DEFINE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PURPOSES OF ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT.

The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. 

WHAT IS THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of the unnecessary expense an effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.

Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief than an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy attaches.

IS CLARIFICATORY HEARING MANDATORY DURING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. However, rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. This provision states:

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.

WHEN IS DUPLICITY OF CHARGES A GROUND TO QUASH CRIMINAL INFORMATION?

Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as the Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.

IS THE PROSPECTIVE EXTRADITEE ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND HEARING BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST?

The need for a hearing to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against an extraditee is addressed to the sound discretion of the extraditing judge.

The majority opinion holds that the private respondent extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It relies on section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which provides:

Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for hearing thereof.

Under the Extradition Treaty Law, the application of the Secretary of Justice for a warrant of arrest need not be set for hearing, and Juan cannot be allowed to post bail if the Court would issue a warrant of arrest. The provisions of the ROC on arrest and bail are not basically applicable. (US v. Puruganan)

MAY BAIL BE GRANTED TO A POSSIBLE EXTRADITEE?

There is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. The constitutional provision on bail as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

After a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances   including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

DISTINGUISH CUSTODY OF THE LAW FROM CUSTODY OF THE COURT OVER THE PERSON IN CRIMINAL CASES.

Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefore constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.   One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

MAY BAIL BE GRANTED BEFORE THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED?

A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty.  A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. 

IN WHAT INSTANCES MAY AN ARRAIGNMENT BE SUSPENDED?

Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

DOES THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OVER DECISIONS AND ORDERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN CRIMINAL CASES?

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.

WHAT REMEDY SHOULD AN AGGRIEVED PARTY AVAIL OF TO ASSAIL THE OMBUDSMAN’S FINDINGS IN THE EXISTENCE OR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN CRIMINAL OR NON-ADMINISTRATIVE CASES?

Parties seeking to question the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, may file an original action for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not with the CA, when it is believed that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.

WHAT COURT AND WHAT ACTION IS AVAILABLE TO A PERSON WHO WAS ORDERED DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE BY THE OMBUDSMAN? CAN SUCH PERSON AVAIL OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OR TRO TO ENJOIN THE EXECUTION OF AN ADVERSE RESOLUTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES?

Appeal to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within 15 days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for reconsideration.

No. The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. Issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is an encroachment on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, and R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure.

WHO HAS THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION?

The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. It secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question

WHEN MAY THE RIGHT BE INVOKED?

Custodial investigation.

The right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is only when a particular question is addressed to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.

IS THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION THE SAME AS THE RIGHT NOT TO BE COMPELLED TO BE A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF?

The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself" signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself.

IS ARRAIGNMENT BARRED BY DOUBLE JEOPARDY?

No. No valid prosecution for slight physical injuries.

IS THE FAILURE TO ALLEGE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION FATAL OMISSION IN THE COMPLAINT OF RAPE?

No. Failure to allege the element of force and intimidation in the complaint of rape is not a fatal omission. It merely a defect that can be cured by unobjected competent evidence proving that the rape was indeed committed through such means and the failure of the accused to object to the sufficiency of the Information.

WHAT IS THE TEST TO DETERMINE THE VIABILITY OF A MOTION TO QUASH ON THE GROUND THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE?

The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash is the sufficiency of the averments in the information that is, whether the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law.

DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DISCHARGE OF AN ACCUSED AS STATE WITNESS UNDER SEC. 17 OF RULE 119, FROM DISCHARGE OF AN ACCUSED TO BECOME A STATE WITNESS UNDER THE WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM.

Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. (9a)

Sec.  10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:

(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed:

    (d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;    (e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and    (f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

IN WHAT INSTANCE MAY AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR BE DISQUALIFIED AS SUCH?Incompetent, Refuses the trust, or fails to give bond (Sec. 6, Rule 78)

WHAT DETERMINES THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OVER PROBATE PROCEEDINGS?Jurisdiction over provisional remedies MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs. [B.P. 129, Sec. 33]

IN WHAT INSTANCE A CLAIM BARRED BY STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS BE NEVERTHELESS ALLOWED AS A VALID CLAIM?

No. The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from the application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability are imperious need. (CIR vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105). Upon taxation depends the Government ability to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of government officials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or detriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons may be made to suffer individually on account of his own negligence, the presumption being that they take good care of their personal affairs. This should not hold true to government officials with respect to matters not of their own personal concern. This is the philosophy behind the government's exception, as a general rule, from the operation of the principle of estoppel.

INTERNET LIBELIn Bonifacio v RTC (2010), the issue revolved around the venue of internet libel cases. The SC held that the venue is NOT where the online article/website was accessed. To consider the place of access as “printed and first published” would let people choose an inconvenient venue for the accused. (Here, the information stated “first published and accessed”)