risk analysis 2
TRANSCRIPT
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Fire Spread in Car Parks; a summary of the CLG/BRE research programme and
findings
By Martin Shipp, Jeremy Fraser-Mitchell, Richard Chitty, Róisín Cullinan, David Crowder, and
Phil Clark.
Disclaimer: The cars used in the tests in this research programme were selectedsolely on the basis of age, size and availability. No cars were selected on the basis of
make or model. All cars were to be either less than five years old, or, if older, be of a
current model. None of the findings in this research programme should be taken as
suggesting that any particular make or model of car performs better or worse in fire,
compared with any other make or model.
In 2006 Communities and Local Government (CLG) Sustainable Buildings Divisioncommissioned BRE to carry out a three year project titled Fire Spread in Car Parks. Duringthis programme 16 fairly new cars were destroyed.
This article very briefly summarises the programme and presents some key research findings.
The existing guidance for fire safety in car parks in England and Wales is in Approved
Document B (Fire safety) to the Building Regulations for England and Wales (AD B) (Ref. 1).
The basis for this guidance for fire safety strategies in car parks relates to fire initiation and
fire growth involving cars whose designs are decades old. There has been increasing
concern about the consequences of fires in car parks associated with modern car design (e.g.
plastic fuel tanks) and how these fires may spread to other vehicles parked adjacently and
nearby. This concern has been heightened by the entry into the market place of cars
powered by alternative fuels such as LPG.
Fires in car parks are rare, and, although there have been few deaths or injuries recorded to
date in the UK, there are concerns regarding new and emerging risks from modern cars and
alternative fuels. There was a need to gather up-to-date information on fires involving cars in
car parks in order that the current fire safety guidance could be reviewed and, if necessary,
updated.
The overall aim of the project has therefore been to gather information on the nature of fires
involving the current design of cars so that, in due course, guidance on fire safety strategies
for car parks can be reviewed and brought up to date, as appropriate.
This project was concerned with fire spread in car parks that fall under the England and
Wales Building Regulations (Ref. 2), and included open-sided car parks, fully enclosed car
parks, and basement car parks. The programme of work included the tasks described below.
Data collection and literature review.
This work comprised “desktop studies” and involved collecting and analysing information and
data on the identified topics. Over 200 items were reviewed, mostly from the UK but many
from overseas. Topics reviewed included:
• Car design, trends in car design, new fuels (in particular, bio-fuels), electric and
hybrid vehicles;
• Car park design, and trends in car park design;
• Case studies of car fires and car park fires; and
• Relevant research.
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A review of the UK fire statistics was carried out, for the 12 years 1994 to 2005 (the most
recent year for which detailed data was available to BRE) (Ref. 3).
Modelling study – smoke spread in enclosed car parks
CFD modelling was used at various stages throughout the project to guide the research,
assess findings and validate current methodologies.
Experimental study – fire behaviour of materials
The objective of this task was to determine the critical exposure conditions, e.g. intensity and
duration of incident thermal radiation, for a range of external materials used on typical road
vehicles, which has assisted determining the spread of fire between cars. Testing was
carried out on a selection of the samples to determine their heat release rate in accordance
with ISO 5660:2002 (cone calorimeter) (Ref. 4). A critical irradiance value was determined for
each sample using the method described in Drysdale (Ref. 5). It was assumed that the
specimens tested were thermally thin.
Experimental study – fire spread between cars
The cars used in all of the tests were in full running order (though not necessarily legally
roadworthy). The only modification made to any of the cars was that all test vehicles had their
air conditioning gas removed. Gas struts, air bags, and other pressurised or pyrotechnic
components were left in place. For most tests, the fuel tank in each car contained 20 litres of
fuel.
The objectives of this task were to benchmark car fire sizes for a range of vehicle types,
determine the spread of fire between cars, the severity (heat release) of car fires, and to seek
to determine the associated conditions (heat, smoke, toxic gas) to which car park occupants
might be exposed, under typical conditions. Three large scale fire tests were carried out in a
car park test rig under the large calorimeter hood in the BRE Burn Hall, each involving threecars.
The test rig was 12m long and 6m wide. The (underside) ceiling height was 2.9m from the
floor. The rig comprised a steel frame, with breeze block infill. The roof was of hollow-core
concrete slabs. One end of the rig was open, but with a 0.5m deep down stand. Ventilation
openings were provided along one side and the back wall.
Figure 1: Car park test rig in BRE Burn Hall
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Figure 2: Car park test rig elevations
Instrumentation was essentially identical (with some minor variations) for all the full scale
tests. It primarily comprised three thermocouple columns within the test rig, thermocouples
on the roof slabs (above and below), thermocouples within and on the surface of each car
(although not Test 1). Heat flux meters were located in five positions and gas sampling (CO,
CO2 and O2) in three locations. Fire gases were collected in the 9m hood and analysed for
heat release rate.
For all tests, three cars were located in the test rig, Cars 1 and 2 next to each other in
adjacent bays, Car 3 separated by a space (equivalent to an un-used parking bay). For all of
these tests, the fire initiation simulated an arson attack. Car 1 driver’s window and offside
passenger window were open (i.e. on the side furthest from Cars 2 and 3). All other car
windows were closed. The fire was started using a No. 7 crib (Ref. 6) on the Car 1 driver’sseat. (See Photograph 1, below.)
Photograph 1: No. 7 crib ignition source.
Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service were on hand for all tests carried out at BRE Garston.
Three tests were carried out: Test 1 was a freely burning test with no sprinklers fitted. Test 2
was a similar test to Test 1 but included a sprinkler system. Test 3 was a repeat of Test 1 but
with larger vehicles.
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Experimental study – burning behaviour of cars fuelled by LPG
The objectives of this task were to determine the behaviour of fires (and explosions; if such
were to occur) involving cars fuelled by LPG and to seek to determine the associated effects
on an enclosed car park, and adjacent cars, from such a fire.
Due to the risk of an explosion, the large scale fire test was carried out in the car park test rigrelocated to the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL), Buxton, and involved four cars (the
additional car occupying the previously vacant space). Car 2 had a full tank of LPG.
Instrumentation comprised two thermocouple columns within the test rig, thermocouples on
the roof slabs (above and below), thermocouples within and on the surface of each car. Heat
flux meters were located in two positions.
Case studies of actual incidents involving exploding LPG vehicles were sought to inform and
assist the analysis of the results of this experiment.
Experimental study – single car tests
The objectives and findings of this task were as follows:
• To examine the time to full development and heat release rate of a fire starting in the
passenger compartment of a modern family car and a people carrier, with windows
closed (i.e. with limited air).
• To examine the time to full development and heat release rate of a fire starting in the
engine bay of a modern family car and a people carrier (with the bonnets closed). In
the people-carrier test, a second car was located nearby to examine “nose to nose”
fire spread.
• To examine the processes of fire spread from car to car by radiant heat. A modern
car, with its windows closed, was exposed to a radiant panel. The processes of fire
spread (and the time to full development of a fire spreading into the passenger
compartment) were studied.
Seven tests in all were carried out on single cars.
Experimental study – stacker test
Increasingly, car park capacity is being enhanced by the use of “stackers”; mechanical
devices which hold cars within the car park, often under the control of a computer. There are
a wide variety of different types of stacker, but they all, necessarily, result in a higher density
of cars in the car park, compared with normal car parks. In many, there is no fire-resisting
vertical separation.
The objective of this test was to examine the processes of fire spread from the lower car to
the upper car on a stacker, and the time to full development of the fire, starting in the
passenger compartment of the lower car with driver’s window open.
For this test a steel and block work test rig, able to support one car above another, in a typical
stacker configuration, was constructed under the BRE 9m hood.
Analysis
The analysis was intended to examine the findings from all of the tasks to seek to resolve the
following issues:
• The severity of fires in modern car designs, potential for spread and fire size;benchmarking car fire size given a range of vehicle types.
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• The combustion products and likely survivability of such fires.
• The potential hazards arising from fuel leakage/spillage in
unventilated/underground/enclosed car parks.
• Additional hazards arising from cars designed to utilise alternative fuel(s); the
potential explosion effects of cars powered by alternative fuels, or other risks of carspowered by hybrid systems, e.g. using a diesel or petrol engine primary power supply
with a battery secondary power supply.
• The need, or otherwise, for different considerations for underground, enclosed and
open-sided car parks.
Findings
Fire statistics
In the 12 year period studied there were 3096 fires reported in car parks that were subject to
the Building Regulations. Of these, 1592 started in a vehicle (i.e. 1504 did not start in a
vehicle, but a few of these did spread to a vehicle). The average number of fires in car parks
in buildings over the period was therefore 258 per year. However, the number of car park
fires per year shows an overall (but not consistent) decline, with 401 in 1994 but only 142 in
2005.
Most car park fires (68%) occurred in buildings reported as “car park buildings”, as identified
in the FDR1 forms completed by Fire and Rescue Services following incidents. 6% of fires in
car parks occurred in “flats”. Most injuries from fires in car parks occur in “car park buildings”
(45%), followed by “flats” (26%). When the ratio of injuries to number of fires is examined, it is
found that the 6% of fires in “flats” cause 26% of the total injuries resulting from fires in car
parks, while the 68% of the fires in “car park buildings” cause only 45% of the injuries. In
other words, fires in car parks that are part of flats are 6.5 times more likely to cause injuries,compared with fires in dedicated car park buildings.
To summarise the statistics:
1. The number of fires in car parks reported by UK fire and rescue services represents a
very small percentage of all fires in the UK (i.e. 426,200 in 2006 – hence less than 0.1%).
2. Of these fires in car parks, about 50% did not start in a car.
3. Most fires in car parks do not spread (to a car or another car).
4. Most fires are in buildings classified as a “car park building”. Only 6% occur in car parks
within “flats”.
5. About 7 people are injured in car park fires each year. (There are very few fatalities; on
average less than one per year.)
6. Fires in car parks for which the building is classified as “flats” show an injury rate which is
quite high compared with other types of premises. However, fires in car parks for which
the building is classified as “car park” show an injury rate which is low compared with
other types of premises.
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Number of car parks fires reported by year (1994-2005)
(all building types)
401
297
229
211
313
256
321
247
202
283
193
142
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
N o . o f f i r e s r e p o r t e d
Figure 3: Numbers of car park fires reported in buildings by year (1994 – 2005)
Fire performance of exterior materials
The critical irradiance levels determined from the cone calorimeter studies for the exterior car
components tested fell between 8 and 19kW/m2, see Table 1, below.
Table 1: Determined Critical Irradiance Levels (based upon a thermally thinassumption).
Sample Critical Irradiance Level (kW/m2)
Hubcaps 17.5
Mud flaps 10
Bumper grill 17.5
Fuel tank 16.5
Roof box 12.5
Wheel arch 12
Bumper 18.5
Bumper Trim 11.5
Mohair soft top 8
PVC soft top 9
Tyre 11
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Full-scale fire tests
Three of the full-scale tests, Tests 1, 3 and 4, demonstrated the ease with which a car fire in a
car park might spread to nearby cars. Once a very severe fire has developed, ignition will
occur on cars separated by an un-filled parking bay.
In this situation, where a number of cars are burning simultaneously, the fire is exacerbatedby heat-feedback and heat release rates in excess of 16 MW might be achieved from two or
three cars. In Test 1 the initial car fire, Car 1, burned at around 2 MW for about 20 minutes
and it was only then that Car 2 became involved (although Car 3 then ignited very soon after).
However in Test 3, all three cars were burning after around 10 minutes. In Tests 1 and 3, the
fire was terminated once Car 3 was involved, to avoid overloading the calorimeter. Heat
release rate measurements for all the relevant tests are shown in Figure 4, below.
Photograph 2: Test 1, 6 minutes after ignition
est
Photograph 3: Test 1 (Three cars) 21 minutes after ignition
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F i r e S p r e a d i n C a r P a r k
s E x p e r i m e n t a l
C o m p a r i s o n H e a t R e l e
a s e R a t e D a t a
0
2 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
6 0 0 0
8 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 2 0 0 0
1 4 0 0 0
1 6 0 0 0
1 8 0 0 0
0
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
7 0
8 0
T i m e ( m i n u t e s )
H e a t r e l e a s e ( k W )
T e s t 1 F r e e B u
r n
T e s t 2 S p r i n k l e
r e d
T e s t 3 F r e e B u
r n
S t a c k e r 2 c a r s
S i n g l e c a r M e d i u m s
i z e
S i n g l e c a r M P V
T e s t
1
F r e e b u r n , 3 c a r s
T e s t
2
S p r i n k l e r e d , 3 c a r s
T e s t
3
F r e e b u r n , 3 c a r s
T e s t
7
S i n g l e m e d i u m
c a r , e n g i n e f i r e
T e s t
8
S i n g l e M P V , e n g i n e f i r e
T e s t
1 1 S t a c k e r t e s t , 2 c a r s
Figure 4: Heat release rate results
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Test 2 showed the effectiveness of a sprinkler system at containing a fire within the car of
origin and slowing its rate of growth, as shown in Figure 4 above. Some minor heat damage
was incurred by the second car in this test but actual fire spread did not occur.
The heat release rate results are summarised in Table 2, below.
Table 2: Summary of heat release measurements from the full-scale fire testprogramme
Testnumber
Date Numberof carsin thetest rig
PeakHRR(MW)
Time topeakHRR(Min)
Time of fireserviceintervention(Min)
Number ofcarsburning atpeak HRR
HRR at 15minutes (MW)
1 6 Sept.07
3 16 21 24 2 (Note 1) 2.5
2 20 Sept.07
3 7 55 85 1 0.1
3 27 Sept.
07
3 11 10 10.5 2 (Note 1) 0.1
(Terminatedbefore 15minutes)
4 3 April 08 4 NA NA None 4 (Note 2) NA5 27 Aug.
081 0.1 NA None 1 (Note 2) NA
6 1 Sept.08
1 0.1 NA None 1 (Note 2) NA
7 27 Aug.08
1 4.8 45 75 1 1.6
8 1 Sept.08
1 3.8 54 80 1 0.1
9a 11 Dec.08
1 NA NA NA 1 NA
9b 9 Feb. 09 1 NA NA 63 1 NA10 9 Feb. 09 1 NA NA 46 1 NA
11 22 Jan.09
2 8.5 12 24.5 2 4
Note 1: In Tests 1 and 3 the fire was terminated by Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service on
request from BRE before all cars were involved, or fully involved.
Note 2: Test 4 burnt out, and Tests 5 and 6 self-extinguished. All other tests were terminated
by Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service on request from BRE.
Other, example, results are shown below.
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TC Tree 1
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Time (minutes)
T e m p e r a t u r e ( C e l s i u s )
50mm from top
100mm
150mm
200mm
250mm
300mm
350mm
450mm
500mm
600mm
700mm
1000mm
1500mm
2000mm from the top
Figure 5: Test 1 temperature measurements; thermocouple tree 1
Gas Concentrations
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Time (minutes)
% C o n c e n t r a t i o n
0
5
10
15
20
25
CO Standing 1
CO2 Standing 1
CO Kneeling 1
CO Standing 2
CO2 Standing 2
O2 Standing 1
O2 Kneeling 1
O2 Standing 2
Figure 6: Test 1 gas concentration measurements
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Fire Spread in Car Parks Experimental- Test 1
Total Heat Released
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Time (minutes)
T o t a l H e a t R e l e a s e d ( M J )
Figure 7: Test 1 Total heat release
Fire Spread in Car Parks Experimental- Stackers
The Rate of Light-Obscuring Smoke Production at Duct Temperature
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time (minutes)
R a t e o f s m o k e p r o d u c t i o n ( m ² / s )
Figure 8: Test 11 smoke production (measured in duct)
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Fire Spread in Car Parks Experimental- Stackers
The Total Amount of Smoke Produced at Duct Temperature
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time (minutes)
T o t a l s m o k e p r o d u c t i o n ( m ² )
Figure 9: Test 11 total smoke production
In Test 4 (LPG in Car 2), Car 2 was alight after 21 minutes and all four cars were burning after
around 23 minutes.
In Test 8, an engine fire test with a nearby car “nose to nose” the fire spread to the second
car within 5 minutes.
In Test 11, the stacker test, the fire spread up to involve the second car within 6 minutes and
fully involved it within 9 minutes.
Photograph 4: Test 11 Stacker test in progress; 10min 10secs from ignition
The ventilation limitations on such a fire in an enclosed car park result in a very hot ceiling jet,
which spreads the fire to nearby cars with the dominant mechanism of heat transfer being
radiation from the flames and hot gas layer. There were only a limited number of cars in each
of these tests (a maximum of four); however escalation to many cars within a specific
proximity in an actual car park must be expected under these conditions. Computermodelling has been employed to examine these larger scenarios.
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Gas temperatures in the enclosed rig (beneath parts of the ceiling) reached 1100OC in all
tests, exceeding 1200OC briefly in Test 4.
The LPG tank did not explode in Test 4 since the pressure relief valve provided with the LPG
tank appeared to work effectively even in quite a severe multi-car fire. This is consistent with
reports from actual fire incidents involving vehicles with LPG (and which have not been
subjected to tampering).
From Test 2, the potential benefits of sprinklers in preventing (or delaying) fire spread
between cars have been demonstrated.
The single car tests demonstrated that a fire in a sealed (i.e. windows closed) passenger
compartment is unlikely to develop; that modern cars are sufficiently well sealed that a fire
starting within the passenger compartment is likely to go out through lack of air. It may be
presumed that most cars left in public car parks will have their windows closed.
These tests demonstrated that a fire starting in the engine compartment of a modern car can
grow within the engine compartment and can break through the bulkhead into the passenger
compartment where a substantial fire can develop and involve the whole vehicle.
The stacker test demonstrated the ease and speed with which a fire could spread from a car
of origin to a car directly above it in the absence of a barrier. Lateral spread would also be
expected if the stacker geometry extended accordingly.
Computer modelling
The modelling that was conducted using the BRE CFD model JASMINE, based on the
findings from this project, and tested against the Monica Wills House (sheltered apartments)
fire (Ref. 7), has led to the development of an effective and practical car fire/fire spread
scenario. Examples of the modelling are shown in Figures 10 and 11, below.
Figure 10: Experimental rig model Figure 11: Predictions of temperature
in the rig
Electric cars
This programme has not examined experimentally the fire behaviour of electric or hybrid cars
and their propensity for fire is currently unknown (since there are still so few). Batteries are a
particular problem since their fire residues may be corrosive and/or toxic. Increased numbers
of such cars might necessitate charging stations in car parks, with potential new risks.
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Conclusions
The fire statistics have shown that there are very few reported injuries in car park fires, and
very few fatalities. However, fires in car parks associated with flats are causing 6.5 times
more injuries (per thousand fires) than fires in purpose-built car parks.
The ease with which a car fire in a car park might spread to nearby cars has been
demonstrated. Once a very severe fire has developed, ignition will occur even to cars
separated by an un-filled parking bay.
The potential use of computer modelling in predicting the spread of fire and smoke in car
parks has been demonstrated and validated.
The findings from this work should be available to feed into standards referred to by AD B,specifically BS 7346-7; 2006 Components for smoke and heat control systems – Part 7: Code
of practice on functional recommendations and calculation methods for smoke and heat
control systems for covered parking areas for cars (Ref. 8). Similarly, the findings from this
research, in particular the “raw” experimental results, will provide a data resource for the fire
safety engineering of car parks. It is intended that the full report from this research
programme will be made available on the CLG website in due course.
References
1. Approved Document B - Volume 2 - Buildings other than dwellinghouses (2006
Edition).
2. The Building Regulations (England and Wales) 2000.
3. Private communication to BRE from CLG Fire Statistical Unit, 2007. (Non-personal
data abstracted from the National Fire Statistics Data Base).
4. International Organisation for Standardisation. Fire Tests-Reaction to Fire-Rate of
heat release from building products. ISO DIS 5660, Geneva, 1990.
5. Drysdale, D., “An Introduction to Fire Dynamics”, pages 212-214, Wiley & Sons Inc.
Second Edition, 2003.
6. BS 5852:2006 Methods of test for assessment of the ignitability of upholstered
seating by smouldering and flaming ignition sources. BSI. 2006.
7. “A careful attitude”. Fire Prevention and Fire Engineers Journal, July 2007, pages 54
- 56. (Monica Wills report).
8. BS 7346-7; 2006. Components for smoke and heat control systems – Part 7: Code of
practice on functional recommendations and calculation methods for smoke and heat
control systems for covered parking areas for cars. BSI. London. 2006.
Acknowledgments
The authors of this report are employed by BRE. The work reported herein was carried out
under a Contract placed by the Communities and Local Government. This article is published
with permission of Communities and Local Government. Any views expressed are not
necessarily those of Communities and Local Government.
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The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance we were given by many individuals and
organisations, and in particular the Advisory Group which was formed from a representative
group of stakeholders and who advised the project from its inception.
For and on behalf of BRE Global LimitedBRE Global Limited, Bucknalls Lane, Watford, Hertfordshire, WD25 9XX, UKT: +44 (0) 1923 664960 F: +44 (0) 1923 664910E: [email protected] W: www.bre.co.uk/fire