The Responsibility to Protect*

MATT DEUTSCHER

Canadian High Commission, London W1K 4AB

The decision whether, if ever, to intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state withmilitary force has become a critical issue of the post Cold War era. In 2000 theCanadian government launched the International Commission on Intervention andState Sovereignty (ICISS), which in 2001 published its findings in The Responsibilityto Protect. The Commission found broad support for the notion of sovereignty notonly as a right, but also a responsibility, the responsibility of a state to provideprotection for its people. The primary responsibility for protecting citizens rests withstates. But when states are unable or unwilling to provide this protection, or arethemselves the perpetrators of atrocities, the Commission argues that theinternational community has a responsibility temporarily to step in, forcefully ifnecessary. The Commission resisted the temptation to identify human rightsviolations falling short of outright killing or ethnic cleansing. This eliminates thepossibility of intervening on the basis of systematic oppression of human rights orintervening to remove a military dictatorship. The intention of the report was toprovoke debate; to strengthen the role of the United Nations and ensure that suchinterventions were multilateral and meeting the wider needs of a region and not theinterests of major powers. There is an ongoing need to ensure that the SecurityCouncil is effective and that resources match the political will. These debates mustcontinue within a UN framework.

KEYWORDS Canada Human rights Military interventionResponsibility to Protect State sovereignty United Nations

The Responsibility to Protect is about the ‘right of humanitarianintervention’ – the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states totake military action against another state for the purpose of protectingpeople at risk. Historically, this issue became alive with the end of the ColdWar, when the international community was faced with humanitariantragedies and loss of civilian life in failed states and internal conflicts inSomalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo. The responses by the internationalcommunity to these were inconsistent, controversial, inadequate oraltogether lacking.

In the case of Rwanda, the UN Security Council actually reduced thetroops available to General Dallaire, the Canadian Force Commander, inthe middle of a genocide; and then played war games to avoid triggering the

*Based on a presentation to Medact’s AGM and Conference, London, 8 May 2004.

MEDICINE, CONFLICT AND SURVIVAL, VOL. 21, NO. 1, 28 – 34 (2005)ISSN 1362-3699 print/1743-9396 onlineDOI: 10.1080/1362369042000315041 # 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

1948 Genocide Convention and its obligation to prevent or stop genocide.1

The international community remained ineffective during the tragic war ofBosnia 1992–95, helpless to prevent the deaths of over 100,000 Bosnians.This included the tragic killing of over 6,000 Muslim men in the UN safehaven of Srebrenica.2 With these events, it became clear that theinternational community needed to act when faced with an occurring orinevitable humanitarian tragedy.

The issue came to a head in 1999 with the NATO intervention in Kosovo.That autumn UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched a debate in theGeneral Assembly when he challenged the UN membership to reachconsensus on reconciling state sovereignty with the imperative of upholdinghuman rights and humanitarian norms. In particular he asked how theUnited Nations should respond to human rights and humanitarian crises andthe specific means it should employ.

A year later, in his report to the Millennium Assembly, he framed theissue as follows:

Few would disagree that both the defence of humanity and the defence ofsovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell uswhich principle should prevail when they are in conflict. HumanitarianIntervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty and notsusceptible to easy answers. But surely no legal principle – not evensovereignty – can ever shield crimes against humanity.3

It was in direct response to this challenge that Canada, under theleadership of then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, launched theInternational Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).4

The Commission was comprised of distinguished practitioners of interna-tional relations, drawn from every region of the world and from manydisciplines. Northern and Southern perspectives were even reflected in thechoice of co-chairs: Gareth Evans (former Australian foreign minister) fromthe ‘North’ and Mohamed Sahnoun (former Algerian diplomat and SpecialRepresentative and Adviser of the UN Secretary-General) from the ‘South’.The ICISS was given a one-year mandate to promote comprehensive debateand to foster global political consensus on how to move from paralysistowards international action, particularly through the UN.

The built-in diversity of the Commission and the extent and inclusivenessof its consultation makes the consensus it reached on its report, TheResponsibility to Protect,5 all the more remarkable and compelling. All 12members endorsed it; there was no minority opinion. Canada presented thereport to Secretary-General Annan in December 2001.

So what is so important about the findings of the ICISS? Why do we feelthat it has broken new ground for establishing the principles ofhumanitarian intervention? For Canada, the way the Commission re-framed the debate is of fundamental importance. The issue was re-cast not

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as an argument about the ‘right to intervene’ but about the ‘responsibility toprotect’. In doing so, it shifted the focus onto the needs of people at risk,rather than the interests of the interveners. The Commission also foundbroad support for the notion of sovereignty not only as a right but also as aresponsibility, the responsibility of a state to provide protection for itspeople. This reflects an expansion of the definition of sovereignty, fromcontrol to responsibility.

The primary responsibility for protecting citizens rests with states. Butwhen states are unable or unwilling to provide this protection, or arethemselves the perpetrators of atrocities, the Commission argues that theinternational community has a responsibility temporarily to step in,forcefully if necessary.

It should be stressed that the responsibility to protect remains a pro-sovereignty doctrine. Strong, effective and accountable states are best ableto protect their own people. But where weak or failed states cannot or willnot act, the responsibility to protect devolves to the internationalcommunity, temporarily.

Importantly, the Commission defined responsibility to protect as havingthree dimensions: prevention, reaction and rebuilding. While assigning veryhigh priority to prevention efforts, as indeed the UN itself is trying to do,the Commission’s mandate was to study the harder edge of intervention, toconsider under what circumstances it is warranted, under whose authority itshould be conducted, and the modalities for its execution.

This is not to demean the value of prevention and re-building, whichcannot be under-estimated. However, the ICISS mandate was to discuss theprinciple of Reaction or Military Intervention – the area that is mostdifficult to arrive at consensus.

Military Intervention

On military intervention, the Commission summarised the relevantdecision-making criteria into six headings: just cause, right intention, lastresort, proportional means, reasonable prospects and the right authority.The Just Cause Threshold argues that there are grounds that warrantintervention irrespective of state sovereignty. This includes genocide andlarge scale ethnic cleansing, whether actual or imminent.

The Commission resisted the temptation to identify human rightsviolations falling short of outright killing or ethnic cleansing. Thiseliminates the possibility of intervening on the basis of systematicoppression of human rights or intervening to remove a military dictatorship.

It is important to note that the report clearly states that military actioncan be legitimate as an anticipatory measure in response to clear evidence oflikely large-scale killing. Without this possibility of anticipatory action, theinternational community would be placed in the morally untenable positionof being required to wait for genocide to begin before acting. For these

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reasons, the report did not reach conclusions on numbers of deaths, but thetrigger to protect is understood to be real or potential killings anddestruction on a mass scale (that is, thousands, not hundreds).

The second criterion is the Right Intention. This stipulates that theprimary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert humansuffering. To ensure that this criterion is satisfied, military intervention isbest done on a collective or multilateral basis and supported by the peoplefor whose benefit it is intended. The opinion of other countries in the regionshould be taken into account and should be supportive.

Thirdly, a military intervention must be the Last Resort, as militaryintervention can only be justified when every non-military option for theprevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, withreasonable grounds for believing that lesser measures would not succeed.The responsibility to react with military force can be justified only when theresponsibility to prevent has been fully discharged.

The fourth principle, Proportional Means, calls for the scale, duration andintensity of the planned military intervention to be the minimum necessaryto secure the defined objective of protecting people. The scale of actiontaken must be commensurate with its stated purpose and with themagnitude of the original provocation. It should not, for example, includeregime change as an objective, though that may be a collateral result.

The report also describes the highly pragmatic Reasonable Prospectsprinciple. This means there must be a reasonable chance of success in haltingor averting the suffering that has justified the intervention. The con-sequences of action should not be worse than the consequences of inaction.Military action must not risk triggering a wider conflict. As a practicalmatter, according to this principle, action against a major power, includingany one of the permanent members of the Security Council, would be ruledout.

The Question of Authorisation

What about the question of authorisation? The Responsibility to Protect isclear: the primary authority for authorising military action for humanprotection purposes is the Security Council.5 The legitimacy of any suchaction will best be assured by the multilateral approval of the UN. Unilateralaction will always be seen as self-interested and suspect.

The Commission’s clear objective was not to find alternatives to theauthority of the Security Council, but to make the Council work better. Atthe same time, as Secretary-General Annan himself said in 1999:

If the collective conscience of humanity – a conscience which abhors cruelty,renounces injustice and seeks peace for all peoples – cannot find in theUnited Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will lookelsewhere for peace and justice.

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The Commission considered what might be done in the face of paralysisby the Council. Here the alternatives included working through the GeneralAssembly via the Uniting for Peace provision, as was done in severalinterventions in the 1950s and 1960s. Another alternative is recourse toregional organisations, subject to their authorisation after the fact by theSecurity Council. However, I must stress that none of these scenarios isconsidered preferable to the Security Council authorisation in the firstinstance, but they may arise out of necessity when the need for action isoverwhelming and the Council is paralysed by the veto. The Commission’sconclusion is therefore to press the Council to act, whether on its owninitiative or in response to entreaties by member states or the Secretary-General.

A key recommendation aimed at avoiding paralysis by the SecurityCouncil is to restrict the use of the veto. The Commission argues that itshould be limited to situations that engage the vital national interests of oneof the permanent members.

Political Will

Some worry about the prospect of too much intervention while othersworry about the reality of too little. The Responsibility to Protect stresses thedecisiveness of political will in reaching consensus on when to act in the faceof genocide, ethnic cleansing and other atrocities.5 As in the case of Rwandaand Bosnia, the Council’s authorisation was no guarantee for effectiveaction. Political will is needed to use the existing instruments at our disposalflexibly and creatively to meet the needs of the day. This means engaging inpreventive diplomacy, imposing sanctions or taking coercive action whenneeded.

It also means developing peace operation mandates that are suited to thesituation on the ground and have the resources to do the job. ‘Political Will’can be raised through events such as this Medact Conference. This placesthe spotlight on humanitarian interventions and enables democraticsocieties to shape national positions on and contributions to collectivemilitary action to protect civilians and the common sense demand for actionto curb atrocities. The challenge now is for us to continue to discuss thisreport, and to bring it to the attention of our politicians, so that they willhave the political will to forward The Responsibility to Protect on theinternational stage.

Canada’s Position

In the autumn of 2002, Canada introduced a draft technical resolutiontaking note of the report and locking-in further consideration of it by theGeneral Assembly of the UN. The resolution encountered resistance froma number of member states (particularly those traditionally protective of

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sovereignty and non-interference in ‘internal affairs’ of states) whorequested more time to discuss the substance of the report before movingon a resolution. While the resolution has not been withdrawn, noimmediate voting action will be taken. Instead, more time will be devotedto informal discussion of the report and its implications for the UNsystem. In support of these efforts, Canada has struck an informal ‘groupof friends of the responsibility to protect’ whose core membership isgrowing. We also plan to use the Human Security Network6 in support offollow-up efforts.

Canada’s leadership of the follow-up effort does not require that weembrace all aspects of the report, and no formal Canadian position has beentaken. Rather we view it as a vehicle for promoting international discussionand greater agreement on issues of human protection action by theinternational community, including the strengthening of new norms andpractices in this field.

Broadly, we believe The Responsibility to Protect is an importantcontribution to human security and to the continuing debate over thelegitimate use of force by the international community to protect civilians.In particular, we view it as an opportunity to strengthen the UN’sfundamental peace and security mandate and norm-building function.

What’s Next?

Clearly the responsibility to protect involves further challenges at thepolitical, normative and operational level. But the ICISS report provides ahelpful framework and roadmap to guide the decisions that will inevitablyneed to be made when conscience-shocking situations cry out for action inthe future.

I believe it is fair to say that the gulf in the protection debate hasnarrowed in recent years. Who today would question that there should havebeen action to stop the genocide in Rwanda?

Consensus is also being reached at the regional level, for example by theEconomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SouthernAfrica Development Community (SADC), on collective responsibilities andaction in their jurisdictions. The Responsibility to Protect should appeal tothose with legitimate concerns about intervention.

The report is about more, not fewer, rules to govern the use of force bythe international community. It is also about enabling the UN and theSecurity Council to do its job better and more consistently. It is a hedgeagainst unilateralism or action taken without Security Council authorisa-tion.

Canada’s goal is to build as broad and strong a consensus as possible, theconsensus that Secretary-General Annan challenged us to achieve. Canada’sgoal is also to keep the UN and its unique legitimacy at the centre of thatconsensus.

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References

1. Melvern L. Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. London: Verso, 2004.2. Rose M. Fighting for Peace. London: Harvill, 1998.3. Annan K. We the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century.

Millennium Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations. New York:United Nations, 2000. At: 5http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.-htm4 (accessed 1 Sept. 2004).

4. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). At:5 http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp4 (accessed 1 Sept.2004).

5. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsi-bility to Protect. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.

6. The Human Security Network. At: 5 http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.php4 (accessed 1 Sept. 2004).

(Accepted 4 September 2004)

Matt Deutscher is Second Secretary (Political) at the Canadian High Commission inLondon, where he is responsible for human rights, human security, theCommonwealth and NGO outreach. He was previously Desk Officer for Croatia/Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Department of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade in Ottawa.

Correspondence: Canadian High Commission, Macdonald House, 1 GrosvenorSquare, London W1K 4AB; email: 5matt.deutscher@dfait-maeci.gc.ca4 .

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