restructuring nepal army

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Restructuring Nepal Army:

A Conflict Transformation Perspective

Bishnu Raj Upreti

1. Introduction

Nepal is at a crossroads of fundamental socio-political

transformation. Facilitating and sustaining such transformation requiresnew vision, new constitutional framework, new institutional

arrangement, new instruments and new commitment. Conduct, action

and behaviour of the political parties, judiciary, security (military,

armed police, civilian police, intelligence and other security related

institutions) and bureaucracy are some of the fundamental institutions

that determine success or failure of materializing fundamental socio-

political transformation. Hence, substantial reorientation of these

institutions is a precondition to make them relevant to the changing

political context. This paper discusses the restructuring of military,

one of the fundamentally important security components of security

sector, from the conflict transformation2 and peace building perspective.

The objective of this paper is to initiate a constructive debate on the

need and approach of restructuring of Nepal Army in the changing

political context. The paper brings argument that the relevance of

transformation of Nepal Army is essential at the present context.

2. Restructuring of Security Sector: A Conceptual Basis

Restructuring of security sector is not much debated in Nepal. Even

the definition of security sector is globally contested and difficult to

find a unanimous definition. OECD defines security sector as those

state institutions, which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of

the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion3. Security

Sector Reform (SSR) is a common concept globally used in the post-

conflict literatures. SSR is a process of transforming the organizations

having legitimate authority to use or order the use of force such as

police, army, paramilitary, local security units, intelligence and other

legally defined arrangements4. Changing roles, responsibilities and

actions of security actors in a changing context in consistent with


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Nepali Journal of Cont emporary Studies Vol. VII No. 1 2007

democratic norms, values and principles of good governance are some

of the basic elements of SSR.5

Fundamental principles of SSR are civilian control and parliamentary

oversight of security apparatus, rightsizing and modernization and

professionalisation of security forces, respecting rule of law, facilitating

war to peace transition, etc.6 SSR is a concept of total reform in the

shortcomings and weaknesses of security sector, new vision and

neutrality that demands honest commitments and impartiality from both

civilian government and security professionals. Appropriate trainings

(both military and human rights, capacity building and technicalcompetence), mainstreaming security issues into development policy

and programme, delicate balance between confidentiality and

transparency, strong co-ordination and operational mechanisms,

relationship between military and civilian, building public awareness,

strengthening constitutional and legal frameworks, periodic review of

performance of security sector and strengthening of independent

oversight mechanisms (e.g., public complaint bodies like human right

commission, auditor general, legislative and judicial bodies, etc.) are

some of the important elements of SSR.7

Restructuring of military is not only related to security aspects but

also with social, political, economic, international and development8

issues. Security sector reform has to address policy, legislative,

international relations; structural and oversight issues set within standard

democratic principles and value.9 The classical security approach mainly

focuses on legal monopoly of state to use the security instruments and

security force for safeguarding people and national security specifically

to defend against external threats. Further, the conventional notion of

existence of military force is to prepare for, prevent and engage in

war 10 and army, paramilitary and police forces, intelligence and secret

services are used for this purpose. This conventional state centric

approach of security operation is narrow and ignores modern notion

of security that relates with holistic framework of human rights,

livelihood security, environmental security, energy security in other

words broader human security with peoples rights for dignified life.11

Hence, democratic governance, which is a serious issue in Nepal, is a

central element of security sector restructuring.12


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3. Changing Political Context and Security Sector

Transformation in Nepal

The 10 years' peoples war waged by the Communist Party of

Nepal (Maoist)13 [hereafter CPN (Maoist)] since 1996 and the peoples

movement of April 2006 and consequent peace process (signing of the

Comprehensive Peace Accord; involvement of the United Nations (UN)

in assisting management of arms and armies, promulgation of the Interim

Constitution and formation of the Interim Parliament) have paved the

path for fundamental socio-political restructuring of Nepal.

Nepal is now at a crossroads of transformation from a centuries'old feudal, top-down, autocratic and exclusionary monarchical regime

to a modern nation.14 The kings 1st February 2005 coup greatly helped

the major political parties, popularly known as Seven-Party Alliance15

or SPA to work together and to collaborate with the CPN (Maoist) to

defeat the king as CPN (Maoist) was proposing from the last two

years. As a consequence, a 12-point understanding reached between

them, ultimately leading to the mass agitation in April 2006 that defeated

the king and brought the Maoists in the mainstream. The

Comprehensive Peace Accord signed between the government and the

CPN (Maoists) on 21 November 2006 not only formally ended the

armed conflict and but also outlined ways for restructuring of the unitaryNepali state.

The clause 4.7 of the Section Four of the Comprehensive Peace

Accord mentionsed that the Nepal Army should be democratize It

states"

The cabinet would control, mobilize and manage Nepal Army as

per the new Military Act. The interim cabinet would prepare and

implement the detailed action plan of democratization of Nepal Army

by taking suggestions from the concerned committee of the interim

parliament. This includes works like determination of the right number

of Nepal Army, prepare the democratic structure reflecting the national

and inclusive character, and train them on democratic principles and

human rights values.

Similarly, Article 144 (3 and 4) of the Interim Constitution has

stated similar provisions. Hence, the new political context has clearly

envisioned restructuring the existing army structures. However, neither

the Comprehensive Peace Accord nor the Interim Constitution has

aptly visualized the comprehensive need of security sector restructuring

Restructuring Nepal Army ....


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which includes holistic approach, i.e., developing national security

policy (by complementing international relations, defense policy, and

economic policy; establishing a supreme and powerful national security

apparatus such as national security council), reforming intelligence,

restructuring army, police and other security apparatus. Some isolated

effort of restructuring of one component of security sector alone cannot

produce expected result. It therefore needs holistic approach. Military

is obviously an extremely important component of the security sector

and therefore transformation of military is the focus of this paper.

3.1 Steps and Process for Security Sector Reform

Step 1: Analyze security sector

Prioritize core needs and challenges,

Identify weaknesses and constraints,

Explore opportunities and potentials.

Step 2: Formulate new policy, institutional and legislative framework

based on the identified opportunities and potentials,

Step 3: Translate policy, institutional arrangement and legislative

framework into action.

3.2 Basis of Security Sector TransformationOften the need of security sector reform arises from:

Transition form war (civil or inter-state) to peace,

Fundamental political change in the country,

Unanticipated security related crisis faced by the country,

Regal or gradual process of change.

In any of these situations, important interrelated basesis are:

The context of the country (economic, political, security, etc.),

International relation policy of the country,

National defense policy of the country.

The following figure shows interrelationship between the context,

international policy and defense policy as a basis of transformation of

security sector.

There are some established approaches of security sector reform

widely used in post-conflict countries. OECD/DAC approach17,

European approach18, UNDP approach are some of the more common

operational approaches. However, discussing these approaches is

beyond the scope of this paper.


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3.4 Why Security Sector Reform

As Nepal is entering into a new era, new vision, new policy and

legal framework, new institutional arrangement, new orientation, new

relations and change in behaviour of security forces are essential to

meet the new challenges faced by the country in the 21st century.

Meeting these needs requires fundamental transformation of security

sector based on the holistic framework (defining new security policy

based on the defense, international and economic policy; and human

rights standards; social justice and good governance framework,

recognizing Nepalese people as the ultimate source of power).

The new security policy of Nepal should not be limited to the

conventional security paradigm practiced so far and must cover the

new paradigm that includes:

National defense,

International relation, Territorial security,

Human security,

Environmental security,

Livelihood security, and

Energy security.

Policy on

International

Relations

The Context

National Defense

Policy

Basis for

SSR

Security/ Military

Judiciary

Bureaucracy



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The current debate on security policy includes even good

governance framework, economic and development policy of the state.

Conventional security is not enough to provide security to a nation and

its people, especially in the developing countries. The Brandt

Commission 21 and Olaf Palme Commission22 have amply highlighted

this issue. The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces

(DCAF) has vividly establisheds relationship between reform of security

centre and development by embedding reform of security sector into

human development and helping poverty reduction and expanding

options for life of poor people.23Hence, Nepal needs to reorient securitysector according to the new security paradigm mentioned above.

4. Restructuring of Nepal Army

Despite the reservation of few critical commentators, the history of

Nepal Army is linked to state building King Prithivinarayan Shah's

effort of unifying several petty states into the modern state of Nepal

was made successful by the army. Historically, they were in the

forefront while resisting external security threats. The Military Act

2063 (BS) has stated the need of Nepal Army for the protection of

independence, sovereignty, national integrity and national unity of the

nation.Security apparatus, bureaucratic apparatus and judicial apparatus

are three fundamental permanent pillars of any governing system of a

modern state. These three structures provide basic services to citizens

of a country. It is not possible to govern democratically without

modernizing and professionalizing these fundamental state apparatuses

and making them accountable. As Nepal Army is one of the very

important components of the security sector of Nepal, its restructuring

in the changing political context is highly expected by both political

actors and citizens.

While discussing the restructuring of Nepal Army, four areas are

crucial. They are:

1. Rule transformation (laws and regulations; guidelines, norms and

values, etc.),

2. Content transformation (training content, orientation, issues,

structural arrangements, etc.),

3. Procedure transformation (organizational culture, behaviour and

action, operational style, use of symbols, etc.),


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4. Relation transformation (civil-military relation24; media policy;

balancing transparency and confidentiality; accountability and

civilian control and parliamentary oversight; human rights, etc.)

4.1 Existing Areas of Engagement of Nepal Army25

1. Safeguarding territorial integrity,

2. Mobilization during internal conflict,

3. Development work:

a. Road construction,b. Construction of bridges and other vital areas,

4. Nature Conservation (parks and reserves),

5. Disaster management and responding to crisis,

6. UN peace keeping,

7. Security of palaces26 and V/VIPs,

8. Rescue and recovery (mainly helicopter service),

9. Protection of vital areas:

a. Airport security,

b. Border security,

c. Security of banks and fund transfer,

d. Telephone towers and relay stations,e. Jail security,

f . Others.

10. Provisional emergency medical services to limited general public

through Chhauni Military Hospital, Kathmandu.

These areas of engagement can be redefined, reoriented, combined,

modified or reduced on the basis of the comprehensive assessment of

Nepal Army as outlined in the section 3.1 considering the changing

context of Nepal and international security dynamics. Some of the

existing areas of engagement of Nepal Army may not be necessary

given the changed context. A debate is emerging on the engagement

of the army in National Parks and reserves as people-park-partnership

is becoming more sustainable and effective. A large number of the

army deployed in the security of the palaces and the royal families are

no longer needed as the government has already shifted that role to the

police force. The engagement of security in development work such

as construction of roads and other infrastructures is also the issue not

beyond debate on economic and social grounds.



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4.2 Why Rrestructuring of Nepal Army?

The success of the peoples movement in April 2006 and the political

development that followed brought to light debate on restructuring of

the state. Ssecurity sector in general and the Nepal army in particular

became the integral part of the debate.

The holistic transformation of the security sector in general and

Nepal Army in particular hinges on the new constitution to be made

by the constituent assembly as it is to decide on security issues,

international relations, economic issues, states political structures

(federal or decentralized autonomous region, etc.). Guiding principles,content, process, institutional arrangement and regulative and legal

framework of the restructuring of the security sector will be clear only

after the new constitution to be made by the elected constituent assembly.

However, it is essential to have some debate on security sector

restructuring to make people aware so that they would elect right people

in the constituent assembly.

4.2.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of Nepal Army

Nepal Army was largely a close structure in the Panchayatregime.

It was presented as some thing especial and beyond the proper

understanding of general public. The palace always used this institution

for strengthening its power and privileges. Even after the political

change of 1990, Nepalese politicians and the government failed to

regulate, monitor and oversight the army. They perceived that Nepal

army was the interest of the palace only. Consequently, Nepal Army

continued its loyalty with the palace. The National Defense Council

Strengths

Disciplined and hard working, Professional,

Good reputation in UN peace keeping

operation in different parts of the

world,

Not ambit ious for mil it ary ru le

(Never attempted to rule the country

militarily),

Not observed resistance to the change

process of 2006.

Weaknesses

M on ar ch is t o ri en ta ti on

27

an daccountability (the king as supreme

commander),

L es s r ep re se nt at iv e (Madeshi ,

women, etc.),

Inadequate civil-military relation,

Controversy in human rights issues

(Doramba, Nagarkot, Belbari,

etc.),

Lack of tr ansparency ( ra tion ,

welfare fund, etc.).


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totally failed to perform its role envisioned in the constitution but the

parties and their governments either suspected or blamed the army for

not being cooperative with them. Obviously, the palace made efforts

to control the army and also succeeded in it because of the culture,

tradition and command structure (the King as supreme commander).

The National Defense Council and Prime Minister/Defense Minister

should be held responsible for weaknesses and the disputes related to

the army in the last 15 years.

Image is a powerful instrument as it influences society both positively

and negatively . Therefore, organizations and individuals always attemptto provide good image in society. Nepal Army in the Panchayatera

was perceived as a powerful, elitist and especial institution because of

the use of language and words, action and response. Its image after the

1990s political change has to be examined into four stages. They are:

1. 1990 to 2001: less controversial and largely accepted as a credible

institution in public,

2. The armys involvement in armed conflict: controversy started,

Maoists targeted army as main enemy, cases of human rights abuses

and disappearance by the army increased, public fear towards army

multiplied. Relation with civilians worsened. International Crisis

Group has extensively reported about the involvement of the armyin the armed conflict of Nepal28.

3. Royal takeover of 1st February and April Movement: The army

fell intocontroversy, lost its credibility domestically29 and

internationally.30 General public thought that the king used the army

as a tool to suspend democracy and establish autocracy.31 General

people, civil society and political parties lost their faith in the army

when it suppressed Janaandolan. The already deteriorated image

of the army from the 1st February coup was further worsened even

internationally because of its role in suppressing the April 2006

peoples movement 32 as it was globally covered by the international

media. In this stage, it lost its image and acceptance detrimentally.

4 . PostJanaadolon: Nepal Army showed its commitment to political

change. Contrary to the assumption of some of the analysts that

Nepal Army would openly stands for the king, it cooperated with

government, expressed its commitment to peace and responded

positively. It has even started taking proactive role in initiating

debates of transforming the army.



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Nepal Army claims that inclusive process in the army is already

underway as it is recruiting women in non-technical officers, cadets,

military police, etc. and, establishing Sabujgan ofMadheshi community

inJaleshworofDhanusha andRipumardanigan ofKirantcommunity

in Hile ofDhankuta districts33 It is claimed that more than 50 castes

and ethnic groups are working in the army.

Military welfare fund and financial contribution deducted from the

army participating in UN peacekeeping force are facing a court case

for the legal settlement. However, the image and credibility of Nepal

Army in UN peace keeping operation (approximately 36000 NepalArmy personnel have so far participated in the UN peace keeping

operation in different war-torn countries) has been characterized as:

Honest and sincere,

Hard working and committed,

Professional,

Brave and able to work in adverse condition in different war-

torn countries.

4.3 Holistic Approach of Restructuring

A successful restructuring of Nepal Army depends upon internalizing

the holistic approach of security sector restructuring. That means: Developing new national security policy (defense and

international relations)

Redefining National Defense Council (existing arrangement of

NSC is too narrow)

Restructuring of Ministry of Defense

Transforming

o Nepal Army

o Civilian Police

o Armed Police

Redefining state intelligence (both security and civilian structures)

Redefining and strengthening of oversight bodies (parliamentary,

judicial and human rights bodies)

These components of security sector are interrelated and

complementary. Therefore they need to be reformed simultaneously

to meet the requirements of modernization, professionalisation and

democratic governance of security sector.

Nepalese people, especially political parties, should realize that


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national security and international policy must be developed by

consensus (there should be in-depth study, serious discussion and wider

interaction among and between political parties while formulating these

policies) but once they are finalized, theses policies must be common

for all political parties and must not change with the change of

governments.

4.4 Basic Principles of Restructuring of Nepal Army

Nepalese people as the ultimate source of power,

Accountability, Transparency,

Representation,

Rule of law and human rights,

Social justice and good governance principles,

International provisions and standards.

The new army act has introduced some of these principles.

4.5 Rightsizing of Nepal Army

The actual size of Nepal Army depends upon several factors. Some

of them are:

Long term national security policy, International power relations and Nepals position

Economic feasibility of the state

Possibility of mobilizing alternative security arrangements (e.g.,

military training to eligible citizens, mobilizing paramilitary,

etc.),

Major areas of engagement (3 categories: must be engaged, better

to engage and less important to engage)

Other factors

The Comprehensive Peace Accord and Interim Constitution state

about redefininge the size of Nepal Army. There are several arguments

for and against of reducing the existing size of Nepal army (the total

strength: 91444 persons34). Theoretically, there can be three options:

Downsizing of the existing strength,

Upsizing of the existing strength,

Keeping the existing strength.



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4.5.1Arguments for keeping the existing strength (or not drastically

downsizing)

Reducing the existing size causes imbalance in the command

and control strengths particularly in senior positions,

Need for deterrence in case of unexpected external interference,

Serious problems occur in nature conservation,

Affects development work carried out by Nepal Army,

Alters contribution in UN peace keeping,

Affects in disaster management and risqu operation,

Affects security of V/VIPs, Affects protection of vital areas such as airport security, security

of banks and fund transfer, telephone towers and railway stations,

Affects jail security,

Requires strengths if internal conflict escalates.

4.5.2Arguments for downsizing the existing strengths

The expansion of the existing military size into double during

the past 10 years was precisely because of the Maoist armed

conflict and this strength is not needed after the end of the Maoist

armed conflict,

Nepal, a poor country, can not sustain big size of military as itis an extremely expensive institution,

Some of the conventional areas of military engagement such as

palace security, parks and reserves security should be terminated,

Nepal can not militarily confront or compete with the giant

neighbours

If deterrence needed, Nepalese citizens should be trained.

The down sizing of the army is coming vehemently from the CPN

(Maoist). In his first public appearance at the Prime Ministers official

residence,35 Prachanda said that Nepal needs only about twenty

thousands army to provide military training to all eligible Nepalese

people as the security of the nation is the responsibility of all citizens.

4.5.2.1 General criteria for downsizing

Terminatiing who have completed the legally defined pension

period (phasewise criteria can be used),

Terminating who have records of human rights abuses,

Accepting voluntary resignations,


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One time decision for premature pension retirement (one or two

years before the normal pension time depending upon the size

to be reduced),

No new recruitment in vacancies created from the completion

of pension period and from other reasons (exception may apply

in some crucial positions),

Golden handshake package, where appropriate,

Other appropriate criteria defined by the government.

4.5.2.2 Social reintegration and other options for Nepal ArmyFor reintegrating the reduced army in society, the existing

reintegrating procedures and packages should continued as the obvious

option. However, in case of a large scale downsizing, the following

are potential areas of engagement:

Placing in the permanent peace keeping force of UN. It requires that

the government should take especial efforts to convince the UN,

Adjusting in private security sector: industrial security, security

of public institutions, etc.

Engage in skill based occupations, income generation,

Creating special force of post-conflict reconstruction and

development, Assigning civilian roles in the government structures where

appropriate,

Other relevant options.

4.6 Establishment of Technical committee for Restructuring

of Nepal Army

Both Comprehensive Peace Accord and Interim Constitution state

that the interim government should prepare and implement the detailed

action plan for democratizing Nepal Army by taking suggestions from

the concerned committees of the interim parliament. In addition to this

provision, there is a need of setting up a technical committee comprising

PLA leaders, Nepal Army officers and experts to assist parliamentary

committees (State Affairs, and other relevant committees) and the

interim government. This committee has to workout all necessary details

to overcome technical complications while transforming Nepal Army

and integrating PLA. This committee should continue till the complete

transformation of security sector.



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4.7 The Right Time for Restructuring of Nepal Army

Some work such as revising military act has started. The focus is

on the military alone, leaving holistic transformation of security sector

a side. However,Comprehensi ve Peace Accord and Interim

Constitution have opened some avenue to work on security sector

transformation. However, it is extremely difficult to make a clear

proposal of military restructuring because of uncertainty on the states

structure (unitary or federal). Nepal's national defense policy, foreign

policy and economic policy will most probably undergo a change after

the new constitution to be promulgated by the constituent assembly.Hence, only an informed debate on military restructuring would be

appropriate. The following three-stage strategy is useful to initiate

restructuring:

4.7.1 Pre-constituent assembly election

Debate and discussion,

Analyzing security sector,

Exploring opportunities and challenges.

4.7.2 Post-constituent assembly election (during the period of

constitution making) Ensuring the incorporation of fundamental principles of operating

security sector (discussed in the section 4.4) in the new

constitutional provisions,

Providing conceptual framework for the modern, professional

and democratically operating security apparatus.

4.7.3 By The elected government after promulgating new

constitution

Preparation of comprehensive security sector transformation

package,

Execution of actual security sector reform according to the new

constitutional provision by restructuring

o National Defense Council,

o Ministry of defense

o Nepal Army,

o Nepal Police,


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o Intelligence

o Other Security Apparatus.

5. Integration between People's Liberation Army and Nepal

Army into a single structure

The Maoists argue for forming a new national army by combining

both PLA and Nepal Army. Though the Maoists have not made public

the detail on how to form a new national army, they have raised this

issue very strongly.

The actual size of PLA will be clear only after the completion ofverification process by the UN. PLAs verified by UN will be eligible

candidates for the integration if they meet some standard criteria.

As the Maoists are repeatedly saying that the existing size of army

is not necessary for Nepal, it will be difficult for them to justify their

argument of incorporating all PLAs in the army. Hence, the down

sizing means less number of PLA integrating in the army. However,

determining the actual size is a political decision but it should be based

on the sound technical basis.

There is argument that the PLA is an ideologically indoctrinated

body of political cadres of one party and that cannot be professionally

neutral.

5.1 Criteria of Selection

The interim government needs to decide on selection criteria after

a through discussion with senior officials of PLA and Nepal Army.

However, the following can be general bases to integrate the verified

PLA in national army:

Giving up the party membership (neutrality principle)

Physical fitness,

Meeting the standard age requirement and other standard selection

criteria,

No record of human rights abuses,

Inclusiveness and representativeness - caste, geographical regions

and sex

5.2 Mainstreaming and Integration of PLA

Disarming is a process of handing over of the arms used by

individuals to the authorities who are responsible for the safe storage,



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redistribution or even to the destruction of those arms. Demobilization

is an act of either disbanding arms unit, reducing the number of

combatants or an interim stage before reassembling entire armed forces.

Reintegration is a social and economic process by which ex-combatants

acquire civilian status and gain access to civilian forms of work and

income.

The Maoist leaders have so far rejected the classical notion of

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). They interpret

DDR as an approach to apply only for the defeated rebel force.

However, the agreement between the government and the Maoists onmanagement of arms and armies and involvement of UN Mission in

Nepal39 (UNMIN) is an integral part of DDR. Further, DDR applies

to both the defeated rebel force and the state security force, no matter

which side wins or defeats.

Once the integration of the registered PLAs in Nepal Army starts,

those who do not meet the criteria have to adjust in different areas

such as:

Industrial security,

Engage in skill-based occupations (by providing training,

resources and conducive environment), Adjusting in private security sector: industrial security, security

of public institutions, etc.

Creating special force of post-conflict reconstruction and

development,

Assigning civilian roles in the government structures where

appropriate,

Other options.

6 Role of International Community in Security Sector

Restructuring

In developing countries, military assistance is often provided by

donors mainly under the framework of development cooperation.40

Global experiences of the conflict ridden and war torn countries show

that international communities and aid agencies play leading role in

security sector reform, DDR and post conflict development. 41 Their

engagement in security sector reform has shown both positive and

negative outcomes, depending upon the degree of involvement


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(facilitation to dictation and promotion to control of the process). The

dominance of donors and aid agencies in the security sector

restructuring, police and military reform, post conflict development

and reconstruction is shaped by their financial support and associated

technical assistance.

In the case of Nepal, we need donors' support but not control over

the transformation process and imposition on the restrictive conditions

to facilitate home-grown security sector transformation process,

assisting in national capability building and providing required financial

resources.

7 Challenges and Opportunities for Military Restructuring

Challenges:

Old mindset of key actors (both security and political),

Vested interests of certain domestic groups/individuals,

Unwanted international influence,

Managing smooth transition

Proper reintegration of security forces including PLA into society

Unanticipated or unintended consequences and risks;

preparedness to deal with these uncertainties,

Others

Opportunities:

Peoples aspiration and pressure to decision makers from general

public,

Commitment made in the interim government and Comprehensive

Peace Accord,

Realization by Nepal Army for the need of change,

Commitment from political parties including Maoists,

Others.

Endnotes

1 This paper is based on the work partially supported by NCCR North

South.

2 Conflict transformation refers to outcome-, process- and structure-

orientated long-term peace building efforts shaped by new forms of

relation, which aim to truly overcome revealed forms of direct,



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cultural and structural violence.

3 OECD, Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good

Practice, http://www. oecd.org/dac/conflict, 19 May 2004 as cited

in Kumar and Sharma, Security Sector Reform in Nepal: Challenges

and Opportunities. Kathmandu: Friends for Peace, 2005

4 O. Greene, "Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and

Regional Perspectives," Journal of Security Sector Management,

Vo.1, No. 1, 2003, PP. 1-15

5 A. Schnabel and H-G Ehrhart (eds.), Security Sector Reform and

Post Conflict Peace Building, New York, Tokyo and Paris: United

Nations University Press, 2005

6 B.R. Upreti,Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal: The Maoist

Insurgency, Past Negotiation and Opportunities for Conflict

Transformation. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2006; op. cit. 3;

DFID, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform,

London: Department for International Development, 2002

7 David Baldwin, The Concept of Security,Review of International

Studies , Vol. 23,1997; N. Ball, Enhancing Security Sector

Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP, www. undp.

org/bcpr/jssr/docs/UNDP_ SSR_ Concept_Paper_9 October, 2002;

A. Aditya, B.R. Upreti and P.K. Adhikari , Countries in Conflict

and Processing of Peace: Lessons for Nepal, Kathmandu: Friends

for Peace, 2006; DFID, Security Sector Reform Policy Brief, January

2003; A. Ebo, "The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector

Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia," Geneva Centre for the Democratic

Control of Armed Force, Occasional Paper, No. 9, 2005

8 The relationship between security sector and development has been

extensively discussed by the report of the Club of Rome in early

1970s (Meadows et al., 1972),Brandt Commission (1980) and Olaf

Palme Commission (1982).

9 Ibid

10 S. M Walt, The Renaissance of Security Studies, International

Studies Quarterly, June 1991


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11 Op.cit., Upreti, 2006; B. R. Upreti, The Price of Neglect: From

Resource Conflict to Maoist Insurgency in the Himalayan Kingdom,

Kathmandu: Bhrikuti Academic Publications

12 D. Kumar and H. Sharma, Security Sector Reform in Nepal:

Challenges and Opportunities, Kathmandu: Friends for Peace, 2005;

B.R. Upreti, "Security Sector Reform: A Neglected Agenda," The

Kathmandu Post, 9 May 2003, A. Aditya, B.R. Upreti, and P. K.

Adhikari, Countries in Conflict and Processing of Peace: Lessons

for Nepal, Kathmandu: Friends for Peace, 200613 The details of the Maoist insurgency is covered in the three books

of the author entitled 1)Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal:

The Maoist Insurgency, Past Negotiation and Opportunities for

Conflict Transformation, 2006, New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. 2)

Nepal ma Maobadi Sasastra Danda: Karan, Ashar Ra Amadhanka

Prayashhru (Armed Maoist Conflict in Nepal: Causes, Consequences

and Efforts for Resolution), Kathmandu: Bhrukati Academic

Publications. 2005; and 3) The Price of Neglect: From Resource

Conflict to Maoist Insurgency in the Himalayan Kingdom ,

Kathmandu: Bhrikuti Academic Publications, 2004.

14 ICG, 2006a; op.cit., Upreti, 2006

15 The Alliance is composed of the Communist Party of Nepal, Unified

Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), Nepali Congress (NC), Nepali

Congress-Democratic (NCP-D), Nepal Sadbhawana Party

(Anandidevi), Nepal Peasants and Workers Party, United Left

Front and Samukta Janamorcha.

16 Op. cit., OECD

17 M. Chalmers, Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: an

EUPperspective, Joint report published by Saferworld and the

Conflict Prevention Network, http://www.saferworld.co.uk/pubsecu.htm, 2000

18 N. Ball, Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual

Framework for UNDP, www. undp. org/bcpr/jssr/docs/UNDP_

SSR_ Concept_Paper_9 October, 2002

19 Op. cit., Kumar and Sharma



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20 Brandt Commission,North-South: A Programme for Survival,

Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1980

21 O. Palme, Common Security: A Blue Print for Survival, New York:

Simon and Schuster, 1982

22 Ibid

23 See Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory

and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, London: The Belknap Press

of Harvard University Press for the detail about the conceptual basisof civil military relations, 1957

24 Information obtained from Army Command and Staff College on

19 January 2007.

25 The Government of Nepal decided to use police instead of Nepal

Army for the security of palace after the historic declaration of the

Parliament on 18 May 2006.

26 Dhruba Kumar and Hari Sharma (op.cit., 12) wrote, The army

believes the popular forces as being intrusive to the political landscape

of the country causing instabilities and discords, hence threat to the

status quo that has preserved peace, independence and sovereignintegrity of the state. For them the symbol of national unity and

stability remain the institution of monarchy. Such a perception on

monarchy is nowhere reflected more poignantly than in the keynote

speech of the incumbent Chief of Army Staff Pyar Jung Thapa to

the graduate officer cadets at the 11th convocation of the Command

and Staff College of the Royal Nepal Army on May 14, 2004.

According to him, The Crown is the symbol of our identity and

the kingship is the progenitor and guardian of the Royal Nepal Army

along with the unalterable symbol of Nepali nationalism and national

unity. The faith, devotion and the trust of the people towards the

Crown have remained the essence of Nepali nationalism since time

immemorial. All Nepalis should therefore be united to work towards

preserving the symbol of our identity along with the fundamentals

of our national interests (COAS 2004, Sri Sam. Pra. Se. Pa. Jyu

bata Si.Sam. 11 Kamand Tatha Estaf Talimko Dichayanta

Samarohama Dinu Hune Sambodhan, (The Statement prepared for

the Rt. Honble Chief of Army Staff to be delivered at the 11 th


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Command and Staff Convocation Ceremony of the Military

Academy, May 14).The motto of the army has been Rajbhakti,

Hamro Shakti, i.e. the loyalty to the king is the power of the

army. Monarchy as integral to the integrity of the state has thus

become the acquired value, which should be the primacy of national

security and political stability. Therefore, the army has always been

cautious about identifying itself with the democratic government

rather than monarchy.

27

International Crisis Group (ICG) is globally perceived as one of themost credible international organizations in producing conflict

analysis report. It has produced a series of report about Nepal after

2003. These reports are: 1) Nepal: From People Power to Peace?,

Asia Report N115, 10 May 2006; 2) Nepals Crisis: Mobilizing

International Influence, Asia Briefing N49, 19 April 2006, 3) Nepal:

Electing Chaos, Asia Report N111, 31 January 2006; 3) Nepals

New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and The Maoists, Asia Report

N106, 28 November 2005; 4) Nepals Maoists: Their Aims,

Structure and Strategy, Asia Report Briefing N104, 27 October

2005; 5) Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia Briefing N41,

15 September 2005; 6) Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: TheConstitutional Issues, Asia Report N99, 15 June 2005; 7) Nepal:

Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N94, 24 March

2005; 8) Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing N36,

24 February 2005; 9) Nepals Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation

Worse, Asia Report N91, 9 February 2005; 10) Nepal: Dangerous

Plans for Village Militias, Asia Briefing, 17 February 2004 11)

Nepal: Back to the Gun, Asia Briefing, 22 October 2003; 12) Nepal:

Obstacles to Peace, Asia Report N57, 17 June 2003; 13) Nepal

Backgrounder: Ceasefire Soft Landing or Strategic Pause?, Asia

Report N50, 10 April 2003.

28

Reports of local media and human rights organizations from February2005 to April 2006 widely documented the controversy during the

direct rule of the country. They argue that king would not be able to

conduct coup if army was not involved.

29 The international missions visiting Nepal (for example, US Senators,

EU Troika mission, ICJ mission, Amnesty International mission



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and many others) and organizations closely watching Nepals political

crisis after the royal takeover expressed their deep concerns about

the deteriorated situation because of the coup and autocratic rule.

30 See ICG reports: 1) Nepals Crisis: Mobilizing International

Influence, Asia Briefing N49, 19 April 2006, 3) Nepal: Electing

Chaos, Asia Report N111, 31 January 2006; 3) Nepals New

Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and The Maoists, Asia Report

N106, 28 November 2005; 4) Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia

Briefing N41, 15 September 2005; 5) Towards a Lasting Peace inNepal: The Constitutional Issues, Asia Report N99, 15 June 2005;

6) Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N94,

24 March 2005; 7) Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia

Briefing N36, 24 February 2005; 8) Nepals Royal Coup: Making

a Bad Situation Worse, Asia Report N91, 9 February 2005; for

detail.

31 ICG Report No 36, Feb 2005

32 SeeNepal Samacharpatra Daily, 23 January 2007 for detail.

33 The figure obtained from the Army Command and staff Colleague

on 19 January 2007. If we see the castewise distribution of 91444people working in the Nepal Army, 8901 are Brahmin, 37764

Chhetri, Thakuri 3706,Janajatis 22000,Madeshi 5122,Newar5821,

Dalit5655,Muslim 13 and 2462. In terms of gender disaggregating,

1025 are women and remaining are men.

34 Prachanda, chairman of the CPN (Maoist) appeared in public after

the first summit meeting between the Seven-Party Alliance and the

Maoists at the Prime Ministers official residence at Baluwatar in

Kathmandu on Friday, June 16, 2006 and first time publicly express

about the size of Nepal army and since then various leaders have

repeated the same.

35 C. Gleichmann, Odenwald, K. M. Steenken and A. Wilkinson,

Disarmament,Demobilization and Reintegration: A Practical Field

and Classroom Guide. Swedish National Defense College, Pearson

Peacekeeling Centre, German Technical Cooperation and The

Norwegian International Defense Centre, 2004


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91

36 Ibid

37 Ibid

38 UN Security Council passed a resolution on 23 January 2007 to

operate UN Mission in Nepal for a year where more than 186 arms

monitors and around 600 persons in total will work in different part

of the country.

39 M. Brzoska,Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector

Reform, Occasional Paper No. 4, Geneva: Geneva Centre for theDemocratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), November, 2003;

N. Ball, Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual

Framework for UNDP, www. undp. org/bcpr/jssr/docs/UNDP_

SSR_ Concept_Paper_9 October, 2002

40 Op. cit., Schnabel and Ehrhart

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restructuring nepal army

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