Somalia -- and pwticu1arLy tbOoe imolvad in the Tank Force R a n g e r raid. of Sept~&er-Oct~b.~, 1993 - pla:ccu them ~ o l d i e r ~ , urn-, Sail~zcl and b4arinea in history with QU hi ! heat a3litary traditions. morawrs, the willingaeer of alliad orces to ,mod in aasuming a role with the W.S. troop. is e ~ n d . b l e . mzel~~at h thi. rmgad ware Malay8am and P a k i o t d forsea bmlved j , ~ t h e raaape e f f o r t of U . S . forces following the tragic

. ,

octobez 3-4, 1993 oprrmtioa*

m zaeeuund i m d i a t a release to th. pufjlic 'o f this repert.

Carl L W ~

05-23-55 0G: 1 3 FM FROM SEN. GAEL L E Y I N , DS

8eotiaa N. Decirion to s t t e v t to' apprsbtmd Alda.8

Section ZZL P-1 comment

rucomod -- not ei-ly In pewakeeplag or mf-t -- but

ode-d the m a r axad heentian of Aided and offated a $25,000 zeward .for i nfermrsfan laadbg to hi8 s r r ~ t . . BU1Thar. Hawe rsquoated U.S. f ~ ~ c m a te aaptuxa him. TN clintm -atration al1or.d 0 . 8 . t-m to d a r k on chis mireiao w&i& a l u x l y p t :ha US. an one ride i a a c i v i l war.

Although Gunad W e 1 1 and the cammdu of C e s t ' ~ 1 1 c o d , CWaz1 Hslr, etrongly op@ .rd .chriHd againot a.nding U . 8 . Spacial Operatiom Fo~ca8 t o SwUli. t o a t t ~ c to apt- Rldued, they m w t w l y cu@isd w i t l a - m c l ~ i l i u r aontrola and reluatdly implunmntd a dsp1aylc~mat of addFtfW U.8. forcer for t h i n On AuWt 14. 1993 : -01ut.l 440 u.8. magen a d -1 O p . n c 1 0 ~ 1 pegaonml &pl-d to Smmlia with thm miamicm to c l p t m Aideed & hi8 @mipil Liaut-t8.

aquipaat would bvo had an the tragic October '3-4 r a i d . While it i e tnre that, WJ ~antgaarsry* e nquaar for hatry armor' was not specifically ta @#tad for the R.nger ~ ~ t i ~ i ' i t La char r that tha srrmDr coul have b r a usad clecisivuly in ttae rsaou. operation o f Oatokr 3-4, and, if availabla, might have b a a integrated into the -gar growad alemanta that'imm an emmential part of tm formu coaducting the Octokr 3 raid.

the miamion the' huagry, we m nation b ~ i l u . ~

in my judg-t , a cambination ~eacemking, peacekmap* axad nation-building uureiee." . .

Aided h d h e n trained by thr Pzunch m J l i t u y t at aru ti- he had hmld the +& of G W U B ~ Ln the 8001111 a i L t . ~ / . 88mt0r Levin 1 m t Uua, ta3.k.d at gteae l a w w i t h .Urn a AOdia Ababa dut%ng ou+ t r t p to the -ion. 80 Lm ao rtrm0.r to militrry ractica; ha i r , and was, no fool. :. , : .

who wae Flirirsg A daily a r a e a m t of the incmmiag rimk of there miso%onr due to the repetition o f tactics? Who wsr aseoeuiag such bcrc)uea riek aga-t the .nd.vaLuo af a c . S W e

?or uuaple, c a r u i a . U.S. miUtar/ wa i t8 $ t t i c i p a t w In the raid of .Octobex 3-4, 1993, dik. o t h U U.S. &tar ham a8 part of thir mmd, the fallovfngr

Althougb U . 8 . dlit- *.rr 69- th.ir boat with flawed, &mag* polhiem, and a 1-1 of t.ar by cfoflirn authority tb.t toll abort* the=@ miru tb. tian of -fh@~ r the an-scam c-r abould have re*% the b-8- riek to their troop@, of a likely f ulrd rPi.oioa, dua to tb. mpeitian of the -dm. Th. elou~eat of '8- "war r ~ l y diminislaad, the rdtnmuiu had to ham bun an a 1.- m, wtd yet our 0olmund.n p ~ a m d an. . .

Both m i l i t u y urd, oivilion ofSic iar isa tha c h b of c o d , am -11 aa W w in aa acMdroy roL.',. 8-d carefully and cuatimulLy sra-evaluatiag th. T u k Fo-'. Id88im and tactica after aach raid, with an ey. ta*atd m- t h a t the -rat- be te-ted if thm r i o b wmm d..md to grown too high. T U B war not done with tb. Qlpfb and GM

The policies which dxuvm the miutsry oparatioz=, formulated in the Clintoa Abrnirrtrurrtiaa and U.N. hrrdgumara, and conveyed W g h tm chine of commrnd - - 1) a CIIPC, the .U. 8 . ' Ceatral ~0- (-COM); sad 2) a U.N. caamunci und+r r U.N. Ckasral. In aaatfoa, orro U.S. k n ~ a l Fn Somalia wore tm h8ts. OM aa the Deputy to t b U.S. Cummader and one am C ~ o r of U.8. Force. i a B d i a , s u b o + d h t e to Commmder, -.. Thia created difficult -- i f mt unprscedmc8d -- KItPmrrad arrangenmtr. Them wkL1, f o m a r , rer~.ia le@timmee qru.tiona rtga- the -a impaut them comrrund mgemmntr had on tho e m t u a l autcaaas in aumalla

~n -1, tb pol ic ie r of the ~1intoi-strati011 - - and the U.H. -- rag-g tb c r l e i r in 8 d i a a p p u to ham bean cbrrararriaed by abrupt nhif t0, a hdc of jcleity, and incoamistraaier that hard a difficult -.of frrfrrrpretrtion upan thdb dmlmd el 1 fw ~ u m m a d ~ & T U ~ Fur= II.ng.r ~ 8 . sent to Samlia w i t h tho misrioa t o mpturr Aldaad, againot p r o f a a m i d milit.ry advice.

C

redue1Dg the 0 . 8 . milit~~y pra.urce tn 30amlh 'whtla . oidtrruourly tarking U . S . forcam te -ga inn. c&8t wntia~ with Ugh atteabmt p.a& rielu ws8 lzacoarirtont. Thon offieialr who rdvooatmd md thin p e l i c y ~ ~ ~ m t bear th. ultimata reaponribility for tho soante t h a t fa l land . Aa Ubder Seczetary of Defame W i m x a e r coz~ectly obranradt '"the oingle moot aarioue flaw in our polioy w a e that we tried to oaaouplieh political objectiws 6olely'by militw me.nr.n:

3 - 9 3 0 9 : 1 2 iY I R C M SEN. CARL ; Z V I i l , ii ' I . . . .. .

' I n ' t 7 I

1 . -

?ha attached remrt compt.huaatvely a*..eo heat o f iesuer relating to th. ci-tance6 eurrouading the Rungax raid of Octaber 3-4, 1993 Mogadiehu, Somalia. What follow8 i o not an attrmpt to runmurite tha cantento of that mport, nut rather =a exprom a f e w k i e f personal thoughto abouteop. o f th. key

. . ia~ues i~mlvrd.

Many dif farant aotionm and inactions contributed to the poaition that U.8. forcer found thopanlvor in at . thr baginaiag of octobet, 1993 in Hog.$irhu, at the time of the Ranget raid which remtLted La -%cur cuu8ltLea.

Ckid ammg thaam warn th. d m b u o J m a dacimien of th United 19.tioru 8 . w i t y C o w m i l to try t o u r r m t and dmtrin for pmsacutiao thorn mmpruible for thm ~IUM 5 , 2993 amed attaokm c J n W t 8 d N . t i 0 ~ ~rork0rp.m. Tha fiftam- O f the Security Council voted [IROBCP 1837) f o r th. u t . m t effext an June 6 , 1993. Th. d ~ i a i m a 17 o f thr 8 a ~ m m . m m l t @ Special Repmment8tivm, Ambaamador H a , to o f f u a +rmd'for Aidwdfa capture and to cammurct a major hunt f= Urn l n Mogadiohu, m a 13-1y nrpported by tha 0.8.. cowmdar an the ground, O.rurrl nantgcmary, ud by tho uluOSa 13. fama cemmndar, m k i u h -al B i r r both of whblll actually fmmsed~offoring a higher reward for a w e d s capture.

. .

The deciaian t o hunt f o r Aldeed involved thi U.H. maher n o t i o m a d U.8. Eoruaa i a t h arrt*rarl po l i t iw wad elan rivalrier of Mogadi8hu io a new way, w i t h 8tt-t dangem that were oot imavaiatrly rpprrelated.

led UNITAF

. .

the UNOSOM 11 a f f ~ l t to a-rs ti18 root c a w m of the f.miru, ineludinp ~ t i o n a l mconc i l i a t l~~~ and diaumFng the. w r r r f n O factiaru, aad to m t tho famio. from r-hg. Although d i e c h g 8 wa.# preaeat i n m S O M IT'@ d t t - mrmdrt8 w)rm it took mmr in May, 1993, i ~ a :mplem8atat%on war inooluietrrrt and unclear, and a8 the monthe parred, political and diplamtic efforeo w a n incmaingly at cmmm purpoma with t h , actianm of =he military foruae. The motiveo b u a d th. &,aaioo a h . n ~ s were good, but ths canflicttag tactic. ured czeated diamat, not coagsration among the warring Somali factionr, urbrorantmt, not traaat, t0urrd UAD6m and U. 8 , f OYCM. Thm CLinten Admietafration -8 -aged lo a major ef for t to forco batter cootdination of p01it ie . l .md militrry taetic. with thu U.N. juat prior t o th. incidmatu o f Oct 3-4. . .

While pmaa n p a r t a ham plaead muoh W i i . an th. impact that artnor dadad to .U, 8 . forcer dght bvm tub upan aa.urltiaa in MogucUahu h d it b..n present on OEt. 3-4, Ganezml Ci.rricon, who ~lrectrd that raid, haretoted mat h. h a d k ~ tho equipaunt he nmded for hi. aperation and might not ham ' w d tanka a- if ha had th.rr. Ha 81- ..id h. did aot am&- wiag mom trak. axad AD- from a l l i e d artioor a8 baokupa in tb. .Rangar O m Raactia fome. while mom armor, in p- and m.dy for a reacue etforf. might have allowed a faster ruoru of injurmd Raagota, it i o ilagomibla te dotemha rh.th.+ 'asy Uvm. wodld ham b.m 8- # k c 0 fh. V8.f m j ~ t f t y of C W t i a . 08- dutiag the ummwnt 02 forcer to thb firm h1LoapUr c r u h ai ta , and probably would not have b r a affactad by a u l i e ~ W-1 of tanka and armzed vQhiclee in a remaw farm. ..

: 3CM SEN. CARL X I H ,

* chapter V I I of t&e UN chQ.nrr and in n.goara foe m offmr by the Vaited Stater to taka the lead in organiaing .md, c(361111\.ndlng auch aa o p o ~ t i o a . authorisad tha uaa o f a l l xm0088uy.muro t o eotab1i.b a em- atvisenumat f o r h u r n r a i t ~ f ~ m1i.f opuatfow ?a ~aaulia. That multiLateral cperarlon, ]mown a8 Unified Ta&k ~ o s c e or DNITAF and ar Oparation Renton -8, included about 25.600 U.S. trabpa and 13.000 troopa from 20 o t h u aormtriaa. UNITAP m a ~uaoeaaful in aaaompltshing i t 8 maodon ot eutabliaking a ammum eavixamcnt f o r h u d t a r i u r re l ief operatiam. The united 8tatawled oparat$oa,. b m w 8 x r did wt involve the djaarrmarmu~t of variour S m 8 l i r f a~tfcm8 and did not theughout all of Soumlia.

. .

of di88kmmuatw d aalled ifor the Fesca Cammdu ' o f UZ?bOBt I1

( c ) to ID.illtaiu cantxo1 of che heavy waapamm of th. organhad f a c t i w w h i c h will have bna bsbught undu international cant-1 pending their mmntmal damtruetion or trarufar to a newly-coplltituted aruxy;

.

(d) to e e i m m U l mas at aLl uauthoriaed amed element8 and t a aorirt ia t h regiatratian d maaurity of nrah

n amm.. . . . .

The Secutity Couacil allo requerted the UZU 8mct.t Waexal, through hio 8pbcial lbpmnntativa, mtirrd tlnitmd "2; tatam Mmital Jonathan Hove, to p&& aaaimtanee to th. 8oamli people in rehabilitating their pol i t ia l kutitutioru and prmwtbg r l a t f ~ l rec~i l ia t iorr . . . .

Ak ttk. tim of. th. c ~ o e m m n t oof th. v.&-led -ration to aatablbh a rocuxe ewimment for SumaaitarLrn rulief operatiom i n Somalia, thblr Pmaldmt BUmh atated thtatm United Statam would mad a eubatontial fame of troop8 t o Bmdia *with a limited abjectiwc t o ap.n the apply rrouter, to gat the food w i n g , and t o p-ue the way fo r a U.N. peecdmepiag forcm to keep I= ~ i n g . ~

U.S. tmap leva18 reached a pork of. 25,800 i n ' m i d - ~ a n ~ 2993 in aad a m d 80mlia. Tha opsatioa uaa kaowa by it. u.8. n m m u Opetation Raators Hope and by i t 8 UZV namwiu. W f 3 . d Tark Force OY U1OITAP. 20 otMf countriem contributedmon Uua 33,400 trow to ImTAF.

On March 26, 199) the UN S-fty mil m a a d ~ ~ b ~ t i ~ 814 uochr Chagter VII of the U10 cbprr;u mphuirirrp ia cnro i r l importmaa of dia-tm and raquerted th4 Force C o m m d e r of ONOSW I1 ag8~1na ~ m p m i b i l i t y 4 e thm omaoli&tiom, expaxmaen and ~ h t n n r n c a o f a mcura emkrammt thrclrughaut Somalian and a to o r g . d i o a p-, mumah mad .phwa tx rnr i t ioa from UlUIZTAF t o IRQOBOM 1 Z . q noted abuve in ractiun I1 of thin review, the military taakr for UHOSOM IT incluelad the umfrrtaamce of coatrsl o f th. heavy rraporu of tb. fautiosu rPd tho aeizurm of -11 arrru of all .uzaau+hariord trlamxati..

rapidly bringing the UHQSOM cumnand o t a f t ' o otntcture up to full atrengt&. A U.N. p 1 W g team artivrm 'in Moogadiohu thia weekend to coordinate and advrwa the tranaitfon plaaahg . f l .

, .

On May 4 , L993, U!UbSQld 11 farmally took mr tha mtarton %om VAITAF. During VD008W 11, V.8, trcop strength had b..n raduuad to about 4 ,000 (of which aaly mt 2,000 w m r r canbet troop.). 3.9. combat forcea were iatanded t o ba umod &y a. o quick W a c t i o ~ F o x 8 (QRF)., which would c a m to. the aid of tho iomea of 'cthet nacioae t: they became Fnvolved in rrituatiaaa that they wet. urublr to huzdh. Tb8 plan mr for t h QPP to m e off-ahera am oooa a8 pesaibla Prrd evratrully t o . ' z e t ~ to the Whited Btater. Waitad Btrtaa policy ram t o keep t b U . 8 . force ia B a n u l i a 88 n a U as poaaible w U l 8 atSthr HM tlm not allow th. US ogarrt$Oa to f a i l .

Th. QRO, harrcnr, beemam involved irr totem' ptoteetion opratioPr aad dlrumbg Bouulir k c u u o tha TI f m r wete Uumulrrqly rrlucunt to leaw thetr 8aclnr without U.8. forcer prtfieipatian, particularly after tha &mm 5th' .akuh of ~akistanl forcea that romulted in 24 Pakistani death..

Nobody -8 w U a U&md dacidad t o at&&: tha US. Did it a ta r t at Addio Ahb. in March? Towardm tha .Dd of IJBWFAP, RLded8a z d i o put out bad information abut t h Wtmd etate. and cullad tha Oaited N a t i o a r god . , %y mid-my, h i s proprgrrrdr had t a d agrilut the U U t d Natioru. For -la, .ha .aid that mdaarnor@ Horn rould tura .8amlia in to a UN trrutaewp. Th. relectioa of judsaa, th. forumtian of dirtr ict . council., and th. a m t a b l i m m o f otbar imtitutacmr roact%oaed by the Abdir. cantembace, were appo8.d by Aided ar ha parcaived t h a. a t h a t .

LTSE# - For the f $ r a t operation8 uad.r' Chapter VII, ,

them w a r not sulficioat time to plaza th. trkeuver from mTAF.. -It wae iLaporrlble to totablirh the UNQSCJM headquarters with ao f ow people. Wa m. had. r S brigade forae, w h i o h i o w h t was pledged aad w k m t u n zma&d. Wa

- - u y : l!j '3 :XLM SEN. SARI N I H , LC

. ,

worm not given bmld political guid.ne., mo w u M m i l i t u y p h a . W. triad to lay dom mtlftrry. guidmce but th. june Sth BoWoturi masrrcre forcd urn, to. gm rftu the mil1fi.a. rJatAOa8 #ere here for a hummitaxfur aJsmioxa and when forces etartrd to take casualties, thay stopped aoap.ratLag with negativa conaequencm. ,

Over the oummr, it became wm8t . tUt tbr ' allieu couldn' t be d.g.rd.4 ugon. &i~ a remi l t , mar time m 10.t ccatml of Wadiahu. TbFnp. certainly w e n t born bill w h r r thm PWatpnis wwe mmhed. In aqtcmber, Roro r e q u m m t m d mom U.S. troops. I said no1 We ioat contml ofMogadiahu absolutely in May. No one in the UHaSObl.he.dguortate war in cbarg. of Mogadiaha. Ifhen tho U.S. w u indtarga, the Mariaem ran Mogadtshu. Owing OIJfTAP, Wilhelm mat with Aideed and trllcsb to all the allism, h.16 t h s k ' had, axid got then to take mfsriono they could handle. 1,tr lked to ~ o w a about setting up.a Oiviaion hedquutera . h o t the U.S.)

t The deaimion coacaenfng th. hecurity S S F E & e g a 1% *.a wortrr i in isterwmacy forum. Thuc war no r8crimtarm in DoD to the maadate for UllWOM IT. Wa mn in a jam u the ezi#iml m t e f o r mmP m u t o faad tho p-le .nd then luvr. : m long am va hod 23,000 t t o o p m there m r m no pmbllar. Wa did -not believe tham would ba a pmblm onam we left. Q a a u d Pornll w u cewammd Wt qettLrrp our fomar em of soluli. and trm m o z t o r y ciaam- Baut'~~.-dh. l i W8. ba&ag.ur t o lea- our faroam t h n . The pumh to laam Seuu1ia w u net &am t o my Cengr@rriorul p a - , rather it *u d9. to tb. i-t on our budgot u, th. fact that the drploynrnt w w tying up 25,OQo tmupa d its rotation bur, Th@ P.8. miUt- -8 agitatLag to get ue out. At th. tLm of tb. tuxam= to -OM lT, ~ ~ t ~ a r n a ~ ~ t wu that tb. U19 torcar would be a b h to hamdl6 the m i t \ u t i = . In ratmspat , rar ei- undarceiMfW th8 warlorb or - o ~ m t i n n t e d t b caprbillty of the mJ forcar..

faction info- t h e lattw of its .pl- .to c-ct on the folloring day, waapona varification inapct ioru of the authOzizad weaponm atorage a i t w in f o w loaationa in o a t h ~ogadioh~ aaQ one stte (Aigoy) an tha outaktrt 'o f the c i t y . The weapon8 r i te8 had beem e8tabliebd volrme.rtly by t h e annod faatiapo after th. arrival of UMIT'AF.and watb entirely undat the control of the fact ioae. Fh. la8t -ction had been conducted by UNITZIP in January md P . ~ I c u ~ 1993. The UNOSOM XI of f icer wh0.0fficial1~ inioraud a URC/8NA of f icer , who warn OM of .Aidead4e cloeeot aorociater w m 8dvLsed t f ra t the iaapectiozu mat not ba ~ r f o n n d md tbt, if thay were, it would laad t o ' war " . ,

nLDtor in th day, Pakiatanl uni tamttamihg fmcn iacldenta aloewhere in M-rhu traruittod 21 0ctob.r Road, w h e n they ~ c a u n t . n d a I q n , GarmtUly. -- tht.8-midad ambutah that raeultrd in wtcrruiva canultiem. Othez attadem took placo e l a ~ h m r a in th. city hi thr aft- mb the U.8. Quid Raaattoa Oorce wam deplayd t o u d m t th. ~ U ~ t P r r i force.. Aa a =malt 25 Pakist.Pi roldium wmm killed, 1 0 l irtra 8r Urlrrg, a W 53 P.tJmt& a d 3 V.8. ooldimra uera ww&d.

. .

nutm80M 11 will oontiau. tta Lait$ J dir.crp.bwat. affortm until eatirf%eQ L t ha8 nutralizad a1 haua krom/BBL rnrpws and. amnatnitian storage s i te r .nd c a m l a W .-

Mog.di.ku a d any ~ t h a n that thrrrten m. clty. =tar t b i m i a cwpiete, WW i f w i l l undozt.h an ardarly mctor-by- arctor d iaumam~i t of th. c i t y . -, : t h i m rmphuia will shift to cwpetative effort8 tawlvhg -Urn .& mVOa( II re loon ar f errible. . .

aod he-ooaductad tha'inveatigation b t o .the 5, 1993. a d e b . o f the PIJciatrni troops a8 t h legal.'earuultant to mSOM 11. Exc~Lpfa from his temt* f 0 1 X a . a

X M SEN. L I il

flhm the ti- for substituting a force u&w the policy dimation of Bou-m-Wli f o t the W . 8 . forcc d r e w near, th. Security Council adopted aa &ling rn80hat%ar which gave to thr.raglaceunt farue, a force both in fana axad f a c t ~ c h d u than the ana 'abaut to Leave, gave to it'. puadoxically m d e r mios im. Rathar than aimply ~ i a t a a a i n g the ncuraty of humsaitarirn ap~at%onm, it m a to arelac the Boarlia b rebuildtag a dwmxatic state . Thir bmad and vague mandate walr, hcww8x, . upaa to two quite d f f f o r m t conrtructiana. It could ham bMn''cazmtru.d

n n i & . d rpry aoturlly havm b o l i e W , at th.:tinm-af th. f i r a t c a n t m t a t i o n with UN forcer, that he ru acfbg in legitimate mlf-def-e of M a olaa frua eoi- at the radio mtatian i t controlled aad fm thr fSnt eta- of the clad r f 0ro.d unilaterd dim-nt. Both :the US Ida- M l s ~ i ~ ~ a in aoc~laia uad UZUWOM awt oacupt .. aurmun of reeponribility for randiag rigW.a, hor*vrt. iz&w=tatly, that could have produced nrch a k l i a f . ! . . . .

A - Nabody why Aid- maw it LA hta i n t r t u t to attack th a. bid it'atrrt at A b b i m

B t e f and 080 puEiefpatmd WM held on JuP. 5, - in thm wake of th. attack on t he Pakistani peaaakaapazr. ' A t Wt m e t a g -it waa m d that UBlllP rauld wo* towardm a at- diplomatic zm.pa~r0 fora both thm 0.8. m t and the VN. UN8Ql 837 ~8. draf ted at VW hardpurrtw'.iP NW YO- on Sunday, - J u r ~ 6, and voted on t&at d8y.. . .

million m a for 8onuUa. W i n g a floor stateutaat' on the b i l l on June I?, 1993, 8-tw B p d , one of the fw m a P k n of Cangrema to coclllllbnt on the tloot on 8omalia, after nethag proaa report. tut the TBxLtad 8tat.8 9.. oandfng a H.riru Bxp.attiorury unit to the at.& ut8t.d that .I: would caution th adn&urcratioa t o b e w a n o f enhncing U. S . participation in a miroian which k m s to be beyoad that which ma originally a w e d to by th ia body," amator alro etatad Ifthe contributioa of the Dnited atate. to th. 199-led ap.ratioa i a Somal ia r u m & to be kept at a level which doao not put the W t e d BtaEa6 back %ate fhu gmitios of uhould.riag a diapmportloaately large Wt of th. coat8 and risk., Doubllng 0.9. f otcer over th. weekad will: add to both, and rhmld bo conridmnd vwy aaz~fully.~

I knm tbe miomton to get Aidemd warn h.ating;up. On June 30th. when I wu Ln P.C., 3 t ~ l d the polioy guys tha t it was 8 b.d thing to de. I thought there -8 a SO* .dau%ao of getting the requited intelligence, m, mm'gotten, only a 508 c m o that we would get Aidmd. SO i t .,war a 25% chance of euccero and i t wuuld be high riek.

ci.aenl Pewall w a d with me felt e m - attongly t u x did. I f e l t it wae OK to gat Aid8.d as an incibatal rewt 02 a qmzatiaa w i t h the forcer em .hand. but mtgamry felt that the QRP warn not m u l y trained for

In early July, Z folt that m had killed tbr i&8. Thoze , cmt10Wg i~crrrot -Um p u t o f loam p e a p l m , but thay warn aat clzrylne the day. But thiagr batad up a g . h and w h . n I m e $a L C . an Augurt 9 to 11, I a ~ d 8 the aauw points

on mguat 17th thr Chlef of Statian craa ' baal 'rod mid t b n w u an ability to get act2oaable iatellig.nm. What

n e d d , Lrr him viow, WU a SWAZ t a m tO.Imafch Aidmod-

me palicy g m u ~ ma& thm dacimion. , I 'm :not .uro how the deciaioa ma mdr. My coawraatiw m- with mh, Wfsnar, and tba N8C. Poumll to ld m e tht tha -18 inoolvad in tha deci~ion w e r e W r m , li.~ur, d. -brn I b d i 8 ~ fbt P a n 1 1 war aoan wY8 8k.ptAe.l '.rbout the

z t warn a bad brcieioa. We put th. prestige of tho 0 .8 . and Premide~e Clfatw, on the line to tm onabigk risk opetation. Than i s a whole new dvmsm of uaintradad c a ~ a g u u ~ ~ e . The policy of going aftu: Aidnd wao a flamd

- (in n.ponse to a quertiar, for tb. zrcota 8uMuitted by -tot Kempthozzm aft- tba t88timwty of LTG Sheohm a d CXamt on Octobor 7 , 1993 boforr the 8amta m d . Semicea C d t f ee) - throughout the r\lmnur o f 1993,

LO che o . p . ~ t # a a t 02 002.0.8, including the Secretuy of O.tanre. tb. qh.tnarrr of the Joint Chhf 8 . of Stact, Pad U S C ~ remiatad daplaylng a d d i t i a d u.8. form. to a p p a e n d and RLdeed. Hmver, UNWQl4 w a a uaabla to v i g o m l y raenergise tho political a d h-tarf.o p-m~, and efforrm t o do-emph.oizo the militazy c o t a t i o n hecm incrsasingLy d i d i i ~ l t au Udmd i s e m a d hi. attacks on UNOSCW pe-81 -;d. f adlittieea. It

- - mnt Taek Percm ~lngrr .in w i t h t b -teat reluctanae . Wo received a at-* CIIUDD beat' d- .06

mr.ada (who inclmt8aly cru a US=, not state ~wemwt , of f i cu ) , p u e u g U8 to pudm to et Rideed. N t e t tha Shinn bri.fm, a by 3-5

~ ~ ~ g ~ r C Y - + had 8 rep on the -it-), 8 pruh w S o c a d who rrntrd to do the job, ROU rad I t i l k d . viewed it an a Ugh r=ak, '1688 tw 50-50.cbmcm of

' (1 v i m d i t am rwa learn t h B O W . The . g m ~ y @.id we horn a11 t h r m auu8tr whom wm. c m uro eo locat. Aidawl. ~y view m a that thaw agentu, who b*. paid. far infomnat$m, would.not fingar =deed baa- a c e th.y did and we enatciami himt they would be out of.:a.job. I a160 w.nted the ag- t~ d o m o ~ t r r t e w h a t their .agents could. do, but t h y eaid we cm! t endangar them for r t 8 m t and w i l l only uae thrPl if the Taek Potce i e daplaybd.

'

In tbs third weair of Auguut, I talkad to Elow aab amid, e a e Oarrtsaa, Maatgummy, the a d shkm a l l are pumbing UP to dO tUs, I will go along eincr a8 agenatal principle I beUm in supporting thh cwmades to flu field.

the a d t a d Natioao ia trlkiag about nrtioruL recoaciliation. #haf doma that mom. BM the 8 a t e bought aato that?"

lllurther U.B. aation a d participatian in the newly wcpmd.d mireion should either b. ep.cifically endorsad ths C o a g r e m , oz wm rmLd pack up snd go ham.- My vote i o for

operation.

troop8 war tharr.. We had a contanuizlg p-lm that gmr ovat ti-, to us. the qBP for force protaction. I didn't b u l i e ~ fhac the coalition tacem would do the job to mat aur farce p t m c t i o n rmquizeumnta. So wm urnad th. Qm to do 80-

,-pa d ascort for conveys; work chat we badad t mticipiated a t f izrt . OV.r the a-x, i t beam8 appazaat that the .ILiea cuuLdndt br d&d -011. AI a ~ . a u l t , o- ti-: um 1o.f c ~ m l of ~ogadiohu. Thfag. carta luy w a t t Qom hi11.rh.n tha p r k i a t d a wro amburhd. In Beptmbe& U r a l Hors nw#smd mom U.8. troogm. I staid no1 Pse i08c control oE m d i r h abrolutaly i a my.

up unit& ~ b . a m - -fa Mm by t b a i r d t 1 4 . wa wan t o be drpbyed w i t h J C-1419 and a C-5.. Th.rr $ 8 raav logic to tbt. vm druvdrov. W mint at r f f nutr, a- 8- middla . IC th. ).C-I3oo *at. t h m . rn U10Ut81y m d b.re

$9-2$-?j 0 9 : 4 5 iY 7BCM SEN. l h l l :Z?IHl LC

- I dan't leaow why the AC-130,' wue dtmrppiaved. But I tho-t th. tld.8iOIl W 8 8 d0.bL8 wgfhout fh.ID. It i 8

y that th. X-13Oo rauld hra md8 8 Thm Z o l l d a g $-ton ass -1-8

(3) IU ioz i t 8 ahooriag capabUti.., i.a.''pauf- l . . ~ ~n th. taxgmf, I cbn't knmf how ma&- lead a d d haw b a n . appl id , Oa Wt- 3-4 , could ~ S V W ~ . d the AC-130. to hrw pulvexil;.d thr Olympic hotel, but bQ18 t hR much of an impact it WCmlQ have h.d, exa.pt ~ h o l ~ a y . f did not h.*. a -irtioa for t b A C - I 3 O ' m p.yahol~ic .1

I . . .

AC-Z3Oa amaid have .hot up obmt~bm 018- on th. strrata of MoQ@di@hu, but i t could h.cn : m t m d 1- abatacloa b th. gfWW8. I dfd not 8 -t for th AC-1300 o n o m we wrra war tham - f .dorr4t W U m 1 coaeidersd it. I atid not e n t~ AC-IJOB u b.iag .&tirl. to out rairaiorr, avaa in ntmlpIct mO mrr d t m r maw' tha plychbldorl i q ~ t of th. AC-130. If W a X.'U0.8i.m VOPlld h . ~ bad an lirqacm pmblam with the littlm bi;lrdr. It h.d it, I am not nure the AC-130. would h w ' $ o t t . o a rbot o f f .

, d.. big difieraacs. %my wpuId.h.cR f i r e 8 u o p ~ s , eye., "d p . y ~ h o 1 ~ i c . l L+. T h q cDuLd have told ua of any m a ~ ~ m i z a g o f fozuma. Thw c a d hvr ievmlled the Olympic hotal and could have bm- thr h o k of th. 8m.

- T b AC-130'8

' wa had trained -bod with t-m. In addition to tm* f L m mpOort ow&ilitie~, t h y c.n alao ng1LnE8 t L l l d t e an area with

fafra-rcl.4 aaagchlight) . They weuLd h8w baan ueetul to p z ehm QW t m g h madbloako.

"

P : Admix61 xalm annr ~ t u i . t o . g % m up the ' .- . , .

tSL 8, i, in s l y m. d a d a fn building# and it vunOt tbe grr.tm imrg . ryor ,a . I do

. . not hwe any rewllactiao of the A C L C - L ~ O ~ being a pl+t of the Ranger Tamk F m p . ~ h g a . If Undu Beantrry Wimt

. . rocall. .-'avw it, I muat by. d a u ? a o too. I do muall _ - , that we ~ n t n d d i t i d Cobror to a-t the QBD, d..pita

. . oppodtioa Czom the policy ahup. I o m only sg.oulata that it waa a quartion of how much & YOU need..

ouirnl Bw a t e =tad +ha dewmi& of whanaing AfdrHdor poaitlon; domomtic v l i t i c d baggaga of methes. plum-up i n U.8. 8-gth ia 8-11s; and the gatmtid far* haem-d aollatorrl damaga. . .

?

the' U.3.

bv

Chi- of the J o i n t Qliefo of Staff. He nudo the

""""""=f of Defame a r u s that Cerrsral mu had daletad the raqusrt o r artillrry. In ace-. w i t l a Ooldwater- Nichols, the Chairman of the Joint chirf 8 . of S t a f f rat-d that the tequeat be a- after reamivLng raaommdat%oru on both side. o f t h iraru fram .=-Late mnbotr of C h a Joint Staff. ?UI moatiorud, cuaer8l -11 a h o diacuamd the iegua with at- mombum g f the ~ o i a t CUefr o f S t a f f , eapaially General 8ulUm, th. Chlaf of stat2 of th. Amy, whe corrournd." mAttw conmalting with PowmU,' mmcrtuy -in elactad not to am- thr rrquut at that time. At the ti-, U.B. policy in 80lnrlia n r to redue8 i t 8 military p w c # Uld i t 8 -1. h -, !lot it. Thi8 ~ L C U ~ U mp8.t W U c l k r r ~ ~ t e d w d 88 #'~rarri'di- tm mb -mat ~ i l ~ . t L l y f o r fore. . .ptetMtios t u k o ouah 8. emeorting logreticr tratttc, r 8 U o f coa~oy., ead ceadvoting road-block clauing. "Th. pt...~~. ef 8 'pur.' V.8. ~lmpmuo fern coarirting of umor sad iwcb.dted infant- mi* have '.rriv.d to u i l i i m t th. Rangmr Tuk Wree in horn t U m (W.8. . : u d t m dght ha- bema mprr readily available and 1mam pUmWg. tSmr idmt b . ~ kar waded t h a t which ma nmr..ly for co8lition op.nticmr) . ISmmver, much of thm &lay :in getting tha lnaor to the cruh s i t e ru dam to a oomuad &aidom t o h.v, it F i n t ua-le at t b new part -8 in ord.t to c ~ L 8 t 0 pa- md ~OOrdfnatim 80 thlt i t ~atLd b0 eff aatively dap1oy.d i n a camhrl md d.1-tm unul t . a

i f th.y lud =fmd err1i.t a t thr trrg.t, thr tanka and a-red Mhtclrr would oot 3aave migaifiuntly rffrated tha -tion er nduced the mnba~ 02 c m u l t i a o , a h a tha vaat nujority o t RMp.r T u k Borce -ti-' OQ-a w i t h i n .the f f a t hilf haut d t e x the f in t blicaptat was

e n n a t b l l y atatmd that 8eamw' -in a d not m C Z ' 8 . H O W 8 d h , . h0 8mitim to Cangraraionrl preaa~ra to gn w out am- m o a n u poaoible. la my talk. with a n d Haw, I kapz W&ag f o r th jumtificatfon. I didn't w a n t MW tcmkr to blamt bulldingo in ~og.cUshu. m u a l ~ontgcmry felt mtmngly. The r i t u t i o n wao maomlw more t 8 ~ e i a mgadirbu. Dampit. ny

133-29-95 03:Cf. ?I :RCM SEN. SARI, ;ZYIII, LC

3 3CM SEN.

After th. f i r a t raid, Conoral Hear gava ma a p c i f i c guidance that 1 had to have nuxrrt, actionrble iatolliganam, L o . I had to krow thm guy war actuPlly a t tho tasgmt . - i t had to k verifid. That i a why we " g ~ ~ n UP' . ( p m w d to a-ct the oporatioa) raorcl thaa 4 0 time8 but only- cmduuted 7 raid., Oru tim, we M in te l l igaaa t h t A i d . d wmnt into a buildiop md *unO t sear coning aut. If& lawChad mcanruirruram h l o r but them war to be wen awooktad with Aidaed. L a . no a n puubr. 1.- fairly cootident hr wu t-, but we did not law& b e a u a m of our gui-a.

.

tar t t m r i a k ri& with each raid,. 1': wu aarrc-4, but i hadmt at thapoiat whrrr I falt we )i.d t o atop. T b e ~ Fntel l igno~ wwn8 t gattizag .ny ktt.t. :

I hu* that tha clorer n got to the Bllt.rt.uWket, the futu wa &ad t o get in and get out. Tha LWd gum4 reactian t iam n m -11 bwa. nhQlr th. halo waa m d , .n lost flU Fnifirtlm. Qnae th. rur.ult force n.cb.6 the oruh nit., oMr t h a w 11 hQUX8, thay n t i f m m a 3 U b G r r P u a d . . Th. lietle bird. wmm canrtlntly aprr th. rat. 'ULb 0.8 p8rmuml we- ia a dmfesu&n porttion d - rmb.r mtmsr.

I always . o r i d that it n ever got into r firefight, uw would w i r r th. htth Wt mid loo* t b W. .

03-29-95 03:45 i% 3 C Y SEN. CABL X V I H , C C . ' . . . , , . . .

3 5 :!,? , . . .

' 3 i', . - * :4

1 1 1

it omrlltu. We rnmietard - we wanted to.& it ao w e train. - (In rampeame to a qwatiorr 'for tha racord

submittad by Sewtor w n af ter the Oct- 7 , ; 1993 teatimany of LTa Shmrhan and RADM CRlllrr before. th. senate m d &t=rticom Cemmitted - Rfter noticm of thr axecution of tha raid aad, aftmt ensu1ing- that tho 0.8. QRF vu already poat~ ing to @upport R Rangar should they ,aeod hrlp (which wa8 e taadad ptoaedura betmen USFORBC(a and R Ranger), I d t o n d the m i d thmugh a liaieoa off ieex in my h.dqua=ora oa a adauto-to-minuta hi.. When I percaived chat the U.8. Q1V would be r.quireb, I beg- to eaaure further backup rould be available. F k a t , a c a l f m e mrde to tbl3BlOMMQW (first call f o r U.H. op.nttarrr batore any .

U.6; iPvolvamat), th. M.1ay.ia.n contiageat. It8 collnundu immdiataLy a m e d t o m o ~ . Urn unit to a ataging aru in tha IIW 6WpOZ't anb wmm in pornition by appseximatel'y 1830 hrs. N u t m a a dmak on the rvallability of P . k i 8 t m i t.akr ~ h n t l d wr rued W m . Thua ware might i a t b c i ty , four of d o h uposntioarl. Th.y - not p u t ' of any QW sinaa nrch valuable Limited maeta catmot ba left s i t t i n g far -aaciar onLy .nB narmrlly a m ampLuywi in p r i a oupparehg m ~ n g pointr. Th. Palciatan% comaaad.r i d a t r l y a@ azad moved him tralu to thm ataging area to j 0 h f b w y 8 - 8 X Z i ~ h g at rbout th. tm. Both e l r ~ t r *.re available to th QRF o m n i f no&d hf0- th8 6 i t ~ f i a -8 c1.u e t h rrgud f 0 R m g s ' 8 ability to extract ite farce. with th, U . B . m.

-il P-11 w.. vary u p a t with the firat Ranger raid. Re warn urqry that they had dcae it without good intelligence d had oham bor they would moat.. . .

- I t o t @ l u ~ a UU- U U - - . g o d t o U.8. O t tUa C o u n t r y 'ph. CleraJf. W ~ P ~ W

inf r u t i o n very unuuotwwrtby. #a-.don8 t hva a goad EUHZMT p-, cartainly not for airlr 'or un*rrt;&cig~ted

The 1- . . pole warn

ttoupr i s B e i 8 , polfaimm and militrry lfY8tbW mm pr~maxily focumad oa rp.ihtaia&ng opa liau of coaamicationr to f a c i l i t a t e the ptinciprl ob)eativm of fmadkrg t h etuvfzag ..Somali a. Fol lowing the canplation of UZWIW aad the commaeawat o f UNOBOH 11 w h e a the U.N. teak aosr raapenrlbility far the operation, tha UaNw policy m a chramd to include dimlrmhQ thr w u r f a g f action8 throughout a11 of S a c d i a . V#0WM 11 fernem wen inoapable and, in soem camr , -11- CQ p e r f o m the u d ~ m ~ ~ -r.prJt.d to implanaat the milftazy ap.ration8 imzmf in the aew policy.

During tTRDSOI4 If, U.B. troep atre- had bwa mducod to about 4,000 (of which only rbout 2,000 wmra combat tmopr). u.8. forcer, w h i c h i8t.nd.d to be wmd orJy u &:Quick Ramtion Force (-1, becam iavolved in force pmfection.op.ratloaa, attempt. t o aaptura Aidad, aad d l u m i a g 8 d i r ; b.cauaa tha nB0S01 1% forcar w n ba+umirsgly m l u c t ~ t to.18a9b t he i r enclam. T U r w u p.rrtLcU.rly true aftor . t b Jun. 5th a.mbush of P a s t - fo-• 24 P W o t m i r o l d h r r killed.

U.9, cmmmdma u u a coping w i t h a QuL poliay.which e t c d tht 0.8. fwoam be kapt mull Wle &t.tb. mme time canduct* aitry oprntlsru t o aa8urr tht 'thm'V.H. m L d not appeu to f U . Thir policy atatchrd th. ua@il i t ims of U.8. foreom aad gut strerr on ths lanitad n u m b s oC 0 .8 eopb*t troapa . .

Foltowhg the T u k Poraa R.Pg.r raid md'battle of Octokx 4 , wtrur U.8. colavndrn i a SomLi8 beli- that the canul t ieo inflicted as Aidedr r forcer (eatiauted of f , 000) M r r iga i f to .n f ly wuk8nad him, the U.M. dec lurb a .ceantke. mi- mk., A i b d hiawolf, waa a pa.Hng.+: an 8 JJ.8. militazy plane rhLch c ~ i e d &im to -age ia negotiatiana in -8 Abba, Ethiopia.

while the U.S. rignUicont1y mbfmrd it* fornee fn. S d i . d t h 9-8 f d l m w a battle Oat- 3-4, U.S. fomaa umaati.Uy fallouad thmmdtu a a g u ' r i w , *tnmkezad- d o m ~ l i c y , r8ariPing primarily w i t - t h i s

' o f v i m , .both w % t k i n the AdutbirtmtAon knmn the Wead stater and the W t a d 88tioa8, u to v h t h u thus 8 W d k incraa#.d diplamatic af foz t or wn a w u i o r milftuy action. In foot, tha s # t Z 8 t l a b.gm to follow a t - - t m amah--.mploying both diplesnrtlc activity am weL1 em a\iU~.ry action. It deea aot agpwr, in ratmrglot. that t&m bjpf01~.t ic activify cmd thm lailituy effort . onrr wall-cwtdinr,ted vitbin the AdnaizrirttattoO no+ mtma the 0 . 8 . ud +h.: U.N.

- I Th m i ~ . f o a - d ' f m -taxi- & o f the nwatah to tmd80# 11 ia M8y

rarultbg fWm ttm bm.d UN amcurity oouncil rmnd.ta. The

. .

-8 At tha o m tima th8f'ue m e daploying tho R.ng.r R.k F m c e , un m r m aloo w g .*,two-track appmauh. We had dmtarariood in W 8 r k i n - a t h t th.n w a n too much emphuk, a1w.t exclwimly, oa +he m i l i t u y force track and not maugh oa the~polltical traok.

Ia my .p.auh to tho CPIS on Auwt 27, 1993, I . c m n t e d on this lorue. I eont a capy o f my p c h to-all 8eaatorr by letter &ate6 8ept.nb.t 3 , 1993 in w h i c h 1-.atated that Wur purpdn no* i r to b.19 re r to t r to a l l o i BumUa, iacludlng oouth Wogrdiahu, a f oundrtion of atability .and aaourity upon ~biah 8-L' 8 t m 6 l V W -- w i t h fh. hrlp of th. la- C m turn t o thr tough wrk of p o l i t i u d trcolrciliatioa mad roonadc rrcorul0ntctL0~l. The apewb includeO the folloroingr . .

"The Pzr8idrat0. dmcimion to dmphy an addit%& 400 troop. t o 8ouUio bu fecurnd r e m d att .ntion#oa thr, aemarity ampme -- inded an the U.8. milituy ug.ct -0- of what i r h.gp.aing t m . Tht f o c w i m much too nrrra*. Tham 18 much ta w h a t La hrppedag i x z B d h thrn tha #tory of U f t r r y conflict in ~0gabi.h~. Aod i f thsm i a ro be a ~ l ~ t i 0 n t o w i l ' 8 p r o b l m , i t USWt b0 th.a 8 military .elution*"

fioa e c m a and t~ political moarmt~tution. of a country, smm p-I. hU bema but mzm work ~ m d a to be soar.'

------- - -- w r u w m & w mb +-A LO 1at up on thr mi11,tary track. . .

d om a -0 0s .Biglorqr. I t 1 h.6 bud .a4 w u pmtty 8ura i t

wu true that Prrridmt canel: had mat with .ludrrd lclo b.d in faat.repoztrb back to th. RreriQat that m y diploamtic mlution w a tha anly adartion, b eonfa- that, 80 .I u r d , -11, m. maid.rr t , i f .Uute.ii t b o u r , w f y thr 0- 3 mido th. mai- . di-y. EW -6 whma hr gof thr -port8 of thr cu~lllliltier, tht wam his f k . t quartion; What in th. world are &Lng coslductiag 8 =mid? That i m not t&e in whf& ue

k operat* today. We abould in Suet -be aodshg a d ip lan t ic mzut*. . W tb.f wu f O t m, th.t thr R r m m i d a a t rhrnd my dimmy and buiorlLyy: u i d he tharght tht was tha koy qwatioa that had to k ud&aaaad.@ - . .

B a t o n atatiag au+ aosroluriaam, i t i a .iagor+.nt .to ==pat t h uubmturce of ua ..EU~E: caution - wo urn than c o n c l u a i ~ w i t h the lwnrf it of hinQliga, with. time for crnN thought, and with h l e d g e of the f mto, and th. v i m of a number of inaividurla.

- . .

d . The Security Coux i l should have pravided policy gugui&nca t o -OM I1 once it waa elmat. am a remulf. o f the =ti-rn papagmd. of Radio Aideed and the remw.1 of Somalt National Alliance (SL3A) we8 onm from weapon cantonment alter, t P i t Aidred was unwi f ling to cooperate with ~ ~ 0 8 0 ~ 11. such guadpnae wao particularly impoztaat when Aido~d's aeooaiate advised the ZRK)OOM I1 repxemuatavitn.that axzapecti0~3 of the weapon8 cantonment s i tes would lead to war* " e. Thm U.S. policy to keep the U. 8 , forces in s ~ U a as 6mall am pouaible while at the s w tim.not.allowing the UN operation to fail ahould have been reviaitad whn.neaw national f orcee that were pledged to UZWOM 11 did not arrive on ti-, ame xaatioaal conttag.ot8 r e f u n d to follow Gen-1 B i r ' e ozdmrr, Aideed refund t o cooperate, and the W.S. Quick Rerction Force (QW) had t o be uoed for tub outaide their original miarion.

can The mood in the cangresa at the time-that-thm * q u e m t for .

armor w m being ~aaaiduad.wam one o f dimmatiafactfoa w i t h the situation i a Somal ia .rrd 8 denire to tme t3m deployment of u.8. forcam bzaught to an end a8 8oan as porriblr. Nevarthalere, the secretary of Defer8 sbwld have given mom canmidentian t o rho requeota' fmm h i s military coam~nders aaad t h recammndatioa frm the Cbirrrrsrrr, J W and' appxwed the requecrt for umor..

If 0.9. armor had baeen. available in MogacUohu :on Octokr 3 , 1993, i t would haw bees @milable for i n c l u i o a Lo the Ranger Ground Reactioa farca that waa poaitionma aavmra3 blockr awmy from +he aauaulf e i t e . O i m the inclueion of 5-ton.truck. with asndbaga in the Ruager Ground Reaction f orCa, i t / is . . likely that Bradley lighting veUCle8, i f pmrmt . would ham ' been used instead. The inclusion of Bradley fighting vdaiclaa tn t h t force might krvo~reeultrd in reduced IJ.8. cuuaL$Lea but i t i e inpoaaible to reach ur infommd jubgematnc oa the:unaat of that reduction, i f any. U . S . aradlmy fighting vahiclea and turk. definitely would have h e n u o e d i n tha roecum affort, .would hwe allowed a fastar zemcua. aad pooeibly roaulted.ia fewer casualtiaa ir. tho ramcue force . ~t i~ i l ~ g o n m i b l ~ ~ o quantiw the

_ - _ number. It i s kmgortant t o notr that once the fdrcer at the af ta o f the fisrtxiomed helicopter had been reauppliod, t h y sustained only thrm m i n o r wounds. one of the Rurgezs w h o

44%

- -

03-29-95 3:Oi ?X ?9CM SEN, CABL ;EVIli , C C ? O 1 ,

Tbr fr i lab attmpt t o w e an a l u a t of thm Mum Brp.dftioorry Cbrit to v h m d Af.dsr.d an Jbm 23rd, r m d t o alert Aidood to th. thrut. allowed bitr to ge i a t o hiding, and mcla th. t u k mom= dFfffcult. It %a i r o d a tht

&dad dght hava hen mPlch .A2 attmmptad by

recbrr than in Smptmbar. Ir i. diffioult to UndAmtmb th. nt$en.la for t b firat

raid tb.t OsTurd 0lrrri.m ardud. Th.f g a b r ~Uah h4 ood*t.d in ordat to avoid tb. dmlepunt of .fl& bunkor mentalitym by bia t-8, ua& to m c . th ~ ~ O O Q . of hi8 T1.k P o ~ n , if.tbay wua not rlrrrocly bema, ud t a maem of the tactiom thrt th. Taok B o m m would urn. Ttm laak of a m u d ratioaale for 18- th. + r i e l .hauld at.6 mposiorm in tho oh.in of to the need to omLully mevaluate th. T u k ~orew o mimaion a f t u m ~ b o p ~ z a t i ~ ~ ~ onm of the w e r t a r r P ~ ~ r n of a unit 1 ika 3mk ~.ngu, whoam c a b . t capabilAtim m unpukLlaLed, i 8 fk. b.li.2 by the unit mmubera and %to c- thW t h y w aacompliah m y mirrloa. B- of tha

canfIdrllrr01) of ~ $ 8 1 SO-8, eh. oh.in of

w m a1ro ahauld aot lo.. sight of eh faat- tb.t'*tb. canbinad ef fort8 of thr mi1it.n perrolrzl.1 -1- b ;UHZTA9. .and UrSOSQU I1 eaved many thOUIradr af B a a c l i liwm. Tha -lor, p m f o a m i ~ i . n a a d ut- dCuaip&&am or th. U, 8. -8 that carried out tho 0rO.t. of mupuiom 8emlf;a -- md puztirxllazly thore isOO1~1d la tm m k mgca rridr of Geptember - Oetob.t, 1993 place. thr BdldLua, Alrnrsn, Sailors and Marinas in hirtory with our highmat sa i l f t .y .twtiosm. O u r =ti= owe8 them a debt of gratitude. . . .

- . .