republic of the philippines_crim law cases to review

7/31/2019 Republic of the Philippines_crim Law Cases to Review

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO,ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES,accused-appellants.

MELO,J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of theCourt for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, toundersignedponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by thePNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene,2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value ofP40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on,Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded,with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by EmilioChangco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, includingaccused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took completecontrol of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crewmembers to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front andrear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel.The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo,Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleadingradio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of tvessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the PhilippineForce and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yieldednegative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singaporecruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failarrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 19arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10

nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Prianchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to tranthe vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hsupervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after aninterruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 19

On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed ttransfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessremained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in thbatches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authoritia period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. Thbatch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven baccused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought thImus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew inproceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accusedappellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different pin Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crecalled the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incideThe crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. Thincident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the offand members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates werepresent at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of


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surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBIheadquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at AguinaldoHi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed toevade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at thelobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation ofPresidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, andCHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy(Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10,1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequentthereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the saidaccused, then manning a motor launch and armed with high poweredguns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping oneanother, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fireupon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOCTABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with thecomplement and crew members, employing violence against orintimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel toproceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafterreturned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of theaforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the RegTrial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Uponarraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupoensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding someinconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transferany cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed havin

their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on Ma1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with CaptainEdilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached theseashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a veThey were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,0a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. Theyagreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked,cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They deniedhaving gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Uponarrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 eachsalary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitttheir addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed bparties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he wahome sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of EChangco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidthat he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officerlater completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two yeboard a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port CapThe company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including shipobunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned fvessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changand his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the MercantiSection of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radiotelephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."


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The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker,who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singaporedollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan,the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceededto the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong,upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated

by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil andwas given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong,together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailedtoward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would bemaking the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the portauthorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure aport clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, PaulGan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through theimmigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers

then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transferof the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/TGalilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiongclaimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter'spersonal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "NaviPride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which"Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed thepayment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning ofMarch 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased bythe firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the firsttransfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks,including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfertook ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full forthe transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four veand wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines tdiscuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new tranthis time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel wascheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSHperson by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be EmilioChangco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecil

Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafterarrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of thcrime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment ishereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, VirgilioLoyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonabdoubt, asprincipals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong SanHiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law,

penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However,considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose tdeath penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infanteand Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSIONPERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused ChSan Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. aCecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping andTransport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longreturn the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly andseverally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount ofP11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate oper annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All taccused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to theCaltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accuscan no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused arhereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, I


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the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currencyplus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong SanHiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at theNational Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during thependency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by andcomply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila andthe National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants maybe summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the

trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time theywere being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving themof their constitutional right to procedural due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered hisappearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, oron February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a memberof the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined sevenwitnesses for the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformlycontend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical

violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to readthe contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed oftheir rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that theprosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of

qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew whototaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliteratedcrime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden islodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowle

that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" anthat the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracythe trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualifpiracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-RoLaw of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as anaccomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed ouof Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making faconclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact arecontrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convictihim as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he wcharged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating hi

constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation agahim.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do notprove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified pHe further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "MTabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the informatwith qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convifor acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminajurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.


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The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legaleffects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellantsduring the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence ofcounsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding thatthe prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellantscommitted the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliteratethe crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellantCheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when theacts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and

territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) wasexecuted by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they wererepresented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representationduring the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made withthe full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, asrepresented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subjectmanifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. Theyalso affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February

11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himselfin person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment topromulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalitiesof trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless thewaiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs orprejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code ofthe Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, theaccused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears tothe court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." Byanalogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practiceof law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently andproperly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of therecord will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule thatthere was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the

full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigmay not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission ofoffense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent anhave competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Iperson cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with oThese rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence ofcounsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means wvitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, soincommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of tsection as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of tortursimilar practices, and their families.

Such rights originated fromMiranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gabirth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to anyquestioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he haright to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence againhim, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained orappointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the wis made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds thmore stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in thepresence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessiothe accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the


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Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestatedSection 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phraseminted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case ofNardone vs. UnitedStates (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivativeevidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on theprinciple that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain otherevidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidencesubsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this

case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without avalid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information isderived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence againstthem.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there issufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree withthe sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and"UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire andconfederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now JusticeRomeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals

. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers andmembers of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified andpointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the"M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, offLubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with itscargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of HorseboughLighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore andsold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo wasdischarged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price ofabout $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .

xxx xxx xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao"were on board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2,1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be noscintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of thevessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact,

immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operativesthe National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa,Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (E"B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of the pirate

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel

evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel saileddestination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of dis not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight igiven to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnessethan to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime(People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin,Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by

complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate ChristianTorralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing wone another along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to woboard the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, saiaccused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite peritime without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing theirdestination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed forlong voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with huexperience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain LiboonSecond Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clthe evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on Mayand 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his houBacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inhereweak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v

Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and conco


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and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincingevidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible forhim to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he waslikewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony isaccorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity toobserve directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certainwitness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists whentwo or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felonyand decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, oneneed not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in everyact or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in theexecution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times whenconspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated toone another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a commoncriminal design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin,

Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the"M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco wasto fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan,Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crewand the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on theirway home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant CecilioChangco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another.Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka

Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-AsiaShipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residencesare approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families areclose. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since theirparents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellantLoyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and

Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T IslaLuzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. EmiliChangco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that tremained at large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convictpiracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effJanuary 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has

impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that PresidenDecree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Ar122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 pupiracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile thlaws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree N532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply tooffenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel,whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither membethe complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coveof the law.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas.The pof reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the highshall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement npassenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, itsequipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philwaters.The penalty ofreclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon anyperson who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seivessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall sthe whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personalbelongings of its complement or passengers.


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(Italics ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2.Definition of Terms.The following shall mean and beunderstood, as follows:

d. Piracy.Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away ofthe whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongingsof its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means ofviolence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed byany person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said

vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shallbe considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italicssupplied).

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a memberof its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No.7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses

committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No.532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any personincluding "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippinewaters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person iscovered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracyunder Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret thelaw. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keepingwith the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimesagainst the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of

Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessnesscondemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under theArticle 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 existharmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over theperson of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philiwaters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/TTabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committePhilippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates toSingapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfwas done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although PresideDecree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo becommitted in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and i

cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be commin Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Codesuch, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same prinapplies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation ofqualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decre532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree Noshould be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discouraand prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [19It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional ribe informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the groundhe was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 5even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section said law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure o"M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his grouthe attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was

indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo.Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation windisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of piratesthe disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 53which provides:


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SECTION 4.Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracyor highway robbery brigandage.Any person who knowingly and in anymanner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as givingthem information about the movement of police or other peace officers of thegovernment, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigandsor in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly orindirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage,shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punishedin accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in thisSection has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack ofcomplete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not asprincipal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to theparticipation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved infavor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs.

Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential

Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided insaid section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the caseat bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that heknowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken bysuch pirates and derived benefit therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing ofthe stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T NaviPride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services,Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified thequantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel infalsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer

went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirateswith food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3,1992, pp. 133-134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure)and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi

Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection bySingapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified saentries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegalactivities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecutiSingapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "NaPride" could not have been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detailaccused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summariz

follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galithat the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (fodeparture) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HHand "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart a(10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the purpof the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and tr1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with EChangco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyoprepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that thecargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that althoug

Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificabove the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paidP150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changcodid not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrivalSingapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,7tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired witsame irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer froend.

Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of hsuperiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the carg

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the sourand nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T TabangaoSecond, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoide


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participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances underwhich it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or evena purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he neverbothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/TGalilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he metfor the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfertook place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marinevessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marinetransacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued

therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safeto deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 orroughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate atthat time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mindwould go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportationonly to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, inaddition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiongwas well aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.

Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following theorders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience

to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that themeans used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised PenalCode, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior ChuaKim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of internationallaw. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover,the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misledport and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, toconsummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial courtwas convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. Thesecircumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications of theorder of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow ordersto conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did

not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidenceon record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED.

People vs Dasig

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text

case cited. Xie xie!

People vs DasigG.R. No. 100231

April 28, 1993

Facts:

Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuez and 6 others were charged together ofshooting Redempto Manatad, a police officer, as he died while performing dutieUpon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of "not guilty."However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness, accused Nueschanged his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeythe promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the prosecution hadfinished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuez died on M10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.

At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons,

of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of tgiving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. On August 16, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspectedsafehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Ureaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to escThe team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliberrevolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnpursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upparm and subsequently apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver with 17 liveammunitions were confiscated from him. Thereafter, Dasig was brought to thehospital for treatment, while Nues was turned over to the Metrodiscom forinvestigation. Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killed Pfc.

Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nues were members of the sparrowand the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively.

The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page therwith the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However, D


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contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken waslegally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends thatassuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at mostof simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault. Appellant also claims that thecustodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and consequently, hecould not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of thedeceased and participated in the act of rebellion?

Held:

Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellionbeyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofimprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc.Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicableto persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of

the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence toprove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he wasnot specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to thegroup which attacked Pfc. Manatad.

Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command ofan unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonmentof eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewiseordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)as civil indemnity.

BENITO ASTORGA,petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the revof a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5,2001,1[1] as well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.

On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following Informaagainst Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his meArbitrary Detention:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent

thereto, at the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and withjurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer,the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity and committing the offin relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with unidenpersons, who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES, who warmed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and thewillfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz,Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to leave the place, without any legand valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of their personal libertnine (9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2[2]

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, TacloCity sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligencegathering and forest protection operations in line with the governments campaiagainst illegal logging. The team was composed of Forester II Moises dela CruScaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree MarkerCrisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law


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Enforcement Section, as team leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B.Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian.3[3]

The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where theysaw two yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting with the local barangayofficials, the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael Figueroa.However, since Figueroa was not around at the time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay.4[4]

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats being

constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militantedisembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor,Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request ofMayor Astorga.5[5]

When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian,approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their mission, Simonwas suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed,Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nganatupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge

ha misencounter. (I can make you swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that Ican box? I can box. Dont you know that I can declare this a misencounter?)6[6]

Mayor Astorga then ordered someone to fetch reinforcements, and forty-five minutes later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men,of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team members.7[7] ASimon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams mission.8[8] He then out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact his people at DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of the teams whereabouts. Suddenly, MaAstorga forcibly grabbed Simons radio, saying, Maupay nga waray kamo raddiri somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig . (

better if you have no radio so that your office would not know your whereaboutso that you cannot ask for help).9[9] Mayor Astorga again slapped the right shoulSimon, adding, Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay dkamo puwede ha akon. (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samabecause I will not tolerate it here.)10[10] Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to alloteam to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that they would not be allowgo home and that they would instead be brought to Daram.11[11] Mayor Astorgaaddressed the team, saying, Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagk

Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko

ipadakop an akon. (If you really want to confiscate anything, you start with the


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time. If you confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrendermine.)12[12] Simon then tried to reiterate his request for permission to leave, which

just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily said, Diri kamo maka uli yana

kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya. (You cannot go

home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many things to discussthere.)13[13]

The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be serveddinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table,

and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m.14[14] After dinner, Militante, Maniscanand SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but not to leave thebarangay.15[15] On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to leave.16[16]

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against MayorAstorga and his men, which led to the filing of the above-quoted Information.

Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleadedguilty to the offenses charged.17[17] At the trial, the prosecution presented thetestimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint AffidaviHowever, the presentation of Simons testimony was not completed, and none o

fellow team members came forward to testify. Instead, the members of the teamby the DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.19[19]

On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accuBENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in theabsence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying the IndeterminSentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) montharresto mayoras minimum to one (1) year and eight (8) months ofprisioncorrectional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.20[20]

The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 200121[21] which denied by the Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated September 28, 2001.22[22] A


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Second Motion for Reconsideration dated October 24, 200123[23] was also filed, andthis was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2002.24[24]

Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for review:

5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of ArbitraryDetention as defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code,based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding theAffidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses wherein the

latter categorically declared petitioners innocence of the crime charged.25[25]

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum ofevidence to prove the guilt of the accused,26[26] especially in light of the fact that theprivate complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.27[27] Petitioner asserts

that nowhere in the records of the case is there any competent evidence that cousufficiently establish the fact that restraint was employed upon the persons of thteam members.28[28] Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed methe scene does not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in factinstilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they would feelcompelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.29[29]

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, witholegal grounds, detains a person.30[30] The elements of the crime are:

1. That the offender is a public officeror employee.2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.31[31]

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then MayDaram, Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, the offender is a public officer or employee, is undeniably present.

Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his actwere spurred by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts motivated by his instinct for self-preservation and the feeling that he was bein


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singled out.32[32] The detention was thus without legal grounds, thereby satisfyingthe third element enumerated above.

What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.

In the case ofPeople v. Acosta,33[33] which involved the illegal detention of a child,we found the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack ofevidence to show that any physical restraint was employed upon the victim.However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to leave

until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned, he was practically a captivein the sense that he could not leave because of hisfearto violate such instruction.34[34]

In the case ofPeople v. Cortez,35[35] we held that, in establishing the intent to deprivethe victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within anenclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, theoffended party in said case was found outside talking to the owner of the house whereshe had been taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises forfear that the kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she do so.We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where sheresided and they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousinwas to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render

people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threatkill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence.36[36]

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that thecurtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon tvictims person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fearmind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim icompelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishethe accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their plethe witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home.3This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozenreinforcements, all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircleteam, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses.38[38] Given suchcircumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement that it was notsafe to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders.39[39] It was not just the presence of the men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team whproves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the exthat they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent thedeparture of the complainants and witnesses against their will i s thus clear.


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Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainants,suffice it to say that the principles governing the use of such instruments in theadjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare, it washeld that an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress thedefenses of the accused, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. Theremust be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance,create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial andaccepted by the judge. Here, there are no such circumstances.40[40] Indeed, the belatedclaims made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations that the

incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that the team acceded to MayorAstorgas orders out of respect, are belied by petitioners own admissions to thecontrary.41[41] The Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private complainants isevidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged in the information andproven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of interest of privatecomplainants to pursue the case. This conclusion is supported by one of its latterparagraphs, which reads:

11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerityand improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive andother official of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and projectcan be effectively implemented through the support of the local

officials for the betterment of the residence living conditions who arefacing difficulties and are much dependent on governmentsupport.42[42]

Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence, pointing outthat the Sandiganbayans reliance on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced,

for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants in thecase.43[43] He also makes much of the fact that prosecution witness SPO1 Capoqwas allegedly not exactly privy to, and knowledgeable of, what exactly transpirbetween herein accused and the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, fromalleged confrontation, until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morn2 September 1997.44[44]

It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings are conclusivebinding upon appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and

substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.45[45] Nothinthe case at bar prompts us to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPCapoquian is not one of the private complainants is completely irrelevant. Neithpenal law nor the rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusivelsupplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. FurthermMayor Astorgas claim that SPO1 Capoquian was not exactly privy to what

transpired between Simon and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoqutestified that he accompanied Simon when the latter went to talk to petitioner.46heard all of Mayor Astorgas threatening remarks.47[47] He was with Simon whewere encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14


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rifles.48[48] In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances which led to theArbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor Astorga.

Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented fromleaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to while away thetime and take advantage of the purported hospitality of the accused.49[49] On thecontrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they were simply whiling

away the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early thefollowing morning.50[50] SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that they did

not use the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure earlythe following morning to enjoy the place and that, given a choice, they would havegone home.51[51]

Petitioner argues that he was denied the cold neutrality of an impartial judge,because theponente of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate and advocatewhen he propounded very extensive clarificatory questions on the witnesses.

Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle arbiter during a trial. It canpropound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. Theimpartiality of the court cannot be assailed on the ground that clarificatory questionswere asked during the trial.52[52]

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyreasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Cprovides that, where the detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shallarresto mayorin its maximum period toprision correccional in its minimum pewhich has a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to aminimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayits minimum and medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one day to four (4) months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the

indeterminate penalty of four (4) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight (8) months ofprision correccional, as maximum.

Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto in hisconcurring opinion inLino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed public officials in committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and called for theintensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:

The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed bygovernment officers form part of our statute books even before the advent ofAmerican sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effect duthe Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule; continued in e

under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were not repeaThe same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign Repof the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violaof said provisions, it is very seldom that prosecutions under them have been instdue to the fact that the erring individuals happened to belong to the same governto which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high time that every one must do hduty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting officers should not answer withshrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegaldetention.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of theRevised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton

trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. The responsible officialsshould be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees right to the indemnity


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which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamentalrights.53[53]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. TheDecision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimeof Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four(4) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of

prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

DWARD S. SERAPIO,petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRDDIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR.,J.:

Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio,assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying hispetition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition forhabeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder whereinpetitioner is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, JoseJinggoy P. Estrada and several others.

The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and theLegal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profitfoundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providingeducational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslimyouth and students, and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim

educators and scientists.

Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on itsbehalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson through the latters assistant Mrs.Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amto the Foundations treasurer who later deposited i t in the Foundations accountthe Equitable PCI Bank.

In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then PresidentJoseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, includ

its operation on the illegal numbers game known asjueteng. This triggered the with the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against JosepEstrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons. Among sucomplaints were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejer

Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754;Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Ser

et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; andLeonardo De Vera, RoT. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Ed

Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-00-1757.

Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. T

other respondents likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The Office oOmbudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints and on Ap2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada,petitioner and several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.

On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informagainst former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post as Presof the Republic of the Philippines. One of these Informations, docketed as CrimCase No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, theOmbudsman filed an amended Information in said case charging Estrada and seco-accused, including petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended foprovisional release of all the accused, including petitioner. The case was raffled

special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. Theamended Information reads:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, anwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito EstradaTHEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE


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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR inCONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OFHIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESSASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKINGUNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully,unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount ORTOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT

HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOSAND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBYUNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSEAND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt ORcriminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERALINSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDREDFORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROMILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF

AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose JinggoyEstrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANEDOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGALGAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusingDIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefitpublic fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDREDMILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share allocated for theProvince of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR inCONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE

a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. DeliaRajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN ANDBENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE,351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security

System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THEBELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSASIX HUNDERED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIXHUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONBILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDREDSEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTA

[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOAND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OFSTOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLIONSEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESSFROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THEDEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAMJOSE VELARDE;

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHAREPERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIIN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the amount of MO

OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION OHUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOAND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THSAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THEEQUITABLE-PCI BANK.

CONTRARY TO LAW.54[1]

On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsmans Joint Resolutfinding probable cause against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, hewith the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration and/orReinvestigation.55[2] Petitioner likewise filed on said date, this time with the


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Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance ofWarrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination ofProbable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration and/orReinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation ofthe Charges against accused Edward Serapio.56[3]

On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioners motion for

reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since theamended Information charging petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the

Sandiganbayan.57[4]

In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrantsof arrest for the accused, including petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayanissued an Order on the same date for the arrest of petitioner.58[5] When apprised ofsaid order, petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day toPhilippine National Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since beendetained at Camp Crame for said charge.

The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, inCriminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001,

petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set forhearing on May 4, 2001.59[6] For his part, petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy

Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that heentitled to bail as a matter of right.

During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, theprosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier thaJune 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of theprosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and shoulheard beforepetitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the otheaccused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for bail.

Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence onpetitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.

On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners petition for bail, Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, JinEstrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, JinEstrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a manifestationquestioning the propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in thehearing on his (petitioners) petition for bail.

The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the hearings petitioners petition for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve

prosecutions pending motions as well as petitioners motion that his petition fobe heard as early as possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.

On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners A

6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed by petithad already been resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cauhold petitioner and his co-accused for trial.60[7] Petitioner filed a motion forreconsideration of the said May 31, 2001 Resolution.

On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendancepetitioner as well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the


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hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. TheSandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in themanner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy terminationof the case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearingconsidering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whateverevidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automaticallyreproduced at the trial.61[8]

However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the

Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing dueto pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26,2001.62[9]

On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyingpetitioners motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bailhearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date petitioner filedwith the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on the groundsthat as against him, the amended Information does not allege a combination or seriesof overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amendedInformation does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overallunlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended

Information to have been illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gottenwealth as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amendedInformation charges him of bribery and illegal gambling.63[10] By way of riposte, theprosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdrawhis motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioners motion to quash the

amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail.

The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the petifor bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it tresolve the pending incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner. However, ebefore the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and thprosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition forHabCorpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court decvoid the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likeprayed for the issuance of a writ ofhabeas corpus; that the People be declared to

waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and,premised on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioners gplunder, that he be granted provisional l iberty on bail after due proceedings.64[11

Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbamotion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.

On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners moto quash the amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on saida copy of said resolution.65[12] The motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Eswas also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.

On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitmanifested to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion forreconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash and the deferment of his arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that twas no provision in the Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayans rules grantingright to petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of an interlocutory ordissued by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for reconsiderationWhen petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment.Petitioner refused to plead, impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for h


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On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed asG.R. No. 148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess ofjurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash,notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amendedInformation against him do not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is charged,under the said amended Information, for more than one offense. Jose JinggoyEstrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R. No.148965 for the nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion

to fix bail.On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for Certiorari,docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 31May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25,2001 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001Resolution.

Re: G.R. No. 148769

Petitioner avers that:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OFJURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TOLACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONERSERAPIOSMOTION TO QUASHNOTWITHSTANDING THAT

I

THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINSTPETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.

A. TheAmended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege acombination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.

B. TheAmended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege apattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

C. The money described

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