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REVIEW ARTICLE

MARVIN FOX

Sidney Hook. Religion in a Free Society. University of Nebraska Press. 120 pp. $ 4.00.

In this short book, originally presented as lectures at the University of Nebraska, Professor Hook concerns himself with a major issue of public policy in the United States. He offers us his own thoughts concerning the proper place of religion in a democratic society, together with a critique of recent Supreme Court decisions prohibiting prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. Hook believes the Supreme Court to have made deciisons which are poorly reasoned, which are without sound basis in constitutional law, and which threaten our society with a destructive divisiveness.

Since Hook is a philosopher, he feels it necessary to justify his writing about such matters by showing that it derives from his special view of philosophy as "the pursuit of wisdom," which in turn seems to mean "the evaluation of evaluations." He holds that this is "The only conception of philosophy which explains the continuity of the philosophic tradition from Socrates to John Dewey," and calls on the philosopher to "light up some area of moral concern." Philosophers must speak not only to each other, but must have something important to say to other men as well, "something relevant to their life in its personal or social dimension."

However sympathetic one might be with this conception of philosophy, we must recognize that it is hardly fashionable at present. Most contem- porary professional philosophers seem embarrassed by the suggestion that they have any special wisdom to offer on moral and social questions. They tend to view their work as a highly technical and somewhat esoteric specialty, just one more professional field within the panoply of the modern university. Consider the fact that teachers of philosophy today call themselves "philo- sophers," following the model of mathematicians, physicists, astronomers, economists, agronomists, beauticians, and morticians. "Philosopher" has lost its honorific ring. It no longer suggests special wisdom, only a certi- fied level of professional expertise.

In calling us back to an older and more exalted conception of philosophy Hook could have performed a valuable service. He might have given us, in his book, a paradigm case of philosophic wisdom. This would have been the best argument in defense of his conception of philosophy. Were his views on morals, religion, and their place in a free society infused with that special wisdom which he celebrates as the aim of the philosopher, this might have persuaded his readers that the old and honored Platonic notion of philosophy is still viable. Unhappily, what Mr. Hook offers us is not any

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special wisdom, but a collection of his own prejudices, and a view of the way his insight and perspective are limited by his own personal background and experiences.

That personal prejudice should be offered as a philosopher's illumination of public policy is not surprising in the light of Hook's theory of the founda- tions of democracy. He explicitly denies that democracy rests on either theological or metaphysical foundations. "A sufficient justification of democracy can be found in the empirical consequences - the common fruits of experience - of living together as compared with the consequences of living in a non-democratic society." Hook never makes clear in his book just what these desirable consequences of democracy are. Whatever they might be, however, as consequences they can be desirable only in so far as they happen to serve the interests of some individuals or groups. It is apparent that Hook does not think of any consequences which are intrinsic- ally good, since this would almost inevitably involve him in the metaphysical issues that he considers irrelevant. We are left, then, with a defense of democracy resting on the fact (interesting, but hardly decisive) that Mr. Hook prefers the consequences of life in a democratic society to those of life in a non-democratic society. Yet one has the feeling that he doesn't really want it just that way, that he believes that democracy is objectively superior. But why? In Hook's scheme each man should judge the fruits of democracy in terms of his own tastes, desires, needs and interests. Is it an a priori truth that in making such judgment all men will find democracy or its consequences superior? Or is it merely an empirical claim? It is obviously not the former, and he offers no evidence for the latter, which leaves us only with the cer- tainty that Mr. Hook himself finds democracy a most attractive form of government and thinks that reasonable men would share his view. Even if a world plebiscite were to show that a large majority of mankind shares his tastes this would in no way help his case. For in order to give special weight to the views of the majority we require some justification beyond the fact of their personal preferences, since it is by no means obvious that the ma- jority is always right. But Mr. Hook seems determined to avoid such theory at all costs. In any case, it is clear that he does not want to subscribe to the view that voxpopuli, vox dei. It may be well to recall that Tocqueville spoke of democracy as, at times, becoming a new religion.

In one passage he justifies morals in general in the same way as democracy. "One can teach kindness and truthfulness to the young on the basis of plural justifications, the most persuasive of which usually are their consequences in experience." It is clear enough that this is a self-defeating doctrine since, first, we can never anticipate all the possible consequences of an act, and, second, we are dependent on accepting as normative individual and private responses to those consequences. Does Mr. Hook really want to say that a man is morally justified in adopting a policy of cruelty and lying so long as he likes the consequences of such behavior? Or can he assure us that every reasonable man necessarily shares his tastes and thus must prefer the con- sequences of kindness to those of cruelty and of truth to falsehood? We are

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again left with only private preference and what men think to be their personal interest as the grounds of morality, a position which seems to be an admission of the total inability of Hook's philosophy to deal with such questions.

Having established a position with respect to morals and politics which is completely relativistic, Professor Hook proceeds to reverse himself in a remarkable way. Arguing against those who would make morals rest on religion - a view which he finds repugnant - Hook proclaims "the indepen- dent authority of moral judgment," though he never makes clear whether this independent authority is the private possession of certain morally gifted individuals or is present in all men. Our astonishment grows when we learn of the mortar that holds democratic society together. "It is because we share certain objective standards of morality that we avoid social anarchy. . ." How can anyone look at contemporary western society, with all its inner turmoil, and continue to believe that there is a commonly accepted and recognized morality? Nowhere are we told where to find these objective moral standards or how to distinguish them from subjective standards. If some of Hook's own moral judgments in this book are to be taken as in- stances of these objective standards, one can only be skeptical of their moral soundness and of their professed objectivity, as I shall now try to show.

Professor Hook argues that while the state should be neutral in matters of religion it "cannot be neutral in grave matters of morality." He concludes that citizens are free to push for legislation on moral grounds, but never on religious grounds, and that the democratic community rests on a notion of morality, but rejects the category of the sinful. Of course, Hook conveniently overlooks the fact that for many free citizens in a democratic society morality does rest on religion, and for them there is no distinction between the morally evil and the sinful. His arguments to the contrary are by no means decisive. Even if they were, he could only impose them on religious men by coercion, or else, would be forced arbitrarily to exclude a very large segment of society from participation in policy decisions. This might mean inventing a new test for the right to vote, namely, an oath that in the voting booth the voter will never make a decision on religious grounds, even if he is sincerely convinced that these are the only grounds that are relevant. One hardly needs to make explicit the absurdity and potential evil in such a position. Let a single example bear witness.

Suppose a bill were introduced into the legislature of a democratic community regulating in the interests of prevention of cruelty to animals the mode of their slaughter in meat-processing plants. This conceivably might conflict with the practices of ritual slaughter prescribed by some religious sects. The consideration would be relevant in determining whether the legislation should be adopted. If, however, the representatives of the community regarded the moral issue as of overriding concern, and if the legislation were adopted on moral grounds, all citizens, whatever their religion, would be boundby it. So long as the legislation was aimed at certain immoral practices, any disability suffered by individuals because of their religious beliefs would have to be borne by those affected.

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Several issues emerge from Professor Hook's treatment of this case. First, considering what has gone before, it would follow that religious Jews (which is what is meant by the phrase "some religious sects") would be prohibited in good conscience (as citizens in a free society) from voting for candidates who oppose restrictions on ritual slaughter, even though their own interests are deeply affected. So long as their concern for ritual slaughter is religious rather than moral they may not promote their own deepest needs. This is the case even if they deny that there is any distinction between religion and morality, since they are pronounced by Mr. Hook to be in error on this point and must not be permitted to act on such an erroneous principle.

Second, in determining what constitutes the objective moral standard of which Mr. Hook seems to have special knowledge, it turns out to be nothing more than what "the representatives of the community" regard as "the moral issue" which is "of overriding concern." Why these representatives should be viewed as endowed with any special moral knowledge is not clear. Nor is it clear that the elected members of the state legislature are morally wiser than the ecclesiastical authorities or even than the members of the American Philosophical Association. We have not yet arrived at Plato's ideal republic, and we cannot claim to be governed by his philosopher-king. Even in democratic states many who govern are less wise than the governed. What- ever it is that gets men elected to public office in the United States, it is surely not the undemonstrable claim that they have special knowledge of the objective standards of true morality.

Third, in the particular case before us the moral judgment which Professor Hook makes is, in my opinion, outrageous and perverse. If the moral sense of the "representatives of the community" should be more concerned with the presumed welfare of animals than with the actual welfare of human beings their rulings deserve to be rejected out of hand. On what basis would Hook decide that the concern for animals should in this case prevail over the concern for men? Is it enough merely to label the one religious and the other moral, itself an arbitrary distinction, at best? Should the convictions of one group be forced to yield to the sentiments of another? Given common morality it would seem obvious that there is something wrong with denying an entire religious community the right to eat meat, simply because another segment of the community does not approve of their method of slaughtering animals. There is no objective moral standard here at all. There is only the prejudice which labels one set of opinions as moral, and thus politically binding, and another set as religious, and thus without independent rights in a democratic society. Honesty forces us to acknowledge that certain views gain sufficient support at given times to prevail and become law. No one should confuse this legal process with an objective moral standard, nor should such "objectivity" be reduced to whatever happen to be the sentiments of the representatives of the community. The rule of the majority may be legal, but it does not follow that the laws which may be enacted are morally right, even if they express the moral ideas of the community. Fifty million Frenchmen can be wrong.

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It is with the same kind of "objectivity" that Mr. Hook deals with the specific policy concerning religion in the public schools. Though he offers some serious criticisms of the legal reasoning involved in the court decisions banning prayer and Bible-reading from the schools, this is not the main ground of his objections. The decisions are primarily criticized because Hook believes they are unwise, and he assures us that "what is wise and what is constitutional are not necessarily the same thing." Hook says explicitly that "were we founding a democratic community of plural religious faiths, there could be no justification for the introduction of even faintly devotional elements in state and school." Since, however, we are legislating not ab initio, but in a historical context in which religion is still prized, "it is the better part of common sense to rely on gradual processes of enlighten- ment to hasten the euthanasia of religious practices in public life rather than to arouse sleeping religious furies by legal interdiction." The present question is, then, purely one of wise policy, Hook himself having admitted that (whatever the errors of the Justices of the Supreme Court) on strictly legal grounds there is no place for religious exercises in public schools. He opposes the legal prohibition of these exercises for two reasons, that they are in his opinion trivial and hurt no one, and that they are not coercive so that whoever seeks may be exempted from participation. In Hook's words, "we are dealing with vestigial religious practices of a non-compulsory nature," "historic vestiges of a religiously oriented culture that have no harmful effects on those who are unreligious or who do not share the domi- nant religion, but at the worst produce occasional irritation or boredom..."

These judgments of alleged fact are supported only by Hook's own ex- perience as a public school student in Brooklyn before World War I, and as a teacher ten years later in the same public schools. He reports that he and his friends, though not Christian and perhaps not religious at all, regarded the Protestant prayers, hymns, and devotional Bible readings with tolerant amusement. Happily, as a teacher he did not need to conduct such exer- cises, since all but the Bible reading had been eliminated, and the latter served, he says, as "excellent illustrative material for subsequent lessons in English, history, civics, and dramatics." One regrets that the devotional exercises were stopped before Hook's career as a teacher began. There is something deliciously comic in the picture of the Sidney Hook we know leading a Protestant prayer service under government compulsion.

His very limited empirical evidence could not stand up under the casual scrutiny of even the most undemanding standards of scientific method. The experiences which he describes and his attitudes toward them are in no sense typical. America is not Brooklyn, and truly religious people do not readily fit Hook's image. In much of America, if not in Brooklyn, the religious exercises are taken very seriously indeed. In rural schools, in small towns, in the vast mid-west, and in many other places these practices are not vestigial or trivial. They are live and forceful, often prevailing and coloring the entire life of a school. Daily classes, Christmas and Easter assemblies, graduation exercises, almost every aspect of the school life is cast in a mold of Protestant

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religious forms. And they are forms about which the school authorities, the teachers, the students and the community are often very serious indeed. It is simply false to say that they are bland innocuous remnants of another age. They are strong and prized religious rites, whose threatened elimination is frequently viewed with alarm as a blow to faith and morality.

Hook and his classmates, having probably been a dominant non-Christian majority in his Brooklyn school, may have been amused by what they regard- ed as either time-wasting or anachronistic rituals. He tells us that, "The idea that our religious freedom was being violated even though there was no pro- vision for exemption from religious exercises would have been hilarious." It is not hilarious at all to be a member of a small religious minority in a public school where devotional exercises of another and dominant faith are a daily classroom activity. To a believing Jew, Christian prayers and hymns can be disturbing and offensive. To a devout Roman Catholic, Protestant worship can be the imposition of a serious and painful tyranny. Children, of all people, are least capable of coping with such situations, if they take their religion seriously. One should have special sympathy for the distress of children trained to be atheists. Such religious practices in public schools show a basic contempt for the minority. They are symbolic expressions of the conviction that in reality our public institutions are not the property of all Americans, but only of the dominant majority. As some social critics have observed, America does not need to seek an official state religion, since in Protestantism we already have one. In treating these problems as little more than a joke, Professor Hook disqualifies himself from any possibility of perceptive or wise policy judgments on these delicate questions.

It is this same lack of understanding that leads him to believe that there is no coercion, no forcing of children to participate. Of course, the right to be excused during prayers is formally granted, thought not everywhere. Hook is certain that a child who exercises this right will be respected, if not admired. Should the child meet with hostility from other students, Hook has no doubt that a skilled teacher will find it "easy to explain and make accep- table the whole practice as part of America's proud tradition of religious tolerance." What an unrealistic picture of our schools and of our teachers! The schools all too often encourage conformity, not difference. Teachers, in general, share and readily impose the attitudes and prejudices of our society because they are their own. There are few children who, already sensitive to their minority status, have the strength to stand alone in a way which emphasizes their religious difference from their classmates. Why should they be forced to do so? Have they not the right to attend school without being subjected to the strains and pressures which are unavoidable if sectarian religious worship is permitted in the classroom? (We might note that there is no non-sectarian worship. Whatever carries that label is ordinarily a version of Protestant Christianity.) Rather than condemn the court for creating divisions in American society over supposedly trivial matters, Hook's own values should compel him to congratulate the justices for protecting the rights of a helpless minority.

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In spite of the fact that Professor Hook has made other very important contributions to our understanding of major issues in social and political philosophy, he falls below his own high standards in this small book. He is right in arguing that it is not always wise to invoke the law, even when legal rights are completely dear. He is wrong in thinking that the issue of religion in public schools is one on which wisdom commands us to allow the majority to violate the law. A correct and sympathetic understanding of the position of religious (and irreligious) minorities in this country would surely have brought him to very different policy decisions from those he proposes in this book.

Ohio State University