rhetoric and rationality a study of democratization in the soviet union 1997

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    Rhetoric and Rationality: A Study of Democratization in the Soviet UnionAuthor(s): Richard D. Anderson Jr. and Bernard GrofmanReviewed work(s):Source: Public Choice, Vol. 93, No. 3/4 (1997), pp. 287-314Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30024303 .

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    PublicChoice93:287-314,1997. 287@ 1997 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed n theNetherlands.

    Rhetoric and rationality: A study of democratization in the SovietUnion *RICHARD D. ANDERSON, JR.' & BERNARD GROFMAN2'Departmentof PoliticalScience, Universityof California,LosAngeles,CA90024-1472,U.S.A.;2Schoolof Social Sciences, Universityof California,Irvine,CA92717-5100,U.S.A.Accepted 12July 1995Abstract. Canpoliticalactorsuse rational trategiesorpoliticalconflictwhenestablished nsti-tutions are unavailableto structurepolitical choices because the institutionsare themselvesamong the contested issues? In Soviet politics from 1985 to 1991, cross-cutting cleavagesplaced in questionthe possibility of any stable outcome. We arguethat a multi-dimensionalissue space was reducedto a single dimension,along which MikhailGorbachevcould tem-porarilyoccupya median,by the interactionbetweenGorbachev's wn rhetoricand rhetoricaltactics used by leaders of his nomenklatura pposition, by Boris Yeltsin as the leaderof thedemocraticopposition,andby single-issue groupscalledneformaly.The matchbetween thesefourplayers'rhetoricsand the fourstrategicoptions dentifiedby asimple spatialmodel offersempiricalevidence that rationalstrategieswereavailabledespiteinstitutional lux.

    1. IntroductionCanpoliticiansfollow rationalstrategiesn the absenceof established nstitu-tions that structurepoliticalchoices? Democratizations by definitiona timeof institutional lux, when the rule of politics are not fixed. We investigatewhether rationalstrategiesare possible in such circumstancesby compar-ing the expectationsof a rationalmodel of politicalaction to the rhetoricofthe principleparticipantsn the Soviet transition owarddemocracyduring1989-1990.

    *We are indebtedto DorothyGreen for bibliographicassistance and to Colleen Conniff,Melissa Dawson, AlexandraGrozdanic,Carla Thorson andJudithChase for researchassis-tance. Forcommentingon variousversions of thispaper,we also thankStephenAnsolabehere,KathleenBawn, BarbaraGeddes, StephenHansen,ThomasSchwartz,GeorgeTsebelis, theparticipants n a seminararrangedat WashingtonUniversityin St. Louis by JohnGilmour,participants n the UCLA political economy lunch, attendeesat the Western Political Sci-ence Association Annual Meeting, and participants n a conference on "Rational ChoiceApproachesto ComparativePolitics" at the Universityof California,Irvine. None of thesepeople are responsiblefor any faults. This researchwas partiallysupportedby the Interdis-ciplinaryFocused ResearchProgram n Public Choice, Universityof California,Irvine;bythe Academic Senateof the Universityof California,Los Angeles;andby the RAND/UCLACenterfor Soviet Studies.

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    288Much researchpresentspolitics in the Soviet Union before the August1990 coup as a conflict pittingreformersagainstthose officials withinthenomenklatura partyand governmentbureaucrats)who tried to defend thestatusquo. Several observershave portrayedMikhail Gorbachevplaying acentristrole in this conflict:aware of some nomenklatura fficials' fear that

    public demonstrationsorganizedby single-issuegroupscalled "neformaly"mighttopplethem frompower,he exploitedtheofficials'anxietyto gaintheirgrudgingapprovalof his proposalsfor limited reformspromisingto easepublic discontent(see Breslaner,1989; Hongh, 1989; Bova, 1989; Roeder,1993).InthisrespectGorbachev mergesas a liberalizer omparableo thosesaid by several recent studies to occupy the political center between hard-liners and democratizersduring ransitionso democracy n variouscountries(see Di Palma, 1990;O'Donnell andSchmitter,1986;Przeworski,1991).Theportrait f Gorbachevoccupyingamedian n aunidimensionalpoliticsof perestroika oncealsa previouslyunrecognizedpuzzle.Reportinga surveyof publicopinion nthe formerUSSR in 1990,FinifterandMickiewicz(1992)call attention o the "multidimensionalityf attitudes oward he complexofreforms introduced in the Gorbachev era."They observe that preferencesexpressed on the issue of whether the state or the individualshould bearresponsibilityfor economic well-beingwere not correlatedwith support ora transition o democratic nstitutions.Takingthe responsesto the questionof state or individualresponsibilityas an index of support or Gorbachev'smarketreforms,FinifterandMickiewicz concludethathe neededto assemblea coalitioncomposedof separategroupsof supportersor differentkinds ofreform.Finifter andMickiewicz's (1992) conclusions have since been questionedby Duch (1993) and by Miller et al. (1994). CriticizingFinifter and Mick-iewicz for relyingon a single item to measuresupport or economicreform,both critics findthat when measuredby scales composedof multipleitems,support ormarket eforms s stronglycorrelatedwithsupportordemocracy.However,bothcriticsreportCronbach'salphasfor their scales rangingfrom.58 (Duch) to maxima of .63 to .68 for subsamplesof theirsurvey(Milleretal., 1994). Duch (1993), moreover,explicitly admits that factoranalysisofthe items used in his scale to measuremarket eformrevealed hepresenceoftwo dimensions.While the level of Cronbach'salpha acceptable or the con-structionof aunidimensional cale is partlya matterof the researcher'saste,we would interpret he critics' findingsas failing to rejectthe Finifter andMickiewicz conclusion aboutthe multidimensionality f popularattitudestoward his pairof issues.Finifter and Mickiewicz's (1992) findingof multidimensionalitys furthersupportedby interviewswithrankingpoliticiansof the Gorbachevyearswho

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    289recountdisagreementsoverhow to coordinatedifferentreform ssues. Inter-viewed by one of the authors n Moscow in October1992, Yuri Prokof'evrecalledthatas secondsecretaryof theMoscowcitycommittee nearly-1989,he approachedhe firstsecretaryoquestion he wisdomof Gorbachev's ffortto proceedwith democraticandmarketreformsat the same time. Prokof'evargued nsteadthat the Sovietpartyshould emulatethe Chinesecourse,pro-ceeding with marketreforms in the near term and delaying the move todemocracyuntil a marketeconomywas well established.Gorbachevearnedof theconversationand,encounteringProkof'ev n a Kremlin taircase,bracedhim with, "So you're a panicker!" paniker,a wordfrequentlyencounteredin Gorbachev'spublic speeches). Interviewedat the GorbachevFoundationin October 1993, formerPolitburo member and ideology secretaryVadimMedvedev said that several Politburomembers wantedto disentangleeco-nomic, agricultural, thnic,andlegalreform rom thepoliticalreformsadvo-catedby Gorbachev,eitherdelaying politicalreformor hastilycompletingalimitedversionin order o avoid interferencewith otherpolicy issues.In general, multidimensional ssue spaces are highly unlikely to featurestable medians of the kind commonly (and we believe correctly) said tohave been occupied by Gorbachev.Where institutionsare fixed, they maybe designedto limit or prohibitcycling amongoutcomesfor which majoritysupportvariesdependingon the order n which they arecompared.Investi-gatingthe same problemin nineteenth-centuryNew Zealand,Nagel (1993)has recentlyarguedthatverbalbehavior,of a kindlabeled"heresthetics" yWilliamRiker (1982), could substitute or the absence of institutional im-its on cycling. We preferthe term "rhetoric," sed not in the meaning of"persuasion" ut in the looseroriginalsense "oratory,"o Riker'sneologism.Examiningthe rhetoricused by Gorbachev,by leaders of the nomenklaturaopposition,by his radicalopponentBoris Yeltsin,andby the neformaly,weargue that rhetorical tactics succeeded in creatinga short-runstability byreducing hismulti-dimensional paceto a singledimensionopposingradicalreformers o the nomenklatura, dimensionalongwhich a medianwas tem-porarilyavailableto Gorbachev.This temporary tabilitycontributedo, butalso limited,thegradualisticransition owarddemocracymanifestduring heperiodof perestroika.We use speechesas evidence because unlike otherpossibleevidence aboutpolitical strategies n theSovietperiod,speechesofferevidenceof whatbroadSoviet audiencesweredirected o ascribe o individualactors.In a stimulatingarticle,AndersonandBoettke(1993) havejustifiablymade much of the gapbetween rhetoric and performanceduringthe Gorbachevyears. Gorbachevproposedeconomic reforms,but the resulting changes in economic institu-tions redistributed pportunitiesor officials to extractquasi-rents ather han

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    290diminishingthe sum of quasi-rentsby relaxingstatecontrols.We agreethatperformance reatlydiverged romrhetoric,butwhereasAndersonandBoet-tke (1993) ascribethe gap to Gorbachev'sstrategic nsincerity,we conceivepolicy actionsby the Soviet governmentas a compoundcombining(a) Gor-bachev's decrees (issuedwith the reluctantassent of Politburoconservativeswho fearedpopularunrestif they refused)and(b) shirkingby rent-seekingbureaucrats, ncouragedby the Politburoconservatives,who exploitedthelimits on his monitoring capacity to implementthe decrees to their ownadvantageregardlessof Gorbachev's ntent(Anderson,1993: Ch. 2). Givenourargument,we do not thinkthat Gorbachev'sorhis opponents' ndividualstrategiescan be assessed simplyby observing heir oint,or"public," hoic-es. The texts printedin newspapersand stenographicrecords of meetings,on the otherhand,represent ignalsattributed y thepressto Gorbachevandhis variousopponentsas individuals.Becausethepressmight misreportwhatthey actuallysaid,it wouldhave beennecessary orhim and or his opponentsto considerhow the presswouldreport heir statementswhendecidingwhatto say, but since we have no direct evidence of the actual statements,butonly the press reports,we do not model these decisions.We assumethat forattentiveSoviet publics (andfor us as observers), hese texts could serve as"cheapsummaryndicators"Peltzman,1984:183)of Gorbachev'sandotherpoliticalactors' effortsto bid for support rom official andpopularaudiencesby offeringpoliticalalternatives.

    2. An informal model of Soviet politics, 1985-1991Below we offer anabstractmodel of state-societyrelationsnthe SovietUnionduring1989-1990, identifyingthe strategicresourcesandconstraints acedby the various actors. Like all rationalmodels, this model gains tractabilityat theexpenseof oversimplifyinganadmittedly armorecomplexreality.2.1. TheplayersWemodel thegameashavingfourkeysets of actors:Gorbachev ndhisallies(G), the conservativemembersof the nomenklaturaN), grass-rootsreform-ers "from below" (R) composed of neformaly("informals" r unregisteredcitizens' groups), cooperatives(privatebusinesses), and strike committeesrepresentingworkers,andYeltsin and otherdemocrats.2.1.1. NomenklaturaCommunistPartyofficials andgovernmentbureaucrats ho resistreformsaredecisive in thatno winningcoalitioncan exist without hem,since Gorbachev

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    291did not control a stablemajorityof thePolitburo,as his formerspeechwriterrecounts(Cherniaev,1993: 291, 295-297, 322) and as we documentbelow.The nomenklaturaofficials are assumed to be trying to preservea statusquo in which they enjoy a wide rangeof specialprivilegesand control theenactmentand executionof officialpolicy,buttheyare also unwillingto risklosing office as a resultof a confrontationwitha fully mobilizedmasspublicenragedby theirarbitraryonduct.When we use the word "nomenklatura"orefergenerallyto officials who opposedreforms,we remainawarethatsomemembers of the nomenklaturaat all levels welcomed reformeven thoughit would reduce the existing powers andprivilegesof the nomenklatura sa whole. As Anderson and Boettke(1993: 108) pointout, some supportiveofficialswelcomedreformbecausetheyexpectedto win evengreaterpowersandprivilegesundera newsystem.Inanycase,if we suppose hatopponentsnthenomenklaturawerefew oruninfluential,we havedifficultyunderstandingwhy Politburoconservativeswent to the troubleof signalingtheiroppositionto reformor why Gorbachevengagedin issue packaging.2.1.2. Gorbachevand his alliesThe motivationsbehind Gorbachev'sactionsduringperestroika emaindis-puted even today. Following a substantialbody of literature,we shall treathim as a "balancer." y existingrules,Gorbachev's ack of aPolitburomajor-ity precludeshim from imposinghis will on either the nomenklatura r thepublic, and he seeks limitedbut still verysubstantial eformson a varietyoffronts in orderto placatean angrypublicthatmightotherwiseseek to expelthe nomenklatura onservativesfrom office. As a centrist Gorbachevmayseek enactmentof policy proposals avoredeitherby the reformersorby thenomenklatura, ependingon how fully eachwing mobilizesits membersandtheirpowers;thatis, he may move eitherrightor left. As long as bothwingsmobilize, however,he cannot move all theway to eitherway.2.1.3. Grass-rootsreformersWithin two years after Gorbachev'ssuccession in March 1985, the Polit-buro decided for the first time to tolerate the formation of interestgroupsnot underthe control of official organizations see Berezovskiiand Krotov,1990: 19). One kind, the neformalyor "informal" rganizations,proliferat-ed rapidly.They were estimated to number30,000 by December 1987 and60,000 by March 1989 (althoughthese totalswere never substantiated ndincluded many apolitical clubs devoted to leisure activities) (see Bonnell,1990).Anotherkind of special-interest rganizationwas the so-called"coop-erative,"which sprangup after the passageof the Law on IndividualLaborActivityin May 1987.Cooperativeswerepartnershipsoftenindividual ntre-preneursmasquerading spartnerswiththeiremployees) engaged n avariety

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    292of privatebusinesses.Workers'committeesalso beganto appear,andin July1989 coal miners workedup to a strikethat,althoughpartlyresultingfromlocal disputes, spread romthe mines in theKuzbass o theminesof Vorkutaand Donetsk. Not only coal minersstruck; he head of government aidthattogetherwith ethnic conflicts, strikeshad cost 9.5 million person-daysinthe firstfour months of 1990, and seven million person-days n all of 1989(Pravda,25 May 1990).Members of the neformaly,cooperativesand workers'groupscould exertpressureon the nomenklaturay strikes, treetdemonstrations,ndcampaign-ing. Two CommunistPartyauthorssympathetic o the informalsdescribedtheirchallengeto the nomenklatura: informalassociations .., tryingto pro-mote their own opinions,revive and routinizedemocratic ormsof strugglepreviouslyeliminatedfrom ourpractice, ncludingsome to whichthe estab-lished political and social-economicstructures repainfullysensitive:massrallies,the nominationof theirown candidates orpeople's deputy,and eventhe establishmentof parallelstructuresof political power"(ChurbanovandNelinbin, 1990:9).Our model does not dependon an assumption hateveryinformalorgani-zation forms preferencesalong only one issue dimension.As reforms werefrustrated, nformalsparticularlyn Ukraine,the Baltics and the Caucususrepublicsformedbroadcoalitionsthatlinked issues within those republics,particularlyying togetherdemandsfornational ndependencewithecologi-cal concerns.Nevertheless,as long as the informalscan exert morepressurewhen both umbrellagroupsand single-issue groupsjoin in protestactions,there is an incentive for reformers o adopt strategiesthat incorporate hegroupswith single-issue preferences.2.1.4. Yeltsinand the "democrats"While most neformalyorganized orchangeon particularubstantivessues,duringthe campaignprecedingthe March1989 elections individualcandi-dates and groupsof supportersdeclaredtheiroppositionto the Communistparty'smonopoly of the right of political organization.Prominentamongthese candidateswas Boris Yeltsin.These candidates and their supportersgained the name "democrats"by makingdemands for replacementof thecommunistmonopolywith majorityrule.2.2. Strategies n thegameWithonly one issue dimension(e.g., democracyversusauthoritarianism,rthecommandeconomyversus the market),a centeror medianvoterpositionwould always exist. In contrast, n the multi-dimensional ssue space docu-mentedby Finifterand Mickiewicz(1992),a single"center" ositioncapable

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    293of commandingmajoritysupport n pairwisecompetitionagainsteverypos-sible alternative i.e., a single median or core - neverexists except undertheveryrestrictiveconditionthatthesupporters ndopponentsof the centristpolicy are distributed ymmetricallyalong everydimension(see, e.g., Riker,1982;orOrdeshook,1986: 349-353).Five basic strategies,each withits own vulnerability, xist forcopingwiththe absence of a core in multidimensionalpolitics. First, if subsets of theelectorateholdparticularly trongviews on each of thedimensions, t maybepossibleto assemblea coalition of "intenseminorities"Downs, 157),but thecoalition is vulnerableto disruptionby "divideand rule"counterproposals(Kadane, 1972) and is very difficult to organizeand enforce when any ofthe differentinterestgroups' goals conflict.Second, an organizermay seekto packagea generallycentristpositionlocatedat the median on each issuedimension,but thatstrategy s vulnerable o coalitionscomposedof elementsfrom bothextremesand formedby makingspecialconcessions to aparticularintense minority,especially if the views of the participantsn the coalitionabout a given issue are far from the medianposition on that issue.1 Thirdis disaggregationof politicalchoices, separatingssues by acting along onedimensionat a time. ThisstrategyproduceswhatShepsle(1979)called "struc-turally nduced" quilibriumforliterature,ee Krehbiel,1988),but tdependson prior agreementabout the institutionalstructure or reachingdecisions.Fourth s ambiguityaboutspecific issues in favorof establishingproceduralnorms,suchas the idea that choices shouldbe made in a democratic ashion,but this strategyis vulnerableto warningsaboutthe consequencesfor spe-cific issues of the adoptionof democraticprocedures Shepsle, 1972). Fifthis advocacy of strong supra-majoritarianonsensus, or supra-majoritariandecision procedures, n orderto createpolicy positionsthat,once in place,are invulnerable o overthrow Schofield,GrofmanandFeld, 1988), but bybroadening he numberof participantswith a veto overchange,this strategytends to privilegethe statusquoand is thereforeunsuitable orreformerswhoface significantopposition.If rationalactionwere infeasible when established nstitutionsareunavail-able to structure olitics,this set of strategies houldnot describe he behaviorof politicalactors n the Soviet Union before theAugust1991coup.To refutethis null hypothesis,we now turn to presentingevidencethat the first strat-egy was pursued (unsuccessfully) by grass-rootsreformers, he second byGorbachev, he thirdby his nomenklatura pponents,the fourthby Yeltsinandhis fellow democrats;none of the fourplayerspursued hefifth,whichisinfeasible when significantoppositionto reformexists. Gorbachevproposedtheadoptionof perestroika s an "issuepackage"- a set of policy proposals nwhichacceptanceof anyproposalwas said to be dependenton acceptanceof

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    294

    R

    AxisofP e r e s t r o i k a

    Ecology reform

    G

    Q NAcceptance

    ofethnic

    assertiveness

    Ethnic

    demands

    Ecological demandsFigure1.

    all the rest. The nomenklatura's epresentatives irectly opposedsuch issuepackagingby proposingto separate ssues. Yeltsinemphasized proceduralchangesoverreformsof particular olicies.Wearguethattheplayers'adop-tion of these three strategies,togetherwith the failure of the neformalytoachieve any cohesive nationwideorganizationand everyone'savoidanceofthe infeasible fifthstrategy,madepossibletheappearance f the single issuedimensionalongwhichGorbachev s oftenportrayed s occupyinga centristposition.We can illustrateourhypothesizedSovietbargaininggameby simplifyingit to two dimensions(whichrepresent ssues of, e.g., ethnicityandecology)as in Figure1.In the two-dimensionalpolicy spacepresented n Figure1, the horizontal(leftward)arrowsymbolizespopular orces(neformaly)organized o supportecological reform. The vertical(upward)arrowsymbolizes popularforces(neformaly) avoringpolicies moreresponsive o ethnic concerns.2Theprob-able outcomeof bargainingone issue at a time is shownby thepointN.We assume that the nomenklatura fficials could affect policies actuallypursuedby the Soviet state,andthattheir decisionsdependedon the combi-nation of (a) their ownpolicy preferencesand(b) theirdesireto avoidhavingtheneformalyengageinexcessivedemonstrations,ivildisobedience,strikes,

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    295or otherprotestactions. Wefurtherassume that thewillingnessof the nefor-maly to stage protestsdependedon how manypeople they could summoninto the streets to face possible police counteraction.Under these assump-tions, each policy must be a tacit bargainbetween the nomenklaturaandthe neformaly.Because not all neformalycareaboutpolicy changealongallissue dimensions,if the nomenklaturaan arrange o have each issue negoti-atedseparately,he compromiseshould be closer to thenomenklatura'sdealpoint.ThepointN representshe set ofpoliciesmostfavorableo thenomenklaturathatalsopacifiestheneformaly ocatedalong anyissue dimensionconsideredin isolation.3What the neformaly actuallywantwe havesymbolized by thepoint R, which representsthe platformthat combines the preferredpointsof the neformaly organized along each separateissues dimension. Whilethe policies at point N representthe best the neformalycan obtain fromthe nomenklatura f they negotiate along each dimension separately,andthe point R reflects what they might get if they could put together (andkeep together)a coalition of intense minoritiesthat would breakup presentpower relationships, hepointG is intended o reflect"compromise" oliciesproposedby Gorbachev,a "perestroika ackage."As long as G is up and to the left of N, G corresponds o a point alongeither dimension which theneformalyalongthat dimensionstrictlyprefertowhatthey can get from the nomenklatura y bargainingone issue at a time.Knowingthatthey can neverget R as long as the nomenklaturaetainstherightto decide policy, the neformalyshould be willing to acceptG. On theotherhand,thenomenklaturamust fear that f it rejectsG, theneformalyandcooperativeswill resolve theirdifferencesandformthecoalitionatorclose topointR. Such a coalition would be able tomobilize moreparticipantsn streetdemonstrationsand strikes than the neformalyalong any single dimension,and consequentlyit might extract more far-reaching oncessions from thenomenklatura rthreaten he destructionof thesystemwhoseprivilegestheyenjoy.Thus G is anissue packageattractive o boththe nomenklatura nd itspopularopposition(theneformalyandcooperatives)by bundling he diverseissue dimensions into a single all-or-nothing hoice which all actorsprefer otheiravailablealternatives.

    One obvious questionis why the nomenklatura ndneformalycould notsimplyconvergeon a bargainatG, dispensingwithGorbachev.Thiscompro-mise would requirethe neformalyandcooperatives o organizethemselvesinto a nationalcoalition, or party,behind Yeltsin or some otherleader,whowould conduct thebargainingwith thenomenklatura.One answer s straight-forward.As formationof arivalpoliticalpartywasillegaluntilFebruary1990,a bargainingpartner or the nomenklatura ouldnot emerge.Yeltsin himself

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    296remaineda member of the CommunistPartyCentralCommittee,subjecttoits discipline,until July 1990. The nomenklatura laimed an exclusiverightto act as the sole institutionorganizedacross ssues. Itsspokesmendeniedtheexistence of any "otherpoliticalforce capableof ... resistingthe centrifugaltendencies in society"(Kriuchkov n Pravda,5 Nov. 1989; cf. Ligachev,9Dec. 1989). What made Gorbachev ndispensablewas a combinationof hisassiduous effort to keep himself acceptableto as manygroupsas possible,and their reluctanceor inabilityto negotiatedirectlywith each other.

    Alternatively,ratherthan accept G, the nomenklatura an offer policieslike those representedby the point Q in the figure.These offersdisrupt heconsensusamongthe neformaly n favorof Gorbachev'sssue package.Theecology-minded groupspreferQ to G, andQ is no worse thanthe minimumthe ethnic-mindedgroupscould extract.Shepslepointedout thatby forcingconsiderationof issues one at a time, germanenessrules in Congresscouldprevent he considerationof alternatives ikeQ, therebystabilizing hepolicy(Shepsle, 1979).Butin the Sovietcontext,no ruleprohibits henomenklaturafrom offeringQ, and indeed some officials' speechesdid offer concessionson ecology that seemed intended to breakup alliances between ecologicalneformalyand ethnicseparatists foranexample,see the nextsection).In the abstract, t would appearthat, if the neformalyand cooperativesremainedpredominantlyingle-issue groups,4Gorbachev's onservativeoppo-nents shouldhave been able to counterhis centriststrategyby offeringcon-cessions on selectedpolicy issues to someof the democratsn returnorthosedemocrats'departure rom the democraticcoalition.5Gorbachevsoughttoguardagainst attempts o buy off key actorson a given issue dimensionandthus reducethe size of the coalitionpushingfor reformby insistingthathisproposalsbeing treatedas a completepackage.By proposingmovementinthe direction of reformalong severaldimensionsat once, claimingthatanyproposedreform would fail unless it was accompaniedby enactmentof alltherest,he offered all theneformalyanalternative o the nomenklatura's idsto divide them. The responseof the neformalyto the choice between Gor-bachev'spackageand the nomenklatura'selective concessionsdependedonthe neformalymemberships'relativetrustof GorbachevandotherPolitburomembers. Our model differs from explanationsof perestroika hatrely onuniversalpublic antagonismto the nomenklatura, s in our model even aslight"generalizedbenefit of the doubt" or theproponentof the issue pack-age can be shown to be sufficientto safeguard he packageagainstselectiveconcessions- a crucialpointgiventherapiddwindlingof Gorbachev'spublicsupportduring1989 (see Feld andGrofman,1991).6

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    2973. RhetoricalnichesandtheSovietbargaininggameThemodel we haveproposed mpliesthatfourrhetoricalnicheswill be openfor occupancy.The first is a niche for an issue-packager Gorbachev), hesecond is a nicht for advocates for the statusquo who will seek to fightissue-by-issue delaying actions (the nomenklatura),he thirdis a niche forsingle-issuegroups(variousneformalyandcooperatives),and the fourth s aniche for advocacyof democraticprocedures Yeltsinandothers).Inthe firstniche,Gorbachev houldpresentperestroika s an issuepackage.The purpose of the package is to counteractthe possibility that separateconsiderationof issues will divide the reformcoalition. He should also findways to presenthimself as the center of a politicalspectrumdefinedby thenomenklatura t one end and the democratsat theopposingend.In the second niche, spokesmen for the nomenklatura hould advocateany strategythat moves the bargaintowardN, the best available outcomefor the nomenklatura.Their basic strategyshould be to call for consideringissues separately,seeking to split the reformcoalitionby selective payoffs.Calls for separationof issues can take variousforms,however.Forexample,nomenklaturaadvocates can call for a slowdown in the pace of reformonsome issues while endorsing promptactionon others,or they can demandthe prohibitionof some of the moreextremistneformalyfor the purposeofmovingthe center of thepolitical spectrum oward heir endby exclusionofthe oppositeextreme.In the thirdniche, advocates for the neformalyand cooperativesshouldadvocatea strategythat moves the bargaintowardthe point R. With eachgroupdemandinga policy atthepointon its own dimension hatcorrespondsto R, all the neformalyhope to organizea coalition of minorities that caninsiston R.Inthe fourthniche, democratssuch as Yeltsintryto substitute or the non-existentcoalition of neformalyandcooperativesby introduction f democrat-ic procedures,particularlymajorityvoting.If the nomenklaturas unpopular,candidates rom theneformalyandcooperativeswill defeat its candidates nelections. Then a majoritarianegislaturecan adoptR, because the nomen-klaturawill no longercontrolpolicy.Theadvantageof focusingonprocedurerather han issues in the issues' divisivenesswithin theneformalyandcoop-eratives.We now turn to observationof whetherSoviet political rhetoric fits intothese niches. Of necessity ourexamplesare limited. We believe themto berepresentative.We focus on the periodfromJanuary1989, when candidatesfor the new Congressof People's Deputieswere makingelection speeches,throughJune1990, whendecisionsby theCongressof the CommunistParty

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    298that gravely weakened the organsfor leadershipof the nomenklatura,hePolitburoandCentralCommittee,changestheincentives acingtheactors.3.1. Niche 1: Gorbachev an issue-packagingcentrist?The model implies that Gorbachev(and his allies) should package issuesand explicitly identify themselves with the center.By simplifyingmultidi-mensional issue politics, an issue package makes plausible the claims byGorbachev(andhis allies) thatthey occupy the center of a unidimensionalpoliticalspectrumwith conservativesatone end and radicaldemocratsattheother.We should begin by noting that the identificationof issue packaginginGorbachev'srhetoricis complicated by the absence from Russian of anyphrasethatcorrespondsprecisely to "issuepackage."The word for "issue"is "vopros" literally"question")andthe word for "package"s "paket," utnobody would say "paket voprosov."Gorbachevused a varietyof words,such as the noun"kompleks"a complex),the adjective"vzaimosviazannyi"(interconnected),or the adverbs"odnovremenno"simultaneously)and even"sinkhronno"synchronously).We could legitimatelyhave translatedanyof these phrases as "issue package."Instead the literaltranslationsbelowundoubtedlyseem more ambiguousthanthey are, because Russia did notpresentGorbachevwith the linguisticresourcesto communicate he idea ofan issue packagein terms convenientfor translation ntoEnglish.When wereadpassages like his statement,"Thepolicy of perestroika s a system ofinterconnected evolutionarymeasureswhich can be expectedto accomplishtheirgoals only if theyareadoptedas a complex" Pravda,24 Feb. 1989;seealso 8 Jan.,27 Mar.1989; 29 May 1990;MaterialyPlenumaTsentral'nogoKomitetaKPSS,5-7 Feb. 1990:352), we do notsee how to avoidthe inferencethat Gorbachev was presenting perestroikaas an issue package in whichnothingwouldbeaccomplishedunless movementonevery ssueaccompaniedmovementon any issue.In addition to positive statements n favorof issue packaging,Gorbachevcalled attention oproposals ortheseparation f issuesandexplicitlyrejectedthem:

    [S]ometimes in our controversies he thoughtis expressed,one way oranother, hatwe can tearsome problemout of context,as they say,jumpall over it andsettle it. I don'tthinkthat this is proposed rom the worstmotives. At the sametime we know from thepastandnow from ourownexperience:as soon as we fall behind in one place, this immediatelyandseriouslyaffectsmanyother areasof perestroika.So those who still thinkthatsomeproblemscanbe tornout of contextorcan be consideredoutside

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    299theirlinkage with otherproblemsandprocesses, they, first,are makinga mistakethemselves,andsecond,areconfusingothers,too (Pravda,31Mar.1989).

    Similarly,When anyonesays to us, is it really necessaryto takeon so many things?- theiropinionscan be admittedas correctonly with respectto the factthattheburdenof completingmanytaskssimultaneouslys crushing.Butwe consider to be without foundationtheirarguments hat it would bepossible to delay politicalreform and the completionof other tasksandthat one should first solve economic problems,feed the people, and soforth.Maybethese ideas areappealing o anuninformedperson(Pravda,8 Jan.1989).

    Inthis lastquotation,"solve economicproblems" efersto specificpropos-als thatwould be advancedoverthe next year by Nikolai Ryzhkov(headofthe governmentwith its primary unction of managing he economy), while"feed the people"refersto proposalsby Egor Ligachev,whe presidedoverthe Secretariatwhere he borespecial responsibility or agriculture.7While Gorbachev most often justified his calls for coordination acrossissues by assertinga substantiveconnectionamongpolitical and economicreforms,sometimes his criticisms of separatingpolitical change from eco-nomic reformwere voiced in termsthatdrewexplicitattention o the conflictamong social interests over reform.He explainedthat "earlierreforms- in1953, 1965 and 1966 - perished precisely because as soon as they led tothe need for profoundchanges, throughthe political superstructuremecha-nisms of defense of the old system were immediatelyput into motion,andeverythingstopped,fell back into place"(Pravda,25 May 1990). He urgedparticipantsn neformalyorganized"byinterests" o unify within the "chan-nel of perestroika,"warning hem"against hedangerof becomingscattered,of separatingntogroupsof hobbyists,eachin its ownnook,andlosing iden-tity as a powerfulforce on our society." Pravda,16 Nov. 1989;cf. 26 Nov.1989).

    AlthoughGorbachevdid not makeexplicit referenceto packagingissuesin every speech, when he did not, an issue packagewas often implicit inthe macro-structuralrganizationof his speech. Consider,for example,hisspeech to the FirstCongressof People's Deputies,the first national egisla-ture chosen in openlycontested elections since 1917.Thebodyof thespeechconsists of four sections. The firstbegins with the statement hat econom-ic transformationsare the "foundationof perestroika."The second assertsthat these transformations annotproceedunless accompaniedby politicaldemocratization.The third section arguesthat perestroika s the means to

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    300resolution of ethnicproblemsfacing the multi-nationalSoviet society.Andthe fourth section says thatperestroikacould neither fail to affect foreignpolicy nor succeedif theold foreignpolicywerecontinued Pravda,31 May1989).Gorbachev ocated himself in the politicalcenterby balancingcriticismsof democraticextremistswith attacks on conservatives n the nomenklaturafor attempting o delay perestroika for example,Pravda,31 Mar.,27 Apr.,31 May, 10 June, 19 July, 16 Nov., 10 Dec. 1989; 12 Apr., 12, 22 & 25May 1990; Istvestiia,28 May 1990). When Gorbachev'sattackson demo-craticextremistswerenotaccompaniedbycriticismsof thenomenklatura,heattacksnormallyappeared n the context of discussions of ethnicseparatism(Pravda,16 & 24 Feb.,2 June,16Nov. 1989;15Feb.,1June1990;Istvestiia,14 Jan. 1990). Gorbachev'sreadinessto join the conservativeson the issueof ethnic separatism ollows naturally rom the strategywe have identified.Separation rom the Soviet Union wouldhave isolated the ethnicneformalyfrom their allies in the democraticcoalition. Gorbachev'sstrategyof issuepackagingworked to move political outcomestowardthe democraticpole,but the withdrawalof the ethnic neformaly,by diminishingthe democraticcoalition,wouldhave movedpoliticaloutcomesback toward henomenklatu-ra. Not only would be separatists'achievementof theirgoals pull themselvesout of the democraticcoalition,buttheywouldalso deprive he democratsofthe supportof ecological and otherneformaly n the ethnicrepublics.Conse-quently, f Gorbachevwas to follow anissue-packaging trategy uccessfully,ethnic separatismwas as much of threat o him as it was to the nomenklatu-ra advocates.Thus, he welcomed assertionof ethnic interestsbut opposedseparatists."We have taken and will firmlyhold the course towarddemo-cratic developmentof society,"he said. "Butwe cannotfail to distinguishpeaceful demonstrationsand rallies proceedingwithinconstitutional imitsfrom extremistsgatheringsthatprovokeinter-ethnicconflicts and terrorizeandfrightenpeople of otherethnicities.In responseto people andgroupsofthis kind, soft-heartednessand forgivenessare simply fatal and sometimescriminal" Pravda,20 Sept. 1989).3.2. Niche 2: Nomenklatura dvocatesThe model implies that Politburorepresentatives f nomenklaturanterestsshould seek to divide the reformersby three tacticalappeals: orconsideringissues separately,ordelayindemocratization,ndforprohibition f themoreextremistneformaly.A naturalplaceto lookfor the nomenklatura'sdvocatesin the CommunistParty'sPolitburo, n which most of the twelve memberswereunsympathetico Gorbachev's ssuepackage.9

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    301Advocacy of separating ssues (theconservatives' irststrategy) ook sev-eral different forms. As we would have expected,some Politburomembers

    expressedsupportfor particular eformsbutonly on the conditionthat theiradvocatesseparate hose reformsfrom otheraspectsof thereformdemands,or claimed thatspecial circumstances n particularssue areas(such as agri-culture)necessitated the isolation of those issues from the overall reformpackage.Inaddition,somePolitburomembersargued hat ndividualpoliciesproposed n Gorbachev's ssue packagewereinconsistentwith his otherpro-posals,orsimplysingledout various ndividual ssues asrequiringmmediateattention.

    Politburoconservatives nsistedthat the developmentof separatistmove-ments among ethnic minorities,dramatized n some cases by outbreaksofcommunal violence, be resolved before perestroikacould continue. Gor-bachevargued hatethnic conflicts could not be settledexceptby continuinghis package of reforms,on the groundsthat the conflictsoriginated n thesuppressionof ethnicrightsby the overcentralized oviet state(Istvestiia,14Jan.,2 May 1990).Incontrast,PolitburomembersVorotnikow, hcherbitskii,Zaikov,Chebrikov,RyzhkovandLigachev argued hatperestroika ould notproceedwithoutactionto maintain he supremacyof central nstitutions.

    Ligachevsaida "seriousblunder"had been madewhen theleadershiphadbegundemocratizationwithout"discern[ing]he chief danger" emphasis noriginal)and "fatalthreat"posed by "powerful orces of a nationalist,sepa-ratist,anti-socialisttrend"which had been "lyingin wait" to takeadvantageof democratizationMaterialy,5-7 Feb.1990:164).Vorotnikovchairman fthe Russian egislature)said,"Weclearlylack thestrengthor a simultaneousadvancealong all axes. Perhaps t would be worthwhile o thinkagainaboutconcentrating ffortson thepriority,decisive,shockelementsof perestroika..It seems that the ethnicparameters f perestroika hould be viewedpreciselythrough heprismof all theseproblems."10While Gorbachevconcurredwith calls for firmactionagainstethnic sep-aratists who were inciting violence, he criticizedthose who, "speakingofthe need for action without delay,"proposed"to reduce the whole job toextraordinarymeasuresandputtingout fires"withoutrecognizing he need tointegrateaninnovativeethnicpolicy into a largerprogram r democratization(Pravda,2 June 1989;cf. 15 Feb.,28 Apr.1990).

    Besidesethnicity,conservativesalsochosetheissue of "discipline"ortheirargumentshataction onparticularly ressingor criticalproblemsshouldpre-cede furtherdemocratization.Lack of "discipline" eferred o a broadrangeof social pathologies- failure to observecontracts,absenteeism romwork,thefts, bribe-taking,maladministration, rime, summons to civil disobedi-ence, and violence. A contrastdevelopedbetween Gorbachevand conser-

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    302vative members of the Politburoon the sequencingof democratization ndrestorationof discipline. In a series of public speeches, Gorbachevarguedthatmeasuresto restoredisciplinehad alreadybeen tried but hadprovedtobe inadequateby themselves.The only remedyto indisciplinewas a "well-developedsense of citizenship" hatcouldemergeonly in a democracy.Lawsand decrees could maintaindiscipline only if most citizenscompliedvolun-tarily,and in anycase "abigjob of creationof legalnorms"by representativeinstitutions ay ahead before the law could accomplishits task (Pravda, 16Mar. 1989; see 27 Apr., 18 May, 10 June,20 Sept., 10 Dec. 1989; 9 & 29May 1990). "We need today above all to use the opportunitiesnherent ndemocracy,"Gorbachevsaid, "to introduce irmpublicorderbased on con-science [and]to strengthenegalityand statedisciplineonall levels"(Pravda,7 Nov. 1990; cf. 16 Feb. 1989). While Gorbachevarguedthatthe solutionto indiscipline was more democracy,PolitburomembersZaikov,Ryzhkov,Shcherbitskiiand Nikonov all argued hatfurtherdemocratization ependedon measures to restorediscipline.Zaikov(headof the Moscow partycom-mittee) said that"strengthening f conscious discipline"was "thevery firstcondition for thedevelopmentof democracy"Pravda,11Mar.1989;fortheothers,see ibid., 8 June,18 July,14 Dec. 1989;29 Feb.,4 Mar.1989).

    Togetherwith Ryzhkov and Zaikov (Pravda, 16 June, 21 July 1989; 25May 1990), both Chebrikovand his replacementat the KGB and later inthe Politburo,Kriuchkov,disagreedwith Gorbachev'sview that harsher awenforcementcould not succeedunless accompaniedby furtherdemocratiza-tion andlegal reforms. Chebrikovsaid:"Wealreadyhavequite a few goodlaws which reallyreflectthe will of the people ... The essence of the matterlies ... in thepracticeof applying helegislation .." Pravda,11Feb.1989;seealso 28 June,9 July,2 Sept. 1989; 8 Feb. 1990). Gorbachev nterpretedhisdisagreement or the public, claimingthatthe issue of disciplinewas beingraisedto impede democratization."Amongsome people, of course, talk ofdisciplineis nothingbutyearningforthe old days.This exists for sure,com-rades.Whatcan I say: he talks aboutdiscipline,butthinksaboutthe stronghand,a return o the rule that once it hasbeen said,do it anddon'tdiscuss it.This is present,for sure"(Pravda,31 May 1989).Agricultural olicywas anotherarea hatconservatives ought o severfromthe reformpackage.PolitburomembersLigachevandNikonov,who sharedresponsibility oragriculture, rgued hatspecialcircumstances emanded heisolationof agricultural olicy fromGorbachev'soverallpackageof reformsdesignedto increase individualautonomyrelativeto institutionsdirectedbynomenklatura ppointees.BothNikonovandLigachevargued hatimprove-mentsin the food supplywere preconditionso further eforms.As Nikonovsaid, the food problemdeserved attention"atthe frontof the line" and "can

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    303least be deferred"Pravda,26 Feb.1989).Ligachevcalled thefood issue "theveryfirstpriority" Materialy,5-7 Feb. 1990:163;cf. Pravda,21 July1989).Ligachevcriticizedproposals o improve oodsuppliesby "abolishinghecol-lective andstatefarms,distributingand to thepeasants,anddenationalizingthe land"as a firststepto the "denationalization f allmeans of production."He rejectedtheseproposalsas inappropriateo conditionsprevalentn Sovietfarming:"theoverwhelmingmajorityof peasantsdo not wantto takethe landand leave the collective and statefarms"(Pravda,7 July 1989; cf. 18 June1990). Accordingly,he andNikonov gave a series of speeches during1989in which they advocated an increaseof investment n agricultureand foodprocessingand othermeasuresto strengthenhe existingfarmorganizations,controlledby nomenklatura ppointees, nsteadof Gorbachev'sproposalstomake farmersand food processorsmore autonomous Pravda,7 &9 Feb., 2,7 & 16 Apr.,17 May, 16, 17 & 30 June1989).

    Ecologywasyetanotherareawhereconservativememebersof the Politburoindicated a willingness to push for reform,but only if ecological issueswere separated rom broaderreformquestions.PolitburomembersZaikov,Chebrikov,Nikonov,Ligachev and Vorotnikovall portrayed hemselves aswelcomingpublic pressures or action on the ecological issue.11In a speechin the formerrepublicof Moldavia,Chebrikov the former KGB chief now

    assignedto legalreformand awenforcement) ncouragedocalpublicoutcryaboutecological damagecausedby the centralization f decision-making nMoscow, far from informationaboutthe consequencesof environmentallyharmfulpolicies. But, at the same time, Chebrikovcalled on the ecologicalmovement o divorce ts demands rom theissueof ethnicrights, nsistingthatall decisions must remainsubjectto "obligatory oordinationwith all-unioninterestsaccordingto the principlesof socialist internationalism.. (Pravda,11 Feb. 1989).Politburo membersRyzhkov and Vorotnikov ried to limit the scope ofdemocratizationby claiming thatGorbachevmust choose between his pro-posals for economic reforms and for democratization.They endorsedin theabstractbothdemocratization ndGorbachev'sproposalfor "socialreorien-tation of theeconomy,"whichreferredo a shiftof resources romproductionof investmentgoods to consumergoods, food and housing. But, Ryzhkovsaid, "Theeconomy is incapableof operatingand developingfavorably nconditionsof a democracyof publicrallies [mitingovoidemokratii]."l2Oppositionto extremism characterized tatementsby Ligachev,Zaikov,Vorotnikov,Chebrikov,Ryzhkov, and Shcherbitskii,who all warned thatextremists were taking advantageof the democratic iberties introducedatGorbachev's nitiative to pursueanti-socialistgoals. Ligachevsaid, "Underthe cover of democracyand'glasnost,'extremist,anti-socialistandnationalist

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    304elements have become more active.They advanceslogansagainstthe Party..." (Pravda, 17 June 1989). He and otherconservativescalled for defenseof the CommunistPartyagainstattacksby "dark orces"and"demagogues"who were tryingto mobilize theneformalyagainstPartyrule.Ryzhkovsaid,"Allkinds of scum has risen to the surfaceon the waveof healthyprocessesin the society.It does harm,and we do not reactto it in anyway.Democraticleagues, rallies of a dubious orientation to much of this we just silentlyconsent"(Pravda,21 July 1989; see also 21 Jan., 11 Feb., 2, 3 & 12 Mar.,17, 28 & 30 June,2 July,9 Aug., 14 Dec. 1989; 8 Feb.,25 & 30 May 1990;Materialy,5-7 Feb. 1990: 119, 165; ibid., 11, 14 & 16 Mar. 1990: 91-95,130).Fromtheconservatives'viewpoint,aparticularmeritof all threetacticswasconsistencywith their claim thatthey fully supportedGorbachev'sprogramof perestroikaand were disagreeing with him only over minor points ofimplementation. n thisway theyconfusedthe issuebetween themselvesandGorbachev,both in theeyes of manySoviet citizens (Cherniaev,1993:319-322) and for some foreign analysis(Surovell,1991).By underminingpublicsupport orGorbachev,who bore theblame for actionswhichmayhavebeeninstigatedby conservatives uch as theApril1989Tbilisimassacre Sobchak,1991: 80-104), publicconfusionlimited his abilityto distancehimself fromnomenklatura upport.3.3. Niche 3: Neformaly,cooperatives,andstrikersNeformaly,cooperativesandstrikerscanexert morepressureon the nomen-klaturaif they can cooperate,and therefore our model implies that theirstrategyshould be to build local and nationalcoalitions of groups pursu-ing differentparticularnterests.In some locales this strategysucceeded,inothersit failed, butconflicts of interestamongdiversegroups prevented heemergenceof anyencompassingall-unioncoalition.Most "reform"groups (neformalyand cooperatives)organizedarounda"single issue" aboutwhich they had intense concerns.Neformalypursuedecological restoration,tolerance of culturalpractices or religious obser-vance, ethnic rights, rehabilitationof victims of political repression,femi-nism, rightsof militaryofficers,andotherparticularistic oals. Cooperativessoughtincreased ncomes for theirmembers.Strikers oughtwage increases,occupationalsafetymeasures, mprovementsn the supplyof foodstuffsandconsumergoods, andcontrolof the workplace.These pressures or changeon particularisticssues raised a varietyof more general political question,includingthe expansionof rightsof participationn politics with the asso-ciated freedoms of expressionand association,the developmentof marketinstitutionsto replace the commandeconomy, regulationof the marketto

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    305safeguardthe environmentand to maintain social welfare, and devolutionof power from the central governmentto the ethnic republics, especiallyRussia.

    Although some of the neformalyagreed on the need for change to beachievedfrombelow,theirabilityto coalesce in favorof democraticreformswas hamperedby the conflictsof interestsnaturalwithin a movementcom-posed of single-issue groups.These conflicts are evident both from surveyresearch and from direct observationof the neformaly.Finifter and Mick-iewicz (1992) conclude fromtheiropinionsurvey hatproponentsof politicaldemocracywere actuallymorelikely to opposethanto welcome a reductionof thestate's rolein theeconomy,whileproponents f economicreformswerenot necessarilyproponentsof the rightto strike or protest(Sobchak,1991:860-861). These contradictions n mass public opinionfound reflectioninconflicts among organizedneformaly.Some ecological neformalyopposedcooperatives'demands or anunregulatedmarket hatwouldpermitbusiness-es to do furtherdamageto the environment.Strikingcoal minersattackednotonly theofficialministriesbut also the formationof cooperatives n food ser-vice andretailing(Mandel,1991). Russian nationalistneformalydemandedpreservationof the Union, while Russian democraticclubs often welcomedthe separatistaspirationsof neformaly n theethnicrepublics.In the late 1980s, local neformalybeganto combineintocoalitions,oftencalled"clubs"or"fronts,"ombiningvarioussingle-issuegroupsand ntendedto presenta broad-gaugeoppositionto thebureaucracy. ome groupsdevel-opedfull-fledgedpolitical platforms panningvirtually he entirespectrumofideological principles(monarchism,anarchism,christiandemocracy,socialdemocracy,nationalism, ascism),but the membersof thesepolitical groupswere the most likely to suffer arrestfor their activities. The single-issueneformalywere much more likely to encounterofficial tolerance.Despitetendenciestowardpoliticizationandcoalition,theneformalyremainedorga-nized only at a local level, failing in an August 1988 attempt o organizeanumbrellaorganization panning he Unionor even the RussianRepublic.The experienceof Moscow politicalclubs gives a sense of the difficultiesexperienced n organizingcoalitionsamongtheneformaly. nthe fall of 1986a groupcalled the Club for Social Initiatives,KSI, formedwith the supportof thenewspaperKomsomol'skaiaPravda.During1987KSIencourageddis-cussions among otherneformalyleading to the creation of a FederationofSocialist PublicClubs. But those groups readyto takean open standagainstsocialism as practiced n the SovietUnion,togetherwith S. Skvortsov'sFundfor Social Initiatives,splitoff fromtheFederation.Then two Marxistswithinthe Federation ook their followers out to form agroupcalled "SocialistIni-tiative."By thesummer1988forty-sixof thesegroups hen coalescedagain n

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    306the Moscow PopularFront,which then built anelectoralalliancewith a sec-ond coalitioncalled the Moscow Association of Voters.These inturnbecamethe basis for a RussianPopularFront,formed n the fall of 1989 butencom-passingonly aboutfifty groups(BerezovskiiandKrotov,1990: 88), and fora competingInterregionalAssociationof DemocraticOrganizationsSemi-na, 1990: 164-165; Ivanitskii,1990:287). WhiletheMoscow PopularFrontscored dramaticvictories in the March1990 elections, the forty-six groupsparticipatingn it encompassedonly a tiny fractionof the city's neformaly;forexample, representatives f six hundredneformalyattendeda conferenceon ecology sponsoredby the city's communistpartycommittee(Pravda,21June1989).Popular rontsoutside theRussianRepublic, ikethe well-knownSajudis in Lithuaniaand Rukh in Ukraine,were more stableand managedto combine more single-issue concernsunder one roof (particularlyinkingethnicindependencewithecology), butby virtueof their ambitions or inde-pendencefrom the USSR, theirformationwas antitheticalo a Union-wideorganization.While the political clubs schismed and fused, privatecooperativesout-side the statesector foundthemselvesdefendingtheirveryexistenceagainstpressurefrom the governmentand Partybureaucracy.They needed to lob-by (normallyin the form of paying bribes)for permissionto operate.As anationalspokesman or the cooperativemovement old an interviewer, spe-cially during 1990 "cooperativesexperiencedmercilesspersecution .. theywere annihilated n batches,prohibited,robbed...."Under these pressures,the cooperativeswere ableto form a national obbycalledthe USSR Leagueof AssociatedCooperatives Kruglianskaian Istrestiia,7 Aug. 1991;Illesh'andRudner n ibid.,5 Mar.1990;Matukovskii nibid., 12 June1990)buttheirassociationdid not reachbeyondthe cooperatives o otherkinds of interestgroups. 3The failureto forma nationwidecoalition of neformaly,cooperativesandstrikersmay also have been an adaptive responseto the dangerof policerepressionof whichthepopularmovementremained onscious. Laba(1991),following Piven and Cloward(1979), arguesthat mass movementsfacingpolice repressionare better advised to avoid consolidationinto a bureau-cratized organization,because dispersionof authoritymakes their leadersharder orpolice to identifyandtheirgroupseasier to reconstitute fterpoliceactions.3.4. Niche 4: Yeltsin nd other democratsOur modelproposesthat one way to deal withincompatible eformdemandsis to emphasizethe goal of majorityrule rather hanspecify issue positions,especiallysince issues were divisiveamongtheparticipantsn neformalyand

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    307cooperativeswho were most eagerforchange.Yeltsin'sgoal is to emergeasa focal point for coordination actingas a leader in the sense suggestedbyCalvert(1992) of publicpressureon the nomenklatura;e attempts o directattention o commoninterestsby downplayingdivisiveparticulars.Some reformersavoidedparticularssues in favor of a generalizedsupportfor democratizationhat ooktheformof a focus onprocedure.Theproceduralfocus and its relationship o issue conflictsdividingthe massmovementwasevident to Soviet observers.V.Ginzburg,a seniorAcademicianandPeople'sDeputy who was a Gorbachevadherent,wrote: "I am impressedthat thearousedactivityof the masses, or in any case of a noticeableportionof thepopulationandof thedeputiesof variousranks, s takingthe form of endlessdebateson questionsof procedure .."(Istvestiia,17 May 1990).14Anotherobservercommented,"The liberals,includingthose of 'neformaly'origin,stand n these disputesin defense of the absolutewill of themajority .."as ameans of reconciling"conflicting nterests" Mareeva,1990:78).Yeltsin'sspeeches displaythispreference orproceduraleformover standson issues. Evidence about his rhetoric before the August coup is sparse,since as Yeltsin himself commentedafter his election as chairmanof theRussian Republic legislature, the official media had subjectedhim to an"informationblockade."15Yeltsinaddressedmanyof his speeches to streetrallies,and officialnewspapersdid not recordtheir texts.Nonetheless,whatis strikingabout his availablespeeches is his focus on procedureand hisavoidance of the contentious issues that were dividing the opposition tothe nomenklatura.Soviet commentatorsoccasionallyremarkedon Yeltsin'sreticence aboutissues. The writerDaniil Granincommented,"Some readerswill not be satisfied by Yeltsin's too scanty,ratherundevelopedremarks... about where we are going ... I thinkthis self-restraint s understandable(LiteraturnaiaGazeta, 5 Sept. 1990; see also Tretiakov n Moscow News,1989;No. 16).In each availabletext, Yeltsin calls for variousproceduralchanges thatwould makepossible majorityrule. In a speech in Permin December1988he affirmed he "needto make the new electoralsystemas directaspossible"andurged"nationwidereferendums" s "thegenuineexpressionof the willof the entire people" (Trehubin Report on the USSR, 13 Jan. 1989: 6-8; see also Report, 24 Feb. 1989: 64). In his electoralplatformof March1989, Yeltsin wrote, "It is necessaryto struggleagainstthe existing elitistbureaucratictratumvia the transferof powerto electedbodies ..."(quoted nLane, 1990). Addressingthe firstCongressof People'sDeputiesin May,hecalled for introductionby a "constitutional ath"of aprocedure orchoosingthe "leaderof the stateamongalternative andidaciesby general, equalanddirectelections"andfor "areal transfer fpower romtheparty o the Soviets"

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    308(PervyiS"ezdNarodnykhDeputatovSSSR,StenograficheskiiOtchet,Vol. II,Moscov: IzdanieVerkhovnogoSovetaSSSR, 1989:43-49).Afterwinningelection to theCongress,hebegancampaigningoradoptionof the multi-party system. In a radio interview he called for nationwidediscussionsleadingto itsenactment Report,17 Mar.1989:32). In DecemberYeltsin repeatedhis appeal from the floor of the Congress after publiclyissuing a summons for a generalstrikein favor of multipleparties(Report,15,22 & 29 Dec. 1989:34-35). Interviewedhe nextmonth,Yeltsinsaid,"Wemust recognize in the constitutionthe opportunityor any political, social-polical, social organization o participateon equal termsin the life of thecountryand to strugglefor its authorityon the basis of its ownplatform."nthe same interviewhe explainedthat "moredemocratic,radicaldecisions"were thepurposeof his campaignfor a seat in the Russianparliament.16Their priorityconcern for majorityrule was the reason thatYeltsin andhis allies earned the title "democrats." y a rhetoric hatcoupledattacksonthe nomenklaturawith demandsfor thoroughdemocratizationwhile avoid-ing controversial ssues, Yeltsinfocusedordinary itizens' attentionon theirsharedexperience,nottheirconflicting nterests."People dentifywithYeltsin.He is a victim of dislike on the partof higher-ups who of us hasn'tbeenin the same position?And he is being slightedfor refusingto look for theirapproval who hasn't dreamedof doingthis? And themainthing- he speakswith everyone,those below andthose above, in a similarway andon equalterms, smashingthe hierarchicalbarrierswhich everyone,especially thosebelow, is fed up with"(Tretiakovn MoscowNews, 1989: No. 16).

    4. DiscussionIf the availabilityof rationalpolitical strategiesto actorsdependedon thepresence of established institutionsthatstructurepoliticalchoices, rationaltheories should not be capableof classifyingthe actors' observedbehaviorswhen institutionalproceduresare in flux. In Soviet politics between 1985and 1991, grass-rootsreformers ried the well-knownstrategyof formingacoalitionof intenseminorities,buttheyfailedbecausetheyweremostlyorga-nized in single-issue pressuregroups(the neformaly),theirissue concernswerediverse andconflicting,and on any givenissue thesegroups'bargainingpositionwas weakerthanthatof thenomenklatura. orreform-mindedmem-bers of the elite, two alternative trategieswere available.First,they coulddownplay specific issues in favorof advocatingdemocratization f decisionprocedures; econd,theycouldtrytoput togetheranissuepackageof reformswithsomething n it foreveryoneandemphasize he need for this issuepack-ageto be treatedas aunifiedwhole. We haveprovidedsome evidencethat he

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    309Yeltsinchose the firststrategyandGorbachev hesecond.Politburoopponentsof reformrespondedby advocatingconsiderationof issues one at a time, astrategyknown to be suitable for blockingor delayingreformsby dividingthe reformcoalition.In thepresenceof opposition,none of these actorstriedthesupra-majoritariantrategy hatwidelydistributed etoes overchange.

    Acceptanceof our model dependson observingthatGorbachev acked amajorityn thePolitburo. fhisprogramhadcommandedastablemajority,heinstitutionalrules in force within the nomenklaturawould have enabledhismajority o introducedemocratic nstitutionsbydecree.Hewouldhave lackedanyreason to adopta complicatedstrategyof issue packagingor to occupyacentristpositionbetween conservativemembersof the nomenklatura ndthemore extremereformgroups.Thus we shouldhave foundthatanti-packaging(and anti-democratic) trategies figuredin the public statementsof at leastsix of the twelve 1989 Politburo members.In fact, the evidence providedin the previoussection shows that seven of the Politburo's welve membersadvocated issue separation(Ligachev,Chebrikov,Shcherbitskii,Ryzhkov,Vorotnikov,Zaikov,Nikonov).We believe we can rejectan alternative xplanation orthispattern,name-ly that issue separationwas a result of division of responsibilitiesamongPolitburomembers,with eachadvocating hepriorityof his own responsibil-ities andonly the GeneralSecretaryresponsible o providea comprehensiveprogram.The 1989 Politburo ncludeda GeneralSecretary, ight issue spe-cialists and threepersonswith territorial esponsibilities.17We have quotedsome commentsby issue specialistsadvocating op priority or theirareas ofresponsibility.Butamongtheconservatives,we alsofindtheagricultural pe-cialistLigachevsayingthatethnicconflictdeserved op priority,heeconomicspecialistRyzhkovemphasizing aw andorder,andthe lawandorderspecial-ist Chebrikov allingforpriorityattentionoecologicalissues.Meanwhile,allthreeconservativeswith territorialesponsibilitiesalso call forseparating er-tain ssues,eventhough heyarenot issuespecialists.CounteringGorbachev'scalls forpursuingallreformsconcurrently,ach conservative issuespecialistor not) demandsthatotherreformsproposedby Gorbachevbe deferreduntilafterresolution of the issue in question.Finally,all four Politburomemberswhom we identifyas Gorbachevsupporterswere issue specialists,but theirspeeches (which we have not presented)advocate Gorbachev'spackageofreforms.The decision whetherto advocateissue separationor packagingisan indication of a Politburomember'spoliticalidentityas a conservativeorreformer,not a consequenceof issue specialization.Studiesof perestroika ftenview Yeltsinandthenomenklatura sanchoringthe left andrightsides of a single dimension,with Gorbachevmoving overtime from right to left (althoughwith some reversals)as Yeltsin's support

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    310grewand the conservatives' ollowingdiminished.While we share his view,it is only compatiblewith Finifter and Mickiewicz'sevidenceof a complexmulti-dimensional ocial realityif we can specify how multipledimensionsbecame reduced o one. While the FinifterandMickiewiczevidencehas beenchallenged,disagreementsabouthow specificissuesrelate o largerconcernsarepreciselywhatpolitics,in the formof issuepackagingand ssueseparation,is about.A crucial elementin theexplanationof thepoliticsof perestroikasleadership hetoric hatofferedapairof alternative inarychoices: to separateor to package issues, and to packageissues or to decide themby majorityrule. If the conservatives'rejectionof the issue packagewouldhave forcedthem to acceptthe choice betweenit andmajorityrule,while the reformers'rejectionof the issue packagewould have forcedthem to acceptthe choicebetweenit and issue separation,Gorbachev ouldoccupythecentristpositionoften ascribedto him.

    Both Gorbachev's ssue packagingand Yeltsin'sdemands ormajorityrulehelpedto counteract hetendencyfor themovementof grass-rootsreformersto fragments.In this manner he interactionbetweentheirstrategieshelpedto sustaintheoppositionbetweenapopularmovement or reformand officialconservatismthat stabilizedthe Soviet polity while its institutionswere influx. At the same time, however,their strategiesalso combinedto impedecompletionof the transitionomajority ule.HadGorbachev toppedresistingYeltsin's demandsfor majorityrule, he would have eliminatedthe pair ofbinaryalternativesn favorof a single choice betweenmajorityrule andtheissue-by-issue decisions offered by the nomenklatura.While we have notprovided he evidencefor a furtherargumenthatraisesquestionsbeyondthescope of this paper,we would suggest thatissue packaging nitiallyworkedfor Gorbachevbecause the Partybureaucratsuffereda generalinabilityorunwillingnessto communicatewith the single-issuegroups.This reluctancelimited theirabilityto circumventGorbachevby makingtheirown deal withthepressuregroups,as didthesingle-issuepressuregroups'skepticismaboutthe sincerityof bureaucrats' ffersof side deals.The ability to build a broad coalitionfor reformcapableof withstandingattemptsto split it into its component (issue-specific) partswas critical tothe process of democratizationn the Soviet Union. Studiesof transitions odemocracy n manycountrieshaverelied on the sametripartite lassificationof elite actorsas hard-liners, iberalizers,or democratizers,andwe suspectthat the coalition-building actics we haveidentifiedmayhaveplayeda rolein these cases too.

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    311Notes

    1. Such a strategymay still succeed if enough actorsprovidea certainbenefitof the doubtto thepositionadvocatedby the centrist eaderand refuse to considerproposals o deviatefrom that leader's policies unless the expected gain is substantial Feld and Grofman,1991).2. The implicationsof Figure 1 below can readilybe generalizedto more than two issuedimensions,to include, for example,the marketreformssoughtby the cooperatives.Forsimplicity,and withoutreal loss of generality,we will developourexpositionin only twodimensions.3. While we havesimplifiedtherepresentation ypretendinghat all neformalyweresingle-issue pressuregroups with ideal points located along one of the axes, modifying thisoversimplificationdoes not affect the basic structure f the model as long as some nefor-

    maly are indifferentto policy change along other issue dimensions,or would normallyfocus all theirenergyonly for changeon thepolicy dimension aboutwhichtheyaremostconcerned.4. See discussion in the next sectionof their failureto build nationwidecoalitions.5. If theneformalymost concernedwith aparticularssue wouldacceptselective concessionson that issue in return or withdrawing rom the democraticcoalition, the nomenklaturawould gain. The willingness of membersof these neformaly ojoin mass protestactionswould diminish,weakeningthe abilityof the democraticcoalition to mobilize protesters.Diminution n the scale of protestwould forceGorbachev'sssuepackagedownand to therightalongotherdimensions.Hopingtobreakupthegeneraldemocratic oalition,variousconservatives ried the tactic of proposingselective concessionsto particularingle-issuegroups (especially on the issue of ecology), but their success was limited. See below.6. Acceptanceof Q, in return or defectingfromthe alliance with neformaly ocatedalongother dimensions(see Figure1), requires hat theecology-mindedgroupsand other nefor-maly not distrustassurancesby the nomenklatura hat thepolicies symbolizedby Q willin fact be forthcoming.If the neformalysee Gorbachevas more crediblethan the leadersof the nomenklatura, hey may preferhis package even if it offers less. In the Sovi-et case Gorbachev's ssue package would have been safe againstselective concessionsif proposalsby the nomenklaturaaced a negativebenefit of the doubt,in the form ofwidespreaddistrust of its representatives.To protectGorbachev's ssue packageagainstoffers like Q, a bias againstthe nomenklatura eednotbe universalamongthepopulation.

    The Feld and Grofman(1991) findings requireonly that a sufficientminorityof votersrejectthe blandishmentsof challengers,with the adequacyof the minoritydependentonthe ideological distance between the incumbent and the center of the policy space. IfGorbachevoccupiedsucha centralposition,a small numberof neformalymemberswithanti-nomenklatura ias would have been sufficientto protecthim against challenges atpointslike Q.7. For an instanceof Ligachev's proposalwithin one month of Gorbachev's tatement,seePravda,7 Feb. 1989;for anotherGorbachevrebuttal,16 Mar.1989.8. We certainlydo not wish to claim that Gorbachev'sadvocacyof an issue packageneverallowed him toemphasizedifferentpartsof thepackageat different imes. As heexplained,"In the processof transformationsheremay be stages,priorities,one or anotherrateofchange- in otherwords,full synchronizations out of thequestion."Butat the sametime,he made it clear that"(p)erestroika hould move consistently along all axes. We cannotallow a big gap in the execution of the plannedmeasures" Pravda, 16 Nov. 1989; cf.Materialy,5-7 Feb. 1990: 352.9. During 1989 and until its transformationn July 1990, the Politburocomprisedtwelvevotingmembers includingGorbachev).Gorbachev ackedcontrolof the Politburodespitehavingbeen able to securethe retirementof the most conservativemembersof the 1985Politburo.In September1989, the CentralCommittee'sacceptanceof the resignationsof

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    312three of the remainingconservatives Chebrikov,Nikonov andShcherbitskii) eeminglytitled the Politburo balance in Gorbachev'sfavor. But one of their replacementsalsorevealedhimself as a conservative Kriuchkov,heKGBchief) and the othertwo (IvashkoandMasliukov),while clearlyless conservative hatthe figures heyreplaced,were at bestuncertain adherentsof democratization.See Pravda,3 May, 30 June 1990; cd. Sakwa,1990: 16-20.10. Materialy, 19-20 Sept. 1989: 86-87, emphasisadded;for additionalsimilar statementsby Vorotnikovand otherconservatives,see Pravda, 11 Feb., 1 4 & 11 Mar.,16 June,21July,2 Sept. 1989;25 May 1990.11. For statementsbythe lastthree,seePravda,26 Feb.,2 July1989;30 June1990;SovetskaiaRossiia, 23 May 1990.12. Pravda, 25 May 1990; see also ibid., 14 Dec. 1989, Materialy,5-7 Feb. 1990: 120; forVorotnikov,Materialy,19-20 Sept. 1989: 86; for an attackon this position by PolitburomemberSliun'kov,see Materialy,5-7 Feb. 1990:218.13. We have drawn this discussion of grass-movements rom Hosking, Aves and Duncan(1992); Maliutin(1988); Sakwa(1990): 203-218; White(1990):39-40; Brovkin(1991);Lane(1990): 100.14. Ginzburg'scomment echoed a statementby Gorbachev hreeweeks earlier(Pravda,28Apr. 1990).15. Ogonek, 16-23 Mar. 1991. See also SovetskaiaMolodezh' (Riga), translated n FBIS-SOV-90-021,31 Jan. 1990;for instancesof censorship,see Reporton the USSR,31 Mar.1989: 32, and comparethe TASS reportof 31 July 1989 with Izvestiia'ssummaryon 1Augustof Yeltsin'sstatement o the SupremeSoviet.16. LiteraturnaiaGazeta,24 Jan. 1990. See also XIXVsesoiuznaiakonferentsiiaKommunis-ticheskoiPartiiSovetskogoSoiuza:StenograficheskiiOtchet,Vol.2 (Moskow:Politizdat),57; Pravda, 17 Dec. 1989; 6 Feb., 8 July 1990;SovietskaiaRossiia, 25 & 30 May 1990;Ogonek, 16-23 Mar.1990; andvideotapeof Yeltsin's address o the rallyin frontof theMoskvahotel, 4 Feb. 1990.17. As conservativeswe identifythe two agricultural pecialists (LigachevandNikonov),oneissue specialistwith responsibility or the economy(Ryzhkov),one issue specialistwithresponsibilityfor law and order(Chebrikov),and three with territorial esponsibilities(Zaikov,Scherbitskii,andVorotnikov);hose we identifyas Gorbachevsupporterswereall issue specialists, n foreignpolicy (YakovlevandShevardnadze),deology(Medvedev),or the economy (Sliun'kov).

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