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www.accc.gov.au On anti-competitive and other practices by health insurers and providers in relation to private health insurance For the period of 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 ACCC Report

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Page 1: Report to the Australian Senate on anti-competitive and ... Health... · Introduction 3 1.1 Senate order 4 1.2 Role of the ACCC 4 1.3 The ACCC’s approach to the Senate order 5 1.4

www.accc.gov.au

On anti-competitive and other practices by health insurers and providers in relation to private health insurance

For the period of 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012

ACCC Report

Page 2: Report to the Australian Senate on anti-competitive and ... Health... · Introduction 3 1.1 Senate order 4 1.2 Role of the ACCC 4 1.3 The ACCC’s approach to the Senate order 5 1.4

Report to the Australian Senate on anti‑competitive and other practices by health insurers and providers in relation to private health insurance

For the period of 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012

Page 3: Report to the Australian Senate on anti-competitive and ... Health... · Introduction 3 1.1 Senate order 4 1.2 Role of the ACCC 4 1.3 The ACCC’s approach to the Senate order 5 1.4
Page 4: Report to the Australian Senate on anti-competitive and ... Health... · Introduction 3 1.1 Senate order 4 1.2 Role of the ACCC 4 1.3 The ACCC’s approach to the Senate order 5 1.4

Contents

Executive Summary 1

1. Introduction 3

1.1 Senate order 4

1.2 Role of the ACCC 4

1.3 The ACCC’s approach to the Senate order 5

1.4 Structure of the report 6

2. Insurer recognition of allied healthcare providers 7

2.1 Insurer recognition of services by different types of allied healthcare providers 7

2.2 Reasons for lack of recognition 9

2.2.1 Legislative or regulatory impediments to recognition 9

2.2.2 Medical reasons / qualifications 10

2.2.3 Potential bias in insurers’ assessment processes 11

3. Impacts on consumers and competition 15

3.1 Impact on consumers’ out-of-pocket medical and other expenses 15

3.2 Impact on extent of consumers’ health cover 16

3.3 Impact on the competitive process 17

3.4 Final observations 19

Appendix A Invitation to consult 21

Appendix B List of publicly available submissions 22

Appendix C List of allied healthcare providers identified in submissions as not recognised 24

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Executive Summary

This is the 14th report prepared by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) for the Australian Senate on the issue of private health insurance (PHI) and covers the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012. The ACCC is required to report to the Senate on ‘any anti-competitive or other practices by health insurers or providers which reduce the extent of health cover for consumers and increase their out-of-pocket medical and other expenses’.

The ACCC has previously focused its report to the Senate on various issues impacting the PHI industry including issues surrounding contracting, preferred provider schemes and second-tier default benefits. Although those issues remain relevant to the industry, no new developments have emerged in these areas.

For this reason, the ACCC has this year examined a single issue that has not been examined in previous ACCC reports to the Senate but which has generated complaints and submissions to the ACCC. It relates to the practice by private health insurers of not recognising certain types of allied healthcare provider who offer the same or similar services as other types of ‘recognised’ provider.

The issue arises due to the great deal of crossover in the activities of various categories of allied healthcare provider. That is, many providers are trained and authorised to offer the same or similar services as other providers, usually from a different clinical perspective. For example, the prescription of foot orthoses is within the scope of practice of an orthotist and a podiatrist, yet many insurers do not recognise orthotists for this service and therefore do not offer members a rebate on the cost of the service unless it is provided by a podiatrist.

As such, members who prefer the services of a non-recognised provider must choose between, on the one hand, using their choice of provider but incurring a greater out-of-pocket expense or, on the other hand, utilising the services of a recognised provider and receiving a rebate on the cost of the service from their insurer.

It was put to the ACCC that there exist many examples of circumstances where an entire category of allied healthcare provider was not recognised by any insurer in Australia and that this placed these providers at a competitive disadvantage and negatively impacted consumers.

The ACCC conducted a public inquiry into the issue and received 65 submissions from stakeholders, mainly allied healthcare providers and their peak bodies. The ACCC also consulted with a number of private health insurers and various healthcare provider associations to ensure that their perspectives were taken into account.

The ACCC found that:

• Private health insurers will recognise at least one category of provider for each service covered by their PHI products. However, some members experience difficulty accessing the services of providers that are recognised by their insurer and may need to call on the services of an unrecognised provider. This is more common in rural and remote areas where the number of recognised providers is not always sufficient to meet consumer demand.

• All allied healthcare providers identified in submissions as not recognised had some of their services recognised by some insurers, though not always on the same terms. For example, the ACCC found that there are some insurers that recognise dieticians but not nutritionists and others that recognised nutritionists but not dieticians, and still others that recognise both dieticians and nutritionists.

• There are no regulatory impediments preventing insurers from recognising any category of allied healthcare provider identified in submissions as not recognised. Whether they choose to do so is a commercial decision for the insurer.

• Insurers appear to take into account a number of factors when deciding whether recognition of a new category of allied healthcare provider is commercially viable and in their members’ interests. While there is some variation in assessment frameworks across insurers, most claim to give primacy to the clinical efficacy of the service and any clinical risks. Most also have regard to member demand for services, the impact of recognition on administration and total claim costs (and hence insurance premiums), and whether recognition enhances the ability of the insurer to attract new members.

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e • Insurers’ assessments of clinical efficacy and risk are often fully or partly contracted out to an agency with specialist knowledge in this field and can be a costly process.

• When an insurer decides to recognise a particular type of allied healthcare provider they generally recognise that provider across their product range and make all members eligible for a rebate on the cost of their services (where that services is covered under their PHI product), irrespective of where they live in Australia.

• Allied healthcare providers did not appear to be aware of the factors employed by insurers in deciding whether to recognise healthcare providers.

The ACCC notes that non-recognition of a category of allied healthcare provider can affect the employment prospects and income of those providers. However, as long as insurers are well-informed about the allied health professions preferred by their members, then it is unlikely that non-recognition is, on balance, harmful to consumers. Consumers with a strong preference for the services of a non-recognised provider may incur higher out-of-pocket expenses when they exercise this preference, but they do not contribute toward the cost of the provider through their PHI premium. If there were sufficient consumers with a similar preference, one or more insurers would likely choose to recognise the provider.

However, if insurers are not well informed about members’ preferences for healthcare providers offering the same or similar service, their decisions to recognise a category of provider over others has the potential to distort competition between recognised and non-recognised providers.

One reason why insurers may not be well informed about the preferences of consumers is due to a lack of information to consumers about those categories of allied healthcare provider currently recognised by insurers under their various products. It can be difficult for consumers to identify the categories of allied healthcare provider recognised to provide a particular service covered under a PHI product.

With better disclosure by insurers of the types of allied healthcare providers they recognise for each healthcare service covered under a PHI product, consumers would be better able to make an informed decision when purchasing insurance and insurers may receive a clearer signal of members’ preferences in relation to categories of allied healthcare provider.

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1. Introduction

There are currently 12.3 million Australians covered by some form of private health insurance (PHI). In aggregate there are 34 private health insurers offering more than 25 700 different PHI products in the marketplace.1 These products range from general hospital cover and basic extras cover through to comprehensive hospital and extras cover.

Insurers offer products with varying types of exclusions and restrictions designed to reduce costs for consumers and increase margins for insurers. Excluding certain high-cost services tends to result in lower premiums paid by consumers and allows insurers to offer different levels of cover based on consumers’ perceived level of risk and ability to pay.2 Similarly, restricting the category of provider permitted to carry out a service under a PHI product can help to reduce overall claim costs and thereby reduce premiums.

The practice of restricting the category of provider eligible for rebates to members stems from the high degree of crossover in the ‘scopes of practice’ of different healthcare professions. A ‘scope of practice’ refers to the activities that a healthcare professional is trained and authorised to perform. Submissions indicated that there are many categories of provider that can offer the same or similar services as another category of provider, usually from a different clinical perspective.

The ACCC received complaints and submissions, mostly from allied healthcare providers,3 that insurers are recognising some professions but not others for certain services covered by particular PHI products. It was put to the ACCC that this non-recognition was leading some allied healthcare providers to suffer a competitive disadvantage and was impacting negatively on consumers. For example, podiatric surgeons were said to have difficulties in gaining recognition from insurers when compared to orthopaedic surgeons.

Podiatric surgeons and orthopaedic surgeons

Podiatric surgeons are podiatrists that have undertaken post-graduate education and training in reconstructive foot and ankle surgery. Podiatric surgeons are concerned with the diagnosis and treatment of disorders of the foot and ankle. They care for bone, joint, ligament, muscle and tendon pathology.

Orthopaedic surgeons are medical doctors who specialise in the treatment of fractures, dislocations, chronic degenerative conditions, injuries, diseases and disorders affecting the musculoskeletal system of the whole body. This includes the joints, muscles, tendons, ligaments, pelvis, spine bones and peripheral nerves.

Foot and ankle surgery is within the scope of practice of both podiatric surgeons and orthopaedic surgeons.

Patients seeking treatment by a podiatric surgeon will usually only receive a rebate for the hospital, theatre and accommodation fees. Most insurers choose not to cover the medical and clinical fees of the podiatric surgeon or the anaesthesiologist’s fees.

However, if a patient were to seek foot and ankle surgery from an orthopaedic surgeon they would be covered for the medical and clinical fees of the surgeon and anaesthetist (less any applicable gap payments) as well as hospital, theatre and accommodation fees.

In line with the Senate Order underpinning this report, the ACCC sought to determine whether insurers’ recognition practices resulted in a reduction in the extent of consumers’ health cover and an increase to their out-of-pocket medical and other expenses.

1 Discussion Paper, Competition in the Australian Health Insurance Market, Private Health Insurance Administration Council (2012), p. 16.

2 Ibid, p. 30. 3 There is debate as to which practitioners can be considered to be allied healthcare providers. Health professionals

commonly considered to be allied healthcare providers include, but are not limited to audiologists, nutritionists, dieticians, occupational therapists, orthotists, pharmacists, physiotherapists, podiatrist, psychologists, radiographers, social workers and speech pathologists. Report, The Australian Allied Health Workforce: An Overview of Workforce Planning Issues, Australian Health Workforce Advisory Committee (2006).

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e 1.1 Senate order The ACCC is tasked by an order of the Australian Senate to provide an annual report on competition and consumer issues in the PHI sector. The ACCC is required to report on ‘any anti-competitive or other practices by health insurers or providers which reduce the extent of health cover for consumers and increase their out-of-pocket medical and other expenses’.

This report covers the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012. It is the 14th report prepared by the ACCC in compliance with an order agreed to by the Australian Senate on 25 March 1999 and amended on 18 September 2002.

Senate order

There be laid on the table as soon as practicable after the end of each 12 months ending on or after 30 June 2003, a report by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission containing an assessment of any anti-competitive or other practices by health insurers or providers which reduce the extent of health cover for consumers and increase their out-of-pocket medical and other expenses.4

This report has been prepared in compliance with that order.

1.2 Role of the ACCCA number of government agencies are involved in the administration and regulation of the PHI industry in Australia. The Department of Health and Aging (DoHA) administers the Private Health Insurance Act 2007 (PHI Act) and PHI provider rules. The Private Health Insurance Administration Council (PHIAC) is charged with the registration and prudential regulation of private health insurers and advises the Government on competition policy within the private health industry. In addition, the Private Health Insurance Ombudsman (PHIO) has been established to manage consumer complaints relating to PHI.

The role of the ACCC in relation to the PHI industry is confined to complying with the Senate order and enforcing and encouraging compliance with the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). Issues within the realm of health policy sit outside the remit of the ACCC.

The ACCC is an independent statutory authority established to enforce and encourage compliance with the CCA. The purpose of the CCA is to enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting competition and fair trading. The CCA provides for the protection of consumers in their dealings with business, including prohibitions against misleading and deceptive conduct and anti-competitive conduct.

The principles adopted by the ACCC to achieve compliance with the law are set out in our Compliance and enforcement policy,5 which outlines the ACCC’s enforcement powers, functions and priorities. In carrying out its duties under the CCA, the ACCC has a dual role as:

• a national enforcement agency, and

• a provider of education and information for business (including the professions) and consumers in relation to compliance with the CCA.

The ACCC undertakes enforcement action where appropriate and necessary to underpin its compliance objectives. The ACCC has varied and extensive enforcement powers, which are detailed in the ACCC’s publication Business snapshot: ACCC powers to issue notices.6

4 Senate procedural order no. 17 Health—Assessment reports by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission agreed to 25 March 1999, by means of an amendment to the motion that the report of the committee on Health Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1999 be adopted. J.626, amended 18 September 2002 J.761.

5 ACCC Compliance and enforcement policy http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/344494 6 ACCC Business snapshot: ACCC powers to issue notices http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/item.

phtml?itemId=935285&nodeId=9c617e4684c41f10b20fb5e37c8724a0&fn=Business%20Snapshot_ACCC%20powers%20to%20issue%20notices.pdf

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1.3 The ACCC’s approach to the Senate order The past 13 ACCC reports to the Senate have surveyed a number of issues affecting the PHI sector including contracting, preferred provider schemes, informed financial consent and second-tier default benefits. Although those issues remain relevant to the PHI industry, there do not appear to have been any new developments in these areas. For this reason the ACCC has this year examined only one issue which has not formed the focus of previous ACCC reports but which has generated complaints and submissions to the ACCC.

The ACCC has examined circumstances where certain categories of allied healthcare provider are not recognised by insurers while other healthcare providers, who are said to offer the same or similar services, are recognised. More specifically, the ACCC has examined:

• the extent to which certain types of allied healthcare provider are not recognised by private health insurers and the reasons for this, and

• the effect of the lack of recognition on consumers and competition in relevant healthcare service markets, including the impact on the extent of consumers’ health cover and out-of-pocket medical and other expenses.

During the reporting period, the ACCC received complaints and submissions from healthcare providers that suggested that the non-recognition of certain categories of provider was causing them to suffer a competitive disadvantage and was impacting negatively on consumers.

In order to better understand the gravity of the issue and whether it warranted further inquiry the ACCC met with key stakeholders including PHIO, PHIAC and DOHA and assessed complaints data.

In the relevant period, the ACCC received 112 contacts relating to PHI generally. This comprises around 0.075 per cent of the ACCC’s total contacts for the same period.

Various government agencies confirmed ‘recognition’ was an issue of contention within the industry. PHIO advised that it received a low but consistent level of complaints over time on the issue of recognition of allied healthcare providers.

The ACCC wrote to a wide range of stakeholders with an interest in PHI and allied healthcare. An invitation to make a submission was also made available to the public on the ‘front page’ of the ACCC website. The invitation to consult, including the issues and questions put to stakeholders for comment, is provided at Appendix A.

The ACCC met with various allied health professional associations to appreciate the impacts of non-recognition on providers and their patients. The ACCC also consulted with insurers to better understand the commercial context for the non-recognition of certain healthcare providers.

In total, 65 submissions were received from various stakeholders including allied healthcare providers, medical accreditation bodies, medical practitioners, consumer advocacy groups, individual consumers and private health insurers.

This year the ACCC again asked stakeholders to consent to the publication of their submission. A list of those who made submissions, along with links to publicly available submissions, is provided at Appendix B.

The ACCC would like to thank stakeholders for their time in making submissions to the 2011–12 PHI report.

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e 1.4 Structure of the report The report is structured as follows:

• Section 2 identifies the specific circumstances where certain categories of allied healthcare provider are not recognised by insurers and explains some of the reasons given for the lack of recognition. This section also provides some guidance to allied healthcare providers on insurers’ assessment processes to assist them to identify the sorts of information useful to support an application for recognition.

• Section 3 considers how the lack of recognition of certain categories of allied healthcare provider impacts on consumers’ out-of-pocket medical and other expenses, and the extent of their health cover. It also considers whether non-recognition of allied healthcare providers may be distorting competition in some healthcare service markets.

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2. Insurer recognition of allied healthcare providers

Various stakeholders expressed concern to the ACCC that certain categories of allied healthcare provider were not ‘recognised’ by private health insurers while other healthcare providers, said to offer the same or similar services, were recognised. Several allied healthcare providers submitted that by not recognising their profession, insurers were restricting their ability to offer services to their members.

This section provides examples of the circumstances where a particular type of allied healthcare provider may not be recognised and the reasons for insurers’ decisions to not recognise certain providers. It also explains the approach that insurers take when assessing whether to recognise a new category of provider.

2.1 Insurer recognition of services by different types of allied healthcare provider

Insurer recognition practices involve insurers choosing to recognise one category of professional over another for the purpose of the payment of rebates for healthcare services supplied to members.

The ACCC invited stakeholders to identify examples of circumstances where they believed insurers’ recognition practices treated allied healthcare providers, offering the same or similar services,7 inconsistently. A summary list of categories of allied healthcare provider said to be recognised and not recognised for various allied healthcare services is provided at Appendix C.

The ACCC reviewed all submissions and conducted market enquiries to test the extent of non-recognition across insurers. Through this process, the ACCC has been able to go some way towards clarifying the nature and extent of non-recognition of categories of allied healthcare providers by private health insurers in Australia.

From the outset it is important to note that one of the reasons why members sometimes cannot claim the cost of services supplied by allied healthcare providers is because the PHI product they have chosen excludes services of the type that are provided by a category of provider. For example, not all PHI products cover members for all dental-related services. As noted in Section 1, insurers exclude certain services from a PHI product in order to provide a menu of PHI options for existing and prospective members and allow them to self-select the product that best meets their level of service and premium preference.

In many cases, stakeholders put to the ACCC that various categories of allied healthcare provider were not recognised by any insurer. However, the ACCC found that no category of allied healthcare provider was systematically excluded by all insurers, although they often are not recognised in the same way across all insurers and PHI products. In particular, all of the categories of allied healthcare provider listed in Appendix C are recognised by at least some insurers in one of three ways.

First, some submissions incorrectly indicated that particular categories of allied healthcare provider are not recognised by any insurers. For example, it was put to the ACCC that insurers recognise nutritionists but not dieticians. The ACCC found that there are some insurers that recognise dieticians but not nutritionists, others that recognised nutritionists but not dieticians, and still others that recognise both dieticians and nutritionists.

Second, some insurers recognise some of the services provided by a category of allied healthcare provider such as orthotists, occupational therapists, physiotherapists and chiropractors. This means that members are eligible for rebates for the cost of some services received from these providers. For instance, some insurers will recognise an orthotist for the manufacturing and fitting of custom-made foot orthoses to their members, however rebates will not be available for other clinical services such as video gait analysis.

7 Some parties questioned or refuted the proposition that a particular service provided by non-recognised providers was the same or similar to those provided by a recognised provider. However, the majority accepted that at least some services provided by non-recognised providers were comparable to that offered by a recognised provider.

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e Third, in some cases members are generally eligible to claim the cost of services provided by a category of allied healthcare provider when those services are billed through a related provider or through hospital fees. For example, members can claim the cost of services provided by allied dental practitioners (ADPs) when they are billed through a dentist. Additionally, some insurers rebate services provided by podiatric surgeons, midwives or clinical perfusionists only when they are delivered as part of a multidisciplinary medical team or billed as part of general hospital fees.

Medical and clinical perfusionist

A perfusionist supports a patient’s circulation and respiratory function during cardiac surgery by operating a heart and lung bypass machine.

Clinical perfusionists have submitted that there exist a number of funding models for the provision of heart and lung bypass services.

It was submitted that the most prevalent model in the private sector involves a medically trained perfusionist billing for the service rendered by a clinical perfusionist (non-medically trained). Under this model the clinical perfusionist undertakes the operation of the heart/lung bypass machine under the supervision or guidance of the medical perfusionist but will not bill directly for the services. In some circumstances the medical perfusionist will not be available in the theatre room at the time of surgery.

Clinical perfusionists have submitted that they should be able to bill directly for their services rather than be paid a salary by the hospital from the accommodation, theatre and hospital fees received from the insurer.

The chart below illustrates the ACCC’s findings regarding insurers’ recognition of allied healthcare providers in Australia.

Chart 1. Private health insurer recognition of allied health care providers

All services supplied by the healthcare provider are recognised by all insurers; however, providers are unable to directly bill for the service.

• For example, members are able to claim a rebate for the services of allied dental practitioners through a dentist’s provider number.

None of the services supplied by the healthcare provider are recognised by any insurer.

• Not applicable.

Most services supplied by the healthcare provider are recognised by most insurers.

• For example, a chiropractor is recognised by most insurers for chiropractic services, but is not recognised to perform x-rays despite being accredited to do so.

Some services supplied by the healthcare providers are recognised by some insurers.

• For example, an orthotist is recognised by some insurers for the manufacturing and fitting of custom- made foot orthoses, but is not recognised for other clinical services.

All services supplied by the healthcare provider are recognised by all insurers.

• Not applicable.

All IndirectlyAll

Most Some None

Recognition of allied healthcare providers

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2.2 Reasons for lack of recognitionOn the face of it, it is not obvious why only some insurers recognise a category of allied healthcare provider (e.g. nutritionists), or appear to offer a lower level of recognition to some categories of allied healthcare provider (e.g. podiatric surgeons receive different treatment to orthopaedic surgeons performing foot and ankle surgery).

Several stakeholders submitted that the providers that are recognised are more highly qualified than those not recognised by insurers. Other stakeholders submitted that some recognised and non-recognised classes of providers have broadly comparable qualifications (e.g. physiotherapists and occupational therapists) and in other instances, the less qualified category of provider was recognised over the more qualified group (e.g. nutritionists and accredited practising dieticians).8

A number of factors appear to impact on insurers’ decisions to recognise a certain category of allied healthcare provider.

A number of possible reasons for the lack of recognition of certain allied healthcare providers were identified in submissions, including:

• potential legislative and regulatory restrictions imposed on insurers

• different qualification and competency levels

• a lack of understanding of the scope of practice of allied healthcare providers

• historical misconceptions about the clinical efficacy of certain services, and

• the cost to insurers to recognise a new category of provider and the impact this can have on premiums.

These are considered further below.

2.2.1 Legislative or regulatory impediments to recognitionA number of stakeholders submitted that private health insurers have in the past explained to providers and consumers that certain professional groups are not recognised because they do not have access to a Medicare provider number or are not listed on the Medical Benefits Schedule (MBS).

Indeed, some insurers submitted that they are under ‘an obligation’ to ensure services and providers are listed under the MBS before they will recognise a new provider suggesting a legislative or regulatory impediment to the recognition of certain categories of allied healthcare provider. Not being listed on the MBS may suggest to consumers that some categories of provider are not ‘qualified’ or authorised by the Australian Government to perform the service.

Some insurers submitted that they use the MBS as a default provider list in order to meet their obligations in relation to the safety and quality of the services they provide to members. It was submitted that the evidence-based decisions made by the Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC) to recognise a new health technology or procedure under the MBS were considered within the industry to be a valuable assessment of the safety and quality of a professional group and enabled insurers to meet their obligations under the PHI Act.

The ACCC understands that there are in fact no requirements under relevant legislation that a provider must have a Medicare provider number or be listed under the MBS in order for an insurer to recognise their services. The current regulatory environment provides insurers with a capacity to recognise a diverse range of providers. Many insurers can and do recognise various services and providers that are not recognised by Medicare or listed on the MBS (e.g. alternative therapies such as remedial massage, homeopathy, naturopathy and Bowen Therapy).

8 In contrast, some insurers informed the ACCC that they recognised accredited practising dieticians (APDs) over nutritionists as a result of the qualifications and continuing education of APDs.

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Private Health Insurance Act 2007 (PHI Act)

Under the PHI Act, an insurance policy must meet the quality assurance requirements set out under the Private Health Insurance (Accreditation) Rules 2011 (the PHI Rules). These PHI Rules specify quality and safety standards that must be met for each service and provider under a PHI product.

The PHI Rules allow an insurance policy to recognise a healthcare provider that is registered under a state or territory law such as a doctor or dentist, and also includes persons who hold specialist registration in the specialty of podiatric surgery with the Podiatry Board of the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency.

The PHI Rules also prescribe a number of accredited allied healthcare fields that meet the quality assurance requirements e.g. chiropractic services, diabetes education, dietetics, mental health services, occupational therapy, podiatry, psychology etc.

These allied healthcare providers must meet specific qualification requirements as specified under Schedule 1 of the Health Insurance (Allied Health Services) Determination 2007 e.g. the allied healthcare provider must be a member of a specified professional association and must meet strict educational and training specifications.

Where a category of healthcare provider is not specifically prescribed under the PHI Rules an alternative scheme for recognising those providers exists.

A provider can still be recognised by an insurer where the provider is a member of a professional association that meets the criteria for such a body under the PHI Rules e.g. the body is a national entity with membership requirements that provide an assessment of healthcare providers’ level of education, training and experience. The body must also subscribe to ethical standards and maintain a code of conduct and dispute resolution procedures.

2.2.2 Medical reasons / qualificationsA small number of submissions to the report suggested that there are justified medical grounds for not recognising certain categories of healthcare provider.

The Australian Medical Association (AMA) submitted that only medical practitioners are trained in the care of the whole person and that non-medically trained providers have expertise and skills in a very narrow area of healthcare. The AMA submitted that non-medically trained providers may not have the education or expertise to recognise, diagnose and manage complications that may lead to adverse health outcomes. Similarly, the Australian Dental Association submitted that only dentists were capable of performing a proper oral examination and that ADPs were not qualified to perform that task.

Further, the Australian Orthopaedic Association supported the stance of insurers (who provide less cover for members undergoing foot and ankle surgery performed by a podiatric surgeon in comparison with an orthopaedic surgeon) stating that individuals using the title ‘podiatric surgeon’ in Australia were not adequately trained or qualified compared to orthopaedic surgeons or podiatrists trained and accredited in foot and ankle surgery in the United States.

However, many allied healthcare providers submitted that they are highly trained health professionals who have the skills, qualifications and experience to recognise, diagnose and treat disorders within their scope of practice. It was submitted that allied health professionals are trained to recognise complications that sit outside their scope of practice and to refer patients to other suitably qualified healthcare providers when necessary.

It is important to note that the PHI Act and Rules set out the qualification and accreditation requirements for healthcare providers and that any discussion of the suitability of these standards sits outside the remit of the ACCC role in preparing this report.

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2.2.3 Potential bias in insurers’ assessment processes Some submissions suggested that insurers may bias recognition decisions in favour of services that are provided by medically trained practitioners. Others submitted that there exist historical misconceptions and a general lack of awareness of the services offered by allied healthcare providers and that these are being perpetuated within the industry by health advisors and experts relied upon by insurers.

Hypnotherapists and psychologists

In the past hypnotherapy services could only be provided by medical practitioners, psychologists, dentists and persons approved by state psychology boards. Since 1998 all states and territories have moved to deregulate the practice of hypnotherapy, and restrictions on who can practice hypnotherapy are no longer in place.

Submissions from the Australian Hypnotherapy Association and the Hypnotherapy Council of Australia outlined a concern that insurers are refusing to rebate hypnotherapy provided by hypnotherapists on the basis of misconceptions that hypnotherapists are not able to provide the same level of services as a psychologist.

Insurers submitted that they must take into account a number of factors when deciding whether to recognise a category of healthcare provider, including but not limited to:

• the clinical efficacy of the service offered by the provider

• legal requirements for quality and safety, including the qualifications of providers and providers’ accreditation and registration status

• various one-off and administrative costs associated with recognising a provider

• member demand for the service and expected cost of claims

• value to members and prospective members and the insurer’s business resulting from recognition

• whether the service is already being offered effectively by another category of healthcare provider.

Submissions from insurers outlined the processes and procedures taken by insurers when deciding whether to recognise a new healthcare provider. The ACCC has taken these various processes and prepared an indicative process relied on by insurers, outlined in Chart 2. It is important to note that insurers will place different weight on the considerations outlined in the indicative process, depending on their business priorities.

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Private health insurers submitted that assessing the clinical efficacy of a service is the most important factor taken into account when recognising a category of provider. This is because insurers are unwilling to risk the health of their members or risk their reputation and brand image.

To determine the clinical efficacy of a service, insurers first consider if the provider has been listed on the MBS or whether there is strong clinical evidence of the safety and quality of the service. For example, insurers will have regard to the advice of independent medical experts, independent clinical papers, the providers’ scope of practice and any independent clinical reviews.

Insurers’ assessment of clinical efficacy and risk is often fully or partly contracted out to an agency with specialist knowledge in this field and can be a costly process.

Insurers are also likely to consider whether the payment of benefits will assist in the reduction of the incidence of serious illness as well as in the management of chronic disease. Insurers submitted that any services offered under a PHI product must ultimately act to reduce their claims expenses.

Many allied healthcare providers submitted that an investment in preventative health, which is within the scope of many allied healthcare providers, may have the potential to decrease the cost associated with managing many chronic diseases and therefore reduce the benefit outlays of insurers in the future. However, insurers submitted that there was a long lead time for benefits from preventative health to become apparent, with the potential for those benefits to be lost through member churn and over-servicing of members (for example from members seeking to use all their available benefits before they run out in a year, often prompted by reminder letters from providers).

Submissions also noted that the importance of clinical efficacy is reduced for complementary medicine such as remedial massage because the level of risk posed by these services is considered to be relatively low.

Insurers also consider whether a sufficient number of members are likely to value the service offered by the provider before making a decision whether to recognise a new provider. Where consumer demand for a certain product is low, recognition is unlikely to bring benefits to the business or generate enough product sales to maximise a return on the insurer’s investment. This is particularly important if the cost of claims is likely to rise as a consequence of recognising a new category of provider.

Insurers submitted that greater access to a wider range of healthcare providers may lead to greater utilisation of services that can create additional pressure on insurance pools. It was also submitted that this may create greater inflationary pressure on PHI premiums.

Insurers submitted that one-off and ongoing administrative costs of recognising a category of provider can determine whether a new provider will be recognised. These costs include updating brochures, educating consumers, training staff, updating databases, data transfers, and the ongoing maintenance of providers’ details.

An insurer’s decision to recognise a category of provider involves balancing how consumers value that service with the costs of recognition to the insurer. Some insurers submitted that they have not received any convincing business cases for recognising new providers to date.

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Allied Dental Practitioners (ADPs)

The ACCC received many submissions in relation to ADPs (dental hygienists, dental therapists and oral health therapists), who carry out preventative and operative dental services. Unlike many categories of allied healthcare provider that were the subject of submissions, every insurer recognises the professional services provided by ADPs. However, insurers do not recognise that an ADP can independently charge for their services. Instead, insurers pay benefits to consumers claiming an ADP’s services through a supervising dentist’s provider number.

The issue of ‘recognition’ is linked to the need for ADPs to comply with the Dental Practitioner’s Scope of Practice which states that ADPs can exercise autonomous decision making in their areas of expertise, may only practice within a structured professional relationship with a dentist and must not practice as independent practitioners. However, ADPs may practice in a range of environments that are not limited to direct supervision.8

Guidance issued by the Dental Board of Australia states that it is not necessary for the dentist to be physically present on site to supervise the ADP and supervision requirements can be met through ensuring that a structured professional relationship exists with a dentist who can be consulted as necessary via any means.9 The scope of a structured professional relationship will vary between individuals, and in practice an ADP generally works autonomously with a patient after the dentist has inspected the patient and created a treatment plan.

In this context, insurers can choose to recognise the ability of an ADP to independently charge for their services, when the service is provided within a structured professional relationship with a dentist (i.e. the service is provided within the Dental Practitioner’s Scope of Practice).

A number of insurers cited the requirement for supervision as a reason for not directly recognising services performed by ADPs. Submissions from insurers suggest that the existing process, of claims being made under a dentist’s provider number, is viewed as providing a simple mechanism to ensure that services provided by ADP are performed within the scope of practice.

This suggests that the concern of insurers that independent billing could transform into independent practice does not appear to have been overcome, such that applications to date have been refused.

It appears that insurers apply commercial and clinical considerations to determine whether a new category of healthcare provider should be recognised. The approach of individual insurers to recognition does not appear to be biased against new providers. Competition between insurers to retain members and attract new customers through their product offerings brings about the possibility that one insurer may see an overall benefit from recognising a particular category of provider while another may not. This, together with the framework of factors employed by each insurer, tends to explain why certain categories of provider are recognised by some, but not all, insurers.

9 Dental Board of Australia, Scope of practice registration standard, available at: http://www.dentalboard.gov.au/Registration-Standards.aspx

10 Dental Board of Australia, FAQ’s: Scope of Practice Registration Standard, available at: http://www.dentalboard.gov.au/documents/default.aspx?record=WD10%2F2972&dbid=AP&chksum=MYB%2BOq3O0G2M%2BubijHymtg%3D&3D

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3. Impacts on consumers and competition

The Senate order requires the ACCC to report on anti-competitive or other practices which increase consumers’ out-of-pocket medical and other expenses and reduce the extent of consumers’ health cover. This section assesses insurers’ recognition practices in light of these Senate order requirements.

3.1 Impact on consumers’ out‑of‑pocket medical and other expenses

The ACCC sought submissions from various stakeholders on the issue of potential consumer detriment and loss resulting from insurers’ recognition practices, particularly in relation to costs incurred by consumers seeking treatment from an unrecognised category of provider.

Submissions from various allied healthcare providers suggested that where a category of provider was not recognised, members seeking treatment from such a provider would be out-of-pocket for the full cost of the service. It was said that this cost was in addition to the cost of their insurance.

Private health insurers submitted that they will generally recognise at least one category of provider for each service covered by a PHI product. It was stated that in the majority of cases where a member’s chosen category of provider is not recognised by the insurer, they are able to access an alternative category of provider offering the same or similar services.

The ACCC understands that there will also be situations when a member’s chosen category of provider is unrecognised by their insurer but can be accessed under the public health system. In this case the consumer will only be out-of-pocket for the portion of the treatment costs that are not covered by Medicare.

However, this is not always the case and there will be occasions where a member will be liable to pay the full cost of medical services when they choose or require the services of an unrecognised category of provider. Members may choose unrecognised providers for many reasons, including convenience (travel distance and proximity to other healthcare providers), positive past experience and preference for treatment from a particular clinical perspective.

In such cases, consumers’ out of pocket medical and other expenses can include:

• the cost of obtaining the service as a fully private patient

• travel expenses to the nearest recognised provider, which can be significant for consumers located in rural and remote areas

• time and money spent negotiating with insurer under exceptional circumstances clauses e.g. emails, telephone calls and letters to insurers

• duplication of costs from visiting multiple healthcare providers recognised by the insurer (e.g. not all insurers offer rebates for x-ray services taken and interpreted by chiropractors, which forces the consumers to either pay the full cost of the service or seek the additional service of a radiographer).

Consumers with a strong preference for the services of a category of provider not recognised under a PHI product may therefore incur higher out-of-pocket expenses when they exercise this preference. However it is important to note that they did not contribute to the cost of services by that category of provider through their PHI premium. That is, they did not pay for coverage that was not delivered.

As noted in section 2, when insurers perceive there are enough people with a strong preference and willingness to pay for a specific category of provider, they have a commercial incentive to recognise the category. This will require a weighing up of the potential utilisation of the service, cost of claims and members’ valuation of the service. Until such time as member demand and willingness to pay for a service/preference for a particular category of provider is sufficient to outweigh the potential costs of recognition to the insurer, it is unlikely to be economic for insurers to recognise those providers.

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e Members will face higher out-of-pocket expenses if they choose to see a category of healthcare provider not recognised under a PHI product, rather than a recognised healthcare provider. However in the long term, recognising all healthcare providers for a particular treatment, to eliminate short term higher out-of-pocket costs for some members, has the potential to result in increased costs to all members through higher premiums.

The potential for recognition of a category of provider to increase, decrease, or result in no change in expenses in the long term will very much depend upon the circumstances of the individual insurer and the category of healthcare provider in question. In some submissions to the ACCC, healthcare providers suggested that recognition of their profession, or recognition on similar terms as other professions, could bring about a reduction in healthcare costs, which could be passed on to members. Some unrecognised allied healthcare providers argued that their current fee structures are lower than recognised providers of similar services and that recognition will potentially reduce healthcare costs. However, one allied healthcare provider association confirmed that they could not guarantee that this potential would be realised. No submissions provided an assessment of the costs and/or benefits from recognising a particular category of healthcare provider.

The ACCC is of the view that an insurer policy of uncritically recognising all available providers under all insurance products is unlikely to bring benefits to consumers in terms of reduced out-of-pocket medical and other expenses.

3.2 Impact on extent of consumers’ health coverSubmissions to the ACCC emphasised that due to the lack of recognition, consumers were being restricted in their ability to access their first choice of category of healthcare provider. It was submitted that many unrecognised categories of allied healthcare provider offer highly specialised services that can be more tailored to a patient’s needs than the services of a recognised provider. For this reason, it was said that insurers’ recognition practices were resulting in a reduction in the extent of consumers’ health cover.

However, as noted previously, no insurer recognises every category of allied healthcare provider able to supply a particular service. There are costs associated with recognising any category of provider and if an insurer judges that they are not able to recover these costs from members by charging higher premiums, it is rational not to recognise them.

Insurers submitted that they will generally recognise at least one category of provider for a particular service and that the extent of a consumer’s PHI cover—chosen by the member—determines whether the consumer will be eligible for a rebate and the level of that rebate.

In submissions to the ACCC, stakeholders suggested that consumers are not always aware of the categories of provider that are, or are not, recognised to perform the various services covered by their chosen PHI product. This information generally does not appear in PHI product disclosure documents or on insurer websites.

Some stakeholders suggested allied healthcare providers were not informing consumers up-front that they or some of their services are not recognised by some insurers, leaving consumers to discover this after they have received the service. Allied healthcare providers submitted that they lost trade when they informed consumers that their services did not attract a rebate. The ACCC also notes that providers may not possess sufficient information to advise customers on the availability and extent of PHI rebates and members may need to seek this information from their insurer.

It can be difficult and time consuming for members to obtain information about the categories of allied healthcare provider that are recognised by various insurers in order to take this into account when selecting PHI. Generally consumers must telephone an insurer to discover this information. Another difficulty is that consumers are not in a position to anticipate all of the healthcare services they will actually require in the future or identify the categories of provider they will use and therefore may expend resources searching for information about providers of services they will not require.

Without easy and timely access to this information, it is not clear that members are in a strong position to signal to insurers the categories of allied health provider they prefer to be recognised. Information provided by insurers suggests that they place considerable weight on consumers’ preferences and willingness to pay for particular categories of provider when assessing whether to

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recognise a particular category of provider. Greater disclosure about the categories of provider each insurer recognises therefore could help the PHI industry to ensure that their provider recognition decisions are fully in line with members’ preferences.

There appears to be scope for insurers to make it easier for members to inform themselves of insurers’ recognition practices by being more transparent about the categories of allied healthcare provider they recognise for the various services covered under a PHI product. This information may be most valued by consumers when they come to purchase/renew their PHI policy and when they utilise a service or category of healthcare provider for the first time.

Allied healthcare providers also submitted that the extent of health cover and access to services was of particular concern for consumers living in rural and regional areas. A number of submissions stated that the availability of a recognised healthcare provider in a regional town for a particular service could be limited or non-existent.

It was submitted that would-be patients in these localities were being put in a position of choosing between:

• use of their PHI, which might involve travelling out of their locality

• delaying their treatment until such time as the local recognised provider could see them

• obtaining treatment privately but not under their insurance cover (through non-recognised providers), or

• using the public health system (if the service is available).

This was said to be particularly acute in relation to the ability to access mental health services in rural and regional areas, with most insurers recognising mental health services provided by clinical psychologists but not by a counsellor or social worker.11

However, it is important to note that due to the community rating system in Australia, insurers are unable to discriminate between consumers based on their place of residence. The ACCC considers that the difficulties that consumers face in accessing healthcare providers in rural and regional areas reflects a mismatch in the demand and supply of healthcare services generally in those regions, rather than insurers’ recognition practices.

Furthermore, insurers develop products to suit the preferences of their member base. For example, some smaller insurers target their product offering to appeal to consumers in regional and rural areas and will offer services and recognise categories of provider that are relevant to their membership. Consumers who face difficulties in accessing services and providers due to limited recognition may have the option of switching between insurers under portability arrangements to achieve a better level of coverage.

For some members, the recognition practices of their insurer can result in lower health coverage than they would prefer. However this appears to be confined to members with a strong preference for a particular category of unrecognised healthcare provider.

3.3 Impact on the competitive process Submissions to the ACCC raised concerns that allied healthcare providers were being placed at a competitive disadvantage as a result of insurers’ recognition practices. In order to assess the effects of recognition practices on the competitive process, the ACCC asked stakeholders to provide examples of the ways in which allied healthcare providers were being disadvantaged.

Many unrecognised allied healthcare providers submitted that they were unable to compete on an even footing with recognised providers. It was submitted that insured consumers were more likely to choose a healthcare provider based on the availability of a rebate even if this meant not using their first choice of provider. As noted previously, allied healthcare providers submitted that a number of consumers did not proceed to make an appointment after being informed by the allied healthcare provider that a rebate would not be available.

11 Further, the Australian Psychological Society noted that the ability of a member to actually use their private health insurance for mental health might be limited, with members of one fund only able to obtain rebates after they had exhausted their entitlements under the public healthcare system.

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e Many submissions outlined the difficulties faced by unrecognised allied healthcare providers in running a viable practice when compared to recognised providers. One unrecognised allied healthcare provider submitted that they faced difficulties in hiring consult rooms in clinics or gaining referrals. The clinic owners were said to believe that certain allied healthcare providers could not generate a large enough income to cover expenses from wholly private clients.

Some unrecognised allied healthcare providers submitted that they were being ‘forced’ to charge well below the cost of providing the service in an attempt to come close to the gap payment paid by a consumer to a recognised provider. Other submissions stated that allied healthcare providers often offer parts of their services for free to try and reduce the up-front cost for consumers. All of these factors were said to result in a loss of income for unrecognised allied healthcare providers.

Provision of free services by allied healthcare providers

An orthotist outlined that their service of assessment, fitting and review consultations as well as video gait analyses and 3D CADCAM images was not recognised by insurers for foot orthoses but the same services were fully recognised when provided by a podiatrist.

It was submitted that this forced orthotists to alter their business practices in one of two ways. The first, less viable option, is to charge higher overall fees for the recognised services, resulting in higher remuneration for orthotists and full rebates for clients. However, this can result in private health insurers denying claims or advising consumers to avoid orthotists due to ‘expense’.

The second, more commonly used option is to provide parts of the services for free. In relation to this, it was submitted that in many cases orthotists do not charge for video gait analysis and 3D CADCAM images, despite these services being an integral part of the clinical process. This was to ensure that the orthotist fees were competitive with the out-of-pocket costs of similar services provided by a podiatrist.

It is important to appreciate that the ACCC, in assessing the state of competition in a market, is primarily concerned with the competitive process rather than the outcomes of competition on individual market players. For this reason, despite the fact that individual categories of provider may be facing certain financial hurdles, these difficulties are not necessarily indicative of an anti-competitive market.

It appears that the recognition practices of insurers reflect a weighing of commercial risks and opportunities. Insurers are driven by market forces to provide the most valued and cost effective PHI services for their members.

As outlined in section 2, almost all categories of provider will be recognised by at least some insurers in respect of the provision of at least some services. This means that different categories of provider are able to compete within specific market segments or niches and consumers are able to choose and switch between insurers and insurance products to ensure they find the cover that most suits their needs (or anticipated needs).

However, if insurers are not well informed about members’ preferences for allied healthcare, their decisions to recognise a category of provider over others may distort competition between recognised and non-recognised healthcare providers.

One reason why insurers may not be well informed about the preferences of consumers is the lack of information available to consumers about the categories of allied healthcare provider currently recognised by insurers under their various products. As noted previously, it can be difficult for consumers to identify the category of allied healthcare provider recognised to provide a particular service under a PHI product.

With greater disclosure by insurers of the categories of allied healthcare provider they recognise for each healthcare service covered under a PHI product, consumers would be better able to make an informed decision when purchasing insurance and insurers may receive a clearer signal of members’ preferences in relation to categories of allied healthcare provider.

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3.4 Final observations The ACCC found that the recognition practices of private health insurers involve the application of commercial and clinical assessments. The publication by the ACCC of the common factors taken into account by insurers may assist providers seeking recognition in the future.

The ACCC has found that the recognition practices of insurers can result in increased out-of-pocket expenses (but potentially lower PHI premiums) for some consumers. For those consumers with a strong preference for a particular category of unrecognised healthcare provider, the recognition practices of insurers can result in lower health coverage than they prefer (though not relative to the cover they have paid for). However in general, the ability of consumers to use the coverage they paid for depends upon the availability of recognised providers in their location, rather than any decision by an insurer to recognise a new group of provider.

The ACCC notes that individual decisions by insurers in a competitive market setting will result in inconsistent recognition of categories of allied healthcare provider across the industry. While each insurer’s recognition decisions can impact on the ability of unrecognised allied healthcare providers to run a viable practice, these decisions reflect the application of commercial judgement by insurers, who compete to retain and attract new members through their product offerings. It is not appropriate for the ACCC to recommend that any and all categories of allied healthcare practitioner should be recognised by insurers in such a market setting.

During the course of preparing this report, the ACCC received mixed information from stakeholders regarding the degree of disclosure, by industry participants, to consumers, on the eligibility for a rebate on services of certain allied healthcare providers. It is in the interests of consumers, insurers and allied healthcare providers that consumers have easy and timely access to information about the categories of healthcare provider that are recognised by insurers for a rebate.

There appears to be scope for insurers to be more transparent about the categories of allied healthcare provider they recognise. This would assist consumers to make more informed decisions as to the PHI offerings they consume and the types of healthcare provider they use. It will also allow consumers to more clearly signal to insurers their preferences regarding categories of healthcare provider. In turn, this should help insurers to improve their assessment of member demand and willingness to pay for recognition of new provider categories. Finally, greater transparency may help to fast-track insurer recognition of some currently unrecognised allied healthcare providers.

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Appendix A Invitation to consult

3 September 2012

Dear Stakeholder

Re: ACCC Report to Senate on Private Health Insurance

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is inviting stakeholders to comment on preliminary issues identified by the ACCC in preparing a report to the Australian Senate on private health insurance.

The Senate requires the ACCC to provide an annual assessment of ‘any anti-competitive or other practices by health funds or providers which reduce the extent of health cover for consumers and increase their out-of-pocket medical or other expenses’.

The report will cover the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012. It will be the 14th report prepared by the ACCC in compliance with an order agreed to by the Senate on 25 March 1999 and amended on 18 September 2002.

This year the ACCC proposes to examine issues that reduce the extent of health cover and increase consumers’ out-of-pocket expenses which have not formed the focus of previous ACCC reports to the Senate.

In particular, the ACCC will inquire into a perceived lack of recognition of certain allied health care providers by health funds. The ACCC has identified circumstances where certain providers of health care are not recognised by private health insurers while others providing the same or similar services, with different qualifications, are recognised. It has been suggested that in some circumstances this distinction is not justified and places allied health care providers at a competitive disadvantage, and has the potential to impact negatively on consumers.

For example, most health funds do not provide scope for consumers to claim rebates from dental therapists, dental hygienists and oral health therapists for preventative and operative dental procedures. It has been put to the ACCC that the services they provide are of the same quality as those similar services provided by dentists.

Similarly, foot and ankle surgery performed by a podiatric surgeon is not usually covered by health funds, yet the same type of procedure carried out by an orthopaedic surgeon is fully covered.

The ACCC would like to examine the effects of such distinction between different providers of the same or similar services and understand whether the distinction is warranted in all cases. I would appreciate your views on the following:

• Examples where allied health care providers offer the same or similar services as other providers and are not recognised by health funds.

• In each instance referred to, whether this lack of recognition is warranted. In particular, are there any regulatory, medical or other reasons for this lack of recognition?

• Whether this lack of recognition places allied health care providers at a competitive disadvantage. If so, how are allied health care providers disadvantaged by the practices of health funds?

• Whether this lack of recognition results in a reduction in the extent of health cover or an increase in the out-of-pocket medical expenses of consumers. If so, what is the detriment or loss suffered by consumers?

Submissions can be made in writing to the ACCC or by email to [email protected] by 21 September 2012.

This year the ACCC will again make submissions available on its website. If your submission is confidential, in part or in full, and you do not wish to have it published please indicate this clearly.

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e Appendix B List of publicly available submissions

Submissions to the ACCC made by the following stakeholders are publicly available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1080161:

Allied Health Professions Australia

Australasian College of Podiatric Surgeons

Australasian Podiatry Council

Australian Association of Social Workers

Australian College of Mental Health Nurses

Australian Dental and Oral Health Therapists’ Association

Australian Dental Association

Australian Dental Prosthetists Association

Australian Diabetes Educators Association

Australian Healthcare & Hospitals Association

Australian Holistic Healers and the Psychotherapy & Counsellor’s Association

Australian Hypnotherapists Association

Australian Medical Association

Australian Orthopaedic Association

Australian Orthotic Prosthetic Association

Australian Physiotherapy Association

Australian Psychological Society

Australian Society of Anaesthetists

Australian Society of Orthodontists

Australian Society of Orthopaedic Surgeons

Australian Society of Plastic Surgeons

Birthrites: Healing after Caesarean

Catholic Health Australia

Clinical Perfusionist

Consumers Health Forum of Australia

Dental Hygienists’ of Association Australia

Department of Health and Ageing

Dieticians Association of Australia

GMHBA

HBF

HCF

Heinrich Benz, Individual

hirmaa

Hypnotherapy Council of Australia

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Medibank

Medical Technology Association of Australia

Mental Health Council of Australia

Mike Whitburn, Perfusionist

Nikilee Tasker, Individual

Occupational Therapist

Occupational Therapy Australia

Optometrists Association Australia

Oral Health Therapist

Private Health Insurance Ombudsman

Professional Hypnotists of Western Australia Inc.

Professor Leonie Short, CQUniversity

Psychotherapy and Counselling Federation of Australia

Sentiens Psychiatric Clinic

Society of Hospital Pharmacists of Australia

Therese Cameron, Diabetes Educator

Veronica Mills, Diabetes Educator

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e Appendix C List of allied healthcare providers identified in submissions as not recognised

Service Recognised provider Not recognised provider

Nutrition services Nutritionist * Accredited Practicing Dietician +

Foot orthoses Podiatrist * Orthotist and Prosthetist +Orthoses Physiotherapists and

Chiropractor*Orthotist and Prosthetist +

Upper limb orthoses Orthotist + Occupational Therapist + Physiotherapist *

Upper limb orthoses Occupational Therapist + Orthotist and Prosthetist +Hand splint and orthoses Orthotist + Occupational Therapist +

Physiotherapist * Hand splint and orthoses Physiotherapist * Occupational Therapist +Focused psychological strategies

Clinical Psychologist * General Psychologist and other Specialist Psychologist +

Focused psychological strategies

Clinical Psychologist * Psychotherapist and Counsellor +

Focused psychological strategies

Clinical Psychologist * Social Worker, Mental Health Nurse and Mental Health Occupational Therapist +

Hypnotherapy Psychotherapist, Counsellor and Psychologist +

Clinical hypnotherapist +

Foot and ankle surgery Orthopaedic Surgeon, Plastic Surgeon, General Surgeon √

Podiatric Surgeon *

Preventative and operative dental services

Dentists and Dental Specialist √

Dental Hygienist, Dental Therapist and Oral Health Therapist ≠

Dental prosthetic services for implant retained overdentures

Dentists and Dental Specialist √

Dental Prosthetist *

Operation of heart/lung bypass machine

Medical Perfusionist √ Clinical Perfusionist ≠

Low risk birth procedures Obstetrician √ Midwife ≠Diabetes education, monitoring and advice

Accredited Practicing Dietician *

Registered Nurse—Credentialed Diabetes Educator +

Radiological services Radiologist * Chiropractor +Standard diabetes foot assessment

Podiatrist * Credentialed Diabetes Educator +

Note: In submissions to the ACCC various stakeholders claimed that insurers did not recognise any of the allied healthcare providers listed in this table. However, following consultation with insurers and sampling of PHI products available in the market, the ACCC found that insurers generally recognise all, most or some of the services supplied by the healthcare provider depending on their products offerings.

√ All insurers recognise all services supplied by the healthcare provider

≠ All insurers recognise all service supplied by the healthcare provider but do not allow for direct billing

* Most insurers recognise most service supplied by the healthcare provider

+ Some insurers recognise some service supplied by the healthcare provider

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ACCC contactsACCC Infocentre: business and consumer inquiries: 1300 302 502

Website: www.accc.gov.au

Translating and Interpreting Service: call 13 1450 and ask for 1300 302 502

TTY users phone: 1300 303 609

Speak and Listen users phone 1300 555 727 and ask for 1300 302 502

Internet relay users connect to the NRS (see www.relayservice.com.au and ask for 1300 302 502)

ACCC addressesNational office

23 Marcus Clarke Street Canberra ACT 2601

GPO Box 3131 Canberra ACT 2601

Tel: 02 6243 1111 Fax: 02 6243 1199

New South Wales

Level 20, 175 Pitt Street Sydney NSW 2000

GPO Box 3648 Sydney NSW 2001

Tel: 02 9230 9133 Fax: 02 9223 1092

Victoria

Level 35, The Tower 360 Elizabeth Street

Melbourne Central Melbourne Vic 3000

GPO Box 520 Melbourne Vic 3001

Tel: 03 9290 1800 Fax: 03 9663 3699

Queensland

Brisbane

Level 24, 400 George Street Brisbane Qld 4000

PO Box 12241 George Street Post Shop Brisbane Qld 4003

Tel: 07 3835 4666 Fax: 07 3835 4653

Townsville

Suite 2, Level 9 Suncorp Plaza 61–63 Sturt Street Townsville Qld 4810

PO Box 2016 Townsville Qld 4810

Tel: 07 4729 2666 Fax: 07 4721 1538

South Australia

Level 2, 19 Grenfell Street Adelaide SA 5000

GPO Box 922 Adelaide SA 5001

Tel: 08 8213 3444 Fax: 08 8410 4155

Western Australia

3rd floor, East Point Plaza 233 Adelaide Terrace

Perth WA 6000 PO Box 6381 East Perth WA 6892

Tel: 08 9325 0600 Fax: 08 9325 5976

Northern Territory

Level 8, National Mutual Centre 9−11 Cavenagh St Darwin NT 0800

GPO Box 3056 Darwin NT 0801

Tel: 08 8946 9666 Fax: 08 8946 9600

Tasmania

Level 2, 70 Collins Street Cnr Collins and Argyle Streets Hobart Tas 7000

GPO Box 1210 Hobart Tas 7001

Tel: 03 6215 9333 Fax: 03 6234 7796