resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control by r. j. gibbens and f. p. kelly

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Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

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Page 1: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control

By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Page 2: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

A proportionally fair pricing. A fair distribution according to a price the

user is willing to pay.

Why ?

How ?

Page 3: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Rates according to shadow pricing

• Let

• Then The change in the rate is:

Page 4: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Rates according to shadow pricing

• If w(t) = wr Then the stable point of the system is :

A proportionally fair per unit charge.

Page 5: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Congestion Mechanisms

• Creating various measurements and congestion control algorithms in the network itself (routers).[floyd and fall]

• Creating incentives for the end nodes to use congestion control –

charge aware TCP

Page 6: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Different approaches to charge aware TCP

• Paris metro pricing

• Smart market

Page 7: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

The Expected Cost and Shadow price

Page 8: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

The Expected Number of marks

Page 9: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

When distribution is more general

Thus

Page 10: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Congestion Algorithm 1 the Elastic User(w)

Where

Page 11: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Congestion algorithm 2File Transfer(F,W)

Elastic User that changes the Payment.

Page 12: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Comparison with the Internet Packet conversation principle

A new packet isn’t put into the network until the old packet leaves

=self clocking

Page 13: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Current congestion algorithm disadvantages

• Not user specific.

• Dropping packages is an extreme mechanism for congestion control.

• The rate at which the signals a generated in the source.

Page 14: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Response of end-nodes to Congestion

• Jacobson – Average Rate

• Elastic user - Inverse proportion to

Page 15: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Jacobson Average Rate in our Equations

• If the user needs the average rate of Jacobson than the utility function

would produce that rate.

Page 16: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Self Clocking in our Equations

When no congestion indications are present

File-transfer is doubling it’s rate

(with proportion to T).

Page 17: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Self Clocking in our Equations

• Elastic User can be self clocking if cwnd increased by

• So the change in the rate is :

Page 18: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Game Theory Model

• If the user is price-aware he will maximize:

• The solution is

When

Page 19: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Game TheoryThe average paying is

When r= is constant and equal Then

Conclusion – users shade their bids if they have market power

Page 20: Resource pricing and the evolution of congestion control By R. J. Gibbens and F. P. Kelly

Concluding remarks

By appropriately marking the resources

end-nodes are provided with the necessary

information to make efficient use of the

network resources