way, more than one way to skin a cat. We must always remember that there is an

element of religious obedience and respect for the leader of North Korea, and that this can

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always be used to the advantage of the state. Kim Jong Un does not necessarily have to have

absolute control of the economy in order to have absolute control of the people. Instead, it is

more important that the people know that this freedom comes from the kindness of their Great

Leader. Culture and king worship are often overlooked in the details of security, but they can be

critical in taking admissions of failure, such as what we see in the North Korean economy, and

turning them into acts seen by the citizenry as acts of great kindness. Additionally, by making

claims of seeking “greater prosperity for the people of the DPRK”, the government does not have

to admit failure to the international community, and instead presents a desire to see its people

prosper. This can, in turn, present an image of a more civilized and reasonable North Korea, and

create new opportunities for trade and negotiations.

A Closer Look at the Issue of Food Security

A major flaw in the authoritarian communist system is that dictators often spend more

money on providing security from other states than they do on providing basic goods, namely

food, for their people. This fact is more evident in North Korea than in any other part of Eastern

Asia. Ever since Kim Jong Il instituted the songun (military first) policy that redirected most of

the national spending to defense, North Korea has been in a state economic and agricultural

decline that has led to destitution. It is no coincidence that this policy was introduced in 1995,

the same year that North Korea entered into what has become a nearly twenty year famine. If we

look on the spending practices of countries such as the US and South Korea, neither spend more

than twenty percent of their budgets on defense during times of peace. North Korea, on the other

hand, spends up to a third of its total budget on defense, even while millions go hungry everyday

(Reuters Canada, “North Korea Spends About a Third of Income on the Military”). Even Israel,

who is under near-constant attack, only spends seven percent of its GDP on defense (Barbara

Demick of the Los Angeles Times, “North Korea has Long Put Weapons Ahead of Food for Its

People”). However, North Korea has not drawn international attention for its large standing

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army, or for its large defense expenditures. What has caused the world to panic and sanction

North Korea has been its involvement in nuclear weapons, both the most expensive and least

useful of all weapons.

The theory that this paper is trying to prove is that developing nations pursuing nuclear

weaponry has negative effects on food security due to sanctions and misallocation of funds. For

North Korea specifically, nuclear armament isn’t so much a security issue in itself, but the

primary cause for almost all of its security issues, including its most pressing one, food security.

When we take a look at developing nations, such as Pakistan or Iran, we can tell that nuclear

spending has a negative impact on food security and undernourishment levels. While the

developed nations who are approved as nuclear states can afford to maintain such armaments

without much negative effect, nations that struggle with basic public goods provision cannot

afford to carelessly waste money on weapons that, if used, would result in international

condemnation and potential annihilation. While these weapons are more of a detriment to own

than anything else, the perceived security dilemma that exists in many of these countries (Iran’s

fear of westernization, Pakistan’s fear of a more powerful and influential India, etc.) allows each

country to rationalize their necessity. This same build up, however, has had negative side effects,

both in the form of sanctions and in poor allocation of necessary funds. In order to demonstrate

the widespread effects of this improper spending, I will give a brief explanation of the

relationship that exists between involvement in nuclear armament has negatively impacted the

food security of each nation. After that, I will describe how we could test the effects that this

spending has had on the economy of North Korea and what the benefits of a nuclear-free North

Korea could be.

Iran, much like North Korea, has a mortal fear of the western world and the influences of

democracy and capitalism. Also like North Korea, it has attracted international attention and

suffered similar sanctions thanks to its spending on nuclear weapons. High estimates of Iran’s

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expenditures towards nuclear weaponry go all the way up to 160 billion dollars (Times of Israel,

“Netanyahu: Iran Has Spent $160 Billion on Nuclear Weapon Drive”). While it is hard to gauge

Iran’s actual investment in nuclear weaponry due to its high level of secrecy, we can assume that

it has been significant over the past decade if it has warranted international attention. Iran has a

national budget of roughly $311 billion USD for 2015 (Bloomberg, “Iran Budget Faces Short-

Term Oil Price Strain, Rouhani Says”). Assuming accusations are even half of what Iran has

actually spent on nuclear proliferation, this would amount to approximately one-half of one

year’s budget. Even spread over the time of a decade, this is a significant amount of money.

However, due to the flourishing oil market, Iran should be more than able to fund its nuclear

pursuits with plenty of money left to provide for its citizenry, seeing as how it has a larger GDP

than Saudi Arabia and a lower population (Heritage.org). The problem lies in the sanctions

imposed on Iran because of their involvement in nuclear weaponry. First under the Carter

administration and continuing into present day, the US has frozen Iranian governmental assets in

the United States (Indira Lakshamanan of Bloomberg, “Obama Freezes Iranian Government

Assets Under Mandate Passed by Law Makers.”). This comes at a bad time, as Iran is already

suffering a 30.6% inflation rate (Heritage Foundation). This affects food security in a major way.

The price of food is increasing at a higher rate than the buying power of the average paycheck.

The government is unable to provide emergency aid to the population to the lack of available

funds, leaving Iran running on a budget deficit. The results of this mismanagement have become

obvious in food security: approximately one-third of the population lives in poverty and is unable

to buy enough food. While the food is available, nobody can afford to buy it, which decreases the

profit of individual companies, and directly harms the economy. North Korea is much like Iran

in that its spending on nuclear weaponry has caused international sanctions that have harmed the

availability of food. If this money was redirected into emergency aid and trade agreements with

other countries, not only could North Korea and Iran solve their immediate food crises, but they

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would also have sanctions against them removed so that assets and emergency aid could return.

Pakistan, on the other hand, faces no similar sanctions. Being a sometimes-ally of the

United States in its War on Terror, Pakistan is one of the few developing nations allowed to

maintain their nuclear armament. What it shares with North Korea is a security dilemma with a

close neighbor, one of which it used to be a part. The constant bickering and mild escalation

between India and Pakistan seems to mirror the fighting that goes on between North and South

Korea. However, unlike the Koreas, both of these nations have nuclear weapons that have not

been sanctioned by the UN. Neither Pakistan nor India have ever actually used nuclear weapons

against each other, for fear of retaliation or chastisement by the international community.

Instead, they continue to maintain an armament that serves only to gather dust. India, which has

the tenth largest economy in the world, can afford to do this. Pakistan, on the other hand, cannot,

or better put, should not. Seventeen percent of Pakistan’s population remains undernourished

from lack of affordable and accessible supplies of food according to the World Bank dataset,

even while Pakistan continues to spend 2.5 Billion USD annually to maintain its nuclear

stockpile (Global Security Newswire, “Pakistan Spending $2.5B Annually on Nuclear

Arsenal”). To put this in perspective, 2 Billion USD is enough to purchase 20,700 tonnes of

emergency food rations (UNICEF Supply Report 2010). Much like North Korea, Pakistan has

misspent money on nuclear proliferation, which ultimately has gained it no ground in ongoing

disputes with India, and ignored a growing problem with its own populace. I place a disclaimer

here because, as I have said, it is a growing problem. Seventeen percent is no laughing matter, as

the UN considers fifteen percent to be the emergency threshold but in coming years this number

will only grow larger (Threshold Statistic: Jeffrey Gettleman of the New York Times, “Despite

Aid, Malnutrition in Darfur Rises”), (Seventeen Percent Statistic: The World Bank, Prevalence

of Undernourishment % of Population)

There is a very good reason why this relationship exists between developing nations and

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food security issues. First, developing nations are more likely to perceive a security risk, whether

there is one or not. Many developing nations are at legitimate risk of attack by surrounding,

stronger states. Pakistan, for example, has had multiple skirmishes with India. Israel and the

Palestinian nation have been at odds since there was an Israel. However, the problem does not lie

in providing for the common defense, but in the buildup of prohibited weapons. These states

often feel that nuclear weapons will give them a balancing edge against their neighbors, which

will in turn lead to peace and a better position in international negotiations. The actual effects are

exactly the opposite, with stronger neighbors amassing their own stockpiles, and international

superpowers imposing sanctions to deter this kind of behavior. These sanctions usually have

consequences that are just the opposite of what the state intended, leading to international

alliances against it and sanctions that leave its people poorer and worse off because of trade

restrictions.

Second, in addition to sanctions that harm trade and the alienation of neighbors, nuclear

armaments are naturally very expensive to build and maintain. It costs the US alone over one

hundred billion dollars per year to maintain its nuclear stockpile (Broad and Sanger of the New

York Times, “US Ramping Up Major Renewal in Nuclear Arms”). For smaller nations such as

North Korea, who has a total GDP of around 40 billion USD, to maintain even small stockpiles

requires extravagant reallocations of the state’s minimal resources (Heritage Foundation). Often

times this funding comes from areas of greater immediate necessity, such as economic

development, welfare programs, and agricultural stimulus. Authoritarian or highly militaristic

states, such as Iran and North Korea, are particularly bad about this. North Korea’s songun

strategy has put such a huge emphasis on military development that it has left one-third of the

population undernourished. Iran’s nuclear programs have left it unable to claim the billions of

dollars of funds mentioned earlier in this paper.

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Hypothesis and Test

My hypothesis is that if North Korea would redirect spending from its nuclear program to

agricultural and economic development programs, the money alone would be enough to develop

sufficient relief and economic programs to end its famine in five years. I believe that the negative

relationship between nuclear spending and proliferation and food security could be solved by

simply redirecting spending from weapons to development. In order to test this, we would need

four pieces of data. First, we would need the most recent budget from North Korea, including

spending on nuclear weapons. Second, we would need to know what regions were hit hardest in

recent years. Third, we would have to determine how much food relief this money could buy.

Finally, we would need hard statistics—as opposed to estimations—of the number of

undernourished people in North Korea.

The first piece of information, GDP, would be the hardest to obtain. Due to North Korea

distrust of the West, their budget statistics are not readily available over the internet. There are,

however, two potential ways we could go about obtaining it. The first would be to obtain these

numbers from countries with which the US has close diplomatic or trade relations. China could

become a primary source of information, as they happen to be one of the few shared economic

allies of both countries, and the most likely to have budget statistics from North Korea. It is

possible that the Chinese government could be convinced to disclose this evidence to the US

State Department over time. Alternatively, this information could come out in bits and pieces

through North Korean escapees or the black market, as much as our information comes from

these sources anyway.

The second option for gathering information would be a UN investigation into North

Korea. This appears to be a more and more viable option every day, due to both North Korea’s

illegal testing of nuclear weapons and its prison camps. It is likely that should an investigation

occur, whether by force or by persuasion, budget information would be presented during the

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disclosure, and would soon become public. With this information, we will be able to accurately

determine exactly how much money has been going to nuclear weapons, and how much has been

spent on agriculture and stimulus programs.

Next, we would have to determine which parts of North Korea were hit the hardest by the

famine in order to study the food distribution systems implemented by the state. It is not enough

to know that there are starving people. We must know where the majority of the undernourished

live and how the state intends on implementing supply lines that reach these areas. Are they

subject to a return to famine even if the state can provide relief, or will they be able to become

self-sufficient again once immediate needs are met and economic stimulus is introduced? The

easiest way to determine this is to use sources we already have that were familiar with the area as

late as 2009. Multiple NGOs were active in different regions of North Korea, and would be able

to provide us with statistics as to which areas needed more aid than others. Once gathered, this

info would draw us a map of which areas suffered the worst since the 1995 famine, and which

areas had received the majority of the food able to be produced since then.

The third piece of information would be the easiest to obtain once we had the first pieces.

Once we know the amount of money that could be shifted to food purchases and agricultural

development, we could access UNICEF and World Food Program statistics to determine how

much simple foodstuffs would cost. Staples such as rice and grains could easily be purchased in

bulk from China and brought into the country. From there, all that would be required would be a

distribution system, something that was never a problem for North Korea in the past. Price and

purchasing is a large part of the reason that I estimate it would take five years to end the famine.

The North Korean government would have to experiment with the division of money between

emergency relief and long term development. It is not enough to simply alleviate short term

hunger. The goal for North Korea, if it is to maintain its sovereignty, must be a return to juche, or

self-reliance.

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The final piece of information, the number of starving or undernourished in North Korea,

could also be obtained through cooperation between NGOs and the UN. Should a large-scale

investigation occur, this is likely a statistic that will be checked and scrutinized. NGOs can

provide us with a rough estimate based on work in the region and older statistics. This number

could also be easily extrapolated from earlier data obtained on regions heavily affected by the

famine. This number, however, is useful because it would allow a very thorough dispersal of

funds based on both total poverty and which areas are the most isolated from aid.

Testing this hypothesis, while difficult, would not be impossible. There have already

been talks of economic reform in North Korea, and a UN investigation could very well lead to a

shift away from nuclear spending (even if it does not lead to disarmament) to economic

development. If the famine continues the way it has been, eventually the North Korean

government will have to implement changes quickly and efficiently if it wants to have an army

or population capable of sustaining the state. If North Korea ever returns to allowing NGOs and

foreign aid into the country, we will be able to see if any of my ideas hold true. If continued

negotiations away from nuclear spending succeed, we may very well be able to put this idea to

the test.

Conclusion

North Korea is a state with multiple pressing security issues. Food security is its number

one issue. Almost one-third of the total GDP in North Korea goes to the funding of nuclear

missiles, leaving the famine-plagued country with a dire lack of necessary food. The effects of

malnourishment are becoming evident in the stunted growth of children and in the overall

decline of health in North Korea. Issues with South Korea have led to multiple instances of

escalation and de-escalations. The prison camps have been drawing UN attention lately, and

have led to the possibility of an intervention. Finally, the growing black market threatens to

undercut the government’s control on the economy.

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While all of these are pressing matters, food security needs to be North Korea’s top

concern. Food is a basic need that must be met before anything else can be tackled. This food

insecurity can be linked directly to North Korea’s involvement in nuclear weapons. The

sanctions and misspending of funds has resulted in poverty not only in North Korea, but in

similarly situated states, such as Iran and Pakistan. Nuclear weapons, which are unusable in the

modern age without catastrophic, are nothing more than increasingly useless bargaining tools.

They act only to divert spending from necessary state functions to defense spending.

Finally, it is possible for North Korea to get out of its predicament. All it has to do is shift

spending, without even removing current assets, from nuclear spending to agriculture and aid.

With data on the budget of North Korea, geographic data on where the famine has hit hardest and

how many people affected by it, and finally how much food this money could buy, we can

accurately determine how long it will take for the famine to end, and what can be done to

expedite it.

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