review of norwegian development assistance to afghanistan ... · sustainable and just development,...

C M I R E P O RT R 2 0 1 6 : 0 4 F E B RUA RY 2 0 1 6

Review of Norwegian development assistance to Afghanistan 2011–2014

Commissioned by the Norwegian Commission for Afghanistan

Arne StrandDeputy Director, Research Director

Nils TaxellSenior Advisor

AUTHOR S

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TableofContentsAbbreviations......................................................................................................................................................3

ExecutiveSummary.............................................................................................................................................5

Introductionandmethodology.........................................................................................................................10

Contextualchanges2011-2014........................................................................................................................11

Overviewofdevelopmentassistance2011-2014.............................................................................................13

Assessmentofhowevaluationrecommendationswerefollowedup..............................................................17

ManagementofNorwegianDevelopmentFunds.............................................................................................22

Trends,prioritisation,thematicfocusandimplementingpartners.............................................................22

Basesforadjustmentofthemes,partnersandfunding...............................................................................26

Extentoffollow-upofthe2011evaluationandinternalstrategy/plans.....................................................26

Engagementwithandsupportandevaluationofimplementingpartners..................................................27

Norway’sabilitytorespondtochangingcircumstancesaffectingdevelopmentassistance.......................29

Norway’scoordinationwithotherdonors...................................................................................................30

NorwayasdonorcomparedwithSwedenandDenmark.............................................................................32

NorwegiandevelopmentassistanceinAfghanistan2011-14andtheresults..................................................36

ReviewofNGOsandtheiractivities..................................................................................................................36

AssessmentofNGOactivities.......................................................................................................................43

ReviewofTrustFunds.......................................................................................................................................45

AfghanReconstructionTrustFund...............................................................................................................45

LawandOrderTrustFund............................................................................................................................46

Tawanmandi.................................................................................................................................................47

M&EandAnti-CorruptionProcedures..............................................................................................................48

Monitoring&Evaluation..............................................................................................................................48

Anti-corruptionprocedures..........................................................................................................................49

Casestudies......................................................................................................................................................51

Education......................................................................................................................................................51

RuralDevelopment.......................................................................................................................................55

GoodGovernance.........................................................................................................................................58

Lessonslearnedandrecommendations...........................................................................................................60

AnnexI:Interviewlist.......................................................................................................................................64

AnnexII:TermsofReference............................................................................................................................66

AnnexIII:NGOprofiles.....................................................................................................................................70

AnnexIV:Keydocumentsreviewed.................................................................................................................73

AnnexV:ExampleofTheoryofChange............................................................................................................77

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Abbreviations

ACTED AgencyforTechnicalCooperationandDevelopment

AIHRC AfghanistanIndependentHumanRightsCommission

AKF AgaKhanFoundation

ANDS AfghanNationalDevelopmentStrategy

ARTF AfghanistanReconstructionTrustFund

ASGP AfghanistanSubNationalGovernanceProgramme

CDC CommunityDevelopmentCouncil

CSO Civilsocietyorganization

DACAAR DanishCommitteeforAidtoAfghanRefugees

DDC DistrictDevelopmentCouncil

ECC EducationCoordinationCommittee

ELECT EnhancingLegalandElectoralCapacityforTomorrow

EQUIP EducationQualityImprovementProgram

FAO FoodandAgricultureOrganisation

GoIRA GovernmentoftheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistan

ICRC InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross

IDLG IndependentDirectorateofLocalGovernance

IDP InternallyDisplacedPerson

IS IslamicState

IWA IntegrityWatchAfghanistan

LOFTA LawandOrderTrustFund

M&E MonitoringandEvaluation

MEC IndependentJointAnti-CorruptionMonitoringandEvaluationCommittee

MFA MinistryofForeignAffairs

MoE MinistryofEducation

MoF MinistryofFinance

MRRD MinistryforRuralRehabilitationandDevelopment

NABDP NationalAreaBasedDevelopmentProgramme

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NAC NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

NCA NorwegianChurchAid

NGO Non-governmentalOrganisation

Norad NorwegianAgencyfordevelopmentCooperation

NORCROSS NorwegianRedCross

NORDIC+ Norway,Sweden,Denmark,IcelandandFinland,andoccasionallyothercountries

NPP NationalPriorityProgram

NRC NorwegianRefugeeCouncil

NSP NationalSolidarityProgram

OCHA OfficeforCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

PRT ProvincialReconstructionTeam

Sida SwedishInternationalDevelopmentCooperation

SIGAR SpecialInspectorGeneralforAfghanistanReconstruction

SRSG SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretaryGeneral

TMAF TokyoMutualAccountabilityFramework

ToR TermsofReference

UNAMA UnitedNationsAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan

UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees

UNICEF UnitedNationsChildren’sFund

UNOCHA UNOfficeforCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

UNODC UNOfficeonDrugsandCrime

WASH WaterSanitationandHygieneEducation

WB WorldBank

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ExecutiveSummaryThisreviewwascommissionedbytheNorwegianCommissionforAfghanistanwiththeaimtoassessthe2011–2014NorwegianDevelopmentAssistancetoAfghanistan.Thepurposewasthree-fold:

1) Provide an assessmentof how theMinistryof ForeignAffairs (MFA)has responded to therecommendations from the 2012 Norad evaluation of Norwegian aid to Afghanistan, andhowtheNorwegianaidhasbeenalignedtoMFAstrategiesandinternalguidelines.

2) ProvideanoverviewofNorwegiandevelopmentassistanceinAfghanistanduringthe2011–14periodand,wherepossible,identifytheirshortand(expected)long-termresults.

3) ProviderecommendationsforfurtherdevelopmentcooperationinAfghanistan.Specifically,theteamswasaskedtoreviewthemanagementoftheNorwegianDevelopmentFunds,and the contributionof implementingpartners,with respect to the concrete short and (expected)longtermresultstheyhavegeneratedintheperiodunderreview.The Terms of Reference (ToR) request an analysis of trends in the period 2011–2014 in terms ofprioritization and selection of thematic focus and implementing partners. They also ask for anassessment of the degree to which these meet the overall Norwegian development goals of: 1)strengthening Afghan institutions; 2) contributing to a political settlement; and 3) contributing tosustainable and just development, humanitarian efforts, and to the promotion of the governance,human rights and gender equality agendas. Thematic priority areaswere: a) good governance; b)education;andc)ruraldevelopment.

Major contextual changes took place in Afghanistan during the period under review. The securitysituationworsened throughout the country, and the economy stagnated. Together, these changesresultedinincreasingchallengesfortheimplementationofdevelopmentprogrammesandprojects.These circumstances also applied to the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of Norwegian fundedassistance.

Norwegian development funding to Afghanistan totalled NOK 5,363million for the period 2001–2011, and NOK 3,008million for the period 2011–2014. The annual disbursement over these lastyearswasapproximatelyNOK750million.

Duringtheperiodunderreview,multilateralorganisations(theWorldBankandtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentFund)remainedthemainfundingchannelsforNorwegiandevelopmentaid,receiving55% of the total assistance. Forty per cent was channelled through Norwegian, international andAfghanNGOspartners.Therewasanincreaseinsupportforeconomicdevelopmentandtrade(56%of total funding), and a substantial reduction in emergency response assistance (13% of totalfunding)comparedtothepreviousperiod(2001–2011).

Akeyfindingfromthe2012Noradevaluationoftheperiod2001–2011wasthatNorway’spolicyandinterventions“matchcloselytheinternationalagendaforAfghanistanandwithinthatframeworkitsdevelopment agenda is certainly relevant”. The evaluation found alignmentwith Afghan prioritiesconsistently high on theNorwegian agenda, and the choice of aid channels remarkably consistentovertheyears.Theevaluatorswere,however,oftheopinionthat“limitedadministrativecapacity(attheEmbassy)isoneclearreasonwhypoliciesareweakontheoperationalside”.

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The2012evaluation foundthatNorwegiandevelopmentmaderealachievements inoutput terms,butthat“thereisstilllimitedevidenceofconcreteoutcomes”.ThereportfounditdifficulttoidentifytheimpactoftheNorwegianassistance.Itsmainrecommendationwasthat“NorwayshouldrethinkitsstrategyandaidprogrammingforfutureengagementinAfghanistan”.ThisreviewhasfoundthattheMFAandtheKabulEmbassyadoptedspecificmeasuresinresponsetothereport.Thesemeasuresincludedoperationalresponsestoseveraloftherecommendations.TheMFAandtheKabulEmbassy,however,alsodisagreedwithsomeofthefindings.Furthermore,onthebasisoftherecommendations,theycarriedoutaclosedialoguewiththeWorldBank(WB)managedAfghanReconstructionTrustFund(ARTF)andtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and the funded Non-GovernmentalOrganizations(NGOs),ontheneedtodevelopa)baselinestudies,b)anti-corruptionstrategiesandtools,andc)plansandinitiativesformonitoringandexternalevaluations.MostNGOpartnersreportcompliancewiththese,andsomeofthemalsodevelopedtheoriesofchange.This review found that therewas a process underwaywell before 2011 to focus and reduce thenumberofdevelopmentpartners andprojects involvedwithin the givenbudget. Therewas also astrongemphasis instrategydocuments,and intheEmbassy’sannual“Virksomhetsplan”tosupportthedialoguewiththeAfghangovernmentandtodevelopthecapacityof itsministries“tomanagetheirowndevelopment”. The selectionof thematic focusand implementingpartners in the2011–2014periodwasbasedon:

1) AdherencetotheNorwegianstrategyforthedevelopmentassistancetoAfghanistan.2) Adherence to the requirements set in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework

(TMAF)toaligndonorfundingwithnationalpriorities.3) Awishtoreducethenumberofprojects/programmeswithinthegiventhematicareas,

andtochannelmoreaidthroughtrustfundsinordertoreducethemanagementburdenattheEmbassy/MFA.

4) ThegoalofminimizingexposuretocorruptionrisksandallowingforastrongerfocusonM&Eintheremainingprojects/programmes.

5) AreductioninthenumberofNorwegianstaffhandlingthedevelopmentportfolioattheNorwegianEmbassyand,from2013,ashiftinthemanagementroleoftheEmbassywithgreaterresponsibilityshiftedtoOslo(MFAandNorad).

6) Acontinuationoffocusareasandaidchannels,althoughwithahigherpriorityonARTFandareductioninNGOfunding.

The closureof theProvincialReconstructionTeam in Faryab in2013meant that theDevelopmentAdvisor positions inMeymanehdisappeared, thereby ending the Embassypresence in the field aswellastheregularfield-visitsfromEmbassystaff.ThegradualreductionofNorwegiandevelopment-relatedpositionsattheKabulEmbassyfrom2013onwards,andtheabolishmentoftheNorwegiandevelopment councillor position since the end of 2014, reduced substantially Norway’s ability toengageindevelopmentpolicyprocessesinKabul.

The review has found that the Embassy, MFA and Norad have had a sustained and activeengagementwithimplementingpartners,not leasttoensurecompliancewiththeTMAF.However,

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the contact at/with the Embassy on development issues—as well as the capacity to take part instrategic and more technical coordination efforts—decreased after the reduction in Norwegiandevelopment staff and finally the withdrawal of the Norwegian development councillor. Severalpersons interviewed suggested that Norway could have taken a more proactive role in initiatingindependentM&E activities, including those of the Trust Funds and their implementingMinistriesand partners. The Embassy suggested here to make use of Afghan consultants and researchinstitutes,whichwouldalsocontributetobuildtheircapacity.

The review has found that Norway has been a very responsible partner of the Government ofAfghanistan,throughactivedialoguewiththeadministrationandthevariousMinistriesandthroughcompliancewiththeTMAF.ThroughitsinvolvementinandperiodicleadershipoftheNordic+groupofdonors,Norwaywasabletoinfluencedevelopmentpolicybeyondwhatwouldhavebeenpossiblehad Norway acted on its own. More active use of Norad by the Embassy during 2012–2014 foradvisementandprocess inputhelped insecuringthequalityofthedevelopmentmanagementandactivities.The review concludes that Norwegian aid was highly relevant in terms of focus and selection ofintervention areas. The balance between multilateral and bilateral channels ensures support toprojectsofnationalpriorityandimportance,whilealsoallowingfordiversificationandriskreductionthroughthefundingforNGOs.Thereviewteam’smainconcernisthattheselectionofimplementingpartnersbecamelessinnovativeovertheseyearsasnonewpartners(neitherAfghanNGOsnorcivilsocietyorganisations)weresupported,butleftforthecivilsocietytrustfundTawanmanditofinance.ThisstrategynowposesamajorchallengeasfundingforTawanmandiwasterminatedbymid-2015.There are considerable similarities in the focus, priorities and approaches of Norway and Swedenduring this period, and they also came to apply to Denmark, which concluded its direct budgetsupporttoandpresenceintheMinistryofEducation.AllthreecountriessigneduptotheTMAFandworked actively through the Nordic+ group towards its implementation. NGOs from all threecountries have had a long and sustained presence in Afghanistan, and have received substantialdonorsupportthroughoutthereviewperiod– includingfundingfromdifferentNordicdonors.Themaindifferences are foundbetweenSwedenandNorwaywhen it comes to themanagement andmonitoringofthedevelopmentassistance.ForSweden,theresponsibilityformanagingdevelopmentaid is primarily delegated to the Swedish Embassy in Kabul.Norwayhasdivided thismanagementresponsibilitybetweendifferentsectionsinMFAandNoradsince2013.SwedenhasfiveSwedishaidofficialsandtwolocallyrecruiteddevelopmentadvisorsbasedattheEmbassy.Swedenthereforehasmorecapacity todo fieldmonitoringand toengagewithauthoritiesatdifferent levels, generatingupdated information and knowledge they can bring into the dialogue with other donors and theAfghangovernment.

TheNorwegiansupportforNGOsgoesprimarilytowardsprojectswithinthethreepriorityareasofNorwegian engagement. A review of NGO priorities and activities showed: involvement in servicedelivery;tovaryingdegreesprioritygiventocapacitybuildingforgovernmentandAfghanNGOsandcivilsociety;abilitytobuildnationalownershipthroughsomeprogrammers;andvaryingdegreesofattention to gender issues, with some very innovative projects. The NGOs have the capacity toprovideflexibleresponsestosuddenchangesinthecontextofhumanitarianassistance,forexampleafternaturaldisastersandinternaldisplacements.

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With some variation, all NGOs receiving Norwegian aid undertake conflict analysis and havedevelopedriskmitigationplans,whichpotentiallymakesthembetterpreparedtomitigaterisksandcorruptionchallengesthantheywerein2011.MostofthedevelopmentorientedNGOshavedonebaseline surveys--including some that are very extensive and involve local communities andgovernmentrepresentatives--,andsomeoftheseNGOshavealsodevelopedatheoryofchangetoguidetheirinterventions.Mostofthemprioritizecapacitybuildingandnationalownership,althoughthe extent of inclusion of government staff and capacity development varies. All NGOs report onresults against plan, and some also report on project impact or detail the expected impact of theassistance.However,thisreporting istypicallymoreacaseof isolatedexamplesthanofsystematicreportingandimpactassessment.

AreviewofthethreeTrustFundssupported(ARTF,LOTFAandTawanmandi)showsmorevariationintheresultsofNorwegiansupport.Norwegianpolicyguidelinesemphasizetheneedforfundingandsupportforcivilsociety.However,thesupportchannelledtotheTawanmandifundwasterminated,effectivemid-2015.Theargumentwasthatthetrustfundhadnotdeliveredonprogramobjectivesandexpectations,primarilyduetoweakperformanceofthemanagementagent. Still,asstated inoneofthe interviews:supportforAfghanmediaandanti-corruptionorganisationsmayhavehadagreater impact on fighting corruption through public disclosure, than support for anti-corruptionmeasuresprovidedtoAfghangovernmentinstitutions.

SupporttoARTFandLOTFAhascontinuedthroughoutthereviewperiod,despitesomeirregularitiesidentified in themanagement of LOTFA funds. Norway played an active role together with otherdevelopmentpartnerstostrengthensafeguardsinLOTFA,aswellastoimproveM&EandreportingagainstresultsinbothLOTFAandARTF.

Overall,wefindthatMFA/NoradandtheEmbassyinKabulhavedonewhattheycouldtoaddresstheshortcomings that the 2001–2011 evaluation identified in terms of M&E, impact reporting andminimizing risks of corruption, given the challenging context and limited number of staff on theground.Thatsaid,itwasnotedthatNorwaycouldhavedonemoretoinitiateitsownM&Eactivities,butnonethelessthequalityofpartners’systemsandsafeguards improvedduringtheperiodunderreview.

Theteamspecificallyreviewedsupporttogoodgovernance,educationandruraldevelopment.Wefound that the interventionswere relevant and that implementations progressed satisfactory andplannedoutputswerebeingachieved.Theexampleof IntegrityWatchAfghanistan is illustrativeofthe potential effect of what initially was just limited and time-bound Embassy support for aninnovativeidea.

Norway’s support to the Afghan education sector was provided through the ARTF-managedEducationQualityImprovementProgramme(EQUIP)andNGOs,andthroughtheGlobalPartnershipfor Education. The Embassy also participated actively in technical groups and coordination bodiesuntil thecapacitywas reducedat theKabulEmbassy.DespiteNorwegianand internationalefforts,the statusbymid-2015 isa continuedneed for capacitydevelopment in theMinistryofEducationand, equally important, for increased teacher training to ensure implementation capacity andimproved quality. There is also a need for close on-going follow-up and monitoring of ARTF andEQUIPfunding,tocounterconcernsaboutcorruptionandinflatedstudentandschoolnumbers,andtoensurecontinuedattentiontoqualityimprovement.

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In the rural development sector, Norway supported the National Solidarity Programme (NSP),international, Norwegian and Afghan (partner) NGOs, the UN Food and Agriculture Project (FAO)“PromotingIntegratedPestManagementinAfghanistan”,andNORPLAN’sdocumentationofAfghanhydrogeology.We found that the international andNorwegian support for rural development hasyielded extensive results, and some documented impacts, including some in the area ofwomen’srolesanddevelopmentopportunitiesandinthestrengtheningofAfghancivilsociety.

Taken together, there have been documented outcomes and results from the Norwegian annualdevelopment assistance of NOK 750 million, distributed through different channels and with theinvolvementofheAfghangovernmentandvariousministries.There isa request frompartners forthecontinuationofpredictableandflexiblefundinginthecomingyears,whereasseniorNorwegianbureaucrats recommend more attention be placed on addressing corruption challenges (and onindividualsinfluencingthem)toensurethattheNorwegianassistancemeetsrequiredneedsandthejointlyagreeddevelopmentgoals.

Ourconcernisthatsince2013Norwegian“ontheground”managementcapacityinAfghanistanhasbeen reduced, and replaced by a much more fragmented aid management system. Contractresponsibility has been divided between Norad and MFA, but we struggle to identify where theresponsibilityrestsforinitiatingstrategydebatesandM&Einitiatives.

Thissituation isaconcernaswerecognizetwoclearneeds inthe increasinglychallengingpolitical,securityanddevelopmentcontextofAfghanistan.Thefirstone isthatM&Eshouldnotbe leftasaresponsibilityonlyofNorway’simplementingpartners,butshouldbecomplementedbyindependentfieldmonitoringandevaluations.Norwaywouldnothavetocarryoutthisoversightmeasuresonitsown.Itislikelytohavegreaterimpactandbemorecost-effectiveifdoneinpartnershipwithotherdonorsandusingnewM&Etechniques,includingcommunitybasedmonitoring.Thesecondneedisfor continued on the ground strategic and project related “development dialogue” with theGovernmentofAfghanistan,otherdonors,trustfunds,NGOsandcivilsocietyorganisations.Havingsufficient and skilled Embassy staffingwould help ensure that there is a capacity for learning, formakingadjustmentsandforsecuringimpactclosetowherethechangesaretakingplace.ThiswouldcontributetomakingthebestuseofNorwegianfundinginanunpredictableandconstantlychangingcontext.

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IntroductionandmethodologyThis report isa reviewfor theNorwegianCommission forAfghanistanonNorwegianDevelopmentAssistancetoAfghanistanfortheperiod2011-2014.AsdefinedbytheTermsofReference(ToR;seeAnnexII),thepurposeofthisstudyisthree-fold:

1) Assess the follow-up to the recommendations from the Norad-report, including MFAstrategiesandinternalguidelines.

2) DevelopanoverviewoftheNorwegiandevelopmentassistanceinAfghanistan2011-14and,wherepossible,itsshortand(expected)long-termresults.

3) ProviderecommendationsforfurtherdevelopmentcooperationinAfghanistan.Thereviewisbasedonacombinationofpubliclyavailableinformation,documentsreceivedfromtheCommissionsSecretariat(includingtheNorwegianKabulEmbassy’stri-annualstrategiesandannualplans), reports from the various implementing partners and interviews with key informants.Interviewees include staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Norwegian Agency forDevelopmentCooperation(Norad)inOslo;staffoftheNorwegianEmbassyinKabul;representativesfrom non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Oslo and Kabul; staff of the Danish and SwedishEmbassies in Kabul, and World Bank (WB) staff administrating the Afghan Reconstruction andDevelopmentFund(ARTF)inKabul(thelistofinterviewsisenclosedasAnnexI).TheUnitedNationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP), which administers the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) forAfghanistan,didnot respond to requests for interviewsmadeby theEmbassy inKabul.Therefore,ourassessmentofLOTFAisbasedonreportsandinterviewswithMFAandNoradstaff.

Theteamoperated inKabulunderthesecurityregulationsof theNorwegian/DanishEmbassy.Thiscircumstanceplacedsignificantconstraintsonourability tomeetwithGovernmentofAfghanistanofficialsandinstitutionsthatcouldpotentiallyprovideamoreindependentopinionaboutNorwayasdonor and about Norwegian assistance. Later efforts to obtain information and viewpoints aboutNorwegian assistance through email queries to Afghans holding key positions in Ministries,DirectoratesandCommissionsprovidedlimitedresults.Nevertheless,whererelevant,wequotetheresponses received. The Norwegian Embassy in Kabul hosted a dinner with Afghans from varieddevelopment and policy backgrounds. This meeting provided the opportunity for an informaldiscussionontopicsrelevantforthisreview,includingsuggestionsforfuturedirectionsandpriorities.

Thetriangulationofthevarioussourcesandfurtherinquiriesonsomeissuesidentifiedformedthenthebasisforouranalysis. It is importanttomentionherethata limitedreview,primarilybasedonthe organisations own reports and perspectives, is not in a position to provide any in-depthassessment of results and impacts beyond what is covered in the documents or in the externalreviews/evaluations/reportsidentified.

The team received valuable comments and inputs to the inception report submitted in earlyDecember2015, including limitationsofsomeofthe initialquestionsraised intheTOR,andtothedraft reportsubmitted inearlyFebruary2016.EllingTjønneland(CMI)hasprovidedqualitycontrolforthereport.

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Contextualchanges2011-2014ThereweremajorcontextualchangesinAfghanistanduringtheperiodunderreviewthatindifferentways influencedthesecurityanddevelopmentcontext,andthusposedchallengesfortheplanningandimplementationofdevelopmentprogrammes.Someofthedevelopmentsthatoccurredin2015arereflectedoninordertoenableadiscussiononfuturechallenges.

Thesecuritysituationwasinfluencedbytheplannedreductionintheinternationalmilitarypresencethatwasannouncedin2011.MostmilitarycontingentshadleftAfghanistanbyendof2014,onlyasmall Norwegian mentoring force remains in Afghanistan as part of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization’s(NATO)OperationResoluteSupport.Thereductionininternationalforceshashadanegative influence on security throughout Afghanistan, leading to an annual increase in civiliancasualtiesduetoattacksinthecitiesandalongthehighways.Thedepartureofforceswasfollowedbyaweakenedeconomyduetoreducedmilitaryspending ingeneralandtoreducedsupportfromProvincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) for development projects for many countries (except i.e.NorwayandSweden).The worsened security situation led to gradually increased challenges for the implementation ofdevelopmentprojects,aswellasformonitoringandevaluation(M&E)ofon-goingprojectsinmanyparts of the country. Affected areas included previously relatively secure places such as Faryab,Kunduz,BaghlanandBadakshan.Theconflictdidmoreoverleadtoincreasedinternaldisplacement,and a subsequent increase in need for humanitarian assistance. Uncertainty over the securitysituation led many Afghans to consider migration, beyond the already existing job migrations toPakistan,IranandtheGulfcountries. Inparticular,manyyoungmenhaveleftthecountryoverthelast years, includingmigrants toNorway,where theyhave constituted the largest groupofunder-agedasylumseekers.MoretargetedattacksinKabulagainsthotelsandrestaurantsfrequentedbyinternationalpersonnel,assassinations and an increased numbers of kidnappings (some attacks taking place close to theNorwegianEmbassy,asone inearly2014) led tomuchstricter security regimesand limitationsontravel for Embassy staff. It has also led International organisations andNGOs to reconsider theirpresence, travels and staffing levels in-country. The ARTF, as an example, has shifted theirinternational staff toDubai. TheNorwegian Embassywas, for a combinationof security concernsandinordertoreducecosts,mergedwiththeDanishEmbassyinlate2014.The2014Presidentialelectionwasmarredbyallegationsofcorruption,delayedtransferofpower,andasaresultareducedrespectfordemocraticinstitutionsandprocesses.USpoliticalinterventionina6monthsstandoffbetweenthetwomaincompetitors,AshrafGhaniandAbdullahAbdullah,ledto the establishment of a National Unity Government in September 2014, and to the transfer ofPresidentialauthorityfromHamidKarzaitoAshrafGhani.While the Karzai government had developed an increasingly confrontational relationshipwith theinternationalcommunity,thenewgovernmentstruggledtoestablishafunctionaladministrationandto agree on key positions in the Central and Provincial administrations. The complicated politicalsituationhasnegatively influencedthegovernment’sabilitytodeliverontheirpromises,togetthe

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administration and the various ministries and commissions staffed and functional, and to gainnationalandinternationaltrust.Thishasagainaffectednegativelyeconomicdevelopment.Corruption and insufficient control of development assistance came to the forefront in 2012throughmediareportsontheKabulBankfraud,involvingcloserelativesofPresidentKarzaiandthethen Defence Minister. In the same year, allegations emerged of mismanagement in the UNDPadministered LOTFA. Frequent reports from the US Special Inspector General for AfghanReconstruction(SIGAR)havecontinuedtodrawattentiontothescaleofthecorruption,andtothelackof,andchallengesrelatedto,M&Eofreconstructionanddevelopmentassistance.Theillustrationbelowontheprevalenceofbriberyofpublicofficials,drawingonsurveysconductedbytheUNOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC),illustratestheextentofthecorruptionchallenge.1Figure1.Prevalenceofbribery,bypublicofficialreceivingthebribe,Afghanistan,2009and2012

Therewasagradualincreaseininsecurityandaworsenedeconomicoutlookfrom2011to2014.Thesituationdeteriorated further in2015.Thisdeclinehasmajor implications for thedevelopments inthe coming years. The temporary fall of Kunduz city to theTalibanand the its increasedpresencethroughout Afghanistan demonstrated the political and military inability to address Taliban’sadvances.Theproblemalsoincludesthehighdesertionrateamongbattle-fatiguedAfghansoldiers.TherecentpresenceoftheIslamicState(IS) inAfghanistanfurther increasedthecomplexityofthemilitarychallenge,buthasalsoledtoUSandNATOcommitmentsextendingbeyond2017.However,the sharp increase in thenumberofAfghans leaving for Europe is indicativeof the challenges theAfghangovernmentandtheirarmyareconfrontedwith.Thesearechallengestheysofarhavenotbeenabletocounterinamannerthatcanearninternationalandnationalconfidenceandtrust.

1 The2012UNODCreport“CorruptioninAfghanistan:RecentPatternsandTrends”isavailableathttps://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_FINAL.pdf,visited22.02.2016.

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Overviewofdevelopmentassistance2011-2014Before reviewing the Norwegian development assistance provided from 2011–2014 we willsummarise the main trends in the period 2001–2011. The data is derived from the 2012 NoradevaluationandfromofficialNorwegianaidstatistics.2

NorwayreportedatotalspendingofNOK5,363millionfrom2001–2011,andthenNOK3,008millionfrom2011–2014.TheannualbudgetallocationwasapproximatelyNOK750million.

Figure2fromthe2012reportdocumentsafairlyequaldistributionoffundingforNGOs,theUnitedNations(UN),theARTFandamiscellaneouscategory.

Figure2. Total grant value share per disbursement channel 2001–2010 (Total = NOK 5,363 million)

Source:Norad 2012 report.Duringthe2011–2014period,asindicatedinFigure3below,themultilateralorganisationsremainedthe largest channel, receiving 55%of the assistance,which is a slight increase from the combinedARTFandUNfundingof51%forthe2001–2011period.Therewasaslight internalshift,however,withmoreofthefundingchannelledthroughtheARTF.ThelargestchangeisontheNGOside,thatisup from24% to40%,although someNGO fundingmighthavebeen included in themiscellaneouscategoryinthe2001–2011figures.

The20%earmarkingofassistancefortheFaryabprovincewasacontributingfactortotheincrease,as funding to thisareawaschannelled throughNGOs.Wecannotehere that the totalnumberofNGO partners and projects have sharply reduced over the period, and the management of theirthree-yearframeworkagreementswasshiftedfromtheEmbassyinKabultoMFAandNoradinOslo.ThischangereducedconsiderablythemanagementburdenattheEmbassyinKabul.

2Availableathttps://www.norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/,visited25.01.2016.

1.33billion(NOK)

MISC25%

1.28billion(NOK)

NGO24%

1.18billion(NOK)

UN22%1.57billion(NOK)

ARTF29%

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Figure 3. Disbursement between partners 2011–2014

Source:Norad Aid Statistics. Figure4illustratesthedistributionofgrantsbetweensectorsforthe2001–2011period.Multi-sectorassistance,with34%,isthelargestarea,followedbyemergencyresponsewith22%,andthensupportforgovernmentandcivilsocietywith13%.

Figure 4. Total share of grants by sector 2001–2010 (%)

Source: Norad Aid Statistics.

Lookingatfiguresfrom2011–2014thefollowingpatternondistributionbetweensectorsemerge(Figure5).

Health4%

Education4%Governmentandcivilsociety13%

Other5%

Conflictprevention

andresolution,peaceandsecurity5%

ARTFMultisector25%

EmergencyResponse22%

OtherMultisector9%

Agriculture1%

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Figure 5. Total share of grants by sector 2011–2014 (%)

Source: Norad Aid Statistics.

Whatisevident,althoughthelabellingdiffers,isamajorincreaseof22%(from34%to56%)fortheareaofeconomicdevelopmentandtrade.Thisisprimarilymulti-sectorsupport,plusNOK50millionfor agriculture. There is likewise a substantial reduction in emergency response/assistance of 9%(from22%to13%),althoughthiscouldpartlybeashiftfromdirectNGOsupporttoapreferenceforfunding the OCHA Emergency Relief Fund. Other sectors remain fairly equal: there is a slight 2%increase to the good governance sector (corresponding to the “government and civil society andconflictprevention,peaceandsecurity”categoryinthe2001–2011listing).Thereisasmallreductionfortheeducationsector(from4%to3%),possiblybecauseeducationwasnolongergivenpreferencethroughARTF.

Wewillcomebacktothestrategiesanddecisionsleadingtothesechanges.

Wenotethat from2013onwardstheEmbassy inKabul increasinglyrequestedadviceand inputtothemanagementof thedevelopmentportfolio fromNorad,which toa largerextentassistedwithevaluations, reviews and projects assessments. As a result, the number of external reviews,commissionedbytheEmbassy,werefewerthanintheprecedingyears.Management of contractswith Norwegian NGOswas transferred to Norad’s SIVSA department in2013. In 2014 the remaining contracts (support to trust funds and international NGOs) weretransferredto«SeksjonforTilskuddsforvaltning”inthedepartmentforCompetenceandResources.This department is part of theMFA’s central administration, not of the regional departmentwithresponsibilityforAfghanistan.ThesectioncanrequestsupportfromNoradonthefollow-uponi.e.ARTFandLOTFA.Norad and MFA included reviews and evaluations as a requirement in the NGO frameworkagreements,withtheresponsibilityforimplementationcorrespondingtotheNGOs.Thesamegoesfor ARTF and LOTFA,where their regular review and evaluation systemswas to be followed. Thisarrangementhasledtoanumberofsystem-wideevaluationsoftheARTF,inadditiontoprogrammemid- and end-term evaluations. ARTF funded programmes (such as the National SolidarityProgramme) have undergone a large number of evaluations (including an impact evaluation) inadditiontotheirregularmonitoring.Norway,aspartofthedonorcommunity,alsopushedformore

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targetedevaluationsofLOTFAandEQUIPinresponsetoconcernsthathadbeenraised,andwithheldfundinguntilsatisfactoryexplanationsorchangeshadtakenplace.

Ingeneral,itcanbeconcludedthatNorwayhasensuredthatthe“regularreview/evaluationsystem”has been in place through the various programme contracts, but with the responsibility forimplementationplacedonthetrustfundsandNGOs.Further,thesemeasureshavebeenfollowed-upthroughNorway’sparticipationinthevarioussteeringandprogrammecommitteesforthetrustsfunds and specific programmes. When concerns have been raised or more knowledge has beenneededonspecificprogrammes,Norwayhasalsoinitiatedtargetedevaluations.Thisisdiscussedingreaterdetail belowwhen lookingatNorway’s support to theeducation sector. TheEmbassyalsorequestedin its2014“Virksomhetsplan”tomakeuseofAfghanconsultantsandresearchinstitutesto undertake field monitoring and evaluations as the security situation has made field visits forembassystaffincreasinglydifficult.Itseemsthatthishasonlybeenactuallydonetoalimitedextent,butwehavenotedaFaryabstudyundertakenbyanAfghanorganisation.

However, according to one source, there is reason to be concerned because under the presentstructure andbureaucratic divisionof contracts between theMFAandNorad inOslo, it is unclearwho can and should initiate or decide on new reviews or evaluationswhen these go beyond theongoingmanagementofexistingagreements.

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AssessmentofthefollowuptoevaluationrecommendationsA key document for this review is the Norad 2012 report Evaluation of Norwegian DevelopmentCooperationwith Afghanistan 2001–2011 (Report 3/2012). In practical terms, the evaluation onlycovered activities in theperiod 2001–2009 (p. xv). The aimof the evaluationwas to “…assess thecontributionsoftheNorwegiandevelopmentassistancetopromotesocio-economicconditionsandsustainable peace through improvements in the capacity of the Afghan state and civil society toprovide essential public services” (page iii), applying theOECD/DAC evaluation guidelines.Wewillhere present the main evaluation findings before discussing, first, how they was addressed andfollowedupbytheMFA,theEmbassyandNorad,andafterwards,howthiswasdonebythevariousimplementersofNorwegian-fundedassistance. A key finding from the evaluation is that Norway’s policy and interventions “match closely theinternationalagendaforAfghanistanandwithinthatframeworkitsdevelopmentagendaiscertainlyrelevant”. Moreover, that “the focus on governance, gender equality, education and communitydevelopment has been consistent over the years, just as consistent as the choice of channels andpartners” (p.133). The evaluation found alignment with Afghan priorities consistently high on theNorwegian agenda, although there is a concern that it primarilywas the international communitythat defined the Afghan priorities, which then limited Afghan participation and ownership. ThereportpointsoutthatasonlyNGOfundsremainearmarkedfortheFaryabprovince,withARTFandEQUIP no longer being preferences for the province, the provincial government feared aboutreducedownershipandaboutneededcapacitystrengtheningoftheprovincialadministration.Anotherfinding is thatNorwegianpolicytowardsAfghanistanandthechoiceofaidchannels (trustfunds,UNorganisations,NGOsandcivilsocietyorganisations)hasbeenremarkablyconsistentoverthe years (which was found to reflect a political consensus across two parliaments), The reportnoticedthat“apartfromincreasedfundingforARTFthereisremarkablylittlechangeoverthepastdecade”(p.134).Theevaluationmadethe followingobservationonpredictabilityandrelevance,andtheunderlyinganalysis(ibid.):

On the one hand Norway is a good example of predictability of resources and clearcommitmenttointernationallyagreedgoalsandthereforeNorwegianassistanceisdefinitelyrelevant.Ontheotherhand,theuseofunderlyinganalysisremainsweakanddoesnotseemtoinformpolicychoices,whichmayweakentherelevanceofNorwegianassistance.

Theevaluatorsare,however,oftheopinionthat“limitedadministrativecapacity(attheEmbassy)isone clear reasonwhypolicies areweakon theoperational side”and that “follow-upon identifiedrisksisnotalwayssatisfactory”.Whiletheyarguethatthereasonsforsuchanunsatisfactoryfollow-up is not clear to them, they identified that “pressure to disburse large amounts of funds is acontributor,giventhelimitedstaffandeffectsofthesecuritysituationonworkingconditions”(ibid.).Turning toeffectivenessof theassistance their finding is that “inoutput terms, realachievementscanbereportedtowhichNorwayhadcontributed”(ibid.).Referringheretoarangeofdevelopmentandgovernanceachievements,asschoolenrolment figuresof7millionchildrenby2010 (ofwhich

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37%weregirls),which–toplaceitincontext–isupfromlessthan1millionin2001(andveryfewgirls).They,however,goontoconcludethat“…thereisstilllimitedevidenceofconcreteoutcomes”,except for “improved access to services (such as midwifery) and enhanced pedagogical skills ofteachers”(p.135).Thereis,accordingtotheirassessment,notsufficientevidencetooutweighthat“theoverall qualityof newly constructed schools is poor, literacy remains lowand schooldropoutratesarehigh,governanceremainspoorandgenderequalityisstillfarfromreality.”Following a discussion on the elusive prospect for a sustainable peace, the evaluation found that“donors, includingNorway,madeattempts to reducecorruption,butdespiteall efforts corruptionremains endemic and negatively affects the attainment of real outcomes” (ibid.). They go on toidentifythe“weaknessofmonitoringandevaluationsystems”tobe“themainreasonwhythereissolittlegoodqualityinformationaboutoutcomes.”Arguingthatbythestartofthecenturyallagenciesweresopreoccupieswithgettingactivitiesupand running“thatM&Ewasoneofmany importantdesign considerations that were sacrificed in favour of speed. Gender was another” (ibid). This,accordingtotheevaluationteam,“meantthatvirtuallynobaselineweredoneand,asM&Egraduallyimproved, therewasnothing tomeasureprogressagainst.”As securitydeclinedafter2005, “M&Ehasbecomeincreasinglyproblematiclogisticallyandinsecureforstafftovisitprojectareas”.Theevaluationconcludedthat“theoverwhelmingreasonsforthelimitedresultsispoorgovernanceandcorruption.” It goeson to state that “donorshaveknownabout, tolerated,and in somecasesexacerbated these formany years in spite of simultaneous efforts to bring improvements” (ibid.).Thiscouldbearesultof“lackofagreementamongdonorsabouthowtogoaboutstatebuildingandgovernanceagendas”(p.136).TurningspecificallytotheroleofNorway(ibid.),thereportsays:

Although theMFAhas systems inplace toprevent corruption, and requires itspartners tohaveanti-corruptionpoliciesandstrategies, thesemaygosomewaytominimising, thoughnot eliminating, corruption at the lower level but they have no effect on the far moredamaginggrandcorruptionwhichtakesplaceinsomeoftheministries.ARTFhasnotprovedable tomanage these and the lack ofmonitoring is a contributory factor. All donors havetakenenormousriskswhichhaveincreasedwiththeincreaseinbudgets.

The evaluation found the assessment of efficiency problematic due toweakM&E and the lack ofdata,andthereforeconcludedthat“noreliableassessmentcanbemadetocomparetheefficiencyof various aid channels or aidpartners” (p. 137).Although they state that “ARTF as amulti-donormechanism appears to be a relatively efficient undertakingwhen viewed from the perspective offundmanagementandadministration”.TheymoreoverdrawattentiontotheNorwegianEmbassyinKabul’s increased management responsibility since 2005, in 2011 managing two thirds of theNorwegian aid budget, and observed that “this has created a heavy management burden for anEmbassy that is chronically understaffed”. This leads the evaluators to conclude that “themanagement of such a complex portfolio in a very complex environment has received insufficientattention”, finallystatingthat“foraportfolioofthissize,thehumanresourcesattheEmbassyarewhollyinadequate.”Wecanseetwotrendsinthisarea.Onetrend,asdocumentedinFigure6below,isthatthenumberofagreements(andpartners/projects)wasgraduallyreducedfrom2007onwards.Thesecondtrend,

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inFigure7,isthatincreasingresponsibilityforhandlingthedevelopmentportfoliowasplacedattheEmbassyinKabuluntil2010.Figure6:Norwegian development assistance to Afghanistan 2001–2011 (million NOK)

Source: Norad 2012 report.

Figure 7: Share of total value of grants per extending agency per year

Source: Norad 2012 report. The evaluation finds sustainability a difficult concept to define in the context of Afghanistan, andthereforedoesnotattempttosubstantiallyaddresstheissue.However,theymaketheclaimthatthesustainabilityoftheNorwegianassistance“hasnotbeenthemostimportantconcernforNorwayandhasoftenbeensacrificedwherehigherpriorityisplacedonotherobjectives”(ibid.).

TotalGrantValueandNumberofAgreementsperyear

TotalGrants

Agreement(RightScale)

Year

Year

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They find it difficult to identify the impact of theNorwegian assistance butmake amore generalobservationofthesituationasof2011(ibid.):

Governance has been poor and, bymost accounts, is getting worse. It is often cited as agreater threat to the future of the country than security. The local political economy--manifested in corruptionanduseofpatronagenetworks--hasworkedagainst internationalobjectives.Povertyhasbeenreducedforsomepeoplebuthasincreasedformany,especiallyinthefaceofdeterioratingsecurityacrossthewholecountry.Therehasbeensomeprogressonsomeof thehumandevelopment indicatorsbutAfghanistancontinuestobeoneof thevery poorest countries in theworldwith themajority of people illiterate and someof themoreextremeformsofgenderinequality.

TurningtoNorway’sachievements,theyarguethattheyemergeprimarilythrough“beingaconsistentand reliable donor within the framework of the international engagement”, where Norway hassucceeded “to put the principles of harmonization and alignment into practice”. They observe that“Norwayhasaverygoodreputationbasedonitscommitment,itsconsistentandreliablefundinganditsmodestapproach.TheimplicationisthatthevisibilityofNorwayisnotveryhigh”.Arguingthatdonorsingeneralarerethinkingtheirstrategies,andreferringtoliteraturethat“pointsinthedirectionofmorefocusedandbetterstrategiesthatarebasedonsoundtheoriesofchange”theirmain conclusion is that “Norway should rethink its strategy and aid programming for futureengagementinAfghanistan”(p.138).However,theevaluationdidnotprovideanysuggestiononthedirectionandcontentofsuchastrategy,orhowtheaidprogrammingandselectionofchannelsandpartnersshouldbechanged.Neitherdidtheygiveanyspecificrecommendationsfordevelopmentoftheoriesofchange,despitetheirconcernovertheirabsence.Our assessment of the follow up to the recommendations from the Norad-report, includingMFAstrategies and internal guidelines, can be divided in twoparts.Onequestion is how theMFA, theKabulEmbassyandNoradfolloweduponandoperationalizedtherecommendations.Thesecondishow the implementers of Norwegian development assistance, the Embassy and Norad, either ontheir own or on advice and follow-up from the MFA, responded to and took on-board therecommendations. It should be noted here that several persons interviewed for this reviewcommentedthatmanyofthefindingsinthe2012Noradevaluationwereverygeneral,asweretherecommendations, and that they had expresseddisagreementwith someof them, e.g. thatNGOslacked contextual knowledge. The vagueness of the report made it difficult to identify clear anddetailedinitiativesfortheEmbassytofollow-up.Many NGO representatives, on their part, had taken note of the requirement for a baseline tofacilitate impact documentation, of the need for better M&E instruments, and for routines topreventcorruptionandtoensuretheexpectedoutcomes.The Embassy in Kabul did, as would be expected, develop a follow up plan for a selected set ofrecommendations detailing: a) concretemeasures, b)whowas responsible for implementation, c)timeframeandd)reportinprogressaccordingtoplan.

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Thedocumentidentifiedfourmainrecommendationsforfollow-up:1. An urgency to establish effective routines for follow-up and evaluation of development

assistance.2. ClarificationoftheWB’sCountryAssistanceStrategyandresultsframework.3. IncreasedpriorityonthestrengtheningofSub-NationalGovernance.4. NGOs selection of projects and programmes must be based on conflict analysis and

knowledgeoflocalcontext.

Theplanincludedelevensub-prioritiesandafurthernumberofactivities,andspecifiedwhethertheresponsibilityrestedwiththeEmbassy,theMFA(andwithwhichdepartment),orNorad.The follow-up reportwas regularlyupdatedandapprovedby theMFA; the latestone foundbeingfrom 6 March 2015. At the time it was reported that 11 activities aimed at addressing therecommendationswerecompleted,whileninewerestill inprocess(withsomehavingtakenlongertimethananticipated).Furtherdetailswill followinthenextchapter.However,thefollowupfromthe Embassy side went further than the recommendations provided in the evaluation report anddeeper into the challenges identified. We find reference to (or overlap with) the mainrecommendations, as well as thosemade by the Office of the Auditor General of Norway, in theEmbassy’s three-year plans (2011–2103, and 2012–2014) and in the annual “Virksomhetsplaner”(2011,2012,2013and2014).

These documents expose a more detailed context analysis than what was described in the 2012evaluation, suggest anumberofmeasures to address identified challenges, andprovidea realisticassessmentoftheEmbassy’sabilitytomeettheirgoals—accompaniedwithwellarguedrequestsforbudget allocations and human resources. One observation though is that we do not find anysuggestionfromtheEmbassyordemandfromtheMFAtodevelopa“theoryofchange”orrevisetheoneconstructedbytheevaluationteam.

Fromour interviewswecandocumentthattherehasbeenaconsistentfollow-up,overtime,fromtheEmbassy, theMFAandNoradwith their implementingpartnersonkey issues.Theyhavebeenraised indialogueandnegotiationon frameworkagreements, in annualmeetingsand inmeetingsheldat theKabulEmbassy.Thediscussionshave includedtheneed fora)baselinestudies,b)anti-corruptionstrategiesandtools,andc)plansandinitiativesformonitoringandexternalevaluations.Ithas,aswecan judge fromvarious reports, consistentlybeen followedupwithARTF (including thecommissioningofexternalstudies)andwithLOTFA,substantiallyaftertheexposureofmanagementandcorruptionconcerns.

An issue thatwashighlyemphasised in theevaluation reportandaddressed inallEmbassyannualplanswas the request for increased staffing to handle the Embassy’s development portfolio. Thismatterwillbeaddressedinthenextsection.

TheNGOpartners report extensivework ondeveloping baselines (somedoing it jointlywith theirimplementing partners and some involving local communities and government representatives),improving M&E procedures and practises, and introducing or developing further anti-corruptionguidelinesandmeasuresdiscussedlaterinthisreport.However,itseemsthatmuchoftheseeffortswerealreadyrecognisedandplannedforwhenreportwasreleased,althoughthereportwasinsomecasesatriggertoacceleratetheirprocesses.

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ManagementofNorwegianDevelopmentFundsInthischapter,wewillanalyseanddiscusshowNorwegiandevelopmentassistancedevelopedandwas managed in the period 2011–2014; what were the bases for the adjustments; howrecommendationswerefollowed-upon;theinteractionwithandsupportforimplementingpartners;theinvolvementinaidcoordination,andfinallydevelopacomparisonwithDenmarkandSweden.Trends,prioritisation,thematicfocusandimplementingpartnersThe TOR request an analysis of trends in the period 2011–2014 in terms of prioritization andselectionofthematicfocusandimplementingpartners,andalsoanassessmentaboutthedegreetowhichtheymeetoverallNorwegiandevelopmentgoalsforAfghanistan.ItisimportanttonoteherethatthroughouttheperiodtherehavebeenthreeoverarchinggoalsfortheNorwegianassistancetoAfghanistan:

1)StrengthenAfghaninstitutions.

2)Contributetoapoliticalsettlement.

3) Contribute to sustainable and just development, humanitarianefforts, andpromote thegovernance,humanrightsandgenderequalityagendas.

Thethirddevelopmentgoalhadthreedefinedthematicpriorityareas:

1)Goodgovernance.

2)Education.

3)Ruraldevelopment.

Thesepriorityareaswere,aswehavebeenabletoestablish,prioritizedbasedonearlieragreementsbetween donors on how to divide thematic responsibility, as well as on Norway’s continuedemphasisongender,humanrightsandeducation.Arguably,supportforgoodgovernanceisessentialif Afghan institutions are to be strengthened and gain the confidence of the population. A stronggovernment would likely also be in a better position to ensure a lasting political settlement.Education is a long-term investment, andmeets the critical need formore girls (and boys) to beeducated inorder tobe able to takeon larger responsibilities in their communities and inAfghaninstitutions,andisessentialforthepromotionofthehumanrightsandgenderequalityagendas.Theprioritygiventoruraldevelopmentisarecognitionoftheneedtoprovidelivelihoodforthe5millionAfghans that after 2002 have returned from neighbouring countries, and of the opportunity tosupportlocalgovernancestructures,andtherebypeoples’engagementingovernance.

Beforegetting intospecifics,weneedto recall theexistingstrategy, thedirectionsalreadysetandthe on-going debates in 2011, aswell as the further strategic and practical steps thatwere takenuntil theendof2014.Weare specificallydrawingon two three-yearplans (2011–2013and2012–2014)andtheEmbassy inKabul’sannual“Virksomhetsplaner” for2011,2012,2013and2014,andtheMFA’scorresponding“Tildelingsskriv”.

Thedecisionsmadewithregardstodevelopmentassistanceseembasedonthreemainfactors.ThefirstoneistheoveralldirectionandaidvolumeestablishedintheNorwegianNationalBudget(with

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Stortingsproposisjon 1, 2010–2011, as the starting point). The second factor is the alignmentwithinternational/Afghan driven processes and meetings (such as the London and subsequent Tokyomeetings),andnotleasttheTokyoMutualAgreementFramework(TMAF).ThethirdfactoristheaimtoensurecompliancewithspecificUNresolutions,suchasResolution1325.

Importanttonoticehereisthatthe2011–2013plan(from2010)referstoadecisiontoreducethenumberofpartnersandconsolidatethedevelopmentportfolio,andtoensureregularevaluationsofthepartners.Theplanpointsoutthatthenumberofpartnersandagreementshadbeenreducedby50%since2007.Thisfactsuggeststhatthedecisionforreductioninnumberofpartnerswasinplacebeforehand.

The 2011–2013 plan indicates two overarching directions for Norwegian development assistance.One is to increase the funding channelled through the ARTF, and support the establishment of aNordiccivilsocietytrustfund,whilereducingtheaiddisbursedthroughtheUNandNGOchannels.Aseconddirection involvesa shift tomorenon-earmarked funding. Itwasnoted that thesechangesdepended on the Afghan government’s commitment to address corruption. The same planemphasises concentration on higher education and management of natural resources, in parallelwithacontinuationoftheprioritisationofgoodgovernanceandeducation.TheEmbassyplansignalsacontinuationofsupportfortheNationalSolidarityProgramme(NSP)andtheNationalAreaBasedDevelopment Programme (NABDP), support through NGOs for the Faryab province, as well assupportforhumanrightswithareferencetoanewlydevelopedactionplan.The 2011 “Virksomhetsplan” is in line with the three–year strategy. More emphasis is placed onmaintainingahighprofileonanti-corruptioninitiatives,andonstrengtheningEmbassycompetencein this field. The Embassy also planned for a higher priority on humanitarian assistance, andconsequentlyparticipationinUNAMAandOCHAcoordinationefforts.TheEmbassymoreoverinvitedMFAforadiscussionoftheexchangeofoneoftheNorwegianadvisorpositionsagainstrecruitmentofthreenationaldevelopmentandsecurityexperts,whichwasalsotoensurealargerdegreeofstaffcontinuityattheEmbassy.The2012“Virksomhetsplan”maintainsthe2011prioritiesbutnotesadelayinwhatisreferredtoasthe“Kabulprocess”causingachallengetotheARTFagreement.ThiswastheresultoftheKabulBankcorruption scandal and of a lacking of agreement between Afghanistan and the InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).MoreeffortsweremadetoensureNordiccollaborationonUNWOMANandona jointNordiceffortwith theUnitedKingdom toestablisha civil society trust fund (Tawanmandi).The Embassy maintained the priority for good governance (including an increase in support forLOTFA),education(includingEQUIP)andruraldevelopment(includinginFaryab).InvolvementintheenergysectorwasputonholdawaitingclarificationsfrominvolvedAfghanministries.Thisplanningtookplace in lightofanMFAdecisiontoreduceNorwegianpresence inAfghanistan,including a number of staff positions in 2012 and 2013, assumingly linked to the reducedmilitarypresence. The implication, according to the Embassy, was to reduce the ambitions of being adevelopment policy actor and dialogue partner in Kabul and to drop the engagement in healthrelatedactivities.TheEmbassymaintainedarequestfortherecruitmentofanAfghandevelopmentexpert.

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The “Virksomhetsplan 2013” maintained the priority areas for development assistance, but alsoreportsseveraldevelopmentsandinitiativesthatinfluencetheplanningandimplementationofthedevelopmentassistance.

• The first issue is that the reductionofdevelopmentprojects/agreementshascontinued, inordertosafeguardsufficientmanagementcapacity.Bytheendof2012,25agreementswereto be terminated; efforts were underway to improve the Embassy’s “forvaltningsrutiner”;recruitmentofanewnationaldevelopmentexpertwasplanned;and theycontemplatedalargeruseofNoradexpertise.

• The secondone is thepriorityof and involvement in the “TokyoConference”held inmid-2012,includingthedialogueprocessesbetweentheinternationalcommunityandtheAfghangovernmentbeforeandaftertheconference.

• The third issue is themanagement response to theNorad2012evaluation report, amicrorisk assessment of the development work, and the planning of a strategy seminar (seebelow).

• A forth one is a plan to pay further attention to the coordination of the humanitarianassistance,thedevelopmentofanEmergencyReliefFund,andacontinuedattentiontothecorruptionallegationsagainstLOTFA.

The December 2012 strategy seminar is of interest to this review, as it was an attempt by theEmbassy (withMFA andNorad participation) to address development challenges identified in theNorad 2012 evaluation report and the Tokyo process. A key issue was how to ensure a policydialoguewiththeAfghangovernmentonhowtomeet(andreporton)thetargetsetfora50%onbudgetsupportandan80%alignmentwithNationalPriorityPlans(NPPs).AmorepracticalissuewaswhetherpartofthemanagementofthedevelopmentportfoliocouldbeshiftedtoOslo,sothattheEmbassy could (in our translation): “ensure a better follow-up of the development projects, be adistinct development actor in the external debates, use development assistancemore effectively,whileatthesametimeaimingtoreducethenumberofagreementstoensureamoremanageabledevelopmentmanagement.”The seminar does reflectmoreover that the Ambassador, who took up his position in September2012, had a development background, with a special concern for the quality of the developmentassistance.Hehadanexpressedintentiontodrawonexternalresourcesandexpertise(asinNorad)toensurethatNorwaymetitsdevelopmentgoals.3Thiswasthendoneoverthecomingyears,withveryspecificassistancerequestsmadetoNorad.Inthe“Virksomhetsplanfor2014”wecanidentifysomevisibleresultsofthestrategyworkandtheprioritisation made. Although the three priority areas for development assistance remained thesame,definedaspartofthreestrategicgoals,theyappearhereslightlyextendedfromtheoriginalwording:

1)ContributetothestrengtheningAfghaninstitutionsforthecountrytoensureownsecurityanddevelopment.

3Wehavenothadaccesstoanynotesfromthemeetingbutseveralofthoseinterviewedpointtowardstheseminarasanimportantevent,bothinshapingthedevelopmentagendaandinbringingthevariousactorsmorecloselyandconstructivelyintotheprocessoverthecomingyears.

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2)Contributetoapoliticalsettlement,includingstrengthenedregionalcooperation.3)Contributetosustainableandjustdevelopment,humanitarianefforts,andthepromotionofthegovernance,humanrightsandgenderequalityagendas.

The 2014 plan noted that the civilian coordinator position in Faryab was terminated the 1st ofSeptember,2013,whileanadditionalpositionasmigrationattachéwasestablishedattheEmbassyfrom1stofJanuary,2014.It isevident fromreportsand interviews that theEmbassyhadallocatedsubstantial resourcesandtimeduring2012and2013toensureplanningandimplementationoftheTMAFinconsultationwiththeAfghangovernment.ThisactivitiesincludedpreparationsfortheSeniorOfficialsmeetinginKabulwithin the Nordic+ framework, follow-up to the LOTFA, and an active engagement to furthereducationthroughsupportandstakeholderdialogueontheELECTIIprogramme,whilealsoengagingveryactivelyonhumanandwomenrightsissues.Bytheendof2013,theEmbassytookasoberlookatrealitiesandadvisedtheMFAthatuncertaintyovertheAfghanpresidentialelectionsinApril2014,andthepull-downoftheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce (ISAF)byendof2014,might lead toa considerable change in the framework forEmbassyactivitiesduring2014.Wecanthereforeconcludethattherewasaprocesswell inplacebefore2011tofocusandreducethenumberofprojectsandagreementsinthedevelopmentportfolio.Itincludedastrongemphasison support for dialoguewith theAfghangovernment, and for thedevelopmentof its capacity “tomanagetheirowndevelopment”,whileatthesametimeNorwaysignalledawilltochallengethemon corruption, gender and human rights issues. They were prepared to engage strategically, forexample through the ARTF, to fund activities in support of these priorities. Ensuring sufficientEmbassystaffingforthehandlingofalargedevelopmentportfoliowasconsistentlybroughtupinthedialoguewiththeMFA,aswasthewayinwhichthetasksandresponsibilitiesforthedevelopmentportfolioandpartnerscouldbedividedbetweenOsloandKabul/Meymaneh.Thedocumentreviewidentifiedsomemaintrendswithregardstotheprioritisationandselectionofthematic focus and implementing partners, and to the fulfilment of the overall NorwegiandevelopmentgoalsforAfghanistan:

1) AdherencetotheNorwegianstrategyforthedevelopmentassistancetoAfghanistan.2) Adherence to the requirements set in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework

(TMAF)toaligndonorfundingwithnationalpriorities.Specifically,toensurethat50%ofNorwegian funds were “on budget” and 80% were aligned with the National PriorityProgrammes. This took considerable time and resources in a dialoguewith theAfghangovernment,withintheNordic+frameworkandwithotherdonors.

3) Adeliberatereductioninthenumberofprojects/programmeswithinthegiventhematicareas,includingtheterminationoffundingtotheAfghanistanSub-NationalGovernanceProgramme (ASGP) and the exit from a planned energy programme. Priority was onchannellingaidthroughtrustfunds(ARTF,LOTFAandTawandandi)inordertoreducethemanagementburdenattheEmbassy/MFA.

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4) A planned reduction in the number of Norwegian staff handling the developmentportfolioattheNorwegianEmbassy,complementedbyanincreaseofnationalstaff,andthe shifting of management responsibility from 2013 onward to MFA (internationalNGOs) and Norad (Norwegian NGOs). However, the termination of the Norwegiandevelopment councillor position in Kabul at the end of 2014, and the potentialconsequences for aid management and coordination/dialogue, is not addressed ordiscussedinavailableEmbassyplansorinotherdocumentsreviewed.Increasedsecurityconcernsduringearly2014,iscitedininterviewsasapossiblereasonforthedecisiontoterminatetheinternationaldevelopmentadvisorposition.

5) Acontinuationandnochangeinselectionoffocusareasandchannels,althoughwithashift of priority between channels, giving higher priority to ARTF and reducing NGOfunding.

Ourassessment,bothbasedonthedocumentreviewandtheNoradevaluationreport,isthatboththematicareasandtheimplementingpartnersselectedcontributedtotheNorwegiandevelopmentpriorities set for Afghanistan. The Embassy efforts in the TMFA process then helped shape andinfluence implementation. There is a noted consistency in the three-year and the annual plans inensuring adherence to these goals, and alignmentwith (and support for) goals commonly agreedbetweentheAfghangovernmentandtheinternationalcommunity–notablytheTMAF.Thereasonbehindthisconsistencyisdiscussedfurtherbelow.Basesforadjustmentofthemes,partnersandfundingTheperiodunderstudyhadaplannedreductioninthenumberofNorwegianpartnersandprojects,while the funding remained constant (except for a reduction in educational support of NOK 50million in2013due tonon-compliance from theAfghangovernmentwith respect toadherence totheTMAF).TheterminationofthePRTinFaryabin2013endedthepositionofaMeymanehbasedDevelopmentAdvisor, and thereby theMFA/Embassy field presence that had secured the ability to coordinatepartners and projects in the field, and to maintain direct contact and dialogue with provincialauthorities.Theterminationofthepositiondidnotleadtoanychangeinthemes,partnersorleveloffunding, but it was indicative of the increased “remoteness” from the field activities of theNorwegianEmbassysince2013 (when fieldmonitoringended).Followedbya reducedability fromlate 2014, when the Development Councillor position was terminated, to engage substantially indevelopmentpolicyprocessesinKabul.

Extentoffollow-upofthe2011evaluationandinternalstrategy/plansTheNoradevaluationanditsmainfindingswereintroducedintheprevioussection.TheTORforthisreview asks for a more in-depth assessment of the following points to determine the extent offollow-uptothe2011evaluationandinternalstrategies/plans:

• DevelopmentofatheoryofchangeoftheoverallNorwegiancontribution.

• Improvedcontextualanalysis,conflictsensitivityandriskmitigation.

• Anti-corruptionprocedures.

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• Monitoringandevaluationsystems.

• Internalhumanresourceallocationandadministrativecapacity.We noted above thatMFA/Norad and the Embassy in Kabul have reported systematically on theactionstakentorespondtotherecommendationsfromthe2012Noradevaluationreport.TheEmbassyreportedonthefollow-uponfouroftherecommendations:

1. Establishment of effective routines for monitoring and evaluation of development

assistance: A number of initiatives are reported as completed and there are on-goingactivitiesatMFA,Noradand theEmbassy.These includedialoguewithARTFandNGOsonhowtheycanstrengtheninternalroutinesandasuggestionfromtheEmbassytointroducea“supervisory-model”aspartoftheanti-corruptionprocedures.

2. Clarification requiredon theWB’s country strategy and results framework: It is reportedthatsomeactivitieshavebeencompleted,andothersarestillon-going.

3. Prioritisehigherthestrengtheningofdistrictandprovinceadministration:Allactivitiesarereported as completed, with the exception of the continuous follow-up required on theTMAF.

4. NGOs selections of programmes and projects must be based on conflict and contextualanalysis:Themajorityofrecommendationsarereportedasimplementedwhilesomeareon-going,includinghavingNGOpartnersdevelopanexitstrategy.

ARTF and the partner NGOs interviewed report that they have addressed most of therecommendations under the five focus points, including preparation of Theories of Change (ToC)(overall and forparticulardevelopment interventions), althoughwith varyingdegreesofdetail.AnexampleofaNGOdevelopedToCisprovidedinAnnexV.

All implementing partners report to have undertakenmore extensive baseline studies after 2012.These baselines can thus both constitute a short-term tool for improved monitoring and enablenecessaryprojectadjustments.Wethereforeexpect thatNGOsover thecomingyearswillprovidemoredetailedandcommunity-verifiedimpactmeasurements.All implementingpartners report tohaveM&Emechanisms inplace (see separateanalysis). Therehas been a continuous discussion between the MFA/Norad and the Embassy, and their variouspartners, onhow to securequalityof assistance,prevent corruptionanddocumentoutcomesandimpact.

Allimplementingpartnersreporttoundertakecontextualanalysisandriskmitigationinitiativesasanintegratedpartof theirownprogram implementationand, fordonorNGOs, toensure it ispartoftheir implementing partners’ planning processes. This is presented in more details in the NGOreview.

EngagementwithandsupportandevaluationofimplementingpartnersAllNGOstaffinterviewed,aswellastheARTF,reportthattheEmbassy,MFAand/orNoradhavehadanactiveengagement,beyondannualmeetings,onprogram/projectdirectionanddialogueonhow

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toensurecompliancewiththeTMAF.Theproject/programmingdialoguehas,however,decreasedfollowingwithdrawal of theNorwegian Development Counsellor. Regular securitymeetings takingplaceattheEmbassyarewelcomeastheyserveasavenueforinformationsharingamongstNGOs.

ARTF regardNorwayas anactivedonor, inparticularon thematic issues suchas gender,butnotemore generally that the participation/involvement has decreased over the last year. Reporting ofresults is, as reported above, part of the dialogue with the NGOs where they are encouraged toimproveM&E routines and activities, andwhere the possibility for introduction of a “supervisoryagent”isunderdiscussionattheEmbassy.

Several of those interviewed suggested that Norway could have taken a more proactive role ininitiating independent monitoring and evaluations as the level of insecurity increased and placedrestrictionsonEmbassystafftravels,includinginARTFsupportedchannels/activities.Thiscouldhavehelped to ensure a more systematic verification of results and impact and provide a check onpossible mismanagement and corruption throughout the entire development chain. This raisesimportant issues on the development and use of monitoring mechanisms and evaluations in anincreasingly challenging security environment, including issues of remote and/or communitymonitoring–whichareacommonconcernamongdonors.4

There is an emerging experience and literature on those types of community based monitoring;5IntegrityWatchAfghanistan(IWA),discussedlaterinthisreport,hasbeenapioneerinthisfield.6Wecanbroadlydividethattypeofmonitoringintotwocategories.Oneisthemoretechnicalapproachwiththeuseof images,beingthatfromsatellitepictures,dronesorbyonthespotpictures/videos(withlocationtagging)thatcandocumentthephysicalpresenceofadevelopmentfundedobjective–asaschool,aclinic,abridgeoranirrigationstructure.SIGARhashadanumberofreportswheretheyhavetriedto locateUSfundedinfrastructureprojectsthoughsatellitepicturesandfield-visits,withmixedresults. Inseveralcasesthe infrastructureexistedbut locationcoordinateswerewrong(andseveralothers,includingonelocatedintheMediterranean,probablydidnotexist).Suchimagescandocument thequalityof the infrastructureonly toa limiteddegree,andcanhardlyassess thequalityandimpactoftheactivitiesthattakeplaceinorresultfromthestructurebuilt.

The later kind of confirmation requires in-person monitoring, both to complement the remotemonitoring and to ensure that the infrastructure meets the planned specifications. That plannedactivities are taking place for the persons/groups intended, that thesemeet quality requirements,andthatboth infrastructureandactivitiesaremaintainedandsustainedovertime,alsorequireonsiteverification.Aschool isa typicalexample:buildingsneed tobemaintained; thereneeds tobeteacherswith required qualification in place; they should be supplied teachingmaterials; and theplannednumberofstudentsneedtoobtainthetypeandqualityofteachingrequiredfortheiragegroup.Suchmonitoringcanbedonethroughself-monitoring,e.g.byNGO’s,NSP’sandEQUIP’sown

4ThiswasatopicofdiscussioninameetingwiththeSpecialInspectorGeneralforAfghanistanReconstruction(SIGAR)inWashingtonin2013,attendedbyoneoftheauthorsandaNoradSeniorAdvisor.5Seeforinstancethereport“Afghanistan:InnovativeRiskManagementApproachesforLocalAidDelivery”whichformedthebasisforapresentationanddiscussionwithSIGARandUSIPinWashingtonD.C.in2014,http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?5130=afghanistan-innovative-risk-management-approaches,visited13.02.2016.6IWAhasadedicatedwebpageforcommunitymonitoring,includingahandbook,availableathttp://communitymonitoring.org,visited13.02.2016.

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monitors,orbyexternalandindependentmonitorsthatcanreviewdifferentaspectsoftheactivitiesagainsttheimplementationplan(andovertimeagainstthebaseline).Thesecanreporteithertotheimplementingagencyorthedonor,ortothecommunityandthelocalgovernment(thoughthisdoesnotalwaystakesplace).This typeofoversightshouldbearegularandstructuredprocess,butcanand should be complemented by unexpected inspections. Some programmes and several of theNorwegian funded NGOs have community complaints mechanisms that when activated shouldtriggeraninspection.

A different type of oversight mechanism is community based monitoring, where either intendedbeneficiarieswithknowledgeoftheprogrammeorahiredpersoninaneighbouringcommunityaretaskedtomonitortheprogressandqualityofaprogramme.Thistypeofmechanismis increasinglyused in areas with high insecurity (as are inspections done by Afghan staff), and ideallycomplementedwithvisitsfromtheM&Estaffoftheimplementingagencyaswell.IWAhaslearnedthatthattrainingofthemonitorsiscrucialforensuringaccuratemonitoringandreporting,ascrucialas it is to find ways to avoid themonitors to come under pressure from either implementers orinfluentialpersonsinthecommunity.

Norway’sabilitytorespondtochangingcircumstancesaffectingdevelopmentassistanceNorway emerges as a very responsive partner to the Government of Afghanistan by ensuringcompliancewiththeTMAF.TheeffortsputintoNordic+andtheactiveleadershiprolethereemergeasimportant.Thiscontributionensuredbothadialoguebetweendonorsandgovernment,andmadeNorway a highly relevant policy actor towards other donors, including the US, with a “proactive”adaptationtonewrealities.Weconfirmthiscircumstanceinthe“Virksomhetsplan2014”,wheretheplanned development activities are grouped (and assessed) according to the strategic objectives.ThatNorwayisgivenrecognitionasanactivepartnerbytheGovernmentoftheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistan (GoIRA) is confirmed by a written response from a former Minister from the periodunder review, in which he stated that: “With adequate justifications, Norway has always madeattemptstoadaptanddisplayadegreeofflexibilityinitsroleasadirectandbi-lateralpartnertotheGoIRA.”

Onequestion iswhether theNorwegianstrategy,developmentprioritiesandpartnersshouldhavebeenadjustedinaccordancewiththecontextualchanges.Ouropinionisthat,onthestrategicside,therewasno reason to change theoverallNorwegianaimof 1) strengthenAfghan institutions, 2)contribute to a political settlement and, 3) contribute to sustainable and just development,humanitarian efforts, and promote the governance, human rights and gender equality agendas.Rather,thesestrategicalaimsbecameevenmorerelevantthroughouttheperiod.

The second question is whether changing circumstances warranted changes to the developmentpriorityareasofgoodgovernance,educationandruraldevelopment.Again,itisourassessmentthatthese priority areas remained highly relevant throughout the period under study, although forchanging reasons. The efforts to improve governance are key for the GoIRA’s ability to properlyhandletheirdevelopmentassistanceandprovidebasicservicestotheirpopulation,andtocurbthenepotism and corruption that reduces the value and impact of the assistance. Many of thesechallengescouldonlybeaddressedbyandthroughchangesintheGoIRA.Education,andespeciallyeducationforgirls,notonlyhelpstoclosetheexistingeducationgap,butensuresinthelongerrunabettereducatedandskilledAfghanworkforce.Acontinuationofthesupportforruraldevelopmentacknowledgesthat themajorityofAfghanssecuretheir livelihoodsand jobsoutsidethecities,and

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assistancemighthelp tostemanextremelyhighurbanisationrate.Whilenotassessing thequalityand impact of each of these interventions, we are of the opinion that they remained valid formeetingtheneedsontheAfghanside,andthattheywereinalignmentwith,andinsupportof,theachievementoftheoverallNorwegianstrategicgoals.We have mentioned discussions in the Embassy about potentially prioritising other developmentactivities.Theenergysectorwasunderconsiderationforseveralyears,butwas intheenddecidedagainstforthreereasons.ThefirstonewasthemixedexperiencewithsupportfortheestablishmentoftheAfghanmininglaw,andthesubsequentbiddingprocessadministeredbytheMinistryofMinesthat did not adhere to agreed procedures.7 A second reason, as reflected in several“virksomhetsplaner”,was the lackof clarity onwhichMinistrywouldbe responsible formanagingtheenergysector.AndathirdreasonwastheAmbassador’sconcernthat,giventheuncertaintyoverresponsibilityandtheresourcesrequiredattheEmbassytoseetheprojectthrough,suchaprojectmight notmeet the required standard and that itwould be difficult to provide quality assurance.Amongotherprojectsdiscussed,accordingtonationalstaffattheEmbassy,wasonetomapandhelpincreasethewatersupplyinKabul,giventhepositiveresponsetotheNORPLANprojectfromseveralMinistries.Thethirdquestioniswhetherthereshouldhavebeenfurtherchangestoaidchannelsandpartnersbetween 2011 and 2014. Therewas already a deliberate policy in place to reduce the number ofpartners (primarilyNGOs)andprojects,andabudgetshift towardstrust fundsandnon-earmarkedfunding.ThatshiftedthemanagementburdenandresponsibilityforM&EtotheWB,theUNDPandtheBritishCouncil(Tawanmandi),whohavesuchmechanismsinplace.However,NorwaycontinuedfundingthroughaselectednumberofNorwegianand internationalNGOs, includingsupport in theFaryab province. It was a secure, but not very innovative policy, and might have missed out onopportunitiestodevelopmoreAfghan-leddevelopmentandcivilsocietyorganisations.With this caveat, the decisions to reduce the numbers of partners but to maintain a diversity ofchannelsappearsassound,inthelightofthecontextualchallengesoutlinedinthepreviouschapterandoftheEmbassy’smanagementcapacity.There is,however,anotedconcernoverhowsupportforAfghancivilsocietyorganisationscancontinueaftertheterminationofthecivilsocietytrustfundTawanmandiinmid2015.

Norway’scoordinationwithotherdonorsTheresponseswereceivedaboutthisquestionweremostlypositive.Norway isseenasactiveatastrategiccoordinationlevel, in internationaldonormeetings(e.g.Tokyoandthebiannualfollow-upmeetings), in the ARTF steering committee, and not least in the follow-up to LOTFA. Particularimportance is placed on the role played in the ARTF thematic sub-committees and in educationcommittees, arenas used to ensure that strategy and policy (in areas like education and genderequality)isturnedintopractice.NorwegianworkonandintheNordic+coordinationgroupemerges

7Fordetailsseethe2010studyAfghanhydrocarbons:Asourcefordevelopmentorforconflict?AriskassessmentofNorwegianinvolvementindevelopmentoftheAfghanoilandgasindustry,availableathttp://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?3763=afghan-hydrocarbons,visited15.02.2016

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ashighlyimportantandinfluentialinbothpolicyandpracticalterms.ItenabledNorwegianinfluenceonkeystrategicissuesfarbeyondwhatcouldhaveachievedotherwise.Atthenationallevel,therewason-goingcoordinationwiththeGoIRAandwithotherembassiesonarangeofactivities,includingaleadingroleonAIHRCandinvolvementinMEC(thelatterdelegatedtothe Danish Embassy). During the course of 2015, the co-location with the Danish Embassy hasopened up further dialogue and collaboration given the range of common aid channels andimplementers.TheNorwegiancoordinationandengagementpractiseisoutlinedindetailintheeducationchapter,fromARTFstrategicengagement,throughdonordiscussions(wheretheNordic+circlegavefurtherleverage) andworking groups involving differentministries, and direct project dialogue.Whatwehavebeenabletoestablishwasthatthiswasnotuniquefortheeducationsector.TheEmbassyalsoprioritisedgenderandhumanrightsissues.TheNordic+circlewasestablishedalready in themid-2000sasa joint coordinationpointbetweenNordicdonorsthathasbeenexpandedtootherdonors,dependingontheissuesaddressed.In2006Norad developed the document “Nordic Plus: Practical Guide to Delegated Cooperation”, and thecollaborationwasformalizedata2008meetingoftheNordicForeignMinisters.APlanofActionforNordic Cooperation inAfghanistanwas adapted for the donors in order to be ”amore concernedpartner for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the internationalcommunity.”8Itstatedthat

Theoverallaimofanincreasedcooperationinthedevelopmentfieldistoachieveastrongerimpact in sectors of particular importance to the Nordic countries. A more efficientorganisationofdevelopmentworkshouldeasetheworkloadforeachcountry.Furthermore,a strengthened Nordic cooperationwould enhance cooperation among donors in general,and strengthen the role of the Afghan government in taking overall responsibility for thedevelopmentofAfghanistan.

TherearefewdetailsontheactivitiesoftheNordic+inthedocumentsmadeavailabletotheteam,butthe“Virksomhetsplan2014”notesthatNorwaywastheleaddonorforthefirstpartof2013,andthe Embassy judged the collaboration in the period as “good and constructive”. For 2014 theEmbassy noted that Nordic+ developed and extensive collaboration and carried out shared(project/programme)assessmentsandreviews“to rationalisesuch typesof tasks” Italso indicatedthat “delegated collaboration is considered where possible”. The Embassy further explains that“delegationoftasksbetweendonors,andarotatingresponsibilityforprocessfollow-up(TMAF)hasdemonstrateditseffectivenesswithintheNordic+circle.Similarsharingoftasksisalsotakingplaceintheeducationsectorandonsingularcontracts.”(pp.10-11,ourtranslation).

8Formoredetailsseethe2009Noradreport“StrengtheningNordicDevelopmentCooperationinandwithAfghanistan”,availableathttp://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3323-strengthening-nordic-development-cooperation-in.pdf,visitedon15.02.2016

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The interviewsconfirmtheextentof theeffortput intoNordic+,andalso that itwas regardedasveryvaluable inthedialogueonTMAFwithotherdonors,andparticularlybytheGoIRA.However,somerespondentssuggestedthatthereductioninthenumberofNorwegiandiplomaticstaffandtheterminationofthedevelopmentadvisorpositionattheEmbassyhaveaffectedthecapacitytoattendcoordination and thematicmeetings, and thereby Norway’s influence on processes and decisions.Nationalstaffmembers,despitetheirknowledgeandtrustedpositions,willfindithardertobeheardin such fora. Such staff will also sometimes be required to consult colleagues or theMFA beforestatingNorway’spositionorcommittingto/approvingchangesorsuggestions.Thesamedevelopment isalsonoted ina responsereceivedfroma formerAfghanMinister.WhenaskedifhehadwitnessedanychangeinNorwegianpolicyand/orpracticeintheperiodfrom2011to2014,theformerMinisterresponded:

Even before 2011, Norway had very clear ideas about a separation between security andsocial development activities through the highly specific role of its PRT in Faryabprovince. The largest change experienced in policy or practice over this period was thereductionof aphysicalpresence inKabulwiththeNorwegianMission shrinking in sizeandreducing itsin-country capacity. The main constraint with this became the reliance ofEmbassystaffonOsloforfinalisinganyinformeddecision.

Wewould like tomention that theEmbassyhas, asnotedabove,hadanactive role in facilitatinginformationexchangewithandbetweentheNGOpartnersthroughregularmeetingsattheEmbassy.In Faryab, the Development Advisor organised regular coordinationmeetings betweenNorwegianFundedNGOsandtheprovincialauthorities,thoughthepracticewasdiscontinuedafterthepositionwaseliminated.Thislackofnational/localcoordinationandinformationsharingondevelopmentandhumanitarianactivitieswiththeEmbassyisinouropinionanegativedevelopment,notleastbecauseit reduces the Embassy (and the NGOs) contextual knowledge in a rapidly changing security andpoliticalenvironment.NorwayasadonorcomparedwithSwedenandDenmarkThere are considerable similarities in the focus andapproachesofDenmark,Norwayand Sweden,especially after Denmark concluded its direct budget support and presence in the Ministry ofEducation(discussed later inthereport)andchannelledtheireducationfundingthroughtheARTF.Thethreecountrieshaveall takenpart inandcommittedtotheLondonandTokyoprocesses,andnot only signed up to the TMAF but worked actively through the Nordic+ group for theimplementation of the framework. There has been a very active and sustained NGO presence inAfghanistan from all three countries, with key individuals in the Karzai and Ghani governmentshavingspenttheirformativeyearsinoneorseveraloftheseNGOs.Denmark’sstatedprioritiesare:1)economicgrowthandemploymentwithafocusontheagriculturalsector;2)education;and3)goodgovernance,democracyandhumanrights.Thereisalsocontinuedsupportfor:1)capacitybuildingoftheAfghanpolice;2)returningrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersons;and6)providinghumanitarianaid. Inaddition,women'srightsandopportunitiescontinue

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to be a priority and Denmark maintains a strong focus on fighting and preventing corruption.9Denmarkbudgetedanaverageannualsupportof530millionDKKfortheperiod2013-2017.

Sweden has two stated strategic results goals: 1) Strengthened democracy and gender equality,greater respect for human rights and freedom from oppression; and 2) better opportunities forpeople living in poverty to contribute to and benefit from economic growth, and to gain a goodeducation.Thesegoalsaredeignedtorespondtothe“FiveE’sforAfghanDevelopment”announcedat the Tokyo conference: 1) Empowerment, 2) Education, 3) Employment, 4) Enterprise, and 5)EconomicIntegration.10Swedenhasbudgetedatotalof4.87billionSEKfortheperiod2014-2019.

Inthischapter,however,theaimistocomparestructuresandpractisesformanagingdevelopmentassistance.We find more similarities between Norway and Denmark on the way aid delivery ismanaged,withtheMFAastheleadandDANIDAandNoradactinginanadvisoryandsupportrole.Inthe case of Norway, the MFA manages at headquarters level the framework agreements withInternationalNGOsand trust funds. In contrast, Sida ismore independent from theSwedishMFA,andismandatedto“implementthestrategiesandmanageinterventions,(includingmonitoringandevaluation of results)”.11 This independence is then reflected in the way the Swedish Embassy isorganisedandmanagesitsdevelopmentactivities.SidastaffisintegratedintotheEmbassystructure,with theAmbassador as thehighest authority.A Swedish Embassy is considered a separate entityfromtheMFA,whichmanagesthedevelopmentassistance,althoughitremainsresponsibletofollowandimplementtheinstructionsgivenbytheMFA.

Theextenttowhichdevelopmentassistanceismanagedoutoftheembassyorfromthecapitalalsoresults indifferencesinthestaffingoftherespectivecountriesembassies.TheDanishEmbassyhashadadedicatedseniordiplomatresponsibleforoverseeingdevelopmentassistance,thoughshe(andherAfghancolleague)havehadlimitedabilitytoundertakefieldmonitoring.Wewereinformedthatthestaffmemberwasleavingherpositionintheendof2015andwillprobablynotbereplaced,thusleaving the now joint Danish/Norwegian Embassy without a senior international developmentcounsellor.

TheSwedishEmbassyhashadaverydifferentapproacheventhoughtheirprojectsareimplementedin many of the same locations as those of Denmark and Norway—and facing the same securitychallenges.WhenthedevelopmentadvisorpositioninMazar-e-Sharifwaseliminated,anewpositionwasinsteadcreatedattheembassyinKabul.Asaresult,thenumberofinternationaladvisorsattheembassyhasincreasedfromfourtofive.TheyworktogetherwithonemaleandonefemaleAfghanadvisors.Theymanagetogetherthedevelopmentassistanceportfolioandregularlyundertakefieldmonitoring,even inareasconsideredbyothersasbeing toohigh risk.Theirestimation is that thispractice works well, with specific security assessments being made for each travel to determinewhen,how,andwithwhomtheytravel.9TheDanishAfghanistanStrategy2015-17,availableathttp://afghanistan.um.dk/en/~/media/Afghanistan/FACT%20SHEET%20The%20Danish%20Afghanistan%20Strategy%202015-17.pdf,visited21.01.2016.10ResultsstrategyforSweden’sinternationaldevelopmentcooperationwithAfghanistan2014–2019,availableathttp://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/c3f71737c5f84cebb8550f61b214ab78/results-strategy-for-swedens-international-development-cooperation-with-afghanistan-20142019visited21.01.2016.11Sida:ApproachesandMethods,availableathttp://www.sida.se/English/how-we-work/approaches-and-methods/visited21.01.2016.

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Thebenefitsarehowevernotlimitedtotheirabilitytodirectlyassesstheirdevelopmentassistanceandtomeetwiththeintendedbeneficiaries.AfurtherbenefitistheircapacitytohavemeetingswithGovernmentofficialsandmembersofProvincialCouncilandCommunityDevelopmentCouncils,andto gain contextual and province/district specific knowledge that international staff at otherembassiesmightnothave.Italsoallowsthemtoseetheimplementationofotherprojectactivitiesdeveloped through mechanisms funded by Sweden, such as ARTF, which also provides valuableinformation for further engagementwith thesemechanisms.It should also be noted that it is notonlythedevelopmentstaffthatundertakesthesefieldvisits.Thecurrentandpreviousambassadorsalsotravelfrequentlyandengagewithprovincialauthorities,NGOsandAfghancivilsocietygroups.

OnelikelyreasonforthisdifferenceistheclearlystatedpriorityoftheSwedishAmbassador,andthedirection from theMFA, to have Swedenpresent in the field to the extent possible. This is also adecisionthattheAmbassadorhastheauthoritytomake,as theposition ismandatedtodecideonmattersrelatingtotravelandsecuritypoliciesinconsultationwiththeirsecuritystaff.

WethereforeobservethelargestdifferenceinthemanagementofdevelopmentassistancebetweenSweden and Norway. The responsibility for managing development aid primarily lies with theSwedish Embassy in Kabul. Norway has this responsibility divided between (different sections in)MFAandNorad.Swedenalsohasa largerteam(internationalandnational)basedattheEmbassy,allowing for more hands on and contextually grounded management. This also allows them toconducttheirownonthegroundmonitoringofSwedishdevelopmentassistance.

We also see differences in how development assistance was utilised as part of the militaryengagement.Norwaydecidedonaclear separationbetween themilitaryandcivilianengagement,withMFAstaff coordinating the20%of theNorwegiandevelopmentassistanceearmarked for theFaryab province. One interviewee observed that this left Norway in a better position than othercountrieswhentheystartedplanningforwithdrawalfromthePRTandshiftingassistancefromthemilitarytocivilianmanagement.

Denmark, as part of the UK led PRT in Helmand, had a CIMIC (Civil and Military Cooperation)detachment and civilian advisers from the MFA. These, based on an annual “Helmand Plan”,12implementedabout400smallprojectswiththeaimofproducingquickandvisibleresults“inareaswherecivilianorganisationsareunabletowork”.Theprojectswereprimarilytargetedateducation,watersupply,healthandinfrastructure.13ThetentativebudgetfortheHelmandengagementwas85millionDKK in2011,90millionDKK in2012, and100millionDKK in2013, as thePRTprepared toleaveandhandoverresponsibilitytolocalauthorities.

Swedenallocatedapproximately 15-20%of its development cooperation towards thenorthof thecountry. These fundswere administered by the civilian component of the PRT that Sweden led inMazar-e-Sharif,whichwasresponsibleforthestabilityoffourprovinces:Balkh,Jowzjan,SamanganandSar-ePul.AidactivitiesweredevelopedincooperationbetweentheSwedishembassyinKabul

12The2011–2012Helmandplanisavailableathttp://www.fmn.dk/temaer/afghanistan/baggrundforindsatsen/Documents/Helmandplan2011_FINAL_web.pdf,visited13.02.2016.13Fordetailsseehttp://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/9103/html/printerversion_chapter03.htm,visitedon13.02.2016.

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andSidadevelopmentadvisersbasedinMazar-eSharif.Decisionsonfundallocationweredelegatedto theembassy inKabul. TheSwedishdevelopmentadvisorsat thePRTwerepartof theEmbassystructure and handled development projects by Sida in the northern provinces. When SwedenwithdrewfromthePRT,theremainingdevelopmentadvisorwasrelocatedtotheEmbassyinKabul,tomaintaintheoveralllevelofstaffinginAfghanistan.

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NorwegiandevelopmentassistanceinAfghanistan2011-14andtheresultsInthissection,wewillprovideaschematicpresentationoftheNGOsandtrustfundsinlightofthemainToRquestions,anddiscusstheextenttowhichtheyreportonandcandocumentshortandlongtermresultsandimpact.

ReviewofNGOsandtheiractivitiesBasedontheToRweselectedanumberofNGOsandrequestedtheirreports,monitoringandevaluation,andanti-corruptionguidelines.WewereabletointerviewmembersoftheNGOsinKabul(excepttheAgaKhanFoundationthatdidnotrespondtoourrequests),whiletheNorwegianbasedNGOswerealsointerviewedinOslo.BasicinformationaboutthemisincludedinAnnexIII,buttheNGOsselectedarethefollowing:

• AgaKhanFoundation(AKF)• AgencyforTechnicalCooperationandDevelopment(ACTED)• DanishCommitteeforAidtoAfghanRefugees(DACAAR)• IntegrityWatchAfghanistan(IWA)• NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee(NAC)• NorwegianChurchAid(NCA)• NorwegianRefugeeCouncil(NRC)• NorwegianRedCross(NORCROSS)

TherearesomeimportantdifferencesbetweentheseNGOstobekeptinmind.NCAandNORCROSSbothworkwith,andimplementprojectsthroughAfghanNGOs,theAfghanRedCrescentandcivilsocietygroups.TheotherNGOslistedareprimarilyimplementingtheirownprojects,butcollaboratetovaryingdegreeswithlocalcommunities(includingCommunityDevelopmentCouncilsandsimilarbodies)and/ornational,districtandlocalauthorities.

NAC,NCAandNRC(thelatterwithabreakbetween1994and2002)havehadasustainedpresenceinPakistan/Afghanistansincetheearly1980s,laterjoinedbyNORCROSS.Startingin2002theEmbassyinKabulprovidedsupportforAKF,andlaterforIWA,aspartofsupportforanti-corruptioninitiatives.ACTEDandDACAARwerepartnersfortheNorwegiandevelopmentsupportinFaryab.

AllthesepartnersarewellrecognizedNGOsandhavesubstantialadditionalfundingfromarangeofdonors.ACTED,AKF,DACAARandfourofNCA’spartnerNGOsarefacilitatingpartnersfortheNationalSolidarityProgramme.

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AgaKhanFoundation(AKF)

Developmentorientationwithstrongbeneficiaryinvolvement.Projectson1)humanandinstitutionaldevelopment,2)professionaldevelopment,3)publichealthpromotion,4)cultureandtourismpromotion,5)alternativeenergies,6)maternalandchildhealth,and7)“LightupBamyan”.Contextanalysis&riskmitigation

Capacitybuilding

Nationalownership

MonitoringandEvaluation

Anti-corruption

Results/impact

Gender14

YesExtensiveanalysisandriskmitigation,incl.localstaffhiringandcontactwithcommunityleaders.

YesSubnationalgovernancestructures,incl.localNGOsandcommunitycouncils.MOEatprovince&district,andforTTCsPublicHealthworkers.

YesTrainingandinvolvementofandwithgovernancestructures(province&district),andnationalNGOs,incl.foradvocacywork.

Communities,increasedcapacityforowndevelopment.AlignmentwithNPP.

YesEvidentfromreportsandincludingbaseline.

YesReferencetoAKF(UK)Anti-corruptionandbriberypolicy.

YesAllprojectsreportonactualdeliveryagainstplans–andprovideexplanationswhengoalsnotmet.Sustainabilityandlessonslearneddiscussedforeachprojectarea.Impactcasespresented.

YesGenderpolicy,andgenderunit,genderadvisorsandprojectfocalpoint.

14BasedonT.WimpelmannandA.Strand.2014.WorkingwithGenderinRuralAfghanistan:ExperiencesfromNorwegian-fundedNGOprojects.(NoradEvaluationsno.10/2014).Oslo:Norad.

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AgencyforTechnicalCooperationandDevelopment(ACTED)

Ruraldevelopmentandhumanitarianassistanceorientation.InFaryabtheyhaveimplementedprojectsto1)improvenatural,human,socialandphysicalcapital,2)improvetheeconomicpotentialofexcludedgroups,and3)improvegovernance.

Contextanalysis&riskmitigation

Capacitybuilding

Nationalownership


Anti-corruption

Results/impact

Gender

YesExtensiveconflictanalysis,projectlevelriskmitigation,includingdelegatedauthoritytofieldforrapiddecisionmaking&stafftraining.

SomeGIRoA:outreach/monitoring.Trainingofyouthgroups.

MixedMoUwithministriesbutreportchallengeswithgovt.partici-pationinprojects.AlignmentwithNPP.

YesInternalM&Eunit.Financial/auditcontrolandamixoflocalandexpatmonitoringstaff,pluscommunitymonitoringandcomplaintsmechanisms.

YesACguidelinesandautonomousdepartmentswithreportinglinetoHQ.

Yes,partiallyTheyreportachievementagainstplannedoutcomes–buti.e.actualincreaseinincomenotdocumented/assessed.ImpactinFaryab:Morewomentakinguniversityqualificationtests.Increaseinfemaleeconomicactivities.Estimated9millUSDsavingsduetolivestockvaccination.

YesGenderpolicyandstrategy,genderunitand7genderfocalpoints.

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DanishCommitteeforAidtoAfghanRefugees(DACAAR)

Ruraldevelopmentorganisation,expertiseonWaterSanitationandHygiene(WASH).Faryabprogrammeincludes1)Ruraldevelopmentactivitiesaimedat:a)reducedhouseholdvulnerabilityandb)reducedfemalevulnerabilityforsocio-economicrisks/stress,and2)WASHactivitiesaimedat:a)capacitybuildingfortechnical/managementskills;b)groundwatermonitoringandc)accesstocleanwater.


Capacitybuilding

Nationalownership


Anti-corruption

Results/impact

Gender

YesCoveredinstrategydoc,incl.scenarios.Reportsmoretechnicallyoriented,withlessonactualrisk-mitigationefforts.

YesForprovincialgov.staff,NGOsandindividualsonagriculturalandWASHthemes.Trainingofwomenandestablish-mentofWomenResourceCenters.

PartlyArticulatedfocusontraining,lessoninvolvementandownership.AlignmentwithNPP.

YesIncludingmixedmonitoringteams.TheM&Esystemisunderdevelopment,basedonevaluationrecommendation.Detailedbaselinestudyonprogramprioritiesconductedatprojectstart.

YesAnti-corruptionpolicywithzerotoleranceandCodeofConductonanti-corruption.ACcontrolinFinanceManualandProcure-mentManual

YesDetailedonresultsagainstplan/baseline.Waterdatageneratedusedforotheractors–contributedtoNationalDrinkingWaterStandard.

YesGenderpolicy,andonegenderadvisor.

IntegrityWatchAfghanistan(IWA)

NationalNGOwithanti-corruptionexpertise,projectson1)publicservicemonitoring;2)communitybasedaidmonitoring;3)extractiveindustriesmonitoring;4)budgettracking;and5)communitytrailmonitoring.


Capacitybuilding

Nationalownership


Anti-corruption

Results/impact

Gender

StrongIncludingunderstandingofpersonal,organizationalandcommunalrisksassociatedwiththeiractivities–andwaystomitigatethese

YesAmainIWAobjective.Targetedforgovernmentofficials,judges,civilsocietygroupsandindividuals-includingruralareas.

YesIncludingbuildingnationalcapacitytocontrolandendureoutcome(andimpact)ofdevelopmentprocesses.

YesBuildingnationalandcommunalcapacitytomonitorandevaluategovernmentactivitiesanddevelopment,andprivateprojects.

YesAddres-singitbothintheoryandpractice.

YesSomeareashaveprovenmorechallengingtoobtainresultsinthanothers.

YesFortrainingandinstudiesonthegenderaspectsofdevelopmentandcommunityinvolvement

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NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee(NAC)

Integratedcommunitydevelopmentanddisasterreduction/mitigation.Projectincludeteachereducation,midwifeeducation,ruralpublichealth,naturalresourcemanagement,disasterriskreductionandadvocacywork.


Capacitybuilding

Nationalownership


Anti-corruption

Results/impact

Gender

YesDetailedcontextanalysis.Identificationandsuggestionforriskmitigationonabroadrangeofpotentialriskstopopulation,projectsandorganisation.

YesForgovernmentandcommunities.NACplacestechnicalstaffintheprovince/districtoffice,asexpertisetobedrawnonbythegovernment.

YesConsequentinengagingwithandincludinggovernmentinstitutionsandofficialsintheprojectcycle.DocumentedalignmentwithNPP.

YesHasM&Epolicyinplace,andmonitoringunitandstrategyinplace–andcommunitymonitoring.Theoriesofchangedevelopedwithstakeholders.Hasextensivebaselinestudy.

YesHasACpolicyandconcreteprojectfollow-up.

YesDetailedreportsonresultsagainstplans.Documentedimpactofmidwifeprojectbyreductioninchildmortalityinageographicalarea.

YesGenderpolicyandstrategy,Onegenderfocalpoint

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NorwegianChurchAid(NCA)

DonorNGOworkingthrough/withAfghanNGOsandcivilsocietyorganisations.NCAsupportsabroadrangeofruraldevelopmentactivities,includingsolarenergyandfemaleempowerment,andprovidesupportforadvocacywork.Peacebuildingisanintegratedpartoftheirprojects.


Capacitybuilding

Nationalownership


Anti-corruption

Results/impact

Gender

YesBothontheirownandincollaborationwiththeirpartners.Particularfocusondonoharm,andmitigatingthataidgenerateconflict.WorkingONconflictsandnotonlyINthem(ref.Norad2012).

YesMainobjectivetowardstheirpartners,GIRoAandlocalcommunities,partlyimplementedbyNACandpartlybypartners.

YesClearobjective,aimedatnational,provinceanddistrictauthorities,partnerNGOsandlocalcommunities.CoordinationofficeinFaryab,workedcloserwiththegovernment.Governmentrepresentativesinvitedforprojectmonitoring.AlignmentwithNPP.

YesPolicyandguidelinesinplace,includingscorecardsandreflection,trainingofpartners.BaselineforinterventionareasdevelopedjointlywithpartnerNGOsItdoesownmonitoringandhiresexternalevaluators.

YesPolicyandguidelinesinplace.Follow/upwithpartnersandcommunities,indialoguewithAfghanNGOsoncommunitymonitoring.

YesTwofold,oneoncapacitybuildingofpartnersandthesecondmorequantitativeonwhatresultstheseproduce.Indicatorsofimpact,butexpectedtobesubstantiatedwhenmeasuredagainstbaseline.

YesGenderpolicyandstrategy,andgendercoordinatorinKabul.

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NorwegianRefugeeCouncil(NRC)

HumanitarianNGOwithrefugee/IDPfocus,includinga)humanitarianassistance;b)educationandinformationactivities,and3)legaladvise(ICLA).


Capacitybuilding

Nationalownership


Anti-corruption

Results/impact

Gender

YesContextanalysisinplaced,includingonaccess,andonwaystomitigateriskinfragileareas.

PartlyLimitedtoownstaffonownprojectandstaffofRefugeeMinistry.

NoNostrategytoincreaseAfghanownershipandbuildcapacityasexpatsmanageoperations.Abouttochange,NRCplantoemploy/buildAfghanexpertiseoverthecomingyear.HumanitarianassistancenotpartofNPP.

YesM&Esysteminplace,internationalstaffinchargeofanindependentunit.Realtimemonitoring,datagatheringandanalysis.

YesGeneralNRChandbookandpolicy,personresponsibleforACoversightreportsdirectlytoCountryDirector.

YesOnresultsaccordingplan.Lessimpacttoreporton,programmetobeevaluatedin2016.Theyexpecttohavemoreindicatorsinplacebythen.

PartlyGeneralcodeofconduct,nodedicatedstaff.

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NorwegianRedCross(NORCROSS)

HumanitarianNGOwithpartnerandnetworkfocus,providingsupportandmentoringforARCS’sorganizational,logisticandanti-corruptiondevelopment;andfortheirgenderdepartmentandtheRCRCnetwork:organizationaldevelopment,healthprogrammesaswellassupportforKabulambulance.


Capacitybuilding

Nationalownership


Anti-corruption

Results/impact

Gender

YesButlargelybasedontheextensiveknowledgeandmitigationcapacityoftheARCS,IFRCandICRC.

YesMainobjectivefortheirsupportforARCS.Includescapacitytorespondtoemergenciesandstrengtheningtheirgenderdepartment.

YesARCSisthelargestvolunteerandhealthnetworkinAfghanistan,workingcloselywiththeGIRoA.AlignmentwithNPP.

YesMainefforttodeveloptheARCSsystemandcapacitytomonitorandevaluateownactivities.Includinglogisticsystemfortracing/useofreliefcommodities.TheNORCROSSrepresenta-tivemonitorsprojectactivities.

YesAssistedARCSindevelopingtheirACstrategy,proceduresandroutines.LogisticsystemformpartofACmeasures.NORCROSShaswhistle-blowingpolicy.

YesReportonkeyachievementsofsupportedactivities,peoplereachedandsuccessstories.Reflectiononsustainabilityandlessonslearned,lessreferencetoimpact.

YesPolicyandsupportforaswellascapacitybuildingofgenderdepartment.

AssessmentofNGOactivitiesAnalyzing the above information, we see a diversity of orientations and approaches among theNGOs,aswellasacrossthetypeofhumanitariananddevelopmentassistancetheyprovideand itsgeographical coverage. Activities are primarily within the three priority areas of Norwegianengagement,particularly forruraldevelopmentbutalsofortheeducationsector,capacitybuildingandtheadvocacypartofgoodgovernance.TheNGOsholdadistinctcapacityforrespondingtoandmitigating the outcomes of natural disasters, responding to internal displacements and providinghumanitarianassistance.GenderissuesareaddressedbymostNGOs,withsomeworkingspecificallyonhumanrights.

As expected, we find a concentration of NGOs in the Faryab province, but also presence in thepoorestandleastdevelopedprovinces(suchasDaikondi,Ghor,Uruzgan,BadakshanandNooristan)andinthoseareaswithlargeinfluxofreturneesorconcentrationofIDPs(suchasNangarhar,HeratandKabul).While there is some variation depending on their typeof activity, allNGOsundertakeconflictanalysisandhavedevelopedriskmitigationplans.Mostofthemprioritizecapacitybuilding,though the extent of inclusion of government staff varies, as does their perspective on whethergovernment staff represents an opportunity for collaboration or a major obstacle for the NGO

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operations.Thisdifferencesare thenreflected inhoweachNGOaimstobuildnationalownership.ThepracticeofplacingNGO technical staff in governmentofficesand invitinggovernment staff totake part in evaluations is among the clearest examples of a long-term capacity building strategy;merelyinformingthemaboutongoingactivitiesisjusttheshort-termoption.

ItisevidentfrominterviewsanddocumentsreviewedthatmostofthedevelopmentorientedNGOshaveperformedbaseline surveys since2011,andsomeof themhavedevised theirownTheoryofChange. This puts them in a better position to not only report outcomes and numbers, but tomeasureimpact(atleastovertime)inaccordancewithOECD/DACguidelines:

The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly orindirectly,intendedorunintended.Thisinvolvesthemainimpactsandeffectsresultingfromtheactivityonthelocalsocial,economic,environmentalandotherdevelopmentindicators.

SomeNGOsreportontheirprojects’impactorstatetheexpectedimpactoftheassistance.However,theseexercisesconsistmostlyof isolatedexamples insteadofthesystematicassessmentof impactthatarerequiredtocomplywiththeguidelines.

Although with variations, these NGOs are better prepared to meet and adapt to contextualchallenges,documentresultsandaddresscorruptionchallengesthantheywerein2011.TheyhaveM&E strategies and procedures in place, as well as anti-corruption policies and regulations, anddedicated staff to do the follow up. This is reassuring,when compared to challenges identified inother channels. Still, testing over time is the onlyway to determine howwell functioning are thesystemsthevariousNGOshaveinplace,andwhataretheresultsandimpacttheycansubsequentlydocument.

Gender issueswere a high priority forNorway over the period studied.Wewill refer to themainconclusionofa2014NoradstudyofruralAfghanistanthatexaminedtheperformanceofmostoftheNGOsunderstudyhere.Oneofitsfindingsstandsoutasparticularlyrelevantforthisreport(p.v):

The study zoomed in on women’s income generation projects in order to examine therelevance, sustainability, results and promising practicesof gender related activities. Thereview found interesting differences in howprojectswere conceived and implemented; towhatextenttheyaimedandsucceededinexpandingwomen’scontroloverthevaluechain,whetheritwaspossibletomobilizewomeninsmallcollectiveswithregularmeetingsandtowhat extent women were able to obtain a sustainable income. The findings suggest thatorganizationsshouldconsiderwhethertheycouldbemorestrategic,focusedandambitiousintheirworkwithwomen’seconomicempowerment.

Weagreewiththeassessmentthat«genderprojects»frequentlyappearas“tickthewomenbox”projects,withlimitedplanningandambitionsfortheirresultsandimpact.ThisisageneralcriticismforprojectstargetingwomeninAfghanistan,15butonecouldhaveexpectedmorefromNorwegianNGOpartners.Thatbeingsaid,wewouldliketoemphasizethattherewereseveralinnovativeprojectsidentifiedthatdeservecredit(notallofthemincludedinthe2014reviewthatcoveredtheframeworkagreementswithNGOs).Theseprojectshelpedfurtherwomen’seconomicprospects(as

15AfghanResearchandEvaluationUnit.2013.Women’sEconomicEmpowermentinAfghanistan,2002-2012:InformationMappingandSituationAnalysis.Kabul,AREU.

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solarengineersandmidwifes),securedtheirlegalrights(asinthecaseofreturningfemalerefugees),andensuredwomeninvolvementinpeaceprocesses(MidwifesforPeace).

ReviewofTrustFundsIn this section, we will examine the main three trust funds used for channelling Norwegiandevelopment assistance: theWB administered ARTF, UNDP administered LOTFA, andmore brieflytheBritishCounciladministeredTawanmandi.

AfghanReconstructionTrustFundTheARTFwasestablishedin2002toprovideacoordinatedfinancingmechanismfortheGovernmentofAfghanistan'sbudgetandprioritynational investmentprojects. The fund is administeredby theWBandsupportedby34donors.Thetrustfundisthelargestsinglesourceofon-budgetfinancinginthecountry.ARTFgrantssupporttotheGovernmentofAfghanistan’soperationalbudget(recurringcosts) and to 21 programmes, including education, agriculture, rural development, health, socialdevelopment, infrastructureandgovernance.ARTF isthemainchannelusedbyNorwaytosupportthe priorities set by the Afghan government. In total, Norway has contributedUS$395.656.635 toARTF.

The ARTF reports on their results in their annual ARTF Scorecards.16 It reported the followingaccumulatedtotalresultsby2015:

• DirectARTFbeneficiaries:8,7million(38%female),inadditionto27millionbeneficiariesfromNSP(48,5%female).

• Education:8,2millionchildren. • Electricity:4,5millionbeneficiaries. • Roads:13,6millionbeneficiaries. • WaterandSanitation:10millionbeneficiaries. • Employment:4000EnterpriseGroupmembers,2.200graduatesfromtheNational

InstituteofManagementandAdministration. • Shorttermemployment:59millionlabourdays. • SavingsandEnterprisesupport:69500beneficiaries. • Agriculturaland/orirrigationservices:10millionbeneficiaries.

AstocktakingoftheARTFcarriedoutin2012foundthat:

The ARTF remains the mechanism of choice for on-budget funding, with lowoverhead/transaction costs, excellent transparency and high accountability, andprovidesawell-functioningarenaforpolicydebateandconsensuscreation.

That being said, the stocktaking also found shortcomings in terms of the reporting of results(discussedbelowinthesectiononM&E).NorwayplayedanactiveroleintheStrategyGroupandtheSteeringGroup,inguidingtheeffortstostrengthenthereportingmechanism,includingtheselectionof indicators.During theperiod,Norwaywasalsoadriving forcebehindensuring thatgenderwasfullyconsideredundertheARTF.

16ARTF.2015.“ARTFScorecard2015:IntegratedPerformanceandManagementFramework”,availableathttp://www.artf.af/images/uploads/ARTF_FINAL_2015_SCORECARD_REPORT.pdfvisited22.02.2016

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LawandOrderTrustFundLOTFAwas established in 2002with the aimof covering “all reasonable costs associatedwith thestart-upandoperationalneedsofthepoliceforce”.Thetrustfund,whichisadministeredbyUNDP,was intendedtobeakeychannel for the internationalcommunity tosupport theAfghanNationalPolice(ANP)inordertostrengthenthesecuritysector.Duringtheperiodunderreview,LOTFAwasinitssixthphase.PhaseVI(2011-2014)wasaimedatachievingfivemainoutputs:

1. Police force anduniformedpersonnel of Central PrisonsDepartment (CPD) paid efficientlyandtimely.

2. RequiredequipmentandinfrastructureprovidedtoMinistryofInterior(MoI).3. CapacityofMoIatpolicy,organizationalandindividuallevelimprovedinidentifiedareasand

administrativesystemsstrengthened.4. Gendercapacityandequalityinthepoliceforceimproved.5. Police-Community Partnerships institutionalised for improved local security, accountability

andservicedelivery.

The main emphasis was put on the payment of salaries. While Norway also contributed to thecomponents aimed at building capacitywithin ANP/MoI,many of the other donors appeared lessinclinedtodoso.Assuch,LOTFAwastosomeextentseenmainlyasamechanismtochannelfundstopayfortheANP.NorwegiancontributionstoPhaseVIofLOTFAtotaledUS$25.521.375.

LOTFAreportedthefollowingachievementsbyDecember2015:17

• Salariespaidto150.000AfghanNationalPoliceandprisonstaff. • Establishmentof1.350securitycheckpoints,andrefurbishedpolicehospital. • Establishmentof100FamilyResponseUnitsand50GenderMainstreamingUnits. • IncreasednumberofPoliceWomenCouncilsto70in30provinces.• Trainedmorethan10.000policeofficersontheCodeofConduct.• Establishedsix119EmergencyCallCentresand31InformationHelpDesksforthepublic.• Connected33ProvincialHeadquarterstotheweb-basedElectronicPaymentSystem.

While there had been growing concerns over possible mismanagement of funds in LOTFA in theprecedingyears,theproblemreacheditsclimaxin2012.FollowingareportbytheMEC,followedbymediareports,thedonorsdemandedaresponsefromUNDPontheallegations.FuturefundingwasmadecontingentonUNDPaddressinganyshortcomingsinLOTFAinasatisfactorymanner.Norwaywasamongstthedonorspushingforatoughstance.Whileseekingtoaddressdonordemands,UNDPrequestedanextensionofPhaseVIofLOTFAthroughtheendof2014(PhaseVIshouldhavebeencompleted by early 2013). The extension was meant to give UNDP sufficient time to strengthenmanagement and align activities for Phase VII,with the aim of putting in place a strategy for theeventualhandingoverofresponsibilityforthepaymentofANPsalariestotheAfghangovernment.

While the reforms undertaken focused primarily onUNDP procedures, rather than on procedureswithin theMoI, donors were sufficiently satisfied with the safeguards put in place. The strategicimportanceof LOTFA for thegovernments counter insurgency activities alsomeant that cuttingof

17LOTFA(2015)ProjectSummaryDecember2015,availableathttp://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/lotfa.htmlvisited22.02.2016.

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fundswould have been a difficult, if not impossible, decision tomake. From the decisionmakingprocessforcontinuingNorwegianfundingtoLOTFA, it isclearthatMFA/Noradwerefullyawareofthe challenges, and worked closely with other development partners to push for the reform ofUNDP’smanagementofLOTFA.Despitetherisks,itwasfeltthatsufficientsafeguardswerebeingputinplace. To this end,Norwayalso funded theextensionofPhaseVI (US$9,6millionoutof a totalamount of US$25,5 million). As discussed below in the section on M&E, Norway also used thisopportunityforpushingforstrengthenedM&EandreportingonthepartyofLOTFA.

TawanmandiTawanmandi was established in 2011 as an Afghan civil society strengthening fund by a donorconsortiumincludingDenmark,Norway,Sweden,Switzerland,andtheUnitedKingdom.TheBritishCouncilwasselectedtomanagethefund,withajointFunders’CouncilandSteeringCommittee.18

TawanmandisupportedAfghancivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)inthreemainways:a)byprovidingCSOs with grant financing; b) by providing CSOs with capacity development support according totheirneeds;andc)byhelpingtobuildeffectiveCSOpartnerships,networks,andcoalitions.

Tawanmandiaimedtocontributetothedevelopmentof“...avibrantandinclusivecivilsociety,withfocusonissuesofpolicyandpracticeintheareasofaccesstojustice,anti-corruption,humanrights,media,andpeace-buildingandconflictresolution,withdisability,genderandyouthascross-cuttingthemes”.Tawanmandi financed threephasesofprojectgrants,where“a totalof78projectgrantshave been awarded through the programme. Funded projects have directly benefited close to150,000Afghancitizensin29provincesand187districtsacrossthecountry”.19

ThedonorsinformedabouttheterminationofsupporttoTawanmandiinSeptember2014,withthecontractexpiringon31 July2015.Theyhaddecidedagainstpursuing theplanof transforming thefundintoanindependentAfghanentity,whilestillassuringfurthersupportforAfghanCSOs.20Allthepersons interviewed supported the idea and rationale for the establishment of Tawanmandi, butthey were also unison in their agreement that the fund did not deliver over time according toprogram objectives or according to the expectations of either donors or Afghan civil society. Themainreasonprovidedforthefailurewasrelatedtothewaythefund,anditsrelationshipswithCSOs,was managed. The British Council, as organisation, had not been able to establish a functionalmanagement system for theprogramme.Thus,donorsdecided to terminate funding following theconclusion of the present funding phase. The Danes placed importance on continued support forAfghan civil society and discussed the possibility of providing funding through a European Union“ProgrammeinSupportofCivilSociety”,thoughtheyhadcommentstothepresentEUprogrammenote.

Those interviewed for this review had no knowledge about theway in which Norway planned tocontinue its support for theAfghancivil society,or ifanyparticular fundingmechanismwasunderdiscussion.

18Fordetails,seehttp://www.tawanmandi.org.afvisitedon25.01.2016.19BritishCouncilwebpage,https://www.britishcouncil.org/partner/track-record/tawanmandivisitedon25.01.2016.20Theletterisavailableherehttp://tawanmandi.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Letter-from-Tawanmandi-Donors-28-9-2014.pdfvisitedon25.01.2016.

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M&EandAnti-CorruptionProceduresTwoareasofparticularconcernraisedbythepreviousreviewwere:i)theabilitytodocumentresultsand impactof theNorwegiandevelopmentassistance, and ii) the capacity toaddress andpreventcorruption.Recommendationsincludedstrengtheningproceduresandmechanismsinbothareas.

Monitoring&EvaluationTheevaluationofNorwegiandevelopmentcooperationinAfghanistanduringtheperiod2001–2011notedthatM&EhadbeenaweakpointlargelybecauseNorway,duetothesecuritysituation,hadtorely largely on the reporting of others. The absence of baseline data alsomeant that impactwasdifficulttomeasure.WhilethiswasacknowledgedbyMFA/Norad,itwasalsonotedthatthesecuritysituation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate through 2011–2014—the period of this review.Similarchallengesremained,withlimitedpossibilitiesforstafftocarryoutmonitoringinthefield(novisitsweremadetoFaryabsince2013)anda relianceon implementingpartnersM&E frameworksandreports.WiththereductionofstaffingattheEmbassyandthetransferofresponsibilityforNGOcontracts toOslo,people interviewednoticesthatthis issuehasbecomeevenmoreofachallengeduringtheperiodunderreview.

This is not a concernunique toNorway, either for thepreviousperiodor for theperiod currentlyunderreview.Otherdonorsfacesimilarchallenges,althoughsome(e.g.Sweden)havemaintainedoreven increased staffing at their embassies and made efforts to get staff out into the field. Thispractice shows that it is actually possible to conduct field visits, although the security assessmentcarriedoutbytheEmbassyinKabuldoesnotallowfordoingit.Asaresult,workingtostrengthentheM&E and reporting procedures of implementing partners was the main channel to address thefindingsofthepreviousreview.

Asnotedearlierinthisreport,multilateralorganizations(primarilyARTFandLOTFA,themainmulti-donortrustfunds)continuedtoreceivethemajority(55%)oftheNorwegiandevelopmentfundstoAfghanistan.While thismeans that strengthening theM&Eand reportingof theseorganizations iscritical for tracking the impactofNorwegian funds, it is also theareawhereNorwayhas the leastcapacitytoeffectchangeonitsown.

However,duringtheperiodreported,anexternalreviewofARTFwascarriedout,findingthatmoreattentionneededtobeplacedonstrengtheningM&Eandreporting,aswellasonprovidinggenderdisaggregateddata.ThishasallowedNorway,aspartoftheARTFStrategyGroup,tohaveinputintothe process. These efforts have resulted in improved reporting on results, as well as in thedevelopmentofanARTF resultsmatrix (launched in2015),whichprovidesat least somebaselinesagainstwhichprogresscanbemeasured,andsomegenderdisaggregatedindicators.

Duringtheperiodunderreview,emergingconcernsaboutmismanagementinLOTFA(whichcametoaheadin2012)alsopresentedanopportunityforNorway—asoneofthemaincontributorstothetrust fund—to exercise pressure for the strengthening of M&E and reporting mechanisms.Whilebaselines remained weak, Norway, together with other donors were heard in terms of moreemphasis being placed byUNDP on strengtheningM&E procedures and providingmore adequatereporting.

ThestrengtheningofM&EframeworksandreportinghasalsobeenamajoremphasisinthedialoguewithNGOimplementingpartners,withcontinueddiscussionsbetweenMFA/NoradandtheNGOsin

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relation to their framework agreements at the annual meetings. While it was mentioned thatbaselinedataisdesiredforallnewprojectagreements,itwasalsorecognizedthatgiventhesecuritysituation baseline datamay not be available in all cases, and that itwould be possibly absent foremergency/humanitarianassistance. Assuch,theabsenceofbaselinedatadoesnothavetomeanthataprojectisautomaticallydisqualified.

Thisemphasisonresultsreportingappearstohavehadresultsduringtheperiodunderreview,withall NGO implementing partnersworking towards establishingmore robustM&E frameworks (withinnovativeways ofmonitoring being adopted, such as documenting impactwith digital camera orcommunity reporting), improved reporting procedures, and the establishment of baselines againstwhich to measure results. While these efforts are still ongoing, a majority of NGO implementingpartnersnowhavethesemechanismsinplace,andhavefrequentlyestablishedabaselinefortheirprojects.Insomecases,partnersarealsomovingtowardsdevelopingtheoriesofchange(seeAnnexVforNAC’stheoryofchange)toguidetheiractivities.Theseeffortsgosomewaytowardsaddressingthe concern that there is toomuch reliance on reporting from implementing partners due to theinabilitytoverifyindependentlytheimpactsclaimed.

Overall,interviewswithNGOimplementingpartnersindicatethatsignallingfromNorwayduringtheperiodunderreview,togetherwithanoveralltrendtowardsagreateremphasisonM&Eandimpactreporting,hasprovidedapushforthemtoinvestmoreinthisarea.Similarly,itseemsthatNorwayhasbeenabletoseizetheopportunitiespresentedtopushforchangealsowithinthemajormulti-donortrustfunds.Whilethereisstillscopeforimprovement,itdoesseemthatMFA/NoradandtheEmbassy in Kabul havemade a considerable effort to improveM&E frameworks and reporting onresults,takingintoaccountaverychallengingcontext.

Anti-corruptionproceduresCorruption remains a major concern in Afghanistan, threatening long-term development andstability. The Afghan government and the international community have repeatedly affirmed thataddressing corruption is a key priority. Through interviews and the review of the relevantdocumentation, we are satisfied that the risk/threat that corruption poses to NorwegiandevelopmentcooperationisrecognizedbystaffwithinMFA/NoradandattheEmbassyinKabul.

Overall,underaverydifficultcontext,theMFA/NoradandtheEmbassy inKabulhavebyandlargetakenthemeasuresthatcouldbetakentosafeguardagainstthemisuseofNorwegianfunds.Despiteapotentiallyhigherriskofcorruptionthaninotherpartnercountries,theEmbassyactuallyhadlessmeans at their disposal to adopt safeguards than would have been the case in a more regulardevelopmentcontext(e.g.fieldvisitsandonsightmonitoring).

TheoverallframeworkformitigatingcorruptionrisksinNorwegiandevelopmentcooperation,alongwithazero-toleranceofcorruptionpolicy,alsoapply inAfghanistan.Thisframeworkprovidesclearguidelinesforhowtoaddresscorruptionallegations,includingchannelsforreportingtotherelevantunits at HQ level. However, with the difficulties for carrying out monitoring in the field and adecrease in staffing at the Embassy in Kabul, the review of documentation from implementingpartners increasingly became themainmeans of identifying cases of corruptionduring the periodunderreview.Thevalueofazero-tolerancetocorruptionpolicyinahigh-corruptioncontextwasalsoaconcernraised.Theriskisthatpartnersmaynotreportsuspectedcasesofcorruptioninorderto

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avoidhaving their fundingdiscontinued—a situation thatNACexperiencedduring theperiod. Thisconcernwasconfirmedbyseveralinterviewees.

Whilecorruption,whenuncovered,shouldneverbetolerated,cuttingfundingmaynotalwaysbethemost appropriate response if it ends up jeopardizing the implementation of critical developmentactivities. Instead,applyingtheprincipleofproportionalitywouldbedesirableandallowfor,totheextentpossible,continueddevelopmenteffortswhileworkingtopreventfurthercasesofcorruption.

Proportionality, in this case, entails adopting an approach that is appropriate given the scale ofcorruption encountered. For example, if an implementing partner staff member is found to haveembezzledfunds,cuttingfundingcompletelywouldbeadisproportionateresponse.Requestingtheorganizationtosanctionthestaffmemberandputtinginplacebettersafeguards,whilecontinuingtoimplementdevelopmentactivities,wouldprotectdevelopmentfundsinthefuturewithouthavinganegative impact on implementation. That said, this would also require close follow-up with theimplementingpartner toensure thatactionsare taken. It ispossible that this againwould requiresufficientstaffingattheEmbassytobeabletodothisinatimelymanner.

Atthesametime,thenumberofprojects/implementingpartnerswasdecreasedduringtheperiod,inanefforttominimizetheriskofcorruption/increaseoversight.ThismeantthatNorwegianaidwaschannelled through fewer organizations,with stringent due diligence carried out prior to enteringinto a funding agreement. All contracts included an anti-corruption clause and implementingpartners (including NGOs) are expected to have in place adequate safeguards against corruption,includingcomplaintsmechanisms.

The review of the NGOs that Norway is workingwith (see section on “Review of NGOs and theiractivities”above)showsthatallofthemhaveeitherputinplaceorareintheprocessofputtinginplacespecificpoliciesandmechanismsformitigatingcorruption.Theeffectivenessofthesepoliciesandmechanismsishoweverdifficulttodeterminewithoutcarryingoutamorein-depthassessmentoftheactualsystemsputinplaceandofthecapacityofthestaffresponsibleforputtingthemintoeffect.Wedohowever share theviewofkey informants thatover theperiod reviewed it appearsthat adequate controlshavebeenput inplaceby theNGOs to safeguardNorwegian/donor funds.Wedonotehowever thatmorecouldbedone in termsofprovidingsupport forNGOs inorder tostrengtheninternalsystemsandbuildingcapacityoftheirstafftofurtherincreaseconfidenceinthesafeguardsthattheyhaveputinplace.

With the major multi-donor trust funds (e.g. ARTF and LOTFA), Norway has relied on adequatesafeguards having been put in place by the administrative agent (WB for the ARTF andUNDP forLOTFA). In cases where this assumption has not held (e.g. in the case of LOTFA), Norway actedtogetherwithotherdevelopmentpartnerstoseektostrengthencontrolmechanisms.

There is greater uncertainty as to the controls in place to prevent corruption once funds enterAfghan government systems or reach out into the field. This of course is beyond the capacity ofNorwaytoaddress,buttheEmbassyworkedwithotherdevelopmentpartnersduringtheperiodtokeep the issue high on the agenda, and supported projects/interventions aimed at strengtheningAfghangovernmentsystems.Thishoweverremainedadifficultundertakinggiventheperceptionofalack of commitment to genuinely tackle corruption on the part of the Afghan government.

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CasestudiesWewill present three brief case studies in this section to reflect the Norwegian priority areas ofeducation,ruraldevelopmentandgoodgovernance.Inthesecasestudies,wehaveputtheemphasisonreviewingthesupportforanti-corruptionefforts.

EducationTheGoIRAdecidedearlyontoprioritiseeducation,andtoresumetheresponsibilityforthesector,and not outsource the implementation to NGOs (aswith the NSP). The new Afghan Constitution,approvedin2004,statesthat“educationistherightofallcitizensofAfghanistan”.NGOsandprivatecompanies were allowed to build schools and provide teacher training and vocational/specializedtraining. In the field of higher education, private universities and institutes were allowed to beestablished, in parallel to the strengthening of the public universities. Finance Minister Ghanidemanded direct budget support for the Ministry of Education (MoE), but most donors werereluctantandpreferred tochannel the funds through theARTF.Denmarkwasanexception in thismatter,aswewilldiscussbelow.

ThisledtotheestablishmentoftheEducationQualityImprovementProject(EQUIP)in2004,undertheARTF,with an EQUIPCoordinationUnit tasked to coordinate theARTF/WB supportwithin theMoEandtoliaisebetweentheMoEandtheWB.KeydonorshavebeenAustralia,Canada,Germany,theNetherlands,Norway,Spain,SwedenandUSA.

ThebudgetforEQUIPIatthestart-up,in2004,wasUS$79million,targeting26provinces.EQUIPIIstarted in 2008, with initial funding for US$188million, and with a subsequent cost extension ofUS$250million.PlanningforphaseIIIisunderway.Supportwastemporarilysuspendedin2011duetoacriticalMidTermEvaluation,butcontinuedlater,accordingtotheNorad2012evaluation(p.5),afterWBandMoEinterventionsthataddressedmostoftheconcerns.

Between 2003 and 2015, Denmark provided direct support to the MoE through their EducationSupportProgramtoAfghanistan(ESPA).ItaimedtosecurelargersustainabilityandownershipbytheAfghangovernment,and includedsecondmentofstafftotheMinistry.The initialexpectationfromtheDanishsidewasthatotherdonorswouldjointthemintheinitiative.Asthatdidnothappen,theywereleftwithaheavyadministrativeburden,“especiallyastheMoEwasratherfragmentedintheirstructure, had limited capacity, and faced challenges related to corruption during theimplementation.”21DenmarkthereforedecidedtochanneltheireducationsupportthroughtheARTFfrom2015.

Atthesametime,in2011AfghanistanjoinedtheGlobalPartnershipforEducation(GPE)(supportedand funded by Norway), and theMoE received a three-year grant of US$55,7 million, starting in2013. The GPE aim was to address some of the inequalities in the education system throughtargeting provinces that were “insecure, underserved, difficult to access, and have the lowesteducationandeconomicfactors”.Theproject,thathasestablisheditsownGPECoordinationUnitintheMFA,placeslargeemphasisonownershipandsocialmobilisationthroughcommunityandparentinvolvement,andonlocalteacherrecruitment.WhiletheEQUIPprogrammehasbeenevaluated,so21FormoredetailsseeStrand.A.(2015)FinancingEducationinAfghanistan:OpportunitiesforAction.CountryCaseStudyfortheOsloSummitonEducationinDevelopment,availableathttp://www.osloeducationsummit.no/pop.cfm?FuseAction=Doc&pAction=View&pDocumentId=63328,visitedon25.01.2016

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farthereisnoindependentassessmentoftheGPEassistance,beyondanoticeableconcernamongdonors due to a slow start, a lack of coordination, and the risk that of it ending up as a separateprogrammeratherthananintegratedpartoftheAfghaneducationsystem.

TheNorwegianeducationsupportbetween2001and2012wasprimarilyprovided throughEQUIP,butalsothroughsupportfortheWB’sVocationalEducationandTraining,UNICEFforbasiceducationand literacy, UNESCO for educational planning, and later the NAC, NRC and FOKUS for basic,vocationalandhealthsectortraining.WiththeterminationoftheprioritygiventoeducationthroughtheARTF,thereisonlyNGOsupportregisteredforthe2011–2014period.Noradaidstatisticsshowsthat the NRC receives most of the support, a total of NOK 93 million, for their basic educationproject.

However,acasestudyistoonarrowforreviewingtheNGOsupportfortheperiod2011-2014,sinceNorwayhasgivensubstantialsupporttotheeducationsectorovertimeandhasbeenengagedwithseveralcoordinationefforts.WewillthereforeprovideamoregeneralassessmentoftheNorwegiansupport toeducation,and itsoutcomesand impacts,drawingprimarilyon the research foraMFAfundedstudy(2015).

Theresultsareimpressive,fromlessthan1millionchildreninschoolin2001(withalowproportionofgirls),theMoEestimatedthatin2015thenumberofstudentshadreached8,35millionstudents(39%ofthemgirls)inprimary,lowersecondary,anduppersecondarygovernmentschools--includingIslamic schooling. The school-aged population is 10,33 million. However, 3,3 million children, themajorityofwhicharegirls,arestilloutofschool.Thereisacommonconcernoverthereliabilityofthe data and numbers provided by theMoE. Numbers are not independently verified, and somestudents remain in the system for several years even after they have dropped out. However, thenumberof8,35millionstudentsusedhereisregardedbythestatisticsdepartmentoftheMoE,theWB and EQUIP as fairly reliable, and is far below numbers quoted on several occasions by thepreviousMinisterofEducation.

There is amajor lack of equity in the Afghan education system,measured by gender, geographiclocation,andlanguage.Afghanistanhasthehighestlevelofgenderdisparityinprimaryeducationinthe world, with only 71 girls in primary school for every 100 boys.22 Only 21% of girls completeprimary school, with important cultural barriers (such as early marriages) and a lack of femaleteachersastwoofthemainobstacles(GoIRA2015).

There isalsoamajordifference inenrolment inprimaryeducationbetweenruralandurbanareas.TheEducationInequalityprofileforAfghanistan23showsthat58%ofboysand52%ofgirlsinurbanareas attend school, while in rural areas only 41% of the boys and 28% of the girls. To furtherhighlightthegenderandgeographicaldisparities,80%oftherichestboysinurbanareascompletedprimaryschoolin2011,whilethesamewastrueonlyfor4%ofthepoorestgirlslivinginruralareas.

22GovernmentofAfghanistan.2015.AfghanistanNationalEducationForAll.2015ReviewReport.Kabul,MoE.23Availableathttp://www.epdc.org/education-data-research/afghanistan-education-inequality-profile,visitedon03.06.15.

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There are numerous bottlenecks identified—including insecurity, limited human resources,infrastructure, qualified teachers, teacher training and teaching materials—, while demand sideissuesincludeeconomicfactors,culturalbarriers,andgovernanceandcapacity.

The limited capacity of and within the MoE to handle and report on progress is itself a barrier,especially inprovincesthathavenothadthesameattention,supportandallocationofadvisorsastheministryinKabul.

As expected, given the major overhaul the education sector has been through (including thedevelopmentofcurriculums,theprintinganddistributionoftextbooks,teachingofteachersandthetaskofbuildingschools), ithastakentimeto increasethequalityofeducationandtomeasurethequality of education and learning. TheGoIRA points out that “…bymost standards, the educationquality in Afghanistan is very low. Learning outcomes are generally poor. A few sample studiessuggest that about less thanhalf of the children are able tomeet theminimum required learningoutcomeattheir levelofstudy.”Furthermore,theGoIRAfoundthatfortechnicaltraining“mostoftheeducationistheoreticalandofverylittlepracticalvalue”(GoIRA2015).

However,thelackofevidenceonresultsisnotasbleakaswaspaintedbythe2012Noradevaluation. ThefirstlearningassessmentfortheClass6levelreleasedin201524stated“…whiletherearesmallnumbersofClass6 studentsoperatingat thehigher levelofproficiency ineachof thedomainsofreading,writingandmathematical literacy, therearesubstantialproportionof thepopulationwhoarenotable toperformsimplereading,writingandmathematical tasks”.Acomparisonwith threepeer countries in the region indicates that their Class 4 students are performing at a similar or ahigherlevelthanClass6studentsinAfghanistan.

The assessment suggests that “what is needed is a focuson thequality of teaching, both throughpolicyandplanninginthewiderlevel,andthroughtheprofessionalpracticeofindividualteachersinclassrooms.”

Interviews for theeducation report, including anumberof donors,MFAofficials, EQUIP andARTFstaff, established that the MoE and donors agree to continue to channel funding for educationthoughtheARTF,as“thishasprovedatrustedmechanismthatensuresafairdegreeofinfluenceandprioritizationfromtheAfghangovernment”(p.13).

Thereportnotedthat

While there have beenmajor achievements in Afghanistan since 2001, there is still concernoverthequalityofeducation.Thereisabroadrecognitionthatmorefundingalone,ifavailable,wouldnotensurequalityeducationforall.Rather,qualityeducationdependsonanumberoffactors that must be addressed in parallel, and should be included in the new educationstrategyfor2015–2020,intheplanningforEQUIPIII,andanyextensionoftheGPE.

Therecommendationswereto:a)startwiththeteachersandbuildtheirskills,andallowforNGOstoplayalargerrole;thenb)strengthentheMoE,andinparticularthedatacollection/verificationand

24T.Lumley,J.Mendelovits,R.Turner,R.StanyonandM.Walker.2015.Class6ProficiencyinAfghanistan2013.OutcomesofLearningAssessmentofMathematical,ReadingandWritingLiteracy.Victoria,AustralianCouncilforEducationalResearch.

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coordinationefforts,forabetterplanningandmanagementoftheeducationassistance;andc)buildinadditionadomesticresourceandsupportbase,includingcommunityandparentinvolvement,andrequestforsupportfromtheprivatesector.

Norway, albeit not the largest donor, has played amajor role in developing theAfghaneducationsector. Its involvement has gone beyond funding, both donors and MoE refer to a very activeengagementofstaffattheNorwegianEmbassyinthevariouscoordinationbodiesandinEQUIPandARTFfora,pushingforapriorityforeducationand inparticulargirls’education.TheNGOactivitieshave from 2011–2014 complemented the GoIRA activities putting emphasis on improved teachertraining to increasequalityofeducation, vocational training toeaseaccess to the jobmarket, andliteracy,numeracyand life skills training for thosemany thathavenotgainedanybasiceducationskills.

Aquestion thatemerges iswhetherquantity—andespeciallygirls in school—trumpedquality, andwhetherNorwayandotherdonorscouldhavedonemoretoensurethequalityofeducation.Therearetwoobservationstobemadeinthisregards,bothindicatingthattherewasanawarenessattheEmbassyoftheprevailingchallengesintheeducationsector,anddueattentionpaidtothisconcerneven ifearmarkingforeducationthroughARTFhasended.Onepoint isthediversity infundingfortheeducationsector, includingsupportforteachertraining,vocationaltrainingandschoolbuildingthroughtheNGOs.Moreimportant,andemphasizedbytheMinistryofEducationinaninterview,isthe scale of the Norwegian strategic and policy engagement during the period 2010–2013. ThisengagementincludedparticipationfromtheEmbassyinKabulinthefollowingbodiesandfora:

• ARTF’sstrategy-groupandcouncil.• TheHumanResourceDevelopmentBoard(HRDB),acollaboratingbodybetweendonorsand

fourAfghanministries.• TheEducationCoordinationCommittee(ECC),andadvisorybodyforprimaryeducation.• Adonorworkinggrouponprimaryeducation.• AworkinggroupfordonorstotheEQUIPproject.

Further,

• NorwaywasthefundingteamleaderthatcoordinatedandreportedonAfghanistan’sfirstjointeducationsectorreviewin2012.

• TheEmbassywasthedonorfocalpointfordevelopmentoftheNationalPriorityProgramme(NPP)forhighereducation.

• NorwaywastheonlydonorwithanobserverintheEQUIPImplementationSupportMissionduringautumn2013.25

This engagement was then complemented by the Norwegian international support to the GPE,including the prominent position of Rohana Ghani, wife of the Afghan president at the 2015Education for Development Summit. This involvement represents a major contribution to thedevelopmentoftheAfghaneducationsector.Still,itrequiresclosefollow-upandmonitoringofARTF

25NorwegianEmbassy.2013.“NorskutdanningsbistandtilAfghanistan”,memo,12.12.2013.

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andEQUIPfundingtocounterconcernsaboutcorruption,inflatedstudentnumbersandacontinuedattentiontoquality.

RuralDevelopmentAfghanistan remains a primarily rural country, where the majority of the population secure theirlivelihoods and income from agricultural activities, services and trade—including those of illegalsubstances. Wars between 1979 and 2001 destroyed much of the traditional irrigation systems,roadsandproductionfacilities.Thisledtogeneralneglectofthefield,duetoconflictandmigration,anda lackof researchand trails reduced thequality andquantityof agriculturalproducts. Lackofincome opportunities ledmany youngmen to join armed groups, or to seek job opportunities inneighbouringorGulfcountries.

Ruraldevelopmentwasthereforehighontheagendabackin2002,andtherewasanoverwhelmingdonor support for the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) when introduced in 2003. It wasmodelled onWB experiences in Indonesia pairedwith UNHABITAT experienced fromAfghanistan,andplacedundertheresponsibilityoftheMinistryofRuralRehabilitationandDevelopment(MRRD).Accordingtoitswebpage,

TheNationalSolidarityProgramme(NSP)wascreatedbytheGovernmentofAfghanistantodeveloptheabilityofAfghancommunities to identify,plan,manageandmonitor theirowndevelopment projects. Through the promotion of good local governance, NSP works toempowerruralcommunitiestomakedecisionsaffectingtheirownlivesandlivelihoods.

The programme is the primary vehicle used to promote rural development inAfghanistan. Empowered rural communities collectively contribute to increased humansecurity.NSP lays the foundation fora sustainable formof inclusive localgovernance, ruralreconstruction,andpovertyalleviation.

NSPhad,atthattime,animportantgovernancecomponent/function. It introducedballotelectionsfor the establishment of the village based CommunityDevelopment Councils (CDC), in advance ofparliamentaryandpresidentialelections.TheCDCswereintroducedasthelowestleveloftheAfghangovernancesystem.26

One reason for the quick establishment and rapid results of the NSPwas that experienced NGOs(Afghanand International)wereassignedas facilitatingpartners for thedifferentprovinces. Thesepartnersa) facilitatedtheCDCelection;b)assistedthevillages intheselectionof theircommunitydevelopmentproject(withinagiveneconomicframe);andc)assistedwiththeimplementationandreportingontheproject.Lateron,femaleCDCswereintroduced,thenDistrictDevelopmentCouncils(CDCs),andfinallytheconceptofClusterCDCsformanagingprojectscoveringlargerareas.

ItisimportanttonotethattheMRRDalsointroducedanumberofotherruralprogrammes,includingthe Norwegian funded National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP) and the NationalRuralWaterSupply,SanitationIrrigationProgramme(Ru-WatSIP).Norway,moreover,supportedtheprivate enterprise NORPLAN to develop documentation of Afghan hydrogeology (including that of

26TheCDC’sgovernancerolewaslaterdisputedbytheIndependentDirectorateofLocalGovernance(IDLG)andremainanissuefordiscussion,refNPPdebates.

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Faryab), which has been useful for severalMinistries.27 TheMRRD drew extensively on the NGOswhenrecruitingtheirstaff,notleastonNACandNCAandtheirpartnerNGOs.

NSPprovides results for the threephases of theprogramme. Phase III is extended into 2016. TheoverviewpresentedinFigure8presentsthemostupdatedinformation.ThetotalNSPbudgetfrom2003toSeptember2015(excludingcommunitycontributions)wasUS$2,5billion.28

Figure8:NSPProgress2003-2015,asof21June2015(Source:NSP)

Key Indicators

# of communities with CDCs elected 3.439

# of communities financed (at least partially) 33.809

# of communities with full 1st block grant utilization 27.583

# of sub-projects proportional finances (at least partially) 87.133

# of sub-projects completed 66.133

BG Committed (US$) Million 1.595

BG Disbursed (US$) Million 1.563

# of male CDC members 294.142

# of female CDC members 151.891

Itshouldbementionedmoreoverthat,duringtheperiodunderreview,Norwaycontinuedtoprovidesupport for rural development through NGOs (and NCA partners) with an integrated approach totheir development projects, and frequently collaborating with/implementing projects through theCDCs.29

WecannoticethattheNGOshavereportedarangeofoutputssofar,whilewecanexpectfurtherdocumentation of impact as they start to measure up against their established baselines. Animportantreflectiontobemadefromthereportsreviewedisthattheinvestmentindevelopmentofcommunityorganisations,andtheirinvolvementindevelopmentactivities,hasenabledabetterandfar more rapid local disaster-risk response, especially when these organisations have pre-stockedemergencyequipmentorcashhavebeeneasilyavailable.

Since 2011, Norway has provided support for the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)project“PromotingIntegratedPestManagementinAfghanistan”.Theprojecthas,accordingtoFAO,

27ForapresentationofNORPLANSactivities,seehttp://www.norplan.afvisited15.01.201628Availableathttp://www.nspafghanistan.org/Default.aspx?sel=109,visitedon26.01.2016. 29ThereisalargerdiscussionabouttheadvantagesofCDCscomparedtomoretraditionalvillagestructures,andabouttheextenttowhichelitesinfluencetheirdecisionsandpriorities.AKFhadaninterestingexperiencesonthewayinwhichregularre-electionsofCDCsensureafairerrepresentation(privatecommunication,Kabul).

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led to a major crop increase and production, with significant and sustained increase in farmerincome.30

NSPisoneofthemostfrequentlyevaluatedprojectsinAfghanistan,duetohighdonorinterestandlevel of funding, and efforts have been made to put the programme in line with therecommendations provided. The 2012 Norad evaluation mentions early results from an impactassessment,whichprovided impact indicators forsomeobjectives, tough itprovided less forotherones(p.56). Thefinalreportwasreleasedin2013andhasthemostsubstantiveevaluationofthedevelopmentimpactwehaveidentifiedthroughthisreview.Thereportconcludedthat:

NSP-funded utilities projects deliver substantial increases in access to drinking water andelectricity,but infrastructureprojectsare lesseffective.Asaconsequence,NSPhas limitedimpactsonlong-termeconomicoutcomessuchasconsumptionorassetownership.

Projectimplementationandtheaccompanyinginfusionofblockgrantresourcesdo,though,deliver a short-term economic boost. This stimulus also improves villagers’ perceptions ofcentral and sub-national government, as well as of allied actors such as NGOs and ISAFsoldiers.However, the impactofNSPonperceptionsof governmentweakens considerablyfollowing project completion,which suggests that government legitimacy is dependent ontheregularprovisionofpublicgoodsand/orinteractionwithserviceproviders.31

They also conclude, however, that the “creation of CDCs by NSP has few durable impacts on theidentity or affiliationof de facto village leaders”. But as amore important change, it appears that“themandatingoffemaleparticipationbyNSP—andtheconsequentfemaleparticipationinprojectimplementation—results in increased male acceptance of female participation in public life andbroad-based improvements in women’s lives, encompassing increases in participation in localgovernance,accesstocounselling,andmobility.”And,“theseandothereconomic,institutional,andsocial impacts ofNSP further drive increases in girls’ school attendance and inwomen’s access tomedical services, as well as improved economic perceptions and optimism amongwomen in NSPvillages.”Thisisinitselfaremarkableresult,andoneofthefewsolidlydocumentedimpactsofthedevelopmentassistance.

ItisthereforeofinterestforfurtherNorwegianruraldevelopmentengagementthatPresidentGhaniinNovember2015announcedthatNSPwillbereplacedbya“NationalCitizenCharterProgram”.Inhiswords, inaspeechtoCDCleaders,theobjectiveis“toexecuteoverallgovernmentprogramsatvillage level through a singlemechanism that is called NSP/National Citizen Charter Program.Ourobjective is toprovideoverallAfghan rural communitieswithequal essential services inupcomingfouryears.”32

Donors and NGOs that had been involved in the discussion of a concept note for the charterprogrammewere uncertainwhere this initiativewould lead,whether itwould influence the CDCsroleinthegovernancestructureandwhetheritwouldcontinuetoattractpublicanddonorsupport.

30Fordetailsontheprojectandresults,seeFAO.2016.“AfghanistanandFAOPartneringforfoodsecuritythroughgenderequality”,http://www.fao.org/3/a-az491e.pdf,visitedon25.01.2016 31Availableathttp://www.nsp-ie.org/reports/finalreport.pdf,visited26.01.2016. 32SpeechbyPresidentAshrafGhaniatthe5thCDCconferenceNovember2015,availableathttp://www.nspafghanistan.org/default.aspx?sel=156,visitedon26.01.2016.

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Still, itmight address the recognized lack of cooperation and coordination betweenministries – iftheyaccepttobeledbyanyoneelsethanthemselves.

Considering the entire 2001–2014 period, there is no doubt that the international andNorwegiansupport for rural development, and NSP in particular, has yielded extensive results, and somedocumentedimpacts.Resultsthatarelikelytoholdmajor influenceonthefurtherdevelopmentofAfghanistan,notleastwhenitcomestowomen’srolesanddevelopmentopportunities.Thedegreeof communitymobilizationandengagement thathas takenplace is in itself amajor step forward,andamajorstrengtheningofAfghancivilsocietyatthevillageandcommunitylevel.

Therehasbeenanoticeableconcernaboutpossiblecorruptioninsuchalargeprogramme,aswellassuggestions for more active ARTF and external monitoring and verification of numbers ofbeneficiariesandprojects.Still,thereareindicationsthatproperlycommunitymanagedprojectsarebetter insulated against corruption than large infrastructureprojects,whichmight have ensured ahighutilizationoffundsinthissector.

Therealchallengenowisfiguringouthowinvestmentsmadecanbesecured,andhowtheon-goingneedforcommunitydevelopment(to increasefoodproduction,strengthentheruraleconomyandgenerate much needed jobs) can be continued under the new NSP/National Citizen CharterProgram—withagovernmentstrugglingtogettheiracttogetherandwhereministriesarereluctanttocollaborate.

GoodGovernanceThefightagainstcorruptionhasconsistentlybeenattheforefrontofthegoodgovernanceagendainAfghanistan.Whileprogressontacklingcorruptionhasarguablybeenlimited,therehavebeenafewsuccessful initiatives, including the establishment of IntegrityWatchAfghanistan (IWA), anAfghancivil society organization committed to increasing transparency, accountability, and integrity inAfghanistan. IWAwasestablishedasan independentcivil societyorganization in2006,andshortlyafterwards the Embassy in Kabul decided to provide the newly established organizationwith corefunding—thefirstdonortodoso.ThefundingdecisionwasinlargepartaresponsetothedialoguebetweenthedevelopmentadvisorattheNorwegianEmbassyandthefoundersoftheorganization,and of the recognition of IWA’s potential impact. During the period 2009–2011, Norwegian corefundingtotalledUS$971.795.

Fromhumblebeginnings, IWAhasgrown toanorganizationwithapproximately90 staffmembersand 700 volunteers, with head offices in Kabul. IWA has provincial programmatic outreach inBadakhshan,Balkh,Bamyan,Herat,Kabul,Kapisa,Logar,Nangarhar,Parwan,Panjshir,SamanganandWardak.IWAfocusesitsactivitiesinthreemainareas:1)communitymonitoring;2)research;and3)advocacy. In the area of community monitoring, IWA works through four program pillars: 1)communitybasedmonitoring;2)publicservicemonitoring;3)extractive industriesmonitoring;and4) community trial monitoring. IWA’s work during the period of review has been significant inproviding an evidence base for advocacy efforts, and in piloting successful communitymonitoringtoolswhich are currently being scaled up.Many of the approaches adopted by IWA are not onlyinnovativeintheAfghancontext,butalsoglobally.

Norway’sdecisiontoprovide IWAwithcorefundingallowedtheorganizationtofind itsownfocusand establish itself as a credible voice in the fight against corruption, instead of being driven by

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donorfundingtocarryoutspecificprojects.ItalsoprovidedIWAwiththefinancialstabilitytobridgetheperiodbetweenitsestablishmentandthedevelopmentofcapacitytoattractfundingfromotherdonors.

However,withtheestablishmentof theTawanmandi trust fund,Norwayended itscore fundingtoIWA in 2012. Instead,Norwegian funding to IWAwas to be channelled through Tawanmandi. Thetrust fund did not however prove to be sufficiently flexible or quick in responding to fundingrequests,asdescribedabove.Fundingdelays,alongwith insufficient fiduciarycontrolswithin IWA,lettoadifficultbudgetsituationin2013,whichcouldpotentiallyhavejeopardizedthefutureoftheorganization.Quick internalactionwithin IWAandadditional fundingbeingprovidedbydonors (inparticularSida)allowedIWAtobalanceitsbudgetin2014andensureitscontinuedsurvival.

IWAisagoodexampleofacasewhereMFA/NoradstaffbasedinKabulwereabletoidentifyanopportunityand,withtheflexibilityprovidedthroughNorwegiandevelopmentassistance,takeacalculatedriskinsupportinganewlyestablishedCSO.Withoutthissupport,itisunlikelythatIWAwouldhaveflourishedanddevelopedintotheorganizationthatitistoday.ThiswillremainalastinglegacyofNorway’ssupporttotheanti-corruptioneffortsinAfghanistan.Conversely,channellingfundingtocivilsocietythroughatrustfundsuchasTawanmandidoesnotprovideasimilardegreeofflexibility,andrisksunderminingtheabilityofNorwegianaidtohavesimilarcatalyticimpactinthefuture.

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LessonslearnedandrecommendationsThe ToR ask for the review to provide recommendations for further development cooperation inAfghanistan, while a clarification from the Secretariat modified the request to develop a moregeneralreflectionaboutfuturelearning,includingnewdevelopmentengagements.Wewillthereforestartwithsomeofthesuggestionsmadebytheinterviewees/Afghanstakeholders,andthenreflectonthemoregenerallessonslearnedfromourfindings.

Thedevelopmentpartnersrequestacontinuationofpredictableandflexiblefundingforthecomingyears,whichtheyseeasaprerequisitetoprovidequalityhumanitariananddevelopmentassistanceinan increasinglychallengingworkenvironment.TheNGOsandtheARTFargue foracontinuationfor the thematic areas they cover, but without suggesting cuts in other parts of the Norwegianengagement.SeniorNorwegianbureaucratshaveasimilarposition,buttheyalsorecommendmoreattentiontoM&EoftheNorwegianfundedassistance,andseveralofthememphasizetheneedtoaddressgrandcorruptionchallenges (and the individuals influencing them) inorder toensure thattheNorwegianassistancemeetstherequiredneedsandthejointlyagreeddevelopmentgoals.

One importantobservation is that thesituation inAfghanistanchangedsubstantially in2011.WiththeUSannouncementofmilitarywithdrawalfrom2014,amoredefinitetimelinewassetthatledtothe expectation among Afghans of a reduction of all types of international assistance. The newcontextestablishedanewurgencyandplanninghorizonforallactorsinvolved,includingthosethataimedtobenefitfromthecorruptionandembezzlementopportunitiestheassistanceprovided.TheKabulBankcase,andtheinvolvementofrelativesofseniorgovernmentofficialsinthefraud,isoneexample.

Challenges to security, economic development and the establishment of a functional Afghangovernment increased in the 2011–2014 period and placed an even stronger urgency onworkingtowardsNorway’sstrategicaims.Thesewereto1)strengthenAfghaninstitutions(tobeinapositionto handle international assistance as well as to increase and manage their own revenue); 2)contribute to a political settlement (to ensure a more peaceful future); and 3) contribute tosustainableandjustdevelopment,humanitarianefforts,andpromotionofgovernance,humanrightsandgenderequality. It canbearguedthat thesegoalshavebeenpursuedconsistently since2001,includinginthe2011-2014period.Thedifferenceisthatinthisperiodthesegoalshavebeenpursuedthroughfewerdevelopmentpartnersandprojects,andwithgraduallylessprocessinvolvementfromtheKabulEmbassyduetothereductionofNorwegianstaff.

Thisiswhereweidentifythemainchallengefordevelopmentassistant,andwheretheAfghancasecan offer insights for similar and future peace/state building efforts. The Norwegian support toAfghanistan has hadmultiple objectives since 2001. It included building a state structure and thedevelopmentandstrengtheningofadministrativecapacities;buildingajudiciary,incompetitionwithatraditionaljusticesystem;establishingawesterndemocraticsystemandrunningregularelections;gettingafreemarketeconomyinplace;andrunningamilitaryoperation(whilebuildinganewarmyand police force). Also relevant to this review, in collaboration with multiple donors andstakeholders,Norwaysoughttocontributetotheachievementofmajordevelopmenttasks(andtobuildingAfghancapacitytotakethemonovertime),whileensuringtherightsandopportunitiesofthe most vulnerable, not least of Afghan girls and women. The Afghan government was heldresponsible—expectedtobeinthe“driver’sseat”—forleadingtheseefforts.

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At the same time, it was acknowledged that most Afghan ministries and the newly electedparliament lackedtherequiredmanagementcapacityto fulfil this role.Thedonorresponsewastoestablish trust funds to manage development activities, and to make use of NGOs and privatecompanies to implementdevelopmentprogrammesandprojects, though incollaborationwithandunder control of Afghanministries and donor coordinationmechanism. Such a fragile framework,however, requires a continuity of process knowledge, and of awareness about how and whycommitments weremade. It has been challenging tomaintain continuity in this area as Embassyofficials (and UN, WB and International NGO staff) rarely stay on for more than 2 years inAfghanistan,andaskeyministrystaffisoftenchangedwhenanewministertakesup.

Thelargertrustfunds,aswehaveseen,hadinplaceinternalmanagementprocedurestosafeguarddonor funds. This was not necessarily the case when these funds were transferred to theimplementingministry for implementation and/or salary payment. Evenwhen severemisuse wasdocumented, as in the case of LOTFA, the response options for donor were limited, as theconsequence of cutting funding could threaten their overall engagement in Afghanistan. In theLOTFAcase,donorswereabletoputpressureonUNDP,buthadverylittleleveragetoeffectchangesintheMoI.ThecaseofTawanmandiwasdifferent,assupporttocivilsocietyorganisationswasnotseen as equally important to the achievement of the overall objectives for the Afghanistanengagement(particularlyinthesecurityside),andwasthereforemoreeasilyterminated.

However, funddisbursement isonlyoneaspectofprogrammemanagement.Anequally importantaspectistheNorwegianinvolvementinsettingandensuringstrategicobjectivesindialoguewiththeGoIRAandotherdonors.Alsocrucialisensuringcompliancewithplansandpriorities;coherencewithNorwegian (or Nordic) priorities (as in ARTF, LOTFA and Tawanmandi); and follow up onimplementation,M&Eprocessesandanti-corruptionsafeguards.

Actually,therearestrictercontrolsappliedtoNGOsupportthantosupportforthetrustfunds,bothintermsoftheselectionofimplementingpartners,andofassessingtheiroverallconflictanalysis,riskmitigation, M&E and anti-corruption systems and routines before they are accepted as partners.Theirprojectproposalsareassessedas fordevelopmentobjectivesandbudgetalignment.Budgetsarecutorwithheldifreportsoraccountsarenotdelivered,orifthereareaccusationsofcorruption.Suchaccusationsresult inaclosedialoguewiththeNGOtoensurethattheyaddresstheconcernsidentified,oranexternalinvestigationeitherconfirmsoracquitsthemoftheallegations.

We are drawing up this picture to identify a weakness of the aid management system in afragile/weak state such as Afghanistan, where there are major concerns over weak managementcapacityandcorruptionon thegovernment side. Successful implementationdepends, inourview,equally on 1) donor administrative systems, approval and control of the aid funding –which is inplace,butnowlocatedinNorwayandadministrativelydividedbetweentheMFAandNorad.And2)donors’ ability to engage in a “development dialogue”with the government of Afghanistan and arangeofother stakeholders throughout theprogrammeplanningand implementationperiod. Thisdialogueiscritical,asoutcomeswillonlybeachievedifthereiswillingnessandabilityonthepartofthenationalgovernmenttoensurethatsharedgoalsareestablishedandmetthroughtheselectedand implemented programmes and projects (and some of them through other partners, as in thecaseoftheNSP).

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ThefirstpartoftheaidmanagementsystemiswellinplaceforAfghanistan,andmadeeasierwithareducednumberofpartnersandprojects.Thereisalsoalargercontinuityandinstitutionalmemoryas there is amore permanency in staff in theMFA and Norad than was deemed possible at theEmbassyinKabul,giventhesecuritysituation.TheNGOsareverysatisfiedwiththehandlingoftheircontracts,recognizingthatNorwayhasbeenabletocombinealongtermfundingcommitmentwithflexibilitywhenrequired.

As for the second—crucial—part, the aid management system’s capacity for dialogue with theAfghangovernmenthasgraduallybeen reducedover the last yearswith the reduction inEmbassystaffing. In Figure 8, we have illustrated the different funding and potential dialogue channels inAfghanistan,takingintoaccountthatultimatelyitistheGoIRAthatisresponsiblefor,orimplements,themajorityofthedevelopmentprogrammesNorwayfunds.

Figure 8: Funding and dialogue channels for Norwegian Development Assistance

Source:developedbyStrand,TaxellandMjeldheim.

ThereductioninNorwegiancapacityfordevelopmentdialogueinAfghanistantakesplaceatatimewhen the need for sustained dialogue and trust building, according to our observations, hasincreased.Thisengagementisnecessaryfortwomainreasons.Ontheonehand,strategicandhighlevel diplomatic efforts with the GoIRA and other donors and donor mechanisms is required tomaintainthestrategicdirectionandprioritiesofthetrustfunds.And,ontheotherhand,thereisaneedformorepracticalprogramme/projectfollow-upandcoordinationwithGoIRAandotherdonorsinordertoensurecoherencewithNorwegianpriorities.

Thereis,asarguedabove,aneedtoinitiateindependentM&E(preferablywithotherdonors)ofbothNGO and trust fund projects, as well as of their management. This requires continued dialogue,engagementanddevelopmentdiplomacyeffectedinKabultoensurethatthenecessarychangesareimplemented, assistance calibrated to the implementing capacity of ministries and NGOs, andsufficientresourcesallocatedtoensurethebuildingofthenecessarycapacity.Thepresenceatthe

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EmbassyinKabulofonededicatedandskilledinternationaldevelopmentcounsellor,workingcloselywithskillednationalstaffempoweredtomakedecisionswithindefinedresponsivityareas,canmakeamajor difference for theNorwegian development engagement, evenwithin the present securityregulations.

Thepresentsecurityregulationscanbelessuniversallyapplied,bringinginAfghan/externalmonitors(and “remotemonitoring”) and possibly requesting assistance (e.g., from Sweden) for programmemonitoring,inordertoimprovetheoversightandresultsofNorwegianfundedassistance.

Ensuring a continuation of support for Afghan civil society organisations and engaging in the newNSP/National Citizen Charter Program are two ofmany tasks that cannot wait if Norway aims toinfluencefuturedevelopmentsinAfghanistan.

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AnnexI:Interviewlist

Name Organisation Position Date

PetterBauck Norad SeniorAdvisor 12.11.15

LivKjølseth NAC SecretaryGeneral 12.11.15

MaritStrand Norad SeniorAdvisor 13.11.15

ArneDisch SCANTEAM 13.11.15

AndersWirak MFA 13.11.15

MetteBastholmJensen DanishEmbassy,Kabul HeadofDevelopment 16.11.15SabirNasiry NorwegianEmbassy,

Kabul 16.11.15

ZabiullahShenwari NorwegianEmbassy,

Kabul 16.11.15

AzadaHussaini WorldBank,

CountryManagementUnit OperationsOfficer 19.11.15

MuhammadWali

Ahmadzai WorldBank FinancialManagement

Analyst 19.11.15

Cherise Chadwick NorwegianRedCross CountryManager 19.11.15

ConnieMariaShealy NCA AssistantCountry

Director 19.11.15

AhmadHassan NCA ProgramManager 19.11.15

JavlonHamdamov ACTED CountryDirector 21.11.15

KaithlynScott ACTED AMEOfficer 21.11.15

TerjeWatterdal NAC CountryDirector 21.11.15

KennethMarimira NAC M&ESpecialist 21.11.15

JohnMorse DACAAR Director 21.11.15

SayedIkramAfzali IWA Director 21.11.15

Qurat-ul-AinSadozai NRC CountryRepresentative4.12.15

NilsHaugstveit MFA Ambassador2012-14 11.12.15

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AndersTunord NCA ProgramCoordinator 11.12.15

LivSteimoeggen NCA CountryRepresentative

MargretheVolden NCA AreaTeamLeader,

MiddleEastandAsia

AdamCombs NRC HeadofSection,Asia 11.12.15

AnnaHamre Norcross ProgrammeCoordinator16.12.15

AfghanistanandPakistan

OddPedersen Norcross LogisticsCoordinator

SemundHaukland Norad SeniorAdvisor 05.01.2016

UlrikaJosefsson EmbassyofSweden Counsellor/Headof 15.01.2016DevelopmentCooperation

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AnnexII:TermsofReference

ReviewofNorwegiandevelopmentassistancetoAfghanistan2011-2014

TermsofReferenceIntroductionandrationaleOn21November2014,theNorwegianGovernmentappointedaCommissiontoevaluatetheNorwegiancivilianandmilitaryeffortinAfghanistanintheperiod2001-2014.TheCommissionwillsubmititsreporttotheNorwegianGovernmentbyJune1st2016.ForthemandateoftheCommissionsee:https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/utvalg_afghanistan/id2340951/(Englishlanguageexcerptattached).AmongthemanyquestionsraisedintheCommission’smandateconcerningthecivilianeffort,twostandoutasparticularlyrelevantasoverallguidelinesfortheCommission’sinvestigativework:whataretheresultsontheground,forAfghans,ofNorwegiandevelopmentassistancetoAfghanistanfrom2001-14?And:towhatextenthasthisassistancebeensupportiveoftheoverallNorwegianpoliticalprioritiesandgoalsinitsengagementinAfghanistan?ApartialanswertothesetwoquestionsmaybefoundintheevaluationreportpublishedbyTheNorwegianAgencyforDevelopmentCooperation(Norad)in2012,coveringtheperiod2001-2011.Thecentralquestionofthisevaluationwas:whatcontributionhasNorwegiansupportmadetosustainablepeace,improvedgovernanceandreducedpovertyinAfghanistan?Takingthepointofdepartureofanalysingthedevelopmentportfoliointermsofrelevance,effectiveness,effect,impactandsustainability,theevaluationconcludesthattheportfolioisrelevantandinlinewithinternationalandnationalpriorities,andthatcertaindirectresultshavebeenachieved.However,theevaluationrecommendsthattheNorwegianMFArethinksitsdevelopmentandaidstrategyinordertobebasedonamoresoundtheoryofchange.Intheabsenceofamorerecentevaluation,theCommissionhasdecidedtooutsourceasmall-scalestudyofNorwegiandevelopmentassistanceintheperiod2011-2014.ThestudywillfocusonthemanagementofNorwegiandevelopmentfunds,andtheresultsofNorway’smaincooperation-partners:internationalinstitutions(theWorldBankandUNDP)andinternationalandNorwegianNGOs(includingACTED,DACAAR,NorwegianChurchAid,NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,AgaKhanFoundation,NorwegianAfghanistanCommitteeandtheNorwegianRedCross),inadditiontothenationalNGOIntegrityWatchandthenationalfundTawanmandi.InviewoftherapidlydeterioratingsecuritysituationinAfghanistan,thiswillinessencebeacombinationofadeskstudy,consultationsinOslowithrelevantaidofficialsanddiplomats,aswellasinterviewswithkeystakeholdersresidinginAfghanistanandelsewhere.Theseinterviewsmaybeconductedthroughskypeorphone,ortheconsultantmayengageKabul-basedconsultant(s).PurposeThepurposeofthisstudyisthree-fold1)Anassessmentofthefollow-upoftherecommendationsfromtheNorad-report,includingMFAstrategiesandinternalguidelines.

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2)EstablishanoverviewoftheNorwegiandevelopmentassistanceinAfghanistan2011-14and,wherepossible,theshortand(expected)long-termresultsofthese.3)ProviderecommendationsforfurtherdevelopmentcooperationinAfghanistan.EvaluationquestionsInordertoensurecoherencebetweentheNorad2012reportandtheproposedoutputs,thecriteriawillremainthesamebutshouldbefurtherguidedbyfollowinggroupsofquestions:ManagementofNorwegianDevelopmentFunds:Whattrendscanbeseenintheperiod2011–2014intermsofprioritizationandselectionofthematicfocusandimplementingpartners,andtowhatdegreedotheymeettheoverallNorwegiandevelopmentgoalsinAfghanistan?Ifadjustmentsinprioritizationofthemes,partnersandfundingweredone,onwhatcriteriawerethesebased?Towhatextentandhowhavetherecommendationsfromthe2011evaluation(andtheinternalstrategy)beenfollowedup?Particularfocusshouldbegivento:1. developmentofatheoryofchangeoftheoverallNorwegiancontribution;2. improvedcontextualanalysis,conflictsensitivityandriskmitigation;3. anti-corruptionprocedures4. monitoringandevaluationsystems5. internalhumanresourceallocationandadministrativecapacityHowandtowhatextenthaveNorwegianauthoritiesengagedwith,supportedandevaluatedtheactivitiesofimplementingpartners?HowresponsivewasNorwayinadaptingtochangingcircumstancesdirectlyaffectingdevelopmentassistance?HowwelldidNorwaycoordinatewithotherdonors?HasNorwaystoodoutinanyway,positiveornegative,initsdevelopmentassistancepolicycomparedtoother“likemindedcountries”(e.g.Swedenand/orDenmark)?Contributionofimplementingpartners:Whatconcreteresults,shortand(expected)longterm,canNorway’simplementingpartnersrefertointhe2011-2014period?1. Thisentailssynthesisingreportedresultsfromthepartners,internationalinstitutionsandNGOs

atcountrylevel,includingreportedresultsinFaryabprovince2. Forassessmentsofresults,acasestudyshouldbeselectedtoillustrateeachofthesectors:good

governance,educationandruraldevelopment.Theseshould,ifpossible,identifykeyfactorsleadingtosuccessorfailure.

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3. AsynthesisedoverviewofM&EmechanismsutilizedTowhatextentandhowhaveNorway’spartnersandthekeychannelsthroughwhichNorwegianassistancehasbeenallocated,contributedtostrengtheningAfghanownershipatinstitutionalandcommunitylevel?HowdokeyimplementingpartnersperceivethesupportandengagementfromtheNorwegiangovernment?Recommendations:Whatrecommendationsforfuturedevelopmentcooperationinconflictareascanbedrawnfromthefindings?MethodologyTheevaluationteamwillfocusitsworkongoingthroughkeyimplementingpartners’resultsreports,evaluationsrelevanttoNorwegiancontributionsandotherrelevantwrittensources.Theevaluationteamshouldalsoconductextensiveinterviewswithdevelopmentassistantworkers,policymakersandotherstakeholders,choseninconsultationwiththesecretariat.OrganisationoftheevaluationTheevaluationwillbefundedandsupervisedbythesecretariatoftheCommission.Theconsultant(s)shouldconsultextensivelywithstakeholderspertinenttotheassignment,andstakeholdersshouldbeaskedtocommentonthedraftfinalreport.Accesstorelevantarchiveswillbefacilitatedbythesecretariattotheextentpossible.ThefinalreportwillbethepropertyoftheCommissionwhowilldecideonitsfurtherdissemination.Theconsultant(s)Theconsultant(s)shouldhavefollowingqualifications:1. Demonstratedprofessionalknowledgeandunderstandingofdevelopmentassistancepractices,

andevaluationsofthese;2. Solidknowledgeand/orexperienceofNorwegiandevelopmentassistancetoAfghanistan,in

particularfrom2011onwards;3. SolidknowledgeofdevelopmenteffortsinAfghanistananddemonstratedaccesstoAfghan

networksthatmayprovideAfghanperspectives;4. ProficiencyinaScandinavianlanguageinordertobeabletoreaddocumentsinNorwegian.TheCommissionencouragestheconsultant(s)toestablishateamtocoverthedifferentrequirements.BudgetanddeliverablesThebudgetoftheevaluationshallnotexceedNOK490000.

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Deliverableswillbe:1. Aninceptionreport/finalwork-planincludinganoverviewofexpectedfinaldeliverables,tobe

discussedwiththesecretariattwoweeksaftersigningofcontract2. Updateonprogress–midterm(est.earlyJanuary2016)3. Afinalreportnotexceeding40pages,basedonagreeddeliverables4. OnedayofmeetingswithmembersoftheCommissionandthesecretariattopresentthe

findings,inOslo.PhasesanddeadlinesWhat Who When

Invitationtotender Commission/secretariat 26September2015Tendersubmission Consultant(s) 15October2015Signingofcontract Consultantandsecretariat EndofOctober2015Inceptionreport/work-plan Consultant(s) 15November2015Interviews Consultant(s) MidNovember-end

DecemberDraftreport Consultant(s) 18January2016Finalreport Consultant(s) 15February2016Onedaydisseminationseminar

Consultant(s) EndFebruary2016

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AnnexIII:NGOprofilesAgencyforTechnicalCooperationandDevelopment(ACTED)isaninternationalreliefagencywithheadquartersinParis,France.ACTEDwasestablishedinPeshawar,Pakistanin1993toprovidehumanitarianandrehabilitationassistancetoKabulduringthecivilwar,buthaslaterbroadlyexpandedtheiractivities.ACTEDisamongthelargestNGOsoperatinginAfghanistan,employing961nationaland9internationalstaff.ACTEDhasabroadrangeofprojectsthroughoutAfghanistanandisafacilitatingpartnerfortheNSP,includinginFaryab.TheNorwegianEmbassyestablishedastrategicpartnershipwithACTEDin2008,andtheorganizationhassincebeenamajorimplementerofNorwegianassistancefortheFaryabprovince,includingtheGhormakdistrict.ACTEDhadsixoftheirnationalstaff-memberskilledinFaryabinNovember2013.ThefinancialframeworkhasamountedtoNOK120millionfortheirproject“SustainedRuralDevelopmentinFaryabProvince”.AgaKhanFoundation(AKF)isaSwiss-registeredfoundationthatformspartoftheAgaKhanDevelopmentNetwork(AKDN).AKFwasestablishedasaninternationalorganizationin1967undertheleadershipofHisHighnessAgaKhan,theSpiritualLeaderoftheShiaIsmaeliMuslimcommunity.

AKFestablisheditselfinAfghanistanin2002andquicklybecameoneofthelargestNGOsinthecountry,with1700staff-members.ItisafacilitatingpartnerfortheNSPinBadakshan,Baghlan,BamyanandTakhar.

TheNorwegianEmbassyestablishedapartnershipwithAKFin2007,supportingamultisectorsupportprogrammeintheBadakshan,BaghlanandBamyanprovinces,includingBamyanElectrificationProject,withafinancialframeworkofNOK64mill.

DanishCommitteeforAidtoAfghanRefugees(DACAAR)isaDanishNGOformedbackin1984asacollaborationbetweenthreeDanishNGOs.DACAARsupportedAfghanrefugeesinPakistanduringthe1990sandthenpioneeredsupportforAfghanwomenthroughanembroideryprojectandastructureforsellingtheirproducts.

FollowingthewithdrawalofSovietforces,since1989,DACCARstartedtoshifttheiractivitiesinsideAfghanistan,goingintoruraldevelopmentandvocationaltraining,whilecontinuingtargetedsupportforwomenandwaterandsanitationprojects.WhatsetDACAARasidefrommanyotherNGOswastheiremploymentofDanish(andinternational)academicswithextensiveknowledgeofAfghanistan,whichinformedtheirprioritiesandapproaches.

DACAARemploys850nationaland10internationalstaffmembers,andisafacilitatingpartnerfortheNSP,inwhichtheyworkedinFaryab,Herat,LaghmanandParwanprovincesin2012.

TheNorwegianEmbassyhassince2010supportedDACAARfortheirprogramme“RuralDevelopmentinNorthernAfghanistan”intheFaryab,Sar-e-PulandBadakshanprovinces.Thetwomainactivities,ruraldevelopmentandwatersupplyandsanitationhadafinancialframeworkofNOK77million.

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IntegrityWatchAfghanistan(IWA)isanAfghancivilsocietyorganisationestablishedin2006,committedtoincreasingtransparency,accountability,andintegrityinAfghanistan.IthasreceivedNorwegiansupportsince2009.

The mission of Integrity Watch is to put corruption under the spotlight through communitymonitoring,research,andadvocacy.Theymobilizeandtraincommunitiestomonitorinfrastructureprojects, public services, courts, and extractives industries. They develop community monitoringtools, provide policy-oriented research, facilitate policy dialogue, and advocate for integrity,transparency,andaccountabilityinAfghanistan.IWAhasapproximately90staffmembersand700volunteers.TheheadofficeofIntegrityWatchisinKabul,withprovincialprogrammaticoutreach inBadakhshan,Balkh,Bamyan,Herat,Kabul,Kapisa,Logar,Nangarhar,Parwan,Panjshir,Samangan,andWardak.NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee(NAC)isaNorwegianNGOestablishedin1980asasolidaritymovement,workingsolelywithAfghanistan.TheyprovidedemergencyassistanceandoperatedmedialteamsinsideAfghanistanduringthe1980s.From1989onwardstheirworkshiftedtowardsrehabilitationanddevelopmentassistance,andfieldofficeswereopenedinGhazniandBadakshanprovinces.

NCAisworkingonhealth,educationandnaturalresourcemanagementthroughanintegratedapproach,andhasastaffof200nationaland1internationalmemberbasedinKabul,Jaghori(Ghazni)andBadakhshan.

Theruraldevelopmentproject,withprojectsinGhazniandBadakshanprovinces,hasafinancialframeworkofNOK45million.

NorwegianChurchAid(NCA)isaNorwegianNGOthatworksinpartnershipwith/throughAfghanNGOsandcivilsocietyorganisations.NCAhavesupportedAfghanssince1979,firstwithassistancetorefugeesandsincetheearly1990swithrehabilitation,developmentandhumanitarianassistanceinsideAfghanistan.ItestablishedaKabulofficein1993.

NCAappliesanintegratedapproachfortheirsupportforclimatejusticeandtherighttopeaceandsecurity,advancedthroughlong-termdevelopment,emergencyassistance,andadvocacywork.GiventheirroleasdonorNGO,NCAhasarathersmallstaffbasedinKabulandMaimane,Faryab.

Thecontractonintegratedruraldevelopmentincluded12partnerNGOs,operatinginFaryab,DaikundiandUruzganprovinces,withabudgetofNOK105million.Themoretargetedprogramme“PromotingWomen’sEngagementandParticipationinFaryab»wasimplementedthroughfourpartners.TheseactivitieshadafinancialframeworkofNOK6,9million.

NorwegianRedCross(NORCROSS)isaNorwegianNGOthatworksinpartnershipwiththeAfghanRedCrescentSociety(ARSC),TheInternationalFederationofRedCrossandRedCrescentFederations,andtheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross.

NORCROSSworksprimarilytosupport,strengthenandsupplementthehumanitarianactivitiesoftheRedCrossandRedCrescentMovementsinAfghanistan,withmajoreffortsgoingintostrengthentheorganizationalandmanagementcapacityoftheARSCandtheiractivities.

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NORCROSShasKabulbasedCountryRepresentativesthatmonitorandcoordinateNorwegianfundedactivities.

NorwegianRefugeeCouncil(NRC)isaNorwegianNGOthatoperatedajointofficeinPakistanwithNCAuntil1994,whentheydisengagedfromAfghanistan,butthentheyre-establishedtheirpresenceinKabulin2002.

NRCsupportsandadvocatesfortherightsofreturningrefugeesfromneighbouringcountriesandofInternallyDisplacesPersons(IDPs)throughlegalassistance,education,shelter,WASHandemergencyassistance.

NRChas450nationaland22internationalstaff-membersworkingfromtheirKabulofficeandfromsixfieldoffices.Theprojectincludedinthisreview,“YoutheducationandGenderbasedViolencePrograminFaryabandNangarharprovinces”hasafinancialframeworkofNOK38million.

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AnnexIV:Keydocumentsreviewed

ACER.2015.“Class6proficiencyinAfghanistan2013:Outcomesofalearningassessmentofmathematical,readingandwritingliteracy”.ReportforMinistryofEducation.Melbourne:ACER.ACTED.2013.“SustainedRuralDevelopmentProgramme,PhaseIICompletionReport,Faryabprovince:Almar,Qaisar,KohistanandPashtunKotdistricts.2010-2013”.Kabul:ACTED.

ACTED.2014.“ResultsReporting:FaryabSustainedRuralDevelopmentProgram”.Kabul:ACTED

ACTED.2015.AnnualReport2014.Paris:ACTED.

AfghanReconstructionTrustFund.2015.“ARTFScorecard2015,IntegratedPerformanceandManagementFramework”.Kabul:ARTF-WB.

AfghanResearchandEvaluationUnit.2013.Women’sEconomicEmpowermentinAfghanistan,2002-2012:InformationMappingandSituationAnalysis.Kabul:AREU.

AgaKhanFoundation.2013.“FinalReportApril2010-June2013:MultiSectorSupportProgramme(MSSP)Extension.StrengtheningLicitRuralLivelihoodsinBamyan,BaghlanandBadakshanprovincesofAfghanistan”.Agreementnumber:AKF2779-08/007.Kabul:AKF.

AgaKhanFoundation.2014.“FinalReportApril2010-June2013:MultiSectorSupportProgramme(MSSP)Extension.StrengtheningLicitRuralLivelihoodsinBamyan,Baghlan,BadakshanandTakharprovincesofAfghanistan”.Agreementnumber:AKF277913/0002.Kabul:AKF.

AgaKhanFoundation.2015.Multi-SectorSupportProgram–PhaseIII,Annualreport.GrantAgreementAFG-13/0002.Kabul:AKF.

AmbassadeniKabul.2010.Treårigplan2011–2013.Kabul:DenNorskeAmbassaden.

AmbassadeniKabul.2011.Treårigplan2012–2014.Kabul:DenNorskeAmbassaden.

AmbassadeniKabul.2010.Virksomhetsplan2011.Kabul:DenNorskeAmbassaden.



AmbassadeniKabul.2012.Behovforfagligetjenester2013fraNorad.Kabul:DenNorskeAmbassaden.


AmbassadeniKabul.2013.Behovforfagligetjenester2014fraNorad.Kabul:DenNorskeAmbassaden.

DACAAR.2013.“RuralDevelopmentinNorthernAfghanistan.FinalReport(April2010-June2013).”Contractnumber:AFG278608/008(includingRDPBaselineSurveyReport).

DACAAR.2012.StrategicProgrammeFramework2013–2016.Kabul:DACAAR

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DACAAR.2015.DACAARAnnualReport2014.Kabul:DACAAR.

DACAAR.2015.“AStudyofGenderEquitythroughtheNationalSolidarityProgramme’sCommunityDevelopmentCouncils”.Kabul:DACAAR.

DANIDA.2012.“EvaluationofDanishDevelopmentSupportforAfghanistan.August2012.”Copenhagen:DANIDA.

EuropeanUnion.2015."EUProgrammeinSupportofCivilSocietyConceptnote”,28September2015.Kabul:EU.EuropeanUnion.2015.“EUCountryRoadmapforEngagingwithCivilSociety.2015-2017.”Kabul:EU.FAO.2011.“PromotingIntegratedPestManagementinAfghanistan.Progressreport”.Kabul:FAO.

FAO.2012.“PromotingIntegratedPestManagementinAfghanistan.Progressreport”.Kabul:FAO.

FAO.2012.“IntegratedPestManagementinAfghanistan.RevisedLogframe”.Kabul:FAO.

FAO.2013.“PromotingIntegratedPestManagementinAfghanistan.Progressreport”.Kabul:FAO.

FAO.2013.“Follow-upreportontheManagementResponsetotherecommendationsofEvaluationMissionfor‘IntegratedPestManagementinAfghanistan-GCP/AFG/058/NOR’.”Evaluationconductedfrom14Jan-02Feb2013.Kabul:FAO.FAO.2014.“PromotingIntegratedPestManagementinAfghanistan.Progressreport”.Kabul:FAO.

IntegrityWatchAfghanistan.2012.“ProjectCompletionReporttotheRoyalNorwegianEmbassy”.Kabul:IWA.

IntegrityWatchAfghanistan.2013.“GenderAspectsofDevelopmentandCommunityInvolvementExaminingGenderDifferencesinDataonProvincialReconstructionTeamsandDevelopmentProjects”.Kabul:IWA.

Intrac.2014.“StudyonNCAAfghanistan’spartnershipapproach”.Oxford:Intrac.

IslamicRepublicofAfghanistan.2012.“TheMinistryofRuralRehabilitationandDevelopment”.Kabul:MRRD.

IslamicRepublicofAfghanistan.2014.“EQUIPProgressReport2014:July–December”.Kabul:MinistryofEducation.

IslamicRepublicofAfghanistan.2015.“AfghanistanNationalEducationforAll(EFA)Review2015Report”.Kabul:MinistryofEducation.

IslamicRepublicofAfghanistan.2015.“NationalTechnicalAssistanceSalaryScaleandImplementationGuidelines”.DRAFT.Kabul:GoIRA.

IslamicRepublicofAfghanistan.2015.“CapacityBuildingandInstitutionalCooperationinthefieldofHydrogeologyforFaryabProvince,Afghanistan”.FirstDraftFinalReport.Kabul:MinistryofRuralRehabilitationandDevelopment.

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Lumley,T.,J.Mendelovits,R.Turner,R.StanyonandM.Walker.2015.Class6ProficiencyinAfghanistan2013.OutcomesofLearningAssessmentofMathematical,ReadingandWritingLiteracy.Victoria:AustralianCouncilforEducationalResearch.Norad.2012.“EvaluationofNorwegianDevelopmentCooperationwithAfghanistan2001-2011”,(Report3/2012).Oslo:Norad.

NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee.2014.“BaselineStudyReportforCommunityDisastersRiskManagementProject,BadakshanProvince,Afghanistan”.NAC:Kabul.

NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee.2013.AnnualReport2012.NAC:Oslo.

NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee.2013.“GenderImpactAssessmentToolsandApproachesforNRMInterventions”.NAC:Kabul.

NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee.2015.AnnualReport2014.NAC:Oslo.

NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee.2014.IntegratedRuralDevelopmentIII.NAC:Kabul.

NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee.2014.“BaselineStudyfortheIntegratedRuralDevelopmentIIPrograminAfghanistan”.AgreementAFG-2778AFG-12/0049.NAC:Kabul.

NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee.2014.“EducationCaseStudy:OverallSchoolImprovement”.NAC:Kabul.

NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee.2014.“Monitoring,EvaluationandLearningStrategy.”NAC:Kabul.

NorwegianAfghanistanCommittee.2015.:CommunityBasedDisasterRiskManagement.AnnualReporttoNorad”.NAC:Oslo.

NorwegianChurchAidandACTAlliance.2009.“Anti-fraudandcorruptionpolicyfortheACTAlliance”.

NorwegianChurchAid.2013.“EvaluationPolicyforNorwegianChurchAid'sInternationalWork”.NCA:Oslo.

NorwegianChurchAid.2014.“MobilisingReligiousActorsforPeace:EndofProjectFormativeEvaluationReport”.NCA:Kabul.

NorwegianChurchAid.2014.NCAAfghanistan:Monitoringpolicy/framework.NCA:Kabul.

NorwegianChurchAid.2014.“FinalreportforIntegratedRuralDevelopmentProgramtoRoyalNorwegianEmbassyfortheperiodJanuary2010–December2012”.Submittedon15thJanuary,2014.NCA:Kabul.

NorwegianChurchAid.2015.“AnnualReport2014:Buildingresilientcommunitiesforsustainabledevelopmentandpeace”.NCA:Oslo.NorwegianChurchAid.2015.“4yearreport:Coveringtheyears2011,2012,2013and2014”.NCA:Oslo.

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NorwegianRefugeeCouncil.2006.NRC’sAnti-corruptionHandbook.UpdatedJanuary2015.NRC:Oslo.

NorwegianRefugeeCouncil.2014.“FinalProjectReport:StrengtheningGender-BasedViolencePreventionandResponseinFaryabProvince”.NRC:Kabul.NorwegianRefugeeCouncil.2014.“AnnualReport2013:EducationandInformation,counsellingandLegalAssistance(ICLA)programmeinFaryab”.NRC:Oslo.NorwegianRefugeeCouncil.2014.“MonitoringandEvaluationFactsheet”.NRC:Oslo.NorwegianRefugeeCouncil.2014.“MonitoringandEvaluationGuidelines”.NRC:Oslo.NorwegianRefugeeCouncil.2015.“AnnualReport2014:EducationandInformation,counsellingandLegalAssistance(ICLA)programmeinFaryab”.NRC:Oslo.NorwegianRefugeeCouncil.2015.“NRCEvaluationPolicy”.NRC:Oslo.NorwegianRefugeeCouncil.2015.“FaryabBriefing,includingIDPsituation”.NRC:Kabul.RødeKors.2015.“FinalReport2012-2014andAuditedFinancialStatements2014.TheNorwegianRedCrossinAfghanistan2012-2014”.AFG-12/009.NORCROSS:Oslo.

Riksrevisjonen.2015.“Riksrevisjonensundersøkelseavbistandtilgodtstyresettogantikorrupsjoniutvalgtesamarbeidsland”.Dokument3:9(2014–2015).Riksrevisjonen:Oslo.Tawanmandi.2014.“FutureoftheTawanmandiProgramme:LettertoPartnersof28September2014”.TawanmandiandDonors:Kabul.UNDPAfghanistan.2011.“ELECT,FinalEvaluation:EnhancingLegalandElectoralCapacityforTomorrowProject”.June2011.UNDP:Kabul.

UNDPAfghanistan.2013.“Sub-nationalGovernanceandDevelopmentStrategy”.June2013.UNDP:Kabul.

Utenriksdepartementet.2011.“Statsbudsjettet2011–Tildelingsskriv.Utenriksdepartementet”.OsloUtenriksdepartementet.2012.“Statsbudsjettet2012–Tildelingsskriv.Utenriksdepartementet”.OsloUtenriksdepartementet.2013.“Statsbudsjettet2013–Tildelingsskriv.Utenriksdepartementet”.OsloUtenriksdepartementet.2014.“Statsbudsjettet2014–Tildelingsskriv.Utenriksdepartementet”.Oslo.Wimpelmann,T.andA.Strand.2014.“WorkingwithGenderinRuralAfghanistan:ExperiencesfromNorwegian-fundedNGOprojects”(NoradEvaluationsno.10/2014).Oslo:Norad.WorldBank.2015.“StrategicDirectionsfortheNationalSolidarityProgram.AssessmentofStrategicIssuesandRecommendationsforFutureDirections”,March31,2015.GSURRSOUTHASIA.WorldBank.2015.“AfghanistanDevelopmentUpdate”.October2015.Kabul,WorldBank.

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AnnexV:ExampleofTheoryofChange

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) is an independent, non-profit research institution and a major international centre in policy-oriented and applied development research. Focus is on development and human rights issues and on international conditions that affect such issues. The geographical focus is Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern and Central Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.

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CM I RE P O RT R 2 016: 0 4 Review of Norwegian development assistance to Afghanistan 2011–2014