REPORTS OF INTERNATIONALARBITRAL AWARDS

RECUEIL DES SENTENCESARBITRALES

Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission - Preliminary Decisions

August 2001, December 2005 and July 2007

XXVI pp. 1-22VOLUME

NATIONS UNIES - UNITED NATIONSCopyright (c) 2009

ParT i

Preliminary decisions

Decisions of August 2001 19 December 2005

27 July 2007

Décisions préliminaires

Décisions d’août 2001 19 décembre 2005

27 juillet 2007

PreliminaryDecisions

Décisionspréliminaires

eritrea-ethiopia Claims Commission

decision number 1 of august 2001

décision numéro 1 d’août 2001JurisdictionoftheCommission—jurisdictiono�erclaimsrelatedtotheconflict

betweenEritreaandEthiopia—claimsrelatedtoe�entsthatoccurredafterMay1998untiltheeffecti�erepatriationofallprisonersofwar(POWs)—repatriationofPOWsincluded in thedisengagementmeasures toend theconflict—no jurisdictiono�erclaimsrelatingtotheinterpretationorimplementationoftheagreementbetweentheParties .

CompétencedelaCommission—compétences’agissantdesréclamationsrelati�esauconflitentrel’Érythréeetl’Éthiopie—réclamationsrelati�esauxé�énementssur�enuspostérieurementàmai1998etjusqu’aurapatriementeffectifdetouslesprisonniersdeguerre—rapatriement des prisonniers compris dans les mesures de désengagementpourmettrefinauconflit—absencedecompétences’agissantdesréclamationsrelati�esàl’interprétationetàlamiseenœu�redel’accorddepaixentrelesParties .

The Commission’s mandate/Temporal scope of JurisdictionUnderArticle5(1)oftheAgreementofDecember12,2000(“TheAgree-

ment”),theCommissionhasjurisdictiono�er“allclaimsforloss,damageorinjurybyoneGo�ernmentagainsttheother,andbynationals(includingbothnaturaland juridicalpersons)ofonepartyagainst theGo�ernmentof theotherparty . . .thatare(a)relatedtotheconflictthatwasthesubjectoftheFrameworkAgreement,theModalitiesforitsImplementationandtheCessa-tionofHostilitiesAgreement,and(b)resultfrom�iolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,includingthe1949Gene�aCon�entions,orother�iolationsofinternationallaw .”

A. No Supervisory Jurisdiction Over Interpretation or Application of the December Agreement

The Commission decides that claims regarding the interpretation orimplementationoftheAgreementassucharenotwithinthisgrantofjuris-diction .Suchanimportantgrantofjurisdictioncannotbeimplied .NeitherthetextofArticle(5)1noranyotherpartoftheAgreementgi�essuchasuper-�isory role to theCommission .Thiscontrastswith the jurisdictionof the

4 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

Iran-UnitedStatesClaimsTribunal,whichwasexpresslyauthorizedtodecidedisputesregardingtheinterpretationandapplicationoftheClaimsSettlementDeclaration .

B. Claims Arising During the Conflict

TheCommissionbelie�esthatthecentralreferencepointfordetermin-ingthescopeofitsmandateunderArticle(5)1oftheAgreementistheconflictbetweentheparties .Intheo�erallcontextoftherele�antdocumentscitedinArticle(5)1, theCommissionunderstandsthistomeanthearmedconflictthatbeganinMay1998andwasformallybroughttoanendbytheAgreementonDecember12,2000 .Thereisapresumptionthatclaimsarisingduringthisperiod“relateto”theconflictandarewithintheCommission’sjurisdiction .

C. Claims After December 2000

TheCommissionhasconcludedthatcertainclaimsassociatedwithe�entsafterDecember12,2000mayalso“relateto”theconflict,ifapartycandem-onstratethatthoseclaimsaroseasaresultofthearmedconflictbetweentheparties,oroccurredinthecourseofmeasurestodisengagecontendingforcesorotherwisetoendthemilitaryconfrontationbetweenthetwosides .Thesemightincludeforexample,claimsbyeitherpartyregardingalleged�iolationsofinternationallawoccurringwhilearmedforcesarebeingwithdrawnfromoccupiedterritoryorotherwisedisengagingintheperiodafterDecember12,2000 .AnysuchclaimsmustbefiledwithinthefilingperiodestablishedbytheAgreement .Moreo�er,asnotedinPartAabo�e,theCommissiondoesnotha�ejurisdictiono�erclaimsforallegedbreachedoftheAgreement .

D. Claims Before May 1998

TheCommissionbelie�esthatClaimsarisingpriortoMay1998areofadifferentcharacteranddonotcomewithinitsjurisdiction .Logically,suchclaimscannot“relateto”theconflictinthedirectsenseindicatedabo�eforcertainclaimsarisingafterDecember12,2000,becausethearmedconflictthatisthecentralfocusoftheCommission’sjurisdictionhadnotyetoccurred .Accordingly,theCommissionmustexaminewhetherthereareotherwaystointerprettheterm“relatedto”thatwouldbeinharmonywiththeterm’sordi-narymeaningandthepurposeandstructureoftheDecemberAgreement .

Intheirpapersandinoralargument,bothPartiesrecognizedthatthisconceptmightbegi�enbroad interpretations thatwouldbringwithin theCommission’sjurisdictionlong-standinglegalcontro�ersies,notjustgoing

PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 5

backtoJuly and August 1997, but perhaps going back for decades.1 Neither Party suggested that the Commission adopt such a broad interpretation .Indeed,suchaninterpretationcouldnotbeeffecti�elyimplementedgi�enthelimitedcapacityandresourcesofthefi�e-memberclaimscommissioncreatedbytheDecember12Agreement .Howe�er,theargumentspresentedinsupportofjurisdictiono�ere�entspriortoMay1998didnotindicatetotheCommis-sionanyprincipledwaytointerpretthetexttoa�oidthisextremeresult,aresultapparentlynotintendedbyeitherParty .

Moreo�er,theCommission’smandateunderArticle5mustbeconstruedsoastobeinharmonywiththeo�erallinstitutionalstructureestablishedbytheAgreement .Inthisregard,thePartiesga�etwootherinstitutionsclearandexpansi�emandatesregardinge�entsthatoccurredbeforetheoutbreakofthearmedconflict .ItisdifficulttoseehowthisCommissioncouldinquireintoandpassjudgementregardinge�entspriortoMay1998andwithoutrunningafoulofthemandatesoftheseotherbodies .

Forexample,duringoralargument,itwasurgedthatcertainclaimsaris-ingbeforeMay1998shouldfallwithintheCommission’sjurisdiction .How-e�er,thesedisputesessentiallyresultedfromtheParties’disagreementso�erthelocationoftheirboundary .Article4oftheAgreementcreatesaneutralBoundaryCommission,andgi�estothatCommissionalonetheresponsibilityfordeterminingtheboundary .ItwouldnotbeconsistentwiththestructurecreatedbytheAgreementforthisCommissiontoattempttoarbitrateadisputethathasatitsheartthequestionofthecorrectlocationoftheboundary .

ThePartiesassignedotherimportantresponsibilitiesregardinge�entspriortoMay1998toyetanotherbody .UnderArticle3oftheAgreement,anindependentimpartialbodyappointedbytheSecretary-GeneraloftheOAUistocarryoutanin�estigation“ontheincidentsof6May1998andonanyotherincidentspriortothatdatewhichcouldha�econtributedtoamisunder-standingbetweenthepartiesregardingtheircommonborder,includingtheincidentsofJulyandAugust1997 .”Again,itisdifficulttoseehowthisCom-missioncouldexercisejurisdictionwithrespecttothee�entsoccurringpriortoMay6,1998thataremostindisputebetweenthepartieswithoutrunningafoulofthemandateofthein�estigatingbodyauthorizedbyArticle3 .

Thus,thePartiesexpresslyga�etomechanismsotherthatthisCommis-siontheprimaryresponsibilityfordecidingquestionsrelatedtotheboundaryandforassessingthecharacterandconsequencesofcontro�ersiesbetweenthePartiesbeforetheoutbreakofthearmedconflictinMay1998 .Gi�enthis,the

1 See,e .g .MemorandumoftheStateofEritrea,May1,2001at26,(“certainclaimsmaybeproperlycompensablebeforetheCommissione�enthoughtheyconcern,inpart,e�entstakingplacepriortothesummerof1997 . . .itisdifficulttostatecategoricallyanyjurisdictionaltimeframeidentifyingwhichclaimsaresuitableforconsiderationbythisCommission .”);MemorandumoftheFederalRepublicofEthiopia,June15,2001,(‘Thefactsande�entsofthepastduringwhichmisunderstandingsaroseo�ertheboundaryreachbacktothe19thcentury,whenboundarytreatieswerefirstconcluded .”)

6 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

Commissionbelie�esthatitwouldnotbeproperforittointerpretthewordsofArticle5toincludeaswellclaimsfor�iolationallegedtooccurbeforetheoutbreakofthearmedconflictinMay1998,onthegroundthatthoseclaims“relateto”thatconflict .

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decision number 2 of august 2001

décision numéro 2 d’août 2001OrganisationoftheworkoftheCommission—classificationofclaimsbysub-

ject—possibilityofmassclaimsproceduresforfixedamountcompensation .Organisationdutra�aildelaCommission—classificationdesréclamationspar

thèmes—possibilitédeprocéduresderéclamationscollecti�espouruneindemnitéfixe .

Claims Categories, forms and ProceduresA. Claims Categories

TheCommissionhasdecidedthatclaimsmaybefiledinthefollowingsixcategories:

Category1—Claimsofnaturalpersonsforunlawfulexpulsionfromthecountryoftheirresidence;

Category2—Claimsofnaturalpersonsforunlawfuldisplacementfromtheirresidence;

Category3—Claimsofprisonersofwarforinjuriessufferedfromunlaw-fultreatment;

Category4—Claimsofci�iliansforunlawfuldetentionandforinjuriessufferedfromunlawfultreatmentduringdetention;

Category5—Claimsofpersons for loss,damageor injuryother thanthoseco�eredbytheothercategories;

Category6—ClaimsofGo�ernmentsforloss,damageorinjury .

B. Mass Claims Procedures/Fixed Amount Compensation

TheCommissionhasdecidedtoestablishamassclaimsprocessunderwhichclaimsofpersonsinCategories1—5maybefiledforfixedamountcom-pensation .ThePartiesshallprepareclaimsformsforallsuchclaims,usingformstobeestablishedbytheCommission .Specifieddataderi�edfromthoseformsmaybefiledwiththeCommissioninelectronicformpursuanttoguid-ancetheCommissionwillpro�ide .

EachPartywillgroupitsclaimsineachCategoryinsub-categoriesthatitselects,insuchamannerthateachsub-categorycontainsallofthatParty’s

PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 7

claimsinthatCategoryallegedtoarisefromaparticular�iolationofinterna-tionallawand/orfromthesamee�ents .

SubjecttofurtherdecisionsbytheCommission,fixedamountcompensa-tionshallbea�ailableintwotiersdependingonthetypeofe�idencea�ailable .TheamountineachtiershallbedecidedbytheCommissionafterrecei�ingfurther�iewsande�idence fromtheParties .Fixedamountcompensationshallbea�ailableinaccordancewithprocedurestobeestablishedinChapterThreeoftheCommission’sRulesofProcedure .

C. Other Claims

AllclaimsinCategory6,andthoseclaimsinCategories1through5thatseektopro�eactualdamagesorotherwiserequireindi�idualconsideration,shallbefiledinaccordancewithprocedurestobeestablishedinChapterTwooftheCommission’sRulesofProcedure .

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decision number 3 of august 2001

décision numéro 3 d’août 2001Remediesforthe�iolations—monetarycompensation .

Indemnisationdesinfractions—compensationfinancière .

remediesTheCommissiondecides that, inprinciple, theappropriateremedyfor

�alidclaimssubmittedtoitshouldbemonetarycompensation .Howe�er,theCommissiondoesnotforeclosethepossibilityofpro�idingothertypesofrem-ediesinappropriatecases,iftheparticularremedycanbeshowntobeinaccord-ancewithinternationalpractice,andiftheTribunaldeterminesthataparticularremedywouldbereasonableandappropriateinthecircumstances .

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decision number 4 of august 2001

décision numéro 4 d’août 2001Rules of procedure—compliance to international law rules—no decisions ex

aequo et bono—substanti�ee�idencerequested .

Règlesdeprocédure—conformitéauxrèglesdedroitinternational—pasdedéci-sionsex aequo et bono—nécessitédefournirdespreu�essubstantielles .

8 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

evidenceThePartiesareremindedthatunderArticle5(13)oftheAgreementof

December12,2000,theCommissionisboundtoapplytherele�antrulesofinternationallawandcannotmakedecisionsex aequo et bono.TherulesthattheCommissionmustapplyincludethoserelatingtotheneedfore�idencetopro�eordispro�edisputedfacts .

TheCommissionthereforecallsonthePartiestopayparticularattentiontomattersrelatedtoe�idenceinthecollectionandpreparationofclaims .TheCommissionexpectsthePartiestode�elopguidanceforallpersonnelwhocollectorprepareclaims,emphasizingtheimportanceofe�idence,andindi-catingthetypesofe�idencepotentiallya�ailable .

TheCommissioncallsonCounselforbothPartiestobeincontactregard-ingthismatter,andstronglyencouragesthePartiestoharmonizetheguid-anceregardinge�identiarymattersthateachPartypro�idestoitspersonnelwhocollectandprepareclaims .

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decision number 5 of august 2001

décision numéro 5 d’août 2001Rules of procedure—possibility of claims under se�eral categories in a mass

claimsprocess—�ariousle�elsoffixed-sumcompensationforindi�iduals .Règlesdeprocédure—possibilitéd’introduiredesréclamationsdansplusieurs

catégoriesdans lecadred’uneprocédurecollecti�e—fixationdedifférentsni�eauxd’indemnisationpourlesindi�idus .

multiple Claims in the mass Claims Process, fixed-sum Compensation at the $500 and $1500 levels, multiplier for

Household ClaimsOnthebasisoftheParties’submissionsbeforeandduringthehearingof

1—3July,2001,andthepost-hearingsubmissionsfiledbytheFederalDemo-craticRepublicofEthiopia(7August2001)andtheStateofEritrea(8August2001)inresponsetotheCommission’sletterof24July2001,theCommissiondecidesasfollows:

A. Multiple Claims in the Mass Claims Process

NotingthatArticle5,paragraph1,of theAgreementof12December2000requirestheCommissiontoentertain“allclaimsfor loss,damageorinjury”thatarerelatedtotheconflictandresultfrom�iolationsofinterna-tionalhumanitarianlaw,theCommissiondecidedthatthePartiesmayfile

PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 9

claimsonbehalfofanindi�idualnationalinmorethanoneoftheCategories1—5inthemassclaimsprocess .

B. Fixed-Sum Compensation at the $500 and $1500 Levels

Takingintoaccount,amongotherthings,thatthePartiesmayfilemul-tipleclaimsonbehalfofindi�idualnationalsinthemassclaimsprocess,theCommissiondecidesthatthele�elofthefirsttieroffixed-sumcompensationinthemassclaimsprocesswillbe$500perindi�idualnationalandthele�elofthesecondtierwillbe$1500perindi�idualnational .(ThetwotiersremainasdescribedinDecisionNumber2 .)

Assetoutinparagraph7ofitsletterof24July2001,theCommissionwillconsiderestablishingadditionalle�elsoffixed-sumcompensationforclaimscategoriesastheclaimsprocessde�elopsande�idenceisfiled .

C. Household Claims

NotingtheParties’concurrencethatamultipliershouldbeusedtosetthefixed-sumcompensationformassclaimsforwrongfulexpulsionandforwrongfuldisplacement(Categories1and2),andfurthertakingnotethatmostfamilies inEritreaandEthiopiaha�echildren,theCommissiondecidestoadoptthemultiplierofthree(3) .

In response to questions raised in the post-hearing submissions, theCommissionfurtherdecides:

(1) Ahouseholdclaimforexpulsionmaybemadee�enifsomemem-bersofthehouseholdwerenotexpelled .(2) Ahouseholdexpulsionclaimandanindi�idualexpulsionclaimforamemberofthathouseholdcannotbothbemade .(3) Theageofapersonatthetimeofexpulsioncontrols,i .e .,apersonundertheageof18atthetimeofexpulsioniswithinthehouseholde�enifheorsheiso�ertheageof18atthetimeoffiling .

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decision number 6 of 19 december 2005

décision numéro 6 du 19 décembre 2005Proceedings—WithdrawalofaclaimbytheClaimant .

Procédure—Retraitd’uneplainteparlerequérant .

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eritrea’s Claim 18

Eritrea’sClaim18wasbroughtbeforetheCommissionbytheClaimant,theStateofEritrea(“Eritrea”)againsttheRespondent,theFederalDemocrat-icRepublicofEthiopia(“Ethiopia”),pursuanttoArticle5oftheAgreementbetweentheGo�ernmentoftheStateofEritreaandtheGo�ernmentoftheFederalDemocraticRepublicofEthiopiaofDecember12,2000(“theAgree-ment”) .TheClaimantsoughtcompensationforlossessufferedbyEritreaanditsnationalsandagentsasaresultofEthiopia’sallegedbreachoftheTelecom-municationsSer�icesAgreementofSeptember27,1993,abilateralagreementregulatingtheoperationoftelecommunicationsbetweenthetwonationsdur-ingthe1998—2000internationalarmedconflictbetweentheParties .Ethiopiadeniedliability .

TheCommissioninformedthePartiesonAugust29,2001thatitintendedtoconductproceedingsinGo�ernment-to-Go�ernmentclaimsintwostages,firstconcerningliability,andsecond,ifliabilityisfound,concerningdamages .EritreafileditsStatementofClaim18onDecember12,2001,pursuanttoArti-cle5,paragraph8oftheAgreement .EthiopiafileditsStatementofDefenseonOctober15,2002 .Eritreaad�isedtheCommissionbyletteraccompanyingitsMemorialsfiledonNo�ember1,2005thatitwasnotfilingaMemorialforClaim18 .

ThefinalroundofhearingsonliabilitywasheldinApril2005 .AtthehearingtheCommissionaskedEritreahowitwishedClaim18tobedealt,andcounselforEritrearespondedthat“Eritreafiledthestatementofclaimbutchosenottoproceedwithit .”(Transcriptatp .564)

Decision

In light of the history of this case as set out abo�e, the CommissiondecidestoregardEritrea’sClaim18aswithdrawnbytheClaimant .NoAwardwillbeissued .

(Signed)Hans�anHoutte

President

Eritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommission

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decision number 7 of 27 July 2007

décision numéro 7 du 27 juillet 2007Stateresponsibility—questionoftheextentofEritrea’sliabilitytopaydamages

foritsbreachofthejus ad bellum .

PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 11

Legalcausation—degreeofconnectiondependinguponnatureoftheclaimandothercircumstances—measureofdiscretionnecessaryinassessingthelinkbetweendelictandcompensableinjury—choiceoftheelementofforeseeabilityforassessingproximitybetweencauseanddamage .

Extended�iewofStateresponsibilitynotsupportedbythepracticeofStates—broadcategoriesofclaimstraditionallyexcludedfromrangeofpossibledamagesbywarclaimstribunals—noreparationdeterminedthroughapplicationofinternationallawre�ealedbypre�iouspractice—unusualandcompellingcircumstancesleadingtoUnitedNationsCompensationCommission’screation .

RoleoftheSecurityCouncil—findingofjus ad bellumbreachesnotregardedasfindingthatEritreainitiatedanaggressi�ewarforwhichitbearsextensi�efinancialresponsibility .

Responsabilitédel’État—questiondel’étenduedelaresponsabilitédel’Érythréede compenser les dommages résultant de la �iolation du jus ad bellum qu’elle aperpétré .

Causalitéjuridique—degrédeconnexiondépendantdelanaturedelaréclama-tionetd’autrescirconstances—partdediscrétionnécessaireafind’établirlelienentreledélitetledommageindemnisable—choixdel’élémentdepré�isibilitéafind’é�aluerlaproximitéentrelacauseetledommage .

L’optiond’uneresponsabilitéétatiqueétenduen’estpassoutenueparlapratiqueétatique—largeé�entaildeplaintestraditionnellementexcluesdelagammedesdom-magesallouéspar les tribunauxdeguerre—lapratiqueantérieureneré�èleaucuncasderéparationdéterminéeparl’applicationdudroitinternational—circonstancesinhabituellesetincontestablesmenantàlacréationdelaCommissiond’indemnisationdesNationsUnies .

RôleduConseildesécurité—leconstatde�iolationsdujus ad bellumn’estpasassimiléauconstatdel’initiationd’uneguerred’agressionparl’Érythréepourlaquelleelleauraituneresponsabilitéfinancièreétendue .

Guidance regarding Jus ad Bellum liabilityI. Introduction

1 . ThepurposeofthisDecisionistopro�ideguidancefortheParties’pleadingsandargumentsinthefinalroundofhearingsoftheseproceed-ings,regardingtheextentofEritrea’sliabilitytopaydamagesforitsbreachofthe jus ad bellum, thelawregulatingresorttoarmedforce,asidentifiedintheCommission’sDecember2005partialawardJus ad bellum (Ethiopia’sClaims1–8)ofDecember19,2005 .

2 . As the Parties are aware, the Commission held four rounds ofhearingsonthemeritsofbothParties’claimsbetweenNo�ember2002andApril2005,andissuednumerouspartialandfinalawardsfollowingthosehearings .Theseresol�edthemeritsofallof theParties’claims,except forEthiopia’sclaimsrelatingtoEritrea’s�iolationofthe jus ad bellum.

12 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

3 . TheissueoftheextentofEritrea’sresponsibilityinthisregardper�ades Ethiopia’sdamagesclaims .Many rest, inwholeorpart,uponEthiopia’scontentionthatEritreabearsliabilitybecauseofthe�iolationofthe jus ad bellum. Theseclaims included se�eral typesof injury that theCommissionearlierfounddidnotin�ol�e�iolationsof the lawregulat-ingarmedconf lict,thejus in bello. Amongthesearelossesresultingfromshelling or incurred by internally displaced persons, deaths and injuriesattributable to landmines,andotherdamageassociatedwithbothPar-ties’militaryoperations .

4 . TheCommissionhelditsfirstroundofhearingsinthedamagesphaseoftheseproceedingsinApril2007 .BothPartieswerein�itedatthathearingtoaddressthelegalextentofcompensabledamageresultingfromits jus ad bellum partialaward .Atthehearing,EthiopiacontendedthatEritreabore�eryextensi�eliabilityonaccountofthis�iolation .Eritreacontendedthat,becausethemannerinwhichEthiopiapresenteditsclaimdidnotcon-formtotheCommission’sproceduralinstructionspriortothehearing,theclaimshouldbedismissedinitsentirety .

5 . TheCommissiondoesnotaccepteither�iew .Inaninformalmeet-ingwiththePartiesfollowingtheAprilhearing,theCommissioninformedthemasfollows:

TheCommissiondoesnotregarditsjus ad bellum findingasafindingthatEritreainitiatedanaggressi�ewarforwhichitbearstheextensi�efinancialresponsibilityclaimedbyEthiopia .Atthesametime,itdoesnotacceptEritrea’sargumentthatthereisnofinancialresponsibility .Atthenextstage,theCommissiondirectsthePartiestoaddressthespecificextentofdamagethatisreasonablyforeseeable/proximatelycausedbythespecificfindingofliabilitymadebytheCommission .TheCommissiondoesnotexpectthePartiestosimplyrepeattheargumentstheyha�emadeatthecurrentstage .

6 . ThepurposeofthisDecisionistopro�idethePartieswithfur-therguidanceregardingthesematters .

II. Legal Causation

7 . TheCommissionregardsthestandardoflegalcausationtoberel-e�anttothemattersatissue .Compensationcanonlybeawardedinrespectof damages ha�ing a sufficient causal connection with conduct �iolatinginternationallaw .AsthePartiesnoted,numeroustermsha�ebeenusedtodescribethisconnection,includingsuchtermsasreasonable,direct,proxi-mate,foreseeableorcertain(orcon�ersely,unreasonable,remote,attenuated,orspeculati�e) .AsbothPartiesacknowledged,these�aryingterminolo-giesoftenpro�idelimitedassistanceinanalyzingspecificsituations .11Both

1 See Marjorie M . Whiteman, III Damages in International Law pp . 1766–1767(1943) .

PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 13

Parties also referred to a point noted by the International Law Com-mission in itsCommentary to itsStateResponsibilityArticles—that“therequirementofacausallinkisnotnecessarilythesameinrelationtoe�erybreachofaninternationalobligation .”2Thedegreeofconnectionmay�arydependinguponthenatureoftheclaimandothercircumstances .Inthisregard,somewritersseecausationbeingmorereadilyfoundincasesin�ol�ingparticularlyserious�iolationsoflaw .3

8 . Ethiopiaacknowledgedthepotential limitationsofany�erbalformulation .Howe�er,atthehearing,itmaintainedthatthe�aryingformu-laewerebestdistilledinWhiteman’streatiseonDamages in International Law—“thatdamagesallowedonaccountofthecommissionoromissionofanactgi�ingrisetoresponsibilitygenerallyarethosewhichitisreasonable toallow .”4WhileacknowledgingitsdebttoWhiteman’streatise,theCom-missionisnotpersuadedthatherformulationisthebestwayforward .Thenotionsof“reasonableness”or“reasonableconnection”restuponasubjec-ti�econcept—“reasonableness”—likelytobehea�ilyshapedbythedecision-maker’scultureandlifeexperience .Thisconcepthasasignificantroleinsomenationallegalsystems,butnotinothers .Gi�enthis,itcannotbeseenasageneralprincipleoflaw .Moreo�er,gi�enthe�aryingapproachestocausationadoptedbydifferinginternationaltribunals,theconcepthasnotattainedthestatusofacustomaryruleofinternationallaw,andEthiopiadidnotcontendthatitwas .

9 . Foritspart,Eritreaarguedthattheconnectionwasbetterdescribedinthemorefamiliarlexiconof“proximatecause,”althoughitacknowledgedthat this term was not a perfect expression of the required relationship .Again,thisformulationisnotageneralprincipleoflaworaruleofcustom-aryinternationallaw,andEritreadidnotcontendotherwise .Indeed,bothParties�iewedthelinkbetweendelictandcompensableinjuryasanareainwhichjudgmentwasrequired,andwheretheCommissionnecessarilyexercisedameasureofdiscretion .

10 . Yet another approach is the concept of “direct” or “indirect”damages . In the historicAlabama arbitration, thearbitrators’decision toexclude“indirect”claims(forlossesresultingfromthetransferofU .S .shipstotheBritishflag,increasedinsurancerates,andtheprolongationofthewar)

2 InternationalLawCommission,Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary to Art. 31, para. 10, reprinted in JamesCrawford,The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentariespp .204–205(2002) .

3 ArthurW .Ro�ine&GrantHanessian,Toward a Foreseeability Approach to Causa-tion Questions at the United Nations Compensation Commission, in TheUnitedNationsCompen-sationCommission[ThirteenthSokolColloquium]pp .235–236(RichardLillich,ed .1995)[hereinafterLillich] .

4 Whiteman,supra note1,atp .1767(emphasisinoriginal) .

14 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

wascrucialina�oidingpossiblefrustrationoftheprocess .5TheTreatyofVer-saillesalsorequiredGermanytopro�idecompensationfordamage“directlyinconsequenceofhostilitiesorofanyoperationsofwar .”6Howe�er,manytribunalsandcommentatorsha�ecriticizedthisapproach,findingthatitlacksanalyticalpower .TheumpireintheWar-Risk Insurance Premium Claims casedescribed the distinction as “frequently illusory and fanciful,” andurgedthatit“shouldha�enoplaceininternationallaw .”7

11 . Notwithstanding these concerns, when the Security CouncilestablishedthemandateoftheUnitedNationsCompensationCommis-sion(UNCC)inResolution687,itspecifiedthattheUNCC’sjurisdictionwaslimitedto“direct”injury .8Muchofthesubsequentworkof theUNCC’sGo�erningCouncilandof itsPanelsofCommissionershasin�ol�edline-drawingtodeterminewhatinjuryisdeemed“direct”forpurposesofResolution687 .9TheUNCC’sworkisofinterest,butitsrele�ancetothepresentquestionisuncertain .Inadditiontothecriticismsnotedabo�e,the fundamental “line-drawing” decisions regarding the extent of directinjuryfortheUNCC’spurposesha�ebeenmadebytheUNCCGo�erningCouncilinlightofreportsoftheUNCC’sPanelsofCommissioners .TheGo�erningCouncilisapoliticalorganthathasoperatedinanunusualpoliti-calandfactualsetting .Itdoesnotfollowjudicialprocessesornecessarilyapply international law in itsdecisions .10 Thus, while the UNCC offerssignificantprecedentsinmanyareas,itsdecisionsregardingthescopeof“direct”injurymustbeassessedwithcareandinlightoftheircontext .

12 . Anothersubstantiallineofcasesfindsthepropertestofthecon-nectionbetweendelictandcompensabledamagetobewhetherthedam-agewasforeseeable(orsometimes,“reasonablyforeseeable”)totheper-petratorofthedelict .Theseha�eincludedawardsoftheSamoanClaimsCommission,11theU .S .-VenezuelanMixedClaimsCommission,12thePortu-

5 1JohnBassettMoore,International Arbitrationp .646(1898);Whiteman,supra note1,atp .1773 .

6 TreatyofVersailles,June28,1919,225Parry’s Consol. T.S.189,11Martens Nou-veau Recueil(Ser .3)p .323,PartVIII,sec .1,AnnexI,para .9 .

7 7R .I .A .A .p .62,quotedinNorbertWühler,Causation and Directness of Loss as Elements of Compensability Before the United Nations Compensation Commission, in Lil-lich,supra note3,atp .231 .See ReportbySpecialRapporteuroftheInternationalLawCommission(ArangioRuiz),44U .N .GAORSupp .No .10at6,U .N .Doc .A/CN4/425(1989) .

8 See Wühler,supra note7,atpp .207,231 .9 Wühler,supra note7,atpp .207–209 .10 MichaelJ .Matheson,CouncilUnboundp .174(2006);Ro�ine&Hanessian,supra

note3,atp .238 .11 JointReportNo .2of12August1904,oftheAmericanandBritishCommissioners,

in Whiteman,supra note1,atpp .1778–1781 .12 RobertsCase(U.S. v. Venez.),Ralston’sReportp .142 .

PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 15

go-GermanArbitralTribunalcase,13andtheLighthousesarbitrationbetweenFranceandGreece .14

13 . Gi�enthisambiguousterrain,theCommissionconcludesthatthenecessaryconnectionisbestcharacterizedthroughthecommonlyusednomenclatureof“proximatecause .”Inassessingwhetherthistestismet,andwhetherthechainofcausationissufficientlycloseinapar-ticularsituation,theCommissionwillgi�eweighttowhetherparticulardamagereasonablyshouldha�ebeenforeseeabletoanactorcommittingtheinternationaldelictinquestion .Theelementofforseeability,althoughnotwithoutitsowndifficulties,pro�idessomedisciplineandpredictabilityinassessingproximity .Accordingly,itwillbegi�enconsiderableweightinassessingwhetherparticulardamagesarecompensable .

14 . TheCommissionnotesthat,inmanysituations,thechoiceof�er-bal formula todescribe thenecessarydegreeofconnectionwill result innodifferenceinoutcomes .Inthisregard,bothPartiesagreedthatasignifi-cantrangeofpossibledamagesrelatedtowarliebeyondthepaleofStateresponsibility .Bothcitedwithappro�al thedecisionsoftheAmerican-GermanMixedClaimsCommissionestablishedin1922,whichexcludedsignificant typesof claims, suchas increased li�ingcosts and trans-portationcosts,asbeingtooremotefromparticularconductbyGermany .Inthisregard,theAmerican-GermanCommissionmirroredotherwarclaimstribunalsthatexcludedbroadcategoriesofclaims,suchasthoseforgeneral-izedeconomicdamages,increasedinsurancerates,andsimilarmatters .

III. Ethiopia’s Jus Ad Bellum Claims

15 . Asnoted,Ethiopiaclaimedforextensi�edamagessaidtoresultfromEritrea’sbreachofthejus ad bellum. InEthiopia’s�iew,theseallboreareasonableconnectiontoconducttheCommissionfoundtobeunlawful,sothatEritreashouldbeartheirfullcosts .EthiopiamaintainedthatthelegalconsequencesoftheCommission’sJus ad bellum partialawardarenotlim-itedtothetimesandplacesspecificallymentionedinthat partial award .Instead, Ethiopia contended that the jus ad bellum �iolation identi-fiedbytheCommission“inescapablyresultedinthiswidercondition[ofwidescalehostilities]and,totheextentthatthereisloss,damageorinjuryassociatedwithit,thenthatiscompensable .”15Inthisconnection,EthiopiareferredtoreparationsprogramsfollowingtheFirstandSecondWorld

13 NaulilaaCase,2R .I .A .A .p .1013 .(“Theuprising . . .thusconstitutesaninjurywhichtheauthoroftheinitialact . . .shouldha�eforeseenasanecessaryconsequenceofitsmilitaryoperations .”)

14 12R .I .A .A .p .217(1956) .15 TranscriptoftheEritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommissionHearingsofApril2007,

PeacePalace,TheHague,atp .39(ProfessorMurphy) .

16 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

Wars,bothofwhichin�ol�edreparationsforthetotalityoftheconflict,notjusttheinitialattacksattheiroutset .

16 . Ethiopiaplacedparticularemphasisupontheactionsof theUNSecurityCouncilinitsResolutions674and687,regardingIraq’sin�asionandoccupationofKuwait .Asnotedabo�e,inResolution687,theSecurityCouncilstatedthatunderinternationallaw,Iraq“isliableforanydirectloss,damageorinjuryarisinginregardtoKuwaitand thirdStates,and theirnationalsandcorporationsasaresultofthein�asionandillegaloccupa-tionofKuwaitbyIraq .”CounselforEthiopiadescribedinsomedetailhowtheUNCChaddefinedthescopeofIraq’sliabilitypursuanttoResolution687inwaysthat,inEthiopia’s�iew,substantiallyparalleleditsjus ad bellum damagesclaims .

17 . Eritrea acknowledged that Eritrea has an obligation to pro�idereparationforthespecific�iolationof lawidentifiedbytheCommission .Howe�er, itcontendedthatEthiopia’sdamagesclaims farexceeded thescopeof liabilityfollowingfromtheCommission’spartialaward .Eritreastressedwhatitunderstoodtobethelimitedandcarefulphrasingof theCommission’spartialaward .ItfurthercontendedthatEthiopia’ssweep-ingclaimsdidnotrespondtotheCommission’scall,inthedispositifofthepartialaward,foraconsideredassessmentofthescopeofitsliability,andpro�idednobasisforarulingbytheCommission .Eritreamaintainedthatin thesecircumstances,Ethiopia’smonetaryclaimsforthe jus ad bellum �iolationshouldberejected .Ethiopia’sreliefshouldbelimitedtosatisfaction,intheformofadeclarationbytheCommissionthatEritreahad�iolatedinternationallaw,whichcouldberepeatedinafuturedamagesaward .

18 . Eritreacontendedthatusesofforceincontra�entionofArticle2(4)oftheCharteroftheUnitedNationsoccurwithconsiderablefrequen-cy,andtheapplicationofthelawofStateresponsibilitytothemrequiresamorenuancedapproachthancontendedbyEthiopia .InEritrea’s�iew,thereha�ebeenonlythreecasesinwhichtheinternationalcommunityhassanctionedtheimpositionofbroadliabilityononesidetoaconf lict—theFirst and Second World Wars, and Iraq’s in�asion and occupationofKuwaitin1990–1991 .(ThesesamecaseswerealsocitedbyEthiopia .)Ineachcase,itwasestablishedthroughamultilateralprocessenjoyingbroadinternationalappro�althataStatehadinitiatedanaggressi�ewar,andwastoberesponsiblefortheconsequences .Eritreamaintainedthatnoth-ingcomparablehasoccurredhere,andemphasizedthepositionof theSecurityCouncilas thebodycharged by Article 24 of the UN Char-ter with primary responsibi lity for the maintenance of internationalpeaceandsecurity .ItcontrastedtheCouncil’streatmentofIraq’sin�asionofKuwait—whereitunequi�ocallyassignedtotalresponsibilityfortheconflicttoIraq—withitsapproachtotheconflictbetweenEritreaandEthiopia .InEri-trea’s�iew,theCouncil’sresolutionsdealingwiththisconflicttookmuch

PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 17

moremeasuredpositions,anddidnotassignresponsibilityfortheconflicttoeitherparty .

19 . TheCommissionismindfulofthefactorsthatledeachPar-tytoseekitsmaximumpositionregardingthescopeofliabilityattheApril 2007 hearing . Ne�ertheless, the Commission does not regardeitherParty’sargumentsasanappropriatebasisforassessingtheissue .

20 . Becauseoftheimportanceoftheissues,andinordertoaffordbothPartiesanopportunityforfurtherref lectionregardingtheirposi-tionsinlightofthe�iewsexpressedhere,theCommissionreser�esdecisiononEthiopia’sjus ad bellum claims .Itwillreturntotheseissuesatthesecondstageoftheproceedings,afterrecei�ingfurther�iewsfromthePartiestak-ingaccountofthisDecision .

IV. Considerations relevant to assessing Jus Ad Bellum Liability

21 . AsbothParties indicated,thereha�ebeenfewmoderninstancesinwhichaStatehasbeendeterminedtobearresponsibilityfordamagesresultingfromawarasamatterofinternationallaw .Throughouthistory,indemnitiesfrequentlyha�ebeenexactedfromthelosingpartiesinwars,butthishasresultedfromtheexerciseofpowerbythe�ictor,nottheapplica-tionoftheinternationallawofStateresponsibility .

22 . IntheCommission’s�iew,thefewtwentiethcenturycasesinwhichStatesha�ebeenheldtobeinternationallyresponsibleforextensi�ewardam-agesdonotpro�ideclearguidance,andinsteadcounselcaution .Thewarguiltandreparationspro�isionsoftheTreatyofVersaillesreflectedacollecti�ejudgmentbythe�ictoriouspartiestotheFirstWorldWarthatGermanyboreresponsibility for the initiationandcontinuationofthatwar,andauthorizedamassi�eprogramofreparations .Howe�er,thehistoryofthosepro�isionsmakesclearthattheywerehea�ilyshapedbymoti�esofpolicyandre�engeunrelatedtotheprinciplesoflaw .TheprogramofreparationsundertheTreatyofVersailleshadabriefandunsatisfactoryhistory .

23 . TheCommissionlikewisedoesnotseetheinternationalcommuni-ty’smeasuresrelatingtocompensationfollowingtheSecondWorldWaraspro�idingcompellingreferencepointsinthepresentsituation,in�ol�inga�iolationoflawofamuchdifferentorder .Attheendofthatwar,therewasabroadconsensusonthepartoftheAlliedPowers—thatGermanyandJapanwereresponsible for initiatingandwagingaggressi�e war on a massi�escale . Indi�idual leadersofbothStateswereheldcriminallyresponsiblefortheirconduct,andsomeseniorleaderswereexecuted .

24 . Ne�ertheless,thepracticeofStatesatthattimedoesnotsupporttheexpansi�e�iewofStateresponsibilityEthiopiaurgesnow .TheStatesdeemedbytheinternationalcommunitytobedirectlyresponsibleforthewarultimatelyborefinancialconsequencesthatweremodestinrela-

18 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

tiontotheresultingdamages .Forreasonslargelyrelatedtothepost-wardi�isionofGermany,therewasnocomprehensi�emultilateralpeacetreatywithGermanycorrespondingtotheTreatyofVersailles,andtherewasnointernationally agreed program of reparations or compensation . TheSo�ietUnionforatimecarriedoutitsownprogramofenforcedreparationsfromGermany,butthiswas“�ictor’sjustice,”notaprincipledapplicationoftheinternational lawofStateresponsibilityenjoyinginternationalsup-portandlegitimacy .Germanysubsequentlycarriedoutextensi�eprogramsofcompensationandassistancetotheStateofIsraelandtomanygroupsofpersonsinjuredbyitsconduct,butthesewerelargelyshapedbyconsidera-tionsofmoralityandpolitics,notbythelawofStateresponsibility .

25 . TheSeptember1951TreatyofPeacewithJapanincludedsubstan-tialpro�isionsrelatingtoclaimsandproperty,butagaindoesnotpro�idecompellingguidance .WhiletheTreatyofPeacebroughtaboutorconfirmedsubstantialtransfersofassets,itspro�isionsresultedfromanegotiationaimedatreintegratingJapanintotheglobalcommunity,notanapplicationofthelawofStateresponsibility .16Article14oftheTreatyillustratesthisnegoti-atedaspect,aswellastheparties’decisionnottorepeattheexperienceoftheTreatyofVersailles .17

26 . Gi�en itspurposes, theTreatyofPeacedidnot require theimmediate commitmentoffreshfundstopro�idecompensation .Instead,Article14(a)(2)(I)ga�eeachoftheAlliedPowersandChinatherighttoseizeandkeeporliquidatecertaino�erseaspropertyofJapanandJapanesenation-alsandentities .UnderArticle14(a),Japanalsoagreedto“promptlyenterintonegotiationswithAlliedPowerssodesiring,whosepresentterritorieswereoccupiedbyJapaneseforcesanddamagedbyJapan,witha�iewtoassistingtocompensatethosecountriesforthecostofrepairingthedamagedone,bymakinga�ailabletheser�icesoftheJapanesepeopleinproduction,sal�agingandotherwork . . . .”Compensationunder theTreatywasexclusi�e . InArticle14(b)“theAlliedPowerswai�e[d]allreparationsclaims . . .arisingoutofanyactionstakenbyJapananditsnationalsinthecourseoftheprosecutionofthewar . . . .”

27 . Thus,thepost-warpracticeofStatesregardingNaziGermanyandJapan,bothgenerallyregardedbytheinternationalcommunityasha�inginitiatedandwagedaggressi�ewaronamassi�escale,pro�idenoclearrefer-encehere .Thereeitherwerenoreparationsdeterminedthroughapplicationofinternationallaw(Germany),orreparationsweredeterminedthrough

16 TreatyofPeacewithJapan,signedSept .8,1951,136U .N .T .S .p .45,3U .S .T .p .3169 .

17 Article14(a)pro�ides“ItisrecognizedthatJapanshouldpayreparationstotheAlliedPowersforthedamageandsufferingcausedbyitduringthewar .Ne�erthelessitisalsorecognizedthattheresourcesofJapanarenotpresentlysufficient,ifitistomaintaina�iableeconomy,tomakecompletereparationforallsuchdamageandsufferingandatthesametimemeetitsotherobligations .”

PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 19

negotiationsshapedbythedefeatedState’sabilitytopayandotherpoliticalandeconomicfactors(Japan) .

28 . Themostrecentprecedent in�okedbyEthiopia is theUNCC,theclaimsandcompensationprocessestablished in response to Iraq’s1990–1991 in�asion and occupationoftheStateofKuwait .As indicatedelsewhere,theCommissionregardssomeaspectsoftheUNCC’sexperienceasrele�anttoitscurrenttasks .Howe�er,itsrele�ancetoEthiopia’sclaimsforcompensationislessclear,gi�entheunusualandcompellingcircumstancesleadingtotheUNCC’screation .

29 . TheCommissionseesasparticularlysignificantinthisregardthecentralroleoftheSecurityCouncil,theorganbearingprimaryresponsibil-ityforthemaintenanceofpeaceandsecurityunder theUnitedNationsCharter, increating theUNCC .TheCouncil created that commissionanddefineditsmandatefollowingbreachesof internationallawofunu-sualseriousnessandextent .BeginningwithResolution660onAugust2,1990—thedayIraqin�adedKuwait—theCounciladoptednumerousreso-lutionsunequi�ocallycondemningtheIraqiin�asion,directingIraqtowith-drawimmediatelyandunconditionally,anddemanding that Iraqceasehostagetaking,mistreatmentofci�ilians,�iolenceagainstdiplomatsanddiplomaticpremises,andotherformsofbeha�iorinbreachofinternationallaw .18InResolutions661,665and670,theCouncilimposedse�ereeconomicsanctionsonIraqandpro�idedfortheirenforcement .Finally, inResolu-tion678,theCounciltooktheexceptionalstepofauthorizingUNMem-bers“touseallnecessarymeans”—includingtheuseofforce—toupholdandimplementtheCouncil’searlierresolutions .

30 . AsbothPartiesnoted,thiswasthecontext—in�ol�ingper�asi�e,continuingillegalconductbyIraqextendingfarbeyondaninitialbreachofthejus ad bellum—inwhichtheCounciladoptedResolution674,wheretheCouncilfirst“reminded”Iraq“thatunderinternationallawitwasliableforanyloss,damageorinjuryarisinginregardtoKuwaitandthirdStates,andtheirnationalsandcorporations,asaresultofthein�asionandillegaloccu-pationofKuwaitbyIraq .”Asnotedabo�e,whentheCouncilsubsequentlycreatedtheframeworkoftheUNCCinResolution687,19itadoptedmorecautiousterminology .InParagraph16,theCouncilindicatedthatIraqwasliablefor“direct”loss,damageorinjury .

31 . TheSecurityCouncil ’sactionsinrelationtothewarbetweenEritrea and Ethiopia tookaquitedifferent course . Its resolutionsaremarkedlydifferentinsubstanceandtonefromthoseadoptedregarding

18 These includedSecurityCouncilResolutions660 (Aug .2,1990),661 (Aug .6,1990),662(Aug .9,1990),664(Aug .18,1990),665(Aug .25,1990),677(Sept .16,1990),670(Sept .25,1990),674(Oct .29,1990),and678(No� .29,1990) .

19 SecurityCouncilResolution687(Apr .3,1991)(deemedbysome“themotherofallSecurityCouncilResolutions”becauseofitsbreadth) .

20 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

thein�asionandoccupationofKuwait .Noneofthemassignedresponsibil-ityfortheconflicttoeitherparty .Likealloftheresolutionsthatfollowed,theCouncil’sfirstresolutiononthewarspoketobothparties,not toErit-reaalone .20Theresolution’spreamblefoundunacceptabletheuseof forcebothtoaddressterritorialdisputesand“changingcircumstancesontheground”;itskeyoperati�epro�isiondemandedthatbothpartiesimmedi-atelyceasehostilitiesandrefrainfromfurtheruseofforce .Whenhostilitiesintensifiedinearly1999duringEthiopia’sOperationSunset, theSecurityCouncilagainaddressedbothpartiesinequalterms .ItsupportedeffortsbytheOrganizationofAfricanUnitytofindapeacefulsolutionandcalledonbothsidestoexerciserestraintandrefrainfrommilitaryaction .21Ashostili-tiesintensifiedafewdayslater,theCouncilcondemnedtherecoursetoforcebybothsides,andurgedallStatestoimmediatelyendarmssalestoboth .22AtthetimeofEthiopia’sMay2000incursionintoEritrea,theCouncilagaindirecteditsresponsetobothparties,demandingthatbothendthefight-ing,andimposingamandatoryarmsembargoonboth .23

32 . EthiopiadismissedthedifferenceintheCouncil ’sapproachto these twosituationsasa“regrettable”failurebytheCounciltorespondtoanactofaggression,butmaintainedthat itdidnotaffecttheextentofEritrea’sliability .TheCommissiondoesnotagreethatthegreatdifferencesintheCouncil’streatmentofthesesituationscanbedismissedinthisway .TheSecurityCouncil—abodygi�engreatpowersandresponsibilitiesbytheCharter—madejudgmentsregardingthein�asionandcompleteoccupationofKuwaitthatitdidnotmakeinthecaseofEritrea’sunlawfuluseofforceagainstEthiopia .ThisCommission’smandateandpowersarefarmoremod-estthanthoseoftheSecurityCouncil .TheCommissionconcludedthatithadjurisdictiontodecideEthiopia’sclaimthatEritreahad�iolatedthejus ad bellum. Itmadeaspecificfindingregardingthat�iolationthatdidnotincludeafindingthatEritreahadwagedanaggressi�ewar,hadoccupiedlargepartsofEthiopia,orotherwiseengagedinthesortofwidespreadlawlessnessthattheSecurityCouncilidentifiedinthecaseofthein�asionandoccupationofKuwait .Moreo�er,thisCommissiondidnot—norcouldit—altertheinterna-tionallawrulesdefiningtheextentofcompensabledamagesthatfollowfromthebreachofinternationallawthatitidentified .

33 .Accordingly,atthenextstageoftheproceedings,theCommissionin�ites—andexpects—thePartiestoaddressinamoreconsideredandprecisemannerthescopeofdamagesfollowingfromtheCommission’spartialawardinrelationtothespecificelementsclaimedbyEthiopiaonthebasisof jus ad bellum, takingfullaccountofthisDecision .

20 S/RES/1177,June26,1998 .21 S/RES/1226,January29,1999 .22 S/RES/1227,February10,1999 .23 S/RES/1297,May17,2000 .

PartI—PRELIMINARYDECISIONS 21

(Signed)Hans�anHouttePresident

Eritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommissionJuly27,2007

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decision number 8 of 27 July 2007

décision numéro 8 du 27 juillet 2007Relieftowar�ictims—responsibilitiesoftherespecti�eStatestotakeeffecti�e

measurestoensurerelieftotheirnationalswhowere�ictimsofwar—State’sdiscretiontodeterminetheuseanddistributionofanydamagesawardedtoit—impossibilityofidentifyingindi�idualsha�ingsufferedinjurieslinkedwiththewar—requestbytheCommissionforinformationfromtheStatesontheirintendedmeanstorelie�ewar�ictims .

Indemnisationdes�ictimesdeguerre—responsabilitérespecti�edesÉtatsdeprendredesmesureseffecti�espourgarantirunecompensationàleursnationaux�ic-timesdelaguerre—discrétionétatiquepourdéterminerl’utilisationetladistributiondesindemnitésaccordées—impossibilitéd’identifierlesindi�idusayantsubidesdom-magesrésultantduconflit—demandedelaCommissiond’informationsdelapartdesÉtatssurleursmoyensdecompenserles�ictimesdeguerre .

relief to War Victims1 . TheCommissionisconfidentthatthePartiesaremindfuloftheir

responsibilitytotakeeffecti�emeasures,withinthescopeoftheresourcesa�ailabletothem,toensurethattheirnationalswhoare�ictimsofarmedconflictsrecei�erelief .

2 . InitsApril13,2006lettertothePartiesregardingschedulingforthedamagesphase,theCommissionstated:

In�iewofthehumanitarianpurposessetforthinArticle5(1)oftheDecember12Agreement,theCommissionrequeststhatthePartiesinformitintheirfirstfilingshowtheyintendtoensuredistributionofdamagesrecei�edtoci�ilian�ictims, includingpresentlya�ailable informationonexistingoranticipatedstructuresandproceduresforthispurpose .3 . TheCommissionrecognizesthatthePartieschosetopursueinter-

Stateclaims,andthateachPartyhasfullauthoritytodeterminetheuseanddistributionofanydamagesawardedtoit .Theabo�erequestwasnotintendedtoderogatefromtheParties’rightsinthisregard .

4 . IntheirMemorialsandinthefirstroundofhearingsinthedam-agesphaseinApril2007,bothPartiesrespondedtotherequestintheCom-mission’sApril13,2006letter .Bothrecognizedthehumanitarianpurposes

22 ERITREA/ETHIOPIA

emphasizedinArticle5(1)oftheAgreementofDecember2000,andin�itedthefurther�iewsoftheCommission .

5 . TheCommissionagreesthat,astomanyclaimsonwhichithasfoundliability,itwouldprobablybeimpossible,andcertainlyinordinatelyexpen-si�e, to attempt to identify the specific indi�idualswhosuffered injuriesasaresultof�ariousillegalactscommittedagainstthem .Examplesinclude�ictimsofrape,physicalabuseandintentionalkillings .

6 . In�iewoftheforegoing,theCommissiondecidestoin�itethePartiestoconsiderfurthermeansbywhich,intheexerciseoftheirdiscretionregardingtheuseanddispositionofdamagesthatmaybeawardedtothem,thehumanitarianobjecti�esofArticle5(1)canbestbeachie�ed,forexamplebydifferentkindsofreliefprogramsforcategoriesof�ictims,forexampletopro�idehealth,agriculturalandotherser�ices .

7 . The Commission would welcome comments by both Go�ern-mentsonthemattersaddressedinthisDecisionintheirfinalMemorials .

(Signed)Hans�anHouttePresident,Eritrea-EthiopiaClaimsCommission

July27,2007

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