report z85 morgenster - belgium · in the federal public service mobility and transport. figure 4...

Report on the investigation into the loss of the fi shing vessel

Z85 MORGENSTER

with the loss of three lives and a fourth missing c rew member, ten

miles from Dungeness, on 28 January 2015

Independent Unit

Posthoflei 5

2600 Berchem July 2015

Investigation report Z85 MORGENSTER - 2

Extract from the European Directive 2009/18/EC

(26) Since the aim of the technical safety investig ation is the prevention of marine

casualties and incidents, the conclusions and the s afety recommendations should

under no circumstances determine liability or appor tion blame.


Contents:

List of Illustrations 5

List of abbreviations 6

Part 1 - Factual Information 7

1. The Belgian fishing fleet 7

2. Characteristics of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” 8

3. Ownership history 9

4. Crew requirements 11

5. Stability data 12

6. Equipment 13

Part 2 - What happened 14

1 Start of sea journey 14

2 Crew 15

3 Condition of the vessel upon departure 15

4 Course of the journey 16

5 Search and rescue 17

6 Locating the wreck 19

Part 3 - Investigation findings 20

1 First dive mission 20

2 Findings from the first mission 21

3 Investigation potential collision 32

4 Conclusion investigation potential collision 37

5 Investigate possible collision with floating objects 38

6 Further investigation hull damage 39

7 Second mission to the wreck 40

8 SONAR observation second mission 41

9 Dive operations from the BNS "M916 BELLIS" 42

10 Conclusion after the second mission 43

Part 4 – Stability study 44

1 Stability with symmetrical use of beams 44


2 Stability at the moment of capsizing 49

Part 5 – Causes of the accident 50

1 Reasons for capsizing 50

2 Contributing factors 51

Part 6 – Conclusions 52

1 Safety issues 52

Part 7 – Actions Taken 54

Part 8 – Recommendations 54

Appendices 55

General plan of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” 56

Meteorological observation charts of 28 January 2015 57

Service Regulation 15 Stability of fishing vessels 59

Stability calculation at loading condition at the time of the accident according to the stability

booklet 74

Simulation of the stability calculation at the time of the accident with one peaked-up spanker

boom, one spanker boom outboard and fishing gear hoisted 76


List of Illustrations

Figure 1 - MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" ......................................................................................................... 8

Figure 2 - MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" before the reconversion in 2008 ................................................... 10

Figure 3 – Fishing areas according to the map of the Belgian Maritime Inspectorate ............................. 14

Figure 4 – Extract from the crew list file ................................................................................................... 15

Figure 5 – The inflatable life raft from the “Z85 MORGENSTER” ............................................................ 18

Figure 6 – Identification of the wreck of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” .................................................. 19

Figure 7 – Hydrografic vessel ZRMS “LUYMES” of the Dutch Royal Navy ............................................. 20

Figure 8 – Dive team from the ZRMS “LUYMES” near the buoy attached to the wreck .......................... 22

Figure 9 - EPIRB on the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” still in position in cradle .......................................... 23

Figure 10 – Portside winch levers of the fishing gear in off position ........................................................ 24

Figure 11 – Rudder angle indicator on the bridge .................................................................................... 25

Figure 12 – Rudder angle indicator (20° portside) ................................................................................... 26

Figure 13 – Part of name and home port on stern ................................................................................... 27

Figure 14 – Rudder on an estimated 10° to 15° position on portside ...................................................... 28

Figure 15 – Illustration of a REMUS unmanned submarine ..................................................................... 29

Figure 16 – Portside door frame with clothing trapped by the door ......................................................... 30

Figure 17 – Damage to the balustrade ..................................................................................................... 30

Figure 18 - Multibeam SONAR image of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” ................................................. 31

Figure 19 - Side scan SONAR image of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” ................................................. 32

Figure 20 - MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” and MS “MARSELISBORG” in very close proximity according to

the data from the ECDIS of the MS “MARSELISBORG” ......................................................................... 33

Figure 21 - MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” disappears from the radar and AIS ............................................. 34

Figure 22 – Radar image from MCA showing the smallest distance between the MS “Z85

MORGENSTER” and MS “MARSELISBORG” ......................................................................................... 35

Figure 23 – Bow of the MS “MARSELISBORG” on arrival in Algeciras ................................................... 36

Figure 24 – Bow of the MS “MARSELISBORG” on arrival in Algeciras ................................................... 36

Figure 25 - Forecastle of the MS “MARSELISBORG” on arrival in Algeciras .......................................... 37

Figure 26 – Stowage plan of the MS “MARSELISBORG” on departure from the port of Antwerp .......... 38

Figure 27 - M916 BELLIS of the Belgian Royal Navy .............................................................................. 40

Figure 28 – part of the sea bed investigated using SONAR .................................................................... 41

Figure 29 – Physical investigation of the lifting cables on the beams ...................................................... 42

Figure 30 – Damage on the portside of the bow ...................................................................................... 43

Figure 31 – Fishing gear of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” found in Ostend after the incident ............... 46

Figure 32 – Beam measurements according to the calculations in the stability booklet .......................... 47


List of abbreviations AIS: Automatic Identification System

BNS: Belgian Navy Ship

DSC: Digital Selective Call

E: Eastern longitude

EPIRB: Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon

HF: High Frequency

kW: kilowatt

MS: motor ship

MF: Medium Frequency

MRCC: Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

N: Northern latitude

Navtex: NAVigational Warnings by TEleX

Rt: Register ton = 100 cubic feet or 2,83 cubic meter

SONAR: sound navigation and ranging

UTC: Universal Coordinated Time

VHF: Very High Frequency

W: Western longitude

ZRMS: His Majesty’s Motor Ship (Dutch Royal Navy)


Part 1 - Factual Information

1. The Belgian fishing fleet

On 9 October 2014 the Belgian commercial fishing fleet consisted of 76 units with an

accumulated tonnage of around 14,300 register tons. Of the 76 units 64 were equipped for

bottom trawling.

Some vessels equipped for bottom trawling were also equipped for twin rig trawling, including

the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”.

The remaining vessels, not equipped for bottom trawling, fished using lines or other

equipment. Some units were stern trawlers.

The fishing area of the majority of the fleet is the southern and northern parts of the North sea.

Some cutters operate in the Bristol Channel.


2. Characteristics of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”

Figure 1 - MS "Z85 MORGENSTER"

Vessel type Motor cutter for bottom trawling and twin rig fishing

Registration number 01 001186 1996

Certificate of seaworthiness issued at Ostend on 18 July 2014 and valid until 4 June 2015

Home port Zeebrugge

Call sign OPDG

Gross tonnage 82 Rt

Net tonnage 24 Rt

Length 23,82 meter overall

21,31 meter between perpendiculars

Construction Hull: Centraal Staal

Osloweg 110

9723 BX Groningen, Nederland


Fitting-out: SV Scap

Hendrik Baelskaai 27

B-8400 Ostend

Belgium

Reconversion: Gardec SDS NV

Boomkorstraat 7-8

B-8380 Zeebrugge

Engine Since 2000

Mitsubishi- 221 kW/300 hp

Former engines 1987 Mitsubishi - 221 kW/300 hp

1992 Mitsubishi - 221 kW/300 hp

Owner at the time of the accident MORGENSTER NV

Nukkerstraat 85

8450 Bredene

Belgium

3. Ownership history

Former owners 1987 BVBA Flamingo

(Luickx - Eyland)

Zeebrugge

Belgium

1998 BVBA MORGENSTER

(A.Decordier)

Zeebrugge

Belgium


2004 B.V.B.A. Rederij Rudo

(Jelle Kramer)

Residentie Duin

Afrikalaan 13

B-8400 Ostend

Belgium

Since 2008 MORGENSTER N.V.

(Jelle Kramer)

Residentie Duin

Afrikalaan 13

8400 Ostend

Belgium

The shipping company MORGENSTER NV from Ostend awarded Gardec NV from Zeebrugge

the task of reconverting the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER". The MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" was

lengthened while the stem was shortened. The vessel was also equipped for twin rig fishing.

Figure 2 - MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" before the reconversion in 2008


4. Crew requirements

Document on minimum requirements for crew on fishing vessels

Issued in Ostend on 18 July 2014 and valid until 4 June 2015

For the former fishing area 1: Skipper: Certificate of competency skipper limited waters

Helmsman: Certificate of competency helmsman

One crew member must have a certificate of competency

for a 221 kW engine

Each crew member must have a certificate Basis Training

Safety on Board

For the former fishing area 2: Skipper: Certificate of competency skipper limited waters

Seaman: Certificate Basic Training Safety on Board



for a 221 kW engine


Safety on Board

For a journey of an unlimited length, an extra crew

member with a Certificate of competency helmsman must

have signed on

For the former fishing area 3 Skipper: Certificate of competency skipper limited waters

Mate: Certificate of competency mate limited waters




for a 221 kW engine


Safety on Board

5. Stability data

Data recorded by: Scheepsbouwkundig Bureau Herman Jansen BV

Galgeriet 4-B

1141 GK Monnickendam

Nederland

On date 7 December 2012

Approved by: Belgische Zeevaart Inspectie

On date 03 April 2013


6. Equipment

Last inspection 27 May 2014 in Lauwersoog, Nederland

Equipment inventory for a fishing vessel with a length < 24 m

Life rafts 1 raft on starboard side for 6 people

1 buoyant apparatus on portside for 8 people

Life buoys 2 on portside

Life belts 5 on portside

Radar Transponders 1 on portside

VHF radio 1 on portside

Details about the radio equipment

VHF installation

DSC encoder 1

DSC receiver 1

Radiotelephony 1

MF/HF installation

DSC encoder 1

DSC receiver 1

Radiotelephony 1

Additional distress or urgency alert system

NAVTEX-receiver 1

Satellite EPIRB

Cospass Sarsat 1


Part 2 - What happened

1 Start of sea journey

On 26 January 2015 the Belgian fishing vessel "Z85 MORGENSTER" left the port of Ostend at

03:50 am local time, i.e. 2:50 UTC, through the fishing dock lock, bound for the English South

Coast, known as the Former Fishing area II according to the Belgian Maritime Inspectorate,

which is bordered by the 002°W meridian and by the 55°N parallel, with the required crew

according to the Document on Minimum Manning of fishing vessels No. 389/14 issued on 18

July 2014 and valid until 4 June 2015.

Figure 3 – Fishing areas according to the map of the Belgian Maritime Inspectorate


2 Crew

The crew at that time consisted allegedly of skipper Jan Kramer and mate Lubbertje Woort,

both of Dutch nationality, Maurice Coussaert, engineer, of Belgian nationality, and Américo

dos Santos Martins of Portuguese nationality. As shown by the crew list, said crew members

were recruited for the journey by the Enrolment Office for Fishermen, part of ship management

in the Federal Public Service Mobility and Transport.

Figure 4 – Extract from the crew list file

3 Condition of the vessel upon departure

Prior to the journey, the vessel had informed the Flemish Government, Department of

Agriculture and Fisheries, Sea Fisheries Service, that it would be fishing with trawls and that

both trawls on the port and starboard sides would be of a length of 4.00 metres.

Upon departure from the port of Ostend there was no visible damage to the vessel determined

by the lock operator on duty. The same lock operator on duty later explained having identified

three of the four aforementioned crew at the time of departure. Allegedly the fishing community

is such a small community that every member of the community knows every other member of

the community. There was allegedly no possibility of mistaken identity. The lock operator on

duty later explained with certainty who was standing where on deck.


4 Course of the journey

After setting sail, the vessel "Z85 MORGENSTER" proceeded to the fishing grounds of the

County of Kent in English territorial waters, according to the electronic log that was sent at

regular intervals to the Flemish Government, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, Sea

Fisheries Service.

Maritime traffic in this area is monitored by the Dover Coast Guard, part of the Maritime and

Coastguard Agency in the United Kingdom.

The weather forecast issued by the UK Met Office, and broadcast via maritime telephone and

NAVTEX at that time for that area was:

“GERMAN BIGHT HUMBER THAMES SOUTHWEST 5 OR 6, VEERING NORTHWEST 6 OR

7. MODERATE OR ROUGH. RAIN THEN SHOWERS. MODERATE, OCCASIONALLY

POOR, BECOMING GOOD”

On the English south coast was fished as a fleet, along with other fishing cutters, including the

following Belgian fishing cutters: “Z402 NOOITGEDACHT”, “Z525 HEIN SENIOR”, “Z431

ALLES WISSELT” and “N57 SPES NOVA”.

The fishing vessel “Z85 MORGENSTER” fished mostly in the northern traffic lane of the

English Channel traffic separation scheme, according to data from the electronic log, sent

every two hours to the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, Sea Fisheries Service, of the

Flemish government.

On 28 January 2015 at about 13:40 UTC, the course of the "Z85 MORGENSTER" was

intersected by the MS "MARSELISBORG" with IMO number 9453793, and a few minutes

later, at 13:50 hours UTC, the "Z85 MORGENSTER" disappeared from the radar in the

following position: latitude 50°43'93N and longitude 000°56'12E.

The sea was very turbulent at that time. From the meteorological data provided by the English

Met Office, there was a south-westerly wind of Beaufort force 8. There were waves registered

in that zone with a height greater than three metres.

The skipper of another cutter sailing in the fleet had allegedly alerted by radio that they would

stop fishing because of the particularly bad weather and advised other cutters fishing in the

fleet to also stop. Wave heights of over 5 metres were also allegedly witnessed.

The Automatic Identification System (AIS) of the "Z85 MORGENSTER" continued transmitting

new information on the course and the speed of the "Z85 MORGENSTER" until 13:52 UTC.

From 13:52 UTC, the information transmitted by the AIS of the "Z85 MORGENSTER"


remained unchanged and from 13:55 no further information was received from the AIS of the

"Z85 MORGENSTER".

5 Search and rescue

"The Z402 NOOITGEDACHT" reported the last sighting of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" at a

distance of 1.3 nautical miles.

Allegedly the other vessels from the fleet, fishing in the same area, raised the alarm to the

Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Den Helder, Netherlands. The MRCC in Den Helder

then informed the MRCC in Ostend, Belgium. The alarming data was passed on by the MRCC

Ostend to the Dover Coast Guard which subsequently started a search.

Dover Coast Guard remained unable to make contact with the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" and

allegedly a search helicopter was rapidly scrambled as a result.

By late evening at around 23.00 UTC, there were a total of two English and one French rescue

helicopters active, as well as two English rescue boats and an English police boat; however

there was no sign of the ship MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" or its crew.

Several nearby fishing trawlers joined the search.

Because of the lack of visibility the search with helicopters was suspended overnight, however

the fishing boats continued their search.

On 29 January 2015, the search was resumed, this time with two rescue boats, an English

coastguard helicopter and a French coastguard plane as well as a British government vessel

with SONAR equipment, the MS "ALERT". The MS "ALERT" was to search underwater for the

wreck of the "Z85 MORGENSTER".

On 29 January 2015 at around 11:30 UTC, Dover Coastguard reported that the French

coastguard had found an empty inflatable life raft on the coast at Boulogne-Sur-Mer, at 08:55

hours UTC, at EQUIHEN PLAGE, south of the port of Boulogne. A comparison of the serial

number with the serial number that was registered as the raft of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER"

by the rescue services showed that it was the inflatable life raft from the MS "Z85

MORGENSTER".


Figure 5 – The inflatable life raft from the “Z85 MORGENSTER”

washed up on EQUIHEN PLAGE (photo French Media)

At 12:54 UTC one of the flying units reported seeing nets and sent a lifeboat to the scene.

However the nets were not recovered by the lifeboat.

At 13:49 UTC floating objects were seen in position: latitude N 50°45’.705 and longitude E

001°18’.675 E. These were allegedly 3 fish boxes.

At 14:24 UTC, later that day, a French lifeboat recovered a body. At 18:43 UTC, a second

body was recovered by a lifeboat.

Neither of the bodies recovered was wearing a life belt.

Later that day, some flotsam was recovered.

The French and English coastguard subsequently decided and mutually agreed to suspend

the active search for survivors. However shipping traffic in the area was asked to keep a sharp

lookout.

At that time the exact location of the "Z85 MORGENSTER" was not yet known, and there

remained two missing crew members.


6 Locating the wreck

By order of the owner of the "Z85 MORGENSTER", a salvage company, Friendship Offshore

from Terschelling (Netherlands), was ordered, on 2 February 2015, to locate the wreck of the

"Z85 MORGENSTER".

Friendship Offshore sent the MS "GOOD HOPE" to sail to the last known position of the "Z85

MORGENSTER", as broadcasted via the AIS system.

The MS "GOOD HOPE" is a salvage vessel converted from a fishing vessel with a length of

39.80 m and is equipped with side-scan SONAR equipment and underwater cameras.

The MS "GOOD HOPE" started a search for the wreck in the vicinity of the last known position

of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER"

On 3 February 2015 in the morning, the crew of the MS "GOOD HOPE" reported locating the

wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER". The wreck was located with the bow allegedly in the

position: latitude 50°44’.358 N and longitude 000°57’.494 E. The stern was allegedly in

position: latitude 50°44’.365 N and longitude 000°57’.475 E.

The crew of the MS "GOOD HOPE" had allegedly identified the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER"

thanks to underwater images showing the words "Z85" on the bow. Given that under European

law the allocation of identification numbers for sea fishing excludes duplicates and Z always

represents Zeebrugge, it could be assumed that the wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER"

had been located.

Figure 6 – Identification of the wreck of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”

by images taken by the MS “GOOD HOPE”


Part 3 - Investigation findings

1 First dive mission

Allegedly, following major political and social pressure, given the fact that two of the four crew

members were Dutch nationals, the Dutch authorities decided to launch a search for the

bodies. For this purpose, the Dutch naval vessel the ZRMS "Luymes" was requisitioned.

ZRMS "Luymes" is a hydrographic vessel of the Royal Dutch Navy and is equipped with side-

scan SONAR and multi-beam SONAR. This equipment should allow it to make detailed

images of the wreck. Also a large dive team was embarked on board the ZRMS "Luymes" to

look underwater for the bodies of the seamen not yet found.

Figure 7 – Hydrografic vessel ZRMS “LUYMES” of the Dutch Royal Navy

The ZRMS "Luymes" left the port of Den Helder on 3 February 2015, heading for the position

where the wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" was allegedly located according to

underwater footage by MS "GOOD HOPE", with a stop in Zeebrugge to embark an

experienced dive team.

Meanwhile in Belgium, the State Secretary for the North Sea, Mr Bart Tommelein, established

an independent investigation unit via a Ministerial Decree with one investigator who would

establish the cause of the casualty.


The same day, it was also decided to allow the investigator on board the ZRMS "Luymes" in

Zeebrugge, accompanied by an inspector from the Belgian Flag State, a specialist in Belgian

fishing vessels.

2 Findings from the first mission

On Thursday 3 February 2015, the ZRMS "LUYMES" left the port of Zeebrugge. The ZRMS

"LUYMES" proceeded to the place where the MS "GOOD HOPE" reported that they had

located the wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".

On Wednesday, 4 February 2015 at about 08:30, the ZRMS "LUYMES" dropped anchor in the

vicinity of the location that was reported by the MS "GOOD HOPE" as being the location of the

MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".

Subsequently, during the first morning dive, a wreck was located. A grey buoy was attached to

the wreck and it was confirmed with a line to mark the position at the water surface.

In the afternoon, the diving team went down again and a second orange buoy was attached to

the wreck using a line.

Divers explored the stern of the wreck that had not yet been identified by the team as being

the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”.


Figure 8 – Dive team from the ZRMS “LUYMES” near the buoy attached to the wreck

During the second dive, on 4 February 2015, the divers from the Dutch Royal Navy filmed the

starboard railing and the starboard sides of the hull. Both seemed to be intact on the images.

They filmed part of the stern on the starboard side, where they noted that the life buoys were

no longer present, and the watertight door on the superstructure was open.

The smoke manoverboard marker was still in its original position. There was an attempt made

at filming through the glass of the portholes on the starboard side of the stern without result.

The divers did film the Emergency Position Indicator Radio Beacon or EPIRB that was still in

its holder on the starboard side; this should normally be freed by water pressure, using a

hydrostatic release unit.


Figure 9 - EPIRB on the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” still in position in cradle

(images Dutch Royal Navy)

On Thursday 5 February 2015 the divers from the Dutch Royal Navy went down for a third

time. Divers filmed that the starboard and central windows on the front of the bridge were

shattered. The central window was still closed.

It was difficult to see inside the bridge and nothing of significance was filmed. They did see a

large object on the portside of the bridge, which they couldn't identify from outside.

In the afternoon, on Thursday 5 February 2015, the weather worsened and they couldn't dive

any longer.

On 6 February 2015 the weather was so bad that no diving took place that day.

There were wind speeds of up to 9 Beaufort, with waves over 3.5m.

On Saturday 7 February 2015 in the morning, the weather was still too bad for diving, however

in the afternoon the wind speed dropped so they could dive once again.

The divers again went down to the wreck. The divers filmed inside the bridge through the

outside door opening onto the bridge. The divers from the Dutch Royal Navy filmed that the

levers on the portside winch of the fishing gear were in the off (zero) position.


Figure 10 – Portside winch levers of the fishing gear in off position


The indicator of the rudder position was filmed.

This showed a reading on starboard side. This was an electric indicator of the rudder position.

It showed that the rudder was 15° to starboard at the time of the accident.


Figure 11 – Rudder angle indicator on the bridge


The divers again filmed the EPIRB that was still in its position.

The divers filmed that the emergency hatch in the crew space was stuck.

The divers filmed the rudder angle shown by the rudder indicator which was in a stainless

steel housing in the twin rig gear. The steel housing was open.

This rudder angle indicator was hydraulic-powered and was an element in the hydraulic circuit

operating the rudder. This rudder indicator showed a rudder with 20 degrees over portside.


Figure 12 – Rudder angle indicator (20° portside)


During the second dive that day, the divers filmed the stern and identified the wreck as being

the MS “MORGENSTER” as the name and the home port were engraved on the side of the

stern.


Figure 13 – Part of name and home port on stern


The divers from the Dutch Royal Navy also filmed that the rudder lay between the estimated

10° and 15° on the portside.


Figure 14 – Rudder on an estimated 10° to 15° position on portside


The divers filmed that the starboard fish box had been folded.

The divers filmed the fish conveyor belt and under the box at the front.

On Sunday 8 February 2015, they dove twice more to the bridge of the MS “Z85

MORGENSTER”. Divers opened the central window with a crow bar; the window was not

blocked from the inside.

At midday a REMUS submarine was put to sea from the rubber dinghy of the ZRMS

"LUYMES". The REMUS is an autonomous unmanned submarine that is programmed in

advance to make a chart of the sea floor using multibeam SONAR.


The aim was to have an image of the wreck of the "Z85 MORGENSTER". The REMUS

apparatus proved defective and delivered no result.

Figure 15 – Illustration of a REMUS unmanned submarine

There was another dive to the wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER". During this dive they

explored the crew quarters from the stern.

They entered the wreck via the rear door of the crew quarters and from there explored the

passageway on the starboard side up to the external door. Divers filmed that the door to the

inner door of this corridor was lifted off its hinges and the passage through the starboard

passageway was blocked. The door to the engine room was open.

On the morning of 9 February 2015 there was a new attempt to make SONAR images of the

wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" with a second REMUS. The second REMUS also

proved to be defective, therefore no underwater recordings were made with this device.

Once again the REMUS was taken on board, and the divers went down once more to explore

the wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER", particularly the crew quarters.

On the portside, items of clothing were filmed on the frame of the watertight doors between the

door and the frame, trapped approximately halfway up the door, despite the door apparently

being closed.


Figure 16 – Portside door frame with clothing trapped by the door


Then the winch room was accessed through the starboard door. The starboard door was not

closed. The divers from the Dutch Royal Navy filmed two openings in the front engine room

bulkhead which led to the winch room.

The apertures had approximate dimensions of about 50cm by 30cm.

On 10 February 2015, divers filmed the damage to the bow of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".

On the bow on the portside an indentation was filmed which had not yet rusted and there was

damage reported to the balustrade. The Panama chock of the ship was bent.

Figure 17 – Damage to the balustrade



After finishing the dive expeditions and the body of a crew member had been found and

recovered, two underwater observations were carried out by the ZRMS "Luymes", in the late

afternoon of 11 February 2015. One was with a sidescan SONAR and the other with a

Multibeam SONAR.

From the multibeam SONAR images made by the ZRMS "LUYMES", we deducted that there

was an indistinguishable object on the starboard side of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" located

on the seabed.

Figure 18 - Multibeam SONAR image of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”

with allegedly an object on the starboard side (images Dutch Royal Navy)

The images of the sidescan SONAR show a large object on the starboard side of the MS "Z85

MORGENSTER" however the detail of the images does not allow the object to be established.


Figure 19 - Side scan SONAR image of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”

with allegedly a large object on the SB side (images Dutch Royal Navy)

3 Investigation potential collision

During the expedition with the ZRMS "LUYMES", we learned from the Dutch Police, National

Police Service, Water Police, Maritime Police Unit that the Dutch Coast Guard had analysed

the data from the AIS and came to the conclusion that moments before the tragic accident with

the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER", another vessel was alleged to have been at a minimum

distance of 0.4 nautical miles from the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".

This was the MS "MARSELISBORG". The MS "MARSELISBORG" allegedly, after passing 0.4

nautical miles from the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER", sailed to the English south coast via the

Solent and remained at anchor there for several days before allegedly continuing its journey.

To this end, the English authorities, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, studied the radar

images of the alleged passage of the two vessels at a distance of 0.4 nautical miles.

The stakeholders of the MS "MARSELISBORG", were requested to provide information about

the alleged aforementioned passage.


The master of the MS "MARSELISBORG" made a sworn statement which read as follows:

“On the same date at 1340UTC in Iat 50°43,6N lon 000°55,9E, FV Z85 MORGENSTER was

seen visibly by my Second Officer & Watchman on our starboard & altered course to keep

clear at distance 0.42NM on our closest point Sea attached by t11e mi11ute by minute

screenshot pictures from my ECDIS history on the said time & day.”

The master of the MS "MARSELISBORG" also provided us with the alleged data from the

Electronic Chart Display System, which should prove that the two vessels were never closer

than 0.4 nautical miles away from each other when passing near the site of the accident.

According to the ECDIS data of the MS "MARSELISBORG", the ECDIS launched an alarm

signal to the watch officer that a vessel was in the vicinity of their own craft, less than two

nautical miles, namely the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" and that disappeared from the radar and

the AIS system. Allegedly the disappearance of the data of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" was

not follow up on board the MS "MARSELISBORG".

Figure 20 - MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” and MS “MARSELISBORG” in very close proximity according to the data from the ECDIS of the MS “MARSELISBORG”


Figure 21 - MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” disappears from the radar and AIS

according to data from the ECDIS of the MS “MARSELISBORG”

The data, received from the master of the MS "MARSELISBORG" could however not be

verified by us for authenticity.

Taking this into account, the AIS data from both ships from when they passed close to one

another, was requested by us from the English authorities. This data was plotted by us on a

chart, and gave a similar result. The MS "MARSELISBORG" and MS "Z85 MORGENSTER"

were, according to the AIS data, never closer than 0.4 miles away from each other on the day

of the incident.

Also, the radar images from the passage of both vessels were requested from the Maritime

and Coastguard Agency. The MCA gave us a film showing these radar images. In this film it is

also noticeable that both ships have come very close, but they were never at a distance of less

than 0.4 nautical miles from each other moments before the incident.


Figure 22 – Radar image from MCA showing the smallest distance between the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” and MS “MARSELISBORG”

The MS "MARSELISBORG" continued its journey to drop anchor near the Solent and

allegedly awaited improvement of the weather. The master of the MS "MARSELISBORG"

declared in writing that the charterers of the MS "MARSELISBORG" had given instructions to

monitor weather routing instructions from the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological

Institute.

An inquiry to the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute, SMHI, confirmed this

theory and gave us copies of confidential electronic communications between them and the

MS "MARSELISBORG". Allegedly the MS "MARSELISBORG" had cargo on board that could

be damaged by severe weather and the vessel had to take this into account.

After the MS "Marselisborg" had reached its destinations in North Africa, it set a course to

Algeciras in Spain. The Port State Control in Spain subjected the MS "MARSELISBORG" to a

more detailed inspection.

After detailed inspection, no damage was found on the hull of the MS "MARSELISBORG", that

would indicate a collision with MS "Z85 MORGENSTER", as shown by the images of the

Spanish Port State Control.


Figure 23 – Bow of the MS “MARSELISBORG” on arrival in Algeciras

(images Ministerio de Fomento)

Figure 24 – Bow of the MS “MARSELISBORG” on arrival in Algeciras



Figure 25 - Forecastle of the MS “MARSELISBORG” on arrival in Algeciras


4 Conclusion investigation potential collision

Judging from the information obtained from ship stakeholders, MCA, SMHI and the Spanish

Port State Control, a collision between MS "MARSELISBORG" and MS "Z85 MORGENSTER"

could be excluded.

In view of the damage to the hull of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" which was reported by the

Dutch Royal Navy divers, during the exploration of the wreck with the ZRMS "LUYMES",

further investigation was needed into the cause of the damage and whether it contributed to

the capsize and sinking of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".


5 Investigate possible collision with floating obje cts

A collision with floating objects is certainly still in the realm of possibility given the SONAR

images made by the ZRMS "LUYMES" during the expedition to the wreck of the MS "Z85

MORGENSTER".

A first investigation was conducted into a collision with (deck) cargo falling overboard. Initially it

was assumed that (deck) cargo from MS "MARSELISBORG" had fallen overboard.

The MS "MARSELISBORG" had departed from Antwerp the day before the incident.

The Port of Antwerp was asked to copy the surveillance images of the MS "MARSELISBORG"

leaving the locks in the port, but they were no longer available.

The stowage plan of the MS "MARSELISBORG" upon departure from Antwerp was requested

from the cargo stakeholders.

Figure 26 – Stowage plan of the MS “MARSELISBORG” on departure from the port of Antwerp

On the stowage plan it can clearly be seen that no cargo was foreseen on departure from the

port of Antwerp. The cargo stakeholders confirmed that the MS "MARSELISBORG" had

departed from the Port of Antwerp without any deck cargo. Consequently, the hypothesis that

the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" could have come into contact with floating objects from the MS

"MARSELISBORG" is excluded.


6 Further investigation hull damage

It was subsequently investigated whether the damage to the hull of the MS "Z85

MORGENSTER" was already present at the time of the incident.

To that end, contact was made with the Port of Ostend to find out whether there were

surveillance images of the departure of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" on 27 January 2015.

The port authority of the Port of Ostend responded that if surveillance images had existed,

they would certainly have been overwritten by that point. The surveillance images of the lock

complex at the Port of Ostend, via which MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" had left the port on 27

January, were made with a rotating camera, and it was also not certain that the locks were

filmed at the time of the passage of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".

It was therefore decided to question the lock operators in service during the last sailing of the

MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".

The MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" passed out of the dock on 26 January 2015, and set sail at

03:50 am local time.

The staff of the fishing lock in Ostend, the locks via which MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" had left

the port of Ostend declared that they could still remember the last sailing of the MS "Z85

MORGENSTER".

They stated that they had not noticed any damage to the vessel upon departure; at least no

damage that would correspond to the damage ascertained during diving operations.

One of the lock operators still remembered that there were two crew members on deck when

manoeuvring in the lock, who they called to by name, and the skipper, as expected, was on

the bridge of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".

It was also learned from the fishing cutters who were fishing in the same area, and who

searched for the MS "MORGENSTER" at the place where it was last seen, that one of the

participating cutters allegedly touched something at the bottom with their bottom trawls/nets.

It was later claimed that it was at the place where the MS "MORGENSTER" was recovered at

the bottom of the sea. This was initially not communicated to any authority as the subjective

feeling of touching something with bottom trawls/nets is a common phenomenon in sea fishing

with the type of equipment as on the MS "MORGENSTER". The skipper of the vessel who had

the sensation of touching something had therefore paid no further attention to it.

Only later when the position of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" at the bottom of the sea was

known, was the information reported on touching something on the ground.


However, it was not yet possible, at this stage of the investigation, to establish the cause of the

damage to the MS "MORGENSTER", and if there was a link between this damage found by

the ZRMS "LUYMES" and the sinking of the vessel. Therefore a second mission was

launched, with the BNS “M916 BELLIS” of the Belgian Navy.

7 Second mission to the wreck

The BNS 'M916 BELLIS" is a mine hunter equipped with high-tech SONAR, and staffed with

divers/minehunters.

Figure 27 - M916 BELLIS of the Belgian Royal Navy

Prior to the mission, it was agreed with the Belgian Navy what was to be investigated. It was

decided that a detailed SONAR investigation of the sea bed would occur within an area of one

square nautical mile around the wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER", looking for foreign

objects large enough to collide with the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" and cause damage like that

discovered during the first mission.

There would also be a dive to the wreck to determine the damage with detailed images and

physical investigation of the fish gear.

On 27 April 2015, the BNS "M916 BELLIS" left the naval base of Zeebrugge bound for the last

known position of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".


8 SONAR observation second mission

Prior to the diving missions, an area of approximately 1 square nautical mile around the

position of the wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" was searched using SONAR. No

objects were found on the sea bed which were sufficiently large to explain the damage to the

hull of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER".

Figure 28 – part of the sea bed investigated using SONAR

(images Belgian Royal Navy)

Further SONAR investigation of the wreck and more precise interpretation of the SONAR

images taken before by the ZRMS "LUYMES" lead to the conclusion that the object observed

on the sea bed on the starboard side of the vessel was a false echo of a part of the MS “Z85

MORGENSTER”.

To exclude this possibility, they dived to the wreck of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”.


9 Dive operations from the BNS "M916 BELLIS"

During the first dive, the Belgian Navy divers explored the vessel. They filmed the hull on the

starboard side from the bulwark to the keel. On the portside, no damage was found on the

vessel.

The Belgian Navy divers also felt if the lifting cables on the starboard side spanker boom were

tightened or not. Tightened would suggest that the spanker boom was effectively peaked at

the time of the capsize and had not ended up in this position after capsizing.

Figure 29 – Physical investigation of the lifting cables on the beams


The divers found that the cables were tightened.

The portion of the vessel located above the sea bed and that was freely accessible was further

fully investigated. There was no damage found beyond the portside of the bow.

This damage has been fully outlined and recorded.


Figure 30 – Damage on the portside of the bow


10 Conclusion after the second mission

From the observation of the Belgian Navy divers and from the SONAR observations from the

BNS 'M916 BELLIS ", it was revealed that:

- There were no objects found in the vicinity of the wreck of the MS "Z85

MORGENSTER" that could have collided with the vessel and which could have led to

the capsize of the vessel.

- The lifting cables of the starboard spanker boom were tightened at the time of the

capsize, which indicates that the starboard spanker boom was peaked at the time of

capsizing.

- There must be other reasons than a collision for the capsize and the theory of a

collision can be written off once and for all.

- The damage to the portside of the bow of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" can attributed

to the impact of the nets of another cutter that was fishing in the vicinity of the wreck

and who later indicated they had felt an impact with an object on the sea bed at a time

when the position of the wreck of the MS "Z85 MORGENSTER" was not yet known.


Part 4 – Stability study

1 Stability with symmetrical use of beams

The ship’s stakeholders informed us that at the moment of sinking, the MS “Z85

MORGENSTER” carried an estimated 12,000 litres of gas oil on board, as well as 2,000 litres

of water.

The catch at that time is said to have been 1,000kg.

From the information provided by Naval Bureau Herman Jansen BV we deducted that the

ship’s lightweight was 125,165 tonnes.

According to Naval Bureau Herman Jansen BV, the mass of the bottom trawling fishing gear

and the equipment amounted to 5,525 tonnes.

The mass of the lubricating oil on board allegedly amounted to 597kg and the mass of the

hydraulic oil for operating the winches allegedly amounted to 742kg.

Other constants were, allegedly, the cumulated mass of the crew, 500kg, the mass of the

provisions and ship’s stores, 250kg, and the mass of the ice used to preserve the catch, also

250kg.

On the basis of the data mentioned above, we calculate the mass of the ship in tonnes as

follows


Lightweight 125,165

Bottom trawling fishing gear and equipment 5,525

Lubricating oil 0.597

Hydraulic oil 0.742

Day tank 0.215

Marpol tank 0.117

Fuel 12,000

Drinking water 2,000

Crew 0.500

Provisions 0.250

Ice 0.250

Fish 1,000

Total mass of the ship in tonnes 148,361

The total mass of the ship on the date of the accident allegedly amounted to 148,361 tonnes.

From the Carène tables or hydrostatic data provided by Naval Bureau Herman Jansen BV we

deducted that the vessel allegedly had a corresponding draught of 2,132 m. In this loaded

condition the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” had enough freeboard, i.e. 0.612 metres, as service

Regulation 15 of the Belgian flag state requires a breadth of 0.1* with a minimum of 0.6

metres.

Given the fishing gear that remained on the quay in Ostend, deriving from the MS “Z85

MORGENSTER”, the ship’s stakeholders informed us that the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” used

several fishing gears depending on the species of fish being fished for.

It was thus not possible to ascertain with certainty which fishing gear the MS “Z85

MORGENSTER” was using at the time of the accident.

Nor were the ship’s stakeholders able to state with certainty which fishing gear was being used

at the time of the casualty. This could mean a difference of several hundreds of kilogrammes

in the vessel’s total mass.


Figure 31 – Fishing gear of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” found in Ostend after the incident

Conversations with the firm NAVAL BUREAU HERMAN JANSEN BV revealed that when the

stability booklet was drawn up, it was taken into account was taken that spanker booms with a

length of approximately 10 metres, and not the shorter booms of approximately 7.80 metres

that were found on the quay in Ostend, would be used.

The calculated initial stability of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” was calculated with booms of

approximately 10 metres’ length, i.e. the largest possible booms that could be used on this

vessel.

Replacing these booms with other ones would have no effect, or would have a positive effect

on the stability, given the fact that it was not physically possible to fish using larger booms.


Figure 32 – Beam measurements according to the calculations in the stability booklet

applied by the firm NAVAL BUREAU HERMAN JANSEN BV

According to Service Regulation 15 “Stability of fishing vessels” of the Belgian Flag State

services, in accordance with Articles 13 and 121 of the Maritime Inspection Regulations,

paragraph 2a), the following criteria must be met for all the loading conditions mentioned:

At an angle of heel of 30° or more, the righting lever must be at least 0.20 metres.

From the calculated initial stability for the loading condition described above, the righting lever

was 0.281 metres at an angle of heel of 30° or more and the righting lever was compliant with

Service Regulation 15 of the Belgian Flag State.

The maximum value of the righting levers should preferably be reached at an angle of heel of

at least 30° but in no case at an angle of heel of less than 25°.

On the presumption that the data provided to us was correct, the vessel was compliant with

this requirement.


At an angle of heel of 30°, the area under the GZ curve must not be less than 0.055 metre-

radians and not less than 0.09 metre-radians at an angle of heel of 40° �f at an angle of

flooding or if that angle be less than 40°.

In the loaded condition as described above, the area under the GZ curve at an angle of heel of

30° was 0.096 metre-radians, and at 40° it was 0.142 metre-radians, which was compliant with

the requirements of Service Regulation 15.

The calculations above were carried out on the presumption that the vessel had peaked up the

spanker boom at an angle of 45°, with both fishing gears on deck, i.e. the sailing mode

mentioned.


2 Stability at the moment of capsizing

In view of the manner in which the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” was found on the seabed, i.e.

with the SB boom peaked up and the starboard gear on deck and with the portside boom

extended and the portside fishing gear already above water ready to be hauled in, the

probable situation immediately before perishing, a simulation was carried out which produced

the following result, which has been given in detail in Appendix:

With the starboard boom peaked up and the portside boom outboard, the MS “Z85

MORGENSTER” has a static angle of heel of 18°.62 to portside. The righting lever or GZ has

a value of 0.065 metres and no longer meets the requirements of Service Regulation 15.

The area under the GZ curve is only 0.008 metre-radians at 30° and as little as 0.019 metre-

radians at 40°. Neither of the two values mentioned meets the requirements of Service

Regulation 15. The criterion of a minimum required freeboard of 0.1 * breadth of the vessel

with a minimum of 0.6 metres was no longer being met, given that the calculation

demonstrated that the portside of the freeboard deck was 0.38 metres below water level.


Part 5 – Causes of the accident

1 Reasons for capsizing

Given that no eye witnesses of the tragic incident were found, and given that the remains of

only three of the four crew members who were allegedly on board at the time of the accident

and who did not survive were recovered, and that the fourth crew member is still missing, it is

only possible to advance the most probable hypothesis.

Based on the known weather conditions, which were particularly unfavourable for fishing, and

on the fact that the other fishing cutters in the immediate vicinity had already urged the MS

“Z85 MORGENSTER” to cease fishing, and in view of the condition of the vessel as it was

found on the seabed on the day after the accident, i.e. with the starboard boom peaked up and

the portside boom outboard, with fishing gear hoisted with the control levers of the fishing gear

winches in the stop position, and in view of the statements of other fishermen who use the

same gear, we state that:

The MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” had, at the time of capsize, a calculated static angle of heel of

18°.62 to port and the edge of the freeboard deck on portside was 0.383 metres under the

water level. The inclement sea frequently caused waves to go over the vessel. The watertight

doors of the superstructure were open. The waves coming over the vessel must have led to a

larger angle of heel to port, which negatively affected the stability to such a degree that the

vessel capsized to port, and the open watertight doors permitted the rapid flooding of the

vessel.

It cannot be ruled out that the starboard boom swung to port under this kind of angle of heel

and further deteriorated the stability of the vessel, thus preventing the MS “Z85

MORGENSTER” from righting itself, and accelerating the capsize.


2 Contributing factors

- The findings of the first dive mission show that the watertight doors of the superstructure

were open during fishing under the prevailing poor weather conditions. The fact that the

watertight doors of the superstructure were open ensured that seawater could rapidly and

freely enter the vessel during capsize, which accelerated the flooding, the turning over and

the sinking.

The watertight doors of the superstructure should be kept closed at all times when out to

sea. In view of the specific stability situation on bottom trawlers it cannot be presumed

even during calm weather that the situation is safe enough to leave the doors open.

Manipulation of the fishing gear can cause a stability situation in which the vessel strongly

lists and in which seawater can flow in through the open doors, thus further compromising

the stability of the vessel.

- The two crew members who were probably on deck at the time of the accident and whose

remains were recovered, whilst they were attired for the heavy weather, were not wearing

lifebelts at the moment of the accident.

The lifebelt transmitters, which should permit the localisation of the lifebelts, were not

activated. If these crew members had worn their lifebelts, their chances of survival would

have drastically improved. And if the transmitters had been activated, it was more than

likely that they would have been detected by other vessels in the vicinity and the crew

members could have been rescued. Crew members of fishing vessels should wear

lifebelts at all times while they are on deck. Professional organisations and prevention

bodies in the past have given contradictory instructions to crews.

- The EPIRB, although it had been tested and positioned correctly, did not function. The

hydrostatic release unit did not release the EPIRB from its brace. If it had been released

and had been activated, rescue services and ships in the vicinity would quickly have been

appraised of the accident through the COSPASS SARSAT system, and the position of the

floating EPIRP, which would most likely have been in the vicinity of the crew, would

quickly have become known to the rescue services and the ships in the vicinity, and

therefore the crew members’ chances of survival would have improved.


Part 6 – Conclusions

1 Safety issues

The safety issues mentioned above that emerge from the report are listed below in random

order, not in order of importance.

- On 28 January 2015, at approximately 13:50 UTC, the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”

disappeared off the radar and transmissions of the AIS ceased.

- The exact time of the capsize of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” could not be determined,

but on the basis of radar and AIS information it can be presumed that the capsize

occurred at approximately the same time, i.e. 13:50 UTC on 28 January 2015.

- At the moment of capsize of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”, the starboard spanker boom

was peaked up and the starboard fishing gear was on deck. The portside spanker boom

was outboard with fishing gear hoisted.

- At the moment of departure on the dramatic voyage, the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”

complied with all legal stability and freeboard requirements. However, in these fishing

vessels it is possible to influence the stability in a strongly negative way by manipulating

the fishing gear.

- The calculated stability in the situation in which the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” was found

on the seabed and which was probably the situation immediately before capsizing and

sinking, demonstrated that water coming over the vessel could very easily have been able

to capsize the vessel.

- The peaked-up starboard boom could, in a situation such as that in which the MS “Z85

MORGENSTER” was found on the seabed, easily swing to portside, impacting very

negatively on the stability.

- Investigation of the wreckage showed that the watertight doors of the superstructure were

open at the moment of capsize. The portside door was found shut, but the clothing

between the door and the frame demonstrated that the door had been open during

capsize and that it was forced shut during capsize by the pressure of the water. The open


watertight doors allowed water coming over the vessel to flow freely into the vessel and

thus to impact negatively on stability.

- The MS “Z85 MORGENSTER” was equipped with an EPIRB. The EPIRB had been tested

and appeared to have been in good working condition at the moment of the accident. The

fact that it was not released during sinking, in other words, the fact that the hydrostatic

release unit did not function, is a cause of serious concern.

- The crew, which was allegedly on deck at the moment of capsize, were not wearing

lifebelts. It is most regrettable that the crew had learned insufficient lessons from previous

fatal incidents with similar vessels and was not wearing lifebelts while on deck, certainly in

view of the condition of the sea at that moment.

- The electrically operated rudder angle indicator and the hydraulically operated rudder

angle indicator each showed a different reading. The hydraulic rudder angle indicator,

however, gave the real position. The electric indicator probably diverged on account of

electric disturbance due to incoming salt water during sinking.


Part 7 – Actions Taken

Previs, a department of the Zeevissersfonds (Deep-Sea Fishermen’s Fund), which is

responsible for the prevention of occupational accidents on board fishing vessels, will

formulate a unanimous recommendation to the effect that crews of fishing vessels should wear

lifebelts at all times while on deck.

Part 8 – Recommendations

The Federal Public Service for Mobility and Transport will be advised to:

- Issue a notification, to be displayed permanently on the bridge of fishing vessels, which

clearly advises the crew about the procedure to be followed when manipulating the fishing

gear, including the risk of possibly dangerous situations in relation to stability.

- Issue a checking and repertoire system in relation to the various fishing gears that vessels

have at their disposal, which should make it possible to check which fishing gear is on

board and whether the impact of the fishing gear on the stability of the vessel has been

properly assessed.


Appendices


General plan of the MS “Z85 MORGENSTER”


Meteorological observation charts of 28 January 2015


Service Regulation 15 Stability of fishing vessels

(Article 13 of the Maritime Inspection Regulations).

1. Before a fishing vessel is put into service, the following data must be submitted in duplicate:

a) A calculation report of the inclining test and the calculation of the ship’s mass and of the

location of the centre of gravity above keel (KG), in both cases for the lightweight ready for

service.

If the loading conditions that occur during operations are subject to considerable trim

differences, the location of the longitudinal centre of gravity must also be calculated for the

lightweight ready for service.

For fishing vessels equipped for bottom trawl fishing, the location of the centre of gravity above

keel can be calculated with the booms at an angle of no less than 45° to the horizontal plane.

b) A plan of the longitudinal section of the ship, showing the various hold and tank capacities,

as well as the location of the corresponding centres of gravity above keel, and, if necessary,

the longitudinal centres of gravity.

In addition, this plan must show, in tabular form, the largest transverse moment of inertia of the

liquid surface of each tank individually.

c) The carène diagram in tabular form including the frame surfaces (Bonjean curves) and the

frame moments.

The data for the carène diagram must be calculated by means of a computer programme.

For the calculation of the carène diagram in tabular form, the line described under Appendix A

must be taken as the base line.

d) The transverse curves of the static stability (KN sin ϕ ) in tabular form for angles of heel of

2°, 5°, 10°, 20°, 30°, 40°, 50°, and 60° and for draught variations of 1 cm.

The transverse curves must be calculated by means of a computer programme.


For further data concerning the calculation of the transverse curves, see Appendix A.

e) The line plan used to determine the input data for the computer calculations and which must

be certified by the computer centre for identification of the output data of the computer centre.

The full input data as part of the output data in such a manner as to permit a check of the input

data.

f) The calculation of the location of the centre of gravity above keel and if necessary the

longitudinal centre of gravity, as well as the calculation of the initial metacentric height and of

the curves of the righting levers for the following loading conditions of the ship:

(i) Departure from port with destination fishing grounds, fully equipped with full bunkers and

freshwater tanks and with ice and/or salt in the fish hold.

(ii) Departure fishing grounds with a quantity of fuel oil and freshwater corresponding to 50

percent of the available capacity of the tanks, fish hold fully filled with a homogeneous cargo

with a stowage weight of 0.55 t/m³, as well as deck cargo with a weight of 4 percent of the

displacement belonging to the loading condition referred to under (i).

For ships used for bottom trawl fishing, a quantity of cargo in the fish hold that is to be

considered normal for this method of fishing can be included instead of the abovementioned

cargo in the fish hold and on deck.

For ships equipped both for bottom trawl fishing and for another fishing method, and on which

the entire bottom trawl gear remains on board permanently, the including of the deck cargo

can be omitted.

iii) Return to harbour with a residue of fuel oil and freshwater corresponding to 10 percent of

the available capacity of the tanks concerned and otherwise loaded as described in (ii).


(iv) Return to harbour with a residue of fuel oil and freshwater corresponding to 10 percent of

the available capacity of the tanks concerned, in the fish hold, a cargo equal to 20 percent of

the cargo in the fish hold as referred to in (ii).

For ships equipped with a machine for the preparation of ice it may be calculated that a larger

residue of the amount of freshwater required for the preparation of the ice will remain on

board.

(v) Any other loading condition which occurs frequently and which produces considerably less

favourable results than the loading conditions mentioned under (i) to (iv).

When calculating the loading conditions mentioned under (ii) to (v), the influence of free liquid

surfaces in the tanks must be included (see Appendix B).

If the fishing is to be carried out in an area where the formation of ice is to be expected,

the calculation of the loading conditions referred to under (i) to (v) must include the formation

of ice (See Appendix C).

The influence of the wind on the vessel must be included for the loading condition that is least

favourable from the point of view of windsail (See Appendix D)

g) For ships equipped for several fishing methods that will lead to different loading conditions,

the loading conditions for each of these fishing methods must be submitted separately.

2. a) In each of the loading conditions mentioned in paragraph 1 under f) the following

criteria must be met:

(i) The righting lever must be no less than 0.20 metres at an angle of heel of 30° or more.

(ii) The maximum value of the righting levers must preferably be reached at an angle of heel of

at least 30°, but under no circumstances at an angle of heel of less than 25°.


(iii) At an angle of heel of 30°, the area under the GZ curve must not be less than 0.055 metre-

radians, and not less than 0.09 metre-radians at an angle of heel of 40° or at an angle of

flooding (ϕ f) (1) if that angle be less than 40°.

(iv) The increase of an area under the GZ curve between an angle of heel of 30° and an angle

of heel of 40°, or an angle of flooding (ϕ f), if this be less than 40°, must not be less than 0.03

metre-radians.

(v) Except for ships equipped for bottom trawl fishing, the initial metacentric height must be at

least 0.35 metres. For ships equipped for bottom trawl fishing, the initial metacentric height

must be at least 0.50 metres.

(vi) If the ship is equipped for bottom trawl fishing, the righting levers mentioned under (i} and

the areas under the GZ curve mentioned under (iii) and (iv), must be augmented by 20

percent.

(vii) the criteria mentioned under (i), (iii) and (iv) are only valid for ships used for bottom trawl

fishing if the engine power established by the District Head of the Maritime Navigation

Inspectorate and expressed in axial horsepower, is no larger than L² .

If the engine power is larger than L² the righting levers and the areas under the GZ curve must

be augmented in proportion to the larger engine power.

“The length (L)” is equal to 96 percent of the total length on a water line at 85 percent of the

least moulded depth measured from the top of the keel, or from the intersection of the top of

the garboard strake with the bar keel if the ship has a bar keel, or equal to the length from the

foreside of the stem to the axis of the rudder stock if this last length be greater.

If the ship was designed with a rake of keel, the load water line on which this line is measured

must be parallel to the construction water line.

(1) The angle of flooding (ϕ f) shall mean: the angle of heel at which the apertures in the hull,

superstructure or deckhouses that cannot be closed watertight, are flooded. In applying this

criterion, small apertures that, in the judgement of the District Head of the Maritime Navigation

Inspectorate, do not allow water flowing in to penetrate further into the ship, need not be

regarded as open.


2. b) The loading condition that is least favourable from the point of view of windsail

must, moreover, meet the following criterion: the angle of heel that occurs as a result of the

wind moment (ϕc) may not be more than 40° or the angle of flooding (ϕf) if this be less than

40°.

For details concerning the calculation of the wind moment, see Appendix D.

3. Before the keel of a fishing vessel is laid, the following data must already have been

submitted in duplicate:

a) the data mentioned under 1b, c and e .

b) the maximum permissible KG according to the criteria mentioned under 2 and this in the

range empty ship – fully loaded ship for draught variations of 5 cm.

4. If a fishing method is used which in the judgement of the District Head of Maritime

Navigation Inspections entails an increased risk with regard to stability, he is entitled to

establish alternative stability criteria.

The District Head of the Maritime Navigation Inspectorate Antwerp

The District Head of the Maritime Navigation Inspectorate Ostend

Ir. H. DE PAEPE

Ir. R. BLOMME

APPENDIX A

Calculation of the transverse curves of static stability

1. The base line for the calculation must be the line parallel to the designed water line, drawn through the

intersection between the moulding side frame and the centre line of the ship at the location of 1/2 Lord;

all this in accordance with the NEN 3085 norm.

2. If the trim conditions that occur during operations or the shape or arrangement of the ship are such that

changes of trim have a noticeable impact on the righting levers, the influence of such changes of trim

must be taken into account.

3. The possible presence of wooden deck coverings may be taken into account in the calculation.

4. In relation to superstructures, deckhouses etc. the following applies:

a) Closed superstructures that comply with the provisions under b of the tenth paragraph of Article 2 of

Appendix I of the Royal Decree 20.7.73 may be included.

b) Closed superstructures under the second deck above the freeboard deck that comply with the provisions

under a) of the current paragraph may also be included.

c) Deckhouses on the freeboard deck may be included if they comply with the provisions under a) of the

current paragraph for closed superstructures.

d) (i) If deckhouses on the freeboard deck comply with the provisions under a) of the current paragraph,

with the exception of the prescribed extra exit to a higher deck, these deckhouses may not be included;

however, apertures in the freeboard deck within these deckhouses may be considered to be closed, even if

they are not equipped with any means of closing.

(ii) By way of derogation from the stipulations under (i) these deckhouses on small fishing vessels may be

included, if the creating of the extra exit is of no practical use.

e) Deckhouses on the freeboard deck whose access routes do not have doors that comply with the

provisions in Article 10 of Appendix I of the Royal Decree 20.7.73 may not be included; apertures in the

65

freeboard deck within these deckhouses are considered to be closed if they have adequate means of

closing. With the provisions of the Articles 13, 14, 15 or 16 of the Appendix mentioned.

f) Deckhouses under the second or higher decks above the freeboard deck may not be included; however,

apertures in the deck within these deckhouses may be considered to be closed.

g) Upper houses and deckhouses that do not comply with the provisions under a) of the current paragraph

may be included up to the angle of heel at which the underside of the access apertures and such like

becomes submerged (at this angle of heel the curve of the righting levers must show one or more leaps,

while at larger angles of heel the flooded spaces are no longer considered to contribute to stability.

h) Small apertures, such as those intended for running mooring lines, anchor chains etc. through them, as

well as scuppers and drainage and discharge pipes are not required to be considered to be open if they are

submerged at an angle of heel of 30° or more.

If these apertures are flooded at an angle of heel of less than 30°, they must be considered to be open if

they permit the entry of quantities of water that are significant in the judgement of the District Head of the

Maritime Navigation Inspectorate.

i) Trunkways and hatchways may be included.

When submitting the data, those parts of the ship that have been included in the calculation of the

transverse curves must be mentioned.

APPENDIX B

Influence of free liquid surfaces on stability.

1. In every loading condition of the ship, the initial metacentric height (GM) must be corrected for the

influence of the free liquid surface in tanks that are not entirely full.

All tanks that can simultaneously be “slack” in a certain loading condition must be included in this.

2. The apparent decrease of GM can be determined for each tank individually with the formula:

γ i metre

∆

66

in which: γ = the specific weight of the liquid in the tank in t/m³

i = the transverse moment of inertia of the liquid surface in the tank in m 4

∆ = the displacement of the ship in the prevailing loading condition in metric tonnes.

3. The curve of the righting levers must be determined with due consideration to the apparently changed

position of the height of the centre of gravity above keel (KG) as a result of the influence of the free liquid

surfaces.

In doing so, the value of KG must be increased with the calculated decrease of GM as stipulated under

paragraph 2 of this Appendix.

4. If the influence of the free liquid surfaces on the stability at various angles of heel is considerable, the

decrease of the righting levers at the various angles of heel can – by way of derogation from the

provisions of paragraph 3 of this Appendix - be determined for each tank individually with the formula:

v b γ F1/2 metre

∆

in which: v = the total content of the tank in m³.

b = the largest breadth of the tank in m.

γ = the specific weight of the liquid in the tank in t/m³

F = v = the coefficient of fullness of the tank: in which l, b and h are

ïbh the largest length, the largest breadth and the largest height respectively of the tank

∆ = the displacement of the ship in the prevailing loading condition in tonnes of 1,000 kg; and

k = a dimensionless factor that can be determined for various angles of heel on the basis of the table

belonging to this Appendix, depending on the b/h relationship of the tank; for intermediate values of b/h the

factor is obtained through linear interpolation.

5. Other, equally effective methods to calculate the influence of free liquid surfaces on the righting levers

are also acceptable.

6. The influence of the residual liquid normally remaining in empty tanks does not have to be included.

7. It must be clearly indicated in the calculated loading conditions which tanks have been calculated as

being “slack”.

67

TABLE FOR THE VALUES OF COEFFICIENT “K” FOR THE CALCULATION OF CORRECTIONS FOR

FREE LIQUID SURFACES OF THE RIGHTING LEVERS.

APPENDIX C

Ice formation

1. Areas where ice formation is to be expected:

a) The area north of the parallel 65°30 N, between the meridian of 28° and the west coast of Iceland north

of the north coast of Iceland north of the loxodrome between 66°N-15°W and 73°30 N-15° E, north of the

parallel 73°30 N between the meridians of 15°E and 35° and east of the meridian of 35° E , as well as north

of the parallel 56° N in the Baltic Sea.

k = sin ϕ (l + tan 2 ϕ) x b/h k = cos ϕ (1 + tan ϕ ) - cos ϕ 2 (1+ cot 2 ϕ )

12 2 8 b/h 12(b/h) 2

where cot ϕ ≥ b/h where cot ϕ ≤ b/h

ϕ

b/h

5° 10° 15° 20° 30° 40° 45° 50° 60° 70° 75° 80° 90° ϕ

b/h

20 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 20

10 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 10

5 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.03 5

3 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 3

2 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.06 2

1.5 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 1.5

1 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 1

0.75 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.75

0.5 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.5

0.3 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.42 0.3

0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.27 0.63 0.2

0.1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.14 1.25 0.1

68

b) The area north of the parallel 43° N, bordered on the west by the coast of North America and on the east

by the loxodrome between the positions of 43° N-48° W and 63° N-28° W and subsequently along the

meridian of 28° W.

c) All sea areas north of the North American continent west of the areas described in (a) and (b)

d) The Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk as well as the Strait of Tartary during the ice season.

e) South of the parallel 60° S.

The areas listed above have been indicated on the map included in this Appendix.

2. For fishing vessels that will be carrying out fishing in the areas listed under paragraph 1, the following ice

formation must be included in the various loading conditions:

a) 30 kg per square metre for exposed decks;

b) 7.5 kg per square metre for projected lateral surface on each side of the ship above the water line;

c) the projected lateral surface of the railings, loading gear (with the exception of masts) and rigging and

the projected lateral surface of other small parts must be included by increasing the total projected

continuous area by 5 percent and the total static moment of this area by 10 percent.

3. Skippers of fishing vessels must nonetheless be aware that in certain parts of the areas listed in

paragraph 1 larger ice formation can be expected, which can, in some parts of the areas listed under a,

c, d and e, grow to twice the values mentioned in paragraph 2, and in the area mentioned under b) even

more than twice the values mentioned in paragraph 2.

70

APPENDIX D

Impact of the wind

In order to determine the impact of the wind on the ship, the calculation should be based on a gust of wind

of long duration acting on the ship athwartships.

To this end the following must be calculated:

1. The lateral surface of the ship above the water line; i.e. the projected lateral surface of the hull, bulwark,

superstructures, deckhouses, hatchways, masts and booms etc.;

2. The total wind pressure on the lateral surface of the ship, on the basis of a wind pressure of 75 kg/m² up

to a height of 5 m above the load water line and of a wind pressure of 125 kg/m² above this height;

3. The wind moment, i.e. the moment of the total wind pressure calculated in relation to the centre of lateral

resistance of the underwater hull;

4. The wind arm, i.e. the wind moment divided by the displacement; this wind arm must be kept equal for all

angles of heel.

The calculation of the angle of heel (ϕc ) caused by the wind moment should be based on a windward angle

of heel of 10°; see the corresponding figure. Surface B indicated in this figure must be equal to surface A

indicated.

71

INCLINING TEST AND PENDULUM TEST

72

Water displacement D = 226 m³ (obtained by calculation of the lines plan)

Heeling moment gd = 0.5 T x 5.7 m = 2.85 T/m

MG = gd = 2.85 = 0.60

D tg 226 x 0.021

Pendulum test: example

Number of rolling periods per minute= 8.5

T = 60/8.5 = 7.05” per rolling period

If t = 0.8 B then MG is= ( 0..8 B )² = ( 0.8 x 6.25 )² = 25 = 0.51

MG t² 7.05² 49

73

B = breadth of the vessel.

T = rolling period in seconds

74

Stability calculation at loading condition at the t ime of the accident according to the

stability booklet

76

Simulation of the stability calculation at the time of the accident with one peaked-up

spanker boom, one spanker boom outboard and fishing gear hoisted

The simulation is a reflection of the actual situation and was reflected again in the conclusion in order to

obtain an actual picture.

report z85 morgenster - belgium · in the federal public service mobility and transport. figure 4...

Documents