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Administration Review of Public Personnel

DOI: 10.1177/0734371X9401400205 1994; 14; 40 Review of Public Personnel Administration

James Perry, Lois Recascino Wise and Margo Martin The Case of Indianapolis

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40

Breaking the Civil Service Mold

THE CASE OFINDIANAPOLIS*

JAMES PERRY, LOIS RECASCINO WISEAND MARGO MARTIN

A n underlying as-

sumption of the Win-ter Commission Report,Hard Truths/Tough Choices,is that contemporary pub-lic management reforms-sometimescalled &dquo;newpub-lic management&dquo; (Hood,forthcoming)-hold thekey to revitalizing stateand local government or-

ganizations. A number ofthese globally popular re-forms speak to issues re-lated to human resource management(HRM) and connect HRM policies toorganizational productivity. But de-

regulation and decentralization of pub-lic agencies are everywhere put for- /ward as the main instruments for creat-

ing high-performance organizations. An /objective of the National Commission Ion the State and Local Public Service isto &dquo;create a more efficient and respon-sive government&dquo;; deregulation is amajor vehicle for achieving that goal(National Commission on the State andLocal Public Service, 1993). Deregula-tion, responsiveness, and high perfor-mance are key components of the Win-ter Commission’s vision.

Deregulation meansshifting responsibility forHRM from central au-thorities to line agenciesand within those agenciesfrom staff to line manag-ers. It means giving man-agers more flexibility inthe way they perform theirjobs so that they can man-age more effectively. Atan operational level, it

means enabling managersto interview and select job

candidates without restrictive certifica-tion rules typical of civil service sys-tems. It means authorizing managers toset pay levels for entry and incumbentpersonnel based on managers’ assess-ments of employee skills and marketforces.

/ Responsiveness in governmentcan be linked to the concept of strategichuman resource management (Perry,1993), which seeks to integrate person-nel activities into overall governmentmanagement rather than isolate themfrom management through an exces-sive emphasis on technical issues, rules,and processes. Instead of putting upbarriers that hinder achievement of or-



41

ganizational goals, strategic human re-source management shapes control sys-tems to fit management’s needs.

High performance organizationsemphasize continuous improvement inquality and productivity. They seek tobe responsive to the needs and prefer-ences of client groups.

In this sense, high performancevaries with the constituency. For ex-

ample, some populations might con-sider low cost in the production of gov-ernment services an outcome superiorto outstanding quality of service.

As the supporting studies for theCommission’s report document

(Thompson, 1993), a tradition of cen-tralized personnel administration de-veloped in state and local governmentafter the merit reforms of the late 1880s.A mind set focusing on the need to&dquo;police patronage&dquo; and control poten-tial abuse of public offices worked inconcert with an emphasis on centralcontrol and limited discretion. The re-

sult parallels the federal experience,producing what contemporary reform-ists would describe as a highly struc-tured but politically neutral civil servicesystem (Osbome and Gaebler, 1992). Inthis context, centralization and regula-tion are seen as an historical stage in theevolution of professional merit systemsjust as rejection of patronage is viewedas a stage preceding civil service sys-

tems. In this framework, deregulationserves as an intermediate stage between

highly regulated civil service systemsand high performance systems. Since

the model assumes that regulation pre-cedes deregulation, non-regulationwould be an anomaly.

Not all public jurisdictions, how-ever, have followed this path. Countygovernments, for example, have rela-tively little experience with formal meritsystems and, although less common,some major cities were never regulated(Ban and Riccucci, 1993). Adoption ofcentralized civil service managementmight have also occurred as a responseto a prevailing management fad or togive the appearance of reform

mindedness (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).This raises questions about the extent towhich deregulation is a necessary pre-decessor of the sought-after stage ofhigh performance.

This study seeks to examine thevalidity of the assumption that deregu-lation precedes flexibility and high per-formance using a large midwestern city,Indianapolis, the city’s uniformed ser-vices, and its contiguous county (Marion)and county sheriff authority. These

three jurisdictions provide evidence foran alternative model of HRM evolution

in the public sector. We begin with adiscussion of government structure forthe Indianapolis metropolitan region.

FIGURE 1 Path to High Performance



42

Next we describe three distinct models

of personnel policy operating in theregion. Four factors are used to explainthe variations across these models. We

conclude by assessing the lessons of theIndianapolis case, and identify issuesfor further research.

THE CASE OF INDIANAPOLISThe distinctiveness of personnel policyin Indianapolis is not readily explainedby socio-economic factors. The India-napolis metropolitan area falls withinnational norms on most indicators, al-

though it has a lower share of minoritygroup members than other similar-sized

cities. What is unique about the India-napolis case is the uncommon combina-tion of politics, reformism, and person-ality. There is a particularly high level ofpartisan political activity. Fenton (1966)characterized Indiana’s political systemas &dquo;job oriented.&dquo; He noted that the

state institutionalized and accepted prac-tices related to patronage and politicalcontributions that were generally dis-approved elsewhere. Former GovernorMatthew E. Welsh (D) articulates the

positive values of political loyalty sys-tems in his book, View from the StateHouse (1981): &dquo;... the parties must beable to offer the prospect of some re-wards to their workers.&dquo; He further

remarks: &dquo;I am fully aware of the short-comings of the patronage system, but Iwas of the firm opinion it could be madeto work if limited in scope and properlymanaged....&dquo; The idea that patronagepersonnel systems are not compatiblewith high performance organizationswould be rejected by many Hoosiers,even today.

UNIGOV

An important aspect of governance inMarion County, Indiana is its consoli-dated city-county government, calledUnigov. Unigov was created on Janu-ary 2, 1970. The unified governmentmerged 20 city and county departmentsand incorporated 16 towns into India-napolis. Four small cities chose not to beincluded. School districts were not in-

cluded and the county court systemremained intact. For constitutional rea-

sons the county offices of Auditor, Pros-ecutor, Sheriff, Coroner, Recorder, andClerk remained separate. Largely inde-pendent units include the Health andHospital Corporation and the AirportAuthority (Owen and Willbern, 1985).Figure 2 shows the organizational struc-ture of Unigov.

The governments created byUnigov became much more centralizedunder the control of strong mayoralleadership. Six executive departmentswere created. These are the Depart-ments of Administration, Public Safety,Parks and Recreation, MetropolitanDevelopment, Public Works, and Trans-portation. A board of directors over-sees each department. Department di-rectors are appointed and removed bythe mayor. The city currently employsbetween 1800 and 1900 employees, ex-cluding people in police or fire services.A single budget, submitted to the city-county council, Unigov’s governingbody, replaced the fragmented systemof each unit lobbying for annual funds.The unified legislative body has broadresponsibilities in the entire jurisdictiononce controlled by separate boards andcouncils (Owen and Willbem, 1985).The personnel system remained patron-age-based for personnel actions such as



43

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45

hiring and promotion.

PERSONNEL POLICY IN INDIANAPOLISAND MARION COUNTYTo provide context for understandingpast personnel policies, recent develop-ments, and future directions, we inter-viewed Indianapolis City and MarionCounty personnel officials using a semi-structured interview guide. The inter-view guide was organized around per-sonnel issues addressed in the Winter

Commission report and included re-cruitment and selection practices, col-lective bargaining, and the organiza-tional structure for personnel adminis-tration. Information from the inter-

views was supplemented by reviewingdocuments such as collective bargain-ing agreements, employee handbooks,and position announcements. In addi-tion, the incumbent mayor, StephenGoldsmith, his immediate predecessor,William Hudnut, and Hudnut’s direc-tor of administration, Don McPherson,were interviewed.

Table 1 summarizes personnelpolicies for Indianapolis and MarionCounty. The table is organized accord-ing to three models distinguished in thestudy: city of Indianapolis non-uni-formed services; city of Indianapolisuniformed services; and Marion County.For each of these jurisdictions informa-tion is provided on six categories ofpersonnel regulation. These are: hiringand mobility; classification and pay; fir-ing and layoffs; collective bargaining;operating personnel system; and bud-get controls.

COUNTY GOVERNMENT HRM

The county departments left by Unigovinclude those controlled by elected offi-cials and judges (54 separate agencies).These agencies generally handle theirown personnel matters, although a two-person central office exists to processthe initial applicants and channel indi-

viduals to the appropriate department.Hiring selections are now made at theagency level. The system has not been

j &dquo;decentralized&dquo;--in fact, it was never

centralized.At the county level, job applicants

can enter the system through the central

personnel office or through an indi-vidual department. Little testing is done;exceptions are typing tests, some writ-ing samples, and Sheriff’s Department

entrance and promotion testing. Everycandidate meeting the minimum stated

requirements is forwarded for consid-eration. There are 22 different pay gradelevels. A Job Classification Board meetson an ad hoc basis to review new posi-tions and set the disciplinary regula-tions for inclusion in a policy proceduremanual. Use of these procedures isoptional; however, agencies are stronglyencouraged to adopt their own policiesif they choose not to use the countyhandbook. The county employs about2200 people plus about 3850 people inthe largely independent Health andHospital Corporation.

A formal civil service coversSheriff s Department deputies in MarionCounty. Discipline and dismissal mustbe approved by the Merit Board whichalso reviews other grievances and staff-ing questions. Deputies are representedby the Fraternal Order of Police.Veteran’s preference is not required bylaw. About 915 people are employed by



46

the Sheriff’s Department, 120 of whomare non-uniformed personnel.

CITY GOVERNMENT HRMN Non-uniformed personnel. A centralpersonnel office for Indianapolis wasset up after Unigov to streamline andprofessionalize personnel functions.Business influence led to such practicesas performance reviews, managementtraining, exit interviews, and consolida-tion of application procedures (Owenand Willbem, 1985).

The city of Indianapolis maintainsabout a 50/50 split between employeescovered by collective bargaining and allothers (excluding police and fire em-ployees.) There are 18 pay grade classi-fications in the city’s quartile or five-step pay schedule. As in the county,only limited testing is done, and allapplicants meeting the stated minimumqualifications are forwarded to indi-vidual departments. A central person-nel office of about 25 employees (re-duced from 34 in 1991) handles theinitial screening and monitors compli-ance with equal employment opportu-nity requirements. Firing and disciplinewithin the Indianapolis system are atthe pleasure of the mayor and depart-ment heads. Employees covered by Icollective bargaining are not eligible forbinding grievance arbitration. MayorGoldsmith has requested an evaluationand overhaul of the entire personnelsystem in Indianapolis. A consultant isworking with the city reviewing perfor-mance management, team versus lineresponsibilities, broad banding, and payfor performance.

N Uni formed services. All uniformed

police and fire personnel are extensivelytested prior to hiring and promotionand must complete training to be rec-ommended to the Merit Board for finalreview and appointment. Collective

bargaining agreements are negotiatedwith the Fraternal Order of Police and

Indianapolis Professional Fire Fightersfor police and fire fighters, respectively.The Indianapolis Police Departmentemploys 966 uniformed officers withineight ranks and six pay grades and 369non-uniformed personnel. The Fire

Department employs 769, 50 of whomare civilians.

In the Police Department, perfor-mance evaluations were discontinuedin 1984 because the mayor and the chief

thought personality played too much apart in the process. Firing is possibleafter an extensive process of internal

investigation, involvement of the pros-ecutor, chief, Board of Captains, and theMerit Board. The department is consid-ering instituting some new managementtechniques such as career pathing andskill-based pay.

A source of external influence

upon the uniformed services is consentdecrees negotiated with the U.S. JusticeDepartment in 1978-79. The decreesinvolved hiring and promotion prac-tices for minorities and women in the

police and fire departments. Under

Mayor Hudnut, short and long-termgoals were worked out to increase mi-nority and female participation; by 1985significant progress had been made inboth departments. The Justice Depart-ment, however, filed a motion that yearto modify the decrees to eliminate hir-ing goals. The mayor responded:



47

I tried to explain that ratherthan envisioning our hiring andpromoting policies as a verti-cal list where better qualifiedwhite males were passed overto get to less qualified femalesand minorities, we should thinkin terms of a circle, everyoneinside that circle being equallyqualified and nobody being’passed over’ in the selection

process (Hudnut, 1987: 157).

After more than a year of negotia-tion, Indianapolis prevailed and the Jus-tice Department quietly dropped theissue. Consent decrees are still in effect,although recent concerns about &dquo;reversediscrimination&dquo; have forced the depart-ment to select from the top of the list in

promotions.

UNDERSTANDING WHY INDIANAPOLISIS DIFFERENTThe description of the three models ofHRM policy raises some intriguing is-sues relevant to the findings and recom-mendations of the Winter Commission.

Using the Winter Commission’s reportas a benchmark, the Indianapolis casepresents two anomalies. The first can betermed the non-regulation anomaly. Itrepresents the relative absence of civilservice regulation-for example, selec-tion testing, veterans preference, andseniority-based preferences-that theWinter Commission recommended

eliminating or diminishing whereverpossible. Among the three models, In-dianapolis uniformed services comeclosest to traditional civil service regu-lation.’

The second anomaly, termed the

diversity anomaly, represents the rangein personnel policy and philosophieswithin a single metropolitan region.Within Indianapolis and Marion Countythree quite different models co-exist.The anomaly is especially noteworthyin that Indianapolis is one of only ahandful of consolidated city-countygovernments in the country.

What accounts for these dual

anomalies? The answer is complex andembedded in history, politics, and per-sonalities. Four factors are put forwardas offering partial explanation of thedual anomalies.

EXPLANATORY FACTORS

N Respect for tradition. In his 1986 Indianahistory, James Madison attempted todescribe the characteristics that make

Hoosiers distinctive. The main distinc-

tion is that Hoosiers are conservative in

the classic sense, preservers of tradition.

Madison (1986: 319) wrote:

Often the traits outsiders

criticized Hoosiers celebrated.

This was particularly true ofthe attachment to rural and

small-town life. Increasinglyin the twentieth centuryIndianans venerated values

and lifestyles they saw as anti-thetical to urban, industrialAmerica.

Among the by-products of theHoosier culture are a skepticism aboutinnovation, a respect for tradition, and,when change is accepted, an effort toblend old and new.

The Hoosier respect for traditionhas been a powerful force in both slow-



48

ing and shaping the move from patron-age to professionalism. It is manifest in

the blending of elements of patronageand professionalism over the years.Until William Hudnut became India-

napolis’ mayor in 1976, prospectiveemployees were required to obtain for-mal political clearances from ward chair-man. Incumbent employees were ex-pected to work at the polls and pay 2%of their wages as patronage money,2which was collected by city employeeson city time. The Hudnut administra-tion changed these practices, but theywere not abandoned entirely. Clear-

ance forms were eliminated but pollwork and the 2% patronage fee became

voluntary. According to union officials,both parties continue to base some staff-ing decisions on political affiliation.Rather than city employees collectingthe fee on city time, employees couldelect to pay the 2% fee through payrolldeduction. Mayor Hudnut (1993) de-scribed the blending:

There is always a strongdialectic running between pro-fessionalism on the one hand

and politics on the other....Inthe Parks Department we al-

ways ran into this, peoplewould say, &dquo;I don’t have to

work at the polls, I’m a profes-sional.&dquo; But we tried to en-

courage people to work at the

polls, particularly higher uppeople, and be contributors tothe party, but it was not coer-cive.

N Partisanship and political competi-tion. The historian James Madison(1986: 321 ) suggests that interest in poli-

tics is another defining attribute of Indi-ana culture: &dquo;They [Indianans] cel-ebrated the broad and intense popularinterest in politics as an expression oftheir determination to direct and con-

trol their individual and communitylives.&dquo; The longevity of patronage andthe slow movement toward alternative

systems is a reflection of the strength ofpartisan politics in Indiana. The electionof city-county council members on apartisan basis is a reminder of the con-tinued importance of political parties inIndiana. Former Mayor Hudnutsummed up: &dquo;In most other placespartisan politics does not run in suchhigh gear as it does here.&dquo;

Although partisanship accountsfor some of the reluctance to regulatepersonnel policy, variations in partycompetition also explain diversity inpractices among jurisdictions. There isa particularly high level of two-partypolitical activity in Indiana. As CharlesHyneman observed, &dquo;Indiana is a two-party state--all over, all the time, and in

respect to every kind of activity&dquo;(Hyneman et al.,1979: 26). A high levelof two-party competitiveness might alsoreduce the level of politicization to theextent that public leaders anticipate afrequent exchange of power and thus aneed to be able to cooperate.3 MayorsHudnut and Goldsmith asserted that

greater party competition has led India-napolis to take a less political coursethan county agencies.

N Political power. The divergenceamong HRM systems is a story of politi-cal power. Under the 1969 Unigovstatute, a single executive, the mayor,was given substantial authority over sixcombined executive departments. Butthe mayor is only one of many indepen-



49

dently elected officials in Marion County.Thus, while the mayor controls six con-solidated city-county departments,elected officials (excluding judges) headnine other traditionally county-baseddepartments, including the Sheriff’sOffice.

Authority for HRM policy in thecity of Indianapolis is delegated by thecity-county council to the mayor. Thecounty has no parallel executive author-ity structure, however, so HRM policyis vested in each independently electedofficial. This generates powerful cen-trifugal forces among county agenciesthat overwhelm any attempts at coordi-nation. Others concur. The situation

has been described by Tilton (1992) as aseries of fiefdoms, each with its ownrules and practices. Don McPherson,Hudnut’s director of administration,alluded to the enormous difficulties of

coordinating across county units:

On the city side we still hada mayor who could tell a direc-

tor one thing or another. But

who tells the judges? Even ifyou get the county-elected ad-ministrative officials to agree,

you have this other group who

is actually another separateentity in government. Theyare rarely willing to go along.

The mix of HRM policy has beenfurther influenced by the independentpolitical strength of police and fire em-ployees. State law secures some provi-sions of the civil service structure, such

as the Merit Board. Political maneuver-

ing to secure Unigov’s passage gavefurther impetus to the special personnel

system governing city uniformed em-ployees. Owen and Willbern (1985:139)write:

A large portion of the

Unigov Act’s language is oc-

cupied with regulations andreforms for the fire and policeagencies, including provisionsstrengthening the merit and

professional aspects of theseservices. Inclusion of these

long-sought provisions in theact enabled Unigov’s sponsorsto secure fire and police sup-port for the bill.

The personnel requirements em-bedded in Unigov were never static.&dquo;As in other major cities, the Indianapo-lis police department has been a specialcenter of controversy, and the rules gov-erning its personnel continue to bechanged&dquo; (Owen and Willbern, 1985:164). Although union interests havepromoted passage of a state collectivebargaining statute for public employ-ees, it is not part of the present legalframework for Indiana local govern-ments.4 4 Nevertheless, the uniformedservices and about half of the city workforce are sufficiently powerful to havebeen granted collective bargaining bycity officials. County employees, withthe exception of the sheriff’s depart-ment, have not secured bargainingrights. The lack of statutory authoriza-tion for collective bargaining means thatthe process proceeds at the discretion ofmanagement under ground rules thatthey largely control. The advantage ofthe current institutional rules is clear to

Mayor Goldsmith: &dquo;If we were highlyrestricted by a set of state collective



50

bargaining statutes with a lot of work /rules, bargaining restrictions, it would Ibe very disruptive.&dquo;

’

N Leadership styles and personali-ties. For non-uniformed city employees,the lack of civil service regulation haspermitted the mayor to put his personalstamp on HRM policy. The past threeIndianapolis mayors since Unigov wasenacted have been highly attentive towhat they perceived to be the pressingadministrative problems of their day.During Richard Lugar’s mayoralty (inthe 1960s and 1970s) these problemshad less to do with personnel than withorganizational arrangements. The es-tablishment of Unigov received top pri-ority. Personnel policy reached themayor’s agenda only to the extent that itbecame instrumental for Unigov’s pas-sage. As noted above, the merit systemfor police and fire was strengthened asa consequence of political bargainingabout Unigov. For the most part, how-ever, Lugar left HRM issues to Republi- Ican Party County Chairman Keith Bulen,who arranged appointments to boardsand agencies and generally was respon-sible for operating the political machine.

Although HRM policy was not ahigh priority for Lugar, his adminis-tration’s action laid the groundwork forhis successors. Don McPherson (1993)

acknowledged the debt to Lugar: &dquo;Dick

spent, and his staff spent, a lot of time

putting the structure together whichhelped us when we were finally in theadministrative position.&dquo;

The reforms Hudnut introducedwere facilitated by a fortuitous changein personalities heading the RepublicanParty. In 1974, two years before Hudnutbecame mayor, John Sweezy succeededKeith Bulen as party chair. The succes- I

sion represented a shift in how the partyoperated. Hudnut (1993) reflected onthe opportunities created by the change:

Much that I did with the

county chairman that I had, Icould probably not have doneunder these people. Keith wasa fine county chairman, but hewas much more heavy handedin terms of dictating and inter-fering in City Hall operationsand politicizing the operation.

Personnel policy found its way tothe top of the Hudnut agenda largelybecause Hudnut believed that

professionalizationand depoliticizationwere the right things to do. His focus ondoing the &dquo;right&dquo; thing may largely be aresult of his training as a minister(Hudnut, 1987), but it also comes from

recognizing the inevitability of

depoliticization. Hudnut recounted:

The times were changingand the old-style &dquo;Mayor Daleyapproach&dquo; to politics and to

governance was windingdown and there was a new

management philosophy com-

ing in. [Perhaps] partially as areflection of my own feelingsand partially as a reaction towhat was beginning to developacross the country, we wentwith the depoliticization.

One of the reforms that Hudnut

advanced was a movement toward pay

equity through accurate job evaluationand consistent internal alignment. Al-though this reform came during a pe-riod when many jurisdictions were ap-



51

plying formal job evaluation plans to /achieve greater internal pay equity, it Ialso reflected his notion of trust with itcity employees and his belief that the city should function as a single em- ~,ployer. )

Just as the lack of regulation per- /mitted Hudnut to introduce changesbased on his management philosophy,so too is the current mayor reformingthe system to correspond with his man-agement preferences. An absence of

barriers enabled Mayor Goldsmith toattempt to initiate his own version of re-invented government. As Goldsmithclaims:

We may be good comparedto the rest of the world but

we’re awful compared to pri-vate industry, and we want toemulate private enterprise andnot government. We are in the

process of blowing up our en-tire system: trying to drop abomb in it, broad band it, cre-

ating teams instead of job clas-sifications, moving to pay-for-performance systems.

Goldsmith’s reforms are project-oriented, striving toward the goal ofgreater privatization. HRM issues areseen as important in relation to achiev-ing that goal. I

The recent history of mayoral in-volvement in administrative issues re-

flects a sequential attention to prob-lems : Lugar tended to issues of organi-zational structure; Hudnut to profes-sionalization, and Goldsmith to innova-tion and privatization. The nature of

their involvements reflects variability inleadership styles and personal beliefs

about government’s role. In the currentreformist environment where cost sav-

ings is tantamount to good governmentpublic employees bear the full burden ofthe drive for efficiency. Regardless ofstylistic or substantive differences, how-ever, the mayors shared a commitment

to good government as they under-stood it.

To summarize, four explanatoryfactors appear to have strongly influ-enced the non-regulation and diversityanomalies that characterize personnelpolicy among governmental units inMarion County. The Indiana politicalculture’s adherence to tradition and

popular control have dampened prefer-ences for Progressive-era civil servicereform and slowed the transition to

professionalism. Strong partisanshipand political competition and the po-litical power of groups such as policeand fire fighters have also influencedthe evolution of personnel policy in In-dianapolis. Finally, strong, reformistleadership has kept the city responsiveto new governance and managerial ap-proaches.

CONCLUSIONLocal governments in the Indianapolisarea have taken a path different frommany others. They did not reject pa-tronage and embrace civil service re-form as many other governments did inthe early part of this century. Instead

they have sought to blend political andbusiness ways of conducting the tasksof government. The result is that thebureaucratic barriers that the Winter

Commission recommends removinghad never become entrenched, and thusare not impediments for most govern-



52

ments in Marion County.Can the flexibility inherent in the

Unigov case be replicated elsewhere?The flexibility emanates from a

confluence of factors that would be dif-

ficult to replicate. Among the factors arean absence of pervasive civil serviceregulation, a state collective bargaining Istatute that does not impede local con- Itrol, and a political culture that valuespartisanship and political responsive-ness. Although it might be possible toeliminate civil service rules, the otherfactors, particularly political culture, andweak union power, cannot be readilycaptured through conscious design.

What lessons might be drawn fromthe Indianapolis case? One is that a lackof barriers does not assure movement

toward the high performance model.Civil service barriers may partly limitthe extent to which mayors and other

executives can experiment with con-temporary public management trendsor be responsive to the demands forlower costs from taxpayers or custom-ers. As Mayor Goldsmith himself ob-served : &dquo;The system we have de-

signed--if you have progressive cityleadership--is great. If you have non-

progressive leadership it’s probablymore easily manipulated.&dquo;

Another lesson is that flexibility issubstantially increased where manag-ers are not subject to dual personnelsystems of collective bargaining andcivil service regulation. Collective bar-gaining agreements cover most aspectsof the employment relationship wherethey are in force in Indianapolis. This

unitary personnel system seems to besuperior to the dual personnel systemsthat Joel Douglas (1992: 169) argues &dquo;is

an option widely followed yet not rec-

ommended.&dquo; The lesson is that civil

service regulation could be largely dis-placed by collective bargaining withoutdiminishing, and possibly enhancing,the potential for high performance.

Some areas where further researchis needed became obvious in the courseof the study. Foremost among these isresearch to compile evidence about theeffectiveness and success of various ef-forts to &dquo;make government more likebusiness.&dquo; Information pertaining to arange of different outcomes should beaccumulated. These indicators should

reflect different perspectives includingthose of management, taxpayers, andservice recipients. Some evidence abouthow well public employees as a groupfare under non-regulated environmentsas well as the extent to which publicorganizations are able to recruit andretain professionally trained staff mightalso provide insight into the benefitsand costs of non-regulation.

A second area for further research

involves configurations of local and stategovernment personnel systems. Threemodels were identified in this limited

examination. Future research should

explore the extent to which other mod-els exist and the way they are structured(Morgan and Perry, 1988). Research

about factors appropriate for compar-ing models and ways to operationalizethem would provide the foundation forpolicy-relevant knowledge.

A third task for further research is

to explore the way environmental fac-tors such as political culture and leader-ship styles influence the performanceand evolution of personnel systems.Research might examine the extent towhich environmental factors produceconsistent outcomes regarding the struc-



53

ture of personnel management and theextent to which environmental factors

limit the transferability of differentmodels.

This study suggests that politicalresponsiveness and merit can be blendedunder the right circumstances. The keyto blending is finding a reasonable bal-ance between the traditions of politicalresponsiveness and merit for managingstate and local government human re-sources. The case of Indianapolis sug-gests that finding the balance will beinfluenced by external factors such aspolitical culture, partisanship and po-litical competition, and political power,and by such internal factors as leader-ship styles and personalities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS*The authors are grateful to C. James

Owen, Frank J. Thompson, and YorkWillbern for their helpful comments on anearlier draft. Authors are listed randomlyto denote equal contribution.

NOTES1Even the merit boards overseeing

police, fire, and sheriffs’ appointments arenot authorized locally. The merit boardsare mandated by state law.2The practice of paying 2% of wages

to the party was known widely as the TwoPercent Club (Madison, 1986).3The effects of political competition

on institutional design have been mentionedin both the civil service and organizationalliterature. For example, Van Riper (1958)attributed the motivation to pass the

Pendleton Act to Republican apprehensionabout the 1884 elections after they had suf-fered reverses in the 1882 elections. Passing

the Pendleton Act in 1883 assured the Re-

publicans that if the Democrats prevailed inthe 1884 elections their "spoils" would beheld in check by new civil service rules.Moe (1990) recently addressed the generalrelationship between politics and institu-tional design with arguments consistentwith those we advance here.

4The lack of a statute for public em-

ployees can be attributed to the publics’ and

legislature’s fears about increased taxes andlost control.

REFERENCESBan, C. and N. Riccucci (1993). "Personnel

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Goldsmith, S. (1993). Interview. October

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