review god, time and eternity wtj 63 no 2 fall 2001, p 439-445

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS 439

extent that one accepts or rejects Kuyper's views in these areas, to that extent one is mov

ing beyond (legitimately or illegitimately) Calvin himself.

Specifically, at least three legitimate questions can be posed with regard to Kuyper's

neo-Calvinism as Bolt presents it: (1) Is Kuyper's view of God's kingdom a good and

necessary consequence of Calvin's view? (2) Is Kuyper's view of liberty, and liberty of

conscience, in line with Calvin's own emphasis? and (3) How would Kuyper reconcile

Calvin's Geneva with his own public theology?

These questions are not easily answered. Even if answered they still leave open the

more important question of the relationship of Scripture and its teaching to public the

ology. They do, however, it seems to me, reflect at least some of the major contours of

neo-Calvinism and would be topics worthy of another volume (or two or three).Because Bolt gives us Kuyper the political poet, those looking specifically for propo

sitions and principles of statecraft might be disappointed. On the other hand, it is

refreshing to see the development of a Christian public theology that has at its core the

necessity of persuasion over coercion. Thatmessage itself could be the most valuable of

the book.

Bolt's book is an informative, scholarly, insightful and provocative study. He has

served the Reformed community, and the Christian church generally, well in offering

such substantial and thorough suggestions for an evangelical public theology. Debatesand discussions of the relationship of church and state will now need to include Bolt's

analysis and commendation of Kuyper to the American experiment.

K. SCOTT OLIPHINT

Westminster Theological Seminary

Philadelphia, PA

William Lane Craig: Time andEternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time. WheatoIllinois: Crossway Books, 2001. 272 pp. $25.00.

William Craig has attempted to set out a philosophically respectable position with

respect to the concept of eternity and time. There are few more qualified than Craig to

undertake such a task, and there is likely no other book available on this topic that isboth

sparing in technical vocabulary and concepts, thus more widely available, and philo

sophically sophisticated at the same time. The nonpareil accessibility of a book devoted

to such a difficult subject will, therefore, likely broaden its circulation among philoso

phers and non-specialists alike.

As Craig attempts to work through the difficulties, not only of just what time is, but


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440 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

only so, according to Craig, but simplicity and immutability are even less plausible than

any notion of timelessness, so it is folly to attempt to ground the latter in the former. This

dismissal or suspicion of the notions of simplicity and immutability in God is, as a mat

ter of fact, exactly of the kind of problems that plague Christianity when philosophers

attempt to do theology, the kind of problems that those who were required to study phi

losophy brought to Christian theology. The impetus behind the notions of simplicity and

immutability, theologically, is to safeguard the Scriptural truth that God is not essentially

and independently affected by something other than Himself. That is to say, who God is,

as eternal, independent, existing, etc., is determined only by God Himself. There are no

properties or situations that serve to make God something that He would not otherwise

essentially be. While it can be granted that certain notions of simplicity and immutabil

ity obtained an abstractness not consistent with the biblical picture of God, thatproblemis not, first of all, due to misguided theology, but rather to the attempt of philosophy to

define theology's parameters.

Craig moves to an exposition of the special theory of relativity (STR), formulated by

Einstein in 1905, and his general theory of relativity (GTR), completed in 1915. It is

Craig's conviction that "any adequate theory of God's relationship to time must.. . take

account of what these theories have to say about the nature of time" (p. 32). It turns out,

however, that relativity theories are all founded on a false epistemological basis, i.e., that

of empiricism, and thus provide no compelling reason for acceptance (p. 66).One promising argument for divine timelessness that Craig mentions, but eventually

dismisses, is the argument from the incompleteness of temporal life. The argument

depends primarily on the following premise for its cogency: Temporal existence is a less

perfect mode of existence than timeless existence. Given that God, as the maximally

perfect being, could not be maximally perfect if he experienced temporal loss, this argu

ment rests, according to Craig, "on very powerful intuition" (p. 67). Those intuitions,

however, are not sufficient to sustain the premise, says Craig, since "timeless life may not

be the most perfect mode of existence of a perfect person" (p. 73). That is, it may be thecase that the experience of temporal succession adds to rather than subtracts from a per

son such that to experience this succession may not be a defect.

With respect to divine temporality (chapter three), Craig discusses the notion that

God could not be timeless because he is personal. It is impossible for a person not to

experience at least some kind of succession of moments. Is it possible for a personal God

to stand in some kind of relationship to the world and remain timeless? Here we will

quote Craig at length since the substance of his response to this question will form the

foundation for some concerns below.

It is very difficult to see how He can. Imagine once more God existing changelessly

l i h i b i h h l d i i f i ill


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This second alternative presents us with a new dilemma. Once time begins at the

moment of creation, either God becomes temporal in virtue of His real relation to the

temporal world or else He exists just as tunelessly with creation as He does without it.

If we choose the first alternative, then, once again, God is temporal. But what about

the second alternative? Can God remain untouched by the world's temporality? It

seems not. For at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He

did not stand before (since there was no "before"). Even if in creation the world God

undergoes no intrinsic change, He at least undergoes an extnnsic change. For at the

moment of creation, God comes into the relation of sustaining the universe or, at the

very least, of co-existing with the universe, relations in which He did not stand before.

Since He is free to refrain from creation, God could have never stood in those rela

tions, had He so willed. But in virtue of His creating a temporal world, God comes

into a relation with that world the moment it springs into being. Thus, even if it is not

the case that God is temporal prior to His creation of the world, He nonetheless

undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws Him into time

in virtue of His real relation to the world. So even if God is timeless without creation,

His free decision to create a temporal world also constitutes a free decision on His part

to exist temporally, (pp. 86-87)

One way to avoid a notion of divine temporality mentioned by Craig is the way of Tho

mas Aquinas. Aquinas seeks to deny that God stands in any real relation to the world.

While creatures are really related to God, God is not really related to creatures (p. 88).l

This, however, argues Craig, is unintelligible. To say that the world is really related to God,

but that God is not really related to the world "is to say that one can have real effects

without a real cause" (p. 89).2

The substance of his argument is found in chapter four, which is Craig's discussion of

a dynamic conception of time. The best way to think about the difference between a

dynamic and a static view of time is in terms of tense. A dynamic time theorist would

hold (at least) that (1) it is impossible to eliminate tense from language and (2) tense is a

feature of language just because it is a feature of the world itself. Thus, the world is

objectively "tensed" and reality, therefore, flows whether we acknowledge it or not. Thestatic time theorist would likely hold that this "flow" of time is an unfortunate metaphor.

While language may be tensed, the static time theorist would hold that this tense is rela

tive, and that space-time itself is tenseless; it just is (p. 169). The discussion of a dynamic

vs. a static view of time provides the foundation for Craig's conclusion with respect to

time and eternity.

The argument for a dynamic conception of time finds support in two positionsthe

ineliminability of tense and the argument from our experience of time. The argument

from the ineliminability of tense purports to show that tensed facts are not merely a con

vention of language, they are constitutive of realityitself.

Those who would hold to astatic view of time have attempted to show that tense can actually be eliminated from

language without any loss of meaning Craig calls this view the "Old Tenseless Theory


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442 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

of Language" as put forth, for example, by Bertrand Russell. The attempt here was to

translate tensed sentences into a tenseless form without loss of meaning (p. 117). This,

however, has itself been eliminated and the "New Tenseless Theory of Language" has

arisen in its place. Here there would be agreement that tense cannot be eliminated fromlanguage, but the New Tenseless Theory would hold that this fact is irrelevant since all

one needs are not tenseless statements, but tenseless facts. Without going into the details

of the discussion, Craig's rebuttal of this notion, in its earlier and later stages, is simply to

note that there seems to be no compelling argument for the notion that the truth condi

tions of a sentence can be tenseless. D. H. Mellor, one of the main proponents of this

view, fails to show, for example, what makes a fact true, not simply what makes it true at

a particular time. Thus, Craig thinks there is no cogent arguments against the inelimina

bility of tense.

Craig goes on to critique "McTaggart's Paradox" which states, simply that time isessentially tensed, but that tense is self-contradictory. The conclusion of McTaggart,

according to his own article, is "the unreality of time" (p. 144). That is, he denies that

time has an objective reality. McTaggart's primary weakness, according to Craig, was

that he was attempting to see reality sub specie aeternitatis and yet to include tense in his

description of the world. He cannot have it both ways. Because there exists a different

description of reality that holds at each given moment, to attempt to explain reality by

assuming that there exists a single, comprehensive description of it is impossible (p. 154).

It is impossible in a world of which tense is necessarily a part. So McTaggart's attempt

sets up a paradox, one side of which is out of touch with the way the world really is.Thus, McTaggart's Paradox fails as a refutation of dynamic time. Craig goes on to cri

tique the so-called "myth of passage" of time in support of his dynamic view of time.

Craig then explains and critiques the notion of a static view of time in chapter five.

His critique can be summarized in the following:

The static time theorist cannot affirm that the world came into being at the first

moment of its existence and therefore cannot affirm that God created the world in the

full sense of the word "create." It seems to me, therefore, that a static conception of

time is theologically unacceptable. A robust doctrine of creation requires a dynamic

theory of time. (p. 214)

Finally, and somewhat curiously, Craig devotes the last twenty pages to "God, Time, and

Creation." Here Craig notes that tensed facts and temporal becoming are real. According

to him, therefore, it follows from God's creative activity and omniscience that, given the

existence of a temporal world, God is also temporal. God quite literally exists now (p. 217).

Two brief points must be made with respect to this book. It should be noted that the

points of concern have little to do with the substance of the discussion, but rather with

the discussion's impetus, its method of approach, including its starting point. First, Craig

is resolute that the solution to the problem of the relationship of time to eternity is foundin analytic philosophy (p. 11). (One aside: it is interesting that Craig sets time over

i i l ib f G d' i h i i h " l "


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notes that, contrary to the present situation, in the Middle Ages "students were not

allowed to study theology until they had mastered all the other disciplines at the univer-

Ay (p. 11).

Craig's understanding of where or with whom to begin a discussion of this sort isunfortunate. For it is exactly in the discipline of theology that this kind of discussion

needs first to be addressed. Craig's method of approach, it seems to me, taken to its logi

cal conclusion, can serve and has served historically, to undermine the heart and soul of

the Christian faith. Of course, Craig's view of this kind of Archimedean point has been

asserted in the history of Christian thought. There have been schools of thought in the

Christian tradition that have held views identical or similar to Craig's. Prior to our own

country's founding it was thought that what theology needed was a heavy dose of rea

son's influence in order to rid itself of notorious theological absurdities such as original

sin, Trinity and divine incarnation. The way to rid ourselves of such pernicious doctrines is not by a review of God's revelation, but by looking to our own reasonable dis

ciplines to solve the problem. Craig's argument isanother piece of natural theology with

another now familiar conclusion such that aspects of the created world are assigned also

to God.

The point, however, is that, while Craig notes the Middle Ages as an exemplary time

for doing theology, he neglects to mention the monumentally crucial point that the

Middle Ages demanded a Reformation, and the theology coming from that Reforma

tion was designed to subvert the very methodology that Craig wants to praise. This

method of philosophy's right to dictate theology's conclusions, contra the Reformed tra

dition, is a reassertion of the usus magistenalis rationis that has, in certain key times and

places, driven orthodox Christianity eventually to a point where it becomes utterly

opposed to its initial tenets.

To his credit, Craig does consult Scripture in various places through the book. It is

most unfortunate, however, that in this approach (and like discussions concerning God)

the tradition of theology, and more importantly its source (i.e., Scripture), seems to be, at

best, tangential to the discussion and the supposedly newer and more adequate method

(philosophy) is set forth as coming to the rescue of both reason andtheology. For all of its

erudition, the method employed in this discussion, if adopted consistendy, will lead readers beyond open theism (which Craig wants, for now, to reject) to something much

worse.3

Secondly, there is a small hint, though inadvertent, toward a better way to think of

God's relationship (in all of His attributes) to His creation. In the lengthy quote above,

Craig is wrestling with the notion of God's relationship to creation. He concludes,

remember, with the following: "So even if God is timeless without creation, His free

decision to create a temporal world also constitutes a free decision on His part to exist

temporally." That is, God's free decision to create entailed a further free decision on His

part to abandon timeless existence altogether and to become temporal. This conclusion,however, does not follow, particularly given the historic creeds of the Christian faith.


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444 WESTMINSTERTHEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

world with a beginning is a decision on God's part to abandon timelessness and to take

on a temporal mode of existence" (p. 241). Perhaps at this point Craig would have been

betterserved by letting the theologians speak.

The Scriptures are replete with examples of God relating to His creation, and more

specifically to His creatures made in His image. How do we go about understanding

these examples? The best way to understand these examples is guided by the way in

which we understand revelation generally, i.e., as God's infallible redemptive-historical

record of His covenant with His creation. In this way, the examples of God relating to

His creatures and to His creation are to be interpreted in the light of God's climactic

example of relating to His creation in the Incarnation of the Son of God. Or to use

philosophical jargon, examples of God relating to His creation in Scripture, including

God's relationship to time, must be seen as different "tokens" of God's condescension,

of which the incarnation of the Son of God is the (only) "type." That is to say, in God's

redemptive-historical economy, all revelations preceding and proceeding from the Incar-

nation of the Son of God are meant to be seen in the light of God's covenanting with

His creatures in and through that Incarnate Word, His Son. We understand who God is,

primarily and preeminendy, in His Son. Everything else we understand about God flows

from that primary, climactic revelation.

With respect to the relationship of God, as eternal (and infinite, and holy, and

unchangeable, and etc., etc.) to His creation, including time, we lookfirst to the Incar

nation of the Son of God. The incarnation has never been seen as God's abandoning of

any of His essential attributes at all. As a matter of fact, it is in the incarnation that we

begin to see how it is that God can relate to His creation, including time, without becom

ing less than God. Theology has traditionally affirmed that the Son of God, as God, is to

be "acknowledged in two natures inconfusedly (), unchangeably (),

indivisibly (), and inseparably ()" (Chalcedonian Creed). On this

the great creeds of the church have agreed. Craig's "solution" to the relationship of

(only?) one of God's essential attributes to His creation is a kind of theistic Eutychianism

in which the nature of God, at the point of creation, becomes changed and conse-

quendy confused with the nature of His creation.

However, since it is the case that we can know God only as He has revealed Himself,

and since the climax of God's revelation and relationship to us is in His Incarnate Son,

ourknowledge of God's relationship to His creation must be mediated through that cli

mactic revelation of God in Christ. God, the Triune God, can indeed, then, given the

incarnation of God Himself (in the second Person of the Trinity) exist temporally, while

atthe same time, existing eternally as God. The incarnation teaches us that such things are

not onlypossible with God, but are a substantial part of our reason to worship Him. In

the words of Exod 3, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is and remains as well the "I

Am."

4

I fear that these kinds of discussions, left unchecked by Scriptural/Reformed theol

ill t d d i l f th bibli l i f th I ti itself Th


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well. Only as Christian philosophers begin more carefully to listen to Christian theolo

gians will their conclusions move toward real help, intellectually and otherwise, for the

communities they wish to serve.

I shall only say, that those who are inconversant with these objects of faithwhose

minds are not delighted in the admiration of, and acquiescency in, things incompre

hensible, such as is this constitution of the person of Christwho would reduce all

things to the measure of their own understandings, or else wilfully live in the neglect

of what they cannot comprehenddo not much prepare themselves for that vision of

these things in glory, wherein our blessedness doth consist.5

K. SCOTT OLIPHINT

Westminster Theological Seminary

Herman Hanko: For Thy Truth's Sake: A Doctrinal History of the Protestant Refor

Churches. Grandville: Reformed Free Publishing Association, 2000. Xxvi + 541 pp.

$39.95, cloth.

For all those who have an interest in the tradition of Dutch Reformed theology in

North America, this book provides interesting, if on occasion somewhat sad, reading.

Written as a history of the PRC which focuses particularly on its doctrinal distinctives, it

offers valuable insights not only into what the PRC believes but why it believes throughfocusing on the two defining controversies of the church's first seventy-five years: the

common grace crisis of the 1924 synod of the Christian Reformed Church and the con

flict of the late forties and earlyfiftieswith the Schilderites of the Liberated Churches.

For those in the Westminster constituency, there is also some treatment of the Clark-Van

Til controversy, upon which Herman Hoeksema commented at some length and in

which he decidedly favored Clark.

Written by a second-generation PR minister who knew many of the personalities

involved in the events he describes, Hanko has a sensitivity and an understanding of theissues and events which only an insider can possess. On the whole, history has not been

kind to Hoeksema and his followers, and many of their legitimate concerns have disap

peared from debate not because they are not legitimate but because they have been

made to look ridiculous through the unfair caricaturing of exacdy what was at stake,

particularly in 1924. The world can cope with a more sympathetic reading of the PRC,

and this book provides just that.

Nevertheless, the book's strength is also its weakness: Hanko's very closeness to these

things limits his ability to sympathize with those who "lost"and this is most definitely

a history of "winners" (the PRC) and "losers" (the CRC; those who were influenced by

the covenant teaching of Klaas Schilder). Clearly, part of the purpose of the work is to


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review god, time and eternity wtj 63 no 2 fall 2001, p 439-445

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