resources, race and rights: a case study of native title

Edith Cowan University Edith Cowan University

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Theses : Honours Theses

2017

Resources, race and rights: A case study of Native Title and the Resources, race and rights: A case study of Native Title and the

Adani Carmichael coal mine Adani Carmichael coal mine

Kate Arnautovic Edith Cowan University

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Resources, race and rights:

A case study of Native Title and the Adani Carmichael coal mine

This thesis is presented in partial fulfilment of the degree of

Bachelor of Arts Honours

Kate Arnautovic

School of Arts and Humanities Edith Cowan University

2017

USE OF THESIS

The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis.

KateArnautovic,2017

ii

Abstract

Thisthesisexaminestheextenttowhichstateinstitutionsandgovernment

havetakenintoaccountIndigenousrightsandinterestsduringtheapproval

processforalargeminingdevelopment.Thiscasestudyfocusesonthe

variousphasesofapprovalfortheproposedAdaniCarmichaelCoalMine,a

significantdevelopmentthathaschallengedthenativetitlesystemin

Australia.Itassessestheextenttowhichtherightsandinterestsofthe

WanganandJagalingoupeople,thetraditionalownersthatpossessanative

titleclaimovertheregion,havebeenupheldbytheNationalNativeTitle

TribunalandtheStateandFederalGovernment.Thisthesisemploysmultiple

theoreticalperspectivestoexplaintheoutcomesoftheapprovalprocess.

Whilethisstudyaimstocriticallyreviewtheexistingliterature,the

applicationoftwoliberalculturalistperspectivesandthebroaderframework

ofcriticalracetheorycontributeaddedinsightsintheareaofnativetitleand

resourcedevelopments.

KateArnautovic,2017

iii

Declaration

Icertifythatthisthesisdoesnot,tothebestofmyknowledgeand

belief:

(i) incorporatewithoutacknowledgementanymaterial

previouslysubmittedforadegreeordiplomainanyinstitution

ofhighereducation;

(ii) containanymaterialpreviouslypublishedorwrittenby

anotherpersonexceptwhereduereferenceismadeinthetext;

or

(iii) containanydefamatorymaterial.

Signed:

Date:29/5/2017

KateArnautovic,2017

iv

Acknowledgements

IwouldliketoexpressmysinceregratitudetoDrGenevieveHohnenforher

wonderfulguidanceandwarmencouragementduringthefirststagesofthis

thesis,andtoProfessorQuentinBeresfordwhoprovidedexceptional

supervisionandsupportthroughthemostchallengingstagesofthewriting

process.

Thankyoutomyparents,SueandPeter,andtomybrotherAlex–your

unconditionalsupportthroughoutmystudieshasgivenmethestrengthand

willtobeambitiousanddoeverythingwithpassionandmeaning.

KateArnautovic,2017

v

TableofContents

Abstract ............................................................................................................... ii

Declaration........................................................................................................ iii

Acknowledgements .........................................................................................iv

ListofFigures .................................................................................................. vii

Introduction........................................................................................................1MiningCompanies,theStateandIndigenousGroups............................................. 1InternationalLawandAustralia ....................................................................................... 4AustralianDomesticLaw ..................................................................................................... 7TheoreticalPerspective:AMultifacetedApproach .................................................. 9WillKymlicka:LiberalCulturalism.................................................................................. 9AllenBuchanan:CollectiveLandRights ..................................................................... 11CriticalRaceTheory ............................................................................................................ 12ResearchQuestionsandThesisStructure ................................................................. 14Methodology........................................................................................................................... 16ProblemandSignificance.................................................................................................. 17

Chapter2 ........................................................................................................... 19ResourcePolitics................................................................................................................... 19AdaniandAustralianpolitics .......................................................................................... 25

Chapter3 ........................................................................................................... 30TheFirstPhaseofNegotiations ..................................................................................... 30NegotiationBreakdown..................................................................................................... 34AnEmergingPattern........................................................................................................... 39

Chapter4 ........................................................................................................... 42TheFirstDetermination.................................................................................................... 42TheSplitintheCommunity ............................................................................................. 44AChangeofRepresentation............................................................................................. 45ARiftBetweentheApplicants ........................................................................................ 48ASenseofPracticalityorObligation............................................................................ 49

KateArnautovic,2017

vi

Chapter5 ........................................................................................................... 52BacktotheTribunal ............................................................................................................ 52ResponsetotheMedia ....................................................................................................... 53ParliamentaryOversight ................................................................................................... 56ADisputedAgreement ....................................................................................................... 58TheMcGladedecision:Anewhopeormoreuncertainty? ................................. 59

Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 62

AddedInsights:MultipleModesofAnalysis............................................................. 64

References ........................................................................................................ 66

KateArnautovic,2017

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ListofFigures

Figure1.1Adani'scontributionstopoliticalparties ..............................25

Figure2.2AdaniCarmichaelCoalMinedevelopmenttimeline ............33

KateArnautovic,2017

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Introduction

MiningCompanies,theStateandIndigenousGroups

Thisstudywillexaminetheextenttowhichstateinstitutionsandgovernment

havetakenintoaccountIndigenousrightsandinterestsduringtheapproval

processforlargeminingdevelopments.Itwillfocusonthevariousphasesof

approvalfortheAdaniCarmichaelCoalMineandassesstheextenttowhich

Indigenousrightsandinterestshavebeenupheld.TheAdaniCarmichael

Projectisasignificantdevelopmentproposalthathasgreatlychallengedand

exposedlimitationswithinAustralia’snativetitlesystem(Borschmann,2015;

Milman,2015a,2015b;Palese,2015).

TheCarmichaelCoalMinedevelopmentislocatedintheGalileeBasinin

centralQueensland.Itwillbethesecondlargestcoalmineintheworldwitha

proposedscalethatincludessixopen-cutpitsandalifetimeofupto60years

(Horn,2016).TheWanganandJagalingoupeoplepossessaregisterednative

titleclaimovertheproposedminesiteandwhilesomecommunitymembers

havesoughttonegotiatealanduseagreementwithAdani,othershave

remainedrelentlesslyopposedtotheproject(Milman,2015a;Taylor,2015;

Robertson,2015;West,2015).

Thisthesisexaminestheresponsesofstateinstitutionsandgovernmentto

Indigenousrightsandinterests.Theterms‘state’and‘government’referto

separatemechanismsofthemodernsociety.Theterm‘state’referstotheset

ofinstitutionsthatenforcetherulesofasociety,suchastheadministrative

bureaucracy,thejudicialsystemandthemilitary(Best,2002;McAuley,2003).

Stateinstitutionsareindependentofgovernment,however,thestateistasked

withinterpretingandimplementingthedecisionsofpastandpresentpolitical

leadership.Theterm‘government’referstotheelectedrepresentativesof

parliament.Whilethegovernmentcanchangewitheveryelection,institutions

ofthestateremainconstant(Best,2002).Thisstudywillexaminethe

responsesofstatejudicialbodiessuchastheNationalNativeTitleTribunal

(NNTT),theelectedgovernmentoftheStateofQueenslandandtheFederal

Government.

KateArnautovic,2017

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Australiaisaresource-drivennationandresourcecompaniesexerciseahigh

degreeofpowerinthepoliticalsphere.Thecarbonlobbyhasinfluenced

governmentdecision-makingandpublicopinion(Baer,2014;Esteban&Ray,

2006;Hodder,2009;McKnight&Hobbs,2013).Itiswidelyknownthat

resourcecompaniesmakesignificantcontributionstopoliticalparties.The

headsofmultinationalcorporationsoftenenjoyacloserelationshipwith

membersofthepublicofficeandinfluencepolicythatrelatestoresource

interests(Baer,2014;Hodder,2009).Stateinstitutionsandgovernmenthave

atendencytoprioritisedemandsintheenergyandminingsector.

InternationallawsupportstherightsofIndigenousgroupsandencourages

nationstoimplementdomesticlawsthatadheretointernationalstandards

(AustralianLawReformCommission[ALRC],2015).TheAustralian

Governmentfacesaconflictbetweenadvancingwhatisconsideredtobethe

nationalinterestorendorsinginternationalstandardsandtherightsand

interestsofIndigenouscommunities.Theprevailingnationalinterestin

resourcedevelopmentmaycompromisetheinterestsoftraditionalowners

(Altman,2009;Howlett,2010;Marsh,2013;Scambary,2013).

TheWanganandJagalingoupeoplehaveahistoryofspiritualconnectionto

thelandssurroundingthetownofClermontinCentralQueensland(NNTT,

2014).Thenames‘Wangan’and‘Jagalingou’refertodifferentIndigenous

tribalgroupsthathavehistoricallyinhabitedtheregion.Europeansettlement

onWanganandJagalingoulandbecamesustainedinthe1860sandseveral

familieswereforciblyremovedtootherareas(NNTT,2014).However,many

ofthesefamiliesremainedlivinginthetraditionalareaandmaintaineda

strongphysicalconnectiontotheland.

SomedescendantsoftheWanganandJagalingoupeoplehavebeenthevictims

ofmassacres,suchastheMistakeCreekmassacreof1857(NNTT,2014).The

groupsharesacommonknowledgeofspiritualandreligiousbeliefsand

continuesmanytraditionalwaysoflife,suchasalandholdingsystembasedon

inheritancethroughcognaticdescent.TheWanganandJagalingoupeoplehave

demonstratedaclearconnectiontothetraditionallandthatsurrounds

Clermont,andthefactualevidenceprovidedtotheNNTThasdeemedtheir

nativetitleclaimasvalidbeforetheFederalCourt(NNTT,2014).

KateArnautovic,2017

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TheWanganandJagalingoupeoplehavehadanativetitleclaimapplication

registeredwiththeNNTTsinceJuly2004(NNTT,2004;QueenslandSouth

NativeTitleServices[QSNTS],2015).Theapplicationcovers30,200square

kilometresincentralQueensland.TheFederalCourtdeterminedthatthe

grouphadacontinuingconnectiontothelandthatpre-datedEuropean

settlementintheregion(NNTT,2014).Asthereareseveraloverlappingnative

titleclaimsinvolvingotherIndigenousgroups,thefinaldeterminationofthe

WanganandJagalingouclaimhasbeendelayed.Whilethestatusoftheirclaim

remainsunresolved,thegroupstillpossessesanumberofproceduralrightsas

registeredclaimants(NNTT,2014;QSNTS,2015).Itismandatedthatthe

claimgrouparegivennotificationoffutureactsandthatnegotiationsare

conductedtoreachalegallybindingagreement(QSNTS,2015).

AdaniobtainedtheconsentoftheWanganandJagalingoupeopleinan

IndigenousLandUseAgreement(ILUA)signedinApril2016(“Adanimine,”

2016).However,theauthorisationofthisagreementwashighlycontentious

andproblematicasasignificantsectionoftheWanganandJagalingou

communitydeemedthevoteunrepresentativeandillegitimate(Robertson,

2016d,2017;WanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncil[WJFamilyCouncil],

2016).TheWanganandJagalingoupeoplebecamedividedinthecourseof

negotiations,assomecommunitymembersshareddifferentopinionsabout

thedevelopmentontheirland(Milman,2015a;Taylor,2015;Robertson,

2015,2016a,2017;West,2015).

WhileonefactionsupportedtheCarmichaelProject,providedtheILUA

includedsatisfactorytermsofagreement,theotherwasunwillingtosupport

thedevelopmentonanyterms(VanVonderen,2016;Milman,2015a;

Robertson,2015,2016c,West,2015).Thelattercampcontendedthatthe

projectwillleadtothedestructionofWanganandJagalingouancestrallands

andinsistedthat‘nomeansno’regardlessofthecompensationoffered

(Robertson,2016b,2016c;WJFamilyCouncil,2016a).Examiningtheprocess

ofdivision,wherebythesetwogroupswithinthecommunitydevelopedsuch

opposingstancesduringthephasesofapproval,isakeyfocusofthisthesis.

KateArnautovic,2017

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InternationalLawandAustralia

Therehavebeenimportantdevelopmentsoverthepast20yearstowardsthe

recognitionandprotectionofIndigenouspeoplesaroundtheglobe(Tauli-

Corpuz,2008).Indigenousissueshavebeenplacedontheinternational

humanrightsagendaandanumberofsignificanttreatieshaveestablishedthe

rightsofIndigenouspeoples.TheUnitedNations(UN)PermanentForumon

IndigenousIssueswasestablishedin2002andtheUNDeclarationonthe

RightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP)enteredintoforcein2007(Palese,

2015;Tauli-Corpuz,2008).ThesetwoIndigenousrightsdevelopmentsmark

significantmodernadvancementsforIndigenousgroupsworldwide.The

UNDRIPhasestablishedaninternationalframeworkthatcaninformdomestic

lawsdealingwiththecollectiverightsofIndigenouspeoples(ALRC,2015;

Davis,2007).TheDeclarationsetstheminimumstandardsthateverycountry

shouldabidebytofullyrecogniseandprotecttherightsofIndigenousgroups.

Whilethedocumentisnotlegallybinding,itisrecommendedthatcountries

implementitsprovisionsindomesticlawtoremainconsistentwith

internationalstandards(ALRC,2015;Davis,2007;Tauli-Corpuz,2008).

In2007,143statepartiesvotedinsupportoftheUNDRIPandfourvotedin

opposition.ThestatepartiesthatvotedagainsttheDeclarationwereAustralia,

Canada,NewZealandandtheUnitedStates(UnitedNations,2007).Among

otherconcernsraised,thesenationswereopposedtolanguageinthe

DeclarationsuggestingIndigenousgroupshadtherighttovetonational

legislationifitwaslikelytoimpacttheirrightsandinterests.Australia’sUN

delegatecontendedthatthereferencestoself-determinationwouldencourage

thesecessionofAustralia’sIndigenouspeoplesand,inturn,undermineor

completelyeradicatethedemocraticsystemofgovernanceforthose

populations(Davis,2007;UnitedNations,2007).In2009,Australiareversed

itspositionandchosetoadopttheDeclaration(ALRC,2015;Douglas,2013;

Rodgers,2009).SincetheDeclarationisnon-binding,Australia’ssupportofits

principlesplacesnoobligationonthegovernmenttomakechangesto

domesticlaw.However,countriesareencouragedtointroduceoramendlaws

sotheyfulfilltheprinciplesoftheDeclaration(Macklin,2009).

WhileAustraliahasgivendomesticeffecttoanumberofinternationaltreaties,

theprinciplesoftheUNDRIPhavebeenseldomreferencedintheHighCourt

KateArnautovic,2017

5

(ALRC,2015).ManyyearsbeforetheUNDRIPenteredintoforce,the

AustralianGovernmentpassedlegislationforitsfirstnationalsystemof

collectiveIndigenouslandrightsknownasnativetitle.WhiletheNativeTitle

Act(NTA)waslegislatedwithreferencetointernationallawatthetime,

universalhumanrightsstandardspriortotheUNDRIPdidnotaddress

collectiverightsforIndigenouspeoples(ALRC,2015).TherighttoFree,Prior

andInformedConsent(FPIC)setoutintheUNDRIPappliestoIndigenousland

rightswithrespecttodevelopment(Hanna&Vanclay,2013;Tauli-Corpuz,

2008;Rumler,2011).WhileFPICiscitednumeroustimesintheDeclaration,it

isArticle32thataddressesdevelopment:

Statesshallconsultandcooperateingoodfaithwiththeindigenous

peoplesconcernedthroughtheirownrepresentativeinstitutionsin

ordertoobtaintheirfreeandinformedconsentprior[emphasisadded]

totheapprovalofanyprojectaffectingtheirlandsorterritoriesand

otherresources,particularlyinconnectionwiththedevelopment,

utilizationorexploitationofmineral,waterorotherresources.(United

Nations,2008,p.12)

FPICmandatestheState’sresponsibilitytowithholddevelopmentuntilthe

consentofIndigenouscommunitiesisobtained(Hill,Lillywhite&Simon,

2010).Theterm‘consent’referstotheIndigenousgroup’scollectivedecision

toacceptorrejectadevelopment.Somearguethatthenotionofconsent

impliestherighttovetodevelopment(Rumler,2011).WhiletheNTAensures

therighttoconsultationandconsentforsomenativetitleholdersand

claimants,thechoicetowithholdconsentdoesnotvetodevelopment

(O’Faircheallaigh,2006).Ifconsentfailstobeobtained,theAustralian

GovernmentcanextinguishIndigenousrightstolandthroughcompulsory

acquisition(AustralianHumanRightsCommission[AHRC],2014;NNTT,

2008a).

Inmanycases,nativetitlehasbeenoverriddenwhentheStatehasdeemeda

developmenttobeinthepublicinterest.CariñoandColchester(2010)argue

thattherecognitionofFPICdoesnotpermitstatestodisregardconsentonthe

basisofnationalinterest.However,theMineralsCouncilofAustralia(MCA)

contendsthat“mineralownershipisvestedintheCrownandaccordinglythe

processofseekingconsentdoesnotconferarightofvetotoIndigenous

KateArnautovic,2017

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people”(MCA,2014,p.1).Thus,theStatehastheoverarchingrighttogrant

tenementregardlessofconsent.

WhileitremainsunclearwhetherFPICimpliestherighttovetodevelopment,

itcanbereasonablyacceptedthatIndigenouspeopleshavetherightto

withholdconsentifastateisalignedwiththeprinciplesofFPIC(Cariño&

Colchester,2010;Collins,Ali,Lawson&Young,2016;Portalewska,2012;

Smyth,2016).AsCariñoandColchester(2010)assert,“internationallawis

explicitthatindigenousandtribalpeoplesenjoytherighttogiveorto

withholdtheirFPICtoactivitiesorpolicieswhichmayaffectthem”(p.430).

Therefore,whenconsentiswithheld,theStateisresponsibleforthedecision

toprotectornegatetherightsandinterestsofitsIndigenouspeoples.

WhiletheAustralianGovernmentmaywieldthepowertoextinguish

Indigenouslandrightsinordertopavethewayfordevelopment,traditional

ownerscanstillrefusetosignanagreementandtherebywithholdtheir

consent.Thenotionthatconsentisfreeofcoercionmeansitcannotbeforced

ormandatedunderanyproceduralconditions(Portalewska,2012;Officeof

theUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights[OHCHR],2013).

Governmentsmustthereforemakeadecisiontorespecttheinterestsof

traditionalownersorgrantminingtenementwithoutconsent.Thelatter

decisionmaycausegovernmentstobecriticisedasindifferentorinsensitive

toIndigenousinterestsandmayaffectthegrantee’ssociallicensetooperate

(O’Faircheallaigh,2011;Scambary,2013).

ThenativetitlesysteminAustraliaislargelybasedontheassumptionthat

consentwillbeobtained,asnegotiationsbetweenthegovernment,themining

interestandIndigenousgroupmustbeconductedin‘goodfaith’ofreachingan

agreement.Thescenariowhereanativetitleholderorclaimantrefusesto

consenttoanyagreementappearstobeanon-optioninAustralianlaw

(Marsh,2013).

TheAHRCpublishedareviewmeasuringtherightsaffordedtoIndigenous

peoplesintheNTAagainsttheprinciplesoftheUNDRIP.Thereview

concluded:

WhiletheNativeTitleActprovidesaprocesstorecognisenativetitle

rightsandinterestsinthetraditionallands,territoriesandresources

KateArnautovic,2017

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forAboriginalandTorresStraitIslanderpeoples,agapexistsbetween

therealisationoftheserightsandinterestsandthoserightsaffirmed

intheDeclaration.(AHRC,2014,p.9)

WhencomparedwiththeprinciplesoftheUNDRIP,Indigenouslandrightsin

Australiafailtosatisfyinternationalstandards.Theprotectionofhuman

rightsinAustraliawasassessedinthe2012UniversalPeriodicReview.The

reviewcriticisedAustraliaforitsslowdomesticimplementationofthe

UNDRIP(AHRC,2012).Itcanbeconcludedthatnativetitle,asthedomestic

equivalentofIndigenouslandrightsandFPIC,doesnotsatisfythemostrecent

requirementsofIndigenousrightsininternationallaw.

AustralianDomesticLaw

Australia’snativetitlesystemenablesIndigenousgroupstobegrantedland

rightsthroughanapplicationprocess.TherecognitionofIndigenousland

rightsoverturnedthenotionofterranulliusandaimedtorestoreadegreeof

self-determinationandsovereignownershiptothenation’sfirstpeoples.

Colonialistsdeemednativelandasterranullius,aLatinphrasemeaning

‘nobody’sland’(Poynton,1994;Short,2007).TheHighCourt’scontroversial

Mabodecisionin1992abolishedthemythofterranulliusandtheexistenceof

Indigenouscustomarylandwasnationallyrecognised(Finn,2012;Moreton-

Robinson,1998;Poynton,1994;Short,2007).

TheMabocasebeganwithaTorresStraitIslandermanwhochallengedthe

lawsgoverninglandownership.Duringthe1980s,EddieKolikoMabotookthe

StateofQueenslandtocourtinanattempttoclaimtraditionalownershipof

MurrayIsland(Hill,1995).WhentheHighCourtruledinfavourofMabo,the

formerPrimeMinisterPaulKeatingintroducedlegislationtoestablisha

nationalsystemforIndigenouslandrights(Poynton,1994).TheNativeTitle

Act1993wasthefirstpieceoflegislationthataimedtorectifythe

dispossessionofIndigenousland.Intheyearsthatfolloweditsenactment,

subsequentamendmentstotheNTAdiminishedtherightsattributedtonative

titlegroups(Behrendt&Strelein,2001;O’Faircheallaigh,2006;Ritter,2009).

In1996,theHighCourtmadeasecondlandmarkdecisionforIndigenousland

rights.TheWikdecisionruledthatpastoralleasesdidnotnecessarily

KateArnautovic,2017

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extinguishnativetitle(Short,2007;Strelein,2009).TheWikpeople,a

collectiveofdifferentIndigenousgroups,tooktheStateofQueenslandtocourt

inordertohavetheirnativetitleclaimrecogniseddespitetwooverlapping

pastoralleases.ThedeterminationhandeddowninfavouroftheWikpeople

createduncertaintyforpastoralistsacrossthenation,aspastoralleases

comprised42percentofCrownland(Stevenson,1997;Strelein,2009).In

response,theHowardGovernmentlegislatedtheNativeTitleAmendmentAct

1998.TheamendmentstotheNTAdiminishedtherightsofIndigenous

claimants,rulingoutthecoexistenceofnativetitleandpastoralleasesand

increasingtherequirementstoproveconnection(Finn,2012;Smith&

Morphy,2007;Strelein,2009;Tehan,2003).

IncomparisontotheNTAlegislatedundertheKeatingGovernment,the1998

amendmentsconsiderablyweakenedIndigenouslandrights(Behrendt&

Strelein,2001;Ritter,2009).TheAboriginalandTorresStraitIslanderSocial

JusticeCommissioner’s2008annualreviewofthenativetitlesystemfound

thattheNTAhadfailedtodeliverjusticeformostnativetitlegroups(Marsh,

2013).

Nativetitleclaimsarerequiredtopassanumberofstagestobecomefully

recognised.TheFederalCourtmakesthefinaldeterminationbasedonthe

proofofconnection.However,itcantakeanumberofyearsforanativetitle

applicationtoreachthisstage(NNTT,2009a).Beforetheapplicationreaches

theFederalCourt,theNNTTassesseswhethertheapplicationmeetsthe

requirementstobecomeregistered.Registerednativetitleapplicantspossess

anumberofproceduralrights.Theproceduralrightsgiventotheapplicants

dependontheconditionsoftheproposeddevelopment.Ifadevelopmentis

deemedunlikelytoaffecttheclaimarea,theapplicantsmayonlypossessthe

righttobenotifiedortolodgeanobjection(QSNTS,2017;NTSCORP,2017).

However,ifadevelopmentislikelytoinfringenativetitlerights,therightto

negotiate(RTN)mayensue.Thisproceduralrightrequiresthegranteeparty

toconductnegotiationswiththenativetitleapplicantstoestablishalegally

bindingagreement(NNTT,2016,2017c;NTSCORP,2017).

ThenegotiationphasesexaminedinthisthesisinvolvetheRTN.The

CarmichaelCoalMinehasbeendeemedasignificantdevelopmentthatwill

impacttheareaoftheWanganandJagalingouclaim.Asthisclaimisregistered

KateArnautovic,2017

9

withtheNNTT,negotiationsbetweenAdaniandtheclaimgroupare

mandatedundertheprovisionsoftheNTA.

TheoreticalPerspective:AMultifacetedApproach

Anumberoftheoreticalperspectiveswillbeemployedtoexplainthe

outcomesofthisthesis.Thecomplexityofthisspecificcasewarrantsmultiple

modestoprovideinsightintotheoutcomesofthisstudy.

Thefollowingtheorieswillbesummarisedinthissection:

• WillKymlicka’sliberalculturalisttheoryofminorityrights

• AllenBuchanan’sessayoncollectivelandrights

• CriticalRaceTheory(CRT)

WillKymlicka:LiberalCulturalism

WillKymlicka’stheoreticalperspectiveinhisbookMulticulturalCitizenship

(1995),situatesmulticulturalismwithinaliberalframework.Hearguesthat

collectiverightsforminoritiesarejustifiedinliberal-democraticsocietiesto

preserveandprotectculturaltraditionsandpractices(Kymlicka,1995).

Kymlicka’stheoryofminorityrightspostulatesthatliberalprinciples

inherentlyjustifycollectiverightsforthesegroups(Kymlicka,1995).Thereis

nowaconsensusamongliberaltheoriststhatcollectiverightsforminorities

areconsistentwithliberalprinciples.Liberalswhosupportthisargumentare

classifiedas‘liberalculturalists’.Itisthemoralgrounds,orjustification,for

minorityrightsthatremainscontestedamongliberalculturalists(Kymlicka,

2001).

Kymlickajustifiescollectiverightsonthebasisofculturalmembershipandits

capacitytodeliverthebasicliberalprinciplesofindividualfreedomand

autonomy.Hearguesthatindividualfreedom,whichiscentraltoliberalism,is

intrinsicallylinkedtoculture(Kymlicka,1995,2001).Toexplainthis

connection,Kymlickadescribestheexistenceofsocietalcultures.‘Societal

cultures’describesasocietythatisterritoriallyconcentrated,hascommon

economic,politicalandeducationalinstitutions,asharedhistoryanda

KateArnautovic,2017

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standardisedlanguage(Kymlicka,1995,2001).Gainingmembershiptoa

societalcultureallowsanindividualtohaveaccessto“meaningfulwaysoflife

acrossthefullrangeofhumanactivities”(Kymlicka,1995,p.76).Ifan

individualleavesitssocietalcultureandjoinsanewsocietalculture,theywill

beconfrontedwithadifferentsetofcommoninstitutions,adifferentcommon

languageanddifferent‘culturallysignificant’waysoflife.

ThelinkbetweenliberalismandculturalmembershipinKymlicka’stheory

emergesfromthefreedomofchoice,whichisfundamentaltoliberaltheory.In

liberalsocieties,theindividualisfreetochooseandrevisetheirown

conceptionofthegoodlife(Kymlicka,1995).‘Thegoodlife’representsan

individual’sownperceptionofafulfillinglife,asshapedbytheoptionsmade

availabletothem.Associetalculturesprovidemeaningfuloptionsfortheir

members,intermsofthevariouswaystheycanleadtheirlives,itbecomesan

inherentrightforindividualstobegrantedmembershipinasocietalculture

toobtainthefreedomofchoice(Kymlicka,1995).Membersofasocietal

cultureattachvaluetotheoptionsavailabletothemandfromwithinthis

contextdecideontheircurrentconceptionofthegoodlife.Thus,without

accesstoasocietalculture,individualsaredeprivedoftheirrighttothe

freedomofchoice.Theabilitytochoosetheirconceptionofthegoodlife

becomessignificantlydiminishedwhenculturalmembershipfailstobe

obtained(Kymlicka,1995).

Individualswhodonotobtainculturalmembershiptoasocietalcultureare

morelikelytobecomemarginalisedwithinthatsociety.AsKymlickaargues,

“ifacultureisdecayingordiscriminatedagainst,‘theoptionsand

opportunitiesopentoitsmemberswillshrink,becomelessattractive,and

theirpursuit[ofthegoodlife]lesslikelytobesuccessful’.”(Margaret&Raz

citedinKymlicka,1995,p.89).Culturalmembershipisthereforefundamental

toindividualfreedom.ThisconnectionframesKymlicka’sinitialargumentfor

collectiverightsinliberalsocieties.

Kymlicka’ssecondjustificationforcollectiverightsisbasedontheliberal

principleofequality.Kymlickaperceivesminoritygroupsasthebearersofan

inherentandunchoseninequalityduetothemajoritariannatureofsocieties

(Kymlicka,1995).Liberaltheorysupportsthenotionthatallcitizensdeserve

tohaveequalrights.Intraditionalliberaltheory,thismeansindividualrights

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shouldbeequallydisseminatedamongallmembersofasociety,regardlessof

ethnicityorrace(Kymlicka,1995,2001).However,Kymlickahighlightsthat

individualrightsalonedonotensureequalitybutratherperpetuate

inequality.Whatmaintainsthisinequalityisthetendencyforliberal

democraciestomakedecisionsthatappealtotheneedsanddesiresofthe

majority(Kymlicka,1995).

ForIndigenousgroupslivingwithinalargersocietalculture,decisionsthat

favourthemajoritycanthreatenthesurvivaloftheirownpre-existingsocietal

culture(Kymlicka,1995,2001).Inabsenceofcollectiverightstoprotect

Indigenoustraditions,membersofthisgrouprisklosingtheircultural

membership.Asculturalmembershipisrequiredtoensureindividual

freedomandautonomy,Indigenouspeoplesufferadeepinequalitydueto

majoritariandecisions(Kymlicka,1995,2001).Kymlicka’stheorycreatesa

mandateforliberaldemocraciestoaccommodatecollectiverightsinorderto

satisfytheliberalprinciplesofindividualfreedomandequality.

AllenBuchanan:CollectiveLandRights

AllenBuchanan’stheoryoncollectivelandrightsforIndigenousgroupsrelies

lessontheprinciplesofliberalismtoadvocatefortheserights.Buchananin

hisessay,TheRoleofCollectiveRightsintheTheoryofIndigenousPeoples’

Rights(1993),distinguishestwotypesofcollectivelandrightsthatlimitthe

powerofthestateandgovernmenttovaryingdegrees.Thefirstiscollective

propertyrights,whichprovidethesamefunctionasindividualtitlebutwith

collectiveownership.Thesecondiscollectivelandregulatoryrights,which

embodyagreatercapacitytocontrolresourcesanddevelopment.Thelatter

threatenstheauthorityofthestateandgovernment,astheright-holderhas

thepowertoregulatetheuseoftheland(Buchanan,1993).TheAustralian

nativetitlesystemresemblestheformer,asthegovernmenthastheauthority

toproceedwithdevelopmentwithouttheconsentofIndigenousgroupsonthe

groundsofpublicinterest.

Buchanancontendsthatthereisaneedtoadoptcollectiverightsfor

Indigenousgroups,astherightsattributedsolelytoindividualsintheUnited

NationsDeclarationofHumanRightsfailtorecognisepeopleofadistinctly

KateArnautovic,2017

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differenthistoryandculture(Buchanan,1993).TheDeclarationtreatsall

individualsasequalrights-holders.However,Buchananarguesthatthe

historyandcultureofdistinctgroupssuchasIndigenouspeopleswarrants

collectiverightstoprotectpre-existingwaysoflife.

BuchananpredominatelyjustifiescollectivelandrightsforIndigenousgroups

onthreegrounds.Collectivelandrightscanbejustifiedastheinitialstepto

reconcilehistoricalinjustice;arestorationofthecollectivepropertysystem

thatexistedpriortocolonialism;andameanstoensurethesurvivalofan

Indigenousculture(Buchanan,1993).Thesejustificationshaveastrongfocus

onreconciliationwithIndigenousgroupsthathaveexperienceddispossession

ofland.HisessayexploressomeofthemotivationsbehindIndigenous

demandsforcollectivelandrights.Amajorfactoristhedesiretohavepre-

existingmethodsoflandownershippriortotheadventofcolonialism

returnedintopractice.

Buchanandoesmakeanadditionaljustificationbasedontheimportanceof

culturalmembership.Ascultureprovidesmeaningfuloptionstoindividuals,

thepreservationofcultureensuresthatculturalmembershipismaintained

(Buchanan,1993).ThisfinalpremiseoverlapswithKymlicka’sjustificationfor

collectiverightswithintheliberalprinciplesoffreedomandautonomy,for

whichculturalmembershipisacentralcomponent.

WhileKymlickaandBuchanan’stheoriesdoprovidesomesimilarmoral

groundsforcollectiverights,thepredominantjustificationsinboththeories

largelydiffer.Kymlickaseeksjustificationwithintheprinciplesofliberalism

whereasBuchananbaseshisreasoningontherectificationofpastinjustice

andreconciliation.However,boththeoriescanbeattributedtothebroader

frameworkofliberalculturalism.

CriticalRaceTheory

Criticalracetheory(CRT)isasubsetofcriticaltheorythatexaminestherole

ofrace,racismandpowerinsociety.CRTviewsraceasaninfluentialfactorin

theoutcomeoflegalcases(Bell,1995;Darity,2007).Initsinitialyears,the

movementcriticisedthelegalsystemintheUnitedStatesforreinforcing

racismandinequality.However,thisperspectivehasexpandedtoexaminethe

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roleofraceinotherdisciplinessuchaspoliticalscienceandeducation.Critical

racetheoristsviewracismasaconstructthatisengrainedinthesocialfabric

ofWesterncapitalistsocieties(Delgado&Stefancic,2012).

Despitethepresenceoflawsthataimtocounterdiscriminationandinequality

suchasaffirmativeactionregimes,subtleformsofracismremainembedded

instateinstitutions(Delgado&Stefancic,2012;Hutchinson,2004).Critical

racetheoristssharethebeliefthatraceisacommonandordinaryoccurrence.

Itisaphenomenonthatisnormalisedandembeddedintoeverydaylife,which

oftenmakesitdifficulttodetectforthoselivinginthemajority(Delgado&

Stefancic,2012;Gillborn,2005).Whileexplicitformsofracismsuchas

denyingtherighttovotehavebeencurtailedwithmodernanti-discrimination

laws,CRTcontendsthatbusiness-as-usualracismremainsdeeplyprevalentin

society.Thisformofracismisinstitutionalisedandensuresthatpower

remainsinthehandsofthedominantwhiteclass(Bracey,2015;Delgado&

Stefancic,2012;Gillborn,2005).

CRTcontendsthatstateinstitutionsandgovernmentconsciouslyand

unconsciouslyensurethatwhitepeoplecontinuetodominatepositionsof

powerandmaintaincontrolovermaterialresources(Delgado&Stefancic,

2012;Gillborn,2005).Bell(1980)establishestheconceptofinterest

convergence,wherebyracialremediesforblacksareaccommodatedonthe

basisthattherightsaffordedtothemarecompatiblewiththeinterestsof

whites.Attheveryleast,blackrightsmustnotjeopardisewhiteinterests.

Harris(1993)buildsonthisidea,arguingthatovertimethelegalsystemhas

legitimisedwhiteprivilegeandasetofpower-basedpresumptionsare

inherentlyattachedtoallwhites.Thus,racialremedieswillbeamendedor

reversediftheydisruptthewhiteexpectationofpowerandcontrol(Bell,

1980;Bracey,2015;Delgado&Stefancic,2012).Bracey(2015)citesBell

(2004)inhisanalysisonthewhiteclassanditsdominanceoverstateaffairs,

“Whites’controlofthestateispermanentandabsolute,asevincedbytheir

collectivepowertoabrogateracialjusticepolicies‘atthepointthat

policymakersfeartheremedialpolicyisthreateningthesuperiorsocialstatus

ofwhites’.”(p.558).

CRTcanbeappliedtotheAustraliancontexttounderstandthewindingback

ofIndigenouslandrightsaffordedundertheNTA.Thenativetitlesystem

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essentiallyrepresentsabundleofrightsgrantedtoblacks.However,these

rightsarecarriedoutinwhiteinstitutionsandaresubjecttothedecisionsof

white-dominatedpoliticalleaderships.Whennativetitlerightshavebeen

foundtochallengethepowerandcontrolthatgovernmentexertsoverland,

thelegislationisamendedand‘watereddown’.Ascriticalracetheorists

DelgadoandStefancic(2012)purport,“rightsarealmostalwayscutback

whentheyconflictwiththeinterestsofthepowerful”(p.29).

ThisisillustratedintheHowardGovernment’samendmentstoweakenthe

NTAfollowingtheWikdecision.TheFederalGovernment’sscrambletoamend

theActinresponsetotherecentMcGladedecisionalsodemonstratesthe

reluctanceofpoliticalleaderstosituateblackinterestsaheadoflargemining

developmentsontraditionalland.ThedecisionofformerPrimeMinisterPaul

KeatingtolegislatenativetitleratherthanallowMabotodeterminethe

outcomeofsimilarcourtchallengesbywayofcommonlawfurthersupports

theargumentsofCRT.Asreflectedintheseexamples,CRTwouldcontendthat

whitesaccommodateracialremediesonthebasisthatitdoesnotharmthe

interestsofwhiteinstitutionsandgovernment.

ItcanalsobeobservedthattherightsincludedintheNTA,particularlyinthe

futureactprocessthisthesisexamines,canbeoverriddeniftheinterestsof

traditionalownersobstructtheinterestsofthoseinpower.Thus,whileblack

rightshavebeenaccommodatedtoremedypastwrongdoingsandsetthe

nationonapathtowardsreconciliation,theserightshavebeencraftedto

remainsubordinatetothepowersofthewhitedominantclass.

ResearchQuestionsandThesisStructure

Researchquestion:

• Towhatextenthavestateinstitutionsandgovernmenttakeninto

accountIndigenousrightsandinterestsduringthephasesofapproval

fortheAdaniCarmichaelCoalMine?

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Researchsub-questions:

• WhatdegreeofpowerandinfluencedoresourcecompanieslikeAdani

exerciseinAustralianpolitics?(Chapter2)

• Whatfactorscontributedtothecollapseofnegotiations?(Chapter3

and4)

• WhydidtheWanganandJagalingoucommunitybecomedividedinthe

courseofnegotiations?(Chapter4)

• HowdidtheNNTT,theStateGovernmentandAdanirespondto

Indigenousrightsandinterestsduringthephasesofapproval?

(Chapter4and5)

• TowhatextenthaveMembersofParliamenttakenintoconsideration

Indigenousrightsandinterestsduringthephasesofapproval?

(Chapter5)

ChapterTwowillexaminethedegreeofpowerresourcecompaniesexertin

AustralianpoliticsanddeterminewhetherAdanireflectsasimilarlevelof

influence.

ChapterThreewillexaminehowthefirstphaseofnegotiationsoperated

undertheNTAanddeterminewhatfactorscontributedtotheunresolved

outcome.

ChapterFourwillexaminethenextphaseofapproval,wherebythefailureto

produceanagreementleadstotheinvolvementoftheState.Thischapterwill

investigatetheprocessofarbitrationandthecommunitydivisionthat

emergedthereafter.

ChapterFivewillexaminetheresponseofAdaniandtheStateGovernment

whennegotiationsfailtoproduceanagreementandarbitrationissoughtfora

secondtime.Thischapterwilltheninvestigatethedegreeofrecognitionand

oversightofIndigenousissuesbygovernmentintheapprovalprocessand

discusstheeffectoftherecentMcGladedecision.

Theconcludingchapterwillcomparethefindingsofthisstudytotheexisting

literatureandassessthecapacityforeachtheorytoexplaintheresearch

outcomes.

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Methodology

DocumentAnalysis

Documentanalysisisacommonmethodologyemployedinqualitativestudies.

Itinvolvesthesystematicanalysisoforganisationalandinstitutional

documentstobuildunderstandingandcontextualiseeventsandphenomena.

Theprocessrequirestheselectionofmultipledocumentsrelevanttothe

researchproblemandtheevaluationandsynthesisofthedatafoundinthose

documents(Bowen,2009).

Thisthesiswillusedocumentanalysistoinvestigateasinglecasestudy.This

typeofmethodologyisoftenusedincasestudyresearchtodevelopan

understandingofaspecificphenomenonorevent.Inthiscase,arangeof

documentswillbereviewedandevaluatedtodetaileachphaseofapproval.

Comparingthedataineachdocumentwillaimtoverifyandconfirm

importantinformationabouttheapprovalprocessand,inturn,determinethe

extenttowhichstateinstitutionsandgovernmenthavetakenintoaccount

Indigenousrightsandinterests,andifthisisasufficientprotectionofthese

rightsandinterests.

CaseStudy

Casestudyresearchinvolvesthein-depthanalysisofasinglesample.This

methodologyrequiresdetailedanddescriptivecontentaboutonespecific

phenomenonorevent(Pierce,2008).Thisthesiswillexamineasingle

instancewherestateinstitutionsandgovernmenthavehadtoconsiderthe

rightsandinterestsofanIndigenousgroupintheapprovalprocessofa

significantminingdevelopmentproject.

TheCarmichaelCoalMineisahighlyexposedandpolarisingexampleofa

recentlargeminingdevelopmentthathasplacedtheAustraliannativetitle

systemunderthelensandtestedtheexistinglegislation.Thisthesisaimsto

developbroadconclusionsthatmaybeappliedtootherinstanceswherea

largeminingdevelopmenthaschallengedtheStateandgovernment’s

considerationofIndigenousrightsandinterests.

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EmploymentofTheory

Thisthesiswillemploymultipletheoriestointerpretandunderstandthe

outcomesofasinglecasestudy.Whileeachtheoreticalperspectivewillbe

appliedtodevelopacriticalunderstandingofthefindings,thepractical

implementationofeachframeworkwillassessitsapplicabilityinareallife

event.Theapplicationofmultipletheoriesthatarerelevanttotheresearch

problemisintendedtoprovideexplanationandinsightintotheresponseof

stateinstitutionsandgovernment.

ProblemandSignificance

Thisthesiswilldeterminetheextenttowhichstateinstitutionsand

governmenthavetakenintoaccountIndigenousrightsandinterestsduring

theapprovalprocessofalargeminingdevelopment.Itwilldeterminewhether

IndigenouslandrightsinAustraliahavefullymandatedtheconsiderationof

Indigenousrightsandinterestsineachphaseofapproval.Aseriesof

theoreticalperspectiveswillbeemployedtoexplaintheresearchoutcomes.

Thisstudywillcomparearecentcasetotheexistingbodyofliteratureon

IndigenouslandrightsandminingdevelopmentsinAustralia.Thefindings

mayconfirmorcountertheliteratureandmayalsosupportorchallengethe

criticismsoftheNTAasaweakapparatusforIndigenousgroupsseekingto

protecttheirrightstoland.

Theuseofmultipletheoriestoexplaintheoutcomesoftheapprovalprocess

offersanadditionalcontributiontotheliterature.Thereareanumberof

studiesthatexaminecaseswheretheinterestsofIndigenousgroupsandthe

rightsaffordedtothemundertheNTAandtheUNDRIPhavebeenaffectedby

miningdevelopments(Altman,2009;Corbett&O’Faircheallaigh,2006;

O’Faircheallaigh,2006,2008;Scambary,2013).However,theoretical

perspectiveshavebeenscarcelyemployedtoexplaintheinadequaciesof

IndigenouslandrightsinAustralia’sjurisdictionandtheattitudesofstate

institutionsandgovernment.

WhilethereappearstobeaconsensusintheliteraturethattheNTAhasfailed

toupholdIndigenousrightsandinterests,therearefewstudiesthatprovidea

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deepersourceofexplanationbeyondtheinherentweaknessesofthe

legislation.Thisthesisseekstoaccountforthefailureofthenativetitlesystem

usingtheapplicationofmultiplesocialtheories.

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Chapter2

ResourcePolitics

Australiaisaresource-richnationandtheenergyandminingindustryhas

contributedsignificantlytothenationaleconomy.Whileitisacommon

misconceptionthatAustralia’seconomyislargelyboundtoexpendableenergy

andminingproduction,theminingsectoronlycontributesaround8percent

tothenation’sGDP(Frydenberg,2015;Garnett,2015;Roarty,2010).

However,theresourcessectorcontinuestooccupyaprominentpositionon

thenationalagendaasitdeliversmanybenefitstothestate,contributingto

exportearnings,employment,foreignanddomesticinvestment,andto

governmentrevenue(Roarty,2010).

Thenationalrelianceonenergyandmininghasenabledlargeresource

companiestobecomehighlyinfluentialinAustralianpolitics(Baer,2014;

Hodder,2009;Lyons,2016).Thecarbonlobbyhasexercisedsignificantpower

toinfluencekeypolicymakersandpublicopinion.Whilethegovernment

ensurestransparencyforcertainlobbyingpractices,manycasesoflobbying

areconductedofftherecord(Readfearn,2015).Theminingindustryengages

inahighlevelofgovernmentlobbyingandenjoysacloserelationshipwiththe

AustralianGovernment.Thereisarevolvingdoorwherebyindividualsmove

betweenpositionsintheresourceindustryandpublicoffice.Thisclose

exchangemaycompromisetheindependenceofgovernmentdecision-making

andincreasetheinfluenceofenergyandmininginterests(Aulby&Ogge,

2016;Hodder,2009;Readfearn,2015).

TheconductofAdanimirrorstheapproachofmanylargeresourcecompanies

thathaveaimedtoinfluenceAustralianpolitics.Adanihasemployedmultiple

lobbyingstrategies,includingmonetarydonations,personalgifts,private

meetingsandthestrategichiringofseveralformergovernmentexecutivesof

Queensland(Aulby&Ogge,2016;Cox,2015b;Readfearn,2015).Adanihas

receivedwidespreadcriticismbycountlessinterestgroupslocallyand

Australia-wide.DespitesustainedoppositiontotheCarmichaelProjectand

therefusalofAustralian-ownedbankstofinancetheproject,theQueensland

Governmenthascontinuedtotenderapprovals(Bell-James,2015;Haxton,

2015;Milman,2015;Tlozek,2015).Thisraisesthequestionastowhetherthe

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decisiontoissuecontroversialgrantsandapprovalsaremadeindependently

andwithequalconsiderationofotherinterestgroupsthatdonotenjoythe

sameaccesstogovernmentastheenergyandminingindustry.

Australiaproducesawiderangeofenergysources,includingoil,coal,

aluminumandironore.Thenationstronglyreliesoncoalasasourceof

electricityandexport(Baer,2014;Healey,2012).Australia’sdomesticuseof

coaltogenerateelectricityranksitfifthintheworld.Coalgenerates85per

centofgrid-connectedelectricityacrossthenation,andpriorto2011

Australiawastheworld’slargestcoalexporter(Hodder,2009;Baer,2014;

Crowley,2013).Australiacurrentlyprovides30percentofcoalexports

aroundtheglobe.WhileAustralia’sglobalreputationasanenergyandmining

powerhousesituatesitamongtheworld’sresourceheavyweightssuchas

China,theUnitedStatesandIndia,mineralresourcesinAustraliaseldom

belongtolocalminingindustriesandinsteadrestinthehandsofafew

majorityforeign-ownedtransnationalcorporations(Goodman&Worth,

2008).Theselargeenergyandminingcompaniesenjoyacloserelationship

withtheAustralianGovernmentandhavetheeconomicpowertodevote

millionstowardslobbyingfortheirinterests.

Energyandminingcompanieslobbythegovernmenteitherdirectlyor

throughlobbyingfirms.Lobbyingcanincludecontributionstopolitical

parties,gifts,privatemeetingsormediaengagement(Baer,2014;Hodder,

2009).Itisalegalrequirementthatcertainlobbyingpracticesarerecordedon

aformalpublicregister.However,manyoperateoutsidethisrequirementand

remainundisclosedtothepublic.Australianlawdoesnotrequirepolitical

donationsunder$12,100tobeformallyregisteredandthishighlightsalackof

transparencyinthesystem(Readfearn,2015).Lobbyingconductedinsecrecy

isacommonandconcerningpracticethatincreasestheopportunityfor

misconductandinstitutionalcorruption.Transparencyofgovernanceis

reducedandaccountabilitydiminisheswhenlobbyingactivitiesarenot

formallyrecorded.Thereisanentrustedexpectationthatgovernmentofficials

willmakedecisionsindependentofinfluenceandintheinterestsofthepublic.

Liberaldemocraticgovernanceisbasedontransparencyandaccountability.

Fukuyama(2015)statesthatdemocraticaccountability“seekstoensurethat

governmentactsintheinterestsofthewholecommunity,ratherthansimply

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intheself-interestoftherulers”(p.12).Whenthegovernment’sactionsseek

tobenefitthewholecommunity,thepublicinterestisprioritisedandthe

morallegitimacyofthedemocraticsystemisupheld(Beresford,2010).

However,whenthegovernmentmakesdecisionsinfavourofotherinterest

groupsratherthanthepublicinterest,itsmorallegitimacybecomes

compromised.Institutionalcorruptioncanmanifestwhenthegovernmentis

lessaccountabletothepublic.Governmentaccountabilityismaintained

throughtransparencyandwhenademocracylackstransparency,itbecomes

vulnerabletoinstitutionalcorruption.Ahighlevelofpublicdisclosureensures

thatgovernmentofficialsremainaccountableanddecisionsaremadewiththe

publicinterestatheart(Beresford,2010).Australia’sweaklobbyinglaws

reducetransparencyandincreasetheriskofinstitutionalcorruption.The

powerofthecarbonlobbyunveils,tosomeextent,theuneveninfluence

energyandminingcompanieshaveovergovernmentdecisionsandparty

policies.

Perhapsthemoststraightforwardformoflobbyingismonetarydonationsto

politicalparties.Politicaldonationsonthesurfaceappeartobeaone-way

flowoffundsfromadonortoarecipient,ingoodfaithandimpartialofvested

interests.However,politicaldonationsaremorerealisticallyviewedassingle

ormultipletransactionsbywhichthedonorgivesandthengainssomethingin

return.Politicaldonationsareoftenmadetogainsomedegreeofpolitical

advantage(Hodder,2009).Energyandminingcompaniesdonatewiththe

expectationthatpoliticalpartieswillfavourtheirdevelopmentsandexpedite

approvals.Largeandsustainedpoliticaldonationsareaconcerningpractice,

asitintroducesbiasintothedecision-makingprocess(Aulby&Ogge,2016).

Insomecases,itcanbeobservedthatpoliticaldonationscorrespondwith

favourabledecisionsforthedonors.

PoliticaldonationsinAustraliaarelegalandcommonplace(Hodder,2009).

Miningandenergycompanieshavemadesizabledonationstobothsidesof

politics.Sincethe1980s,theLiberalandLaborpartieshavereceivedmillions

incorporatedonations(Baer,2014;McKnight&Hobbs,2013).Mining

companieshavemadedonationsdirectlyandindirectlythroughindustry

lobbygroupsandassociations.TheAustralianCoalAssociation(ACA)

representscoalmininginterestsinQueenslandandNewSouthWalesandhas

madelargedonationstobothmajorpoliticalpartiessincethe1990s(Baer,

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2014;Hodder,2009).OtherindustrylobbygroupssuchastheAustralian

IndustryGreenhouseNetwork(AIGN),across-industrygrouprepresenting

severalmajorenergyandminingcorporations,hasdonatedmillionstothe

LiberalPartyandAustralianLaborParty(ALP)since1998(Baer,2014;

Hodder,2009).Theminingindustryisawealthyconglomerateof

transnationalcorporationsandlobbyiststhatcanaffordtodonatemillionsto

increasethelikelinessthatpolicyleansintheirfavour.

TherehavebeentworeportsreleasedthatexaminetheQueensland

Government’slackoftransparencyanddisclosureoflobbyingactivities.

Readfearn’s(2015)reportonthepoliticalinfluenceofcoalandgaslobbyists

inQueenslanduncoveredastringofgenerousdonationstotheLiberal

NationalParty(LNP).In2007,whenthegovernmentrejectedtheAustralian

energycompanyNewHope’sproposaltoexpanditsDarlingDownscoalmine,

thecompanydonated$950,000totheFederalLiberalPartybetween2008

and2011.In2014,NewHope’sexpansionwasapprovedundertheLNP

NewmanGovernment(Aulby&Ogge,2016;Readfearn,2015).Thisexample

illustrateshowlargedonationstopoliticalpartiescaninfluencekeydecision-

makersingovernmentand,inturn,effectuatecorporateobjectives.

AulbyandOgge’s(2016)reportexaminesthelegislativeoutcomesinspecific

caseswheretheQueenslandGovernmenthasbeenexposedtomultiple

lobbyingtactics.Thefindingsofthereportobserveasignificantdisparity

betweenminingrelateddonationstotheFederalALPandtheFederalLiberal

Party.Between2011and2015,theLaborPartyacceptedapproximately$1.2

millionwhereastheLiberalPartyacceptednearly$3million.Duringthistime,

thereweresixcontroversialminingdevelopmentspendingapprovalin

Newman-ledQueensland.TheLNPNewmanGovernmentreceivedover$1

millionfromtheminingindustryoverthesameperiod(Aulby&Ogge,2016).

CorrespondingwiththeirgenerousdonationstotheLNPandFederalLiberal

Party,theminingcompaniesseekingapprovalsinQueenslandreceived

desirablelegislativeoutcomesundertheLNP(Aulby&Ogge,2016).Itisclear

thatpoliticalpartiesroutinelyreceivelargedonationsfromtheminingsector

andsuchcontributionscancompromiseindependentandunbiaseddecision-

making.

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Evidenceofthelinkbetweenpoliticaldonationsandgovernmentdecisions

castsdoubtsuponthelevelofinstitutionalcorruptionatworkinAustralian

politics.Whilesizabledonationsfromamultiplicityofcorporationsinthe

miningindustryhaveflowedintothepocketsofpoliticalpartiesforyears,

governmentshaveactedfavourablyinreturn.TheAustralianGovernmenthas

givenenergyandminingcompanieslargesubsidiesfortheirdevelopments

andexpansion(Baer,2014).Governmentexpenditureonsubsidiesforthe

miningsectorisanexpensiveinvestment.TheQueenslandGovernmentspent

$9billiononminingprojectsbetween2009and2014(Aulby&Ogge,2016).

Energyandminingcompaniesenjoyaprivilegedlevelofaccesstogovernment

(Aulby&Ogge,2016;Hodder,2009;Readfearn,2015).Industryleaderscan

payforaccesstoeventswherepoliticiansarepresent(Readfearn,2015).In

Queensland,boththeLNPandLaborhaveestablishedsubscription-based

schemeswherecorporations‘buy-in’toattendexclusiveeventswithkey

politicians.Labor’sQueenslandProgressiveBusinessNetwork(QPBN)scheme

chargedcorporations$10,000ayearforasubscriptiontoevents.TheLNP’s

QForumschemepromisedcorporationssuchasHancockCoal,Caltexand

PeabodyEnergyone-on-oneaccesstoministers(Aulby&Ogge,2016;

Readfearn,2015).

These‘cashforaccess’schemeshavebeenkepthighlysecretiveandarenot

inclusiveofotherinterestgroupssuchasthosewithenvironmentalor

agriculturalconcerns(Readfearn,2015).TheestablishmentofQPBNand

QForumencouragesadirectengagementwithgovernmentthatcango

unrecorded.Thesefundraisingforumsallowthelobbyingofkeypolicymakers

tobeconductedbehindcloseddoors,withoutdisclosuretothepublic.As

Hodder(2009)asserts,“Althoughlegal,theseactivitiesaregenerallyhidden

becausebroadexposurewouldrevealthedisproportionateaccessand

influencethatcertainpowerfulactorswithinthesystemenjoy”(p.58).

Judgingtheindependenceofgovernmentdecision-makingbecomes

problematicwhendirectaccessisattainableforsomewealthyinterestgroups

andnotothers.Whiletheredcarpetisrolledoutfortheheadsofenergyand

miningcompaniesto‘rubshoulders’withkeydecision-makers,manyother

groupsdonotenjoythesamelevelofaccesstogovernment(Hodder,2009).

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Thereisarevolvingdoorbetweentheresourcesectorandthepublicofficeof

government(Aulby&Ogge,2016;Readfearn,2015).Inmanycases,former

Queenslandpoliticiansandtheirstaffhaveleftgovernmenttoworkas

lobbyistsforenergyandminingfirmsandthenreturnedtopoliticsmonthsor

yearslater.Theoppositehasalsooccurredwherelobbyistsfortheresource

sectorhaveobtainedinfluentialpositionsinpublicofficeandthenreturnedto

thelobbyworld.Theunrestrainedmovementofstaffbetweenthepublicoffice

andtheresourcesectorraisesaconsiderableconflictofinterest(Aulby&

Ogge,2016;Readfearn,2015).Itisconcerningwhenpoliticianstaskedwith

regulatingdevelopmentarefoundtohaveheldprominentpositionsinthe

energyandminingindustry.Thisconflictofinterestmayleadtothe

preferentialtreatmentandprioritisationofcertaindevelopmentprojectsand

lessconsiderationgiventootherstakeholdersinthecommunity.

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2012-2013FinancialYear

$6,600toLP$7,200toALP

Noapprovals


$49,500toLP$11,000to

ALP

8MayQueenslandapprovesmine


$7,000toLNP$5,500toALP

24JulyCommonwealthapprovesmine

AdaniandAustralianpolitics

Consistentwiththeexperiencesofnumerousenergyandminingcompanies,

AdanihasenjoyeddirectaccesstoAustralianpoliticians,ministersand

bureaucrats.AdanihasactivelylobbiedtheCommonwealthandQueensland

Governmentthroughpoliticalcontributions,giftstoministers,private

meetingsandthestrategichiringofinfluentialformergovernmentexecutives

(Aulby&Ogge,2016;Cox,2015b;Readfearn,2015).Whencomparedwiththe

lobbyingactivitiesofothermultinationalcorporationsthathaveavested

interest,Adaniticksalltheboxes.TheCarmichaelCoalMinehasmadeitsway

throughAustralia’sapprovalprocess,wherebytheStateandFederal

Governmenthasapprovedandre-approvedminingleasesfortheproject

(Bell-James,2015).Whileitisdifficulttodeterminewhetheralinkexists

betweenthelobbyingactivitiesofAdaniandthetenderofapprovals,itis

evidentthatthecompanywieldsadisproportionateinfluenceandaccessto

governmentcomparedtomanyotherinterestgroups.

TheElectoralCommissionofQueensland(ECQ)revealedAdani’s

contributionstobothsidesofpoliticsoverthepastfiveyears.Contributions

ontheECQ’srecordarelistedforeachfinancialyear.Inthe2012-2013

financialyearAdanipaid$7,200totheALPforattendanceatthe2013Budget

DinnerandPost-BudgetLunch(ECQ,2013).Inthesameperiod,theFederal

LiberalPartyreceived$6,600forattendanceatabusinessadvisorylunch

(AustralianElectoralCommission[AEC],2013).Contributionsincrease

Figure1.1Adani'scontributionstopoliticalparties

LP:LiberalParty,ALP:AustralianLaborParty,LNP:LiberalNationalParty

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significantlyinthefollowingfinancialyear.Between2013-2014Adanipaid

$49,500totheFederalLiberalPartyand$11,000totheALP(AEC,2014).In

thefinancialyear2014-2015,Adanicontributed$7,000totheLNPand$5,500

totheALP.TheECQdidnotspecifyareasonforthecontributionsmadeby

AdanifromJuly2013toJune2015(ECQ,2015).

AdanioperatesitslobbyingthroughQueensland-basedfirmNextLevel

StrategicServices(NLSS).NLSShasmadecontributionstotheLNPinexcessof

$52,000since2013(ECQ,2013a,2014,2015a,2015b,2016,2016a).While

Adaniisoneof10clientsmanagedbyNLSS(AustralianGovernment,2017),

thecontributionsthesefirmsmaketopoliticalpartiespromotetheinterestsof

thecompaniestheyrepresent.

Basedonthepremisethatpoliticalcontributionsaremadetoencourage

desirableoutcomesforthedonor,theapprovalsissuedbytheCommonwealth

andQueenslandGovernmentfortheCarmichaelCoalMineinMayandJulyof

2014coincidewithAdani’scontributionsofover$60,000totheFederal

LiberalPartyandALP.Thesetwoapprovalsweretenderedunderthe

NewmanandAbbottgovernments.Incomparisontothecontributionsmade

totheALP,theLiberalPartyreceivedconsiderablylargercontributionsprior

toitsendorsementoftheCarmichaelProject.InAugust2013,theDeputy

PremierJeffSeeneyandhischiefofstaffbothreceivedgiftsfromAdanijointly

valuedatover$1,000(Aulby&Ogge,2016;QueenslandGovernment,2013).

WhileAdani’scontributionstobothfederalandstatedivisionsofpolitical

partiessignificantlydiminishedfollowingthe2013-2014financialyear,

companyexecutivescontinuedtomeetregularlywithministers.

Adanihassustainedcountlessprivatemeetingswiththeheadsofgovernment

inQueensland.Between2013and2014Adanihad12privatemeetingswith

ministersoftheNewmanGovernment,includingsixmeetingswiththeDeputy

Premier(Aulby&Ogge,2016).SincethedefeatoftheNewmanGovernmentin

2015,Adanihasobtained21privatemeetingswiththePalaszczukMinistry

andtheOpposition(QueenslandIntegrityCommissioner[QIC],2016).Adani

hasmetwithpolicyadvisorstotheQueenslandPremierAnastasiaPalaszczuk

oneightoccasionsandtwicewiththePremier.Policyadvisorsandthechiefof

stafftotheMinisterforStateDevelopment,NaturalResourcesandMines,

AnthonyLynham,havehadfivemeetingswithAdani,onemeetingincluding

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theMinister.OtherprivatemeetingsinvolvedtheDeputyPremierJackieTrad,

theLeaderoftheOppositionTimNicholls,severalMembersofParliamentand

theMayorofTownsville(Aulby&Ogge,2016;QIC,2016).Adanihassustained

directaccesstobothsidesofpoliticsinQueensland.

Adanihaspursuedarangeofinternallobbyingtactics,strategicallyemploying

formergovernmentexecutiveswithknowledgerelevanttotheoversightof

developments.ThereareanumberofstaffersworkingforAdanithathave

strongconnectionstothemajorpoliticalpartiesinQueensland(Cox,2015b).

TheformerDeputyPremier’schiefofstaffDavidMooreandformerLeaderof

theOpposition’schiefofstaffCameronMilnerjointlyownthelobbyingfirm

NLSS(Cox,2015b;Rose,2015;Readfearn,2015).NLSShasfacilitatedprivate

meetingsbetweenAdaniandthegovernment(QIC,2016).

LobbyistsDavidMooreandCameronMilnerhaveheldanumberofinfluential

rolesinpublicoffice.Moorehasleftandreturnedtogovernmentseveral

times.AfterservingasJohnHoward’schiefofstafffor10years,Mooreleft

publicofficetostartalobbyingfirm.Hethenlefttheprivatesectorfora12-

monthperiodtoworkasCampbellNewman’schiefofstaffin2011(NLSS,

2013).MilnerenteredtheprivatesectorafterworkingastheALPstate

secretaryinQueensland.Helefthispositionasco-directoratNLSSin2015to

serveasBillShorten’schiefofstaff.After10months,Milnerreturnedtothe

lobbyworld(Maiden,2016;NLSS,2013).MooreandMilner’smovements

betweenprivateenterpriseandpublicofficereflecttherevolvingdoor

betweengovernmentandtheresourcesector.

Adanihasalongtrackrecordofnon-compliancewithenvironmentallaws

overseas.ThishasfailedtodeterordelaytheAustralianGovernment’s

approvalsfortheCarmichaelCoalMine(EarthJustice&EnvironmentalJustice

Australia,2015;Reside,Mappin,Watson,Chapman&Kearney,2016).The

potentialenvironmentalimpactsofthedevelopmentwillputatrisk69,000

full-timejobsdependentontheGreatBarrierReef(Blain,2016;Moore,2015;

Robertson,2015a).Whencomparedtoanestimated1,500full-timejobs

generatedtooperatetheCarmichaelCoalMine(Branco,2015a;Campbell,

2015),theprospectofendangeringaworldheritagelistedsiteandmajor

tourismhubforAustraliaseemsanunnecessaryandhigh-riskendeavour.

Moreover,theconstructionoftheworld’ssecondlargestcoalmineisatodds

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withtheglobalawarenessofclimatechangeandtheconsequencesofhigh

carbonemissiondevelopments(Bell-James,2015;Blain,2016;Reside,

Mappin,Watson,Chapman&Kearney,2016).

DespiteanumberofseriousallegationsagainstAdani’sminingoperations

overseas,theAustralianGovernmenthascontinuedtosupporttheprojectand

advanceitsapproval.Adanicurrentlyfacesnumerousallegationsoffinancial

crimeandcorruptioninvolvingfraud,moneylaundering,andbribery(Aulby&

Ogge,2016;Long,2016;Robertson,2016a).Thecompanyhasstruggledto

secureinvestment,asAustralianandinternationalbankshavebeenreluctant

toprovidefunding.Therehavealreadybeen11internationalbanksthathave

refusedtoinvestintheCarmichaelProject(Haxton,2015;Milman,2015;

Tlozek,2015).

InAugust2015,theAustralianCommonwealthBanksuspendeditsroleas

Adani’sfinancialadvisor.Thisisasignificantmovethatsuggeststhe

CommonwealthBankviewsthedevelopmentascommerciallyunviable

(Tlozek,2015).TheQueenslandTreasuryhasraisedsimilarconcernsandhas

deemedtheproject‘unbankable’.TheTreasuryhashighlightedthecompany’s

largedebtsandthishascastdoubtsonitsfinancialcapacitytodeliverthe

proposedproject(Cox,2015).

EnergyandfinancialanalystshavelabelledtheCarmichaelCoalMine

developmentariskyinvestmentduetoAdani’srecordofdebt,theaccusations

offinancialcrimeandIndia’splantodiscontinuecoalimports(Briggs,2016;

Robertson&Safi,2016).TheIndianGovernmenthasdeclareditintendsto

phaseoutcoalimports.ThisisasignificantpolicyshiftthattheAustralian

Governmentmusttakeintoconsideration.Analystshavepredictedthatthe

CarmichaelProjectwillbecomea‘strandedasset’ifIndiacontinuestoturnto

alternativessourcesofenergy(Milman,2015;Long,2016).Thesuccessofthe

proposeddevelopmentintheGalileeBasinisdependentonIndia’scoal

reliance.TheprominenceofcoalasakeyenergysourceforelectricityinIndia

isbecominganincreasinglyunlikelyprospect.

Adani’shistoryofnon-compliancewithenvironmentallawsdoubledwith

numerousallegationsoffinancialcrimegreatlychallengesitssuitabilityto

operateinAustralia.However,ateverystagetheAustralianGovernmenthas

continuedtoissueapprovalsfortheCarmichaelCoalMine.Itappearstheonly

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setbacktotheprojectistheactionsofconcernedinterestgroupsthathave

heldthegovernmentandAdanitoaccount(Wellington,2016).TheFederal

andStateGovernment’sunduesupportforAdaniateachphaseofthe

approvalprocess,despiteevidencethatsuggeststheprojectisbotha

financiallyandenvironmentallyriskyinvestmentforAustralia,raisesthe

concernthattheactionsofgovernmentarenotindependentofinfluence.

TheAustralianGovernmentappearstohaveignoredallthewarningsignsand

hasunequivocallyhandedAdaniitsapprovals.Inconsiderationofthe

consistentlobbyingeffortsofthemininggiantanditsdirectaccesstokey

policymakers,itispossiblethatAdaniandthecoallobbyhaveexerciseda

disproportionatelevelofinfluenceinAustralianpolitics.Theresulthas

conceivedaseriesofdecisionoutcomesinfavourofthesecondlargestcoal

developmentintheworld.

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Chapter3

TheFirstPhaseofNegotiations

SincetheWanganandJagalingoupeoplereceivedthefirstnotificationofthe

CarmichaelProjectinlate2011,negotiationstookaprolongedand

controversialcourse.Thetaskofreachinganagreementinvolvedsignificant

stateintervention.Withinafive-yearperiod,between2012and2016,the

WanganandJagalingoupeoplerejectedthreeIndigenousLandUse

Agreements(ILUA)putforwardbyAdani(Borschmann,2015;Davidson,

2017;Robertson,2016b).AdaniapproachedtheNationalNativeTitleTribunal

(NNTT)ontwooccasionsandbothtimestheNNTTdeliveredarulingin

favouroftheminingleases.

BeforetheILUAwassignedinApril2016,thereweretwoperiodsof

negotiationsthatfailedtoproduceanagreement.ThefirstbetweenMay2011

andDecember2012concernedthemininglease(ML)70441(AdaniMiningv.

JessieDiver&Others,2013).ThesecondbetweenOctober2013andOctober

2014concernedtwoadditionalminingleases,ML70505andML70506

(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015).Negotiationsonboth

countswereunabletosecureanILUAbetweenAdaniandtheWanganand

Jagalingoupeople.ThecollapseofnegotiationspromptedAdanitopassthe

mattertotheNNTTtwice,amovethatdelivereddesirableoutcomesforthe

mininggiantandeffectivelysidelinedtheconcernsoftheIndigenousgroup.

TheNativeTitleAct(NTA)hasestablishedatwo-prongedsystemthatconsists

ofclaimsandfutureacts.Indigenousgroupsmakeclaimsthatareeither

determined,pendingdetermination(asregisteredorunregisteredclaims),or

rejected.TheWanganandJagalingoupeoplehavearegisteredclaimthatis

pendingdetermination(NNTT,2004).Thefutureactsystemoperates

separatelyfromclaimsandconcernsanyproposedactivitythatmayinfringe

nativetitlerightsandinterests(NNTT,2017a).Futureactsincludeactivities

suchasinfrastructure,mineralexploration,pastoralleasesorminingprojects

(QSNTS,2017;NNTT,2009;NTSCORP,2017).

Registeredclaimantsareentitledtoanumberofproceduralrightsinrelation

tofutureacts.Proceduralrightsrangefromtherighttolodgeanobjectionto

therighttonegotiatecompensationorconditionsattachedtoafutureact

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(QSNTS,2017;NNTT,2009;NTSCORP,2017).Thelevelofproceduralrights

granteddependsonthesizeandimpactofthefutureactanditsproximityto

theclaimarea.Asminingdevelopmentscanleadtotheextinguishmentof

nativetitle,theNTAmandatesthatthemininginterestnegotiatesalanduse

agreementwiththeregisteredclaimants.Whereresourcecompaniesseekto

haveminingleasesgrantedfornewprojectsnearorwithinaregisteredclaim

area,therighttonegotiate(RTN)ensues(NNTT,2016,2017c;NTSCORP,

2017).

TheWanganandJagalingoupeoplehavebeengrantedtheRTNasthe

proposedCarmichaelCoalMineresidesentirelyinsidetheirregisteredclaim

area.Negotiationsareconductedindependentlybetweenthenativetitle

applicantandthemininginterest(QSNTS,2017).Whenanativetitle

applicationismade,theclaimantsappointoneormorepersons,referredtoas

the‘applicant’,torepresenttheinterestsofthegroupasawhole.Theclaim

groupappointapplicantsthroughatraditionaldecision-makingprocessoran

appropriatealternativemethodoftheirchoice.Theapplicantsspeakonbehalf

oftheclaimgroupandmakedecisionsinrelationtotheclaim(Duff,2017;

NNTT,2008,2009;NTSCORP,2012).

TheWanganandJagalingouclaimants,whoconstitute400to500people,have

appointedapplicantsonthreeoccasions(Burragubba&Johnson,2015;de

Tarczynski,2016;Jishnu,2015).Theseapplicantshavedealtdirectlywith

Adaniinthecourseofnegotiations.TheNTArequiresnegotiationstobe

conductedforaminimumofsixmonthsbeforepartiescanrequesttheStateto

arbitratethematter.However,negotiationscanextendforanylengthoftime

providedthatallpartiescontinueingoodfaithofreachinganagreement

(NNTT,2008a,2016;NTSCORP,2017).Negotiationsinbothcaseshave

exceededthesix-monthminimumandAdanihasrequestedthattheState

intervene.

ThischapterwillinvolveextensiveanalysisoftheNNTT’sfutureact

determinationAdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others(2013)toexaminethefirst

phaseofnegotiations.Thisprimarysourcecontainsadetailedchronologyof

correspondencebetweenAdaniandtheWanganandJagalingouapplicants

fromMay2011toDecember2012.Itisasignificantlegaldocumentthat

exceeds100pagesandrecountstheseriesofdisputesthatledtothecollapse

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ofnegotiations.Whilethisdocumentprovidesexcerptsofcorrespondence,

suchasemails,lettersandaffidavits,fullsubmissionsmadetotheNNTTare

notpubliclyavailable.TheauthorcontactedtheNNTTandrequestedthefull

releaseofsubmissionstostrengthenthisanalysis.However,noneweremade

available.Whilethedocumentisstillcriticalforthisstudy,asitprovidesa

comprehensiveaccountofnegotiations,thedenialofaccesslimitsthe

transparencyoftheprocess.Duringthefirstphaseofnegotiationstherewas

minimalmediacoverageorcommentarytosupportthefindingsoftheNNTT’s

determination.Theconclusionsmadeinthischapterhavebeenformed

throughindepthanalysisoftheavailableevidenceinAdaniMiningv.Jessie

Diver&Others(2013).

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2011• May-tirstnegotiationphasecommences• 2November-notiticationofminingleaseforCarmichaelCoalMine

2012

• 7November-Adanitilestirstfutureactdeterminationapplication• 29November-CampbellNewmanleadsseven-daytrademissiontoIndia• 1December-WJclaimantsrejectILUA• December-tirstnegotiationphaseconcludes

2013

• 7May-tirstfutureactdetermination(ML70441maybedone)• 30October-notiticationoftwominingleasesforCarmichaelCoalMine• October-secondnegotiationphasecommences

2014

• 8May-QueenslandCoordinator-GeneralapprovesCarmichaelCoalMine• 24July-FederalEnvironmentalMinisterapprovesCarmichaelCoalMine• 7August-threenativetitleapplicantsreplacesevenapplicants• 5October-WJclaimantsrejectILUA• 10October-Adanitilessecondfutureactdeterminationapplication• October-secondnegotiationphaseconcludes

2015

• 5April-secondfutureactdetermination(ML70505,70506maybedone)• 21August-12nativetitleapplicantsreplacethreeapplicants• 2October-WJFamilyCouncilmakesubmissiontoUnitedNations• 14October-FederalEnvironmentalMinisterre-approvesmine

2016

• 19March-ILUAisrejectedataclaimgroupmeeting• 3April-QueenslandGovernmentissueML70441,70505,70506toAdani• 16April-ILUAisauthorisedatacontestedAdani-convenedmeeting• 22June-NNTTregistersILUAandWJFamilyCouncillodgeobjection• 19August-FederalCourtrejectsWJFamilyCouncil'sjudicialreview• 25November-SupremeCourtrejectsWJFamilyCounci'sjudicialreview

2017 • 2February-McGladedecision• ILUAauthorisedinApril2016maybeinvalidated

Figure2.2AdaniCarmichaelCoalMinedevelopmenttimeline

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NegotiationBreakdown

ThefirstphaseofnegotiationsbetweenAdaniandtheWanganandJagalingou

peoplefailedtoproduceanagreement.Basedontheavailableevidence,it

appearsthatthenativetitleapplicantshadnegotiatedingoodfaithof

reachinganagreement(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).The

applicantsdidnotabandonordisengagefromnegotiationsatanystage,but

continuedtoworktowardsanILUAthatwouldcreatelong-termbenefitsfor

theWanganandJagalingoucommunity.ThefailuretosettleadealwithAdani

canbeattributedtoavarietyoffactors.TheWanganandJagalingouapplicants

andAdanihadmisalignedexpectationsinrelationtothestatusandschedule

ofnegotiations.Asaresult,Adanisoughtauthorisationfromathirdpartyto

meetitsdeadlineandthiswasperceivedasanattempttounderminethe

authorityoftheapplicants.Theapplicantswereultimatelydissatisfiedwith

thedealonoffer,asthetermsofagreementwerenotsensitivetokey

Indigenousinterests(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).

UnalignedExpectations

ThefirstphaseofnegotiationsbeganinMay2011,priortotheofficial

notificationdatefortheCarmichaelCoalMineinNovember2011.

NegotiationswereconductedbetweenAdaniandtheWanganandJagalingou

applicantsfor24months,endinginDecember2012.Whileitappearsthat

negotiationsremainedon-trackforthemajorityofthisperiod,theapplicants

submittedanumberofcontentionstotheNNTTinrelationtotheir

engagementwithAdani(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).

Adani’sdelayedresponsetotheapplicants’initialpositionpaperwasraisedas

aconcern.Theresponseletterreceivedafteraseven-monthdelayincludedan

increasedgeographicalscopeofconsent,anexpansiontheapplicantswould

havetoconsideratlength(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).While

theapplicants’positionpaperhadbeenbasedonthesurrenderof2,700

hectaresofnativetitle,thisareahadexpandedto5,060hectaresinAdani’s

responseletter.Thecompanyhadalsosetthedeadlinetoconclude

negotiationsinearlyOctober2012,expectingtheapplicantstorevisetheir

positioninlessthanthreemonthsandconsenttothedealonoffer.Whilethe

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applicantsacceptedtheexpandedsurrenderoftheirnativetitlerightsinthe

revisedproposal,theyfeltunderpressuretoconsenttotheagreementwithin

Adani’sdevisedtimeframe(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).

Whiletheapplicantshadaimedtomeettheagreementschedule,“theydidnot

agreetobecommittedtothegranteeparty’stimeframes”(AdaniMiningv.

JessieDiver&Others,2013,p.30),nordidthey“giveanunqualifiedassurance

thattheywould[meetthegranteeparty’srequirements]”(p.37).Atameeting

inlateSeptember2012,theapplicants’feltthattheclosedeadlinewas‘forcing

theirhand’andAdanihad‘pushedhard’tohavetheILUAsigned(Adani

Miningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).

EarlierinSeptember2012,amonthbeforeAdaniexpectedtheagreementto

beauthorised,theapplicantschangedlegalrepresentation(AdaniMiningv.

JessieDiver&Others,2013).Thisdecisionhighlightedtheapplicants’concern

fortheirinterests,asthechangeoccurredwhenAdanihadexpandedthe

scopeofconsents.Someoftheapplicantsexpresseddissatisfactionwiththe

directionthatnegotiationsweretravellinginundertheguidanceoftheformer

legaladvisors(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).Thechangealso

demonstratedtheapplicants’intentiontocontinuenegotiationsanddevelopa

strongeragreement.However,itwasunlikelythatabetterdealcouldbe

negotiatedintimetomeetAdani’sdeadline.

Adani’srealisationthattheapplicantswishedtoprolongnegotiationsinorder

tosettleanimprovedILUAcreatedariftbetweenthetwoparties.Adani’s

conductbecamerigidandunwillingtoconsideradditionaltermsof

agreement.Inaletterandteleconference,theapplicants’legalrepresentative

Chalk&Fitzgeraldproposedalifeofmineservicescontractbeincludedinthe

agreement(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).Alifeofmineservices

contractwouldinvolvethepartnershipofTransfieldServicesandtheWangan

andJagalingoucommunitytoprovidetheserviceandmaintenanceofthe

CarmichaelProjectcamps.Thecontractwouldprovidelong-termbenefitsfor

thecommunity,generatingemploymentopportunitiesandbusiness

ownership.Iftheservicescontractwereincluded,theWanganandJagalingou

peoplewerewillingtoacceptthesettlementdeal.However,Adanicontended

thatitwouldnotincludealifeofmineservicescontractintheILUAand

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viewedtheproposalasanattempttoresetthepathofnegotiations(Adani


WhileAdaniwasadamantthattheapplicantswerecommittedtothe

agreementscheduleandwouldsigntheILUAinOctober2012,itappearsboth

parties’perceptionofthestagereachedinnegotiationshadbecome

increasinglyunaligned.Theapplicantswereunwillingtogivetheirconsentto

theexistingtermsofagreementinAdani’sbestsettlementoffer(AdaniMining

v.JessieDiver&Others,2013).Astheyweredissatisfiedwiththedirectionof

negotiations,theapplicantschangedlegalrepresentativeswiththehopethat

itwouldassistthemtonegotiateastrongeragreement.WhenAdani’s

agreementschedulestartedtoelapse,theapplicantsattemptedtonegotiatea

betterdealfortheWanganandJagalingoucommunitythroughtheinclusionof

alifeofmineservicescontract(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).

However,theireffortswereunsuccessfulasAdaniwasunwillingto

accommodatethecontractorextendnegotiations.ThesolutionforAdaniwas

simple,toapproachtheStateforitsmininggrantsandavoidfurtherdelay.

UnderminingAuthority

WhenthelikelihoodofhavinganagreementsignedinOctober2012beganto

diminish,AdanisoughtauthorisationfromaWanganandJagalingouaffiliate

thathadnopreviousinvolvementinnegotiations.Thisoccurredattheendof

2012,afterAdanihadfiledafutureactdeterminationforitsminingleasebut

thecasewasstillawaitingsubmissionsbyallparties.

InDecember2012,Adaniattemptedtosidelinetheauthorityoftheapplicants

andseekauthorisationfromtheWanganandJagalingouTraditionalOwners

AboriginalCorporation(WJCorporation).TheWJCorporationisa

representativebodywithaboardofWanganandJagalingoufamily

representatives(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).Whileits

membershipiscomprisedofmanyWanganandJagalingouclaimants,italso

representspeoplewhoarenotclaimants.PatrickMalonetoldtheNNTTthat

themembershipoftheWJCorporationincluded‘largenumbers’ofpeople

whowerenotdescendantsofthe12familiesthatconstitutetheclaimgroup

(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).

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ThefunctionoftheWJCorporationisseldommentionedintheavailable

evidence,soitisdifficulttodistinguishthedifferencebetweentheWJ

CorporationandtheWanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncil(WJFamily

Council).TheroleoftheWJFamilyCouncilwillbediscussedinthefollowing

chapter.AccordingtotheaffidavitsofthenativetitleapplicantsinAdani

Miningv.JessieDiver&Others(2013),theWJCorporationshareddifferent

viewstotheapplicantsandcannotbeconsideredfullyrepresentativeofthe

claimgroup.

FollowingChalk&Fitzgerald’sproposalforalifeofmineservicescontract,

AdanimadeafinalefforttohaveitsproposedILUAsigned.InNovember2012,

Adanieffectivelysidesteppedtheapplicantsandbegancorrespondencewith

theWJCorporationandtheirlegalrepresentativesJustUsLawyers(Adani

Miningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).Adaniconvenedameetingin

collaborationwiththeWJCorporationon1December2012inanattemptto

havetheagreementauthorisedbytheWanganandJagalingoupeople.While

theNNTTdeemedthisapproachas‘opportunistic’,theapplicantsfeltAdani’s

conductunderminedtheirauthorityandexacerbateddivisionswithinthe

WanganandJagalingoucommunity(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,

2013).ItwasalsostatedthattheWJCorporationrepresentedpeoplewho

werenotregisteredclaimantsandsomememberswereseekingtounseatthe

applicants.TheseconcernswereexpressedinseveralletterstoAdanisentin

mid-November2012.Despitethis,theauthorisationmeetingwasnot

cancelledandaresolutionwaspassedontheday.However,theresolution

rejectedtheILUAonofferandrecommendedadditionaltermstobeincluded

intheagreement(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).

AdanicontinuedtocommunicatedirectlywiththeWJCorporationwhileit

wasawareofadisputebetweentheapplicantsandtheWJCorporationboard

members.Theapplicantsareentrustedwiththeresponsibilitytorepresent

theinterestsoftheclaimgroupduringnegotiations(Duff,2017;NNTT,2017).

WhileAdani’sactionswerenotconsideredillegal,itsdecisiontosuspend

negotiationswiththeapplicantsandseekauthorisationfromagroupit

deemedasequallyrepresentativeoftheclaimgroupunderminedtheroleof

theapplicants(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).

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Whilesomeregisteredclaimantswouldhaveattendedthe1December2012

meeting,andtheapplicantPatrickMalonemovedthemotiontoadoptthe

resolutionontheday,theconductofAdanihighlightsitsunwillingnessto

compromiseonitsfinalsettlementdeal(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,

2013).Adaniplacedtheapplicantsinachallengingposition,wherebyan

unauthorisedrepresentativebodywasdelegatedinfluenceduringapivotal

stageofnegotiations.Thisoccurredwithoutthesupportoftheapplicants.It

appearsthatAdani’sdecisiontogivepowertoathirdpartywasdonewiththe

intentionthatthemeetingattendeeswouldsettlefortheILUAonoffer.

AnUnsatisfactoryAgreement

BothAdaniandtheWanganandJagalingouapplicantspresentanumberof

conflictingclaimsaboutthecircumstancesthatledtothecollapseof

negotiations.Itisunclearwhetherdisagreementscanbeascribedto

miscommunicationordeliberatemisinformation.However,whatbecomes

clearisthattheapplicantswerenotsatisfiedwiththetermsofagreement.The

applicantsstatedinalettertoAdanithatwithoutalifeofmineservices

contractthecompensationaspectoftheILUAwouldbe“whollydeficient”

(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013,p.89).Inalettersentinmid-

OctobertoAdani,theapplicantscontendedthat,“thecompensationput

forwardinAdani’sofferof24September2012foramineofthisscaleand

impactwouldotherwisebeseriouslyinadequate”(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver

&Others,2013,p.73).Thelifeofmineservicescontractwasproposedinthe

letterandindicatedthatwiththecontractensured,theILUAwouldbe

acceptable.However,Adaniwasunwillingtonegotiateaservicescontract

withtheapplicantsandsoughtauthorisationelsewherebeforeturningtothe

Stateforapproval.

Intheprocessofnegotiatingagreementswithgovernmentanddevelopers,

Indigenouscommunitieswishtoattaina‘betterlife’inbothaneconomicand

culturalsense(O’Faircheallaigh,2006).Somefutureactscanproduceshort-

andlong-termopportunitiesforlocalsandsomeIndigenouspeoplestrongly

supportminingdevelopments(Behrendt&Strelein,2001;O’Faircheallaigh,

2006).However,thecumulativeeffectscausedbyminingcanbedamagingto

landandculture.Manynativetitlegroupsattempttostrikeabalancebetween

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thematerialandculturalbenefitsofdevelopmentprojects.Whilefinancial

gainmaybebeneficialforunder-resourcedcommunities,itmaynotbethe

goalthatagreementsaresignedatthedetrimentofconnectiontocountryand

culture(O’Faircheallaigh,2006).Thetermsofagreementmusttherefore

containadequatebenefitstojustifytheimpactofdevelopmentsontraditional

land.

Inthiscase,theapplicantsweredissatisfiedwiththeILUAputforwardand

requiredmoretimetonegotiateastrongeragreement.However,theywere

unabletostrikeadealtheyfeltcompensatedforthesurrenderofnativetitle.

Adani,unwillingtoextendtheirtimeframe,optedtohavetheStategranttheir

miningleasewithoutIndigenousconsent.

AnEmergingPattern

Thefirstphaseofnegotiationsreflectthecomplexitiesobservedinsimilar

casestudies.TheCarmichaelCoalMineisalarge-scaledevelopmentthathas

placedAustralia’snativetitlesystemunderscrutinyandtesteditscapacityto

protectIndigenousrightsandinterests.Largeresourceprojectsoftenbecome

problematicwhentheyencounternativetitleforanumberofreasons.

WhentheWanganandJagalingoupeoplerefusedtosignadealwithAdani,the

companyensuredthatthefailuretoobtainconsentdidnotcausefurtherdelay

andapproachedtheNNTT.TheinvolvementoftheStatehaddesirable

outcomesforAdani.Asitsschedulebegantoelapse,Adanithreatenedto

arbitratethematteriftheagreementwasnotsigned.Inalettertothe

applicantsafewdaysbeforethedeadline,Adaniindicateditwouldfilea

futureactdeterminationapplicationwiththeNNTTiftheapplicants’change

oflawyersweretodelayitsschedule.Theletterexchangedbetweenthelegal

representativesofAdaniandtheWanganandJagalingouapplicantsstated,“If

theILUAweretobeauthorisedon1December2012,thegranteepartywould

considerdiscontinuingitsfutureactdeterminationapplication”(AdaniMining

v.JessieDiver&Others,2013,p.22).Thiscommunicationputtheapplicants

underpressuretoaccepttheagreementorhavetheStateGovernment

compulsorilyacquiretheirland.TheliteraturehasobservedthattheState

consistentlyrulesinfavourofmininginterests(O’Faircheallaigh,2006;Ritter,

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40

2009;Scambary,2013).ThisisreflectedintheNNTT’sdecisiontoapprovethe

CarmichaelCoalMinewhenAdanisoughtafutureactdetermination.

TheFederalGovernmenthasincreasinglytaskeddeveloperswiththeroleof

fundingnegotiations(Burnside,2008;O’Faircheallaigh,2006;Scambary,

2013;Ritter,2009).Thispresentsaconflictofinterestforresource

companies,asitreducestheimpartialityofthefutureactprocessandcan

underminethebargainingpositionofIndigenousgroups(Scambary,2013;

Ritter,2009).Theheadsofdevelopmentprojectscontrolthefundsdistributed

inthecourseofnegotiationsandcanrefusetoprovidecertainadvisorsor

evenchoosetosuspendfunding.Therolecanbeusedstrategicallytopressure

Indigenousgroupsintoacceptingweakagreements(O’Faircheallaigh,2006;

Scambary,2013).

AdanimetthecostsofnegotiationswiththeWanganandJagalingoupeople.

Fundingprimarilyincludedtravelcostsformeetingsandpaidlegaladvice

(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013;AdaniMiningv.Adrian

Burragubba&Others,2015).Inthefirstphaseofnegotiations,Adani

threatenedtodenytheapplicantsfundingfornewlegaladvisors.Adani

expresseddiscontentovertheapplicants’decisiontochangelawyersin

September2012andstatedthatitwas“unlikelytoagreetoextracostsof

fundinglegalrepresentation”(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013,p.

55).Thecompanysubsequentlyagreedtofundmeetingsbetweenthe

applicantsandtheirnewlawyersontheconditionthatanagreementwould

bereachedbythedeviseddeadline.Thisreflectstheconductofdevelopers

observedintheliterature,wherebycontroloverfundsleadstothetendency

tosetconditionsandwithholdfundingifanIndigenousgroupseekstoextend

oralternegotiations(O’Faircheallaigh,2006;Scambary,2013)

WhileAdanideniedthatitexacerbateddivisionsbyinvolvingtheWJ

Corporationinnegotiations,theapplicantsremainedadamantthatitwould

perpetuateconflictwithintheWanganandJagalingoucommunity(Adani

Miningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).Adani’scollaborationwithaseparate

representativebodyeffectivelytookpowerandauthorityawayfromthe

individualsvotedintospeakonbehalfontheclaimgroup.Whilethecompany

acknowledgeditsawarenessofdivisioninthecommunity,itstillactedto

furtheritsowninterests.

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ItisclearfromthefirstphaseofnegotiationsthatwhileIndigenousrights

exist,theycanbeunderminedwhenrequiredtocompetewiththepowerof

mininginterests.Whencollectiverights,suchastherighttonegotiate(RTN),

failtoproducedesirableoutcomesformininginterests,theoverridingpowers

ofgovernmentaresoughttoremedyobstaclestodevelopment.Asoutlinedin

thetheoriesofKymlickaandBuchanan,therightsaffordedundertheNTA

havefulfilledthemandateofcollectiverights.However,examiningthe

tangibleoutcomesoftheserightsexposestheseverelimitationsofthe

process.Criticalracetheory(CRT)wouldpostulatethatthedominanceof

‘white’interests,whichprioritisemininginterestsintheAustraliancontext,

underminesIndigenouslandrights.

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Chapter4

TheFirstDetermination

Adanihassoughtafutureactdeterminationontwooccasions.Thecompany

approachedtheNationalNativeTitleTribunal(NNTT)tohaveitsthreemining

leasesapproved,butnottoarbitrateanIndigenousLandUseAgreement

(ILUA).Thus,negotiationscontinuedbetweenAdaniandtheWanganand

Jagalingouapplicantsdespitetwodeterminationoutcomesthatruledin

favouroftheCarmichaelCoalMine.ThefirstfutureactdeterminationinMay

2013concernedoneinitialmininglease,andtheseconddeterminationin

April2015concernedtwofurtherminingleases.Thischapterwillfocusonthe

May2013determinationandthedivisionwithintheclaimgroupthat

occurredthereafter.

WhenthefirstphaseofnegotiationshadexceededAdani’sdeadlinewithno

agreementoutcome,thecompanyfiledafutureactdeterminationapplication

withtheNNTTon7November2012.Sevenmonthslater,on7May2013,the

NNTTdelivereditsdeterminationinfavourofthemininglease(ML)70441.

ThedecisiongavetheStateGovernmentagreenflagtoapprovethetenement

requiredtocommencedevelopmentfortheCarmichaelCoalMine.Adaniand

theStateGovernmentsoughtarulingthatthefutureactmaybedonewithout

conditions.Itappearsthatbothpartiesactedintandem,routinelyechoingthe

sameperspectivesintheirsubmissionstotheNNTT.TheNNTTruledthatthe

miningleasecouldbegrantedonthebasisofpublicinterest.

TheNativeTitleAct(NTA)permitsanypartytoseekarbitrationif

negotiationsexceedsixmonthswithoutasettlementreached.Anypartymay

fileafutureactdeterminationapplicationattheNNTT(NNTT,2008a,2016;

NTSCORP,2017).Inmakingafutureactdetermination,theNNTTmust

interpretsectionsoftheNTAtodeterminewhetherafutureactmayormay

notbedone(O’Faircheallaigh,2006;Ritter,2009).Theprocessinvolvesthree

parties:thenativetitleapplicants,theStateGovernment,andthegrantee

party.Allpartiesareaskedtomakesubmissionsofanycontentionsor

evidencetotheNNTTtoassistitsdetermination.IftheNNTTrulesinfavourof

theproposedfutureact,thegovernmenthaspermissiontogranttenementin

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theabsenceofanagreementreachedbetweenthegranteeandthetraditional

owners(NNTT,2008a).

InitsMay2013determination,theNNTTconcludedthattheapplicantsdid

notsubmitsufficientevidencetodemonstratetheexerciseorenjoymentof

theirrightsandinterestsintheclaimarea(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&

Others,2013).TheNNTTruledthattheapplicants’submissionsprovided

broadassertionsofanimpactontheirrightsandinterestsbutofferedno

specificevidenceabouthowtheserightsandinterestswereexercisedor

enjoyed.TheStateGovernmentandAdanibothclaimedthattheCarmichael

CoalMinewouldbeunlikelytoaffectthenativetitlegroup’senjoymentof

theirrightsandinterests.TheStateGovernmentandAdanirepeatedly

emphasisedtheeconomicbenefitsoftheCarmichaelProjectforthelocal

community,theStateofQueenslandandthewidernationaleconomy(Adani


Theapplicantsrequestedthatconditionsbeattachedtothemininglease

shouldtheNNTTdeterminethatthefutureactmaybedone.TheNNTT

dismissedtherecommendedconditionsandhandeddownitsdetermination

on7May2013,rulingthattheStateGovernmentmaygrantML70441without

conditions(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013).

TheStateGovernmentandAdani’sresponsehasbeenbasedontheirviews

expressedintheNNTT’sdetermination.However,itmustbeappreciatedthat

thefullsubmissionstotheNNTTarenotpubliclyavailable.Theevidence

reliesontheNNTT’sinterpretationofthosesubmissions.Nevertheless,the

StateGovernmentandAdanireflectedsimilarpositions,emphasisingthesame

benefitsoftheprojectandarguingthattherightsandinterestsofthe

applicantswouldnotbeaffected.Theseviewspersistdespitetheapplicants’

claimthattherewouldbeasignificantimpactontheenjoymentoftheirrights

andinterestsasaconsequenceofthedevelopment(AdaniMiningv.Jessie

Diver&Others,2013).

Whiletherewasnomediacommentaryorparliamentarydebateonthe

outcomeoftheMay2013determination,asignificanteventoccurredatthe

peakofnegotiations.ThiseventdemonstratedthecloserelationsoftheState

GovernmentandAdani.InlateNovember2012,thethenQueenslandPremier,

CampbellNewman,ledaseven-daytrademissiontoIndiatodiscuss

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investmentandexportingprospectsforQueensland’sindustries(Hodge,

2012;QueenslandGovernment,2012;Readfearn,2015).Newmanhighlighted

thattheoverseasmissionwould,“includemeetingswithcompaniessuchas

AdaniGroup,GVKandTataGroup–companieswithdiversifiedinterestsand

investmentsacrossarangeofkeyindustrysectors”(QueenslandParliament.

RecordofProceedings,November9,2012,p.2955).

Newman,formerMinisterforResourcesandEnergyMartinFergusonanda

76-personcohortofQueenslandbusinessmenflewtotheAdani-owned

MundraPortonaprivateAdanijet.Intheevening,theyattendedareception

attheprivateestateofGautamAdaniinAhmedabad(Hodge,2012;Readfearn,

2015).InareportonthetrademissiontabledtotheQueenslandParliament,

NewmanreiteratedhissupportforAdani:“Iacknowledgethelarge

investmentmadebytheAdaniGroupintoQueensland’sresourcessectorsand

indicatedcommitmenttoworkingwiththeAdaniGrouptoensuretheir

investmentinQueenslandissupported”(Newman,2013,p.29).

DuringthetrademissiontheQueenslandGovernmentmadeaclear

commitmenttosupportAdani,whileinthesamemonththecompanyhad

actedtosidestepthetraditionalownersoftheGalileeBasin.Theresponseof

theStateGovernmentandAdanibeforetheNNTTreflectacohesiveand

sharedambitiontoensuretheCarmichaelProjectproceeded.TheState

Governmentappearedunawareorunsupportiveoftheconcernsraisedbythe

nativetitlegroup.

TheSplitintheCommunity

ThesecondphaseofnegotiationscommencedinOctober2013andendedin

October2014.AsnegotiationsfailedtoproduceanagreementbetweenAdani

andtheWanganandJagalingoupeopleafter12months,Adaniapproachedthe

Statetoarbitratethematterforasecondtime.Inthisrespect,thesecond

phaseofnegotiationshadsimilarresultstothefirst.However,duringthis

periodtheWanganandJagalingoucommunitybecamedeeplydividedand

splitintotwofactions.OnesupportedtheCarmichaelCoalMineifthe

agreementwassensitivetoIndigenousinterests,whereastheotherwas

opposedtotheprojectandanydealoffered.Whilethenativetitlesystem

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disenfranchisedtheinterestsofthelattergroup,theformerstillhadthe

capacitytostrikeastrongbargainingpositionandnegotiateamutually

beneficialagreement.Thereisevidencetoindicatethatinternaldivision

contributedtotheunresolvedoutcomeofthesecondphaseofnegotiations.

ThisanalysislargelyreliesonthedeterminationsoftheNNTTanditsaccount

ofeventsandcorrespondencerelevanttoitsdecisions.Thesecondhalfofthis

chapteranalysestheevidenceprovidedinAdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba

&Others(2015),a46-pagelegaldocument.Whenthesecondphaseof

negotiationsendedinOctober2014,Adanifiledafutureactdetermination

applicationwiththeNNTT.Inthisdetermination,theapplicantschosenotto

makeasubmission.Intheabsenceofanymaterialsorcontentionssubmitted

totheNNTTonbehalfofthenativetitlegroup,itisdifficulttodeterminethe

factorsthatledtothecollapseofnegotiationsinthissecondphase.Incontrast

tothepreviousfutureactdeterminationwhereintheapplicantsdetailedtheir

experienceduringthefirstphaseofnegotiations,thesecondphaselacksthe

evidencetoformachronologicalaccountofwhatoccurred.AstheNNTT

assertedinrelationtothesecondphase:“Withintheevidencethereisminimal

informationaboutILUAnegotiations”(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&

Others,2015,p.45).

Whilethereislessevidenceavailabletodetailthesecondphaseof

negotiations,itisclearthattheWanganandJagalingoupeoplewere

dissatisfiedwiththetermsofagreement.AtaclaimgroupmeetinginOctober

2014,theproposedILUAwasrejectedbymajorityvote.Thismarkedthe

secondagreementtoberefusedandAdaniimmediatelysoughtarbitrationto

haveML70505andML70506approvedwithoutIndigenousconsent(Adani

Miningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015).

AChangeofRepresentation

WhiletheWanganandJagalingoupeopleappearedtoresembleaunitedbloc

duringthefirstphasenegotiations,acleardivisionemergedinthecourseof

thesecondphase.On7August2014,thesevenpersonsregisteredasthe

nativetitleapplicantsfortheclaimgroupwerereplacedwiththreeapplicants,

twoofwhomwereexistingapplicants.Fiveapplicantswerenotre-appointed

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(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015).WhilePatrickMalone

andIreneWhitehadbeenrepresentativesforthegroupsincethebeginningof

negotiations,AdrianBurragubbawasappointedasanewapplicant.Itappears

adistinctdivisionofopinionwithintheWanganandJagalingoupeople

coincidedwiththechangeofrepresentatives.

Thedominantperspectiveoftheclaimgroupinthefirstphaseofnegotiations

wasawillingnesstoaccepttheCarmichaelProjectandsurrendernativetitleif

asatisfactoryagreementcouldbereached.However,aseparatefaction

emergedwiththeappointmentofAdrianBurragubbainAugust2014.This

‘breakaway’groupwasunwillingtogiveconsenttotheprojectregardlessof

theconditions,compensationorbenefitsincludedintheILUA.Adrian

Burragubba,asanewapplicantandfounderoftheWanganandJagalingou

FamilyCouncil(WJFamilyCouncil),representedtheviewsofthelatter

faction.

TheWJFamilyCouncilisacommunitygroupthatclaimstorepresentthe

interestsoftheWanganandJagalingoupeople(Hunjan,2015;Yoon,2015).It

hasbeendescribedasananti-minegroupthatseekstoconserveandprotect

thelandofthetraditionalownersincentralQueensland(Ker,2016).TheWJ

FamilyCouncilremainsadamantthattheWanganandJagalingoupeopledo

notwanttheCarmichaelCoalMinetoproceedonanyterms.Inamedia

release,AdrianBurragubbastatedthepositionoftheWJFamilyCouncil:

Apittancefromcompensationagreementssignedunderduress,anda

fewminimum-wagejobsinadyingindustry,arenotwhatourpeople,

especiallyouryoungpeople,deserve.ThecrumbsthrownbyAdaniare

notworthsacrificingourdignity,ourfreedomandourancientlegacy

for.NothingAdanioffersupwilleverbeworththedamagethismine

willinflictonlawsandcustoms.(WJFamilyCouncil,2016d,para.14)

Incontrasttotheanti-minerhetoricofAdrianBurragubbaandhiscohort,the

viewsoftheotherapplicants,PatrickMaloneandIreneWhite,remained

consistentwiththestanceadoptedduringthefirstphaseofnegotiations.This

positionacceptedtheestablishmentofthemineonWanganandJagalingou

landbutaimedtonegotiatetermsofagreementthatwouldreturnlong-term

intergenerationalbenefitstothecommunity.Alignedwiththeperspectivethat

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theywereworkingtowardsanagreementwithAdani,theseapplicantschose

towithholdconsentuntiltheILUAofferedsatisfactorybenefits.

PatrickMaloneandIreneWhitedonotappeartobeassociatedwithany

WanganandJagalingouorganisationinparticular,butinsteadrepresentthe

interestsoftheclaimgroupindependently.Theyarenotboardmembersof

theWJCouncilnoristhereanyevidenceoftheirinvolvementattheWJ

Corporation.Inconsiderationofthedisputebetweentheapplicantsandthe

WJCorporationinthefirstphaseofnegotiations,itcanbeassumedthatthe

applicantscontinuetooperateindependentlyoftheWJCorporationandany

otherWJ-affiliatedorganisations.

ItiscommonformembersofIndigenousgroupstosharedifferentviewson

commercialdevelopmentandculturalheritage.Whilesomemayconsiderthe

opportunityforlocaljobsandbusinessownershipasparamount,othersmay

considertheconservationoftraditionallandsandsacredsitestobemore

important(O’Faircheallaigh,2007).Thedividethatemergedinthesecond

phaseofnegotiationsmayreflectthedifferentvalueseachindividualclaimant

hasattachedtoeconomicgrowthandcultureheritage.Thefactionthat

acceptedthedevelopmentoftheminewaswillingtosurrenderpartoftheir

ancestrallandsinexchangeforlong-termeconomicbenefitsforthe

community.Theanti-minefaction,however,consideredtheprotectionof

traditionallandandculturemoreimportantthananycompensationoffered.

Thediscourseoftheanti-minefactionemphasisedtheimminentthreatofthe

developmenttothecultureoftheWanganandJagalingoupeople.InOctober

2015,WJFamilyCouncilmembersAdrianBurragubbaandMurrawahJohnson

madeasubmissiontotheUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteurontheRightsof

IndigenousPeoplesinapleatohavetheirconcernsrecognised.The

submissiondescribedtheintrinsiclinkbetweenlandandcultureforthe

WanganandJagalingoupeople:

Ourlandandwatersareourculture,andourspecialrelationshipwith

themtellsuswhoweare.Ourcultureisinseparablefromthe

conditionofourtraditionallands…Thedevelopmentofthe

CarmichaelMinewouldteartheheartoutofourcountry,rendering

ourlandunrecognisable,anddevastatingtheplaces,animals,plants

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andwater-bodiesthataresoessentialtousandourculture.

(Burragubba&Johnson,2015,p.2)

ARiftBetweentheApplicants

Thedividedopinionbetweentheapplicantsbecameevidentintheirconduct

beforetheNNTT.Thisoccurredafterthesecondphaseofnegotiationshad

elapsedwithoutanoutcome.InJanuary2015,theNNTTwasinformedthat

theapplicantswouldnotbesubmittinganymaterialorcontentionstosupport

theircase(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015).However,

severaldaysfollowingthedeadlineforsubmissions,AdrianBurragubbasent

anunsignedstatementwrittenonbehalfoftheWJFamilyCouncil.The

statementaddressedconcernsinrelationtotheimpactoftheCarmichaelCoal

MineonthetraditionallandandculturalheritageoftheWanganand

Jagalingoupeople(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015).Adrian

Burragubbaallegedthattheapplicants’viewswerenotunanimousandthat

PatrickMaloneandIreneWhitehadtakena‘contrarydirection’tothe

interestsoftheclaimgroup.WhentheNNTTaskedifhisstatementshouldbe

takenintoaccount,theapplicants,Adani,andtheStateGovernmentallagreed

thatitshouldnotbeconsidered(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,

2015;Kos,2016).

AdrianBurragubba’ssubmissiontotheNNTThasnotbeenmadepublicly

availableandhasbeenbroadlysummarisedinitsdetermination.The

summarynotedthathissubmissiondetailedthereasonstheapplicantscould

notparticipateintheproceedings(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&

Others,2015).Initsdetermination,theNNTTdidprovidethefullversionofa

secondstatementmadebyAdrianBurragubba.Thissecondstatement

clarifiedhisargumentandreinforcedthattheWanganandJagalingoupeople

donotconsenttotheCarmichaelCoalMine(AdaniMiningv.Adrian

Burragubba&Others,2015).

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ASenseofPracticalityorObligation

WhileAdrianBurragubbaandhissupporterswerededicatedtoopposingthe

CarmichaelCoalMineregardlessofthedealoffered,theapplicantsand

claimantsthatreflectedawillingnesstoaccommodatetheprojectmayhave

formedtheirperspectivewithawarenesstothelimitationsofnativetitle.At

best,whenanIndigenousgrouprefusestogiveconsent,thecompany’ssocial

licensetooperatemaybeblemishedintheeyesofinvestors(O’Faircheallaigh,

2011;Robertson,2016b;Scambary,2013).TheWanganandJagalingou

claimantswhodonotsupporttheCarmichaelProjectonanytermsareleft

withoutalegislativefoothold.TheStatehadcontinuedtoissueapprovals

despitethefailuretoobtainconsentupuntilthatpoint.

PatrickMaloneandIreneWhitemayhaveactedoutofpracticality,asthey

understandtheexistinglegislationdoesnotenablethemtopreventthemine

butthatthecommunitycouldattainbenefitsifastrongagreementwas

reached.Inanewsarticle,PatrickMalonestatedthat,“eventhoughsome

[WanganandJagalingou]peopledidn’tliketheideaofthemine,mostknewit

wouldprobablygoaheadanditwasbesttotaketheopportunitiesforour

people,togetjobsforthenextgenerations”(McKenna,2015).Thisstatement

acknowledgedtheperspectivesharedamongclaimantswhorecognisethe

limitationsofthenativetitlesystemandtheinevitabilityofminingexpansion.

PatrickMaloneandIreneWhitehavespokenfavourablyaboutsigningan

agreementwithAdanionthebasisthatitdeliverslong-termintergenerational

opportunitiesthatwillflowbacktotheWanganandJagalingoucommunity

(Branco,2015a;McKenna,2015).However,therehavebeenseveraloccasions

wherethemediahasreporteddivergentviews.WhileIreneWhitehas

remainedaproponentoftheCarmichaelCoalMine,PatrickMalonehas

expressedareluctancetoacceptthemine.Thethreeapplicantsappointedin

thesecondphaseofnegotiationsreflectedfargreaterinconsistencyintheir

sentimentstowardsthedevelopmentcomparedtothoseinthefirst

appointment.Atoneendofthespectrum,IreneWhiteremainedpro-mine

whilePatrickMalonewasinitiallyconflictedandthenacceptedthe

inevitabilityofthemine.Attheotherend,AdrianBurragubbawasstrongly

anti-mine.IreneWhiteexpressedherviewsontheCarmichaelCoalMineto

TheAustralianon3December2015,arguingthat“Thedecisionisabout

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workingwithAdanitocreatejobs,createtrainingsothatwecanbuilda

platformforouryoungergeneration”andthattheagreementwould“deliver

genuineandlastingintergenerationalbenefitstoourcommunity“(McKenna,

2015).PatrickMalonehasspokenbothforandagainstthemine.Whilehehas

admittedthathewould“prefertheminetonotgoahead”,hehasalsotold

mediahehadacceptedthattheprojectwouldbeapprovedandhewas

committedtoachievingthebestdealforhiscommunity(Branco,2015,para.

8).

Thecorporatefundingofnegotiationsmaybeafactorthathascausedthose

applicantsengagedinnegotiationsforalongerperiodtofeelmoreobligated

tomatchtheexpectationsofAdani.Responsibleforfundingnegotiations,

Adanihaspaidthetravelcostsoftheapplicantsformeetingsandlobbied

someoftheapplicantsthroughthepaymentofgenerous‘sittingfees’.Sitting

feeshavebeenpaidtoanumberoftheapplicants.On21August2015,nine

newapplicantswereappointedandPatrickMalone,IreneWhiteandAdrian

Burragubbawerere-appointed(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,

2015).

AccordingtoTheGuardian,Adanipaidsevenofthe12applicants,including

PatrickMaloneandIreneWhite,over$10,500collectivelyinexcessoftravel

expensestoattendmeetings(Robertson,2016,2016b;WJFamilyCouncil,

2016).Thesevenapplicantsthatreceivedsittingfeeswereproponentsofthe

CarmichaelProject.Thefiveotherapplicantswereopposedtothe

developmentandrefusedtoacceptpayments(Robertson,2016b).Forsome

applicantswhomayhavehadmoreaccommodatingviewstowardsthemine,

receivingpaymentstoattendmeetingsmayhaveconjuredasenseof

obligation.Theliteraturestronglysupportstheargumentthatthedeveloper’s

responsibilitytofundnegotiationscreatesanunevenpowerdynamicthatcan

considerablyinfluenceagreementoutcomes(Burnside,2008;

O’Faircheallaigh,2006;Scambary,2013;Ritter,2009).

Itappearsthattheriseofananti-minefactionwithintheclaimgroup

thwartedtheoutcomeofnegotiationsinthesecondphase.PatrickMaloneand

IreneWhiteexplainedtothemediathatAdanihadimprovedthetermsof

agreementandtherevisedILUAhadgainedwidespreadsupport.However,

therewasashiftfollowingtheappointmentofAdrianBurragubbaand

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supportfortheofferdiminished.Whenthegroupmettoconsiderthe

agreementinOctober2014,thegrowinganti-minesentimentscausedittobe

voteddown(McKenna,2015).Itislikelythatdividedopinionduringthe

secondphaseofnegotiationscontributedtotheunresolvedoutcome.

FollowingthesecondrejectionoftheILUA,Adaniendednegotiationsand

lodgedafutureactdeterminationapplicationwiththeNNTTon10October

2014(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015).

ItisclearthattheprocessofnegotiationandthelimitationsoftheNTAleftthe

Indigenouscommunityvulnerabletofracturinganddivision,further

underminingtheirinterests.Whentherighttonegotiate(RTN)failstooperate

asintendedandtraditionalownersrefusetoconsenttoadevelopment,these

rightscaneffectivelybenullifiedthroughtherightofallpartiestoarbitrate

thematter.Thischapterhasexaminedtheavenueofarbitration,whereby

AdanihassoughttheoverarchingpowersoftheStatetoadvanceapprovalsin

theabsenceofIndigenousconsent.ThestrengthoftheRTNissubjecttothe

decisionsofmininginterestsandtheStatewhomayseektooverridethe

interestsoftraditionalowners.Ifanagreementfailsactualise,theRTN

becomesaredundantright.

TheoutcomeofthisprocessdemonstratesthattheNTAdoesnotallow

traditionalownerstofullyassertcollectiverights,asconceptualisedinthe

theoriesofKymlickaandBuchanan.Theweaknessesoftherightsaffordedby

nativetitlereflecttheargumentsinherentincriticalracetheory(CRT).CRT

wouldarguethattheapparatusofnativetitlelawhasensuredthatitoffers

almostnolegislativefootholdforIndigenousgroupswhooppose‘white’

interestsinresourcedevelopment.Thus,thedominantinterestsof‘whites’

willalwayssupersedetherightsandinterestsofnativetitlegroups.

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Chapter5

BacktotheTribunal

WhenthesecondphaseofnegotiationsfailedtoproduceanIndigenousLand

UseAgreement(ILUA),Adanisoughtarbitrationfortwofurtherminingleases.

IftheNationalNativeTitleTribunal(NNTT)ruledthatthefutureactmaybe

done,thegovernmentwouldbeabletogranttheminingleasesintheabsence

ofanILUAsignedwiththeWanganandJagalingoupeople.Adanifiledits

secondfutureactdeterminationfortheadditionalminingleases(ML)70505

and70506inOctober2014.TheNNTTdelivereditsdeterminationinfavour

oftheCarmichaelCoalMineon8April2015(AdaniMiningv.Adrian

Burragubba&Others,2015).

Asexaminedinthepreviouschapter,thenativetitleapplicantschosenotto

makeasubmissiontotheNNTTforthisdeterminationwiththeexceptionof

AdrianBurragubba’stwostatements(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&

Others,2015).Inconsiderationofhisstatements,theStateGovernmentand

theNNTTbothraisedconcernsaboutits‘authenticity’and‘authority’.Afew

daysbeforethedetermination,theNNTTreceivedaletterconfirmingAdrian

BurragubbaasanauthorisedrepresentativeoftheWJFamilyCouncil.

However,hisstatementswerestilldismissedonthebasisthattheyfailed“in

termsofauthority”(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015).The

NNTTreasonedthatsincehissubmissiondidnotreceiveanysupportfromthe

otherapplicants,itshouldnotbetakenintoconsiderationasevidence.

ConsistentwiththeirsubmissionintheMay2013determination,theState

GovernmentandAdanibothreflectsimilarviewsandsoughtadetermination

thatwouldimposenoconditionsonthetwominingleases(AdaniMiningv.

AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015).Bothpartiescontendedthatthegrantof

miningleasesintheareawasunlikelytohaveasignificanteffectonthenative

titlegroup’senjoymentoftheirrightsandinterests.However,itwasadmitted

thattheywereunawareofwhethertheclaimgroupexercisedtheirrightsand

interestsintheproposedarea.InresponsetothelistedcriterionoftheNTA,

theStateGovernmentandAdaniclaimedthattheywereunawareofanylikely

effectontheclaimgroup’swayoflife,cultureandtraditions;developmentof

social,culturalandeconomicstructures;freedomofaccessandfreedomto

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carryoutritesandceremonies;oreffectontheareasorsitesofparticular

significance(AdaniMiningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015).

TheStateGovernmentattributedthefailureofnegotiationstothedivision

betweentheapplicants.InitssubmissiontotheNNTT,itargued,“theNative

TitleParty[theapplicants]andGranteePartywereclosetoauthorisingan

IndigenousLandUseAgreement(ILUA)…butthatissuesarosewithinthe

NativeTitlePartyatthetimeofauthorisationoftheproposedILUA”(Adani

Miningv.AdrianBurragubba&Others,2015,p.38).Consistentwiththeviews

expressedintheMay2013determination,theStateGovernmentandAdani

highlightedtheeconomicsignificanceoftheCarmichaelProjectforlocal

communities,theStateofQueenslandandwiderAustralia.

TheStateGovernmentandAdanibothclaimedthattheCarmichaelCoalMine

wasinthepublicinterest.TheStateGovernmentemphasisedtheimportance

oftheminingsectorwithinthenationaleconomy,assertingthat,“thegrantof

explorationpermitsiscentraltothemaintenanceofahealthyandfeasible

miningindustryinQueensland…[and]theminingindustryplaysapivotalrole

inmaintainingAustralia’seconomicstrength”(AdaniMiningv.Adrian

Burragubba&Others,2015,p.43).Intheabsenceofanymaterialsubmitted

thatchallengedtheviewsofthemine’sproponents,theNNTTdelivered

anotherrulinginfavourofAdaniandattachednoconditionstoitsmining

leases.

ResponsetotheMedia

FollowingtheApril2015determination,PatrickMalonerevealedtothemedia

thattheapplicants’decisionnottomakeasubmissiontotheNNTTwas

becauseitcouldcompromisethependingrecognitionoftheWanganand

Jagalingounativetitleclaim(Branco,2015a).WhilePatrickMaloneremained

alignedwiththepro-minecohortduringnegotiations,attimeshehas

expressedcriticismsofthenativetitlesystemandtheCarmichaelProjectin

hisstatementstothemedia.Hehasspokenoftheinherentbiasinthefuture

actprocessandcontendedthattheNNTTisunfairlyskewedtowardsthe

interestsofminingcompaniesandthegovernment.Havinganawarenessof

theNNTT’stendencytoruleinthefavouroftheproponents,hefelthispeople

KateArnautovic,2017

54

wereunlikelytohaveasuccessfuloutcomeinthedetermination(Branco,

2015a).Hecontended,“We’relookingatanendgamehereandtheendgame

istomakesurethatwegetournativetitledetermination…Ifwe'dhavegone

intothisthingwherewe'regoingtolosetheywouldhaveusedthatagainstus

havingournativetitlerightsrecognised”(Branco,2015,para.10).Itappears

thattheapplicants’anticipationofanunsuccessfuloutcomebeforetheNNTT

hastriggeredconcernsthatitcouldstandinthewayoftheirwiderinterests.

Adani’sresponseinthemediafollowingtheNNTT’sseconddetermination

demonstrateditsreluctancetoacknowledgemembersoftheclaimgroupwho

wereopposedtotheCarmichaelProject.Thecompanyremainedadamantthat

theWanganandJagalingoupeoplesupportedthemineandthatitwas

negotiatingwiththose‘authorised’torepresentthegroup(Branco,2015;

Borschmann,2015;“Qld:Traditionalowners,”2015).Instatementstothe

media,AdaniclaimedthatAdrianBurragubbawasunauthorisedtospeakon

behalfoftheclaimgroup(“Qld:Traditionalowners,”2015;Borschmann,

2015;Branco,2015;Frost,2015).InMarch2015,anAdanispokespersontold

ABCNews,“AdanicontinuestonegotiatewiththeW&Jauthorised[emphasis

added]representatives…AdanidoesnotbelievethattheW&Jdon’twantthis

mine”(Borschmann,2015,para.20-21).TheallegationsagainstAdrian

BurragubbaoccurredwhentheNNTTwastakingsubmissionsandcontinued

formonthsafterthedeterminationwashandeddowninApril2015.

Adani’sattempttosuppresstheviewsofAdrianBurragubbathrough

challenginghisauthorityunderminesthelegitimacyofthenativetitlesystem.

WhilehehadbeenformallyappointedtorepresenttheviewsoftheWangan

andJagalingoupeople,Adanicontinuedtodismisshisauthoritytospeakon

theirbehalfandchosetoliaisewiththeapplicantswhoweremore

accommodatingofitsproject(Burragubba&Johnson,2015).Initssubmission

totheUNSpecialRapporteurontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples,theWJ

FamilyCouncilallegedthat,“[Adani’s]actionsincludeunderminingand

challengingtherightofourauthorisedseniorspokesperson[Adrian

Burragubba]tospeakandbeconsulted”(Burragubba&Johnson,2015,p.2).

ThesubmissionalsoaddressedAdani’seffortstousedivisiontoadvancetheir

interests:

KateArnautovic,2017

55

thecompanyattemptedtouseadivide-and-conquertacticby

excludingourseniorauthorisedspokesperson,AdrianBurragubba,

whowasatthetimeoneofthethreepeoplecomprisingtheApplicant

onthenativetitleclaim,frommeetingsatwhichAdaniMining

attemptedtosecureagreementswiththetwootherApplicantgroup

members…thecompanyhasfalselystatedthatitwas“dealingwithall

dulyauthorisedrepresentatives”oftheWanganandJagalingoupeople

whenitwasdealingonlywiththetwomembersoftheformer

Applicantgroupwhodidnotrepresentthewishesofourpeople.

(Burragubba&Johnson,2015,p.18)

WhileAdrianBurragubbahadexpressedviewsthatstoodinisolationtothe

viewsofPatrickMaloneandIreneWhite,hisoppositiontotheCarmichael

ProjectwassharedwithasectionoftheWanganandJagalingoucommunity.

PatrickMalonerespondedtoAdani’sallegationsandtoldmediathatAdrian

Burragubba“hadasmuchrighttospeakashimselforMsWhite”(Branco,

2015,para.17).Thus,despitethedividedopinionbetweentheapplicantsin

themonthsprecedingandfollowingtheApril2015determination,this

statementconfirmsthatatleastoneoftheapplicantssupportedAdrian

Burragubbaasanauthorisedrepresentativeand,unlikeAdani,didnotdispute

hisauthoritytospeakonbehalfoftheclaimgroup.

Theliteraturerevealedthatminingcompaniesandgovernmentsarequickto

identifyandcapitaliseonanydisunityordivisionwithinnativetitlegroups

(O’Faircheallaigh,2007;Marsh,2013).Internalconflictwilloftenbeexploited

tobenefitvestedinterestsandwheredivisionhasbeenidentified,weaker

agreementoutcomeshavefollowedforIndigenousgroups(O’Faircheallaigh,

2007).

InthedaysfollowingtheNNTT’sApril2015determination,Adanimade

statementstothemediathathighlightedthedivisionithadidentifiedbetween

thenativetitleapplicants(Branco,2015).AnAdanispokespersontoldThe

BrisbaneTimes,“Adaniisawareofatleastoneinstancewheretheauthorised

majorityoftheW&JapplicantinstructedthattheNNTTshoulddisregardan

individualstatementofoneofitsgroup”(Branco,2015,para.11).Alongwith

identifyingdisunity,Adanimadepublicstatementstounderminethe

authorityoftheapplicantwhowasleastsupportiveofitsproject.This

KateArnautovic,2017

56

responsecouldbeviewedasanattempttostifleemergingviewswithinthe

claimgroupthatcoulddelayorthwartnegotiations.

ParliamentaryOversight

TheStateGovernment’sresponsetothetwodeterminationsoftheNNTTis

consistentwiththediscourseofrepresentativesinStateParliament.During

parliamentarydebatesin2014and2015,membershaveexpressedtheir

supportfortheCarmichaelProjectandstressedtheimportanceofthe

resourcessectortoQueensland.

InMay2014,theformerPremierCampbellNewmandeclared,“weare

particularlyexcitedtoseetheAdaniCarmichaelprojectgetgoing”

(QueenslandParliament.RecordofProceedings,May21,2014,p.1662).In

May2015,theMinisterforStateDevelopmentandNaturalResourcesand

Mines,AnthonyLynham,stated,“Thereisnodoubtthattheresourcessector

drivestheQueenslandeconomy…Ajobsfocusedgovernmentisagovernment

thatisprotheresourcessector…WeareworkingwithAdaniandhave

demonstratedoursupportfortheproject”(QueenslandParliament.Recordof

Proceedings,May7,2015,p.560).Thisstatement,reflectiveoftheState

Government’ssubmissionstotheNNTT,emphasisestheprioritisationof

miningasakeycomponentoftheState’seconomy.

ThestatementsofministerstothemediareflecttheStateGovernment’s

supportofAdani.InMarch2015,AnthonyLynhamdescribedtheCarmichael

CoalMineasa‘vital’projectforQueensland(“Adani,GVKwinQueensland,”

2015).InJune2015,QueenslandLaborTreasurerCurtisPitttoldFairfax

Media,“wewelcomeAdani’ssignificantinvestmentproposalinQueensland

withtheCarmichaelCoalProjectandenablinginfrastructure”(Cox,2015a,

para.4).TheQueenslandPremierAnnastaciaPalaszczuktoldABCNewsin

October2015,“myGovernmentwillcontinuetoworkwiththecompany

[Adani]abouthowwecandelivertheprojectsthatareneededhereinthis

state”(Hatzakis,2015,para.10).TheresponseoftheStateGovernmentin

parliamentdemonstratesitsoverwhelmingsupportforminingdevelopments.

Thisviewisconsistentwiththewidespreadperceptionofminingexploration

asanintegralnationalinterest.

KateArnautovic,2017

57

TherightsandinterestsoftheWanganandJagalingoupeopleareseldom

mentionedinparliamentarydebate.DespitediscussionoftheCarmichael

ProjectinStateParliament,theoversightofIndigenousconcernshasbeen

largelyabsentwhenthetopicisraised.InMay2016,AnthonyLynhamboasted

the‘positiveprogress’madebetweenAdaniandthetraditionalownerswith

thesettlementofanILUA,declaringthatthiswasasignificantmilestonefor

theadvancementoftheproject(QueenslandParliament.Recordof

Proceedings,May11,2016,p.1670).TheStateParliamenthasmadereference

totheWanganandJagalingoupeopleoncemore,againtopraisedesirable

developmentsinnegotiations.

TheinterestsoftheclaimgrouphavebeendiscussedbrieflyinFederal

Parliamentinthecontextofcontentiousenvironmentallegislation.In

responsetotheEnvironmentProtectionandBiodiversityConservation

Amendment(Standing)Bill,introducedinAugust2015,LaborMember

MelissaParkeacknowledgedthattheimpactsoftheCarmichaelCoalMine

wereofconcerntothetraditionalownersintheregion.Shemadereferenceto

AdrianBurragubbaasarepresentativeoftheWanganandJagalingoucohort

opposedtothemine,andhighlightedthattheproposedlegislationwould

unfairlyrestrictthegroup’sabilitytochallengesimilardevelopmentsinthe

courts(ParliamentofAustralia.RecordofProceedings,September9,2015,p.

9595).

Whiletheconcernsofenvironmentalgroupshavebeendebatedatlengthin

FederalParliament,itsmembershavefailedtoacknowledgetheinterestsof

theWanganandJagalingoupeople.Whilethemediahascapturedtheviewsof

variousrepresentativesoftheWanganandJagalingoucommunity,there

appearstobelittleparliamentaryoversighttoconsidertheinterestsofthis

groupduringthephasesofapproval.TheWanganandJagalingoupeoplehave

asignificantstakeintheoutcomeofthisprocess,astheypossessrightstothe

land.Despitethis,parliamentarydiscussionhasmainlyfocussedon

environmentalopponentstotheCarmichaelProjectandignoredtheconcerns

ofIndigenousrights-holdersthatalsostandinoppositiontothedevelopment.

AsWellington(2016)contends,“IndigenousoppositiontotheCarmichael

minehasbeenlargelywhitedoutofthestory…Byignoringthem,government

andmediafailtoacknowledgetheIndigenousrights-basedchallengetothe

Carmichaelmine”(para.17-18).Intheprocessofgrantingmultipleapprovals

KateArnautovic,2017

58

toAdani,almostnodialogueenteredFederalorStateParliamentinrelationto

Indigenousrightsandinterests.

Parliamenthasfailedtogiverecognitiontotheanti-minecohort.Itisunclear

whetherthisisduetothegovernment’svestedinterestincoalminingandthe

investmentofAdaniincentralQueensland,orwhethermembersof

parliamentbelievethatthenativetitleprocessisafairandjustsystemthat

produceslegitimateresults.

ADisputedAgreement

WhilethesecondrejectionoftheILUAinOctober2014wasaclearand

unanimousdecision,thevoteforAdani’sthirdsettlementdealhasbeen

disputed.TheWJFamilyCouncilconvenedanauthorisationmeetinginMarch

2016withtheWanganandJagalingoupeoplewheretheILUAwasvoteddown

forathirdtime(WJFamilyCouncil,2016a).However,Adaniconveneda

meetingwiththeclaimgroupthefollowingmonthon16April2016wherethe

attendeesvotedinfavouroftheagreement(“Adanimine,”2016).Whilethe

WJFamilyCouncilhavelabelledthismeetinga‘sham’anddeemedthevote

unauthorisedandillegitimate,theStateGovernmenthasopenlysupportedthe

outcomeoftheAdani-convenedmeeting.

RepresentativesoftheWJFamilyCouncilhavecontendedthatmanyclaimants

presentattheMarch2016meetinghadchosentoboycottthemeeting

organisedbyAdanithefollowingmonth(WJFamilyCouncil,2016c).Asmany

membersoftheclaimgroupdidnotattendtheAdani-convenedmeetingin

April,thevotetoendorsethesettlementdealwasunrepresentativeofthe

WanganandJagalingoupeopleasawhole(WJFamilyCouncil,2016c).Ithas

beenallegedthatoverhalfthevoterswerenotmembersofclaimgroup

(Robertson,2017).Thishasraisedissuesofvalidation,astheWJFamily

Councilclaimedthatmorethan200ofthe340voterswerenotdirect

descendantsofthe12familieswhocomprisetheclaimgroup.Adani

engineeredthemeetingoutcomeandspentoverhalfamilliondollarsto‘rent-

a-crowd’(WJFamilyCouncil,2017).WJFamilyCouncilrepresentative

MurrawahJohnsonexpressedinastatementthat“Adanihasbussedinlarge

numbersofpeople,includingnon-membersofourclaimgroupwhohaveno

KateArnautovic,2017

59

connectiontothecountry…Manymembersoftheclaimgroupwholastmetin

MarchrefusedtoattendAdani’smeetingtoday”(WJFamilyCouncil,2016c,

para.8).Adanirejectedtheseallegationsandmaintainedthatthemeetingwas

consistentwiththerequiredstatutoryprocess(“Adanimine,”2016).

TheILUAauthorisedinApril2016includedanupfrontpaymentof$550,000

totheWanganandJagalingoupeopleandanIndigenousParticipationPlan

thatwoulddistributeapproximately$5,000annuallytoeachpersonlivingin

theregion(Wellington,2016).Theanti-mineWanganandJagalingoufaction

haveclaimedthattheILUAendorsedinApril2016wasaweakerdealthanthe

previoustermsofagreementonoffer.Thewindfallamountofhalfamillion

wasconsiderablylessthanthefigureincludedinthesettlementdealofferedin

2014,allegedtobe$1.5million(McKenna,2015a;Robertson,2017).Ifthese

statementsareaccurate,itmaybethecasethattheclaimantswillingto

accommodatetheminehavebeenunabletonegotiateasatisfactory

agreementandhavesettledforaweakerdealunderpressurefromAdani.

However,ifindeedthemajorityoftheattendeesattheApril2016meeting

werenotpartoftheclaimgroupasithasbeenalleged,thenAdanihas

engineeredapartialagreement.ThiswasthesecondtimeAdanihasactedto

forceanoutcome.Anunsuccessfulattemptwasmadeattheendof2012when

itconvenedameetinginconcertwiththeWJCorporation,sideliningthe

registeredapplicants.

DespitetheWJFamilyCouncil’scondemnationoftheauthorisationmeetingin

April,theAustralianGovernmenthasleftthelegitimacyofthestandingILUA

unquestioned.Instead,theFederalandStateGovernmenthavewelcomedthe

decisionandremainedsilentonthecontentiousnessofthematter.

TheMcGladedecision:Anewhopeormoreuncertainty?

TheCommonwealthhasscrambledtoamendtheNTAinresponsetoarecent

FederalCourtdeterminationthatinvalidatedcountlessILUAs(Borrello,2017;

Connors,2017;McKenna,2017;Sferruzzi,2017).InFebruary2016,a

landmarkWesternAustraliancourtactionknownastheMcGladedecisionset

anewprecedentfortheauthorisationofILUAs.Priortotheruling,the

requirementstoauthoriseILUAshadbeenbasedonthe2010Bygrave

KateArnautovic,2017

60

decisionwherebyauthorisationwasconsideredvalidifaclearmajorityofthe

nativetitleclaimantsvotedfortheagreement.However,theMcGladecasehas

nullifiedtheserequirementsandcreateduncertaintyfor126ILUAsacrossthe

nation(McKenna,2017;Mesner,2017;Sferruzzi,2017).

McGladeaffectsnativetitlegroupsthathavearegisteredclaimbuthavenot

receivedadeterminationintheFederalCourt.ThisincludestheWanganand

JagalingoupeopleandtheircontentiousILUAwithAdani(McKenna,2017).

TheMcGladedecisionrequiresaunanimousvotetoauthoriseILUAs.The

WanganandJagalingoupeoplewhoattendedtheauthorisationmeetingin

April2016voted294-1.Thevotesofthenativetitleapplicantswerealsosplit,

asfiveofthe12applicantsvotedagainsttheILUA(Mesner,2017;Robertson,

2017;Rooney,2017;Sferruzzi,2017).Thevoteatthemeetingwasnot

unanimousandtheILUAhasbecomeinvalidatedasaresultofMcGlade.

InresponsetoMcGlade,theFederalGovernmenthassoughttoamendtheNTA

inordertorevalidatetheaffectedILUAs(McKenna,2017a;Sferruzzi,2017).

ThegovernmenthasdefendedthemovetoamendtheActonthegroundsthat

McGladecouldfreezetheoperationofsomedevelopmentsandjeopardisethe

benefitsdeliveredtoIndigenousgroups(McHugh,2017).However,

representativesoftheWJFamilyCouncilandanumberofAustralianGreens

MembersandSenatorshaveclaimedthatthegovernmenthas‘fast-tracked’

amendmentstoremediatetheeffectsontheCarmichaelCoalMine(Borello,

2017;Connors,2017;“Senateinquiry,”2017;WJFamilyCouncil,2017).

AstheimplicationsofMcGladepresentsafurtherobstacletotheCarmichael

Project,thegovernmenthasattemptedtorushtheamendmentstosecure

certaintyforAdaniandthecoallobby.Ithasalsobeenallegedthatthemotion

tolegislatetheamendmentshasproceededwithoutproperIndigenous

consultation.TheAttorneyGeneral,GeorgeBrandis,hasfacedcriticismsfor

hisattempttoavoidconsultationwithstakeholdersandpasstheamendments

throughtheSenateinoneday(“Minerssupport,”2017;“Senateinquiry,”

2017).

TheresponseoftheFederalGovernmentintheaftermathoftheMcGlade

decisioncanbeinterpretedthroughthelensofcriticalracetheory(CRT).A

majorconceptinCRTisthatrightsaffordedtoblackswillalwaysbe

diminishedwhentheyconflictwithwhiteinterests.Whitesalsoseekto

KateArnautovic,2017

61

maintaindominanceandpoweroverresources.Thus,inthewakeofMcGlade,

proponentsoftheamendmentstotheNTAreflecttheviewthattherights

affordedtoblackswillalwaysbemodifiedorreversediftheyareperceivedto

underminetheinterestsofwhites.AstheAustralianGovernmenthasavested

interestintheenergyandminingsector,ithasprioritisedthedevelopmentof

theCarmichaelCoalMineandignoredIndigenousrightsandinterests.The

proposedamendmentstotheActdemonstratetheeffortsofgovernmentto

negatetherequirementsofnativetitleandfurtherunderminetherightsof

IndigenousopponentstotheCarmichaelProject.

KateArnautovic,2017

62

Conclusion

Thefindingsofthisthesisconfirmanumberofcommonobservationsinthe

literature.Thedecision-makingofstateinstitutionsandgovernmentin

relationtominingdevelopmentprojectscommonlybendsinfavourofmining

interestsoverIndigenousinterests(Howlett,2010;O’Faircheallaigh,2006;

Ritter,2009).TheNationalNativeTitleTribunal(NNTT)asastateinstitution

thatdealswithdevelopmentsonareasofnativetitleinterpretstheNative

TitleAct(NTA)tobenefitmininginterestsandrarelyrejectsproposals

(Howlett,2010;Corbett&O’Faircheallaigh,2006;O’Faircheallaigh,2006).

WhiletheAustralianGovernmenthasaccommodatedmininginterests,ithas

beenunwillingtosupporttheinterestsofnativetitlegroups(O’Faircheallaigh,

2006;Ritter,2009;Scambary,2013).SeveralstudiesconcludedthattheNTA

offersaweakfootholdforIndigenousgroupsduringtheapprovalprocess.The

NTAcannotbesolelyreliedupontoupholdIndigenousinterestsandenable

traditionalownerstonegotiateadesirableagreementwithresource

companiesorotherwiserefusetoacceptdevelopmentsontheirland

(O’Faircheallaigh,2006,2008;Short,2007).

InbothcaseswhereAdanitookthemattertotheNNTTfordetermination,it

ruledinfavouroftheminingleasesanddismissedtheapplicants’requestfor

conditionstobeattachedtothefirstmininglease.TheconductoftheNNTT

examinedinthiscasestudyisconsistentwiththeliterature,which

demonstratestheState’sreluctancetorejectorattachanyconditionsto

miningdevelopmentsgrants.AdrianBurragubbahighlightstheresource-focus

ofstateinstitutionsliketheNNTTthatcorrupttheimpartialityofthenative

titlesystem.Heargues,“There’saninherentbiasinthesystemwhere

companiesknowiftheygeta“no”theycangototheTribunalandarevirtually

guaranteedtogettheirmininglease”(Milman,2015a,para.10).Thereis

strongevidencetoindicatethatAdaniremainedconfidentthatithadthe

unqualifiedsupportoftheStateGovernmentduringthephasesofapproval.In

PatrickMalone’saffidavittotheNNTT,herecalledaconversationwitha

representativeofAdani:

[who]saidwordstotheeffectthatthegranteepartywas‘flavourof

theweek’withtheGovernmentpartywhichwantedtheprojecttogo

ahead,andthatthegranteepartydidnotneedthenativetitlegroup

KateArnautovic,2017

63

becausethegranteepartycouldgetalltheapprovalstheyneedfrom

theState.(AdaniMiningv.JessieDiver&Others,2013,p.51)

ThisisconsistentwiththefindingsintheliteraturethatpurporttheStatewill

prioritiseminingexplorationaboveIndigenousinterests.Whenmatters

proceedtotheStatefordetermination,miningcompaniescanrestassured

thattheywillreceiveapositiveoutcomeinfavouroftheirinterests(Howlett,

2010;O’Faircheallaigh,2006).

WhiletheliteratureacknowledgesthatdividedopinioninIndigenous

communitiesoftenresultsduringthenegotiationprocess(Altman,2009;

O’Faircheallaigh,2006,2008;Scambary,2013),therearenostudiesthat

examinecommunitydivisionindepth.Thisthesisconfirmsthegeneralview

thatthedivisionofcommunitiescomplicatestheprocess,delaysnegotiations

andcaninfluencetheoutcomeofagreements.However,thisstudyprovides

greaterinsightsintohowtheprocesscanintensifyandperpetuatedivision.

TheemergenceoftwodistinctfactionswithintheWanganandJagalingou

claimgrouprevealsthelimitationsofthenativetitlesystemintermsof

accommodatingtheinterestsoftheanti-minefaction.Thisgrouphas

experiencedgreaterbarrierstoachievingrecognitionoftheirinterests.While

Adanihasactivelyattemptedtosilencetherepresentativesofthiscohortby

contestingtheirauthority,thegovernmenthasfailedtoprovidesufficient

oversightandacknowledgetheirconcernsduringparliamentarydebate.

Thesechallengeshavebeencompoundedbytheinadequaciesoftherights

affordedtonativetitleclaimantsundertheNTA.Thecurrentlegislationdoes

littletosupportthoseovertlyopposedtodevelopmentsontheirland,asit

lackstheoptiontovetofutureacts.Thesefindingshighlightingthe

weaknessesoftheNTA,intermsofprovidingaplatformtoassertIndigenous

rightsandinterests,remainconsistentwithcriticismsintheliteraturethat

exposesimilarinadequacies(O’Faircheallaigh,2006,2008;Short,2007).

IndigenouslandrightsinAustraliahavecontinuedtooperatewithinasystem

thatprioritisesresourceinterests.Thiscreatesanimpossibleenvironmentfor

nativetitleclaimantstohavetheirinterestsrecognisedandtoinfluence

decision-makerswhenseekingtopreventtheState’simpositionoflarge

miningdevelopmentsontheirland.

KateArnautovic,2017

64

Inadditiontotheinsightsondivision,thisthesisoffersarecentcasestudyto

updatetheexistingbodyofliterature.Thestudiesthathavepreviously

examinedtheconvergenceofnativetitle,thestateandminingdevelopments

havefocusedonagreementsnegotiatedandsignedover10yearsago(Altman,

2009;Corbett&O’Faircheallaigh,2006;O’Faircheallaigh,2006,2008;

Scambary,2013).Thisthesisprovidesanupdatedcasestudy,confirmingand

addinginsightstotheexistingbodyofliterature.

AddedInsights:MultipleModesofAnalysis

Whilethisstudyconfirmstheliteratureintheareaofnativetitleandresource

developments,itaddsinsightsthroughitsapplicationofmultiplemodesof

analysis.TheliberalculturalisttheoriesofWillKymlickaandAllenBuchanan

providestrongjustificationsforcollectiverightsinliberaldemocracies.

However,theyfailtoaddresstheunderlyingdiscriminativenatureofthese

societiesthatsetsuchidealsonapathtoinadequacy.Criticalracetheory

(CRT)reasonsthatthefailureofcollectiverightstoachieveequalityfor

Indigenousgroupsistheembeddedracialprejudicethatcontinuesto

dominatethestatusquointhesesocieties(Delgado&Stefancic,2012;

Hutchinson,2004;Gillborn,2005).

Whilealiberalculturalistperspectiveidentifiestheinherentrequirementfor

collectiverightstoremediateinequality,CRTprovidesanexplanationforthe

failureoftheserightstoreachtheseideals.CRTexposestheinnateracial

imbalancethatperseveresinliberal-democraticsocieties,despitethe

adoptionofcollectiverights(Delgado&Stefancic,2012;Hutchinson,2004;

Gillborn,2005).Liberalculturalismconceptualisesasetofidealswherethe

recognitionofcollectiverightsrestoresasenseofracialequilibrium.CRT

unmaskswhytheseidealsfailtoactualize.

Nativetitlerepresentsanidealisedsystem,wherebyhistoricalwrongdoings

arerectifiedthroughtheestablishmentofcollectivelandrightsforIndigenous

groups.WhileithasconferredbenefitstoanumberofIndigenousgroups,itis

alsoaflawedsystem.Ateverystage,therightsallocatedundertheNTAcanbe

overriddenbytheState.CRTarguesthatwhilestateinstitutionsand

governmentmaysupporttheadoptionofcollectiverightsforIndigenous

KateArnautovic,2017

65

people,theyensurethattheserightsdonotsupersedethepowerofwhite

institutions(Hutchinson,2004;Delgado&Stefancic,2012).Australia

representsasignificantillustrationofCRTtheorygiventhepowerwieldedby

theresourceindustry,asoutlinedinChapterTwo.IntheAustraliancontext,

economicinterestshaveledtothereversaloftherightsaffordedto

Indigenousgroups.Whiletraditionalownershavegainedcollectiverightsto

protecttheirancestrallands,rightsundertheNTAdonotstandinthewayof

theStateandgovernment’spowertoacquirethatland.TheAustralian

GovernmenthasbeenwillingtograntIndigenousrightstoland.However,it

hasnotbeenwillingtosacrificeitspowertodeterminehowthatlandisused.

WhilethepowerandinfluenceofenergyandminingcompaniesinAustralia’s

politicalspherearemadeexplicitinthisstudy,itsfindingsreinforcethe

doctrineofCRT.Stateinstitutionsandgovernmenthaveactedtonullify‘black’

rightsandinterestsinordertoadvancetheirown‘white’interests,whichseek

toexpandandinvestintheresourcesector.Whilesomestudieshavereasoned

thatthelimitationsofnativetitlearelinkedtoentrenchedcolonialstructures

(Altman,2009;Short,2007),thisstudyisthefirsttoexamineIndigenousland

rightsthroughthelensofCRT.Thereremainsanembeddedbiastowards

Indigenousgroupsthatattempttodefendtheirlandwhenitfacesthe

encroachmentofresourceinterests.TheState’sinterpretationoftheNTAand

theresponseofgovernmenttotheCarmichaelCoalMineillustratethe

deficienciesofasystemunderpinnedbyinstitutionalisedracismthat

continuestoconstrainandlimittherightsandinterestsofIndigenous

Australians.

PostscriptAsofthetimeofwriting,thefinalapprovalfortheCarmichaelCoalMinehas

beensuspendedindefinitelyduetouncertaintyoveraroyaltiesdealwiththe

QueenslandGovernment.TheWanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncilcontinue

tochallengethedevelopmentinthecourts.

KateArnautovic,2017

66

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Adani,GVKwinQueensland backingtoexpandGalileeBasincoalport.(2015,March11).TheSydneyMorningHerald.Retrievedfromhttp://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-resources/adani-gvk-win-queensland-backing-to-expand-galilee-basin-coal-port-20150311-1415wd.html

Allen,G.(2011).PublicaffairsandmininginAustralia–arescuedlicensetooperate.JournalofPublicAffairs,11(4),382-386.doi:10.1002/pa.388

Altman,J.(2009).Indigenouscommunities,minersandthestate.In:J.Altman&D.Martin(Eds.),Power,culture,economy:IndigenousAustraliansandmining.Canberra,Australia:ANUPress.

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Readfearn,G.(2016,August21).Privatedinners,lavishpartiesandshoulderrubbing.HowcoalgiantAdanicharmedAustralia'spoliticalelite.The

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Guardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/environment/planet-oz/2015/aug/21/private-dinners-lavish-parties-and-shoulder-rubbing-how-coal-giant-adani-charmed-australias-political-elite

Readfearn,G.(2017,February3).Coallobby'slonggameputstalkingpointsintoleaders'mouths.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/environment/planet-oz/2017/feb/03/coal-lobbys-long-game-puts-talking-points-into-leaders-mouths

Reporttakesaimat‘terrible’Adanipast.(2017,February15).SpecialBroadcastingService.Retrievedfromhttp://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/02/15/report-takes-aim-terrible-adani-past

Reside,A.,Mappin,B.,Watson,J.,Chapman,S.,&Kearney,S.(2016,November2).Fourenvironmentalreasonswhyfast-trackingtheCarmichaelcoalmineisabadidea.AustralianBroadcastingCorporation.Retrievedfromhttp://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-02/fast-tracking-adani-carmichael-coal-mine-a-bad-idea/7988116

Ritter,D.L.(2009).Contestingnativetitle:Fromcontroversytoconsensusinthestruggleoverindigenouslandrights.CrowsNest,Australia:Allen&Unwin.

Robbins,J.(2010).Anationwithin?Indigenouspeoples,representationandsovereigntyinAustralia.Ethnicities,10(2),257-274.doi:10.1177/1468796810361820

Robertson,J.(2015,November23).TraditionallandownertellscourtAdanimisledtribunalovermine’sbenefits.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/nov/23/traditional-land-owner-tells-court-adani-misled-tribunal-over-mines-benefits

Robertson,J.(2015a,February25).Adani’sfitnesstorunQueenslandmineexaminedoverenvironmentalconcerns.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/feb/25/adanis-fitness-to-run-queensland-mine-examined-over-environmental-concerns

Robertson,J.(2016,March21).TraditionalownersvotetosackrepresentativeswhoreceivedbenefitsfromAdani.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/21/adani-mine-traditional-owners-vote-to-sack-representatives-who-received-benefits-from-adani

Robertson,J.(2016a,April7).AdanibeinginvestigatedforallegedinvolvementinUS$4.4bncoal-pricingscandal.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/07/adani-being-investigated-for-alleged-involvement-in-us44bn-coal-pricing-scandal

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Robertson,J.(2016b,April16).Revealed:TraditionalownersacceptedpaymentstoattendAdanimeetings.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/apr/16/revealed-traditional-owners-accepted-payments-to-attend-adani-meetings

Robertson,J.(2016c,September8).CarmichaelcoalmineappealsaysAdani'misled'nativetitletribunaloverbenefits.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/08/carmichael-coalmine-appeal-says-adani-misled-native-title-tribunal-over-benefits

Robertson,J.(2016d,December7).IndigenousownerslaunchfreshlegalchallengetoAdani’sCarmichaelmine.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/07/indigenous-owners-launch-fresh-legal-challenge-to-adanis-carmichael-mine

Robertson,J.(2017,February7).IndigenousownersthreatenlegalactionunlessAdaniabandonslandaccessdeal.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/feb/07/indigenous-owners-threaten-legal-action-unless-adani-abandons-land-access-deal

Robertson,J.,&Safi,M.(2016,December6).Adani'sCarmichaelcoalraillinemaynotbeeligibleforgovernmentfunding.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/06/adanis-carmichael-coal-rail-line-may-not-be-eligibile-for-government-funding

Rodgers,E.(2009,April3).AustadoptsUNindigenousdeclaration.AustralianBroadcastingCorporation.Retrievedfromhttp://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-04-03/aust-adopts-un-indigenous-declaration/1640444

Rooney,K.(2017,February8).TitlegroupbidtohaltAdani.TownsvilleBulletin.Retrievedfromhttp://www.townsvillebulletin.com.au/

Rose,M.(2015,September16).ConnectionsbetweenAustralianpoliticalandcoallobbyrundeep.SpecialBroadcastingService.Retrievedfromhttp://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2015/09/14/comment-connections-between-australian-politics-and-coal-lobby-run-deep

Scambary,B.(2013).Mycountry,minecountry:Indigenouspeople,mininganddevelopmentcontestationinremoteAustralia.Canberra,Australia:ANUPress.

Senateinquirytoldnativetitleamendmentswilldisenfranchisetraditionalowners.(2017,March17).SpecialBroadcastingService.Retrievedfromhttp://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/aboriginal/en/article/2017/03/16/senate-inquiry-told-native-title-amendments-will-disenfranchise-traditional

Sferruzzi,J.(2017,February14).Casepavedwayforactchanges.TheDailyMercury.Retrievedfromhttps://www.dailymercury.com.au/

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Short,D.(2008).Reconciliationandcolonialpower:IndigenousrightsinAustralia.Aldershot,England:AshgatePublishing.

Slezak,M.(2016,January21).AdanitofacenoactionoverAustralianCEO’slinktoZambiaminepollution.TheGuardian.Retrievedfromhttps://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jan/21/adani-to-face-no-action-over-australian-ceos-link-to-zambia-mine-pollution

Smith,B.,&Morphy,F.(2007).Thesocialeffectsofnativetitle:Recognition,translation,coexistence.Canberra,Australia:ANUPress.

Smyth,L.(2016).Adani’sCarmichaelmine:Internationallawandthedefinitionofconsent.Retrievedfromhttp://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/NativeTitleNlr/2016/16.pdf

Strelein,L.(2009).Compromisedjurisprudence:NativetitlecasessinceMabo.Canberra,Australia:AboriginalStudiesPress.

Tauli-Corpuz,V.(2008).Theconceptofindigenouspeoples’self-determineddevelopmentordevelopmentwithidentityandculture:Challengesandtrajectories.Retrievedfromhttp://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/37745/12197591975Concept_paper_Indigenous_Peoples__Development_with_Identity.pdf/Concept%2Bpaper%2BIndigenous%2BPeoples%2B%2BDevelopment%2Bwith%2BIdentity.pdf

Taylor,J.(2015,May29).IndigenousprotestheldinBrisbaneagainst$16billionAdanicoalmineintheGalileeBasin.AustralianBroadcastingCorporation.Retrievedfromhttp://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-29/indigenous-protest-against-adani-coal-mine-in-the-galilee-basin/6507130

Tehan,M.(2003).Ahopedisillusioned,anopportunitylost?Reflectiononcommonlawnativetitleandtenyearsofthenativetitleact.MelbourneUniversityLawReview,27(2),523-571.Retrievedfromhttp://law.unimelb.edu.au/mulr

Thorpe,N.(2017,March3).TraditionalownershavegatheredinCanberratodemandthegovernmentactfairlyandallowmoretimeforconsiderationbyindigenousgroupsaffectedbyproposedchangestonativetitlelaw.SpecialBroadcastingService.Retrievedfromhttp://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/nitv-news/article/2017/03/02/native-title-being-watered-down-big-mining-say-traditional-owners

Tlozek,E.(2015,August6).Adani:NewblowtoAustralia’sbiggestcoalproject.AustralianBroadcastingCorporation.Retrievedfromhttp://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2015/s4287895.htm

VanVonderen,J.(2016,April14).Carmichaelcoalmine:WanganandJagalingoupeopleplanfurtherlegalaction.AustralianBroadcastingCorporation.Retrievedfromhttp://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-13/wangan-and-jagalingou-plan-legal-action-carmichael-mine/7323728

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WanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncil.(2016).W&Jpeopleauthorisationmeeting:Thefacts.Retrievedfromhttp://wanganjagalingou.com.au/thefacts/

WanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncil.(2016a).‘Threestrikesyou’reout’–traditionalownersrejectAdaniCarmichaelmineforathirdtime.Retrievedfromhttp://wanganjagalingou.com.au/no/

WanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncil.(2016b).QLDminesministerLynham’sAdanimineapprovalshowsgutlessandmorallybankruptapproachofgovernmenttotraditionalowners’rights.Retrievedfromhttp://wanganjagalingou.com.au/gutless/

WanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncil.(2016c).Traditionalowners’rejectionofCarmichaelstands,despiteAdanibankrollingbogus“landuseagreement”.Retrievedfromhttp://wanganjagalingou.com.au/traditional-owners-rejection-of-carmichael-stands-despite-adani-bank-rolling-bogus-land-use-agreement/

WanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncil.(2016d).Adanicourtdecision:TraditionalownerssayfighttostopQLD’sCarmichaelminecontinues.Retrievedfromhttp://wanganjagalingou.com.au/adani-court-decision-traditional-owners-say-fight-to-stop-qlds-carmichael-mine-continues/

WanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncil.(2016e).WestandinthewayofAdaniminesaytraditionalowners.Retrievedfromhttp://wanganjagalingou.com.au/we-stand-in-the-way-of-adani-mine-say-traditional-owners-seek-urgent-meeting-with-gautam-adani-after-filing-objection-to-carmichael-mine-land-use-agreement

WanganandJagalingouFamilyCouncil.(2017).W&JresistminingindustrypushtoamendnativetitleacttosecureCarmichaelmineproposal.Retrievedfromhttp://wanganjagalingou.com.au/wj-resist-industry-push-for-amended-native-title-act-to-secure-carmichael-mine-proposal/

Wellington,P.(2016,October26).Australia’scoalpoliticsareunderminingdemocraticandindigenousrights.TheConversation.Retrievedfromhttps://theconversation.com/australias-coal-politics-are-undermining-democratic-and-indigenous-rights-66994

West,M.(2015,July4).Adanishownthedoorbytraditionalowners.TheSydneyMorningHerald.Retrievedfromhttp://www.smh.com.au/business/comment-and-analysis/adani-shown-the-door-by-traditional-owners-20150702-gi3y2h.html

Willacy,M.(2015,November12).AdaniAustraliaCEOlinkedtominingoffencesinAfrica.AustralianBroadcastingCorporation.Retrievedfromhttp://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2015/s4350893.htm

Yoon,R.D.R.(2015,May9).IndigenousgroupneedsfundstofightAdani.AsianCorrespondent.Retrievedfromhttps://asiancorrespondent.com/2015/05/indigenous-group-needs-fund-to-fight-adani/#7I8QkURPilgRQc6c.97

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Reports

Aulby,H.,&Ogge,M.(2016).Greasingthewheels:Thesystemicweaknessesthatallowundueinfluencebyminingcompaniesongovernment.Canberra,Australia:TheAustraliaInstitute.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tai.org.au/sites/defualt/files/P266%20Greasing%20the%20Wheels%20160726_0.pdf

AustralianHumanRightsCommission.(2012).Australia’suniversalperiodicreview.Retrievedfromhttp://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/ACHRA_UPR_Progress_Report_2012.pdf

AustralianHumanRightsCommission.(2014).ReviewoftheNativeTitleAct1993.Retrievedfromhttps://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/20140508_NativeTitleInquiryALRC.pdf

AustralianLawReformCommission.(2015).ConnectiontoCountry:ReviewoftheNativeTitleAct1993(Cth).Retrievedfromhttps://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/alrc_126_final_report.pdf

Collins,N.,Ali,S.,Lawson,L.,&Young,S.(2016).Lessonsfromimplementingfreepriorandinformedconsent(FPIC)inthePhilippines:Acasestudyforteachingpurposes.Retrievedfromhttps://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/publications/lessons-from-implementing-free-prior-and-informed-consent-fpic-in-the-philippines-a-case-study-for-teaching-purposes-facilitator-s-guide-july-2016

Duff,N.(2017).Authorisationanddecision-makinginnativetitle.Retrievedfromhttp://aiatsis.gov.au/sites/default/files/products/research_report/authorisation_and_decision-making_in_native_title.pdf

EarthJustice&EnvironmentalJusticeAustralia.(2015).CantheAdanigroupbetrustedtocomplywithenvironmentallaws?Retrievedfromhttp://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/Report_Earthjustice%20and%20Environmental%20Justice%20Australia_The%20Adani%20Groups%20Global%20Environmental%20Record_29%20Oct%202015%20(1).pdf

QueenslandSouthNativeTitleServices.(2015).Annualreport2014-2015.Retrievedfromhttp://www.qsnts.com.au/userfiles/files/QSNTS%20-%20Annual%20Report%202014-15%20-%2015%20October%202015.pdf

Readfearn,G.(2015).Toocloseforcomfort:HowthecoalandgasindustrygettheirwayinQueensland.Canberra,Australia:TheAustraliaInstitute.Retrievedfromhttp://www.tai.org.au/sites/defualt/files/P117%20Too%20close%20for%20comfort%20FINAL_0.pdf

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Roarty,M.(2010).TheAustralianresourcessectoritscontributiontothenation,andabriefreviewofissuesandimpacts.Canberra,Australia:AGPS.

Rumler,M.(2011).Areviewoffree,priorandinformedconsentinAustralia.Retrievedfromhttps://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/oaus-fpicinaustralia-report-1211.pdf

Stevenson,B.(1997).TheWikdecisionandafter.Brisbane,Australia:QueenslandParliamentLibrary.Retrievedfromhttps://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/explore/ResearchPublications/researchBulletins/rb0497bs.pdf

CaseLaw

NationalNativeTitleTribunal.(2013).AdaniMiningPtyLtdvJessieDiver&OrsonbehalfoftheWanganandJagalingouPeoplevStateofQueensland.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nntt.gov.au/

NationalNativeTitleTribunal.(2015).AdaniMiningPtyLtdandAnothervAdrianBurragubba,PatrickMaloneandIreneWhiteonbehalfoftheWanganandJagalingouPeople.Retrievedfromhttp://www.nntt.gov.au/

OfficialDocuments

AustralianElectoralCommission.(2013).Politicalpartydisclosurereturn:Financialyear2012-2013.Retrievedfromhttp://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au/Returns/51/REPP1.pdf

AustralianElectoralCommission.(2014).Politicalpartydisclosurereturn:Financialyear2013-2014.Retrievedfromhttp://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au/Returns/55/SLCE8.pdf

AustralianGovernment.(2017).Viewlobbyistprofile.Retrievedfromhttp://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/register/view_agency.cfm?id=766

Burragubba,A.,&Johnson,M.(2015).SubmissiontotheSpecialRapporteuronindigenouspeoplesbytheWanganandJagalingoupeople.Retrievedfromhttp://wanganjagalingou.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Submission-to-the-Special-Rapporteur-on-Indigenous-Peoples-by-the-Wangan-and-Jagalingou-People-2-Oct-2015.pdf

ElectoralCommissionofQueensland.(2013).Disclosurereturn–donortoregisteredpoliticalparty.Retrievedfromhttps://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/9951/Adani-Mining-Pty-Ltd.pdf

ElectoralCommissionofQueensland.(2013a).Disclosurereturn–donortoregisteredpoliticalparty.Retrievedfrom

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https://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/7968/Next-Level-Consulting.pdf

ElectoralCommissionofQueensland.(2014).Disclosureofgiftstoregisteredpoliticalparties–organisations.Retrievedfromhttps://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/11749/Next-Level-Holdings-Pty-Ltd.pdf

ElectoralCommissionofQueensland.(2015).Disclosureofgiftstoregisteredpoliticalparties–organisations.Retrievedfromhttps://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/56768/Adani-Mining-Pty-Ltd.pdf

ElectoralCommissionofQueensland.(2015a).Disclosureofgiftstoregisteredpoliticalparties–organisations.Retrievedfrom https://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/31254/Next-Level-Holdings-Pty-Ltd.pdf

ElectoralCommissionofQueensland.(2015b).Disclosureofgiftstoregisteredpoliticalparties–organisations.Retrievedfromhttps://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/45781/Next-Level-Holdings-Pty-Ltd.pdf

ElectoralCommissionofQueensland.(2016).Disclosureofgiftstoregisteredpoliticalparties–organisations.Retrievedfromhttps://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/63833/Next-Level-Holdings-Pty-Ltd.pdf

ElectoralCommissionofQueensland.(2016a).Disclosureofgiftstoregisteredpoliticalparties–organisations.Retrievedfromhttps://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/66332/Next-Level-Holdings-Pty-Ltd.pdf

Forst,M.(2016).EndofmissionstatementbyMichelForst.Retrievedfromhttp://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20689&LangID=E

Frydenberg,J.(2015,November12).MiningandtheAustralianeconomy:TheAustraliangovernment’sprioritiesfortheminingsector.Retrievedfromhttp://minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/frydenberg/speeches/mining-and-australian-economy-australian-governments-priorities-mining

Macklin,J.(2009,April3).StatementontheUnitedNationsdeclarationontherightsofindigenouspeoples.Retrievedfromhttp://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/Australia_official_statement_endorsement_UNDRIP.pdf

MineralsCouncilofAustralia.(2014).ImplementationoffreepriorandinformedconsentinAustralia.Retrievedfromhttps://www.minerals.org.au/file_upload/files/statements/140714_FPIC_-_Position_Statement.pd

Newman,C.(2013).OfficialmissiontoIndia:29November–5December2012.Retrievedfromhttp://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Documents/TableOffice/TabledPapers/2013/5413T1888.pdf

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OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights.(2013).Free,priorandinformedconsentofindigenouspeoples.Retrievedfromhttp://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/FreePriorandInformedConsent.pdf

ParliamentofAustralia.RecordofProceedings,September9,2015,p.9595.Retrievedfromhttp://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=chamber/hansardr/cd6813da-3cd0-4342-ab78-5445603e1c18/&sid=0037

QueenslandGovernment.(2012).PremiertopromoteQueenslandinIndia[Pressrelease].Retrievedfromhttp://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2012/11/29/premier-to-promote-queensland-in-india

QueenslandGovernment.(2013).Ministerialgiftsregister.Retrievedfromhttps://data.qld.gov.au/dataset/ministerial-gifts-register

QueenslandGovernment.(2014).Coordinator-generaldecidesofGalileemine[Pressrelease].Retrievedfromhttp://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2014/5/8/coordinatorgeneral-decides-on-galilee-mine

QueenslandGovernment.(2016).Carmichaelmineapprovalsputthousandsofnewjobsstepcloser[Pressrelease].Retrievedfromhttp://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2016/4/3/carmichael-mine-approvals-put-thousands-of-new-jobs-step-closer

QueenslandGovernment.(2016a).Ministerialgiftsregister:Reportablegifts1/07/2015–30/06/2016.Retrievedfromhttps://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/right-to-info/published-info/assets/ministerial-gifts-30-june-16.pdf

QueenslandIntegrityCommissioner.(2016).Registeredlobbyingcontacts.Retrievedfromhttps://lobbyists.integrity.qld.gov.au/ContactLog.aspx

QueenslandParliament.RecordofProceedings,August27,2015,p.47.Retrievedfromhttp://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/Hansard/2015/2015_08_27_EstimatesCDC.pdf

QueenslandParliament.RecordofProceedings,May11,2016,p.1670.Retrievedfromhttp://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/Hansard/2016/2016_05_11_WEEKLY.pdf



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UnitedNations.(2007,September13).Generalassemblyadoptsdeclarationontherightsofindigenouspeoples[Pressrelease].Retrievedfromhttps://www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga10612.doc.htm

UnitedNations.(2008).UnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples.Retrievedfromhttp://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf