ReportOnTheInvestigationIntoRussianInterferenceInThe2016

PresidentialElection

VolumeIofII

SpecialCounselRobertS.Mueller,III

SubmittedPursuantto28C.F.R.§600.8(c)

Washington,D.C.

March2019

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Version1.6

NOTETOREADER

The redacted version of the Report On The Investigation into RussianInterference In The 2016 Presidential Election, colloquially known as the“Mueller Report”, was released on the 18th of April 2019 by US AttorneyGeneralWilliamBarr.TheofficialPDFversionofthisdocumentcontains2,390footnotes (including3,355specific references),spreadacross twovolumesandfourappendices.Ofthesereferences,only14arehyperlinkedURLsleadingtolivewebpages.ThisannotatedEPUBversionof theMuellerReportaddressesthis problemwith over 740 hyperlinked citations, including over 100 links toJustice.gov,80linkstoTwitter.comand50linkstoC-span.orgtotalingover700linkstotheoriginalsourcescited.Inanattempttoaddcontextualizationtothereportwehaveaddedlinkstoresourcesnotdirectlycited,thesearedenotedwiththemessage ‘InternetArchiveEditor’sNote (IAEN)’. Inaneffort toeliminatelinkrotandcontentdriftweareusingWaybackMachineURLsorArchive.orgitemsinallcases.While the loadingofcontentfromarchival links is typicallyslowerthanfromthe“liveweb”theInternetArchivebelievesintegrityismoreimportantthanspeed.

This annotated version is not all-encompassing at this time. For example,many cited tweets are unavailable on either the live web or the InternetArchive’sWaybackMachine.Wherea reference isunavailable to thepublic itwas left un-linked. As more information is released, and as redactions arerevealed,weintendtoupdatethisannotatedversion.

TABLEOFCONTENTS–VOLUMEIINTRODUCTIONTOVOLUMEIEXECUTIVESUMMARYTOVOLUMEI

I.THESPECIALCOUNSEL’SINVESTIGATIONII.RUSSIAN“ACTIVEMEASURES”SOCIALMEDIACAMPAIGN

A.StructureoftheInternetResearchAgencyB.FundingandOversightfromConcordandPrigozhinC.TheIRATargetsU.S.Elections

1.TheIRARampsUpU.S.OperationsAsEarlyAs20142.U.S.OperationsThroughIRA-ControlledSocialMediaAccounts3.U.S.OperationsThroughFacebook4.U.S.OperationsThroughTwitter

a.IndividualizedAccountsb.IRABotnetActivities

5.U.S.OperationsInvolvingPoliticalRallies6.TargetingandRecruitmentofU.S.Persons7.InteractionsandContactswiththeTrumpCampaign

a.TrumpCampaignPromotionofIRAPoliticalMaterialsb.ContactwithTrumpCampaignOfficialsinConnectiontoRallies

III.RUSSIANHACKINGANDDUMPINGOPERATIONS

A.GRUHackingDirectedattheClintonCampaign1.GRUUnitsTargettheClintonCampaign2.IntrusionsintotheDCCCandDNCNetworks

a.InitialAccessb.ImplantationofMalwareonDCCCandDNCNetworksc.TheftofDocumentsfromDNCandDCCCNetworks

B.DisseminationoftheHackedMaterials1.DCLeaks2.Guccifer2.03.UseofWikiLeaks

a.WikiLeaks’sExpressedOppositionTowardtheClintonCampaignb.WikiLeaks’sFirstContactwithGuccifer2.0andDCLeaksc.TheGRU’sTransferofStolenMaterialstoWikiLeaksd.WikiLeaksStatementsDissemblingAbouttheSourceofStolenMaterials

C.AdditionalGRUCyberOperations

1.SummerandFall2016OperationsTargetingDemocrat-LinkedVictims2.IntrusionsTargetingtheAdministrationofU.S.Elections

D.TrumpCampaignandtheDisseminationofHackedMaterials1.HOM████

a.Backgroundb.ContactswiththeCampaignaboutWikiLeaksc.HarmtoOngoingMatter████d.WikiLeaks’sOctober7,2016ReleaseofStolenPodestaEmailse.DonaldTrumpJr.InteractionwithWikiLeaks

2.OtherPotentialCampaignInterestinRussianHackedMaterialsa.HenryOknyansky(a/k/aHenryGreenberg)b.CampaignEffortstoObtainDeletedClintonEmails

IV.RUSSIANGOVERNMENTLINKSTOANDCONTACTSWITHTHETRUMPCAMPAIGN

A.CampaignPeriod(September2015–November8,2016)1.TrumpTowerMoscowProject

a.TrumpTowerMoscowVenturewiththeCrocusGroup(2013-2014)b.CommunicationswithI.C.ExpertInvestmentCompanyandGiorgiRtskhiladze

(SummerandFall2015)c.LetterofIntentandContactstoRussianGovernment(October2015-January2016)

i.TrumpSignstheLetterofIntentonbehalfoftheTrumpOrganizationii.Post-LOIContactswithIndividualsinRussia

d.DiscussionsaboutRussiaTravelbyMichaelCohenorCandidateTrump(December2015-June2016)

i.Sater’sOverturestoCohentoTraveltoRussiaii.CandidateTrump’sOpportunitiestoTraveltoRussia

2.GeorgePapadopoulosa.OriginsofCampaignWorkb.InitialRussia-RelatedContactsc.March31ForeignPolicyTeamMeetingd.GeorgePapadopoulosLearnsThatRussiaHas“Dirt”intheFormofClintonEmailse.Russia-RelatedCommunicationsWithTheCampaignf.TrumpCampaignKnowledgeof“Dirt”g.AdditionalGeorgePapadopoulosContact

3.CarterPagea.Backgroundb.OriginsofandEarlyCampaignWorkc.CarterPage’sJuly2016TripToMoscowd.LaterCampaignWorkandRemovalfromtheCampaign

4.DimitriSimesandtheCenterfortheNationalInteresta.CNIandDimitriSimesConnectwiththeTrumpCampaignb.NationalInterestHostsaForeignPolicySpeechattheMayflowerHotelc.JeffSessions’sPost-SpeechInteractionswithCNId.JaredKushner’sContinuingContactswithSimes

5.June9,2016MeetingatTrumpTowera.SettingUptheJune9Meeting

i.OutreachtoDonaldTrumpJrii.AwarenessoftheMeetingWithintheCampaign

b.TheEventsofJune9,2016i.ArrangementsfortheMeetingii.ConductoftheMeeting

c.Post-June9Events6.EventsattheRepublicanNationalConvention

a.AmbassadorKislyak’sEncounterswithSenatorSessionsandJ.D.GordontheWeekoftheRNC

b.ChangetoRepublicanPartyPlatform7.Post-ConventionContactswithKislyak

a.AmbassadorKislyakInvitesJ.D.GordontoBreakfastattheAmbassador’sResidenceb.SenatorSessions’sSeptember2016MeetingwithAmbassadorKislyak

8.PaulManaforta.PaulManafort’sTiestoRussiaandUkraine

i.OlegDeripaskaConsultingWorkii.PoliticalConsultingWorkiii.KonstantinKilimnik

b.ContactsduringPaulManafort’sTimewiththeTrumpCampaigni.PaulManafortJoinstheCampaignii.PaulManafort’sCampaign-PeriodContactsiii.PaulManafort’sTwoCampaign-PeriodMeetingswithKonstantinKilimnikin

theUnitedStatesc.Post-ResignationActivities

B.Post-ElectionandTransition-PeriodContacts

1.ImmediatePost-ElectionActivitya.OutreachfromtheRussianGovernmenb.High-LevelEncouragementofContactsthroughAlternativeChannels

2.KirillDmitriev’sTransition-EraOutreachtotheIncomingAdministrationa.Backgroundb.KirillDmitriev’sPost-ElectionContactsWiththeIncomingAdministrationc.ErikPrinceandKirillDmitrievMeetintheSeychelles

i.GeorgeNaderandErikPrinceArrangeSeychellesMeetingwithDmitrievii.TheSeychellesMeetingsiii.ErikPrince’sMeetingwithSteveBannonaftertheSeychellesTrip

d.KirillDmitriev’sPost-ElectionContactwithRickGersonRegardingU.S.-RussiaRelations

3.AmbassadorKislyak’sMeetingwithJaredKushnerandMichaelFlynninTrumpTowerFollowingtheElection

4.JaredKushner’sMeetingwithSergeyGorkov5.PetrAven’sOutreachEffortstotheTransitionTeam6.CarterPageContactwithDeputyPrimeMinisterArkadyDvorkovich7.ContactsWithandThroughMichaelT.Flynn

a.UnitedNationsVoteonIsraeliSettlementsb.U.S.SanctionsAgainstRussia

V.PROSECUTIONANDDECLINATIONDECISIONS

A.Russian“ActiveMeasures”SocialMediaCampaignB.RussianHackingandDumpingOperations

1.Section1030Computer-IntrusionConspiracya.Backgroundb.ChargingDecisionAstoHarmtoOngoingMatter████

2.PotentialSection1030ViolationByPersonalPrivacy████C.RussianGovernmentOutreachandContacts

1.PotentialCoordination:ConspiracyandCollusion2.PotentialCoordination:ForeignAgentStatutes(FARAand18U.S.C.§951)

a.GoverningLawb.Application

3.CampaignFinancea.OverviewOfGoverningLawb.ApplicationtoJune9TrumpTowerMeeting

i.Thing-of-ValueElementii.Willfulnessiii.DifficultiesinValuingPromisedInformation

c.ApplicationtoWikiLeaksHOM████i.QuestionsOverHarmtoOngoingMatter████ii.Willfulnessiii.ConstitutionalConsiderationsiv.AnalysisHOM████

4.FalseStatementsandObstructionoftheInvestigationa.OverviewOfGoverningLaw

b.ApplicationtoCertainIndividualsi.GeorgePapadopoulosii.PersonalPrivacy████iii.MichaelFlynniv.MichaelCohenv.HOM████vi.JeffSessionsvii.OthersInterviewedDuringtheInvestigation

INTRODUCTIONTOVOLUMEI

This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §600.8(c),whichstates that,“[a]t theconclusionof theSpecialCounsel’swork,he . . . shall provide theAttorneyGeneral a confidential report explaining theprosecutionordeclinationdecisions[theSpecialCounsel]reached.”

The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election insweeping and systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operationsbegantosurfaceinmid-2016.InJune,theDemocraticNationalCommitteeandits cyber response team publicly announced that Russian hackers hadcompromised its computer network. Releases of hackedmaterials—hacks thatpublic reporting soon attributed to the Russian government—began that samemonth.AdditionalreleasesfollowedinJulythroughtheorganizationWikiLeaks,withfurtherreleasesinOctoberandNovember.

InlateJuly2016,soonafterWikiLeaks’sfirstreleaseofstolendocuments,aforeigngovernmentcontactedtheFBIaboutaMay2016encounterwithTrumpCampaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos hadsuggested to a representative of that foreign government that the TrumpCampaignhad received indications from theRussiangovernment that it couldassisttheCampaignthroughtheanonymousreleaseofinformationdamagingtoDemocratic presidential candidateHillary Clinton. That information promptedthe FBI on July 31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individualsassociated with the Trump Campaign were coordinating with the Russiangovernmentinitsinterferenceactivities.

That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russiangovernment “directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons andinstitutions, including US political organizations,” and, “[t]hese thefts anddisclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process.” After theelection,inlateDecember2016,theUnitedStatesimposedsanctionsonRussiafor having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressionalcommitteeswereexaminingRussia’sinterferenceintheelection.

WithintheExecutiveBranch,theseinvestigatoryeffortsultimatelyledtotheMay 2017 appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The orderappointing the Special Counsel authorized him to investigate “the Russiangovernment’seffortstointerfereinthe2016presidentialelection,”includingany

links or coordination between the Russian government and individualsassociatedwiththeTrumpCampaign.

As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel’s investigationestablished that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election principallythrough two operations. First, a Russian entity carried out a social mediacampaign that favored presidential candidateDonald J. Trump and disparagedpresidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian intelligence serviceconducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, andvolunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolendocuments. The investigation also identified numerous links between theRussian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigationestablished that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from aTrumppresidency andworked to secure that outcome, and that theCampaignexpected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and releasedthroughRussianefforts, theinvestigationdidnotestablishthatmembersoftheTrumpCampaignconspiredorcoordinatedwith theRussiangovernment in itselectioninterferenceactivities.

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Belowwedescribe the evidentiary considerationsunderpinning statementsabout the results of our investigation and the Special Counsel’s chargingdecisions,andwethenprovideanoverviewofthetwovolumesofourreport.

The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel’s Officefound to be supported by the evidence collected in our investigation. In someinstances, the report points out the absence of evidence or conflicts in theevidence about a particular fact or event. In other instances,when substantial,credibleevidenceenabledtheOfficetoreachaconclusionwithconfidence,thereport states that the investigation established that certain actions or eventsoccurred.Astatementthattheinvestigationdidnotestablishparticularfactsdoesnotmeantherewasnoevidenceofthosefacts.

In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multipleindividualsconstitutedacrime,weappliedtheframeworkofconspiracylaw,notthe concept of “collusion.” In so doing, the Office recognized that the word“collud[e]” was used in communications with the Acting Attorney General

confirming certain aspects of the investigation’s scope and that the term hasfrequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. ButcollusionisnotaspecificoffenseortheoryofliabilityfoundintheUnitedStatesCode, nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. For those reasons, theOffice’s focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability was onconspiracy as defined in federal law. In connection with that analysis, weaddressed the factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign“coordinat[ed]”—a term that appears in the appointment order—with Russianelection interference activities. Like collusion, “coordination” does not have asettleddefinitioninfederalcriminallaw.Weunderstoodcoordinationtorequireanagreement—tacitorexpress—betweentheTrumpCampaignandtheRussiangovernment on election interference. That requires more than the two partiestaking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other’s actions orinterests. We applied the term coordination in that sense when stating in thereport that the investigation did not establish that the Trump CampaigncoordinatedwiththeRussiangovernmentinitselectioninterferenceactivities.

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Thereportonourinvestigationconsistsoftwovolumes:

VolumeIdescribesthefactualresultsoftheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigationofRussia’sinterferenceinthe2016presidentialelectionanditsinteractionswiththeTrumpCampaign.SectionIdescribesthescopeoftheinvestigation.SectionsIIandIIIdescribetheprincipalwaysRussiainterferedinthe2016presidentialelection. Section IV describes links between the Russian government andindividuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth theSpecialCounsel’schargingdecisions.

VolumeIIaddresses thePresident’sactions towards theFBI’s investigationintoRussia’s interference in the2016presidential electionand relatedmatters,andhisactionstowardstheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigation.VolumeIIseparatelystatesitsframeworkandtheconsiderationsthatguidedthatinvestigation.

EXECUTIVESUMMARYTOVOLUMEI

RUSSIANSOCIALMEDIACAMPAIGN

The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russianinterferenceoperationsidentifiedbytheinvestigation—asocialmediacampaigndesigned to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the UnitedStates.TheIRAwasbasedinSt.Petersburg,Russia,andreceivedfundingfromRussianoligarchYevgeniyPrigozhinandcompanieshecontrolled.PrigozhiniswidelyreportedtohavetiestoRussianPresidentVladimirPutin,███HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████

Inmid-2014, the IRA sent employees toUnitedStates on an intelligence-gatheringmissionwithinstructionsHarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

TheIRAlaterusedsocialmediaaccountsandinterestgroupstosowdiscordin theU.S.politicalsystemthroughwhat it termed“informationwarfare.”Thecampaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 tounderminetheU.S.electoralsystem,toatargetedoperationthatbyearly2016favoredcandidateTrumpanddisparagedcandidateClinton.TheIRA’soperationalso included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in thenames of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political ralliesinsidetheUnitedStates.Toorganizethoserallies,IRAemployeesposedasU.S.grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters andTrump Campaign officials in the United States. The investigation did notidentifyevidencethatanyU.S.personsconspiredorcoordinatedwiththeIRA.Section IIof this reportdetails theOffice’s investigationof theRussian socialmediacampaign.

RUSSIANHACKINGOPERATIONS

At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on supportingcandidate Trump in early 2016, the Russian government employed a second

formofinterference:cyberintrusions(hacking)andreleasesofhackedmaterialsdamagingtotheClintonCampaign.TheRussianintelligenceserviceknownasthe Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army(GRU)carriedouttheseoperations.

In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of ClintonCampaign volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman JohnPodesta. In April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of theDemocratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and theDemocraticNational Committee (DNC). The GRU stole hundreds of thousands ofdocuments from the compromised email accounts and networks. Around thetimethattheDNCannouncedinmid-June2016theRussiangovernment’sroleinhacking itsnetwork, theGRUbegandisseminating stolenmaterials throughthe fictitious online personas “DCLeaks” and “Guccifer 2.0.” The GRU laterreleasedadditionalmaterialsthroughtheorganizationWikiLeaks.

The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (“Trump Campaign” or“Campaign”) showed interest in WikiLeaks’s releases of documents andwelcomedtheirpotentialtodamagecandidateClinton.BeginninginJune2016,HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████ █ █ forecast to senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would releaseinformation damaging to candidate Clinton.WikiLeaks’s first release came inJuly 2016.Around the same time, candidate Trump announced that he hopedRussiawouldrecoveremailsdescribedasmissingfromaprivateserverusedbyClinton when she was Secretary of State (he later said that he was speakingsarcastically).HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████WikiLeaksbeganreleasingPodesta’sstolenemailsonOctober7,2016,lessthanonehourafteraU.S.mediaoutlet releasedvideoconsidereddamaging tocandidateTrump.SectionIIIofthisReportdetailstheOffice’sinvestigationintothe Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump CampaignsupporterstoobtainClinton-relatedemails.

RUSSIANCONTACTSWITHTHECAMPAIGN

ThesocialmediacampaignandtheGRUhackingoperationscoincidedwithaseriesofcontactsbetweenTrumpCampaignofficialsandindividualswithtiesto the Russian government. The Office investigated whether those contacts

reflectedorresultedintheCampaignconspiringorcoordinatingwithRussiainitselection-interferenceactivities.AlthoughtheinvestigationestablishedthattheRussian government perceived itwould benefit from a Trump presidency andworkedtosecurethatoutcome,andthattheCampaignexpecteditwouldbenefitelectorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, theinvestigationdidnotestablishthatmembersoftheTrumpCampaignconspiredor coordinated with the Russian government in its election interferenceactivities.

TheRussiancontactsconsistedofbusinessconnections,offersofassistanceto theCampaign, invitations forcandidateTrumpandPutin tomeet inperson,invitationsforCampaignofficialsandrepresentativesoftheRussiangovernmenttomeet,andpolicypositionsseekingimprovedU.S.-Russianrelations.SectionIVofthisReportdetailsthecontactsbetweenRussiaandtheTrumpCampaignduring the campaign and transition periods, the most salient of which aresummarizedbelowinchronologicalorder.

2015.SomeoftheearliestcontactsweremadeinconnectionwithaTrumpOrganization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow.Candidate Trump signed a Letter of Intent for Trump Tower Moscow byNovember 2015, and in January 2016 TrumpOrganization executiveMichaelCohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of RussiangovernmentpresssecretaryDmitryPeskov.TheTrumpOrganizationpursuedtheprojectthroughatleastJune2016,includingbyconsideringtraveltoRussiabyCohenandcandidateTrump.

Spring2016.CampaignforeignpolicyadvisorGeorgePapadopoulosmadeearly contact with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who hadconnectionstoRussiaandtraveledtoMoscowinApril2016.ImmediatelyuponhisreturntoLondonfromthattrip,MifsudtoldPapadopoulosthattheRussiangovernment had “dirt” onHillaryClinton in the form of thousands of emails.Oneweek later, in the first week ofMay 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to arepresentativeofa foreigngovernment that theTrumpCampaignhad receivedindications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaignthrough the anonymous release of informationdamaging to candidateClinton.Throughoutthatperiodoftimeandforseveralmonthsthereafter,PapadopoulosworkedwithMifsudandtwoRussiannationalstoarrangeameetingbetweentheCampaignandtheRussiangovernment.Nomeetingtookplace.

Summer2016.RussianoutreachtotheTrumpCampaigncontinuedintothesummerof2016,ascandidateTrumpwasbecomingthepresumptiveRepublicannomineeforPresident.OnJune9,2016,forexample,aRussianlawyermetwithsenior Trump Campaign officials Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, andcampaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing themeeting had described as “official documents and information that wouldincriminateHillary.”ThematerialswereofferedtoTrumpJr.as“partofRussiaand its government’s support for Mr. Trump.” The written communicationssetting up the meeting showed that the Campaign anticipated receivinginformationfromRussiathatcouldassistcandidateTrump’selectoralprospects,buttheRussianlawyer’spresentationdidnotprovidesuchinformation.

Daysafter theJune9meeting,onJune14,2016,acybersecurityfirmandtheDNCannounced thatRussiangovernmenthackershad infiltrated theDNCand obtained access to opposition research on candidate Trump, among otherdocuments.

In July2016,Campaign foreignpolicyadvisorCarterPage traveled inhispersonal capacity to Moscow and gave the keynote address at the NewEconomicSchool.PagehadlivedandworkedinRussiabetween2003and2007.After returning to theUnitedStates,Pagebecameacquaintedwithat least twoRussian intelligence officers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 withconspiracy to act as an unregistered agent ofRussia. Page’s July 2016 trip toMoscowandhisadvocacyforpro-Russianforeignpolicydrewmediaattention.The Campaign then distanced itself from Page and, by late September 2016,removedhimfromtheCampaign.

July2016wasalsothemonthWikiLeaksfirstreleasedemailsstolenbytheGRUfromtheDNC.OnJuly22,2016,WikiLeakspostedthousandsofinternalDNC documents revealing information about the Clinton Campaign. Withindays, there was public reporting that U.S. intelligence agencies had “highconfidence” that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails anddocuments from the DNC. And within a week of the release, a foreigngovernmentinformedtheFBIaboutitsMay2016interactionwithPapadopoulosand his statement that the Russian government could assist the TrumpCampaign.On July 31, 2016, based on the foreign government reporting, theFBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the RussiangovernmentandindividualsassociatedwiththeTrumpCampaign.

Separately, onAugust 2, 2016, Trump campaign chairman PaulManafortmet in New York City with his long-time business associate KonstantinKilimnik,who the FBI assesses to have ties toRussian intelligence.Kilimnikrequested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine thatManafortacknowledgedtotheSpecialCounsel’sOfficewasa“backdoor”wayforRussiatocontrolpartofeasternUkraine;bothmenbelievedtheplanwouldrequirecandidateTrump’sassent to succeed (werehe tobeelectedPresident).TheyalsodiscussedthestatusoftheTrumpCampaignandManafort’sstrategyforwinningDemocraticvotesinMidwesternstates.Monthsbeforethatmeeting,Manaforthadcaused internalpollingdata tobe sharedwithKilimnik, and thesharingcontinuedforsomeperiodoftimeaftertheirAugustmeeting.

Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidateTrump speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier, which wasconsidereddamagingtohiscandidacy.Lessthananhourlater,WikiLeaksmadeits second release: thousandsof JohnPodesta’s emails thathadbeen stolenbytheGRU in lateMarch2016.TheFBI andotherU.S. government institutionswereatthetimecontinuingtheirinvestigationofsuspectedRussiangovernmentefforts to interfere in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, theDepartment of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of NationalIntelligence issued a joint public statement “that the Russian Governmentdirected the recent compromises of e-mails fromUS persons and institutions,includingfromUSpoliticalorganizations.”Those“thefts”andthe“disclosures”of the hacked materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, thestatementcontinued,“areintendedtointerferewiththeUSelectionprocess.”

Post-2016Election. Immediately after the November 8 election, RussiangovernmentofficialsandprominentRussianbusinessmenbegantryingtomakeinroads into the new administration. The most senior levels of the Russiangovernmentencouragedtheseefforts.TheRussianEmbassymadecontacthoursafter theelection tocongratulate thePresident-Elect and toarrangeacallwithPresidentPutin.SeveralRussianbusinessmenpickeduptheeffortfromthere.

Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive officer of Russia’s sovereign wealthfund, was among the Russians who tried to make contact with the incomingadministration.InearlyDecember,abusinessassociatesteeredDmitrievtoErikPrince, a supporter of theTrumpCampaign and an associate of seniorTrumpadvisor Steve Bannon. Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in January2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same

period, another business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of JaredKushnerwhohadnotservedontheCampaignortheTransitionTeam.DmitrievandKushner’sfriendcollaboratedonashortwrittenreconciliationplanfor theUnited States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied had been cleared throughPutin. The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, andKushner later gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State RexTillerson.

OnDecember29,2016,then-PresidentObamaimposedsanctionsonRussiafor having interfered in the election. Incoming National Security AdvisorMichaelFlynncalledRussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyakandaskedRussianotto escalate the situation in response to the sanctions.The followingday,Putinannounced that Russiawould not take retaliatorymeasures in response to thesanctionsatthattime.Hourslater,President-ElectTrumptweeted,“Greatmoveon delay (byV. Putin).”The next day, onDecember 31, 2016,Kislyak calledFlynnandtoldhimtherequesthadbeenreceivedatthehighestlevelsandRussiahadchosennottoretaliateasaresultofFlynn’srequest.

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On January 6, 2017, members of the intelligence community briefedPresident-Elect Trump on a joint assessment—drafted and coordinated amongthe Central Intelligence Agency, FBI, and National Security Agency—thatconcluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the electionthroughavarietyofmeans toassistTrump’scandidacyandharmClinton’s.Adeclassifiedversionoftheassessmentwaspubliclyreleasedthatsameday.

Between mid-January 2017 and early February 2017, three congressionalcommittees—theHousePermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligence(HPSCI),the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate JudiciaryCommittee(SJC)—announcedthattheywouldconductinquiries,orhadalreadybeen conducting inquiries, intoRussian interference in the election. Then-FBIDirector JamesComey later confirmed toCongress the existence of theFBI’sinvestigation intoRussian interference that had begun before the election.OnMarch20,2017,inopen-sessiontestimonybeforeHPSCI,Comeystated:

I have been authorized by theDepartment of Justice to confirmthat the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is

investigating theRussiangovernment’sefforts to interfere in the2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating thenatureofanylinksbetweenindividualsassociatedwiththeTrumpcampaignandtheRussiangovernmentandwhethertherewasanycoordinationbetween thecampaignandRussia’s efforts. . . .Aswith any counterintelligence investigation, thiswill also includeanassessmentofwhetheranycrimeswerecommitted.

The investigation continued under then-Director Comey for the next sevenweeksuntilMay9,2017,whenPresidentTrumpfiredComeyasFBIDirector—anactionwhichisanalyzedinVolumeIIofthereport.

OnMay17,2017,ActingAttorneyGeneralRodRosensteinappointed theSpecialCounselandauthorizedhimtoconducttheinvestigationthatComeyhadconfirmedinhiscongressionaltestimony,aswellasmattersarisingdirectlyfromtheinvestigation,andanyothermatterswithinthescopeof28C.F.R.§600.4(a),whichgenerallycoverseffortstointerferewithorobstructtheinvestigation.

President Trump reacted negatively to the SpecialCounsel’s appointment.Hetoldadvisorsthat itwastheendofhispresidency,soughttohaveAttorneyGeneralJefferson(Jeff)SessionsunrecusefromtheRussiainvestigationandtohavetheSpecialCounselremoved,andengagedineffortstocurtailtheSpecialCounsel’s investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it, includingthroughpublicandprivatecontactswithpotentialwitnesses.ThoseandrelatedactionsaredescribedandanalyzedinVolumeIIofthereport.

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THESPECIALCOUNSEL’SCHARGINGDECISIONS

InreachingthechargingdecisionsdescribedinVolumeIof thereport, theOffice determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation offederalcriminallawchargeableunderthePrinciplesofFederalProsecution.SeeJusticeManual§9-27.000etseq. (2018).The standard set forth in the JusticeManual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime; if so, whether admissibleevidencewould probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction; andwhetherprosecutionwouldserveasubstantialfederalinterestthatcouldnotbeadequately served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal

alternatives.SeeJusticeManual§9-27.220.

Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office’schargingdecisions,whichcontainthreemaincomponents.

First, the Office determined that Russia’s two principal interferenceoperations in the 2016 U.S. presidential election—the social media campaignandthehacking-and-dumpingoperations—violatedU.S.criminallaw.Manyofthe individuals and entities involved in the social media campaign have beencharged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States byundermining throughdeceptiveacts theworkof federal agencieschargedwithregulating foreign influence in U.S. elections, as well as related counts ofidentitytheft.SeeUnitedStatesv.InternetResearchAgency,etal.,No.18-cr-32(D.D.C.).Separately,Russian intelligenceofficerswhocarriedout thehackingintoDemocraticPartycomputersandthepersonalemailaccountsofindividualsaffiliatedwith theClintonCampaignconspired toviolate, amongother federallaws,thefederalcomputer-intrusionstatute,andtheyhavebeensocharged.SeeUnited States v. Netyksho, et al., No. 18-cr-215 (D.D.C.).Harm to OngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████PersonalPrivacy████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Second, while the investigation identified numerous links betweenindividualswithtiestotheRussiangovernmentandindividualsassociatedwiththe Trump Campaign, the evidence was not sufficient to support criminalcharges. Among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to charge anyCampaignofficialasanunregisteredagentof theRussiangovernmentorotherRussian principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting andWikiLeaks’sreleasesofhackedmaterialswasnotsufficienttochargeacriminalcampaign-finance violation. Further, the evidencewas not sufficient to chargethatanymemberoftheTrumpCampaignconspiredwithrepresentativesoftheRussiangovernmenttointerfereinthe2016election.

Third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated withtheTrumpCampaignliedtotheOffice,andtoCongress,abouttheirinteractionswith Russian-affiliated individuals and related matters. Those lies materiallyimpairedthe investigationofRussianelection interference.TheOfficecharged

someof those lies as violations of the federal false-statements statute. FormerNational Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about hisinteractions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period.George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period,pleadedguiltytolyingtoinvestigatorsabout,interalia,thenatureandtimingofhis interactionswith JosephMifsud, theprofessorwho toldPapadopoulos thattheRussianshaddirtoncandidateClinton in the formof thousandsofemails.FormerTrumpOrganizationattorneyMichaelCohenpleadedguilty tomakingfalse statements to Congress about the Trump Moscow project. Harm toOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████AndinFebruary2019,theU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbiafoundthatManafortliedtotheOfficeand the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications withKonstantinKilimnikaboutTrumpCampaignpollingdataandapeaceplan forUkraine.

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TheOfficeinvestigatedseveralothereventsthathavebeenpubliclyreportedto involve potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigationestablished that interactions betweenRussianAmbassadorKislyak andTrumpCampaignofficialsbothat thecandidate’sApril2016foreignpolicyspeech inWashington,D.C.,andduringtheweekoftheRepublicanNationalConventionwerebrief,public,andnon-substantive.Andthe investigationdidnotestablishthatoneCampaignofficial’sefforts todiluteaportionof theRepublicanPartyplatform on providing assistance toUkrainewere undertaken at the behest ofcandidate Trump or Russia. The investigation also did not establish that ameetingbetweenKislyakandSessionsinSeptember2016atSessions’sSenateofficeincludedanymorethanapassingmentionofthepresidentialcampaign.

Theinvestigationdidnotalwaysyieldadmissibleinformationortestimony,or a complete picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of theinvestigation. Some individuals invoked their Fifth Amendment right againstcompelledself-incriminationandwerenot,intheOffice’sjudgment,appropriatecandidates for grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of otherwitnesses and information—such as information known to attorneys orindividuals claiming to be members of the media—in light of internal

Department of Justice policies.See,e.g., JusticeManual §§ 9-13.400, 13.410.Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, waspresumptivelycoveredbylegalprivilegeandwasscreenedfrominvestigatorsbya filter (or “taint”) team. Even when individuals testified or agreed to beinterviewed,theysometimesprovidedinformationthatwasfalseorincomplete,leadingtosomeofthefalse-statementschargesdescribedabove.AndtheOfficefaced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as well—numerouswitnessesandsubjectslivedabroad,anddocumentswereheldoutsidetheUnitedStates.

Further, theOffice learned that someof the individualswe interviewedorwhose conduct we investigated—including some associated with the TrumpCampaign—deleted relevant communications or communicated during therelevantperiodusingapplicationsthatfeatureencryptionorthatdonotprovidefor long-term retention of data or communications records. In such cases, theOffice was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison tocontemporaneouscommunicationsor fullyquestionwitnessesaboutstatementsthatappearedinconsistentwithotherknownfacts.

Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinationsthat the Office believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extentpossible, given these identifiedgaps, theOffice cannot ruleout thepossibilitythattheunavailableinformationwouldshedadditionallighton(orcastinanewlight)theeventsdescribedinthereport.

I.THESPECIALCOUNSEL’SINVESTIGATIONOn May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein—then

serving asActingAttorneyGeneral for theRussia investigation following therecusalofformerAttorneyGeneralJeffSessionsonMarch2,2016—appointedthe Special Counsel “to investigate Russian interference with the 2016presidential election and related matters.” Office of the Deputy Att’y Gen.,OrderNo. 3915-2017,Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate RussianInterferencewith the2016PresidentialElectionandRelatedMatters,May17,2017) (“AppointmentOrder”).Relyingon“theauthorityvested” in theActingAttorney General, “including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, and 515,” the ActingAttorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel “in order todischarge[theActingAttorneyGeneral’s] responsibility toprovidesupervisionandmanagementoftheDepartmentofJustice,andtoensureafullandthoroughinvestigation of the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016presidential election.” Appointment Order (introduction). “The SpecialCounsel,”theOrderstated,“isauthorizedtoconducttheinvestigationconfirmedbythen-FBIDirectorJamesB.ComeyintestimonybeforetheHousePermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceonMarch20,2017,”including:

i. anylinksand/orcoordinationbetweentheRussiangovernmentandindividualsassociatedwiththecampaignofPresidentDonaldTrump;and

ii. anymattersthataroseormayarisedirectlyfromtheinvestigation;andiii. anyothermatterswithinthescopeof28C.F.R.§600.4(a).

Appointment Order ¶ (b). Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel “theauthoritytoinvestigateandprosecutefederalcrimescommittedinthecourseof,and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel’s investigation, such asperjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation ofwitnesses.”28C.F.R.§600.4(a).Theauthoritytoinvestigate“anymattersthatarose . . .directly fromthe investigation,”AppointmentOrder¶ (b)(ii),coverssimilarcrimesthatmayhaveoccurredduringthecourseoftheFBI’sconfirmedinvestigationbeforetheSpecialCounsel’sappointment.“IftheSpecialCounselbelieves it is necessary and appropriate,” the Order further provided, “theSpecial Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from theinvestigationof thesematters.” Id. ¶ (c). Finally, theActingAttorneyGeneralmade applicable “Sections 600.4 through 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code ofFederalRegulations.”Id.¶(d).

The Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the SpecialCounsel’s investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda. AmemorandumdatedAugust2,2017,explainedthattheAppointmentOrderhadbeen “worded categorically in order to permit its public release withoutconfirming specific investigations involving specific individuals.” It thenconfirmedthattheSpecialCounselhadbeenauthorizedsincehisappointmenttoinvestigate allegations that threeTrump campaign officials—Carter Page, PaulManafort, and George Papadopoulos—“committed a crime or crimes bycolluding with Russian government officials with respect to the Russiangovernment’s efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.” Thememorandum also confirmed the Special Counsel’s authority to investigatecertain other matters, including two additional sets of allegations involvingManafort (crimes arising from payments he received from the Ukrainiangovernment and crimes arising from his receipt of loans from a bank whoseCEOwasthenseekingapositionintheTrumpAdministration);allegationsthatPapadopouloscommittedacrimeorcrimesbyactingasanunregisteredagentoftheIsraeligovernment;andfoursetsofallegationsinvolvingMichaelFlynn,theformerNationalSecurityAdvisortoPresidentTrump.

On October 20, 2017, the Acting Attorney General confirmed in amemorandum the Special Counsel’s investigative authority as to severalindividualsandentities.First,“aspartofafullandthoroughinvestigationoftheRussiangovernment’sefforts tointerfereinthe2016presidentialelection,”theSpecial Counsel was authorized to investigate “the pertinent activities ofMichaelCohen,RichardGates,PersonalPrivacy███,RogerStone,andPP██ █ █ █ █ █ █ █” “Confirmation of the authorization to investigate suchindividuals,” the memorandum stressed, “does not suggest that the SpecialCounsel hasmade a determination that any of them has committed a crime.”Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized theSpecial Counsel’s authority to investigate “leads relate[d] to Cohen’sestablishmentanduseofEssentialConsultantsLLCto,interalia,receivefundsfrom Russian-backed entities.” Third, the memorandum memorialized theSpecial Counsel’s authority to investigate individuals and entities who werepossibly engaged in “jointly undertaken activity”with existing subjects of theinvestigation, includingPaulManafort. Finally, thememorandumdescribed anFBI investigation opened before the Special Counsel’s appointment into“allegationsthat[then-AttorneyGeneralJeffSessions]madefalsestatementstotheUnited States Senate[,]” and confirmed the Special Counsel’s authority toinvestigatethatmatter.

TheSpecialCounsel structured the investigation inviewofhispowerandauthority“toexerciseallinvestigativeandprosecutorialfunctionsofanyUnitedStatesAttorney.”28C.F.R.§600.6.LikeaU.S.Attorney’sOffice, theSpecialCounsel’sOffice considered a range of classified and unclassified informationavailable to theFBI in thecourseof theOffice’sRussia investigation,and theOfficestructuredthatworkaroundevidenceforpossibleuseinprosecutionsoffederalcrimes(assumingthatoneormorecrimeswereidentifiedthatwarrantedprosecution). There was substantial evidence immediately available to theSpecialCounsel at the inceptionof the investigation inMay2017because theFBI had, by that time, already investigated Russian election interference fornearly10months.TheSpecialCounsel’sOfficeexerciseditsjudgmentregardingwhattoinvestigateanddidnot,forinstance,investigateeverypublicreportofacontact between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals andentities.

The Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordinationbetween the Russian government and individuals associated with the TrumpCampaign. Certain proceedings associated with the Office’s work remainongoing.AfterconsultationwiththeOfficeoftheDeputyAttorneyGeneral,theOffice has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to othercomponents of the Department of Justice and FBI. Appendix D lists thosetransfers.

TwodistrictcourtsconfirmedthebreadthoftheSpecialCounsel’sauthoritytoinvestigateRussiaelectioninterferenceandlinksand/orcoordinationwiththeTrump Campaign. See United States v. Manafort, 312 F. Supp. 3d 60, 79-83(D.D.C.2018);UnitedStatesv.Manafort,321F.Supp.3d640,650-655(E.D.Va.2018).Inthecourseofconductingthatinvestigation,theOfficeperiodicallyidentified evidenceof potential criminal activity thatwas outside the scopeofthe Special Counsel’s authority established by the Acting Attorney General.After consultationwith theOffice of theDeputyAttorneyGeneral, theOfficereferred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities, principallyother components of the Department of Justice and to the FBI. Appendix Dsummarizesthosereferrals.

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To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to

him, the Special Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19attorneys—fiveofwhomjoinedtheOfficefromprivatepracticeand14ondetailorassignedfromotherDepartmentofJusticecomponents.TheseattorneyswereassistedbyafilterteamofDepartmentlawyersandFBIpersonnelwhoscreenedmaterials obtained via court process for privileged information before turningthosematerialsovertoinvestigators;asupportstaffofthreeparalegalsondetailfrom the Department’s Antitrust Division; and an administrative staff of nineresponsibleforbudget,finance,purchasing,humanresources,records,facilities,security, information technology, and administrative support. The SpecialCounselattorneysandsupportstaffwereco-locatedwithandworkedalongsideapproximately 40 FBI agents, intelligence analysts, forensic accountants, aparalegal, and professional staff assigned by the FBI to assist the SpecialCounsel’s investigation.Those “assigned”FBIemployees remainedunderFBIsupervisionatall times; themattersonwhichtheyassistedweresupervisedbytheSpecialCounsel.1

DuringitsinvestigationtheOfficeissuedmorethan2,800subpoenasundertheauspicesofagrandjurysittingintheDistrictofColumbia;executednearly500 search-and-seizure warrants; obtained more than 230 orders forcommunicationsrecordsunder18U.S.C.§2703(d);obtainedalmost50ordersauthorizing use of pen registers; made 13 requests to foreign governmentspursuant toMutual Legal Assistance Treaties; and interviewed approximately500witnesses,includingalmost80beforeagrandjury.

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Fromitsinception,theOfficerecognizedthatitsinvestigationcouldidentifyforeign intelligence and counterintelligence information relevant to the FBI’sbroader national security mission. FBI personnel who assisted the OfficeestablishedprocedurestoidentifyandconveysuchinformationtotheFBI.TheFBI’s Counterintelligence Division met with the Office regularly for thatpurposeformostoftheOffice’stenure.Formorethanthepastyear,theFBIalsoembeddedpersonnel at theOfficewhodid notwork on theSpecialCounsel’sinvestigation,butwhosepurposewas to review the resultsof the investigationand to send—in writing—summaries of foreign intelligence andcounterintelligence information to FBIHQ and FBI Field Offices. Thosecommunications and other correspondence between the Office and the FBIcontaininformationderivedfromtheinvestigation,notallofwhichiscontained

inthisVolume.ThisVolumeisasummary.Itcontains,intheOffice’sjudgment,thatinformationnecessarytoaccountfortheSpecialCounsel’sprosecutionanddeclinationdecisionsandtodescribetheinvestigation’smainfactualresults.

1 FBI personnel assigned to theSpecialCounsel’sOfficewere required to adhere to all applicablefederallawandallDepartmentandFBIregulations,guidelines,andpolicies.AnFBIattorneyworkedonFBI-relatedmattersfortheOffice,suchasFBIcompliancewithallFBIpoliciesandprocedures,includingtheFBI’sDomestic Investigations andOperationsGuide (DIOG). That FBI attorneyworked under FBIlegalsupervision,nottheSpecialCounsel’ssupervision.

II.RUSSIAN“ACTIVEMEASURES”SOCIALMEDIACAMPAIGN

The first form of Russian election influence came principally from theInternet Research Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded byYevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and companies he controlled, includingConcordManagementandConsultingLLCandConcordCatering(collectively“Concord”).2TheIRAconductedsocialmediaoperationstargetedatlargeU.S.audienceswith thegoalofsowingdiscord in theU.S.politicalsystem.3Theseoperations constituted “active measures” a termthattypicallyreferstooperationsconductedbyRussiansecurityservicesaimedatinfluencingthecourseofinternationalaffairs.4

TheIRAanditsemployeesbeganoperationstargetingtheUnitedStatesasearly as 2014. Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated socialmedia accounts and group pages designed to attract U.S. audiences. Thesegroupsandaccounts,whichaddresseddivisiveU.S.politicalandsocial issues,falselyclaimedtobecontrolledbyU.S.activists.Overtime,thesesocialmediaaccounts became a means to reach large U.S. audiences. IRA employeestravelledtotheUnitedStates inmid-2014onanintelligence-gatheringmissiontoobtaininformationandphotographsforuseintheirsocialmediaposts.

IRAemployeespostedderogatoryinformationaboutanumberofcandidatesin the 2016 U.S. presidential election. By early to mid-2016, IRA operationsincluded supporting the Trump Campaign and disparaging candidate HillaryClinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry out those activities,includingbuyingpoliticaladvertisementsonsocialmediainthenamesofU.S.personsandentities.SomeIRAemployees,posingasU.S.personsandwithoutrevealing their Russian association, communicated electronically withindividuals associated with the Trump Campaign and with other politicalactivists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the staging ofpolitical rallies.5 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S.persons knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA’s interferenceoperation.

By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to reach

millions of U.S. persons through their social media accounts. Multiple IRA-controlledFacebookgroupsandInstagramaccountshadhundredsofthousandsof U.S. participants. IRA-controlled Twitter accounts separately had tens ofthousandsoffollowers, includingmultipleU.S.political figureswhoretweetedIRA-createdcontent.InNovember2017,aFacebookrepresentativetestifiedthatFacebookhadidentified470IRA-controlledFacebookaccountsthatcollectivelymade80,000postsbetweenJanuary2015andAugust2017.Facebookestimatedthe IRA reached as many as 126 million persons through its Facebookaccounts.6InJanuary2018,Twitterannouncedthatithadidentified3,814IRA-controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1.4 million peopleTwitterbelievedmayhavebeenincontactwithanIRA-controlledaccount.7

A.StructureoftheInternetResearchAgency

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Theorganizationquicklygrew.HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████11████████HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████12

The growth of the organization also led to amore detailed organizationalstructure.████HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████13

TwoindividualsheadedtheIRA’smanagement:itsgeneraldirector,MikhailBystrov, and its executive director, Mikhail Burchik. Harm to OngoingMatter██████████████████████14Harm toOngoingMatter██████████████████████15

As early as the spring of 2014, the IRA began to hide its funding andactivities.███HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████16

TheIRA’sU.S.operationarepartofalargersetofinterlockingoperationsknownas“ProjectLakhta,”HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████17HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████18

B.FundingandOversightfromConcordandPrigozhin

Until at least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and twoConcord companies funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy RussianbusinessmanwhoservedastheheadofConcord.HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████PrigozhinwassanctionedbytheU.S.TreasuryDepartmentinDecember2016,19HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████20

Harm to OngoingMatter█ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ 21 Numerous mediasources have reportedonPrigozhin’s ties toPutin, and the twohave appearedtogetherinpublicphotographs.22

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IRAemployeeswereaware thatPrigozhinwas involved in the IRA’sU.S.operations,███HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████29████████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████30InMay2016,IRA employees, claiming to be U.S. social activists and administrators ofFacebookgroups,recruitedU.S.personstoholdsigns(includingoneinfrontoftheWhiteHouse)thatread“Happy55thBirthdayDearBoss,”asanhomagetoPrigozhin (whose 55th birthday was on June 1, 2016).31Harm to OngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████32

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C.TheIRATargetsU.S.Elections

1.TheIRARampsUpU.S.OperationsAsEarlyAs2014

TheIRA’sU.S.operationssoughttoinfluencepublicopinionthroughonlinemedia and forums.By the spring of 2014, the IRA began to consolidateU.S.operations within a single general department, known internally as the“Translator” department.████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████IRAsubdividedtheTranslatorDepartmentintodifferentresponsibilities, ranging fromoperationsondifferent socialmediaplatforms toanalyticstographicsandIT.

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IRAemployeesalso traveled to theUnitedStatesonintelligence-gatheringmissions.InJune2014,fourIRAemployeesappliedtotheU.S.DepartmentofStatetoenter theUnitedStates,while lyingaboutthepurposeof their tripandclaiming to be four friends who had met at a party.38 Ultimately, two IRAemployees—Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova—received visas andenteredtheUnitedStatesonJune4,2014.

Prior traveling, Krylova and Bogacheva compiled itineraries andinstructionsforthetrip.HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████████39HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████

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2.U.S.OperationsThroughIRA-ControlledSocialMediaAccounts

Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts andpersonas on different U.S. social media platforms. The IRA referred toemployees assigned to operate the social media accounts as “specialists.”42Starting as early as 2014, the IRA’s U.S. operations included social mediaspecialistsfocusingonFacebook,YouTube,andTwitter.43TheIRAlateraddedspecialistswhooperatedonTumblrandInstagramaccounts.44

Initially, the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be thepersonal accounts ofU.S. persons.45 By early 2015, the IRA began to createlargersocialmediagroupsorpublicsocialmediapagesthatclaimed(falsely)tobeaffiliatedwithU.S.politicalandgrassrootsorganizations.Incertaincases,theIRAcreatedaccounts thatmimicked realU.S.organizations.Forexample,oneIRA-controlledTwitteraccount,@TEN_GOP,purportedtobeconnectedtotheTennesseeRepublicanParty.46Morecommonly,theIRAcreatedaccountsinthenames of fictitious U.S. organizations and grassroots groups and used theseaccounts to pose as anti-immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black LivesMatterprotestors,andotherU.S.socialandpoliticalactivists.

TheIRAcloselymonitoredtheactivityofitssocialmediaaccounts.████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

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By February 2016, internal IRA documents referred to support for theTrumpCampaignandoppositiontocandidateClinton.49Forexample,HOM████████directionstoIRAoperatorsHarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████“Mainidea:UseanyopportunitytocriticizeHillary[Clinton]andtherest(exceptSandersandTrump-wesupportthem).”50HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

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ThefocusontheU.S.presidentialcampaigncontinuedthroughout2016.InHOM███2016internalHOM███reviewingtheIRA-controlledFacebookgroup “Secured Borders,” the author criticized the “lower number of postsdedicatedtocriticizingHillaryClinton”andremindedtheFacebookspecialist“itisimperativetointensifycriticizingHillaryClinton.”51

IRAemployees also acknowledged that theirwork focusedon influencingtheU.S.presidentialelection.HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████

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3.U.S.OperationsThroughFacebook

Many IRAoperationsusedFacebookaccounts createdandoperatedby itsspecialists.███HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

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HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████54IRAFacebookgroupsactiveduring the2016campaigncovereda rangeofpolitical issuesand includedpurportedconservativegroups(with names such as “Being Patriotic,” “Stop All Immigrants,” “SecuredBorders,”and“TeaPartyNews”),purportedBlacksocialjusticegroups(“BlackMatters,” “Blacktivist,” and “Don’t Shoot Us”), LGBTQ groups (“LGBTUnited”),andreligiousgroups(“UnitedMuslimsofAmerica”).

Throughout 2016, IRA accounts published an increasing number ofmaterialssupportingtheTrumpCampaignandopposingtheClintonCampaign.Forexample,onMay31,2016,theoperationalaccount“MattSkiber”begantoprivatelymessage dozens of pro-TrumpFacebook groups asking them to helpplana“pro-TrumprallynearTrumpTower.”55

To reach larger U.S. audiences, the IRA purchased advertisements fromFacebook that promoted the IRA groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audiencemembers. According to Facebook, the IRA purchased over 3,500advertisements,andtheexpenditurestotaledapproximately$100,000.56

DuringtheU.S.presidentialcampaign,manyIRA-purchasedadvertisementsexplicitlysupportedoropposedapresidentialcandidateorpromotedU.S.ralliesorganized by the IRA (discussed below). As early as March 2016, the IRApurchased advertisements that overtly opposed the Clinton Campaign. Forexample, on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an advertisement depictingcandidateClintonandacaptionthatreadinpart,“IfonedayGodlets this liarenter the White House as a president – that day would be a real nationaltragedy.”57Similarly,onApril6,2016,theIRApurchasedadvertisementsforitsaccount “BlackMatters” calling for a “flashmob” of U.S. persons to “take aphotowith#HillaryClintonForPrison2016or#nohillary2016.”58IRA-purchased

advertisementsfeaturingClintonwere,withveryfewexceptions,negative.59

IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largelysupportedhiscampaign.ThefirstknownIRAadvertisementexplicitlyendorsingthe Trump Campaign was purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought anadvertisementforitsInstagramaccount“TeaPartyNews”askingU.S.personstohelp them “make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters” by uploadingphotoswith the hashtag “#KIDS4TRUMP.”60 In subsequentmonths, the IRApurchased dozens of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign,predominantly through the Facebook groups “Being Patriotic,” “Stop AllInvaders,”and“SecuredBorders.”

Collectively, the IRA’s social media accounts reached tens of millions ofU.S. persons. Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds ofthousands of followers. For example, at the time they were deactivated byFacebookinmid-2017,theIRA’s“UnitedMuslimsofAmerica”Facebookgrouphad over 300,000 followers, the “Don’t Shoot Us” Facebook group had over250,000 followers, the “Being Patriotic” Facebook group had over 200,000followers, and the “Secured Borders” Facebook group had over 130,000followers.61AccordingtoFacebook,intotaltheIRA-controlledaccountsmadeover 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017, and these postsreachedatleast29millionU.Spersonsand“mayhavereachedanestimated126millionpeople.”62

4.U.S.OperationsThroughTwitter

AnumberofIRAemployeesassignedtotheTranslatorDepartmentservedasTwitterspecialists.HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████63

TheIRA’sTwitteroperationsinvolvedtwostrategies.First,IRAspecialistsoperated certainTwitter accounts to create individualU.S. personas,HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████64Separately,theIRAoperatedanetworkofautomatedTwitteraccounts(commonlyreferredtoasabotnetwork)thatenabledtheIRAtoamplifyexistingcontentonTwitter.

a.IndividualizedAccounts

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████65HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████66 The IRA operated individualized Twitteraccounts similar to the operation of its Facebook accounts, by continuouslyposting original content to the accounts while also communicating with U.S.Twitterusersdirectly(throughpublictweetingorTwitter’sprivatemessaging).

TheIRAusedmanyoftheseaccountstoattempttoinfluenceU.S.audienceson theelection. Individualizedaccountsused to influence theU.S.presidentialelection included@TEN_GOP (described above);@jenn_abrams (claiming tobe a Virginian Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); @Pamela_Moore13(claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000 followers); and@America_lst_(ananti-immigrationpersonawith24,000followers).67InMay2016,theIRAcreatedtheTwitteraccount@march_for_trump,whichpromotedIRA-organizedralliesinsupportoftheTrumpCampaign(describedbelow).68

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Usingtheseaccountsandothers,theIRAprovokedreactionsfromusersandthemedia.MultipleIRA-postedtweetsgainedpopularity.70U.S.mediaoutletsalsoquotedtweetsfromIRA-controlledaccountsandattributedthemtothereactions

ofrealU.S.persons.71Similarly,numeroushigh-profileU.S.persons,includingformer AmbassadorMichaelMcFaul,72 Roger Stone,73 Sean Hannity,74 andMichael Flynn Jr.,75 retweeted or responded to tweets posted to these IRA-controlled accounts.Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump CampaignalsopromotedIRAtweets(discussedbelow).

b.IRABotnetActivities

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In January 2018, Twitter publicly identified 3,814 Twitter accountsassociatedwith the IRA.79According to Twitter, in the tenweeks before the2016 U.S. presidential election, these accounts posted approximately 175,993tweets, “approximately 8.4% of which were election-related.”80 Twitter alsoannounced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who TwitterbelievedmayhavebeenincontactwithanIRA-controlledaccount.81

5.U.S.OperationsInvolvingPoliticalRallies

The IRAorganized and promoted political rallies inside theUnited Stateswhile posing as U.S. grassroots activists. First, the IRA used one of itspreexisting socialmedia personas (Facebook groups and Twitter accounts, forexample)toannounceandpromotetheevent.TheIRAthensentalargenumberofdirectmessagestofollowersofitssocialmediaaccountaskingthemtoattendthe event. From thosewho respondedwith interest in attending, the IRA thensoughtaU.S.persontoserveastheevent’scoordinator.Inmostcases,theIRAaccountoperatorwouldtelltheU.S.personthattheypersonallycouldnotattendtheeventduetosomepreexistingconflictorbecausetheyweresomewhereelseintheUnitedStates.82TheIRAthenfurtherpromotedtheeventbycontactingU.S.mediaabouttheeventanddirectingthemtospeakwiththecoordinator.83Aftertheevent,theIRApostedvideosandphotographsoftheeventtotheIRA’ssocialmediaaccounts.84

The Office identified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. Theearliestevidenceofarallywasa“confederaterally”inNovember2015.85TheIRAcontinuedtoorganizeralliesevenafterthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.Theattendanceatralliesvaried.Someralliesappeartohavedrawnfew(ifany)participants,whileothersdrewhundreds.ThereachandsuccessoftheserallieswascloselymonitoredHarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

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IRAPosterforPennsylvaniaRalliesorganizedbytheIRA

Thetopsectionoftheposterdisplaysaphotographofamineworkerfollowedbytextthatreads,MinersforTrump.Bringback

FromJune2016untiltheendofthepresidentialcampaign,almostalloftheU.S.ralliesorganizedbytheIRAfocusedontheU.S.election,oftenpromotingthe Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign. Pro-Trump ralliesincludedthreeinNewYork;aseriesofpro-Trumprallies inFloridainAugust2016; and a series of pro-Trump rallies inOctober 2016 inPennsylvania.TheFlorida ralliesdrew the attentionof theTrumpCampaign,whichpostedabouttheMiamirallyoncandidateTrump’sFacebookaccount(asdiscussedbelow).86

Many of the same IRA employees who oversaw the IRA’s social mediaaccountsalsoconductedtheday-to-dayrecruitingforpoliticalralliesinsidetheUnitedStates.███████HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████87

6.TargetingandRecruitmentofU.S.Persons

As early as 2014, the IRA instructed its employees to targetU.S. persons

whocouldbeusedtoadvanceitsoperationalgoals.Initially,recruitmentfocusedonU.S. personswho could amplify the content posted by the IRA.Harm toOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████

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IRAemployeesfrequentlyusedInvestigativeTechnique████Twitter,Facebook,andInstagramtocontactandrecruitU.S.personswhofollowed thegroup.The IRA recruitedU.S.persons fromacross thepolitical spectrum.Forexample,theIRAtargetedthefamilyof███PersonalPrivacy████████████ and a number of black social justice activists while posing as agrassroots group called “BlackMattersUS.”89 In February 2017, the persona“Black Fist” (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protectthemselveswhencontactedbylawenforcement)hiredaself-defense instructorinNewYork tooffer classes sponsoredbyBlackFist.The IRAalso recruitedmoderators of conservative social media groups to promote IRA-generatedcontent,90 as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts (such aswalking around New York City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trumpmask).91

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HOM█ █ █ █ █ as the IRA’s online audience became larger, the IRAtrackedU.S.personswithwhomtheycommunicatedandhadsuccessfullytasked(with tasks ranging from organizing rallies to taking pictures with certain

politicalmessages).HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████95

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7.InteractionsandContactswiththeTrumpCampaign

TheinvestigationidentifiedtwodifferentformsofconnectionsbetweentheIRA and members of the Trump Campaign. (The investigation identified nosimilar connections between the IRA and the Clinton Campaign.) First, onmultipleoccasions,membersandsurrogatesof theTrumpCampaignpromoted—typicallybylinking,retweeting,orsimilarmethodsofreposting—pro-Trumpor anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-controlled socialmedia accounts. Additionally, in a few instances, IRA employees representedthemselves as U.S. persons to communicate with members of the TrumpCampaign in an effort to seek assistance and coordination on IRA-organizedpoliticalralliesinsidetheUnitedStates.

a.TrumpCampaignPromotionofIRAPoliticalMaterials

Among the U.S. “leaders of public opinion” targeted by the IRA werevarious members and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. In total, TrumpCampaignaffiliatespromoteddozensoftweets,posts,andotherpoliticalcontentcreatedbytheIRA.

- PostsfromtheIRA-controlledTwitteraccount@TEN_GOPwerecitedorretweetedbymultipleTrump

Campaignofficialsandsurrogates,includingDonaldJ.TrumpJr.,96EricTrump,97KellyanneConway,98BradParscale,99andMichaelT.Flynn.100Thesepostsincludedallegationsofvoterfraud,101aswellasallegationsthatSecretaryClintonhadmishandledclassifiedinformation.102

- ANovember7,2016postfromtheIRA-controlledTwitteraccount@Pamela_Moore13wasretweetedbyDonaldJ.TrumpJr.103

- OnSeptember19,2017,PresidentTrump’spersonalaccount@realDonaldTrumprespondedtoatweetfromtheIRA-controlledaccount@10_gop(thebackupaccountof@TEN_GOP,whichhadalreadybeendeactivatedbyTwitter).Thetweetread:“Weloveyou,Mr.President!”104

ScreenshotofTrumpFacebookAccount(fromMattSkiber)

ThepostsaysThankyouforyoursupportMiami!MyteamjustsharedphotosfromyourTrumpsignwavingday,

IRAemployeesmonitored the reactionof theTrumpCampaignand, later,Trump Administration officials to their tweets. For example, on August 23,2016, the IRA-controlled persona “Matt Skiber” Facebook account sent amessagetoaU.S.TeaPartyactivist,writingthat“Mr.TrumppostedaboutoureventinMiami!Thisisgreat!”105TheIRAemployeeincludedascreenshotofcandidateTrump’sFacebookaccount,which includedapost about theAugust20,2016politicalralliesorganizedbytheIRA.

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b.ContactwithTrumpCampaignOfficialsinConnectiontoRallies

Starting in June 2016, the IRA contacted different U.S. persons affiliatedwith theTrumpCampaigninaneffort tocoordinatepro-TrumpIRA-organizedrallies inside theUnited States. In all cases, the IRA contacted the CampaignwhileclaimingtobeU.S.politicalactivistsworkingonbehalfofaconservativegrassrootsorganization.TheIRA’scontactsincludedrequestsforsignsandothermaterialstouseatrallies,107aswellasrequeststopromotetheralliesandhelpcoordinatelogistics.108Whilecertaincampaignvolunteersagreedtoprovidetherequested support (for example, agreeing to set aside a number of signs), theinvestigation has not identified evidence that any Trump Campaign officialunderstoodtherequestswerecomingfromforeignnationals.

***

In sum, the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016presidential election through the “active measures” social media campaigncarriedoutbytheIRA,anorganizationfundedbyPrigozhinandcompaniesthathecontrolled.Asexplained further inVolume I,SectionV.A, infra, theOfficeconcluded(andagrandjuryhasalleged)thatPrigozhin,hiscompanies,andIRAemployees violated U.S. law through these operations, principally byundermining throughdeceptiveacts theworkof federal agencieschargedwithregulatingforeigninfluenceinU.S.elections.

2 The Office is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measuresoperations targeting theUnitedStates.Someevidencecollectedby theOfficecorroborates those reports,andtheOfficehassharedthatevidencewithotherofficesintheDepartmentofJusticeandFBI.

3HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████seealsoSM-2230634,serial44(analysis).TheFBIcasenumbercitedhere,andotherFBIcasenumbersidentifiedinthereport,shouldbetreatedaslawenforcement sensitive given the context. The report contains additional law enforcement sensitiveinformation.

4As discussed in PartV below, the activemeasures investigation has resulted in criminal chargesagainst13individualRussiannationalsandthreeRussianentities,principallyforconspiracytodefraudtheUnitedStates,inviolationof18U.S.C.§371.SeeVolumeI,SectionV.A,infra;Indictment,UnitedStatesv.InternetResearchAgency,etal., l:18-cr-32(D.D.C.Feb.16,2018),Doc.1(“InternetResearchAgencyIndictment”).

5InternetResearchAgencyIndictment¶¶52,54,55(a),56,74;HarmtoOngoingMatter█████

████████████████████████████

6SocialMediaInfluenceinthe2016U.S.Election,HearingBeforetheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence, 115thCong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony ofColin Stretch,GeneralCounsel of Facebook) (“Weestimate that roughly29millionpeoplewereservedcontent in theirNewsFeedsdirectly fromtheIRA’s80,000postsoverthetwoyears.PostsfromthesePageswerealsoshared,liked,andfollowedbypeopleonFacebook,and,asaresult,threetimesmorepeoplemayhavebeenexposedtoastorythatoriginatedfromtheRussianoperation.Ourbestestimate is thatapproximately126millionpeoplemayhavebeenservedcontent fromaPageassociatedwith the IRAat somepointduring the two-yearperiod.”).TheFacebookrepresentativealsotestifiedthatFacebookhadidentified170Instagramaccountsthatpostedapproximately120,000piecesofcontentduringthattime.FacebookdidnotofferanestimateoftheaudiencereachedviaInstagram.

7Twitter,UpdateonTwitter’sReviewofthe2016USElection(Jan.31,2018).

8SeeSM-2230634,serial92.

9HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████

10HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████

11SeeSM-2230634,serial86HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████

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13HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████

14See,e.g.,SM-2230634,serials9,113&180HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████

15HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████

16HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████SeeSM-2230634,serials131&204.

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18HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████

19 U.S. Treasury Department, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection withRussia’sOccupationofCrimeaandtheConflictinUkraine”(Dec.20,2016).

20HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████████████

21HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

22See,e.g.,NeilMacFarquhar,YevgenyPrigozhin,RussianOligarchIndictedbyU.S., IsKnownas“Putin’sCook”,NewYorkTimes(Feb.16,2018).

23HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████

24HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████

25HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████seealsoSM-2230634,serial113HOM████

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28Theterm“troll”referstointernetusers—inthiscontext,paidoperatives—whopostinflammatoryorotherwisedisruptivecontentonsocialmediaorotherwebsites.

29InvestigativeTechnique████████████████████████████████████████████SeeSM-2230634,serials131&204.

30SeeSM-2230634,serial156.

31 Internet Research Agency Indictment ¶ 12(b); see also 5/26/16 Facebook Messages, ID1479936895656747(UnitedMuslimsofAmerica)&PersonalPrivacy██████

32HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████seealsoSM-2230634,serial189.HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████.

33HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████SeeSM-2230634,serial205.

34SeeSM-2230634,serial204HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████

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36HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████

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38SeeSM-2230634,serials150&172HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████.

39HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████

40HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████

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43HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████.

44See,e.g.,SM-2230634,serial179HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

45 See, e.g., Facebook ID 100011390466802 (Alex Anderson); Facebook ID 100009626173204(Andrea Hansen); Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Williams); Facebook ID 100013640043337(LakishaRichardson).

46Theaccountclaimedtobethe“UnofficialTwitterofTennesseeRepublicans”andmadepoststhatappearedtobeendorsementsofthestatepoliticalparty.See,e.g.,@TEN_GOP,4/3/16Tweet(“TennesseeGOPbacks@realDonaldTrumpperiod#makeAmericagreatagain#tngop#tennessee#gop”).

47HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████

48See,e.g.,SM-2230634serial131HOM████.

49 The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially announced herpresidential campaign. IRA-controlled social media accounts criticized Clinton’s record as Secretary ofState and promoted various critiques of her candidacy. The IRA also used other techniques. █ █ █ ██HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████SeeSM-2230634,serial70.

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555/31/16FacebookMessage,ID100009922908461(MattSkiber)toIDPP██████5/31/16FacebookMessage,ID100009922908461(MattSkiber)toIDPersonalPrivacy██████

56SocialMediaInfluenceinthe2016U.S.Election,HearingBeforetheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,115thCong.13(11/1/17)(testimonyofColinStretch,GeneralCounselofFacebook).

573/18/16FacebookAdvertisementID6045505152575.

584/6/16FacebookAdvertisementID6043740225319.

59SeeSM-2230634,serial213(documentingpolitically-orientedadvertisements fromthe largersetprovidedbyFacebook).

604/19/16FacebookAdvertisementID6045151094235.

61 See Facebook ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America); Facebook ID1157233400960126 (Don’t Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being Patriotic); Facebook ID757183957716200(SecuredBorders).HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████

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62SocialMediaInfluenceinthe2016U.S.Election,HearingBeforetheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,115thCong.13(11/1/17)(testimonyofColinStretch,GeneralCounselofFacebook).

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66HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████

67Otherindividualizedaccountsincluded@MissouriNewsUS(anaccountwith3,800followersthatpostedpro-Sandersandanti-Clintonmaterial).

68See@march_for_trump,5/30/16Tweet(firstpostfromaccount).

69HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████

█

70Forexample,oneIRAaccounttweeted,“Tothosepeople,whohatetheConfederateflag.Didyouknow that the flag and thewarwasn’t about slavery, itwas all aboutmoney.” The tweet received over40,000responses.@Jenn_Abrams4/24/17(2:37p.m.)Tweet.

71JosephineLukito&ChrisWells,MostMajorOutletsHaveUsedRussianTweets as Sources forPartisanOpinion:Study,ColumbiaJournalismReview(Mar.8,2018);seealsoTwitterStepsUptoExplain#NewYorkValuestoTedCruz,WashingtonPost(Jan.15,2016)(citingIRAtweet);PeopleAreSlammingtheCIAforClaimingRussiaTriedtoHelpDonaldTrump,U.S.News&WorldReport(Dec.12,2016).

72@McFaul4/30/16Tweet(respondingtotweetby@Jenn_Abrams).

73@RogerJStoneJr5/30/16Tweet(retweeting@Pamela_Moore13);a@RogerJStoneJr4/26/16Tweet(same).

74@seanhannity6/21/17Tweet(retweeting@Pamela_Moore13).

75@mflynnJR6/22/17Tweet (“RT@Jenn_Abrams:This iswhathappenswhenyouadd thevoiceoverofanolddocumentaryaboutmentalillnessontovideoofSJWs...”).

76Abotnetreferstoanetworkofprivatecomputersoraccountscontrolledasagrouptosendspecificautomated messages (IAEN). On the Twitter network, botnets can be used to promote and republish(“retweet”)specifictweetsorhashtagsinorderforthemtogainlargeraudiences.

77HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████

78HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████

79EliRosenberg,TwittertoTell677,000UserstheyWereHadbytheRussians.SomeSignsShowtheProblemContinues,WashingtonPost(Jan.19,2019).

80Twitter,“UpdateonTwitter’sReviewof the2016USElection”(updatedJan.31,2018).Twitteralsoreportedidentifying50,258automatedaccountsconnectedtotheRussiangovernment,whichtweetedmorethanamilliontimesinthetenweeksbeforetheelection.

81Twitter,“UpdateonTwitter’sReviewofthe2016USElection”(updatedJan.31,2018).

828/20/16FacebookMessage,ID100009922908461(MattSkiber)toIDPP██████.

83 See, e.g., 7/21/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to PP█ █ █ █ █ █; 7/21/16 Email,joshmilton024@gmail.comtoPersonalPrivacy██████

84@march_for_trump6/25/16Tweet(postingphotosfromrallyoutsideTrumpTower).

85 Instagram ID 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post (“Good evening buds!Well I amplanningtoorganizeaconfederaterally[...]inHoustononthe14ofNovemberandIwantmorepeopletoattend.”).

86 The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts(IAEN).See,e.g.,FacebookID100009922908461(MattSkiber);FacebookID1601685693432389(BeingPatriotic); Twitter Account @march_for_trump; beingpatriotic@gmail.com. (Rallies were organized inNewYorkonJune25,2016;FloridaonAugust20,2016;andPennsylvaniaonOctober2,2016.)

87HarmtoOngoingMatter████████

88HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

89 3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID6051652423528,10/26/16FacebookAdvertisement ID6055238604687;10/27/16FacebookMessage, IDPersonalPrivacy███&ID100011698576461(TaylorBrooks).

908/19/16FacebookMessage,ID100009922908461(MattSkiber)toIDPP█████████████████████████

91 12/8/16 Email, robot@craigslist.org to beingpatriotic@gmail.com (confirming Craigslistadvertisement).

928/18-19/16TwitterDMs,@march_for_trump&PP███████████

93See,e.g.,11/11-27/16FacebookMessages, ID100011698576461(TaylorBrooks)&IDPersonalPrivacy███████████████████████████(arrangingtopayforplaneticketsandforabullhorn).

94 See, e.g., 9/10/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) & IDPersonalPrivacy███(discussingpaymentforrallysupplies);8/18/16TwitterDM,@march_for_trumptoPP███(discussingpaymentforconstructionmaterials).

95HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████

96 See, e.g., @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet (“RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Thousands ofnames changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police investigating #Voterfraud. #DrainTheSwamp.”);@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/2/16 Tweet (“RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING: #VoterFraud by counting tens ofthousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida.”);@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16Tweet (“RT@TEN_GOP: This vet passed away lastmonth before he couldvote for Trump.Here he is in his #MAGA hat. #voted #ElectionDay.”). Trump Jr. retweeted additional@TEN_GOPcontentsubsequenttotheelection.

97 @EricTrump 10/20/16 Tweet (“RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down pressconferencewhenaskedaboutDNCOperativescorruption&#VoterFraud#debatenight#TrumpB”).

98@KellyannePolls11/6/16Tweet(“RT@TEN_GOP:Motherofjailedsailor:‘HoldHillarytosamestandardsasmysononClassifiedinfo’#hillarysemail#WeinerGate.”).

99@parscale10/15/16Tweet(“Thousandsofdeplorableschantingtothemedia:‘TellTheTruth!’RTifyouarealsodonew/biasedMedia!#FridayFeeling”).

100@GenFlynn11/7/16(retweeting@TEN_GOPpost that includedinpart“@realDonaldTrump&@mike_pencewillbeournextPOTUS&VPOTUS.”).

101@TEN_GOP10/11/16Tweet(“NorthCarolinafinds2,214votersovertheageof110!!”).

102@TEN_GOP(IAEN)11/6/16Tweet(“Motherofjailedsailor:‘HoldHillarytosamestandardsasmysononclassifiedinfo#hillaryemail#WeinerGate.’”).

103@DonaldJTrumpJr11/7/16Tweet (“RT@Pamela_Moore13:Detroit residents speakout againstthefailedpoliciesofObama,Hillary&democrats....”).

104@realDonaldTrump9/19/17(7:33p.m.)Tweet(“THANKYOUforyoursupportMiami!Myteamjust shared photos from your TRUMP SIGNWAVING DAY, yesterday! I love you – and there is noquestion–TOGETHER,WEWILLMAKEAMERICAGREATAGAIN!”).

1058/23/16FacebookMessage,ID100009922908461(MattSkiber)toIDPP███████████████████

106HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

107See,e.g.,8/16/16Email,joshmilton024@gmail.comtoPP███@donaldtrump.com(askingforTrump/Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/18/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to PP█ █ █@donaldtrump.com (asking for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/12/16 Email,joshmilton024@gmail.comtoPP███@donaldtrump.com(askingfor“contactphonenumbersforTrumpCampaignaffiliates”invariousFloridacitiesandsigns).

1088/15/16Email,PersonalPrivacy███tojoshmilton024@gmail.com(askingtoaddtolocationstothe“FloridaGoesTrump,”list);8/16/16Email,PersonalPrivacy███to joshmilton024@gmail.com(volunteeringtosendanemailblasttofollowers).

III.RUSSIANHACKINGANDDUMPINGOPERATIONS

Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation’s MainIntelligenceDirectorateof theGeneralStaff (GRU)hacked the computers andemail accounts of organizations, employees, and volunteers supporting theClinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign chairman JohnPodesta.StartinginApril2016,theGRUhackedintothecomputernetworksofthe Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and theDemocraticNationalCommittee (DNC).TheGRU targetedhundredsof emailaccounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, advisors, and volunteers. Intotal,theGRUstolehundredsofthousandsofdocumentsfromthecompromisedemail accounts and networks.109 The GRU later released stolen ClintonCampaign and DNC documents through online personas, “DCLeaks” and“Guccifer2.0,”andlaterthroughtheorganizationWikiLeaks.Thereleaseofthedocumentswasdesignedandtimedtointerferewiththe2016U.S.presidentialelectionandunderminetheClintonCampaign.

TheTrumpCampaignshowedinterestintheWikileaksreleasesand,inthesummerandfallof2016,HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████AfterHOM███WikiLeaks’s first Clinton-relatedreleaseHOM███,theTrumpCampaignstayedincontactHOM███aboutWikiLeaks’s activities. The investigation was unable to resolve Harm toOngoingMatter██ █ █ █ █ █WikiLeaks’s release of the stolen Podestaemails on October 7, 2016, the same day a video from years earlier waspublishedofTrumpusinggraphiclanguageaboutwomen.

A.GRUHackingDirectedattheClintonCampaign

1.GRUUnitsTargettheClintonCampaign

TwomilitaryunitsoftheGRUcarriedoutthecomputerintrusionsintotheClinton Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units 26165 and 74455.110Military Unit 26165 is a GRU cyber unit dedicated to targeting military,political,governmental,andnon-governmentalorganizationsoutsideofRussia,including in theUnited States.111 The unit was sub-divided into departments

with different specialties.One department, for example, developed specializedmalicioussoftware(“malware”),whileanotherdepartmentconductedlarge-scalespearphishingcampaigns.112InvestigativeTechnique███abitcoinminingoperation to secure bitcoins used to purchase computer infrastructure used inhackingoperations.113

MilitaryUnit 74455 is a relatedGRUunitwithmultiple departments thatengaged in cyber operations.Unit 74455 assisted in the release of documentsstolen byUnit 26165, the promotion of those releases, and the publication ofanti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by the GRU. Officersfrom Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards ofelections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software andothertechnologyrelatedtotheadministrationofU.S.elections.114

Beginning inmid-March 2016,Unit 26165 had primary responsibility forhackingtheDCCCandDNC,aswellasemailaccountsofindividualsaffiliatedwiththeClintonCampaign:115

- Unit 26165 used IT█ █ █ to learn about Investigative Technique█ █ █different Democratic websites, including democrats.org, hillaryclinton.com,dnc.org,anddccc.org.InvestigativeTechnique█████████████████████ began before the GRU had obtained any credentials orgained access to these networks, indicating that the later DCCC and DNCintrusionswerenotcrimesofopportunitybutrathertheresultoftargeting.116

- GRU officers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work andpersonal email accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers.BetweenMarch10,2016andMarch15,2016,Unit26165appearstohavesentapproximately90spearphishingemailstoemailaccountsathillaryclinton.com.StartingonMarch15,2016, theGRUbegan targetingGoogleemailaccountsusedbyClintonCampaignemployees,alongwithasmallernumberofdnc.orgemailaccounts.117

The GRU spearphishing operation enabled it to gain access to numerousemail accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers, includingcampaign chairman John Podesta, junior volunteers assigned to the ClintonCampaign’s advance team, informal Clinton Campaign advisors, and a DNC

employee.118 GRU officers stole tens of thousands of emails fromspearphishing victims, including various Clinton Campaign-relatedcommunications.

2.IntrusionsintotheDCCCandDNCNetworks

a.InitialAccess

Bynolater thanApril12,2016, theGRUhadgainedaccesstotheDCCCcomputernetworkusingthecredentialsstolenfromaDCCCemployeewhohadbeen successfully spearphished theweek before. Over the ensuingweeks, theGRU traversed the network, identifying different computers connected to theDCCCnetwork.Bystealingnetworkaccesscredentialsalongtheway(includingthose of IT administrators with unrestricted access to the system), the GRUcompromisedapproximately29differentcomputersontheDCCCnetwork.119

ApproximatelysixdaysafterfirsthackingintotheDCCCnetwork,onApril18,2016,GRUofficersgainedaccesstotheDNCnetworkviaavirtualprivatenetwork (VPN) connection120 between the DCCC and DNC networks.121BetweenApril18,2016andJune8,2016,Unit26165compromisedmorethan30computersontheDNCnetwork, includingtheDNCmailserverandsharedfileserver.122

b.ImplantationofMalwareonDCCCandDNCNetworks

Unit 26165 implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks two types ofcustomized malware,123 known as “X-Agent” and “X-Tunnel”; Mimikatz, acredential-harvestingtool;andrar.exe,atoolusedintheseintrusionstocompileandcompressmaterials for exfiltration.X-Agentwasamulti-functionhackingtool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes, take screenshots, and gatherother data about the infected computers (e.g., file directories, operatingsystems).124X-Tunnelwasahackingtoolthatcreatedanencryptedconnectionbetween the victim DCCC/DNC computers and GRU-controlled computersoutside the DCCC and DNC networks that was capable of large-scale datatransfers.125GRUofficersthenusedX-Tunneltoexfiltratestolendatafromthevictimcomputers.

TooperateX-AgentandX-TunnelontheDCCCandDNCnetworks,Unit26165 officers set up a group of computers outside those networks tocommunicatewith the implantedmalware.126The first set ofGRU-controlledcomputers,knownbytheGRUas“middleservers,”sentandreceivedmessagestoandfrommalwareontheDNC/DCCCnetworks.Themiddleservers,inturn,relayed messages to a second set of GRU-controlled computers, labeledinternally by the GRU as an “AMS Panel.” The AMS Panel InvestigativeTechnique█████████servedasanervecenter throughwhichGRUofficers monitored and directed the malware’s operations on the DNC/DCCCnetworks.127

The AMS Panel used to control X-Agent during the DCCC and DNCintrusionswashousedonaleasedcomputerlocatednearIT███Arizona.128

InvestigativeTechnique███████████████129

InvestigativeTechnique████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

InvestigativeTechnique██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

The Arizona-based AMS Panel also stored thousands of files containingkeyloggingsessionscapturedthroughX-Agent.ThesesessionswerecapturedasGRU officers monitored DCCC and DNC employees’ work on infectedcomputersregularlybetweenApril2016andJune2016.Datacapturedinthesekeylogging sessions included passwords, internal communications betweenemployees,bankinginformation,andsensitivepersonalinformation.

c.TheftofDocumentsfromDNCandDCCCNetworks

OfficersfromUnit26165stolethousandsofdocumentsfromtheDCCCandDNCnetworks,includingsignificantamountsofdatapertainingtothe2016U.S.

federal elections. Stolen documents included internal strategy documents,fundraisingdata,oppositionresearch,andemailsfromtheworkinboxesofDNCemployees.130

TheGRU began stealingDCCC data shortly after it gained access to thenetwork.OnApril14,2016(approximatelythreedaysaftertheinitialintrusion)GRU officers downloaded rar.exe onto the DCCC’s document server. Thefollowing day, theGRU searched one compromisedDCCC computer for filescontaining search terms that included “Hillary,” “DNC,” “Cruz,” and“Trump.”131OnApril25,2016, theGRUcollectedandcompressedPDFandMicrosoft documents from folders on the DCCC’s shared file server thatpertained to the 2016 election.132TheGRU appears to have compressed andexfiltratedover70gigabytesofdatafromthisfileserver.133

TheGRUalsostoledocumentsfromtheDNCnetworkshortlyaftergainingaccess. On April 22, 2016, the GRU copied files from the DNC network toGRU-controlled computers. Stolen documents included the DNC’s oppositionresearch into candidateTrump.134Between approximatelyMay 25, 2016 andJune 1, 2016, GRU officers accessed the DNC’s mail server from a GRU-controlled computer leased inside the United States.135 During theseconnections,Unit26165officersappeartohavestolenthousandsofemailsandattachments,whichwerelaterreleasedbyWikiLeaksinJuly2016.136

B.DisseminationoftheHackedMaterials

The GRU’s operations extended beyond stealing materials, and includedreleasingdocumentsstolenfromtheClintonCampaignand itssupporters.TheGRUcarriedout theanonymous release through twofictitiousonlinepersonasthat itcreated—DCLeaksandGuccifer2.0—andlater throughtheorganizationWikiLeaks.

1.DCLeaks

TheGRUbegan planning the releases at least as early asApril 19, 2016,when Unit 26165 registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service thatanonymizedtheregistrant.137Unit26165paidfortheregistrationusingapoolof bitcoin that it had mined.138 The dcleaks.com landing page pointed to

different tranches of stolen documents, arranged by victim or subject matter.Otherdcleaks.compagescontainedindexesofthestolenemailsthatwerebeingreleased(bearingthesender,recipient,anddateoftheemail).Tocontrolaccessand the timing of releases, pages were sometimes password-protected for aperiodoftimeandlatermadeunrestrictedtothepublic.

Starting in June2016, theGRUposted stolendocumentsonto thewebsitedcleaks.com, including documents stolen from a number of individualsassociated with the Clinton Campaign. These documents appeared to haveoriginated from personal email accounts (in particular, Google andMicrosoftaccounts), rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks. DCLeaksvictimsincludedanadvisortotheClintonCampaign,aformerDNCemployeeandClintonCampaignemployee, and fourothercampaignvolunteers.139TheGRUreleasedthroughdcleaks.comthousandsofdocuments,includingpersonalidentifying and financial information, internal correspondence related to theClinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising files andinformation.140

GRUofficersoperatedaFacebookpageundertheDCLeaksmoniker,whichtheyprimarilyusedtopromotereleasesofmaterials.141TheFacebookpagewasadministered througha smallnumberofpreexistingGRU-controlledFacebookaccounts.142

GRUofficersalsousedtheDCLeaksFacebookaccount,theTwitteraccount@dcleaks_, and the email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com to communicateprivately with reporters and other U.S. persons. GRU officers using theDCLeakspersonagavecertainreportersearlyaccesstoarchivesofleakedfilesbysendingthemlinksandpasswordstopagesonthedcleaks.comwebsitethathad not yet become public. For example, on July 14, 2016, GRU officersoperatingundertheDCLeakspersonasentalinkandpasswordforanon-publicDCLeakswebpagetoaU.S.reporterviatheFacebookaccount.143Similarly,onSeptember14,2016,GRUofficerssent reportersTwitterdirectmessages from@dcleaks_, with a password to another non-public part of the dcleaks.comwebsite.144

The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March2017.

2.Guccifer2.0

On June 14, 2016, the DNC and its cyber-response team announced thebreach of the DNC network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In thestatements,thecyber-responseteamallegedthatRussianstate-sponsoredactors(which they referred to as “FancyBear”)were responsible for the breach.145Apparently in response to thatannouncement,onJune15,2016,GRUofficersusingthepersonaGuccifer2.0createdaWordPressblog.InthehoursleadinguptothelaunchofthatWordPressblog,GRUofficersloggedintoaMoscow-basedserverusedandmanagedbyUnit74455andsearchedforanumberofspecificwords and phrases in English, including “some hundred sheets,” “illuminati,”and “worldwide known.” Approximately two hours after the last of thosesearches,Guccifer2.0publisheditsfirstpost,attributingtheDNCserverhacktoa lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words andphrasesthattheGRUofficershadsearchedforthatday.146

That same day, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0WordPressblogtobeginreleasingtothepublicdocumentsstolenfromtheDNCand DCCC computer networks. The Guccifer 2.0 persona ultimately releasedthousands of documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC in a series of blogposts between June 15, 2016 and October 18, 2016.147 Released documentsincludedoppositionresearchperformedbytheDNC(includingamemorandumanalyzing potential criticisms of candidate Trump), internal policy documents(such as recommendations on how to address politically sensitive issues),analyses of specific congressional races, and fundraising documents. Releaseswereorganizedaroundthematicissues,suchasspecificstates(e.g.,FloridaandPennsylvania) thatwereperceivedascompetitive in the2016U.S.presidentialelection.

BeginninginlateJune2016,theGRUalsousedtheGuccifer2.0personatorelease documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals.Specifically,onJune27,2016,Guccifer2.0sentanemailtothenewsoutletTheSmokingGunofferingtoprovide“exclusiveaccesstosomeleakedemailslinked[to]HillaryClinton’sstaff.”148TheGRUlatersentthereporterapasswordandlinktoalockedportionofthedcleaks.comwebsitethatcontainedanarchiveofemails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March2016.149ThattheGuccifer2.0personaprovidedreportersaccesstoarestricted

portion of the DCLeaks website tends to indicate that both personas wereoperatedbythesameoraclosely-relatedgroupofpeople.150

The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2.0 into August2016. For example, on August 15, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent acandidate for the U.S. Congress documents related to the candidate’sopponent.151 On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona transferredapproximately2.5gigabytesofFlorida-relateddatastolenfromtheDCCCtoaU.S.bloggercoveringFloridapolitics.152OnAugust22,2016,theGuccifer2.0personasentaU.S.reporterdocumentsstolenfromtheDCCCpertainingtotheBlackLivesMattermovement.153

TheGRUwasalsoincontactthroughtheGuccifer2.0personawithHOM███aformerTrumpCampaignmemberHarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████154InearlyAugust 2016,HOM█ █ █ Twitter’s suspension of the Guccifer 2.0 Twitteraccount. After it was reinstated, GRU officers posing as Guccifer 2.0 wroteHOM█ █ █ via private message, “thank u for writing back . . . do u findanyt[h]ing interesting in the docs i posted?” On August 17, 2016, the GRUadded,“pleasetellmeificanhelpuanyhow...itwouldbeagreatpleasuretome.”OnSeptember9,2016,theGRU—againposingasGuccifer2.0—referredtoastolenDCCCdocumentpostedonlineandaskedHOM“whatdouthinkofthe infoon the turnoutmodel for thedemocrats entirepresidential campaign.”HOM responded, “pretty standard.”155 The investigation did not identifyevidenceofothercommunicationsbetweenHOMandGuccifer2.0.

3.UseofWikiLeaks

Inordertoexpanditsinterferenceinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection,theGRUunitstransferredmanyofthedocumentstheystolefromtheDNCandthechairman of theClintonCampaign toWikiLeaks.GRUofficers used both theDCLeaks andGuccifer 2.0 personas to communicatewithWikiLeaks throughTwitter privatemessaging and through encrypted channels, including possiblythroughWikiLeaks’sprivatecommunicationsystem.

a.WikiLeaks’sExpressedOppositionTowardtheClintonCampaign

WikiLeaks,andparticularlyitsfounderJulianAssange,privatelyexpressedoppositiontocandidateClintonwellbeforethefirstreleaseofstolendocuments.In November 2015, Assange wrote to other members and associates ofWikiLeaks that “[w]e believe it would be much better for GOP to win . . .Dems+Media+liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in their worstqualities. . . . With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her worstqualities., dems+media+neoliberals will be mute. . . . She’s a bright, wellconnected,sadisiticsociopath.”156

InMarch2016,WikiLeaks releasedasearchablearchiveofapproximately30,000ClintonemailsthathadbeenobtainedthroughFOIAlitigation.157Whiledesigningthearchive,oneWikiLeaksmemberexplainedthereasonforbuildingthearchivetoanotherassociate:

[W]e want this repository to become “the place” to search forbackground on hillary’s plotting at the state department during 2009-2013....FirstlybecauseitsusefulandwillannoyHillary,butsecondlybecausewewant tobeseen tobea resource/player in theUSelection,becauseeit[sic]mayen[]couragepeopletosendusevenmoreimportantleaks.158

b.WikiLeaks’sFirstContactwithGuccifer2.0andDCLeaks

Shortly after the GRU’s first release of stolen documents throughdcleaks.com in June 2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona tocontactWikiLeaks about possible coordination in the future release of stolenemails. On June 14, 2016,@dcleaks_ sent a direct message to@WikiLeaks,noting, “You announced your organization was preparing to publish moreHillary’s emails. We are ready to support you. We have some sensitiveinformationtoo,inparticular,herfinancialdocuments.Let’sdoittoether.Whatdoyou think about publishing our info at the samemoment?Thankyou.”159InvestigativeTechnique██████████████████

Aroundthesametime,WikiLeaksinitiatedcommunicationswiththeGRUpersonaGuccifer2.0shortlyafteritwasusedtoreleasedocumentsstolenfromthe DNC. On June 22, 2016, seven days after Guccifer 2.0’s first releases ofstolen DNC documents,WikiLeaks used Twitter’s direct message function to

contact theGuccifer2.0Twitter accountand suggest thatGuccifer2.0“[s]endanynewmaterial[stolenfromtheDNC]hereforustoreviewanditwillhaveamuchhigherimpactthanwhatyouaredoing.”160

OnJuly6,2016,WikiLeaksagaincontactedGuccifer2.0throughTwitter’sprivate messaging function, writing, “if you have anything hillary related wewantitinthenexttweo[sic]daysprefable[sic]becausetheDNCisapproachingand she will solidify bernie supporters behind her after.” The Guccifer 2.0personaresponded,“ok. . . isee.”WikiLeaksalsoexplained,“wethinktrumphasonlya25%chanceofwinningagainsthillary...soconflictbetweenbernieandhillaryisinteresting.”161

c.TheGRU’sTransferofStolenMaterialstoWikiLeaks

BoththeGRUandWikiLeakssoughttohidetheircommunications,whichhas limited the Office’s ability to collect all of the communications betweenthem.Thus,althoughitisclearthatthestolenDNCandPodestadocumentsweretransferredfromtheGRUtoWikiLeaks,███InvestigativeTechnique███

The Office was able to identify when the GRU (operating through itspersonasGuccifer2.0andDCLeaks) transferredsomeof thestolendocumentstoWikiLeaksthroughonlinearchivessetupbytheGRU.Assangehadaccesstothe internet from the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, England. InvestigativeTechnique█████████162

OnJuly14,2016,GRUofficersusedaGuccifer2.0emailaccounttosendWikiLeaksanemailbearing thesubject“bigarchive”and themessage“anewattempt.”163Theemailcontainedanencryptedattachmentwith thename“wkdnc link1.txt.gpg.”164 Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account, GRU officerssentWikiLeaksanencryptedfileandinstructionsonhowtoopenit.165OnJuly18,2016,WikiLeaksconfirmedinadirectmessagetotheGuccifer2.0accountthat it had “the 1Gb or so archive” and would make a release of the stolendocuments“thisweek.”166OnJuly22,2016,WikiLeaksreleasedover20,000emailsandotherdocuments stolen from theDNCcomputernetworks.167 TheDemocraticNationalConventionbeganthreedayslater.

Similar communications occurred between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona DCLeaks. On September 15, 2016, @dcleaks wrote to@WikiLeaks, “hi there! I’m from DC Leaks. How could we discuss somesubmission-relatedissues?Amtryingtoreachouttoyouviayoursecuredchatbutgettingnoresponse. I’vegotsomethingthatmight interestyou.Youwon’tbedisappointed,Ipromise.”168TheWikiLeaksaccountresponded,“Hithere,”without further elaboration. The @dcleaks_ account did not respondimmediately.

The same day, the Twitter account@guccifer_2 sent @dcleaks_ a directmessage, which is the first known contact between the personas.169 Duringsubsequent communications, theGuccifer 2.0 persona informedDCLeaks thatWikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and arrange for a way to speakthroughencryptedemails.170

AnanalysisofthemetadatacollectedfromtheWikiLeakssiterevealedthatthestolenPodestaemailsshowacreationdateofSeptember19,2016.171BasedoninformationaboutAssange’scomputeranditspossibleoperatingsystem,thisdate may be when the GRU staged the stolen Podesta emails for transfer toWikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for the DNCemails).172TheWikiLeakssitealsoreleasedPDFsandotherdocumentstakenfromPodesta thatwere attachments to emails inhis account; thesedocumentshad a creation date of October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date theattachmentswereseparatelystagedbyWikiLeaksonitssite.173

Beginning on September 20, 2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumedcommunicationsinabriefexchange.OnSeptember22,2016,aDCLeaksemailaccountdcleaksproject@gmail.comsentanemail toaWikiLeaksaccountwiththe subject “Submission” and the message “Hi from DCLeaks.” The emailcontained a PGP-encrytedmessage with the filename “wiki_mail.txt.gpg.”174InvestigativeTechnique█ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ The email, however, bears anumberofsimilaritiestotheJuly14,2016emailinwhichGRUofficersusedtheGuccifer2.0personatogiveWikiLeaksaccesstothearchiveofDNCfiles.OnSeptember22,2016(thesamedayofDCLeaks’emailtoWikiLeaks),theTwitteraccount @dcleaks sent a single message to @WikiLeaks with the string ofcharactersInvestigativeTechnique█████████

The Office cannot rule out that stolen documents were transferred toWikiLeaksthroughintermediarieswhovisitedduringthesummerof2016.Forexample, public reporting identified Andrew Müller-Maguhn as a WikiLeaksassociatewhomayhaveassistedwiththetransferofthesestolendocumentstoWikiLeaks175 Investigative Technique█ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ InvestigativeTechnique█████████176

On October 7, 2016,WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from thePodestaemailaccount.Intotal,WikiLeaksreleased33tranchesofstolenemailsbetweenOctober7,2016andNovember7,2016.Thereleasesincludedprivatespeeches given by Clinton;177 internal communications between Podesta andotherhigh-rankingmembersof theClintonCampaign;178 and correspondencerelatedtotheClintonFoundation.179In total,WikiLeaksreleasedover50,000documentsstolenfromPodesta’spersonalemailaccount.Thelast-in-timeemailreleased from Podesta’s account was dated March 21, 2016, two days afterPodestareceivedaspearphishingemailsentbytheGRU.

d.WikiLeaksStatementsDissemblingAbouttheSourceofStolenMaterials

AsreportsattributingtheDNCandDCCChackstotheRussiangovernmentemerged, WikiLeaks and Assange made several public statements apparentlydesigned to obscure the source of thematerials thatWikiLeakswas releasing.The file-transfer evidence described above and other information uncoveredduring the investigation discredit WikiLeaks’s claims about the source ofmaterialthatitposted.

Beginninginthesummerof2016,AssangeandWikiLeaksmadeanumberof statementsaboutSethRich,a formerDNCstaffmemberwhowaskilled inJuly2016.ThestatementsaboutRichimpliedfalselythathehadbeenthesourceofthestolenDNCemails.OnAugust9,2016,the@WikiLeaksTwitteraccountposted: “ANNOUNCE:WikiLeaks has decided to issue aUS$20k reward forinformationleadingtoconvictionforthemurderofDNCstafferSethRich.”180Likewise, onAugust 25, 2016,Assangewas asked in an interview, “Why areyousointerestedinSethRich’skiller?”andresponded,“We’reveryinterestedinanything thatmightbea threat toallegedWikileaks sources.”The interviewerresponded toAssange’s statement by commenting, “I knowyoudon’twant to

reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you’re suggesting amanwholeaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered.” Assange replied, “Ifthere’ssomeonewho’spotentiallyconnectedtoourpublication,andthatpersonhasbeenmurderedinsuspiciouscircumstances,itdoesn’tnecessarilymeanthatthetwoareconnected.Butitisaveryseriousmatter...thattypeofallegationisveryserious,asit’stakenveryseriouslybyus.”181

After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessmentthatRussiawasbehind thehackingoperation,Assange continued todeny thattheClintonmaterials released byWikiLeaks had come fromRussian hacking.According to media reports, Assange told a U.S. congressman that the DNChackwasan“insidejob,”andpurportedtohave“physicalproof”thatRussiansdidnotgivematerialstoAssange.182

C.AdditionalGRUCyberOperations

While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks,Guccifer2.0,andWikiLeaks,GRUofficerscontinuedtotargetandhackvictimslinkedtotheDemocraticcampaignand,eventually,totargetentitiesresponsibleforelectionadministrationinseveralstates.

1.SummerandFall2016OperationsTargetingDemocrat-LinkedVictims

OnJuly272016,Unit26165targetedemailaccountsconnectedtocandidateClinton’s personal office PP█ █ █. Earlier that day, candidate Trump madepublicstatementsthatincludedthefollowing:“Russia,ifyou’relistening,Ihopeyou’reabletofindthe30,000emailsthataremissing.Ithinkyouwillprobablyberewardedmightilybyourpress.”183The“30,000emails”wereapparentlyareference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored on apersonal server that candidate Clinton had usedwhile serving as Secretary ofState.

Within approximately five hours of Trump’s statement, GRU officerstargeted for the first time Clinton’s personal office. After candidate Trump’sremarks, Unit 26165 created and sent malicious links targeting 15 emailaccounts at the domain PP█ █ █ including an email account belonging toClintonaidePP███The investigationdidnot findevidenceofearlierGRUattempts to compromiseaccountshostedon thisdomain. It isunclearhow the

GRUwasabletoidentifytheseemailaccounts,whichwerenotpublic.184

Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computingservicePersonalPrivacy███OnSeptember20,2016, theGRUbegantogeneratecopiesoftheDNCdatausingPP███functiondesignedtoallow users to produce backups of databases (referred to PP█ █ █as“snapshots”).TheGRUthenstolethosesnapshotsbymovingthemtoPP███account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRU-controlledcomputers.TheGRUstoleapproximately300gigabytesofdatafromtheDNCcloud-basedaccount.185

2.IntrusionsTargetingtheAdministrationofU.S.Elections

InadditiontotargetingindividualsinvolvedintheClintonCampaign,GRUofficers also targeted individuals and entities involved in the administrationoftheelections.VictimsincludedU.S.stateandlocalentities,suchasstateboardsof elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and county governments, aswell asindividuals whoworked for those entities.186 The GRU also targeted privatetechnology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-relatedsoftwareandhardware,suchasvoterregistrationsoftwareandelectronicpolling stations.187 The GRU continued to target these victims through theelectionsinNovember2016.WhiletheinvestigationidentifiedevidencethattheGRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office did not investigatefurther. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or otherrelevantitemsbelongingtothesevictims.TheOfficeunderstandsthattheFBI,the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separatelyinvestigatedthatactivity.

By at least the summer of 2016,GRUofficers sought access to state andlocal computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities onwebsites of state and local governmental entities. GRU officers, for example,targetedstateandlocaldatabasesofregisteredvotersusinga techniqueknownas “SQL injection,” by which malicious code was sent to the state or localwebsite in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the databasecontents).188 In one instance in approximately June 2016, the GRUcompromised thecomputernetworkof the IllinoisStateBoardofElectionsbyexploitingavulnerability in theSBOE’swebsite.TheGRUthengainedaccess

toadatabasecontaininginformationonmillionsofregisteredIllinoisvoters,189and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the maliciousactivitywasidentified.190

GRU officers Investigative Technique█ █ █ scanned state and localwebsites for vulnerabilities. For example, over a two-dayperiod in July 2016,GRUofficersInvestigativeTechnique███forvulnerabilitiesonwebsitesofmore than two dozen states. Investigative Technique█ █ █ InvestigativeTechnique██ █ Similar IT██ █ for vulnerabilities continued through theelection.

Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved inelection administration and personnel at companies involved in votingtechnology. InAugust2016,GRUofficers targetedemployeesofPP███, avoting technology company that developed software used by numerous U.S.countiestomanagevoterrolls,andinstalledmalwareonthecompanynetwork.Similarly, inNovember 2016, theGRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120emailaccountsusedbyFloridacountyofficialsresponsibleforadministeringthe2016U.S. election.191 The spearphishing emails contained an attachedWorddocumentcodedwithmalicioussoftware(commonlyreferredtoasaTrojan)thatpermittedtheGRUtoaccesstheinfectedcomputer.192TheFBIwasseparatelyresponsible for this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that thisoperationenabledtheGRUtogainaccesstothenetworkofatleastoneFloridacountygovernment.TheOfficedidnot independentlyverifythatbeliefand,asexplainedabove,didnotundertaketheinvestigativestepsthatwouldhavebeennecessarytodoso.

D.TrumpCampaignandtheDisseminationofHackedMaterials

The Trump Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks’s releases hackedmaterialsthroughoutthesummerandfallof2016.HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████

1.HOM███

a.Background

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████

b.ContactswiththeCampaignaboutWikiLeaks

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████193HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████OnJune12,2016,Assangeclaimedinatelevisedinterview to “have emails relating to Hillary Clinton which are pendingpublication,”194butprovidednoadditionalcontext.

In debriefings with the Office, former deputy campaign chairman RickGatessaidthat,HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████195HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████GatesrecalledcandidateTrumpbeinggenerallyfrustratedthattheClintonemailshadnotbeenfound.196

Paul Manafort, who would later become campaign chairman, Harm toOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████.197HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████198

MichaelCohen,formerexecutivevicepresidentoftheTrumpOrganizationandspecialcounsel toDonaldJ.Trump,199 told theOffice thatherecalledanincidentinwhichhewasincandidateTrump’sofficeinTrumpTowerHarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████200HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████ █ █ █ █ █ █ 201 Cohen further told the Office that, after WikiLeaks’ssubsequentreleaseofstolenDNCemailsinJuly2016,candidateTrumpsaidtoCohensomethingtoeffectof,HOM███202

HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████AccordingtoGates,ManafortexpressedexcitementaboutthereleaseHOM██ █ █ █ █203 Manafort, for his part, told the Office that, shortly afterWikiLeaks’sJuly22release,ManafortalsospokewithcandidateTrumpHarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████204HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████205ManafortalsoHOM███wantedtobekeptapprisedofanydevelopmentswithWikiLeaksandseparately toldGates tokeepin touchHOM███aboutfutureWikiLeaksreleases.206

AccordingtoGates,bythelatesummerof2016,theTrumpCampaignwasplanningapressstrategy,acommunicationscampaign,andmessagingbasedonthe possible release of Clinton emails by WikiLeaks.207Harm to OngoingMatter██████████████████████.208Harm toOngoingMatter██████████████████████whileTrump and Gates were driving to LaGuardia Airport. Harm to OngoingMatter██████████████████████,shortlyafterthecallcandidateTrumptoldGatesthatmorereleasesofdamaginginformationwouldbecoming.209

HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████210

c.HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████211Corsiisanauthorwhoholdsadoctorateinpoliticalscience212In2016,Corsi also worked for the media outlet WorldNetDaily (WND). Harm toOngoingMatter██████████████████████213

HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████

████████214Corsi told theOffice during interviews that he “musthave” previously discussedAssangewithMalloch.215█████Harm toOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████216HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████217

Grand Jury██████████████████According toMalloch, Corsi asked him to put Corsi in touch with Assange, whom Corsiwishedtointerview.MallochrecalledthatCorsialsosuggestedthatindividualsinthe“orbit”ofU.K.politicianNigelFaragemightbeabletocontactAssangeandaskedifMallochknewthem.MallochtoldCorsithathewouldthinkabouttherequestbutmadenoactualattempttoconnectCorsiwithAssange.218

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████219HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████220

Mallochstatedto investigators thatbeginninginoraboutAugust2016,heand Corsi had multiple FaceTime discussions about WikiLeaks Harm toOngoingMatter███hadmadeaconnectiontoAssangeandthatthehackedemailsof JohnPodestawouldbe releasedprior toElectionDayandwouldbehelpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or around August orSeptember2016,Corsi toldMallochthat thereleaseof thePodestaemailswascoming,afterwhich“we”weregoingtobeinthedriver’sseat.221

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████222HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████223HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████224HarmtoOngoingMatter███████

█████████████████████████████225

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████226HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████227HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████228)

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████229HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████230██████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████231HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████232

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████233HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████234HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████235██████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████236HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████.237█████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████238

d.WikiLeaks’sOctober7,2016ReleaseofStolenPodestaEmails

OnOctober7,2016,fourdaysaftertheAssangepressconferenceHOM███, the Washington Post published an Access Hollywood video that capturedcomments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to

adversely affect the Campaign.239 Less than an hour after the video’spublication,WikiLeaksreleasedthefirstsetofemailsstolenbytheGRUfromtheaccountofClintonCampaignchairmanJohnPodesta.

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████.240HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████.241HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████242

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████243HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████████Corsisaidthat,becausehehadnodirectmeansofcommunicatingwithWikiLeaks,he toldmembersof thenewssiteWND—whowereparticipatingonaconferencecallwithhimthatday—toreachAssange immediately.244Corsi claimed that thepressurewas enormousand recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape wascoming.245 Corsi stated that he was convinced that his efforts had causedWikiLeaks to release the emailswhen they did.246 In a laterNovember 2018interview, Corsi stated that he thought that he had told people on a WNDconference call about the forthcoming tape and had sent out a tweet askingwhether anyone could contactAssange, but then said thatmaybehehaddonenothing.247

TheOffice investigatedCorsi’s allegations about the events ofOctober 7,2016butfoundlittlecorroborationforhisallegationsabout theday.248HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████.249HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████250However,thephonerecordsthemselvesdonotindicatethat the conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the AccessHollywood story, and the Office has not otherwise been able to identify thesubstanceoftheconversation.HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████

██████████████████████████████████.251However,theOfficehasnotidentifiedanyconferencecallparticipant,oranyone who spoke to Corsi that day, who says that they received non-publicinformation about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having contacted amemberofWikiLeaksonOctober7,2016afteraconversationwithCorsi.

e.DonaldTrumpJr.InteractionwithWikiLeaks

Donald Trump Jr. had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaksduringthecampaignperiod.OnSeptember20,2016,anindividualnamedJasonFishbein sentWikiLeaks the password for an unlaunched website focused onTrump’s “unprecedented and dangerous” ties to Russia, PutinTrump.org.252WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: ‘“Let’s bomb Iraq’ Progress forAmerica PAC tolaunch “PutinTrump.org’ at 9:30am.Oops pw is ‘putintrump’ putintrump.org.”Severalhours later,WikiLeakssentaTwitterdirectmessage toDonaldTrumpJr.,“APACrunanti-Trumpsiteputintrump.orgisabouttolaunch.ThePACisarecycledpro-IraqwarPAC.Wehaveguessed thepassword. It is ‘putintrump.’See‘About’forwhoisbehindit.Anycomments?”253

Severalhourslater,TrumpJr.emailedavarietyofseniorcampaignstaff:

Guys I got aweirdTwitterDM fromwikileaks. See below. I tried thepasswordanditworksandtheaboutsectiontheyreferencecontainsthenextpic in termsofwhoisbehindit.Notsure if this isanythingbut itseems like it’s reallywikileaks askingme as I follow them and it is aDM.Doyouknowthepeoplementionedandwhat theconspiracy theyarelookingforcouldbe?Thesearejustscreenshotsbutit’safullybuiltoutpageclaimingtobeaPACletmeknowyourthoughtsandifwewanttolookintoit.254

Trump Jr. attached a screenshot of the “About” page for the unlaunched sitePutinTrump.org.Thenextday(afterthewebsitehadlaunchedpublicly),TrumpJr.sentadirectmessagetoWikiLeaks:“Offtherecord,Idon’tknowwhothatisbutI’llaskaround.Thanks.”255

OnOctober3,2016,WikiLeaks sent anotherdirectmessage toTrumpJr.,asking “you guys” to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had

advocatedusingadrone to target JulianAssange.TrumpJr. responded thathealready“haddone so,” and asked, “what’sbehind thisWednesday leak I keepreadingabout?”256WikiLeaksdidnotrespond.

OnOctober12,2016,WikiLeakswroteagainthat itwas“great toseeyouandyourdad talkingaboutourpublications.Strongly suggestyourdad tweetsthislinkifhementionsuswlsearch.tk.”257WikiLeakswrotethatthelinkwouldhelp Trump in “digging through” leaked emails and stated, “we just releasedPodesta emails Part 4.”258 Two days later, Trump Jr. publicly tweeted thewlsearch.tklink.259

2.OtherPotentialCampaignInterestinRussianHackedMaterials

Throughout 2016, the Trump Campaign expressed interest in HillaryClinton’s private email server andwhether approximately 30,000 emails fromthat server had in fact been permanently destroyed, as reported by themedia.SeveralindividualsassociatedwiththeCampaignwerecontactedin2016aboutvariouseffortstoobtainthemissingClintonemailsandotherstolenmaterialinsupport of the Trump Campaign. Some of these contacts were met withskepticism,andnothingcameofthem;otherswerepursuedtosomedegree.TheinvestigationdidnotfindevidencethattheTrumpCampaignrecoveredanysuchClintonemails,orthatthesecontactswerepartofacoordinatedeffortbetweenRussiaandtheTrumpCampaign.

a.HenryOknyansky(a/k/aHenryGreenberg)

In the spring of 2016, Trump Campaign advisorMichael Caputo learnedthrough a Florida-based Russian business partner that another Florida-basedRussian, Henry Oknyansky (who also went by the name Henry Greenberg),claimedtohaveinformationpertainingtoHillaryClinton.CaputonotifiedRogerStoneandbrokeredcommunicationbetweenStoneandOknyansky.OknyanskyandStonesetupaMay2016in-personmeeting.260

Oknyanskywasaccompanied to themeetingbyAlexeiRasin,aUkrainianassociate involved in Florida real estate.At themeeting,Rasin offered to sellStone derogatory information on Clinton that Rasin claimed to have obtainedwhile working for Clinton. Rasin claimed to possess financial statements

demonstrating Clinton’s involvement in money laundering with Rasin’scompanies. According to Oknyansky, Stone asked if the amounts in questiontotaledmillionsofdollarsbutwas told itwascloser tohundredsof thousands.Stone refused the offer, stating that Trump would not pay for oppositionresearch.261

Oknyansky claimed to the Office that Rasin’s motivation was financial.According to Oknyansky, Rasin had tried unsuccessfully to shop the Clintoninformationaround toother interestedparties,andOknyanskywouldreceiveacutiftheinformationwassold.262Rasinisnotedinpublicsourcedocumentsasthedirectorand/orregisteredagentforanumberofFloridacompanies,noneofwhichappears tobeconnected toClinton.TheOfficefoundnootherevidencethatRasinworkedforClintonoranyClinton-relatedentities.

In their statements to investigators, Oknyansky and Caputo hadcontradictory recollections about themeeting.Oknyansky claimed thatCaputoaccompanied Stone to the meeting and provided an introduction, whereasCaputodidnot tellus thathehadattendedandclaimedthathewasnever toldwhat informationOknyansky offered. Caputo also stated that hewas unawareOknyanskysoughttobepaidfortheinformationuntilStoneinformedhimafterthefact.263

TheOffice did not locate Rasin in theUnited States, although theOfficeconfirmedRasinhadbeenissuedaFloridadriver’slicense.TheOfficeotherwisewasunabletodeterminethecontentandoriginoftheinformationhepurportedlyoffered to Stone. Finally, the investigation did not identify evidence of aconnectionbetweentheoutreachorthemeetingandRussianinterferenceefforts.

b.CampaignEffortstoObtainDeletedClintonEmails

AftercandidateTrumpstatedonJuly27,2016,thathehopedRussiawould“find the 30,000 emails that are missing,” Trump asked individuals affiliatedwithhisCampaigntofindthedeletedClintonemails.264MichaelFlynn—whowould later serveasNationalSecurityAdvisor in theTrumpAdministration—recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly, and Flynn subsequentlycontactedmultiplepeopleinanefforttoobtaintheemails.265

BarbaraLedeenandPeterSmithwereamongthepeoplecontactedbyFlynn.Ledeen, a long-time Senate staffer who had previously sought the Clintonemails, providedupdates toFlynn about her efforts throughout the summerof2016.266Smith, an investment advisorwhowasactive inRepublicanpolitics,alsoattemptedtolocateandobtainthedeletedClintonemails.267

LedeenbeganhereffortstoobtaintheClintonemailsbeforeFlynn’srequest,as early as December 2015.268 On December 3, 2015, she emailed Smith aproposaltoobtaintheemails,stating,“HereistheproposalIbrieflymentionedtoyou.ThepersonIdescribedtoyouwouldbehappytotalkwithyoueitherinpersonoroverthephone.Thepersoncangettheemailswhich1.Wereclassifiedand2.Werepurloinedbyourenemies.Thatwoulddemonstratewhatneedstobedemonstrated.”269

Attachedtotheemailwasa25-pageproposalstatingthatthe“Clintonemailserverwas,inalllikelihood,breachedlongago,”andthattheChinese,Russian,and Iranian intelligence services could “re-assemble the server’s emailcontent.”270 The proposal called for a three-phase approach. The first twophasesconsistedofopen-sourceanalysis.Thethirdphaseconsistedofcheckingwith certain intelligence sources “that have access through liaison work withvariousforeignservices”todetermineifanyofthoseserviceshadgottentotheserver. The proposal noted, “Even if a single email was recovered and theprovidence[sic]ofthatemailwasaforeignservice,itwouldbecatastrophictothe Clinton campaign[.]” Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues andwrote, “we can discuss towhom it should be referred.”271OnDecember 16,2015,SmithinformedLedeenthathedeclinedtoparticipateinher“initiative.”According to one of Smith’s business associates, Smith believed Ledeen’sinitiativewasnotviableatthattime.272

Just weeks after Trump’s July 2016 request to find the Clinton emails,however, Smith tried to locate and obtain the emails himself. He created acompany,raisedtensofthousandsofdollars,andrecruitedsecurityexpertsandbusiness associates. Smith made claims to others involved in the effort (andthose fromwhomhesought funding) thathewas incontactwithhackerswith“tiesandaffiliationstoRussia”whohadaccesstotheemails,andthathiseffortswerecoordinatedwiththeTrumpCampaign.273

OnAugust28,2016,Smithsentanemail fromanencryptedaccountwiththesubject“Sec.Clinton’sunsecuredprivateemailserver”toanundisclosedlistof recipients, including Campaign co-chairman Sam Clovis. The email statedthatSmithwas“[j]ustfinishingtwodaysofsensitivemeetingshereinDCwithinvolved groups to poke and probe on the above. It is clear that theClinton’shome-based, unprotected server was hacked with ease by both State-relatedplayers, and privatemercenaries. Partieswith varying interests, are circling toreleaseaheadoftheelection.”274

OnSeptember2,2016,SmithdirectedabusinessassociatetoestablishKLSResearch LLC in furtherance of his search for the deletedClinton emails.275OneofthepurposesofKLSResearchwastomanagethefundsSmithraisedinsupport of his initiative.276 KLS Research received over $30,000 during thepresidential campaign, although Smith represented that he raised even moremoney.277

Smithrecruitedmultiplepeopleforhisinitiative,includingsecurityexpertstosearchforandauthenticatetheemails.278InearlySeptember2016,aspartofhisrecruitmentandfundraisingeffort,Smithcirculatedadocumentstatingthathis initiative was “in coordination” with the Trump Campaign, “to the extentpermittedasanindependentexpenditureorganization.”279Thedocumentlistedmultiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign, including Flynn,Clovis,Bannon, andKellyanneConway.280The investigation established thatSmith communicated with at least Flynn and Clovis about his search for thedeletedClintonemails,281but theOfficedidnot identifyevidence thatanyofthelistedindividualsinitiatedordirectedSmith’sefforts.

In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touchwith each otherabout their respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, “wondering if you hadsomemoredetailedreportsormemosorotherdatayoucouldsharebecausewehavecomealongwayinoureffortssincewelastvisited....Wewouldneedasmuchtechnicaldiscussionaspossiblesowecouldmarryitagainstthenewdatawehavefoundandthencouldshareitbacktoyou‘youreyesonly.’”282

Ledeenclaimedtohaveobtainedatroveofemails(fromwhatshedescribedas the “dark web”) that purported to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen

wantedtoauthenticatetheemailsandsolicitedcontributionstofundthateffort.ErikPrinceprovidedfundingtohireatechadvisortoascertaintheauthenticityof theemails.AccordingtoPrince, thetechadvisordeterminedthat theemailswerenotauthentic.283

A backup of Smith’s computer contained two files that had beendownloaded from WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emailsreceivedbyJohnPodesta.ThefilesonSmith’scomputerhadcreationdatesofOctober 2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release byWikiLeaks.Forensicexamination,however,establishedthatthecreationdatedidnotreflectwhen the fileswere downloaded to Smith’s computer. (It appears the creationdate was when WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed inVolume I, Section III.B.3.c, supra.284 ) The investigation did not otherwiseidentifyevidencethatSmithobtainedthefilesbeforetheirreleasebyWikiLeaks.

Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list aboutClinton’s deleted emails until shortly before the election. For example, onOctober 28, 2016, Smith wrote that there was a “tug-of-war going on withinWikiLeaksoveritsplannedreleasesinthenextfewdays,”andthatWikiLeaks“hasmaintainedthatitwillsaveitsbestrevelationsforlast,underthetheorythisallows little time for response prior to theU.S. electionNovember 8.”285AnattachmenttotheemailclaimedthatWikiLeakswouldrelease“All33kdeletedEmails” by “November 1st.” No emails obtained from Clinton’s server weresubsequentlyreleased.

Smith draftedmultiple emails stating or intimating that hewas in contactwithRussian hackers. For example, in one such email, Smith claimed that, inAugust 2016, KLS Research had organized meetings with parties who hadaccesstothedeletedClintonemails,includingpartieswith“tiesandaffiliationsto Russia.”286 The investigation did not identify evidence that any suchmeetingsoccurred.AssociatesandsecurityexpertswhoworkedwithSmithontheinitiativedidnotbelievethatSmithwasincontactwithRussianhackersandwere awareofno suchconnection.287The investigationdidnot establish thatSmith was in contact with Russian hackers or that Smith, Ledeen, or otherindividuals in touchwith theTrumpCampaignultimatelyobtained thedeletedClintonemails.

***

In sum, the investigation established that the GRU hacked into emailaccounts of persons affiliated with the Clinton Campaign, as well as thecomputersoftheDNCandDCCC.TheGRUthenexfiltrateddatarelatedtothe2016 election from these accounts and computers, and disseminated that datathroughfictitiousonlinepersonas(DCLeaksandGuccifer2.0)andlaterthroughWikiLeaks. The investigation also established that the Trump Campaigndisplayed interest in the WikiLeaks releases, and that Harm to OngoingMatter█████████████████████████AsexplainedinVolumeI,SectionV.B,infra,theevidencewassufficienttosupportcomputer-intrusion (and other) charges against GRU officers for their role in election-relatedhacking.HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████

109AsdiscussedinSectionVbelow,ourOfficecharged12GRUofficersforcrimesarisingfromthehackingofthesecomputers,principallywithconspiringtocommitcomputerintrusions,inviolationof18U.S.C.§§1030and371.SeeVolumeI,SectionV.B,infra;Indictment,UnitedStatesv.Netyksho,No.1:18-cr-215(D.D.C.July13,2018),Doc.1(“NetykshoIndictment”).

110NetykshoIndictment¶1.

111SeparatefromthisOffice’sindictmentofGRUofficers,inOctober2018agrandjurysittingintheWestern District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain members of Unit 26165 withhacking the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and other international sportassociations.UnitedStatesv.AlekseiSergeyevichMorenets,No.18-263(W.D.Pa.).

112Aspearphishing(IAEN)emailisdesignedtoappearasthoughitoriginatesfromatrustedsource,andsolicitsinformationtoenablethesendertogainaccesstoanaccountornetwork,orcausestherecipienttodownloadmalwarethatenablesthesendertogainaccesstoanaccountornetwork.NetykshoIndictment¶10.

113Bitcoinmining (IAEN) consists of unlocking newbitcoins by solving computational problems.IT███kept its newlymined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platformCEX.io.Tomakepurchases,theGRUroutedfundsintootheraccountsthroughtransactionsdesignedtoobscurethesourceoffunds.NetykshoIndictment¶62.

114NetykshoIndictment¶69.

115NetykshoIndictment¶9.

116SeeSM-2589105,serials144&495.

117InvestigativeTechnique█████████

118InvestigativeTechnique███

119InvestigativeTechnique███████████

120AVPNextendsaprivatenetwork,allowinguserstosendandreceivedataacrosspublicnetworks(suchastheinternet)asiftheconnectingcomputerwasdirectlyconnectedtotheprivatenetwork.TheVPNin this case had been created to give a small number of DCCC employees access to certain databaseshoused on the DNC network. Therefore, while the DCCC employees were outside the DNC’s privatenetwork,theycouldaccesspartsoftheDNCnetworkfromtheirDCCCcomputers(IAEN).

121InvestigativeTechnique███████████████████████SM-2589105-HACK,serial5.

122InvestigativeTechnique███████████████████████M-2589105-HACK,serial5.

123“Malware”isshortformalicioussoftware(IAEN),andherereferstosoftwaredesignedtoallowathirdpartytoinfiltrateacomputerwithouttheconsentorknowledgeofthecomputer’suseroroperator.

124InvestigativeTechnique███████████████████████

125InvestigativeTechnique███████████████████████

126 Inconnectionwith these intrusions, theGRUusedcomputers(IAEN) (virtualprivatenetworks,dedicatedserversoperatedbyhostingcompanies,etc.)thatitleasedfromthird-partyproviderslocatedallovertheworld.Theinvestigationidentifiedrentalagreementsandpaymentsforcomputerslocatedin,interalia,InvestigativeTechnique███allofwhichwereusedintheoperationstargetingtheU.S.election.

127NetykshoIndictment¶25.

128NetykshoIndictment¶24(c).

129NetykshoIndictment¶24(b).

130NetykshoIndictment¶¶27-29;InvestigativeTechnique███

131InvestigativeTechnique███

132InvestigativeTechnique██████

133InvestigativeTechnique████████████████████████████████████████████

134InvestigativeTechnique██████SM-2589105-HACK,serial5.InvestigativeTechnique██████

135InvestigativeTechnique██████████SeeSM-2589105-GJ,serial649.Aspartofitsinvestigation, theFBI later received imagesofDNCserversandcopiesof relevant traffic logs.NetykshoIndictment¶¶28-29.

136NetykshoIndictment¶29.Thelast-in-timeDNCemailreleasedbyWikiLeakswasdatedMay25,2016,thesameperiodoftimeduringwhichtheGRUgainedaccesstotheDNC’semailserver.NetykshoIndictment¶45.

137NetykshoIndictment¶35.Approximatelyaweekbeforetheregistrationofdcleaks.com,thesameactors attempted to register the website electionleaks.com using the same domain registration service.InvestigativeTechnique██████

138SeeSM-2589105,serial181;NetykshoIndictment¶21(a).

139InvestigativeTechnique██████████████████

140 See, e.g., Internet Archive, “https://dcleaks.com/” (archive date Nov. 10, 2016). Additionally,DCLeaksreleaseddocumentsrelatingtoPersonalPrivacy█████████,emailsbelongingtoPP██████,andemailsfrom2015relatingtoRepublicanPartyemployees(undertheportfolioname“TheUnitedStatesRepublicanParty”).“TheUnitedStatesRepublicanParty”portfoliocontainedapproximately300emailsfromavarietyofGOPmembers,PACs,campaigns,stateparties,andbusinessesdatedbetweenMay and October 2015. According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same Tennessee-basedweb-hosting company, called SmartechCorporation.WilliamBastone,RNCE-MailWas, In Fact,HackedByRussians,TheSmokingGun(Dec.13,2016).

141NetykshoIndictment¶38.

142See,e.g.,FacebookAccount100008825623541(AliceDonovan).

1437/14/16FacebookMessage,ID793058100795341(DCLeaks)toIDPersonalPrivacy████

144See,e.g., 9/14/16TwitterDM,@dcleaks_ toPersonalPrivacy█████████; 9/14/16Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to Personal Privacy█ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █. The messages read: “Hihttps://t.co/QTvKUjQcOxpass:KvFsg%*14@gPgu&enjoy;).”

145 Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee,CrowdStrikeBlog(June14,2016).CrowdStrikeupdateditspostaftertheJune15,2016postbyGuccifer2.0claimingresponsibilityfortheintrusion.

146NetykshoIndictment¶¶41-42.

147ReleasesofdocumentsontheGuccifer2.0blogoccurredonJune15,2016;June20,2016;June21,2016; July6,2016; July14,2016;August12,2016;August15,2016;August21,2016;August31,2016;September15,2016;September23,2016;October4,2016;andOctober18,2016.

1486/27/16Email,guccifer20@aol.frtoPersonalPrivacy██████████████████(subject“leakedemails”);IT█████████.

1496/27/16Email,guccifer20@aol.frtoPersonalPrivacy███(subject“leakedemails”);IT███;

seealso6/27/16Email,guccifer20@aol.frtoPersonalPrivacy███(subject“leakedemails”);IT███(claimingDCLeakswasa“Wikileakssubproject”).

150 Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in anapparentefforttodeflectattentionfromthefactthatDCLeaksandGuccifer2.0wereoperatedbythesameorganization (IAEN), the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent the reporter an email stating that DCLeaks was a“Wikileakssubproject”andthatGuccifer2.0hadaskedDCLeakstoreleasetheleakedemailswith“closedaccess”togivereportersapreviewofthem.

151NetykshoIndictment¶43(a).

152NetykshoIndictment¶43(b).

153NetykshoIndictment¶43(c).

154HOM███

155HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████

15611/19/15TwitterGroupChat,GroupID594242937858486276,@WikiLeaksetal.Assangealsowrote that,“GOPwillgeneratea lotopposition[sic], including throughdumbmoves.Hillarywilldo thesamething,butco-opttheliberaloppositionandtheGOPopposition.HencehillaryhasgreaterfreedomtostartwarsthantheGOPandhasthewilltodoso.”Id.

157WikiLeaks,“HillaryClintonEmailArchive,”availableathttps://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/.

1583/14/16TwitterDM,@WikiLeakstoPP███Lessthantwoweeksearlier,thesameaccounthadbeenused to sendaprivatemessageopposing the ideaofClinton“inwhitehousewithherbloodlutt andamitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees.” 11/19/15 Twitter Group Chat,GroupID594242937858486276,@WikiLeaksetal.

1596/14/16TwitterDM,@dcleaks_to@WikiLeaks.

160NetykshoIndictment¶47(a).

1617/6/16TwitterDMs,@WikiLeaks&@guccifer_2.

162InvestigativeTechnique██████████████████

163Thiswas not theGRU’s first attempt at transferringdata toWikiLeaks.On June 29, 2016, theGRU used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send a large encrypted file to aWikiLeaks email account.6/29/16Email,guccifer2@mail.comIT█████████(Theemailappearstohavebeenundelivered.)

164SeeSM-2589105-DCLEAKS,serial28(analysis).

1656/27/16TwitterDM,@Guccifer_2to@WikiLeaks.

1667/18/16TwitterDM,@Guccifer_2&@WikiLeaks.

167“DNCEmailArchive,”WikiLeaks(Jul.22,2016),availableathttps://wikileaks.org/dnc-emails.

1689/15/16TwitterDM,@dcleaks_to@WikiLeaks.

1699/15/16TwitterDM,@guccifer_2to@dcleaks_.

170SeeSM-2589105-DCLEAKS,serial28;9/15/16TwitterDM,@Guccifer_2&@WikiLeaks.

171SeeSM-2284941,serials63&64InvestigativeTechnique█████████

172InvestigativeTechnique█████████Atthetime,certainAppleoperatingsystemsusedasettingthatleftadownloadedfile’screationdatethesameasthecreationdateshownonthehostcomputer.ThiswouldexplainwhythecreationdateonWikiLeaks’sversionofthefileswasstillSeptember19,2016.SeeSM-2284941,serial62InvestigativeTechnique█████████

173 When WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails (IAEN), its computersystemappears tohave treatedeachattachment as anew file andgiven it anewcreationdate.SeeSM-2284941,serials63&64.

174See9/22/16Email,dcleaksproject@gmail.comIT██████

175EllenNakashimaetal.,AGermanHackerOffersaRareLookInsidetheSecretiveWorldofJulianAssangeandWikiLeaks,WashingtonPost(Jan.17,2018).

176InvestigativeTechnique██████

177PersonalPrivacy██████

178PersonalPrivacy██████

179NetykshoIndictment¶43.

180@WikiLeaks8/9/16Tweet.

181SeeAssange:“MurderedDNCStafferWas ‘Potential’WikiLeaksSource,” FoxNews (Aug. 25,2016)(containingvideoofAssangeinterviewbyMegynKelly).

182M.Raju&Z.Cohen,AGOPCongressman’sLonelyQuestDefendingJulianAssange,CNN(May23,2018).

183 “Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails,” YouTube Channel C-SPAN,Posted7/27/16,availableathttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU(startingat0:41).

184InvestigativeTechnique██████

185NetykshoIndictment¶34;seealsoSM-2589105-HACK,serial29InvestigativeTechnique███.

186NetykshoIndictment¶69.

187NetykshoIndictment¶69;InvestigativeTechnique██████

188InvestigativeTechnique██████

189InvestigativeTechnique██████

190InvestigativeTechnique██████

191NetykshoIndictment¶76;InvestigativeTechnique██████

192InvestigativeTechnique██████

193HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████

194SeeMahitaGajanan,JulianAssangeTimedDNCEmailReleaseforDemocraticConvention,Time(July27,2016)(quotingtheJune12,2016televisioninterview).

195 InFebruary2018,Gatespleadedguilty,pursuant toapleaagreement, toasupersedingcriminalinformationcharginghimwithconspiringtodefraudandcommitmultipleoffenses(i.e.,taxfraud,failuretoreportforeignbankaccounts,andactingasanunregisteredagentofaforeignprincipal)againsttheUnitedStates,aswellasmakingfalsestatementstoourOffice.SupersedingCriminalInformation,UnitedStatesv.Richard W. Gates III, l:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195 (“Gates Superseding CriminalInformation”);PleaAgreement,UnitedStatesv.RichardW.GatesIII,1:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Feb.23,2018),Doc.205(“GatesPleaAgreement”).Gateshasprovidedinformationandin-courttestimonythattheOfficehasdeemedtobereliable.

196Gates10/25/18302,at1-2.

197AsexplainedfurtherinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.8,infra,ManafortenteredintoapleaagreementwithourOffice.Wedeterminedthathebreachedtheagreementbybeinguntruthfulinproffersessionsandbeforethegrandjury(IAEN).Wehavegenerallyrecountedhisversionofeventsinthisreportonlywhenhis statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy; to identify issues on which Manafort’suntruthful responsesmay themselves be of evidentiary value; or to provideManafort’s explanations forcertainevents,evenwhenwewereunabletodeterminewhetherthatexplanationwascredible.Hisaccountappearshereprincipallybecauseitalignswiththoseofotherwitnesses.

198GrandJury█████████

199 In November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-countinformationcharginghimwithmakingfalsestatementstoCongress,inviolationof18U.S.C.§1001(a)&(c). He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney’sOfficeintheSouthernDistrictofNewYork,afterareferralfromthisOffice.Inthemonthsleadinguptohisfalse-statementsguiltyplea,CohenmetwithourOfficeonmultipleoccasionsforinterviewsandprovidedinformationthattheOfficehasgenerallyassessedtobereliableandthatisincludedinthisreport.

200HOM██████

201HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████

202Cohen9/18/18302,at10.HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████

203Gates10/25/18302(serial241),at4.

204GrandJury█████████

205GrandJury█████████

206GrandJury█████████

207Gates4/10/18302,at3;Gates4/11/18302,at1-2(SM-2180998);Gates10/25/18302,at2.

208HOM█████████

209Gates10/25/18302(serial241),at4.

210HOM█████████

211HOM█████████

212 Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his bookUnfit forCommand:SwiftBoatVeteransSpeakOutAgainst JohnKerry. In the 2008 election cycle,Corsi gainedprominenceforbeingaleadingproponentoftheallegationthatBarackObamawasnotbornintheUnitedStates.Corsi toldtheOfficethatDonaldTrumpexpressedinterest inhiswritings,andthathespokewithTrumponthephoneonatleastsixoccasions.Corsi9/6/18302,at3.

213Corsi10/31/18302,at2;GrandJury██████CorsiwasfirstinterviewedonSeptember6,2018attheSpecialCounsel’sofficesinWashington,D.C.Hewasaccompaniedbycounselthroughouttheinterview.Corsiwas subsequently interviewedonSeptember17,2018;September21,2018;October31,2018;November1,2018;andNovember2,2018.Counselwaspresentforallinterviews,andtheinterviewsbeginning on September 21, 2018 were conducted pursuant to a proffer agreement that precludedaffirmativeuseofhisstatementsagainsthiminlimitedcircumstances.

214HOM████████████

215Corsi10/31/18302,at4.

216HOM████████████

217HOM████████████

218GrandJury███MallochdeniedevercommunicatingwithAssangeorWikiLeaks,statingthathedidnotpursue therequest tocontactAssangebecausehebelievedhehadnoconnections toAssange.GrandJury███

219HOM███

220HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

221GrandJury█████████████████████

222HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████

223HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

224HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

225HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

226HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

227HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

228HOM███

229HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

230HarmtoOngoingMatter█████

231HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

232HOM███

233HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

234HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

235HarmtoOngoingMatter

236HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

237HOM███

238HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

239CandidateTrumpcanbeheardoffcameramakinggraphicstatementsaboutwomen.

240HOM█████████

241HOM█████████

242HOM█████████

243HOM█████████

244InalaterNovember2018interview,CorsistatedHarmtoOngoingMatter████████that he believedMalloch was on the call but then focused on other individuals who were on the call-invitation,whichMallochwasnot.(Separatetravelrecordsshowthatatthetimeofthecall,Mallochwasaboarda transatlantic flight).Corsi atonepoint stated that afterWikiLeaks’s releaseof stolenemailsonOctober7,2016,heconcludedMallochhadgottenincontactwithAssange.Corsi11/1/18302,at6.

245Duringthesameinterview,CorsialsosuggestedthathemayhavesentoutpublictweetsbecauseheknewAssangewasreadinghistweets.OurOfficewasunabletofindevidenceofanysuchtweets.

246Corsi9/21/18302,at6-7.

247Corsi11/1/18302,at6.

248HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████GrandJury█████████

249HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

250HOM████GrandJury███HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

251HOM███GrandJury███HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████GrandJury███HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████

2529/20/16TwitterDM,@JasonFishbeinto@WikiLeaks;seeJF00587(9/21/16Messages,PP███@jabber.cryptoparty.is&PP███@jabber.cryptoparty.is);Fishbein9/5/18302,at4.When interviewedby our Office, Fishbein produced what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom (IAEN) in which theparticipantsdiscussedU.S.politics;oneoftheotherparticipantshadpostedthewebsiteandpasswordthatFishbeinsenttoWikiLeaks.

2539/20/16TwitterDM,@WikiLeaksto@DonaldJTrumpJr.

254TRUMPORG_28_000629-33(9/21/16Email,TrumpJr.toConwayetal.(subject“Wikileaks”)).

2559/21/16TwitterDM,@DonaldJTrumpJrto@WikiLeaks.

25610/3/16TwitterDMs,@DonaldJTrumpJr&@WikiLeaks.

257Atthetime,thelinktookuserstoaWikiLeaksarchiveofstolenClintonCampaigndocuments.

25810/12/16TwitterDM,@WikiLeaksto@DonaldJTrumpJr.

259@DonaldJTrumpJr10/14/16(6:34a.m.)Tweet.

260Caputo5/2/18302,at4;Oknyansky7/13/18302,atl.

261Oknyansky7/13/18302,at1-2.

262Oknyansky7/13/18302,at2.

263Caputo5/2/18302,at4;Oknyansky7/13/18302,atl.

264Flynn4/25/18302,at5-6;Flynn5/1/18302,at1-3.

265Flynn5/1/18302,atl-3.

266Flynn4/25/18302,at7;Flynn5/4/18302,at1-2;Flynn11/29/17302,at7-8.

267Flynn11/29/17302,at7.

268Szobocsan3/29/17302,at1.

26912/3/15Email,LedeentoSmith.

27012/3/15Email,LedeentoSmith(attachment).

27112/3/15Email,SmithtoSzobocsan&Safron.

272Szobocsan3/29/18302,at1.

2738/31/16Email,SmithtoSmith.

2748/28/16Email,SmithtoSmith.

275IncorporationpapersofKLSResearchLLC,7/26/17GrandJury███Szobocsan3/29/18302,at2.

276Szobocsan3/29/18302,at3.

277FinancialInstitutionRecordofPeterSmithandKLSResearchLLC,10/31/17█████████GrandJury███Sept.9,2016).10/11/16Email,SmithtoPersonalPrivacy███

278Tait8/22/17302,at3;York7/12/17302,at1-2;York11/22/17302,at1.

279York7/13/17302 (attachmentKLSResearch,LLC, “ClintonEmailReconnaissance Initiative,”Sept.9,2016).

280 The same recruitment document listed Jerome Corsi under “IndependentGroups/Organizations/Individuals,”anddescribedhimasan“establishedauthorandwriterfromtherightonPresidentObamaandSec.Clinton.”

281Flynn11/29/17302,at7-8;10/15/16Email,SmithtoFlynnetal.;8/28/16Email,SmithtoSmith(bcc:Clovisetal.).

2829/16/16Email,LedeentoSmith.

283Prince4/4/18302,at4-5.

284TheforensicanalysisofSmith’scomputerdevicesfoundthatSmithusedanolderAppleoperating

systemthatwouldhavepreservedthatOctober2,2016creationdatewhenitwasdownloaded(nomatterwhatdayitwasinfactdownloadedbySmith).SeeVolumeI,SectionIII.B.3.c,supra.TheOfficetestedthistheoryinMarch2019bydownloadingthetwofilesfoundonSmith’scomputerfromWikiLeaks’ssiteusingthe same Apple operating system on Smith’s computer; both files were successfully downloaded andretainedtheOctober2,2016creationdate.SeeSM-2284941(IAEN),serial62.

28510/28/16Email,SmithtoSmith.

2868/31/16Email,SmithtoSmith.

287Safron3/20/18302,at3;Szobocsan3/29/18302,at6.

IV.RUSSIANGOVERNMENTLINKSTOANDCONTACTSWITHTHETRUMPCAMPAIGN

The Office identified multiple contacts—“links,” in the words of theAppointment Order—between TrumpCampaign officials and individuals withties totheRussiangovernment.TheOfficeinvestigatedwhether thosecontactsconstitutedathirdavenueofattemptedRussianinterferencewithorinfluenceonthe2016presidentialelection.Inparticular,theinvestigationexaminedwhetherthese contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with theTrump Campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providingassistancetotheCampaigninexchangeforanysortoffavorabletreatmentinthefuture. Based on the available information, the investigation did not establishsuchcoordination.

ThisSectiondescribestheprincipallinksbetweentheTrumpCampaignandindividualswith ties to theRussiangovernment, including some contactswithCampaign officials or associates that have been publicly reported to involveRussian contacts. Each subsection begins with an overview of the Russiancontact at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts, which aregenerallypresented inchronologicalorder,beginningwith theearlymonthsoftheCampaignandextendingthroughthepost-election,transitionperiod.

A.CampaignPeriod(September2015–November8,2016)

Russian-government-connected individuals and media entities beganshowing interest in Trump’s campaign in the months after he announced hiscandidacy in June 2015.288 Because Trump’s status as a public figure at thetime was attributable in large part to his prior business and entertainmentdealings,thisOfficeinvestigatedwhetherabusinesscontactwithRussia-linkedindividualsandentitiesduringthecampaignperiod—theTrumpTowerMoscowproject,seeVolumeI,SectionIV.A.1,infra—ledtoorinvolvedcoordinationofelectionassistance.

Outreach from individualswith ties toRussia continued in the spring andsummerof2016,whenTrumpwasmovingtoward—andeventuallybecoming—the Republican nominee for President. As set forth below, the Office alsoevaluatedaseriesoflinksduringthisperiod:outreachtotwoofTrump’sthen-

recently named foreign policy advisors, including a representation that Russiahad “dirt” onClinton in the form of thousands of emails (Volume I, SectionsIV.A.2 & IV.A.3); dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes inRussia andhas connectionswith itsgovernment (Volume I,Section IV.A.4); ameetingatTrumpTowerbetweentheCampaignandaRussianlawyerpromisingdirtoncandidateClintonthatwas“partofRussiaanditsgovernment’ssupportfor [Trump]” (Volume I, Section IV.A.5); events at the Republican NationalConvention (Volume I, Section IV.A.6); post-Convention contacts betweenTrump Campaign officials and Russia’s ambassador to the United States(Volume I, Section IV.A.7); and contacts through campaign chairman PaulManafort,whohadpreviouslyworkedforaRussianoligarchandapro-RussianpoliticalpartyinUkraine(VolumeI,SectionIV.A.8).

1.TrumpTowerMoscowProject

The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside theUnitedStatesaspartofitsrealestateportfolio.Someprojectshaveinvolvedtheacquisitionandownership(throughsubsidiarycorporatestructures)ofproperty.In other cases, theTrumpOrganization has executed licensing dealswith realestatedevelopersandmanagementcompanies,oftenlocaltothecountrywheretheprojectwaslocated.289

Betweenatleast2013and2016,theTrumpOrganizationexploredasimilarlicensingdealinRussiainvolvingtheconstructionofaTrump-brandedpropertyinMoscow.Theproject,commonlyreferredtoasa“TrumpTowerMoscow”or“TrumpMoscow”project,anticipatedacombinationofcommercial,hotel,andresidentialpropertiesallwithinthesamebuilding.Between2013andJune2016,several employees of the TrumpOrganization, including then-president of theorganization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russiancounterparties.Fromthefallof2015until themiddleof2016,MichaelCohenspearheaded the Trump Organization’s pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscowproject, including by reporting on the project’s status to candidate Trump andotherexecutivesintheTrumpOrganization.290

a.TrumpTowerMoscowVenturewiththeCrocusGroup(2013-2014)

The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group, a Russian real estateconglomerate owned and controlled by Aras Agalarov, began discussing a

Russia-based real estate project shortly after the conclusion of the 2013MissUniverse pageant in Moscow.291 Donald J. Trump Jr. served as the primarynegotiator on behalf of the TrumpOrganization; EminAgalarov (son ofArasAgalarov) and Irakli “Ike” Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group duringnegotiations,292withtheoccasionalassistanceofRobertGoldstone.293

In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signedpreliminarytermsofanagreementfortheTrumpTowerMoscowproject.294OnDecember 23, 2013, after discussions with Donald J. Trump, the TrumpOrganizationagreedtoacceptanarrangementwherebytheorganizationreceivedaflat3.5%commissiononallsales,withnolicensingfeesorincentives.295ThepartiesnegotiatedaletterofintentduringJanuaryandFebruary2014.296

FromJanuary2014 throughNovember2014, theTrumpOrganizationandCrocusGroupdiscusseddevelopmentplansfortheMoscowproject.Sometimebefore January 24, 2014, the Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization aproposal for a 800-unit, 194-meter building to be constructed at anAgalarov-ownedsiteinMoscowcalled“CrocusCity,”whichhadalsobeenthesiteoftheMiss Universe pageant.297 In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with EminAgalarov and toured theCrocusCity site during a visit toMoscow.298 FromMarch 2014 through July 2014, the groups discussed “design standards” andother architectural elements.299 For example, in July 2014, members of theTrump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the“demographics of these prospective buyers” in the Crocus City area, thedevelopmentofneighboringparcelsinCrocusCity,andconceptsforredesigningportionsofthebuilding.300InAugust2014,theTrumpOrganizationrequestedspecifications for a competing Marriott-branded tower being built in CrocusCity.301

BeginninginSeptember2014,theTrumpOrganizationstoppedrespondinginatimelyfashiontocorrespondenceandproposalsfromtheCrocusGroup.302Communications between the two groups continued through November 2014withdecreasingfrequency;whatappears tobe the lastcommunication isdatedNovember 24, 2014.303 The project appears not to have developed past theplanningstage,andnoconstructionoccurred.

b.CommunicationswithI.C.ExpertInvestmentCompanyandGiorgiRtskhiladze(SummerandFall2015)

Inthelatesummerof2015,theTrumpOrganizationreceivedanewinquiryaboutpursuingaTrumpTowerprojectinMoscow.InapproximatelySeptember2015, Felix Sater, a New York-based real estate advisor, contacted MichaelCohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and specialcounsel toDonald J.Trump.304 Sater had previouslyworkedwith the TrumpOrganizationandadviseditonanumberofdomesticandinternationalprojects.Saterhadexplored thepossibilityof aTrumpTowerproject inMoscowwhileworkingwiththeTrumpOrganizationandthereforeknewoftheorganization’sgeneral interest in completing a deal there.305 Sater had also served as aninformal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow previously and hadaccompanied Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid-2000s.306

SatercontactedCohenonbehalfof I.C.Expert InvestmentCompany (I.C.Expert), a Russian real-estate development corporation controlled by AndreiVladimirovich Rozov.307 Sater had known Rozov since approximately 2007and, in 2014, had served as an agent on behalf of Rozov during Rozov’spurchase of a building inNewYorkCity.308 Sater later contactedRozov andproposedthatI.C.ExpertpursueaTrumpTowerMoscowprojectinwhichI.C.Expert would license the name and brand from the Trump Organization butconstruct the building on its own. Sater worked on the deal with Rozov andanotheremployeeofI.C.Expert.309

CohenwastheonlyTrumpOrganizationrepresentativetonegotiatedirectlywithI.C.Expertoritsagents.InapproximatelySeptember2015,Cohenobtainedapproval to negotiate with I.C. Expert from candidate Trump, who was thenpresidentoftheTrumpOrganization.CohenprovidedupdatesdirectlytoTrumpabout theproject throughout2015and into2016,assuringhimtheprojectwascontinuing.310 Cohen also discussed the TrumpMoscow project with IvankaTrump as to design elements (such as possible architects to use for theproject311) and Donald J. Trump Jr. (about his experience in Moscow andpossibleinvolvementintheproject312)duringthefallof2015.

Also during the fall of 2015, Cohen communicated about the TrumpMoscowproposalwithGiorgiRtskhiladze,abusinessexecutivewhopreviouslyhad been involved in a development deal with the Trump Organization inBatumi,Georgia.313CohenstatedthathespoketoRtskhiladzeinpartbecauseRtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensingdeal with the Agalarov-owned Crocus Group.314 On September 22, 2015,Cohenforwardedapreliminarydesignstudyfor theTrumpMoscowproject toRtskhiladze,adding“IlookforwardtoyourreplyaboutthisspectacularprojectinMoscow.”Rtskhiladze forwardedCohen’s email to an associate andwrote,“[i]f we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of theRussianGovernment andMr. Trump this project would definitely receive theworldwideattention.”315

On September 24, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that hedescribed as a proposed “[l]etter to theMayor ofMoscow from Trump org,”explainingthat“[w]eneedtosendthis letter to theMayorofMoscow(secondguy in Russia) he is aware of the potential project and will pledge hissupport.”316 In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Rtskhiladzeprovidedatranslationoftheletter,whichdescribedtheTrumpMoscowprojectasa“symbolofstrongereconomic,businessandculturalrelationshipsbetweenNew York and Moscow and therefore United States and the RussianFederation.”317 On September 27, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent another email toCohen, proposing that theTrumpOrganization partner on theTrumpMoscowprojectwith “GlobalDevelopmentGroupLLC,”which he described as beingcontrolledbyMichailPosikhin,aRussianarchitect,andSimonNizharadze.318Cohen told the Office that he ultimately declined the proposal and insteadcontinuedtoworkwithI.C.Expert,thecompanyrepresentedbyFelixSater.319

c.LetterofIntentandContactstoRussianGovernment(October2015-January2016)

i.TrumpSignstheLetterofIntentonbehalfoftheTrumpOrganization

Between approximately October 13, 2015 and November 2, 2015, theTrumpOrganization (through its subsidiaryTrumpAcquisition,LLC) and I.C.

Expert completed a letter of intent (LOI) for a TrumpMoscow property. TheLOI,signedbyTrumpfortheTrumpOrganizationandRozovonbehalfofI.C.Expert,was “intended to facilitate further discussions” in order to “attempt toenter into a mutually acceptable agreement” related to the Trump-brandedproject inMoscow.320TheLOI contemplated a developmentwith residential,hotel,commercial,andofficecomponents,andcalledfor“[a]pproximately250firstclass,luxuryresidentialcondominiums,”aswellas“[o]nefirstclass,luxuryhotel consistingof approximately15 floors andcontainingnot fewer than150hotelrooms.”321Fortheresidentialandcommercialportionsoftheproject,theTrump Organization would receive between 1% and 5% of all condominiumsales,322 plus 3% of all rental and other revenue.323 For the project’s hotelportion, the Trump Organization would receive a base fee of 3% of grossoperating revenues for the first five years and 4% thereafter, plus a separateincentive fee of 20% of operating profit.324 Under the LOI, the TrumpOrganization also would receive a $4 million “up-front fee” prior togroundbreaking.325Under these terms, the TrumpOrganization stood to earnsubstantial sums over the lifetime of the project,without assuming significantliabilitiesorfinancingcommitments.326

OnNovember3,2015,thedayaftertheTrumpOrganizationtransmittedtheLOI,SateremailedCohensuggestingthattheTrumpMoscowprojectcouldbeusedtoincreasecandidateTrump’schancesatbeingelected,writing:

BuddyourboycanbecomePresidentoftheUSAandwecanengineerit.I will get all of Putins team to buy in on this, I will manage thisprocess. . . . Michael, Putin gets on stage with Donald for a ribboncuttingforTrumpMoscow,andDonaldownstherepublicannomination.AndpossiblybeatsHillaryandourboy is in. . . .Wewillmanage thisprocessbetterthananyone.YouandIwillgetDonaldandVladimironastagetogetherveryshortly.Thatthegamechanger.327

Laterthatday,Saterfollowedup:

Donalddoesn’tstaredown,henegotiatesandunderstandstheeconomicissues and Putin only want to deal with a pragmatic leader, and asuccessful business man is a good candidate for someone who knowshow to negotiate. “Business, politics, whatever it all is the same for

someonewhoknowshowtodeal”IthinkIcangetPutintosaythatattheTrumpMoscowpressconference.If he says it we own this election. Americas most difficult adversaryagreeingthatDonaldisagoodguytonegotiate....Wecanownthiselection.Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putins very very closepeople,wecanpullthisoff.Michaelletsgo.2boysfromBrooklyngettingaUSApresidentelected.Thisisgoodreallygood.328

AccordingtoCohen,hedidnotconsider thepolitical importof theTrumpMoscowproject to the2016U.S. presidential election at the time.Cohenalsodidnot recall candidateTrumpor anyone affiliatedwith theTrumpCampaigndiscussing the political implications of the TrumpMoscow project with him.However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the candidatesuggested that his campaign would be a significant “infomercial” for Trump-brandedproperties.329

ii.Post-LOIContactswithIndividualsinRussia

GiventhesizeoftheTrumpMoscowproject,SaterandCohenbelievedtheprojectrequiredapproval(whetherexpressorimplicit)fromtheRussiannationalgovernment,includingfromthePresidentialAdministrationofRussia.330SaterstatedthathethereforebegantocontactthePresidentialAdministrationthroughanother Russian business contact.331 In early negotiations with the TrumpOrganization, Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and hisattempts to set up meetings with Russian officials. On October 12, 2015, forexample,Saterwrote toCohen that“allweneed isPutinonboardandwearegolden,”andthata“meetingwithPutinandtopdeputyistentativelysetforthe14th [of October]. ”332Grand Jury█ █ █ █ █ █ this meeting was beingcoordinatedbyassociatesinRussiaandthathehadnodirectinteractionwiththeRussiangovernment.333

Approximatelyamonthlater,aftertheLOIhadbeensigned,LanaErchovaemailedIvankaTrumponbehalfofErchova’sthen-husbandDmitryKlokov,toofferKlokov’sassistanceto theTrumpCampaign.334Klokovwasat that time

Director of External Communications for PJSC Federal Grid Company ofUnifiedEnergySystem, a largeRussian electricity transmission company, andhadbeenpreviouslyemployedasanaideandpresssecretarytoRussia’senergyminister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen.335He told the Officethat, after receiving this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search forKlokov’snameandconcluded(incorrectly) thatKlokovwasaformerOlympicweightlifter.336

BetweenNovember 18 and19, 2015,Klokov andCohenhad at least onetelephone call and exchanged several emails. Describing himself in emails toCohenasa“trustedperson”whocouldoffer theCampaign“politicalsynergy”and“synergyonagovernmentlevel,”KlokovrecommendedthatCohentraveltoRussia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary. Klokov said thatthose conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between thecandidateandanindividualKlokovdescribedas“ourpersonofinterest.”337Inan email to the Office, Erchova later identified the “person of interest” asRussianPresidentVladimirPutin.338

Inthetelephonecallandfollow-onemailswithKlokov,Cohendiscussedhisdesiretouseanear-termtriptoRussiatodositesurveysandtalkovertheTrumpMoscowprojectwithlocaldevelopers.CohenregisteredhiswillingnessalsotomeetwithKlokovand theunidentified intermediary,butwasemphatic that allmeetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump—including a possiblemeetingbetweencandidateTrumpandPutin—wouldneedtobe“inconjunctionwith the development and an official visit” with the Trump Organizationreceiving a formal invitation to visit.339 (Klokov had written previously that“thevisit[bycandidateTrumptoRussia]hastobeinformal.”)340

Klokov had also previously recommended toCohen that he separate theirnegotiationsoverapossiblemeetingbetweenTrumpand“thepersonofinterest”fromanyexistingbusinesstrack.341Re-emphasizingthathisoutreachwasnotdoneonbehalfofanybusiness,KlokovaddedinsecondemailtoCohenthat,ifpublicizedwell,suchameetingcouldhave“phenomenal”impact“inabusinessdimension”andthatthe“personofinterest[’s]”“mostimportantsupport”couldhave significant ramifications for the “level of projects and their capacity.”Klokovconcludedby tellingCohen that therewas“nobiggerwarranty in anyproject than [the] consent of the person of interest.”342 Cohen rejected the

proposal,sayingthat“[c]urrentlyourLOIdeveloperisintalkswithVP’sChiefof Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet.”343 This emailappears to be their final exchange, and the investigation did not identifyevidence that Cohen brought Klokov’s initial offer of assistance to theCampaign’sattentionorthatanyoneassociatedwiththeTrumpOrganizationortheCampaigndealtwithKlokovatalaterdate.Cohenexplainedthathedidnotpursue theproposedmeetingbecausehewas alreadyworkingon theMoscowProjectwithSater,whoCohenunderstood to havehis ownconnections to theRussiangovernment.344

By lateDecember 2015, however, Cohenwas complaining that Sater hadnot been able to use those connections to set up the promised meeting withRussian government officials. Cohen told Sater that he was “setting up themeetingmyself.”345OnJanuary11,2016,CohenemailedtheofficeofDmitryPeskov, the Russian government’s press secretary, indicating that he desiredcontactwith Sergei Ivanov, Putin’s chief of staff.Cohen erroneously used theemail address “Pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru” instead of“Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru,” so the email apparently did not go through.346OnJanuary14,2016,Cohenemailedadifferentaddress (info@prpress.gov.ru)withthefollowingmessage:

DearMr.Peskov,Overthepastfewmonths,IhavebeenworkingwithacompanybasedinRussiaregardingthedevelopmentofaTrumpTower-MoscowprojectinMoscowCity.Without getting into lengthy specifics, the communicationbetweenourtwo sides has stalled. As this project is too important, I am herebyrequestingyourassistance.I respectfully request someone, preferably you; contact me so that Imight discuss the specifics as well as arranging meetings with theappropriateindividuals.I thankyouinadvanceforyourassistanceandlookforward tohearingfromyousoon.347

Twodays later,Cohen sent an email toPr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, repeatinghisrequesttospeakwithSergeiIvanov.348

Cohen testified to Congress, and initially told the Office, that he did notrecallreceivingaresponsetothisemailinquiryandthathedecidedtoterminateanyfurtherworkontheTrumpMoscowprojectasofJanuary2016.Cohenlateradmitted that these statements were false. In fact, Cohen had received (andrecalled receiving)a response tohis inquiry, andhecontinued toworkonandupdatecandidateTrumpontheprojectthroughaslateasJune2016.349

On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova,Peskov’spersonalassistant.Writingfromherpersonalemailaccount,PoliakovastatedthatshehadbeentryingtoreachCohenandaskedthathecallheronthepersonalnumberthatsheprovided.350ShortlyafterreceivingPoliakova’semail,Cohencalledandspoketoherfor20minutes.351CohendescribedtoPoliakovahis position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed TrumpMoscow project, including information about the Russian counterparty withwhich the Trump Organization had partnered. Cohen requested assistance inmovingtheprojectforward,bothinsecuringlandtobuildtheprojectandwithfinancing. According to Cohen, Poliakova asked detailed questions and tooknotes,statingthatshewouldneedtofollowupwithothersinRussia.352

Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Poliakova or from anyotherrepresentativeoftheRussiangovernment,nordidtheOfficeidentifyanyevidence of direct follow-up. However, the day after Cohen’s call withPoliakova,Sater textedCohen,askinghim to“[c]allmewhenyouhavea fewminutestochat...It’saboutPutintheycalledtoday.”353SaterthensentadraftinvitationforCohentovisitMoscowtodiscusstheTrumpMoscowproject,354alongwithanoteto“[t]ellmeif theletterisgoodasamendedbymeormakewhateverchangesyouwantandsenditbacktome.”355Afterafurtherroundofedits, on January25,2016,Sater sentCohenan invitation—signedbyAndreyRyabinskiy of the companyMHJ—to travel to “Moscow for aworking visit”about the “prospectsofdevelopment and the constructionbusiness inRussia,”“the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormousTower,”and“theopportunitytoco-ordinateafollowupvisittoMoscowbyMr.Donald Trump.”356 According to Cohen, he elected not to travel at the timebecauseof concerns about the lackof concreteproposals about landplots thatcouldbeconsideredasoptionsfortheproject.357

d.DiscussionsaboutRussiaTravelbyMichaelCohenorCandidateTrump(December2015-June2016)

i.Sater’sOverturestoCohentoTraveltoRussia

ThelateJanuarycommunicationwasneitherthefirstnorthelast timethatCohen contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the TrumpMoscow project.Beginning in late 2015, Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen andcandidate Trump, as representatives of the Trump Organization, to travel toRussia to meet with Russian government officials and possible financingpartners.InDecember2015,SatersentCohenanumberofemailsaboutlogisticsfortravelingtoRussiaformeetings.358OnDecember19,2015,Saterwrote:

Please call me I have Evgeney [Dvoskin] on the other line. [359] HeneedsacopyofyourandDonald’spassports theyneedascanofeverypage of the passports. Invitations&Visaswill be issued thisweek byVTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump TowerMoscow. PoliticallyneitherPutinsofficenorMinistryofForeignAffairscannotissueinvite,so they are inviting commercially/ business.VTB isRussia’s2biggestbankandVTBBankCEOAndreyKostin,willbe at allmeetingswithPutinsothatitisabusinessmeetingnotpolitical.WewillbeinvitedtoRussianconsulatethisweektoreceiveinvite&havevisaissued.360

In response,Cohen textedSater an imageofhisownpassport.361Cohen toldtheOffice thatatonepointherequestedacopyofcandidateTrump’spassportfromRhonaGraff,Trump’sexecutiveassistantat theTrumpOrganization,andthat Graff later brought Trump’s passport to Cohen’s office.362 Theinvestigation did not, however, establish that the passport was forwarded toSater.363

Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip toMoscow in connection with the Trump Moscow project. On April 20, 2016,SaterwroteCohen, “[t]hePeoplewanted toknowwhenyou are coming?”364OnMay4,2016,Saterfollowedup:

IhadachatwithMoscow.ASSUMINGthetripdoeshappenthequestion

isbeforeoraftertheconvention.IsaidIbelieve,butdon’tknowforsure,that’s it’sprobablyafter theconvention.Obviously thepre-meeting trip(youonly)canhappenanytimeyouwantbutthe2bigguyswhere[sic]thequestion.IsaidIwouldconfirmandrevert....LetmeknowaboutIfIwasrightbysayingIbelieveafterClevelandandalsowhenyouwanttospeaktothemandpossiblyflyover.365

Cohen responded, “My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes thenomineeaftertheconvention.”366

Thedayafter this exchange,Sater tiedCohen’s travel toRussia to theSt.PetersburgInternationalEconomicForum(“Forum”),anannualeventattendedbyprominentRussianpoliticiansandbusinessmen.SatertoldtheOfficethathewasinformedbyabusinessassociatethatPeskovwantedtoinviteCohentotheForum.367OnMay5,2016,SaterwrotetoCohen:

Peskovwould like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forumwhich isRussia’sDavos it’s June16-19.Hewants tomeet therewithyouandpossiblyintroduceyoutoeitherPutinorMedvedev,astheyarenotsureif1orbothwillbethere.Thisisperfect.TheentirebusinessclassofRussiawillbethereaswell.Hesaidanythingyouwanttodiscussincludingdatesandsubjectsareonthetabletodiscuss[.]368

The following day, Sater askedCohen to confirm those dateswouldwork forhimtotravel;Cohenwroteback,“[w]orksforme.”369

OnJune9,2016,SatersentCohenanoticethathe(Sater)wascompletingthebadgesfortheForum,adding,“Putinisthereonthe17thverystrongchanceyouwillmeethimaswell.”370On June 13, 2016, Sater forwardedCohen aninvitation to theForumsignedby theDirectorof theRoscongressFoundation,theRussian entity organizing the Forum.371 Sater also sent Cohen a Russianvisa application and asked him to send two passport photos.372According toCohen, the invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved ininviting him. Cohen was concerned that Russian officials were not actuallyinvolvedorwerenotinterestedinmeetingwithhim(asSaterhadalleged),andsohedecidednottogototheForum.373OnJune14,2016,CohenmetSaterin

thelobbyoftheTrumpTowerinNewYorkandinformedhimthathewouldnotbetravelingatthattime.374

ii.CandidateTrump’sOpportunitiestoTraveltoRussia

The investigation identified evidence that, during the period the TrumpMoscow project was under consideration, the possibility of candidate TrumpvisitingRussiaaroseintwocontexts.

First, in interviews with the Office, Cohen stated that he discussed thesubjectoftravelingtoRussiawithTrumptwice:onceinlate2015;andagaininspring2016.375AccordingtoCohen,Trumpindicatedawillingnesstotravelifitwouldassist theprojectsignificantly.Ononeoccasion,TrumptoldCohentospeak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate thecandidate’s schedule. Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski, whosuggestedthattheyspeakagainwhenCohenhadactualdatestoevaluate.Cohenindicated, however, that he knew that travel prior to the Republican NationalConventionwouldbeimpossiblegiventhecandidate’spreexistingcommitmentstotheCampaign.376

Second,likeCohen,TrumpreceivedandturneddownaninvitationtotheSt.PetersburgInternationalEconomicForum.In lateDecember2015,MiraDuma—a contact of Ivanka Trump’s from the fashion industry—first passed alonginvitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump from Sergei Prikhodko, aDeputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.377 On January 14, 2016,RhonaGraffsentanemailtoDumastatingthatTrumpwas“honoredtobeaskedtoparticipateinthehighlyprestigious”Forumevent,butthathewould“havetodecline” the invitation given his “very grueling and full travel schedule” as apresidential candidate.378 Graff asked Duma whether she recommended thatGraff“sendaformalnotetotheDeputyPrimeMinister”declininghisinvitation;Dumarepliedthataformalnotewouldbe“great.”379

Itdoesnotappear thatGraffprepared thatnote immediately.According towrittenanswersfromPresidentTrump,380GraffreceivedanemailfromDeputyPrime Minister Prikhodko on March 17, 2016, again inviting Trump toparticipateinthe2016ForuminSt.Petersburg.381Twoweekslater,onMarch

31,2016,GraffpreparedforTrump’ssignatureatwo-paragraphletterdecliningtheinvitation.382TheletterstatedthatTrump’s“schedulehasbecomeextremelydemanding”becauseofthepresidentialcampaign,thathe“alreadyha[d]severalcommitments in the United States” for the time of the Forum, but that heotherwise “would have gladly given every consideration to attending such animportantevent.”383GraffforwardedthelettertoanotherexecutiveassistantattheTrumpOrganizationwithinstructionstoprintthedocumentonletterheadforTrumptosign.384

Atapproximately thesame time that the letterwasbeingprepared,RobertForesman—aNewYork-basedinvestmentbanker—beganreachingouttoGrafftosecurean in-personmeetingwithcandidateTrump.According toForesman,he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian presidential aide involvedwiththeRoscongressFoundation,toseeifTrumpcouldspeakattheForum.385ForesmanfirstemailedGraffonMarch31,2016,followingaphoneintroductionbrokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who produced thetelevision showThe Apprentice). In his email, Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional expertise in Russia and Ukraine, his worksettingup an early “private channel”betweenVladimirPutin and formerU.S.President George W. Bush, and an “approach” he had received from “seniorKremlinofficials”aboutthecandidate.ForesmanaskedGraffforameetingwiththecandidate,CoreyLewandowski,or“anotherrelevantperson”todiscussthisand other “concrete things” Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over“unsecure email.”386OnApril 4, 2016, Graff forwarded Foresman’smeetingrequesttoJessicaMacchia,anotherexecutiveassistanttoTrump.387

With no response forthcoming, Foresman twice sent reminders toGraff—first on April 26 and again on April 30, 2016.388 Graff sent an apology toForesmanand forwardedhisApril26email (aswellashis initialMarch2016email)toLewandowski.389OnMay2,2016,GraffforwardedForesman’sApril30 email—which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald Trump Jr. orEricTrumpsothatForesmancouldconveytotheminformationthat“shouldbeconveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate]absolutelytrusts”—topolicyadvisorStephenMiller.390

Nocommunicationsorotherevidenceobtainedby theOffice indicate that

the Trump Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite thecandidate to the Forum or that the Campaign otherwise followed up withForesmanuntilaftertheelection,whenheinteractedwiththeTransitionTeamashe pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration.391 Wheninterviewedby theOffice, Foresmandenied that the specific “approach” from“seniorKremlinofficials”notedinhisMarch31,2016emailwasanythingotherthan Kobyakov’s invitation to Roscongress. According to Foresman, the“concrete things” he referenced in the same email were a combination of theinvitation itself,Foresman’spersonalperspectiveson the invitationandRussiapolicyingeneral,anddetailsofaUkraineplansupportedbyaU.S. thinktank(EastWest Institute). Foresman told the Office that Kobyakov had extendedsimilarinvitationsthroughhimtoanotherRepublicanpresidentialcandidateandoneotherpolitician.ForesmanalsosaidthatKobyakovhadaskedForesmantoinviteTrumptospeakafterthatotherpresidentialcandidatewithdrewfromtherace and the other politician’s participation did not work out.392 Finally,ForesmanclaimedtohavenoplanstoestablishabackchannelinvolvingTrump,stating the reference to his involvement in the Bush-Putin back channel wasmeanttoburnishhiscredentialstotheCampaign.ForesmancommentedthathehadnotrecognizedanyoftheexpertsannouncedasTrump’sforeignpolicyteaminMarch2016,andwantedtosecureanin-personmeetingwiththecandidatetoshare his professional background and policy views, including that TrumpshoulddeclineKobyakov’sinvitationtospeakattheForum.393

2.GeorgePapadopoulos

GeorgePapadopouloswasaforeignpolicyadvisortotheTrumpCampaignfromMarch2016 toearlyOctober2016.394 In lateApril2016,PapadopouloswastoldbyLondon-basedprofessorJosephMifsud,immediatelyafterMifsud’sreturnfromatrip toMoscow,that theRussiangovernmenthadobtained“dirt”oncandidateClintonintheformofthousandsofemails.Oneweeklater,onMay6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign governmentthattheTrumpCampaignhadreceivedindicationsfromtheRussiangovernmentthatitcouldassisttheCampaignthroughtheanonymousreleaseofinformationthatwouldbedamagingtocandidateClinton.

Papadopoulosshared informationaboutRussian“dirt”withpeopleoutsideof theCampaign, and theOffice investigatedwhether he also provided it to aCampaign official. Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom he

interactedtoldtheOfficethattheydidnotrecallthatPapadopoulospassedthemtheinformation.Throughouttherelevantperiodoftimeandforseveralmonthsthereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals toarrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. Thatmeetingnevercametopass.

a.OriginsofCampaignWork

InMarch2016,PapadopoulosbecameaforeignpolicyadvisortotheTrumpCampaign.395Asearlyasthesummerof2015,hehadsoughtaroleasapolicyadvisortotheCampaignbut,inaSeptember30,2015email,hewastoldthattheCampaign was not hiring policy advisors.396 In late 2015, Papadopoulosobtainedapaidpositionon thecampaignofRepublicanpresidential candidateBenCarson.397

AlthoughCarsonremainedinthepresidentialraceuntilearlyMarch2016,PapadopouloshadstoppedactivelyworkingforhiscampaignbyearlyFebruary2016.398 At that time, Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the LondonCentreof InternationalLawPractice (LCILP),whichbilled itself as a “uniqueinstitution...comprisinghigh-levelprofessionalinternationallawpractitioners,dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the practice ofinternationallaw.”399Papadopoulossaid thathehadfinishedhis rolewith theCarson campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring.400 In early February,PapadopoulosagreedtojoinLCILPandarrivedinLondontobeginwork.401

As he was taking his position at LCILP, Papadopoulos contacted Trumpcampaign manager Corey Lewandowski via LinkedIn and emailed campaignofficialMichaelGlassnerabouthisinterestinjoiningtheTrumpCampaign.402OnMarch2,2016,PapadopoulossentGlassneranothermessagereiteratinghisinterest.403Glassner passed alongword of Papadopoulos’s interest to anothercampaignofficial,JoyLutes,whonotifiedPapadopoulosbyemail thatshehadbeen told by Glassner to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis, the TrumpCampaign’snationalco-chairandchiefpolicyadvisor.404

AtthetimeofPapadopoulos’sMarch2email,themediawascriticizingtheTrump Campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security

advisorswithin its ranks.405 To address that issue, senior Campaign officialsasked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together on short notice.406 AfterreceivingPapadopoulos’snamefromLutes,ClovisperformedaGooglesearchon Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute, andbelievedthathehadcredibilityonenergyissues.407OnMarch3,2016,ClovisarrangedtospeakwithPapadopoulosbyphonetodiscussPapadopoulosjoiningthe Campaign as a foreign policy advisor, and on March 6, 2016, the twospoke.408PapadopoulosrecalledthatRussiawasmentionedasa topic,andheunderstood from theconversation thatRussiawouldbean important aspectoftheCampaign’sforeignpolicy.409Attheendoftheconversation,ClovisofferedPapadopoulos a role as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign, andPapadopoulosacceptedtheoffer.410

b.InitialRussia-RelatedContacts

Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor,PapadopoulostraveledtoRome,Italy,aspartofhisdutieswithLCILP.411ThepurposeofthetripwastomeetofficialsaffiliatedwithLinkCampusUniversity,afor-profitinstitutionheadedbyaformerItaliangovernmentofficial.412Duringthevisit,PapadopouloswasintroducedtoJosephMifsud.

Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the LondonAcademyofDiplomacy inLondon,England.413AlthoughMifsudworkedoutofLondonandwasalsoaffiliatedwithLCILP, theencounter inRomewas thefirst time that Papadopoulosmet him.414Mifsud maintained various RussiancontactswhilelivinginLondon,asdescribedfurtherbelow.AmonghiscontactswasIT██████,415aone-timeemployeeoftheIRA,theentitythatcarriedout the Russian social media campaign (see Volume I, Section II, supra). InJanuaryandFebruary2016,MifsudandIT██████discussedIT██████possiblymeetinginRussia.Theinvestigationdidnot identifyevidenceofthemmeeting.Later,inthespringof2016,IT██████wasalsoincontactIT██████ that was linked to an employee of the RussianMinistry ofDefense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russianmilitary-controlled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promotetheDCLeaks releases in the course of theGRU’s hack-and-release operations

(seeVolumeI,SectionIII.B.1,supra).

According to Papadopoulos, Mifsud at first seemed uninterested inPapadopouloswhentheymetinRome.416AfterPapadopoulosinformedMifsudabouthisroleintheTrumpCampaign,however,MifsudappearedtotakegreaterinterestinPapadopoulos.417ThetwodiscussedMifsud’sEuropeanandRussiancontacts and had a general discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered tointroduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to theRussian government.418 Papadopoulos told the Office thatMifsud’s claim ofsubstantial connections with Russian government officials interestedPapadopoulos,whothoughtthatsuchconnectionscouldincreasehisimportanceasapolicyadvisortotheTrumpCampaign.419

OnMarch17,2016,PapadopoulosreturnedtoLondon.420Fourdayslater,candidate Trump publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy andnational security advisory team chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describingPapadopoulosas“anoilandenergyconsultant”andan“[e]xcellentguy.”421

OnMarch24,2016,PapadopoulosmetwithMifsudinLondon.422Mifsudwas accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya. Mifsudintroduced Polonskaya as a former student of his who had connections toVladimirPutin.423Papadopoulos understood at the time that PolonskayamayhavebeenPutin’sniecebut later learned that thiswasnot true.424During themeeting,Polonskayaoffered tohelpPapadopoulosestablishcontacts inRussiaand stated that the Russian ambassador in London was a friend of hers.425Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos expected Mifsud and Polonskaya tointroducehimtotheRussianambassadorinLondon,butthatdidnotoccur.426

FollowinghismeetingwithMifsud,PapadopoulossentanemailtomembersoftheTrumpCampaign’sforeignpolicyadvisoryteam.Thesubjectlineofthemessage was “Meeting with Russian leadership--including Putin.”427 Themessagestatedinpertinentpart:

Ijustfinishedaveryproductivelunchwithagoodfriendofmine,JosephMifsud, the director of the London Academy of Diplomacy--whointroduced me to both Putin’s niece and the Russian Ambassador in

London--whoalsoactsastheDeputyForeignMinister.428

The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and theRussian leadership to discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump.Theyarekeentohostusina“neutral”city,ordirectlyinMoscow.Theysaid the leadership, including Putin, is ready tomeet with us andMr.Trump should there be interest. Waiting for everyone’s thoughts onmovingforwardwiththisveryimportantissue.429

Papadopoulos’smessage came at a timewhen Clovis perceived a shift in theCampaign’s approach toward Russia—from one of engaging with RussiathroughtheNATOframeworkandtakingastrongstanceonRussianaggressioninUkraine,GrandJury█████████████████████████430

Clovis’s response to Papadopoulos, however, did not reflect that shift.ReplyingtoPapadopoulosandtheothermembersoftheforeignpolicyadvisoryteamcopiedontheinitialemail,Cloviswrote:

This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. Nocommitments until we see how this plays out. My thought is that weprobably should not go forward with any meetings with the Russiansuntil we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies, especiallyFrance,GermanyandGreatBritain.Weneed to reassureourallies thatwe are not going to advance anything with Russia until we haveeveryoneonthesamepage.

Morethoughtslatertoday.Greatwork.431

c.March31ForeignPolicyTeamMeeting

The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team withSenatorSessionsandcandidateTrumpapproximatelyoneweeklater,onMarch31, 2016, in Washington, D.C.432 The meeting—which was intended togenerate press coverage for the Campaign433—took place at the TrumpInternationalHotel.434Papadopoulos flewtoWashingtonfor theevent.At themeeting,SenatorSessionssatatoneendofanovaltable,whileTrumpsatatthe

other. As reflected in the photograph below (which was posted to Trump’sInstagramaccount),Papadopoulossatbetweenthe two, twoseats toSessions’sleft:

March31,2016MeetingofForeignPolicyTeam,withPapadopoulos(FourthfromRightofCandidateTrump)

During themeeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisorsintroduced themselves and briefly described their areas of experience orexpertise.435PapadopoulosspokeabouthispreviousworkintheenergysectorandthenbroughtupapotentialmeetingwithRussianofficials.436Specifically,PapadopoulostoldthegroupthathehadlearnedthroughhiscontactsinLondonthatPutinwantedtomeetwithcandidateTrumpandthattheseconnectionscouldhelparrangethatmeeting.437

Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos’s statement.PapadopoulosandCampaignadvisorJ.D.Gordon—whotoldinvestigatorsinaninterviewthathehada“crystalclear”recollectionofthemeeting—havestatedthat Trump was interested in and receptive to the idea of a meeting withPutin.438 Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of hiseffortstoarrangeameeting.439Gordonandtwootherattendees,however,recallthatSessionsgenerallyopposedtheproposal,thoughtheydifferintheiraccountsoftheconcernshevoicedorthestrengthoftheoppositionheexpressed.440

d.GeorgePapadopoulosLearnsThatRussiaHas“Dirt”intheFormofClintonEmails

WhateverSessions’sprecisewordsattheMarch31meeting,Papadopoulosdid not understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump Campaign to havedirectedthatherefrainfrommakingfurthereffortstoarrangeameetingbetweentheCampaignandtheRussiangovernment.Tothecontrary,PapadopoulostoldtheOffice that he understood theCampaign to be supportive of his efforts toarrange such a meeting.441 Accordingly, when he returned to London,Papadopoulosresumedthoseefforts.442

ThroughoutApril2016,Papadopouloscontinued tocorrespondwith,meetwith, and seek Russia contacts throughMifsud and, at times, Polonskaya.443For example, within a week of her initial March 24 meeting with him,Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message—which emailexchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud—addressingPapadopoulos’s “wish to engage with the Russian Federation.”444 WhenPapadopouloslearnedfromMifsudthatPolonskayahadtriedtomessagehim,hesent her an email seeking anothermeeting.445Polonskaya responded thenextdaythatshewas“backinSt.Petersburg”but“wouldbeverypleasedtosupport[Papadopoulos’s] initiatives between our two countries” and “to meet [him]again.”446Papadopoulosstatedinreplythathethought“agoodstep”wouldbetointroducehimto“theRussianAmbassadorinLondon,”andthathewouldliketo talk to the ambassador, “or anyone else you recommend, about a potentialforeignpolicytriptoRussia.”447

Mifsud, who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on themorningofApril11,2016.Hewrote,“Thisisalreadybeenagreed.IamflyingtoMoscowonthe18thforaValdaimeeting,plusothermeetingsattheDuma.Wewilltalktomorrow.”448ThetwobodiesreferencedbyMifsudarepartoforassociated with the Russian government: the Duma is a Russian legislativeassembly,449while “Valdai” refers to theValdaiDiscussionClub, aMoscow-based group that “is close to Russia’s foreign-policy establishment.”450

Papadopoulos thankedMifsudandsaid thathewouldseehim“tomorrow.”451For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had “already alertedmy personal

links to our conversation and your request,” that “we are all very excited thepossibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump,” and that “[t]he RussianFederationwouldlovetowelcomehimoncehiscandidaturewouldbeofficiallyannounced.”452

Papadopoulos’s and Mifsud’s mentions of seeing each other “tomorrow”referencedameetingthatthetwohadscheduledforthenextmorning,April12,2016,at theAndazHotel inLondon.Papadopoulosacknowledged themeetingduring interviews with the Office,453 and records from Papadopoulos’s UKcellphone and his internet-search history all indicate that the meeting tookplace.454

Followingthemeeting,MifsudtraveledasplannedtoMoscow.455OnApril18,2016,while inRussia,MifsudintroducedPapadopoulosoveremail toIvanTimofeev, amember of theRussian InternationalAffairs Council (RIAC).456MifsudhaddescribedTimofeevashavingconnectionswiththeRussianMinistryof Foreign Affairs (MFA),457 the executive entity in Russia responsible forRussian foreign relations.458Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos andTimofeev hadmultiple conversations over Skype and email about setting “thegroundwork” for a “potential” meeting between the Campaign and Russiangovernmentofficials.459Papadopoulos told theOffice that,ononeSkypecall,he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being monitored orsupervised by an unknown third party, because Timofeev spoke in an officialmannerandPapadopoulosheardoddnoisesontheline.460TimofeevalsotoldPapadopoulos in an April 25, 2016 email that he had just spoken “to IgorIvanov[,] the President ofRIAC and former ForeignMinister ofRussia,” andconveyedIvanov’sadviceabouthowbesttoarrangea“Moscowvisit.”461

After a stop inRome,Mifsud returned toEngland onApril 25, 2016.462Thenextday,PapadopoulosmetMifsud forbreakfast at theAndazHotel (thesame location as their last meeting).463 During that meeting, Mifsud toldPapadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian government officialsduringhisrecent trip toMoscow.Mifsudalsosaid that,on the trip,he learnedthat the Russians had obtained “dirt” on candidate Hillary Clinton. AsPapadopouloslaterstatedtotheFBI,Mifsudsaidthatthe“dirt”wasintheform

of“emailsofClinton,”andthatthey“havethousandsofemails.”464OnMay6,2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos suggested to arepresentativeofa foreigngovernment that theTrumpCampaignhad receivedindications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaignthrough the anonymous release of information that would be damaging toHillaryClinton.465

e.Russia-RelatedCommunicationsWithTheCampaign

While he was discussingwith his foreign contacts a potentialmeeting ofcampaign officials with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos keptcampaign officials apprised of his efforts. On April 25, 2016, the day beforeMifsudtoldPapadopoulosabouttheemails,PapadopouloswrotetoseniorpolicyadvisorStephenMillerthat“[t]heRussiangovernmenthasanopeninvitationbyPutinforMr.Trumptomeethimwhenheisready,”andthat“[t]headvantageofbeing inLondon is that thesegovernments tend to speakabitmoreopenly in‘neutral’ cities.”466 On April 27, 2016, after his meeting with Mifsud,Papadopouloswrote a secondmessage toMiller stating that “some interestingmessages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time isright.”467 The same day, Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaignmanager Corey Lewandowski, telling Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had“been receiving a lot of calls over the lastmonth about Putinwanting to host[Trump]andtheteamwhenthetimeisright.”468

Papadopoulos’s Russia-related communications with Campaign officialscontinued throughout the spring and summer of 2016. On May 4, 2016, heforwardedtoLewandowskianemailfromTimofeevraisingthepossibilityofameetinginMoscow,askingLewandowskiwhetherthatwas“somethingwewantto move forward with.”469 The next day, Papadopoulos forwarded the sameTimofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email “Russiaupdate.”470He included thesameemail inaMay21,2016message toseniorCampaignofficialPaulManafort,underthesubjectline“RequestfromRussiatomeetMr. Trump,” stating that “Russia has been eager tomeetMr. Trump forquite sometime and have been reaching out to me to discuss.”471 Manafortforwarded the message to another Campaign official, without includingPapadopoulos, and stated: “Let[’]s discuss.Weneed someone to communicate

that [Trump] is not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in theCampaignsoasnottosendanysignal.”472

On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain withLewandowskiaboutaRussiavisit,askingifLewandowski“want[ed]tohaveacall about this topic” and whether “we were following up with it.”473 AfterLewandowski told Papadopoulos to “connect with” Clovis because he was“running point,” Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that “the Russian MFA” wasasking him “ifMr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point.”474Papadopouloswroteinanemailthathe“[w]antedtopassthisinfoalongtoyouforyoutodecidewhat’sbesttodowithitandwhatmessageIshouldsend(ortoignore).”475

AfterseveralemailandSkypeexchangeswithTimofeev,476PapadopoulossentonemoreemailtoLewandowskionJune19,2016,Lewandowski’slastdayas campaign manager.477 The email stated that “[t]he Russian ministry offoreignaffairs”hadcontactedhimandaskedwhether, ifMr.Trumpcouldnottravel toRussia, a campaign representative suchasPapadopouloscouldattendmeetings.478PapadopoulostoldLewandowskithathewas“willingtomakethetripofftherecordifit’sintheinterestofMr.Trumpandthecampaigntomeetspecificpeople.”479

Following Lewandowski’s departure from the Campaign, Papadopouloscommunicated with Clovis andWalid Phares, another member of the foreignpolicy advisory team, about an off-the-recordmeeting between the Campaignand Russian government officials or with Papadopoulos’s other Russiaconnections, Mifsud and Timofeev.480 Papadopoulos also interacted directlywith Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the TransatlanticParliamentaryGrouponCounterterrorism(TAG),agroupforwhichPhareswasco-secretary general.481 On July 16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAGsummit inWashington, D.C., where he sat next to Clovis (as reflected in thephotographbelow).482

GeorgePapadopoulos(farright)andSamClovis(secondfromright)

Although Clovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAGsummit,483Papadopoulos remembereddiscussingRussia and a foreignpolicytripwithClovisandPharesduringtheevent.484Papadopoulos’srecollectionisconsistentwith emails sentbefore andafter theTAGsummit.Thepre-summitmessages included a July 11, 2016 email in which Phares suggested meetingPapadopoulosthedayafterthesummittochat,485andaJuly12messageinthesamechain inwhichPharesadvisedPapadopoulos thatothersummitattendees“are very nervous aboutRussia. So be aware.”486Tendays after the summit,Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud listing Phares and Clovis as other“participants”inapotentialmeetingattheLondonAcademyofDiplomacy.487

Finally, Papadopoulos’s recollection is also consistent with handwrittennotes from a journal that he kept at the time.488 Those notes, which arereprintedinpartbelow,appeartorefertopotentialSeptember2016meetingsinLondonwith representatives of the “office of Putin,” and suggest that Phares,Clovis, andPapadopoulos (“Walid/Samme”)wouldattendwithout theofficialbackingoftheCampaign(“noofficialletter/nomessagefromTrump”).489

Thehandwrittenscriptreads,September(boxed).Haveanexploratorymeetingto(slashed)orlose.InSeptember–ifallowedtheywillblastMr.

LatercommunicationsindicatethatClovisdeterminedthathe(Clovis)couldnot travel. On August 15, 2016, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he hadreceived requests from multiple foreign governments, “even Russia[],” for“closeddoorworkshops/consultationsabroad,”andaskedwhethertherewasstillinterest for Clovis, Phares, and Papadopoulos “to go on that trip.”490 CloviscopiedPharesonhis response,which said thathecouldnot “travelbefore theelection”but thathe“wouldencourage[Papadopoulos]andWalid tomake thetrips,ifitisfeasible.”491

Papadopouloswas dismissed from the TrumpCampaign in earlyOctober2016,afteraninterviewhegavetotheRussiannewsagencyInterfaxgeneratedadversepublicity.492

f.TrumpCampaignKnowledgeof“Dirt”

Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the

Campaign—specifically, the then-Greek foreign minister—about Russia’sobtainingClinton-relatedemails.493Inaddition,adifferentforeigngovernmentinformed the FBI that, 10 days aftermeetingwithMifsud in lateApril 2016,PapadopoulossuggestedthattheTrumpCampaignhadreceivedindicationsfromthe Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through theanonymous release of information that would be damaging to HillaryClinton.494 (This conversation occurred after the GRU spearphished ClintonCampaignchairmanJohnPodestaandstolehisemails,andtheGRUhackedintothe DCCC and DNC, see Volume I, Sections III.A & III.B, supra.) Suchdisclosures raised questions aboutwhether Papadopoulos informed anyTrumpCampaignofficialabouttheemails.

Wheninterviewed,PapadopoulosandtheCampaignofficialswhointeractedwithhim told theOffice that they couldnot recallPapadopoulos’s sharing theinformationthatRussiahadobtained“dirt”oncandidateClintonintheformofemailsorthatRussiacouldassisttheCampaignthroughtheanonymousreleaseof information about Clinton. Papadopoulos stated that he could not clearlyrecall having told anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether heaccuratelyrememberedanincidentinwhichClovishadbeenupsetafterhearingPapadopoulostellClovisthatPapadopoulosthought“theyhaveheremails.”495TheCampaignofficialswhointeractedorcorrespondedwithPapadopouloshavesimilarly stated, with varying degrees of certainty, that he did not tell them.Senior policy advisor StephenMiller, for example, did not remember hearinganythingfromPapadopoulosorClovisaboutRussiahavingemailsofordirtoncandidate Clinton.496 Clovis stated that he did not recall anyone, includingPapadopoulos, having given him non-public information that a foreigngovernmentmightbeinpossessionofmaterialdamagingtoHillaryClinton.497

GrandJury█████████498GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████.499Nodocumentaryevidence,andnothing in theemail accountsorother communications facilities reviewedby the Office, shows that Papadopoulos shared this information with theCampaign.

g.AdditionalGeorgePapadopoulosContact

TheOffice investigatedanotherRussia-relatedcontactwithPapadopoulos.TheOfficewas not fully able to explore the contact because the individual atissue—SergeiMillian—remainedout of the country since the inceptionof ourinvestigation and declined to meet with members of the Office despite ourrepeatedeffortstoobtainaninterview.

Papadopoulos first connectedwithMillianviaLinkedInon July15,2016,shortly after Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Clovis.500Millian,anAmericancitizenwhoisanativeofBelarus,introducedhimself“aspresidentof[the]NewYork-basedRussianAmericanChamberofCommerce,”and claimed that through that position he had “insider knowledge and directaccess to the top hierarchy in Russian politics.”501 Papadopoulos askedTimofeevwhetherhehadheardofMillian.502AlthoughTimofeevsaidno,503

PapadopoulosmetMillian inNewYorkCity.504 Themeetings took place onJuly 30 andAugust 1, 2016.505 Afterwards,Millian invited Papadopoulos toattend—and potentially speak at—two international energy conferences,including one that was to be held in Moscow in September 2016.506Papadopoulosultimatelydidnotattendeitherconference.

On July 31, 2016, following his first in-person meeting with Millian,PapadopoulosemailedTrumpCampaignofficialBoDenysyktosaythathehadbeen contacted “by some leaders of Russian-American voters here in the USabouttheirinterestinvotingforMr.Trump,”andtoaskwhetherheshould“putyouintouchwiththeirgroup(US-Russiachamberofcommerce).”507DenysykthankedPapadopoulos“fortakingtheinitiative,”butaskedhimto“holdoffwithoutreach to Russian-Americans” because “too many articles” had alreadyportrayedtheCampaign,then-campaignchairmanPaulManafort,andcandidateTrumpas“beingpro-Russian.”508

On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulospromisingthathewould“sharewithyouadisruptivetechnologythatmightbeinstrumentalinyourpoliticalworkforthecampaign.”509Papadopoulosclaimedtohavenorecollectionofthismatter.510

OnNovember9,2016,shortlyaftertheelection,PapadopoulosarrangedtomeetMillian in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential

workwithRussian“billionaireswhoarenotundersanctions.”511Themeetingtook place on November 14, 2016, at the Trump Hotel and Tower inChicago.512According toPapadopoulos, the twomendiscussedpartneringonbusiness deals, but Papadopoulos perceived thatMillian’s attitude toward himchanged when Papadopoulos stated that he was only pursuing private-sectoropportunitiesandwasnotinterestedinajobintheAdministration.513Thetworemained in contact, however, and had extended online discussions aboutpossiblebusinessopportunitiesinRussia.514ThetwoalsoarrangedtomeetataWashington,D.C.barwhenbothattendedTrump’sinaugurationinlateJanuary2017.515

3.CarterPage

Carter Page worked for the Trump Campaign from January 2016 toSeptember2016.Hewas formally andpublicly announced as a foreignpolicyadvisor by the candidate in March 2016.516 Page had lived and worked inRussia, and he had been approached by Russian intelligence officers severalyearsbeforehevolunteeredfortheTrumpCampaign.DuringhistimewiththeCampaign,Page advocatedpro-Russia foreignpolicypositions and traveled toMoscow in his personal capacity. Russian intelligence officials had formedrelationships with Page in 2008 and 2013 and Russian officials may havefocusedonPagein2016becauseofhisaffiliationwiththeCampaign.However,the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russiangovernmentinitseffortstointerferewiththe2016presidentialelection.

a.Background

Before he began working for the Campaign in January 2016, Page hadsubstantial prior experience studying Russian policy issues and living andworkinginMoscow.From2004to2007,Pagewasthedeputybranchmanagerof Merrill Lynch’s Moscow office.517 There, he worked on transactionsinvolvingtheRussianenergycompanyGazpromandcametoknowGazprom’sdeputychieffinancialofficer,SergeyYatsenko.518

In 2008,Page foundedGlobalEnergyCapitalLLC (GEC), an investmentmanagement and advisory firm focused on the energy sector in emerging

markets.519GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████520Thecompanyotherwisehadnosourcesofincome,andPagewasforcedtodrawdownhislifesavings to support himself and pursue his business venture.521 Page askedYatsenkotoworkwithhimatGECasasenioradvisoronacontingencybasis,GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████.522

In2008,PagemetAlexanderBulatov, aRussiangovernmentofficialwhoworked at the Russian Consulate in New York.523 Page later learned thatBulatovwasaRussianintelligenceofficer,GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████.524

In 2013, Victor Podobnyy, another Russian intelligence officer workingcovertlyintheUnitedStatesunderdiplomaticcover,formedarelationshipwithPage.525PodobnyymetPage at an energy symposium inNewYorkCity andbeganexchangingemailswithhim.526PodobnyyandPagealsomet inpersononmultipleoccasions,duringwhichPageofferedhisoutlookonthefutureoftheenergy industry and provided documents to Podobnyy about the energybusiness.527InarecordedconversationonApril8,2013,Podobnyytoldanotherintelligence officer that Page was interested in business opportunities inRussia.528InPodobnyy’swords,Page“gothookedonGazpromthinkingthatiftheyhaveaproject,hecould...riseup.Maybehecan....[I]t’sobviousthathewants to earn lots ofmoney.”529 Podobnyy said that he had led Page on by“feed[ing]himemptypromises”thatPodobnyywouldusehisRussianbusinessconnections to helpPage.530Podobnyy told the other intelligence officer thathismethodof recruiting foreign sourceswas to promise them favors and thendiscardthemonceheobtainedrelevantinformationfromthem.531

In2015,PodobnyyandtwootherRussianintelligenceofficerswerechargedwithconspiracytoactasanunregisteredagentofaforeigngovernment.532Thecriminal complaint detailed Podobnyy’s interactions with and conversationsabout Page, who was identified only as “Male-1.”533 Based on the criminal

complaint’s description of the interactions, Page was aware that he was theindividual described as “Male-1.”534 Page later spoke with a Russiangovernment official at the United Nations General Assembly and identifiedhimself so that the official would understand he was “Male-1” from thePodobnyy complaint.535 Page told the official that he “didn’t do anything”GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████.536

IninterviewswiththeFBIbeforetheOffice’sopening,Pageacknowledgedthatheunderstoodthattheindividualshehadassociatedwithweremembersofthe Russian intelligence services, but he stated that he had only providedimmaterial non-public information to them and that he did not view thisrelationshipasabackchannel.537Pagetoldinvestigatingagentsthat“themoreimmaterialnon-publicinformationIgivethem,thebetterforthiscountry.”538

b.OriginsofandEarlyCampaignWork

InJanuary2016,Pagebeganvolunteeringonaninformal,unpaidbasisfortheTrumpCampaignafterEdCox,astateRepublicanPartyofficial,introducedPage to Trump Campaign officials.539 Page told the Office that his goal inworkingontheCampaignwastohelpcandidateTrumpimproverelationswithRussia.540To thatend,PageemailedCampaignofficialsofferinghis thoughtsonU.S.-Russiarelations,preparedtalkingpointsandbriefingmemosonRussia,and proposed that candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin inMoscow.541

IncommunicationswithCampaignofficials,Pagealsorepeatedlytoutedhishigh-level contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections betweencandidate Trump and senior Russian governmental officials. For example, onJanuary30,2016,PagesentanemailtoseniorCampaignofficialsstatingthathehad “spent the pastweek in Europe and ha[d] been in discussionswith someindividuals with close ties to the Kremlin” who recognized that Trump couldhavea“game-changingeffect...inbringingtheendofthenewColdWar.”542Theemailstatedthat“[t]hrough[his]discussionswiththesehighlevelcontacts,”Pagebelievedthat“adirectmeetinginMoscowbetweenMr[.]TrumpandPutin

couldbe arranged.”543Page closed the email by criticizingU.S. sanctions onRussia.544GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████545

OnMarch21,2016,candidateTrumpformallyandpubliclyidentifiedPageas a member of his foreign policy team to advise on Russia and the energysector.546 Over the next several months, Page continued providing policy-relatedworkproduct toCampaignofficials. For example, inApril 2016,Pageprovided feedbackonanoutline fora foreignpolicy speech that thecandidategave at theMayflowerHotel,547seeVolume I, Section IV.A.4, infra. InMay2016,PagepreparedanoutlineofanenergypolicyspeechfortheCampaignandthen traveled to Bismarck, North Dakota, to watch the candidate deliver thespeech.548ChiefpolicyadvisorSamClovis expressedappreciation forPage’sworkandpraisedhisworktootherCampaignofficials.549

c.CarterPage’sJuly2016TripToMoscow

Page’s affiliationwith the TrumpCampaign took on a higher profile anddrewtheattentionofRussianofficialsafter thecandidatenamedhimaforeignpolicyadvisor.Asaresult,inlateApril2016,PagewasinvitedtogiveaspeechattheJuly2016commencementceremonyattheNewEconomicSchool(NES)in Moscow.550 The NES commencement ceremony generally featured high-profile speakers; for example, President Barack Obama delivered acommencementaddressattheschoolin2009.551NESofficialstoldtheOfficethattheinterestininvitingPagetospeakatNESwasbasedentirelyonhisstatusasaTrumpCampaignadvisorwhoservedasthecandidate’sRussiaexpert.552AndrejKrickovic, an associate of Page’s and assistant professor at theHigherSchoolofEconomics inRussia, recommended thatNES rectorShlomoWeberinvitePage togive thecommencement addressbasedonhis connection to theTrumpCampaign.553DenisKlimentov, an employee ofNES, said that whenRussianslearnedofPage’sinvolvementintheTrumpCampaigninMarch2016,theexcitementwaspalpable.554Weberrecalledthatinsummer2016therewassubstantialinterestintheTrumpCampaigninMoscow,andhefeltthatbringingamemberoftheCampaigntotheschoolwouldbebeneficial.555

Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES, and he soughtapprovalfromTrumpCampaignofficialstomakethetriptoRussia.556OnMay16,2016,whilethatrequestwasstillunderconsideration,PageemailedClovis,J.D. Gordon, andWalid Phares and suggested that candidate Trump take hisplace speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow.557 On June 19,2016,PagefollowedupagaintorequestapprovaltospeakattheNESeventandto reiterate that NES “would love to have Mr. Trump speak at this annualcelebration” in Page’s place.558 Campaign manager Corey Lewandowskiresponded the sameday, saying, “If youwant to do this, itwould be out side[sic]ofyourrolewiththeDJTforPresidentcampaign.IamcertainMr.Trumpwillnotbeabletoattend.”559

InearlyJuly2016,PagetraveledtoRussiafortheNESevents.OnJuly5,2016, Denis Klimentov, copying his brother, Dmitri Klimentov,560 emailedMaria Zakharova, the Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’InformationandPressDepartment,aboutPage’svisitandhisconnectiontotheTrumpCampaign.561DenisKlimentovsaidintheemailthathewantedtodrawtheRussiangovernment’sattentiontoPage’svisit inMoscow.562Hismessageto Zakharova continued: “Page is Trump’s adviser on foreign policy. He is aknownbusinessman;heusedtoworkinRussia....Ifyouhaveanyquestions,Iwillbehappytohelpcontacthim.”563DmitriKlimentovthencontactedRussianPress Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page’s visit to see if Peskov wanted tointroduce Page to any Russian government officials.564 The following day,Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov-Zakharovaemailthread.Peskovwrote,“Ihavereadabout[Page].Specialistssaythatheisfarfrombeingthemainone.SoIbetternot initiateameetingin theKremlin.”565

OnJuly7,2016,PagedeliveredthefirstofhistwospeechesinMoscowatNES.566 In the speech, Page criticized the U.S. government’s foreign policytoward Russia, stating that “Washington and other Western capitals haveimpededpotentialprogressthroughtheiroftenhypocriticalfocusonideassuchas democratization, inequality, corruption and regime change.”567 On July 8,2016,Pagedeliveredaspeechduring theNEScommencement.568AfterPagedeliveredhiscommencementaddress,RussianDeputyPrimeMinisterandNES

boardmemberArkadyDvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that thesanctionstheUnitedStateshadimposedonRussiahadhurt theNES.569Pageand Dvorkovich shook hands at the commencement ceremony, and WeberrecalledthatDvorkovichmadestatementstoPageaboutworkingtogetherinthefuture.570GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████.571

Page said that, during his time in Moscow, he met with friends andassociatesheknewfromwhenhelivedinRussia,includingAndreyBaranov,aformer Gazprom employee who had become the head of investor relations atRosneft,aRussianenergycompany.572PagestatedthatheandBaranovtalkedabout “immaterial non-public” information.573 Page believed he andBaranovdiscussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranovmight havementioned the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing.574 Pagerecalled mentioning his involvement in the Trump Campaign with Baranov,althoughhedidnotrememberdetailsoftheconversation.575PagealsometwithindividualsfromTatneft,aRussianenergycompany,todiscusspossiblebusinessdeals,includinghavingPageworkasaconsultant.576

OnJuly8,2016,whilehewasinMoscow,PageemailedseveralCampaignofficials and stated hewould send “a readout soon regarding some incredibleinsights and outreach I’ve received from a fewRussian legislators and seniormembers of the Presidential Administration here.”577 On July 9, 2016, PageemailedClovis,writinginpertinentpart:

Russian Deputy Prime minister and NES board member ArkadyDvorkovich also spoke before the event. In a private conversation,Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr. Trump and a desire towork together toward devising better solutions in response to the vastrange of current international problems. Based on feedback from adiversearrayofothersourcesclosetothePresidentialAdministration,itwas readily apparent that this sentiment iswidelyheld at all levels ofgovernment.578

DespitetheserepresentationstotheCampaign,GrandJury█████████████████████████████████████████

██████579GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████580GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████581GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████582The Office was unable to obtain additional evidence or testimony about whoPagemayhavemetorcommunicatedwithinMoscow;thus,Page’sactivitiesinRussia—as described in his emails with the Campaign—were not fullyexplained.

d.LaterCampaignWorkandRemovalfromtheCampaign

InJuly2016,after returning fromRussia,Page traveled to theRepublicanNational Convention in Cleveland.583 While there, Page met RussianAmbassadortotheUnitedStatesSergeyKislyak;thatinteractionisdescribedinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.6.a,infra.584PagelateremailedCampaignofficialswithfeedbackhesaidhereceivedfromambassadorshehadmetat theConvention,and he wrote that Ambassador Kislyak was very worried about candidateClinton’sworldviews.585GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████.586

FollowingtheConvention,Page’striptoMoscowandhisadvocacyforpro-Russia foreign policy drew the media’s attention and began to generatesubstantial press coverage.TheCampaign responded by distancing itself fromPage,describinghimasan“informalforeignpolicyadvisor”whodid“notspeakfor Mr. Trump or the campaign.”587 On September 23, 2016, Yahoo! Newsreported that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page hadopened private communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S.sanctions policy under a possible Trump Administration.588 A CampaignspokesmantoldYahoo!NewsthatPagehad“norole”intheCampaignandthattheCampaignwas“notawareofanyofhisactivities,pastorpresent.”589OnSeptember24,2016,PagewasformallyremovedfromtheCampaign.590

AlthoughPagehadbeenremovedfromtheCampaign,aftertheelectionhe

soughtapositionin theTrumpAdministration.591OnNovember14,2016,hesubmittedanapplicationtotheTransitionTeamthatinflatedhiscredentialsandexperiences, stating that in his capacity as a Trump Campaign foreign policyadvisor he had met with “top world leaders” and “effectively responded todiplomaticoutreacheffortsfromseniorgovernmentofficialsinAsia,Europe,theMiddleEast,Africa, [and] theAmericas.”592Page receivedno response fromtheTransitionTeam.WhenPage tookapersonal trip toMoscow inDecember2016, he met again with at least one Russian government official. Thatinteraction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth in Volume I,SectionIV.B.6,infra.

4.DimitriSimesandtheCenterfortheNationalInterest

Membersof theTrumpCampaigninteractedonseveraloccasionswith theCenter for the National Interest (CNI), principally through its President andChiefExecutiveOfficer,DimitriSimes.CNIisathinktankwithexpertiseinandconnections to theRussian government. Simeswas born in the former SovietUnion and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. In April 2016,candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and nationalsecurityataneventhostedbytheNationalInterest,apublicationaffiliatedwithCNI.Then-SenatorJeffSessionsandRussianAmbassadorKislyakbothattendedthe event and, as a result, it gained some attention in relation to Sessions’sconfirmationhearings tobecomeAttorneyGeneral.Sessionshadvariousothercontacts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters,includingRussia.JaredKushneralsointeractedwithSimesaboutRussianissuesduring the campaign. The investigation did not identify evidence that theCampaignpassedorreceivedanymessagestoorfromtheRussiangovernmentthroughCNIorSimes.

a.CNIandDimitriSimesConnectwiththeTrumpCampaign

CNIisaWashington-basednon-profitorganizationthatgrewoutofacenterfoundedbyformerPresidentRichardNixon.593CNIdescribesitself“asavoiceforstrategicrealisminU.S.foreignpolicy,”andpublishesabi-monthlyforeignpolicy magazine, the National Interest.594 CNI is overseen by a board ofdirectorsandanadvisorycouncilthatislargelyhonoraryandwhosemembersatthe relevant time included Sessions, who served as an advisor to candidate

Trumponnationalsecurityandforeignpolicyissues.595

DimitriSimesispresidentandCEOofCNIandthepublisherandCEOoftheNationalInterest.596SimeswasbornintheformerSovietUnion,emigratedto the United States in the early 1970s, and joined CNI’s predecessor afterworking at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.597 Simespersonally has many contacts with current and former Russian governmentofficials,598asdoesCNIcollectively.AsCNIstatedwhenseekingagrantfromthe Carnegie Corporation in 2015, CNI has “unparalleled access to RussianofficialsandpoliticiansamongWashingtonthinktanks,”599inpartbecauseCNIhasarrangedforU.S.delegationstovisitRussiaandforRussiandelegationstovisittheUnitedStatesaspartofso-called“TrackII”diplomaticefforts.600

On March 14, 2016, CNI board member Richard Plepler organized aluncheon for CNI and its honorary chairman, Henry Kissinger, at the TimeWarnerBuilding inNewYork.601The idea behind the eventwas to generateinterestinCNI’sworkandrecruitnewboardmembersforCNI.602AlongwithSimes, attendees at the event included JaredKushner, son-in-lawof candidateTrump.603 Kushner told the Office that the event came at a time when theTrumpCampaignwashavingtroublesecuringsupportfromexperiencedforeignpolicyprofessionalsandthat,asaresult,hedecidedtoseekSimes’sassistanceduringtheMarch14event.604

Simes and Kushner spoke again on aMarch 24, 2016 telephone call,605threedaysafterTrumphadpubliclynamedtheteamofforeignpolicyadvisorsthathadbeenput togetheronshortnotice.606OnMarch31,2016,SimesandKushner had an in-person, one-on-one meeting in Kushner’s New Yorkoffice.607Duringthatmeeting,SimestoldKushnerthatthebestwaytohandleforeign-policyissuesfortheTrumpCampaignwouldbetoorganizeanadvisorygroup of experts tomeet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policyapproach that was consistent with Trump’s voice.608 Simes believed thatKushnerwasreceptivetothatsuggestion.609

Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the TrumpCampaign regarding theCampaign’s foreignpolicypositions.Forexample,on

June 17, 2016, Simes sent J.D. Gordon an email with a “memo to SenatorSessionsthatwediscussedatourrecentmeeting”andaskedGordontobothreaditandshareitwithSessions.Thememorandumproposedbuildinga“smallandcarefully selected group of experts” to assist Sessions with the Campaign,operating under the assumption “that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable onnational security and foreign policy issues.” The memorandum outlined keyissuesfortheCampaign,includinga“newbeginningwithRussia.”610

b.NationalInterestHostsaForeignPolicySpeechattheMayflowerHotel

During both their March 24 phone call and their March 31 in-personmeeting,SimesandKushnerdiscussedthepossibilityofCNIhostingaforeignpolicy speech by candidate Trump.611 Following those conversations, SimesagreedthatheandothersassociatedwithCNIwouldprovidebehind-the-scenesinputonthesubstanceoftheforeign-policyspeechandthatCNIofficialswouldcoordinate the logistics of the speech with Sessions and his staff, includingSessions’schiefofstaff,RickDearborn.612

Inmid-April2016,KushnerputSimesincontactwithseniorpolicyadvisorStephenMillerandforwardedtoSimesanoutlineof theforeign-policyspeechthatMillerhadprepared.613SimessentbacktotheCampaignbulletpointswithideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI Executive Director PaulSaundersandboardmemberRichardBurt.614Simesreceivedsubsequentdraftoutlines from Miller, and he and Saunders spoke to Miller by phone aboutsubstantive changes to the speech.615 It is not clear, however, whether CNIofficials received an actual draft of the speech for comment; while Saundersrecalledhavingreceivedanactualdraft,Simesdidnot,andtheemailsthatCNIproducedtothisOfficedonotcontainsuchadraft.616

After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNl’s hosting thespeech could be perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate, CNIdecided to have its publication, theNational Interest, serve as the host and tohave theeventat theNationalPressClub.617Kushner later requested that theeventbemoved to theMayflowerHotel,whichwasanothervenue thatSimeshadmentionedduringinitialdiscussionswiththeCampaign,inordertoaddress

concernsaboutsecurityandcapacity.618

OnApril25,2016,SaundersbookedeventroomsattheMayflowertohostboth the speech and a VIP reception that was to be held beforehand.619Saunders understood that the reception—at which invitees would have thechance to meet· candidate Trump—would be a small event.620 SaundersdecidedwhowouldattendbylookingatthelistofCNI’sinviteestothespeechitself and then choosing a subset for the reception.621 CNI’s invitees to thereceptionincludedSessionsandKislyak.622TheweekbeforethespeechSimeshadinformedKislyakthathewouldbeinvitedtothespeech,andthathewouldhavetheopportunitytomeetTrump.623

When the pre-speech reception began on April 27, a receiving line wasquicklyorganized so that attendeescouldmeetTrump.624Sessions first stoodnext to Trump to introduce him to the members of Congress who were inattendance.625After thosemembershadbeen introduced,Simesstoodnext toTrump and introduced him to the CNI invitees in attendance, includingKislyak.626 Simes perceived the introduction to be positive and friendly, butthought it clear that Kislyak and Trump had just met for the first time.627KislyakalsometKushnerduringthepre-speechreception.Thetwoshookhandsandchattedforaminuteortwo,duringwhichKushnerrecalledKislyaksaying,“welikewhatyourcandidateissaying...it’srefreshing.”628

Severalpublic reports state that, in addition to speaking toKushner at thepre-speech reception, Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at thattime.629Sessionsstatedtoinvestigators,however,thathedidnotrememberanysuchconversation.630NordidanyoneelseaffiliatedwithCNIor theNationalInterest specifically recall a conversation or meeting between Sessions andKislyak at the pre-speech reception.631 It appears that, if a conversationoccurredatthepre-speechreception,itwasabriefoneconductedinpublicview,similartotheexchangebetweenKushnerandKislyak.

TheOfficefoundnoevidencethatKislyakconversedwitheitherTrumporSessionsafterthespeech,orwouldhavehadtheopportunitytodoso.Simes,forexample,didnotrecallseeingKislyakatthepost-speechluncheon,632andthe

onlywitnesswhoaccountedforSessions’swhereaboutsstatedthatSessionsmayhavespoken to thepressafter theeventbut thendeparted forCapitolHill.633Saunders recalled, based in part on a food-related request he received from aCampaignstaffmember,thatTrumpleftthehotelafewminutesafterthespeechtogototheairport.634

c.JeffSessions’sPost-SpeechInteractionswithCNI

In the wake of Sessions’s confirmation hearings as Attorney General,questionsaroseaboutwhetherSessions’scampaign-periodinteractionswithCNIapart from the Mayflower speech included any additional meetings withAmbassador Kislyak or involved Russian-related matters. With respect toKislyak contacts, on May 23, 2016, Sessions attended CNI’s DistinguishedService Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D.C.635Sessions attended a pre-dinner reception and was seated at one of two headtables for the event.636 A seating chart prepared by Saunders indicates thatSessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to haverespondedtotheinvitationbyindicatinghewouldattendtheevent.637Sessions,however,didnotrememberseeing,speakingwith,orsittingnext toKislyakatthe dinner.638 Although CNI boardmember Charles Boyd said hemay haveseenKislyakatthedinner,639Simes,Saunders,andJacobHeilbrunn—editoroftheNational Interest—allhadno recollectionof seeingKislyakat theMay23event.640KislyakalsodoesnotappearinanyofthephotosfromtheeventthattheOfficeobtained.

Inthesummerof2016,CNIorganizedatleasttwodinnersinWashington,D.C.forSessionstomeetwithexperiencedforeignpolicyprofessionals.641Thedinners included CNI-affiliated individuals, such as Richard Burt and ZalmayKhalilzad, a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq and the personwhohadintroducedTrumpbeforetheApril27,2016foreign-policyspeech.642

KhalilzadalsometwithSessionsone-on-oneseparatelyfromthedinners.643Atthe dinners and in themeetings, the participants addressedU.S. relationswithRussia, including how U.S. relations with NATO and European countriesaffectedU.S.policytowardRussia.644Butthediscussionswerenotexclusively

focused on Russia.645 Khalilzad, for example, recalled discussing “nation-building”andviolentextremismwithSessions.646 Inaddition,SessionsaskedSaunders(ofCNI)todrafttwomemorandanotspecifictoRussia:oneonHillaryClinton’sforeignpolicyshortcomingsandanotheronEgypt.647

d.JaredKushner’sContinuingContactswithSimes

BetweentheApril2016speechattheMayflowerHotelandthepresidentialelection, Jared Kushner had periodic contacts with Simes.648 Those contactsconsistedofbothin-personmeetingsandphoneconversations,whichconcernedhow to address issues relating to Russia in the Campaign and how to moveforward with the advisory group of foreign policy experts that Simes hadproposed.649 Simes recalled that he, not Kushner, initiated all conversationsabout Russia, and that Kushner never asked him to set up back-channelconversations with Russians.650 According to Simes, after the Mayflowerspeech in lateApril, Simes raised the issueofRussian contactswithKushner,advised that it was bad optics for the Campaign to develop hidden Russiancontacts,andtoldKushnerboththat theCampaignshouldnothighlightRussiaasanissueandshouldhandleanycontactswithRussianswithcare.651KushnergenerallyprovidedasimilaraccountofhisinteractionswithSimes.652

Among theKushner-SimesmeetingswasoneheldonAugust17,2016,atSimes’s request, in Kushner’s New York office. The meeting was to addressforeignpolicyadvicethatCNIwasprovidingandhowtorespondtotheClintonCampaign’s Russia-related attacks on candidate Trump.653 In advance of themeeting, Simes sent Kushner a “Russia Policy Memo” laying out “what Mr.Trumpmaywant to say about Russia.”654 In a cover email transmitting thatmemo and a phone call to set up the meeting, Simes mentioned “a well-documentedstoryofhighlyquestionableconnectionsbetweenBillClinton”andtheRussiangovernment,“partsof[which]”(accordingtoSimes)hadevenbeen“discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and shared with the[Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency.”655 Kushnerforwarded the email to senior TrumpCampaign officials StephenMiller, PaulManafort, and Rick Gates, with the note “suggestion only.”656 Manafortsubsequentlyforwardedtheemailtohisassistantandscheduledameetingwith

Simes.657(ManafortwasonthevergeofleavingtheCampaignbythetimeofthe scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only withKushner).

DuringtheAugust17meeting,SimesprovidedKushnertheClinton-relatedinformation that he had promised.658 Simes told Kushner that, PersonalPrivacy███████████████████████████████████████████████659Simesclaimedthathehadreceivedthis information from former CIA and Reagan White House official FritzErmarth,whoclaimedtohavelearneditfromU.S.intelligencesources,notfromRussians.660

SimesperceivedthatKushnerdidnotfindtheinformationtobeofinterestorusetotheCampaignbecauseitwas,inSimes’swords,“oldnews.”661Wheninterviewedby theOffice,Kushner stated thathebelieved that therewas littlechance of something new being revealed about the Clintons given their longcareeraspublicfigures,andthatheneverreceivedfromSimesinformationthatcould be “operationalized” for the Trump Campaign.662 Despite Kushner’sreaction,SimesbelievedthatheprovidedthesameinformationatasmallgroupmeetingofforeignpolicyexpertsthatCNIorganizedforSessions.663

5.June9,2016MeetingatTrumpTower

On June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met inTrump Tower with a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatoryinformation aboutHillaryClinton from theRussian government. Themeetingwas proposed toDonaldTrump Jr. in an email fromRobertGoldstone, at therequest of his then-client Emin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estatedeveloper Aras Agalarov. Goldstone relayed to Trump Jr. that the “Crownprosecutor of Russia . . . offered to provide the Trump Campaign with someofficial documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and herdealingswithRussia” as “part ofRussia and its government’s support forMr.Trump.”TrumpJr. immediatelyresponded that“if it’swhatyousayI love it,”andarrangedthemeetingthroughaseriesofemailsandtelephonecalls.

Trump Jr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior advisorJared Kushner to attend the meeting, and both attended. Members of the

Campaigndiscussedthemeetingbeforeitoccurred,andMichaelCohenrecalledthatTrump Jr.mayhave told candidateTrump about an upcomingmeeting toreceive adverse information about Clinton, without linking the meeting toRussia.AccordingtowrittenanswerssubmittedbyPresidentTrump,hehasnorecollection of learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found nodocumentaryevidenceshowingthathewasmadeawareofthemeeting—oritsRussianconnection—beforeitoccurred.

TheRussianattorneywhospokeatthemeeting,NataliaVeselnitskaya,hadpreviously worked for the Russian government and maintained a relationshipwith that government throughout this period of time. She claimed that fundsderived from illegal activities in Russiawere provided toHillary Clinton andother Democrats. Trump Jr. requested evidence to support those claims, butVeselnitskaya did not provide such information. She and her associates thenturned to a critique of the origins of the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 statute thatimposedfinancialandtravelsanctionsonRussianofficialsandthatresultedinaretaliatory ban on adoptions ofRussian children.Trump Jr. suggested that theissue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump was elected. After theelection,Veselnitskayamadeadditionaleffortstofollowuponthemeeting,buttheTrumpTransitionTeamdidnotengage.

a.SettingUptheJune9Meeting

i.OutreachtoDonaldTrumpJr.

ArasAgalarovisaRussianreal-estatedeveloperwithtiestoPutinandothermembers of the Russian government, including Russia’s Prosecutor General,YuriChaika.664ArasAgalarovisthepresidentoftheCrocusGroup,aRussianenterprisethatholdssubstantialRussiangovernmentconstructioncontractsandthat—asdiscussedabove,VolumeI,SectionIV.A.I,supra—workedwithTrumpinconnectionwiththe2013MissUniversepageantinMoscowandapotentialTrumpMoscowreal-estateproject.665Therelationshipcontinuedovertime,asthe parties pursued the Trump Moscow project in 2013-2014 and exchangedgiftsandlettersin2016.666Forexample,inApril2016,TrumprespondedtoaletterfromArasAgalarovwithahandwrittennote.667ArasAgalarovexpressedinterest in Trump’s campaign, passed on “congratulations” for winning in the

primary and—according to one email drafted byGoldstone—an “offer” of his“support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues[,]especiallywithreferencetoU.S./Russianrelations.”668

On June 3, 2016, Emin Agalarov called Goldstone, Emin’s then-publicist.669Goldstone isamusicandeventspromoterwhorepresentedEminAgalarov fromapproximately late2012until late2016.670While representingEminAgalarov,Goldstone facilitated theongoingcontactbetween theTrumpsandtheAgalarovs—includinganinvitationthatTrumpsenttoPutintoattendthe2013MissUniversePageantinMoscow.671GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████.672GoldstoneunderstoodGrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████aRussian political connection, andEminAgalarov indicated that the attorneywasaprosecutor.673GoldstonerecalledthattheinformationthatmightinteresttheTrumpsinvolvedHillaryClintonGrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████674GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████675

TheGrandJury███████████████████████████████████████████████mentioned byEminAgalarovwasNataliaVeselnitskaya.676Fromapproximately 1998until 2001,VeselnitskayaworkedasaprosecutorfortheCentralAdministrativeDistrictoftheRussianProsecutor’sOffice,677andshecontinuedtoperformgovernment-related work and maintain ties to the Russian government following herdeparture.678ShelobbiedandtestifiedabouttheMagnitskyAct,whichimposedfinancial sanctions and travel restrictions on Russian officials and which wasnamed for a Russian tax specialist who exposed a fraud and later died in aRussianprison.679Putin called the statute “a purely political, unfriendly act,”andRussiarespondedbybarringalistofcurrentandformerU.S.officialsfromentering Russia and by halting the adoption of Russian children by U.S.

citizens.680VeselnitskayaperformedlegalworkforDenisKatsyv,681thesonofRussian businessman Peter Katsyv, and for his company Prevezon HoldingsLtd.,whichwasadefendantinacivil-forfeitureactionallegingthelaunderingofproceeds from the fraud exposed byMagnitsky.682 She also appears to havebeeninvolved inanApril2016approachtoaU.S.congressionaldelegation inMoscow offering “confidential information” from “the Prosecutor General ofRussia” about “interactions between certain political forces in our twocountries.”683

ShortlyafterhisJune3callwithEminAgalarov,GoldstoneemailedTrumpJr.684Theemailstated:

GoodmorningEminjustcalledandaskedmetocontactyouwithsomethingveryinteresting.TheCrownprosecutorofRussiametwithhisfatherArasthismorningandintheirmeetingofferedto provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that wouldincriminateHillaryandherdealingswithRussiaandwouldbeveryusefultoyourfather.ThisisobviouslyveryhighlevelandsensitiveinformationbutispartofRussiaanditsgovernment’ssupportforMr.Trump-helpedalongbyArasandEmin.Whatdoyou think is thebestway tohandle this information andwouldyoube able to speak toEminaboutitdirectly?IcanalsosendthisinfotoyourfatherviaRhona,butitisultrasensitivesowantedtosendtoyoufirst.BestRobGoldstone

Withinminutesofthisemail,TrumpJr.responded,emailingback:“ThanksRobI appreciate that. I am on the road at themoment but perhaps I just speak toEminfirst.Seemswehavesometimeandifit’swhatyousayIloveitespeciallylater in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next week when I amback?”685GoldstoneconveyedTrumpJr.’sinteresttoEminAgalarov,emailingthatTrumpJr.“wantstospeakpersonallyontheissue.”686

On June 6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstone if there was “[a]nynews,”andGoldstoneexplainedthatTrumpJr.waslikelystilltravelingforthe“finalelections...where[T]rumpwillbe‘crowned’theofficialnominee.”687Onthesameday,GoldstoneagainemailedTrumpJr.andaskedwhenTrumpJr.was“freetotalkwithEminaboutthisHillaryinfo.”688TrumpJr.askediftheycould“speaknow,”andGoldstonearrangedacallbetweenTrumpJr.andEmin

Agalarov.689OnJune6andJune7,TrumpJr.andEminAgalarovhadmultiplebriefcalls.690

AlsoonJune6,2016,ArasAgalarovcalledIkeKaveladzeandaskedhimtoattendameetinginNewYorkwiththeTrumpOrganization.691KaveladzeisaGeorgia-born,naturalizedU.S.citizenwhoworkedintheUnitedStatesfor theCrocusGroupandreportedtoArasAgalarov.692KaveladzetoldtheOfficethat,ina secondphonecallon June6,2016,ArasAgalarovaskedKaveladze ifheknewanythingabouttheMagnitskyAct,andArassenthimashortsynopsisforthemeeting andVeselnitskaya’s business card. According to Kaveladze, ArasAgalarovsaidthepurposeofthemeetingwastodiscusstheMagnitskyAct,andheaskedKaveladzetotranslate.693

ii.AwarenessoftheMeetingWithintheCampaign

OnJune7,Goldstone emailedTrumpJr. and said that “Eminasked that Ischedule a meeting with you and [t]he Russian government attorney who isflyingoverfromMoscow.”694TrumpJr.repliedthatManafort(identifiedasthe“campaign boss”), Jared Kushner, and Trump Jr. would likely attend.695Goldstonewas suprised to learn thatTrumpJr.,Manafort, andKushnerwouldattend.696KaveladzeGrandJury███████████████“puzzled”by the list of attendees and that he checked with one of Emin Agalarov’sassistants,RomanBeniaminov,whosaidthatthepurposeofthemeetingwasforVeselnitskaya to convey “negative information on Hillary Clinton.”697

Beniaminov,however,statedthathedidnotrecallhavingknownorsaidthat.698

EarlyonJune8,2016Kushneremailedhisassistant,askinghertodiscussa3:00p.m.meetingthefollowingdaywithTrumpJr.699Laterthatday,TrumpJr.forwarded theentiretyofhisemailcorrespondence regarding themeetingwithGoldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under the subject line “FW: Russia -Clinton-privateandconfidential,”addinganotethatthe“[m]eetinggotmovedto4tomorrowatmyoffices.”700Kushnerthensenthisassistantasecondemail,informing her that the “[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now.”701 Manafortresponded,“Seeyouthen.P.”702

Rick Gates, who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated duringinterviews with the Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr.announced at a regularmorningmeeting of senior campaign staff and Trumpfamilymembers that he had a lead on negative information about theClintonFoundation.703GatesbelievedthatTrumpJr.saidtheinformationwascomingfrom a group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by afriend.704 Gates recalled that the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., EricTrump,PaulManafort,HopeHicks,and, joining late, IvankaTrumpandJaredKushner.AccordingtoGates,Manafortwarnedthegroupthatthemeetinglikelywouldnotyieldvital informationand theyshouldbecareful.705Hicksdeniedany knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017,706 and Kushner did notrecalliftheplannedJune9meetingcameupatallearlierthatweek.707

MichaelCohen recalledbeing inDonald J.Trump’sofficeon June6or7whenTrumpJr.toldhisfatherthatameetingtoobtainadverseinformationaboutClintonwasgoingforward.708Cohendidnot recallTrumpJr. stating that themeetingwasconnectedtoRussia.709Fromthetenoroftheconversation,Cohenbelieved that Trump Jr. had previously discussed themeeting with his father,althoughCohenwasnotinvolvedinanysuchconversation.710InaninterviewwiththeSenateJudiciaryCommittee,however,TrumpJr.statedthathedidnotinform his father about the emails or the upcoming meeting.711 Similarly,neitherManafortnorKushnerrecalledanyoneinformingcandidateTrumpofthemeeting, includingTrump Jr.712 President Trump has stated to thisOffice, inwrittenanswerstoquestions,thathehas“norecollectionoflearningatthetime”thathisson,Manafort,or“KushnerwasconsideringparticipatinginameetinginJune 2016 concerning potentially negative information about HillaryClinton.”713

b.TheEventsofJune9,2016

i.ArrangementsfortheMeeting

VeselnitskayawasinNewYorkonJune9,2016,forappellateproceedingsin the Prevezon civil forfeiture litigation.714 That day, Veselnitskaya called

RinatAkhmetshin,aSoviet-bornU.S.lobbyist,GrandJury███████████████andwhenshelearnedthathewasinNewYork,invitedhimtolunch.715Akhmetshin told theOffice thathehadworkedon issues relating totheMagnitskyActandhadworkedonthePrevezonlitigation.716KaveladzeandAnatoliSamochornov,aRussian-borntranslatorwhohadassistedVeselnitskayawith Magnitsky-related lobbying and the Prevezon case, also attended thelunch.717GrandJury███████████████VeselnitskayasaidshewasmeetingGrandJury███████████████and askedAkhmetshinwhat she should tell him.718According to several participants inthe lunch, Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging financialmisconductbyBillBrowderandtheZiffbrothers(Americanswithbusiness inRussia), and those individuals subsequently making political donations to theDNC.719GrandJury██████████████████████████720

ThegroupthenwenttoTrumpTowerforthemeeting.721

ii.ConductoftheMeeting

Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side, whileKaveladze, Samochomov, Akhmetshin, and Goldstone attended withVeselnitskaya.722 The Office spoke to every participant except VeselnitskayaandTrumpJr.,thelatterofwhomdeclinedtobevoluntarilyinterviewedbytheOfficeGrandJury███████████████

Themeetinglastedapproximately20minutes.723GrandJury███████████████724█████GoldstonerecalledthatTrumpJr.invitedVeselnitskaya to begin but did not say anything about the subject of themeeting.725Participantsagreed thatVeselnitskaya stated that theZiffbrothershadbrokenRussianlawsandhaddonatedtheirprofitstotheDNCortheClintonCampaign.726SheassertedthattheZiffbrothershadengagedintaxevasionandmoneylaunderinginboththeUnitedStatesandRussia.727GrandJury██████████████████████████728According to

Akhmetshin, Trump Jr. asked follow-up questions about how the allegedpaymentscouldbetiedspecificallytotheClintonCampaign,butVeselnitskayaindicated that she could not trace the money once it entered the UnitedStates.729KaveladzesimilarlyrecalledthatTrumpJr.askedwhattheyhaveonClinton, and Kushner became aggravated and asked “[w]hat are we doinghere?”730

AkhmetshinthenspokeaboutU.S.sanctionsimposedundertheMagnitskyAct and Russia’s response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian children.731Severalparticipantsrecalled thatTrumpJr.commented thatTrumpisaprivatecitizen,andtherewasnothingtheycoulddoatthattime.732TrumpJr.alsosaidthattheycouldrevisittheissueifandwhentheywereingovernment.733NotesthatManafort took on his phone reflect the general flow of the conversation,althoughnotallofitsdetails.734

Atsomepointinthemeeting,KushnersentaniMessagetoManafortstating“waste of time,” followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants atKushnerCompanieswith requests that they call him togivehiman excuse toleave.735 Samochornov recalled that Kushner departed the meeting before itconcluded; Veselnitskaya recalled the same when interviewed by the press inJuly2017.736

Veselnitskaya’s press interviews andwritten statements toCongress differmaterially from other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview, Veselnitskayaclaimed that she has no connection to the Russian government and had notreferredtoanyderogatory informationconcerningtheClintonCampaignwhenshe met with Trump Campaign officials.737 Veselnitskaya’s November 2017writtensubmissiontotheSenateJudiciaryCommitteestatedthatthepurposeoftheJune9meetingwasnottoconnectwith“theTrumpCampaign”butrathertohave “a private meeting with Donald Trump Jr.—a friend of my goodacquaintance’ssononthematterofassistingmeormycolleaguesininformingtheCongressmembersastothecriminalnatureofmanipulationandinterferencewith the legislative activities of the US Congress.”738 In other words,Veselnitskaya claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign. Nowitness, however, recalled any reference to Congress during the meeting.Veselnitskaya also maintained that she “attended the meeting as a lawyer of

DenisKatsyv,” thepreviouslymentionedownerofPrevezonHoldings,butshedidnot“introduce[her]selfinthiscapacity.”739

In a July 2017 television interview,Trump Jr. stated thatwhile he hadnowaytogaugethereliability,credibility,oraccuracyofwhatGoldstonehadstatedwas thepurposeof themeeting, if“someonehas informationonouropponent. . . maybe this is something. I should hear them out.”740 Trump Jr. furtherstated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he should“listen towhatRobandhis colleagueshad to say.”741Dependingonwhat, ifany, information was provided, Trump Jr. stated he could then “consult withcounsel to make an informed decision as to whether to give it any furtherconsideration.”742

AftertheJune9meetingconcluded,GoldstoneapologizedtoTrumpJr.743AccordingtoGoldstone,hetoldTrumpJr.GrandJury██████████████████████████744andtoldEminAgalarovinaphonecallthatthemeetingwasaboutadoptionGrandJury██████████████████████████745GrandJury██████████████████████████746ArasAgalarovaskedKaveladzetoreportin after the meeting, but before Kaveladze could call, Aras Agalarov calledhim.747WithVeselnitskaya next to him,Kaveladze reported that themeetinghad gone well, but he later told Aras Agalarov that the meeting about theMagnitskyActhadbeen awasteof timebecause itwasnotwith lawyers andtheywere“preachingtothewrongcrowd.”748

c.Post-June9Events

Veselnitskaya andArasAgalarovmade at least two unsuccessful attemptsafter the election to meet with Trump representatives to convey similarinformationaboutBrowderandtheMagnitskyAct.749OnNovember23,2016,KaveladzeemailedGoldstoneaboutsettingupanothermeeting“withTpeople”andsentadocumentbearingallegationssimilartothoseconveyedonJune9.750Kaveladze followedupwithGoldstone, stating that“Mr.A,”whichGoldstoneunderstood to mean Aras Agalarov, called to ask about the meeting.751

GoldstoneemailedthedocumenttoRhonaGraff,sayingthat“ArasAgalarovhasasked me to pass on this document in the hope it can be passed on to theappropriate team. If needed, a lawyer representing the case is in New Yorkcurrently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team.”752According toGoldstone,aroundJanuary2017,Kaveladzecontactedhimagainto set up another meeting, but Goldstone did not make the request.753 Theinvestigationdidnotidentifyevidenceofthetransitionteamfollowingup.

Participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting began receiving inquiries fromattorneys representing the Trump Organization starting in approximately June2017.754On approximately June2, 2017,Goldstone spokewithAlanGarten,generalcounseloftheTrumpOrganization,abouthisparticipationintheJune9meeting.755Thesameday,GoldstoneemailedVeselnitskaya’snametoGarten,identifyingherasthe“womanwhowastheattorneywhospokeat themeetingfromMoscow. ”756 Later in June 2017,Goldstone participated in a lengthiercallwithGartenandAlanFuterfas,outsidecounselfortheTrumpOrganization(and, subsequently, personal counsel for Trump Jr.).757 On June 27, 2017,GoldstoneemailedEminAgalarovwiththesubject“Trumpattorneys”andstatedthat he was “interviewed by attorneys” about the June 9 meeting who were“concerned because it links Don Jr. to officials from Russia—which he hasalwaysdeniedmeeting.”758Goldstonestressedthathe“didsayatthetimethiswasanawfulideaandaterriblemeeting.”759EminAgalarovsentascreenshotofthemessagetoKaveladze.760

The June 9 meeting became public in July 2017. In a July 9, 2017 textmessagetoEminAgalarov,Goldstonewrote“ImadesureIkeptyouandyourfatheroutof[t]hisstory,”761and“[i]fcontactedIcandoadanceandkeepyououtofit.”762Goldstoneadded,“FBInowinvestigating,”and“Ihopethisfavorwas worth for your dad—it could blow up.”763 On July 12, 2017 EminAgalarovcomplainedtoKaveladzethathisfather,Aras,“never listens”tohimandthattheirrelationshipwith“mrThasbeenthrowndownthedrain.”764Thenext month, Goldstone commented to Emin Agalarov about the volume ofpublicity the June 9meeting had generated, stating that his “reputation [was]basically destroyed by this dumbmeeting which your father insisted on eventhoughIkeandMetoldhimwouldbebadnewsandnot todo.”765Goldstone

added,“Iamnotabletorespondoutofcourtesytoyouandyourfather.SoampaintedassomemysteriouslinktoPutin.”766

AfterpublicreportingontheJune9meetingbegan,representativesfromtheTrump Organization again reached out to participants. On July 10, 2017,Futerfas sent Goldstone an email with a proposed statement for Goldstone toissue,whichread:

Asthepersonwhoarrangedthemeeting,Icandefinitivelystatethatthestatements I have read by Donald Trump Jr. are 100% accurate. Themeeting was a complete waste of time and Don was never told Ms.Veselnitskaya’s name prior to the meeting. Ms. Veselnitskaya mostlytalked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and themeetinglasted20to30minutesatmost.Therewasneveranyfollowupandnothingevercameofthemeeting.767

GrandJury██████████████████████████thestatementdraftedbyTrumpOrganizationrepresentativeswasGrandJury██████████████████████████768Heproposedadifferentstatement,assertingthathehadbeenasked“by[his]clientinMoscow-Emin Agalarov - to facilitate a meeting between a Russian attorney (NataliaVeselnitzkaya[sic])andDonaldTrumpJr.ThelawyerhadapparentlystatedthatshehadsomeinformationregardingfundingtotheDNCfromRussia,whichshebelieved Mr. Trump Jr. might find interesting.”769 Goldstone never releasedeitherstatement.770

On the Russian end, there were also communications about whatparticipantsshouldsayabout theJune9meeting.Specifically, theorganizationthat hired Samochornov—an anti-Magnitsky Act group controlled byVeselnitskaya and the owner of Prevezon—offered to pay $90,000 ofSamochornov’s legal fees.771AtVeselnitskaya’s request, theorganizationsentSamochornovatranscriptofaVeselnitskayapressinterview,andSamochornovunderstood that the organization would pay his legal fees only if he madestatements consistent with Veselnitskaya’s.772 Samochornov declined, tellingthe Office that he did not want to perjure himself.773 The individual whoconveyed Veselnitskaya’s request to Samochornov stated that he did notexpressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya’s answers but, in

hindsight, recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could haveinterpreted the offer of assistance to be conditioned on his not contradictingVeselnitskaya’saccount.774

Volume II, Section II.G, infra, discusses interactions between PresidentTrump, Trump Jr., and others in June and July 2017 regarding the June 9meeting.

6.EventsattheRepublicanNationalConvention

Trump Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador Sergey KislyakduringtheweekoftheRepublicanNationalConvention.Theevidenceindicatesthat those interactions were brief and non-substantive. During platformcommitteemeetings immediatelybefore theConvention,J.D.Gordon,aseniorCampaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposedamendment to theRepublicanParty platformexpressing support for providing“lethal” assistance to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. Gordonrequestedthatplatformcommitteepersonnelrevisetheproposedamendmenttostate that only “appropriate” assistance be provided to Ukraine. The originalsponsor of the “lethal” assistance amendment stated thatGordon told her (thesponsor)thathewasonthephonewithcandidateTrumpinconnectionwithhisrequest to dilute the language. Gordon denied making that statement to thesponsor, although he acknowledged it was possible he mentioned havingpreviously spoken to the candidate about the subjectmatter. The investigationdidnotestablishthatGordonspoketoorwasdirectedbythecandidatetomakethat proposal.Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed theproposedlanguagewasinconsistentwithTrump’spositiononUkraine.

a.AmbassadorKislyak’sEncounterswithSenatorSessionsandJ.D.GordontheWeekoftheRNC

InJuly2016,SenatorSessionsandGordonspokeattheGlobalPartnersinDiplomacy event, a conference co-sponsored by the StateDepartment and theHeritageFoundationheldinCleveland,OhiothesameweekastheRepublicanNational Convention (RNC or “Convention”).775 Approximately 80 foreignambassadors to the United States, including Kislyak, were invited to theconference.776

On July 20, 2016, Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at theconference.777 In his speech, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the UnitedStatesshouldhavebetterrelationswithRussia.778DuringSessions’sspeech,hetook questions from the audience, one of which may have been asked byKislyak.779 When the speeches concluded, several ambassadors lined up togreetthespeakers.780GordonshookhandswithKislyakandreiterated thathehadmeantwhathesaidinthespeechaboutimprovingU.S.-Russiarelations.781Sessions separately spoke with between six and 12 ambassadors, includingKislyak.782AlthoughSessionsstatedduringinterviewswiththeOfficethathehadnospecificrecollectionofwhathediscussedwithKislyak,hebelievedthatthe two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchangedpleasantriesandsaidsomethingsaboutU.S.-Russiarelations.783

Later that evening, Gordon attended a reception as part of theconference.784GordonranintoKislyakasthetwopreparedplatesoffood,andtheydecidedtositatthesametabletoeat.785Theywerejoinedatthattablebythe ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and by Trump Campaignadvisor Carter Page.786 As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for whatGordonestimatedtohavebeenthreetofiveminutes,duringwhichGordonagainmentionedthathemeantwhathesaidinhisspeechaboutimprovingU.S.-Russiarelations.787

b.ChangetoRepublicanPartyPlatform

In preparation for the 2016 Convention, foreign policy advisors to theTrumpCampaign,workingwith theRepublicanNationalCommittee, reviewedthe 2012Convention’s foreign policy platform to identify divergence betweenthe earlier platform and candidate Trump’s positions.788 TheCampaign teamdiscussedtoningdownlanguagefromthe2012platformthatidentifiedRussiaasthecountry’snumberonethreat,giventhecandidate’sbeliefthatthereneededtobebetterU.S.relationswithRussia.789TheRNCPlatformCommitteesentthe2016 draft platform to the National Security and Defense PlatformSubcommitteeonJuly10,2016,theeveningbeforeitsfirstmeetingtoproposeamendments.790

Althoughonlydelegatescouldparticipateinformaldiscussionsandvoteontheplatform, theTrumpCampaigncouldrequestchanges,andmembersof theTrump Campaign attended committee meetings.791 John Mashburn, theCampaign’spolicydirector,helpedoversee theCampaign’s involvement in theplatformcommitteemeetings.792HetoldtheOfficethathedirectedCampaignstaffattheConvention,includingJ.D.Gordon,totakeahands-offapproachandonly to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump’swishes.793

On July 11, 2016, delegateDianaDenman submitted a proposed platformamendment that included provision of armed support for Ukraine.794 Theamendment described Russia’s “ongoing military aggression” in Ukraine andannounced“support” for“maintaining (and, ifwarranted, increasing)sanctionsagainst Russia until Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are fullyrestored”andfor“providinglethaldefensiveweaponstoUkraine’sarmedforcesandgreatercoordinationwithNATOondefenseplanning.”795Gordonreviewedtheproposedplatformchanges, includingDenman’s.796Gordonstated thatheflagged thisamendmentbecauseofTrump’sstatedpositiononUkraine,whichGordon personally heard the candidate say at the March 31 foreign policymeeting—namely,thattheEuropeansshouldtakeprimaryresponsibilityforanyassistancetoUkraine, that thereshouldbeimprovedU.S.-Russiarelations,andthathedidnotwanttostartWorldWarIIIoverthatregion.797GordontoldtheOffice that Trump’s statements on the campaign trail following the Marchmeetingunderscored thosepositions to thepointwhereGordon feltobliged toobjecttotheproposedplatformchangeandseekitsdilution.798

On July 11, 2016, at a meeting of the National Security and DefensePlatform Subcommittee, Denman offered her amendment.799 Gordon andanother Campaign staffer, Matt Miller, approached a committee co-chair andasked him to table the amendment to permit further discussion.800 Gordon’sconcernwiththeamendmentwasthelanguageaboutproviding“lethaldefensiveweapons toUkraine.”801Millerdidnothaveany independentbasis tobelievethat this language contradicted Trump’s views and relied on Gordon’srecollectionofthecandidate’sviews.802

According toDenman, she spokewithGordon andMattMiller, and theytoldherthattheyhadtoclearthelanguageandthatGordonwas“talkingtoNewYork.”803DenmantoldothersthatshewasaskedbythetwoTrumpCampaignstaffers to strike “lethal defense weapons” from the proposal but that sherefused.804 Denman recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone withcandidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true.805 GordondeniedhavingtoldDenmanthathewasonthephonewithTrump,althoughheacknowledgeditwaspossiblethathementionedhavingpreviouslyspokentothecandidateabout thesubjectmatter.806Gordon’sphone records revealacall toSessions’sofficeinWashingtonthatafternoon,butdonotincludecallsdirectlytoanumberassociatedwithTrump.807AndaccordingtothePresident’swrittenanswers to the Office’s questions, he does not recall being involved in thechangeinlanguageoftheplatformamendment.808

GordonstatedthathetriedtoreachRickDearborn,aseniorforeignpolicyadvisor, and Mashburn, the Campaign policy director. Gordon stated that heconnectedwithbothofthem(hecouldnotrecallifbyphoneorinperson)andapprised themof the languagehe took issuewith in theproposedamendment.GordonrecallednoobjectionbyeitherDearbornorMashburnandthatallthreeCampaign advisors supported the alternative formulation (“appropriateassistance”).809DearbornrecalledGordonwarningthemabouttheamendment,but not weighing in because Gordon was more familiar with the Campaign’sforeignpolicystance.810MashburnstatedthatGordonreachedhim,andhetoldGordon thatTrumphadnot takenastanceon the issueand that theCampaignshouldnotintervene.811

When the amendment came up again in the committee’s proceedings, thesubcommitteechangedtheamendmentbystrikingthe“lethaldefenseweapons”languageand replacing itwith“appropriate assistance.”812Gordon stated thathe and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately agreed to replace the languageabout armed assistance with “appropriate assistance.”813 The subcommitteeaccordingly approved Denman’s amendment but with the term “appropriateassistance.”814Gordonstatedthat,tohisrecollection,thiswastheonlychangesoughtbytheCampaign.815SamClovis,theCampaign’snationalco-chairandchiefpolicyadvisor,statedhewassurprisedbythechangeanddidnotbelieveit

wasinlinewithTrump’sstance.816Mashburnstatedthatwhenhesawtheword“appropriate assistance,” he believed that Gordon had violated Mashburn’sdirectivenottointervene.817

7.Post-ConventionContactswithKislyak

Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with Campaignofficials with responsibility for the foreign-policy portfolio—among themSessions andGordon—in theweeks after the Convention. TheOffice did notidentify evidence in those interactions of coordination between the CampaignandtheRussiangovernment.

a.AmbassadorKislyakInvitesJ.D.GordontoBreakfastattheAmbassador’sResidence

OnAugust3,2016,anofficialfromtheEmbassyoftheRussianFederationin the United States wrote to Gordon “[o]n behalf of” Ambassador KislyakinvitingGordon“tohavebreakfast/teawiththeAmbassadorathisresidence”inWashington,D.C. thefollowingweek.818Gordonrespondedfivedays later todeclinetheinvitation.Hewrote,“[t]hesedaysarenotoptimalforus,aswearebusily knocking down a constant stream of false media stories while alsopreparing for the first debatewithHRC.Hope to take a raincheck for anothertime when things quiet down a bit. Please pass along my regards to theAmbassador.”819TheinvestigationdidnotidentifyevidencethatGordonmadeanyotherarrangementstomeet(ormet)withKislyakafterthisemail.

b.SenatorSessions’sSeptember2016MeetingwithAmbassadorKislyak

Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contactedSessions’s Senate office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak.820 At thetime, Sessionswas amember of the Senate ForeignRelationsCommittee andwould meet with foreign officials in that capacity.821 But Sessions’s staffreported, and Sessions himself acknowledged, that meeting requests fromambassadors increasedsubstantially in2016,asSessionsassumedaprominentroleintheTrumpCampaignandhisnamewasmentionedforpotentialcabinet-levelpositionsinafutureTrumpAdministration.822

OnSeptember8,2016,SessionsmetwithKislyakinhisSenateoffice.823SessionssaidthathebelievedhewasdoingtheCampaignaservicebymeetingwith foreign ambassadors, including Kislyak.824 He was accompanied in themeetingbyatleasttwoofhisSenatestaff:SandraLuff,hislegislativedirector;andPeteLandrum,whohandledmilitaryaffairs.825Themeetinglastedlessthan30 minutes.826 Sessions voiced concerns about Russia’s sale of a missile-defense system to Iran, Russian planes buzzing U.S. military assets in theMiddleEast,andRussianaggressioninemergingdemocraciessuchasUkraineandMoldova.827Kislyakofferedexplanationson these issuesandcomplainedaboutNATOlandforcesinformerSoviet-bloccountriesthatborderRussia.828Landrum recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential campaign as “aninteresting campaign,”829 and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that theRussiangovernmentwas receptive to theoverturesTrumphad laidout duringhiscampaign.830Noneoftheattendees,though,rememberedanydiscussionofRussian election interference or any request that Sessions convey informationfromtheRussiangovernmenttotheTrumpCampaign.831

Duringthemeeting,KislyakinvitedSessionstofurtherdiscussU.S.-Russiarelationswithhimoveramealattheambassador’sresidence.832Sessionswasnon-committalwhenKislyakextended the invitation.After themeetingended,Luff advisedSessions against accepting the one-on-onemeetingwithKislyak,whom she assessed to be an “old school KGB guy.”833 Neither Luff norLandrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or made anyfurther effort to dine or meet with Kislyak before the November 2016election.834SessionsandLandrumrecalledthat,aftertheelection,someeffortsweremadetoarrangeameetingbetweenSessionsandKislyak.835AccordingtoSessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a meetingbetween Sessions and Kislyak, two other ambassadors, and the Governor ofAlabama.836Sessions,however,wasinNewYorkonthedayoftheanticipatedmeeting and was unable to attend.837 The investigation did not identifyevidencethatthetwomenmetatanypointaftertheirSeptember8meeting.

8.PaulManafort

Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign, including a period ascampaignchairman,fromMarchtoAugust2016.838ManaforthadconnectionstoRussiathroughhispriorworkforRussianoligarchOlegDeripaskaandlaterthroughhisworkforapro-RussianregimeinUkraine.ManafortstayedintouchwiththesecontactsduringthecampaignperiodthroughKonstantinKilimnik,alongtimeManafortemployeewhopreviouslyranManafort’sofficeinKievandwhotheFBIassessestohavetiestoRussianintelligence.

ManafortinstructedRickGates,hisdeputyontheCampaignandalongtimeemployee,839 to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign—including internal polling data, although Manafort claims not to recall thatspecific instruction.ManafortexpectedKilimnik toshare that informationwithothersinUkraineandwithDeripaska.GatesperiodicallysentsuchpollingdatatoKilimnikduringthecampaign.

ManafortalsotwicemetKilimnikintheUnitedStatesduringthecampaignperiodandconveyedcampaigninformation.ThesecondmeetingtookplaceonAugust2,2016,inNewYorkCity.KilimnikrequestedthemeetingtodeliverinpersonamessagefromformerUkrainianPresidentViktorYanukovych,whowasthen living in Russia. The message was about a peace plan for Ukraine thatManaforthassinceacknowledgedwasa“backdoor”meansforRussiatocontroleasternUkraine. Severalmonths later, after the presidential election,KilimnikwroteanemailtoManafortexpressingtheview—whichManafortlatersaidheshared—thattheplan’ssuccesswouldrequireU.S.supporttosucceed:“allthatis required to start the process is a very minor ‘wink’ (or slight push) from[DonaldTrump].”840TheemailalsostatedthatifManafortweredesignatedastheU.S. representative and started the process,Yanukovychwould ensure hisreceptioninRussia“attheverytoplevel.”

ManafortcommunicatedwithKilimnikaboutpeaceplansforUkraineonatleast four occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2:December2016(theKilimnikemaildescribedabove);January2017;February2017;andagaininthespringof2018.TheOfficereviewednumerousManafortemail and text communications, and asked President Trump about the plan inwrittenquestions.841TheinvestigationdidnotuncoverevidenceofManafort’spassing along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate oranyone else in the Campaign or the Administration. The Office was not,however,abletogainaccesstoallofManafort’selectroniccommunications(in

some instances,messageswere sent using encryption applications).AndwhileManafortdeniedthathespoketomembersoftheTrumpCampaignorthenewAdministration about the peace plan, he lied to theOffice and the grand juryaboutthepeaceplanandhismeetingswithKilimnik,andhisunreliabilityonthissubjectwasamongthereasonsthatthedistrictjudgefoundthathebreachedhiscooperationagreement.842

The Office could not reliably determine Manafort’s purpose in sharinginternal polling data with Kilimnik during the campaign period. ManafortGrandJury██████████████████████████didnotseeadownsidetosharingcampaigninformation,andtoldGatesthathisroleintheCampaignwouldbe“goodforbusiness”andpotentiallyawaytobemadewhole for work he previously completed in the Ukraine. As to Deripaska,Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with him, Deripaskamightseevalueintheirrelationshipandresolvea“disagreement”—areferenceto one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafort’scredibility and our limited ability to gather evidence onwhat happened to thepolling data after it was sent to Kilimnik, the Office could not assess whatKilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The Office did notidentifyevidenceofaconnectionbetweenManafort’s sharingpollingdataandRussia’s interference in the election,whichhad alreadybeen reported byU.S.media outlets at the time of the August 2 meeting. The investigation did notestablish thatManafortotherwisecoordinatedwith theRussiangovernmentonitselection-interferenceefforts.

a.PaulManafort’sTiestoRussiaandUkraine

Manafort’s Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periodsstemfromhisconsultingworkforDeripaskafromapproximately2005to2009and his separate political consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015,including through his company DMP International LLC (DMI). Kilimnikworked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued tocommunicatewithManafort throughat least June2018.Kilimnik,whospeaksand writes Ukrainian and Russian, facilitated many of Manafort’scommunicationswithDeripaskaandUkrainianoligarchs.

i.OlegDeripaskaConsultingWork

In approximately2005,Manafort beganworking forDeripaska, aRussianoligarchwhohasaglobalempireinvolvingaluminumandpowercompaniesandwhoiscloselyalignedwithVladimirPutin.843Amemorandumdescribingworkthat Manafort performed for Deripaska in 2005 regarding the post-SovietrepublicsreferencedtheneedtobrieftheKremlinandthebenefitsthattheworkcouldconferon“thePutinGovernment.”844GatesdescribedtheworkManafortdid for Deripaska as “political risk insurance,” and explained that DeripaskausedManaforttoinstallfriendlypoliticalofficialsincountrieswhereDeripaskahadbusinessinterests.845Manafort’scompanyearnedtensofmillionsofdollarsfromitsworkforDeripaskaandwasloanedmillionsofdollarsbyDeripaskaaswell.846

In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles EmergingMarketPartnersL.P. (“Pericles”), an investment fundcreatedbyManafortandformer Manafort business partner Richard Davis. The Pericles fund wasestablishedtopursueinvestmentsinEasternEurope.847Deripaskawasthesoleinvestor.848GatesstatedininterviewswiththeOfficethattheventureledtoadeterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska.849 Inparticular, when the fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaskaensued. Gates stated that, by 2009, Manafort’s business relationship withDeripaska had “dried up.”850 According to Gates, various interactions withDeripaskaandhisintermediariesoverthepastfewyearshaveinvolvedtryingtoresolve the legal dispute.851 As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates,Kilimnik,andothersengagedineffortstorevivetheDeripaskarelationshipandresolvethelitigation.

ii.PoliticalConsultingWork

Through Deripaska, Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov, aUkrainian oligarch who hiredManafort as a political consultant.852 In 2005,Akhmetov hiredManafort to engage in politicalwork supporting the Party ofRegions,853apoliticalpartyinUkrainethatwasgenerallyunderstoodtoalignwithRussia.ManafortassistedthePartyofRegionsinregainingpower,anditscandidate,ViktorYanukovych,wonthepresidencyin2010.Manafortbecamea

closeandtrustedpoliticaladvisortoYanukovychduringhistimeasPresidentofUkraine. Yanukovych served in that role until 2014, when he fled to Russiaamidstpopularprotests.854

iii.KonstantinKilimnik

KilimnikisaRussiannationalwhohaslivedinbothRussiaandUkraineandwasalongtimeManafortemployee.855KilimnikhaddirectandcloseaccesstoYanukovych and his senior entourage, and he facilitated communicationsbetweenManafortandhisclients,includingYanukovychandmultipleUkrainianoligarchs.856Kilimnikalsomaintaineda relationshipwithDeripaska’sdeputy,Viktor Boyarkin,857 a Russian nationalwho previously served in the defenseattachéofficeoftheRussianEmbassytotheUnitedStates.858

ManaforttoldtheOfficethathedidnotbelieveKilimnikwasworkingasaRussian“spy.”859TheFBI,however,assessesthatKilimnikhastiestoRussianintelligence.860 Several pieces of the Office’s evidence—including witnessinterviews and emails obtained through court-authorized search warrants—supportthatassessment:

KilimnikwasbornonApril27,1970,inDnipropetrovskOblast,thenoftheSovietUnion,andattendedtheMilitaryInstituteoftheMinistryofDefensefrom1987until1992.861SamPatten,abusinesspartnertoKilimnik,862statedthatKilimniktoldhimthathewasatranslatorintheRussianarmyforsevenyearsandthathelaterworkedintheRussianarmamentindustrysellingarmsandmilitaryequipment.863

U.S.governmentvisarecordsrevealthatKilimnikobtainedavisatotraveltotheUnitedStateswithaRussiandiplomaticpassportin1997.864

KilimnikworkedfortheInternationalRepublicanInstitute’s(IRI)Moscowoffice,wherehedidtranslationworkandgeneralofficemanagementfrom1998to2005.865Whileanotherofficialrecalledtheincidentdifferently,866oneformerassociateofKilimnik’satIRItoldtheFBIthatKilimnikwasfiredfromhispostbecausehislinkstoRussianintelligenceweretoostrong.

ThesameindividualstatedthatitwaswellknownatIRIthatKilimnikhadlinkstotheRussiangovernment.867

JonathanHawker,aBritishnationalwhowasapublicrelationsconsultantatFTIConsulting,workedwithDMIonapublicrelationscampaignforYanukovych.AfterHawker’sworkforDMIended,KilimnikcontactedHawkeraboutworkingforaRussiangovernmententityonapublic-relationsprojectthatwouldpromote,inWesternandUkrainianmedia,Russia’spositiononits2014invasionofCrimea.868

GatessuspectedthatKilimnikwasa“spy,”aviewthathesharedwithManafort,Hawker,andAlexandervanderZwaan,869anattorneywhohadworkedwithDMIonareportfortheUkrainianMinistryofForeignAffairs.870

InvestigativeTechnique█████████

b.ContactsduringPaulManafort’sTimewiththeTrumpCampaign

i.PaulManafortJoinstheCampaign

Manafort served on the TrumpCampaign from lateMarch toAugust 19,2016.OnMarch29,2016,theCampaignannouncedthatManafortwouldserveastheCampaign’s“ConventionManager.”871OnMay19,2016,Manafortwaspromoted tocampaignchairmanandchief strategist, andGates,whohadbeenassisting Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy campaignchairman.872

ThomasBarrackandRogerStonebothrecommendedManaforttocandidateTrump.873 In early 2016, atManafort’s request, Barrack suggested to Trumpthat Manafort join the Campaign to manage the Republican Convention.874StonehadworkedwithManafortfromapproximately1980untilthemid-1990sthrough various consulting and lobbying firms.Manafort met Trump in 1982whenTrumphiredtheBlack,Manafort,StoneandKellylobbyingfirm.875Overtheyears,ManafortsawTrumpatpoliticalandsocialeventsinNewYorkCity

andatStone’swedding,andTrumprequestedVIPstatusat the1988and1996RepublicanconventionsworkedbyManafort.876

According toGates, inMarch2016,Manafort traveled toTrump’sMar-a-Lago estate in Florida tomeetwithTrump.Trumphired him at that time.877Manafort agreed to work on the Campaign without pay. Manafort had nomeaningfulincomeatthispointintime,butresuscitatinghisdomesticpoliticalcampaigncareercouldbefinanciallybeneficialinthefuture.GatesreportedthatManafort intended, if Trump won the Presidency, to remain outside theAdministrationandmonetizehisrelationshipwiththeAdministration.878

ii.PaulManafort’sCampaign-PeriodContacts

ImmediatelyuponjoiningtheCampaign,ManafortdirectedGatestopreparefor his review separatememoranda addressed toDeripaska,Akhmetov,SerhiyLyovochkin,andBorisKolesnikov,879thelast threebeingUkrainianoligarchswho were senior Opposition Bloc officials.880 The memoranda describedManafort’sappointmenttotheTrumpCampaignandindicatedhiswillingnesstoconsultonUkrainianpolitics in the future.OnMarch30,2016,Gatesemailedthe memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort’s appointment toKilimnikfortranslationanddissemination.881ManafortlaterfollowedupwithKilimniktoensurehismessageshadbeendelivered,emailingonApril11,2016toaskwhetherKilimnikhadshown“ourfriends”themediacoverageofhisnewrole.882Kilimnik replied, “Absolutely.Everyarticle.”Manafort further asked:“How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska]operationseen?”Kilimnikwrotebackthesameday,“Yes,Ihavebeensendingeverything toVictor [Boyarkin,Deripaska’sdeputy],whohasbeen forwardingthecoveragedirectlytoOVD.”883

GatesreportedthatManafortsaidthatbeinghiredontheCampaignwouldbe “good for business” and increase the likelihood that Manafort theapproximately$2millionhewasowedforpreviouspoliticalconsultingworkinUkraine.884GatesalsoexplainedtotheOfficethatManafortthoughthisroleonthe Campaign could help “confirm” that Deripaska had dropped the Pericleslawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska (as

discussed further below) so that Deripaska would not move forward with hislawsuitagainstManafort.885Gates furtherstated thatDeripaskawantedavisato the United States, that Deripaska could believe that having Manafort in aposition inside theCampaignorAdministrationmightbehelpful toDeripaska,andthatManafort’srelationshipwithTrumpcouldhelpDeripaskainotherwaysas well.886 Gates stated, however, that Manafort never told him anythingspecificaboutwhat,ifanything,ManafortmightbeofferingDeripaska.887

GatesalsoreportedthatManafortinstructedhiminApril2016orearlyMay2016tosendKilimnikCampaigninternalpollingdataandotherupdatessothatKilimnik,inturn,couldshareitwithUkrainianoligarchs.888GatesunderstoodthattheinformationwouldalsobesharedwithDeripaska,GrandJury████████████.889GatesreportedtotheOfficethathedidnotknowwhyManafortwanted him to send polling information, butGates thought itwas awaytoshowcaseManafort’swork,andManafortwantedtoopendoorstojobsafter the Trump Campaign ended.890 Gates said that Manafort’s instructionincluded sending internal polling data prepared for the Trump Campaign bypollsterTonyFabrizio.891FabriziohadworkedwithManafortforyearsandwasbrought into theCampaignbyManafort.Gates stated that, in accordancewithManafort’sinstruction,heperiodicallysentKilimnikpollingdataviaWhatsApp;Gates thendeleted thecommunicationsonadailybasis.892Gates further toldthe Office that, after Manafort left the Campaign in mid-August, Gates sentKilimnikpollingdatalessfrequentlyandthatthedatahesentwasmorepubliclyavailableinformationandlessinternaldata.893

Gate’saccountaboutpollingdataisconsistentGrandJury███████████████████████████894████withmultipleemailsthatKilimniksenttoU.S.associatesandpresscontactsbetweenlateJulyandmid-Augustof2016.Thoseemailsreferenced“internalpolling,”describedthe status of the Trump Campaign and Manafort’s role in it, and assessedTrump’s prospects for victory.895 Manafort did not acknowledge instructingGatestosendKilimnikinternaldata,GrandJury█████████████████████████████████896

The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the

purpose of the communications with Deripaska and that are consistent withGates’s account. For example, in response to a July 7, 2016, email from aUkrainian reporter about Manafort’s failed Deripaska-backed investment,ManafortaskedKilimnikwhether therehadbeenanymovementon“this issuewith our friend.”897 Gates stated that “our friend” likely referred toDeripaska,898 andManafort told theOffice that the “issue” (and “our biggestinterest,” as stated below) was a solution to the Deripaska-Pericles issue.899Kilimnikreplied:

Iamcarefullyoptimisticonthequestionofourbiggestinterest.

Ourfriend[Boyarkin]saidthereislatelysignificantlymoreattentiontothecampaigninhisboss’[Deripaska’s]mind,andhewillbemostlikelylooking forways to reachout toyoupretty soon,understandingall thetimesensitivity.IammorethansurethatitwillberesolvedandwewillgetbacktotheoriginalrelationshipwithV.’sboss[Deripaska].900

Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin’s“boss,” a reference to Deripaska, “that if he needs private briefings we canaccommodate.”901Manafort has alleged to the Office that he was willing tobrief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an example: whyTrumpselectedMikePenceastheVice-Presidentialrunningmate.902ManafortsaidhenevergaveDeripaskaabriefing.903ManafortnotedthatifTrumpwon,DeripaskawouldwanttouseManaforttoadvancewhateverinterestsDeripaskahadintheUnitedStatesandelsewhere.904

iii.PaulManafort’sTwoCampaign-PeriodMeetingswithKonstantinKilimnikintheUnitedStates

ManaforttwicemetwithKilimnikinpersonduringthecampaignperiod—onceinMayandagaininAugust2016.ThefirstmeetingtookplaceonMay7,2016, inNewYorkCity.905 In thedays leading to themeeting,KilimnikhadbeenworkingtogatherinformationaboutthepoliticalsituationinUkraine.Thatincluded informationgleaned froma trip that formerParty ofRegions officialYuriyBoykohadrecentlytakentoMoscow—atripthatlikelyincludedmeetings

betweenBoykoandhigh-rankingRussianofficials.906KilimnikthentraveledtoWashington,D.C.onoraboutMay5,2016;whileinWashington,Kilimnikhadpre-arrangedmeetingswithStateDepartmentemployees.907

Lateon theeveningofMay6,GatesarrangedforKilimnik to takea3:00a.m.traintomeetManafortinNewYorkforbreakfastonMay7.908Accordingto Manafort, during the meeting, he and Kilimnik talked about events inUkraine, and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump Campaign, expectingKilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine andelsewhere.909 Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognizedManafort’spositionontheCampaignwasanopportunity,butKilimnikdidnotask for anything.910Kilimnik spoke about a plan of Boyko to boost electionparticipation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which was the base for theOpposition Bloc.911 Kilimnik returned to Washington, D.C. right after themeetingwithManafort.

Manafortmet with Kilimnik a second time at theGrandHavana Club inNewYork City on the evening of August 2, 2016. The events leading to themeeting are as follows. On July 28, 2016, Kilimnik flew from Kiev toMoscow.912 The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort requesting that theymeet,usingcodedlanguageaboutaconversationhehadthatday.913Inanemailwithasubjectline“BlackCaviar,”Kilimnikwrote:

I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jarseveralyearsago.Wespentabout5hourstalkingabouthisstory,andIhave several importantmessages fromhim to you.He askedme to goandbriefyouonourconversation.IsaidIhavetorunitbyyoufirst,butinprincipleIampreparedtodoit....Ithastodoaboutthefutureofhiscountry,andisquiteinteresting.914

Manafort identified “the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar” asYanukovych. He explained that, in 2010, he and Yanukovych had lunch tocelebratetherecentpresidentialelection.YanukovychgaveManafortalargejarof black caviar that was worth approximately $30,000 to $40,000.915Manafort’sidentificationofYanukovychas“theguywhogaveyouyourbiggestblack caviar jar” is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow—where

Yanukovych resided—when Kilimnik wrote “I met today with the guy,” andwith a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik referred to Yanukovych as“BG,”Grand Jury██████916Manafort replied toKilimnik’s July 29email,“Tuesday[August2]isbest...TuesorwedsinNYC.”917

Three days later, on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev fromMoscow, and on that same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed “about 2hours”fortheirmeeting“becauseitisalongcaviarstorytotell.”918KilimnikwrotethathewouldarriveatJFKonAugust2at7:30p.m.,andheandManafortagreedtoa latedinner thatnight.919Documentaryevidence—includingflight,phone, and hotel records, and the timing of text messages exchanged920—confirmsthedinnertookplaceasplannedonAugust2.921

Astothecontentsofthemeetingitself,theaccountsofManafortandGates—whoarrivedlatetothedinner—differincertainrespects.Buttheirversionsofevents, when assessed alongside available documentary evidence and whatKilimniktoldbusinessassociateSamPatten,indicatethatatleastthreeprincipaltopicswerediscussed.

First, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoingpolitical problems inUkraine by creating an autonomous republic in itsmoreindustrialized eastern region of Donbas,922 and having Yanukovych, theUkrainianPresidentoustedin2014,electedtoheadthatrepublic.923Thatplan,Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a “backdoor” means for Russia tocontroleasternUkraine.924Manafortinitiallysaidthat,ifhehadnotcutoffthediscussion, Kilimnik would have askedManafort in the August 2 meeting toconvinceTrumptocomeoutinfavorofthepeaceplan,andYanukovychwouldhaveexpectedManaforttousehisconnectionsinEuropeandUkrainetosupporttheplan.925ManafortalsoinitiallytoldtheOfficethathehadsaidtoKilimnikthat the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recallKilimnikaskingManaforttoreconsidertheIanaftertheirAugust2meeting.926ManafortsaidGrandJury████████████████████████thathereactednegatively toYanukovychsending—years later—an“urgent”request when Yanukovych needed him.927 When confronted with an emailwritten by Kilimnik on or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafort

acknowledgedKilimnikraisedthepeaceplanagaininthatemail.928Manafortultimately acknowledged Kilimnik also raised the peace plan in January andFebruary2017meetingswithManafort,GrandJury████████████████████████929

Second,ManafortbriefedKilimnikonthestateoftheTrumpCampaignandManafort’s plan to win the election.930 That briefing encompassed theCampaign’smessaginganditsinternalpollingdata.AccordingtoGates,italsoincluded discussion of “battleground” states, which Manafort identified asMichigan,Wisconsin,Pennsylvania,andMinnesota.931Manafortdidnot referexplicitly to “battleground” states in his telling of the August 2 discussion,GrandJury████████████████████████932

Third, according to Gates and what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort andKilimnikdiscussedtwosetsoffinancialdisputesrelatedtoManafort’spreviousworkintheregion.ThoseconsistedoftheunresolvedDeripaskalawsuitandthefunds that the Opposition Bloc owed toManafort for his political consultingworkandhowManafortmightbeabletoobtainpayment.933

After themeeting,GatesandManafortbothstated that they leftseparatelyfromKilimnikbecausetheyknewthemediawastrackingManafortandwantedtoavoidmediareportingonhisconnectionstoKilimnik.934

c.Post-ResignationActivities

Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016,approximately two weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidstnegativemediareportingabouthispoliticalconsultingworkforthepro-RussianPartyofRegionsinUkraine.Despitehisresignation,Manafortcontinuedtoofferadvice tovariousCampaignofficials throughtheNovemberelection.ManaforttoldGates thathe still spokewithKushner,Bannon,andcandidateTrump,935and some of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. Forexample,onOctober21,2016,ManafortsentKushneranemailandattachedastrategy memorandum proposing that the Campaign make the case againstClinton “as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment” and that“WikileaksprovidestheTrumpcampaigntheabilitytomakethecaseinavery

credibleway–byusing thewordsofClinton, itscampaignofficialsandDNCmembers.”936Later,inaNovember5,2016emailtoKushnerentitled“Securingthe Victory,” Manafort stated that he was “really feeling good about ourprospectsonTuesdayandfocusingonpreservingthevictory,”andthathewasconcerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by “mov[ing]immediately todiscredit the [Trump]victoryandclaimvoter fraudandcyber-fraud, including the claim that the Russians have hacked into the votingmachinesandtamperedwiththeresults.”937

Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told theOffice that, in the wake of Trump’s victory, he was not interested in anAdministration job. Manafort instead preferred to stay on the “outside,” andmonetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity andrelationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.938 Manafortappeared to follow that plan, as he traveled to theMiddle East, Cuba, SouthKorea, Japan, and China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidencywouldentail.939

Manafort’s activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraineand Russia. The first meeting, which took place inMadrid, Spain in January2017, was with Georgiy Oganov. Oganov, who had previously worked at theRussian Embassy in theUnited States, was a senior executive at aDeripaskacompanyandwasbelievedtoreportdirectlytoDeripaska.940Manafortinitiallydenied attending themeeting.Whenhe later acknowledged it, he claimed thatthemeetinghadbeenarrangedbyhis lawyersandconcernedonly thePericleslawsuit.941 Other evidence, however, provides reason to doubt Manafort’sstatement that the sole topic of the meeting was the Pericles lawsuit. Inparticular, textmessages toManafort fromanumber associatedwithKilimniksuggestthatKilimnikandBoyarkin—notManafort’scounsel—hadarrangedthemeetingbetweenManafort andOganov.942Kilimnik’smessage states that themeetingwas supposed tobe“not aboutmoneyorPericles”but instead“aboutrecreating [the] old friendship”—ostensibly between Manafort and Deripaska—“and talkingaboutglobalpolitics.”943Manafortalso repliedby text thathe“need[s] this finished before Jan. 20,”944 which appears to be a reference toresolvingPericlesbeforetheinauguration.

On January 15, 2017, three days after his return fromMadrid, ManafortemailedK.T.McFarland,whowasatthattimedesignatedtobeDeputyNationalSecurity Advisor and was formally appointed to that position on January 20,2017.945 Manafort’s January 15 email to McFarland stated: “I have someimportantinformationIwanttosharethatIpickeduponmytravelsoverthelastmonth.”946ManaforttoldtheOfficethattheemailreferredtoanissueregardingCuba, not Russia or Ukraine, andManafort had traveled to Cuba in the pastmonth.947Eitherway,McFarland—whowasadvisedbyFlynnnottorespondtotheManafortinquiry—appearsnottohaverespondedtoManafort.948

Manafort told the Office that around the time of the PresidentialInauguration in January, hemet with Kilimnik and Ukrainian oligarch SerhiyLyovochkinattheWestinHotelinAlexandria,Virginia.949Duringthismeeting,KilimnikagaindiscussedtheYanukovychpeaceplanthathehadbroachedattheAugust 2 meeting and in a detailed December 8, 2016 message found inKilimnik’sDMPemailaccount.950In thatDecember8email,whichManafortacknowledgedhavingread,951Kilimnikwrote,“[a]llthatisrequiredtostarttheprocessisaveryminor‘wink’(orslightpush)fromDT”—anapparentreferenceto President-elect Trump—“and a decision to authorize you to be a ‘specialrepresentative’andmanagethisprocess.”KilimnikassuredManafort,withthatauthority, he “could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia[Yanukovych]TheOfficehasnotuncovered evidence thatManafort br level,”and that“DTcouldhavepeace inUkrainebasicallywithina fewmonthsafterinauguration.”952

Asnotedabove,GrandJury█████████████████████ █ █ █ and statements to the Office, Manafort sought to qualify hisengagementonandsupportfortheplan.GrandJury█████████████████████████████953GrandJury████████████954GrandJury████████████████████████955GrandJury████████████████████████

OnFebruary26,2017,ManafortmetKilimnik inMadrid,whereKilimnikhad flown from Moscow.956 In his first two interviews with the Office,ManafortdeniedmeetingwithKilimnikonhisMadridtripandthen—afterbeing

confrontedwithdocumentaryevidencethatKilimnikwasinMadridatthesametimeashim—recognizedthathemethiminMadrid.ManafortsaidthatKilimnikhad updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called “black ledger”payments to Manafort that was being conducted by Ukraine’s National Anti-CorruptionBureau.957██GrandJury████████████████████████958

Manafort remained incontactwithKilimnik throughout2017and into thespring of 2018. Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminalcharges brought by theOffice,959 and theUkraine peace plan. In early 2018,ManafortretainedhislongtimepollingfirmtocraftadraftpollinUkraine,sentthepollstersathree-pageprimerontheplansentbyKilimnik,andworkedwithKilimniktoformulatethepollingquestions.960Theprimersenttothepollstersspecifically called for the United States and President Trump to support theAutonomousRepublicofDonbaswithYanukovychasPrimeMinister,961andaseriesofquestionsinthedraftpollaskedforopinionsonYanukovych’sroleinresolvingtheconflict inDonbas.962(ThepollwasnotsolelyaboutDonbas; italso sought participants’ views on leaders apart from Yanukovych as theypertainedtothe2019Ukrainepresidentialelection.)

TheOfficehasnotuncoveredevidence thatManafortbrought theUkrainepeaceplantotheattentionoftheTrumpCampaignortheTrumpAdministration.Kilimnik continued his efforts to promote the peace plan to the ExecutiveBranch(e.g.,U.S.DepartmentofState)intothesummerof2018.963

B.Post-ElectionandTransition-PeriodContacts

TrumpwaselectedPresidentonNovember8,2016.Beginningimmediatelyafter the election, individuals connected to the Russian government startedcontacting officials on the Trump Campaign and Transition Team throughmultiple channels—sometimes through Russian Ambassador Kislyak and atother times through individuals who sought reliable contacts through U.S.personsnotformallytiedtotheCampaignorTransitionTeam.ThemostseniorlevelsoftheRussiangovernmentencouragedtheseefforts.TheinvestigationdidnotestablishthattheseeffortsreflectedorconstitutedcoordinationbetweentheTrumpCampaignandRussiainitselection-interferenceactivities.

1.ImmediatePost-ElectionActivity

As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected President, RussiangovernmentofficialsandprominentRussianbusinessmenbegantryingtomakeinroads into the new Administration. They appeared not to have preexistingcontacts and struggled to connect with senior officials around the President-Elect.Asexplainedbelow,thoseeffortsentailedbothofficialcontactthroughtheRussianEmbassyintheUnitedStatesandoutreaches—sanctionedathighlevelsoftheRussiangovernment—throughbusinessratherthanpoliticalcontacts.

a.OutreachfromtheRussianGovernment

Atapproximately3a.m.onelectionnight,TrumpCampaignpresssecretaryHopeHicksreceivedatelephonecallonherpersonalcellphonefromapersonwhosounded foreignbutwascalling fromanumberwithaDCareacode.964AlthoughHickshadahard timeunderstandingtheperson,shecouldmakeoutthewords“Putincall.”965Hickstoldthecallertosendheranemail.966

The following morning, on November 9, 2016, Sergey Kuznetsov, anofficial at the Russian Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks from hisGmailaddresswiththesubjectline,“MessagefromPutin.”967AttachedtotheemailwasamessagefromPutin,inbothEnglishandRussian,whichKuznetsovaskedHickstoconveytothePresident-Elect.968Inthemessage,Putinofferedhis congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he “look[ed]forwardtoworkingwith[Trump]onleadingRussian-Americanrelationsoutofcrisis.”969

Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner, asking, “Can you look into this?Don’twanttogetdupedbutdon’twanttoblowoffPutin!”970KushnerstatedinCongressionaltestimonythathebelievedthatitwouldbepossibletoverifytheauthenticity of the forwarded email through the Russian Ambassador, whomKushner had previously met in April 2016.971 Unable to recall the RussianAmbassador’s name, Kushner emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI, whom he hadconsulted previously about Russia, see Volume I, Section IV.A.4, supra, andasked, “What is the name of Russian ambassador?”972 Kushner forwardedSimes’s response—which identified Kislyak by name—to Hicks.973 After

checkingwithKushnertoseewhathehadlearned,HicksconveyedPutin’sletterto transition officials.974 Five days later, onNovember 14, 2016, Trump andPutin spoke by phone in the presence of TransitionTeammembers, includingincomingNationalSecurityAdvisorMichaelFlynn.975

b.High-LevelEncouragementofContactsthroughAlternativeChannels

AsRussianofficialsintheUnitedStatesreachedouttothePresident-Electand his team, a number of Russian individuals working in the private sectorbegan their own efforts to make contact. Petr Aven, a Russian national whoheads Alfa-Bank, Russia’s largest commercial bank, described to the OfficeinteractionswithPutinduringthistimeperiodthatmightaccountfortheflurryofRussianactivity.976

Aven told theOffice that he is one of approximately 50wealthy Russianbusinessmenwho regularlymeetwithPutin in theKremlin; these 50men areoften referred to as “oligarchs.”977 Aven told the Office that he met on aquarterlybasiswithPutin,includinginthefourthquarter(Q4)of2016,shortlyafter theU.S. presidential election.978 Aven said that he took thesemeetingsseriously and understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin madeduring these meetings were implicit directives, and that there would beconsequencesforAvenifhedidnotfollowthrough.979Aswastypical,the2016Q4meetingwithPutinwasprecededbyapreparatorymeetingwithPutin’schiefofstaff,AntonVaino.980

AccordingtoAven,athisQ42016one-on-onemeetingwithPutin,981PutinraisedtheprospectthattheUnitedStateswouldimposeadditionalsanctionsonRussianinterests, includingsanctionsagainstAvenand/orAlfa-Bank.982PutinsuggestedthatAvenneededtotakestepstoprotecthimselfandAlfa-Bank.983Aven also testified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by the Russiangovernment in getting in touch with the incoming Trump Administration.984AccordingtoAven,PutinindicatedthathedidnotknowwithwhomformallytospeakandgenerallydidnotknowthepeoplearoundthePresident-Elect.985

AvenGrand Jury █ █ █ █ told Putin he would take steps to protecthimself and the Alfa-Bank shareholders from potential sanctions, and one ofthose steps would be to try to reach out to the incoming Administration toestablish a line of communication.986 Aven described Putin responding withskepticismaboutAven’sprospectforsuccess.987According toAven,althoughPutindidnot expresslydirecthim to reachout to theTrumpTransitionTeam,Avenunderstood thatPutin expectedhim to try to respond to the concerns hehadraised.988Aven’seffortsaredescribedinVolumeI,SectionIV.B.5,infra.

2.KirillDmitriev’sTransition-EraOutreachtotheIncomingAdministration

Aven’s description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with thebehavior of Kirill Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia’s sovereignwealth fund and is closely connected to Putin. Dmitriev undertook efforts tomeetmembers of the incomingTrumpAdministration in themonths after theelection.Dmitrievaskedaclosebusinessassociatewhoworkedfor theUnitedArab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trumptransitionofficials, andNader eventually arrangedameeting in theSeychellesbetween Dmitriev and Erik Prince, a Trump Campaign supporter and anassociate of SteveBannon.989 In addition, theUAE national security advisorintroducedDmitrievtoahedgefundmanagerandfriendofJaredKushner,RickGerson,inlateNovember2016.InDecember2016andJanuary2017,DmitrievandGersonworkedonaproposal for reconciliationbetween theUnitedStatesandRussia,whichDmitrievimpliedheclearedthroughPutin.GersonprovidedthatproposaltoKushnerbeforetheinauguration,andKushnerlatergavecopiestoBannonandSecretaryofStateRexTillerson.

a.Background

Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia’ssovereignwealthfund,theRussianDirectInvestmentFund(RDIF),whenitwasfoundedin2011.990DmitrievreporteddirectlytoPutinandfrequentlyreferredtoPutinashis“boss.”991

RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth

funds.992 Dmitriev regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAECrownPrinceMohammedbinZayed(CrownPrinceMohammed),inconnectionwithRDIF’sdealingswiththeUAE.993PutinwantedDmitrievtobeinchargeofboththefinancialandthepoliticalrelationshipbetweenRussiaandtheGulfstates, in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and spokeEnglishfluently.994NaderconsideredDmitrievtobePutin’sinterlocutorintheGulf region, and would relay Dmitriev’s views directly to Crown PrinceMohammed.995

NaderdevelopedcontactswithbothU.S.presidentialcampaignsduringthe2016election,andkeptDmitrievabreastofhiseffortstodoso.996AccordingtoNader,DmitrievsaidthathisandthegovernmentofRussia’spreferencewasforcandidateTrumptowin,andaskedNadertoassisthiminmeetingmembersofthe Trump Campaign.997Grand Jury █ █ █ █ █ █ █ 998 Nader did notintroduceDmitriev to anyone associatedwith theTrumpCampaignbefore theelection.999

GrandJury████████████████████████████████████1000GrandJury█████████████████████1001GrandJury████████████████████████████████████1002GrandJury████████████████████████████████████1003████GrandJury█████████1004

ErikPrinceisabusinessmanwhohadrelationshipswithvariousindividualsassociatedwith theTrumpCampaign, includingSteveBannon,DonaldTrumpJr., andRogerStone.1005Prince did not have a formal role in theCampaign,althoughheoffered tohost a fundraiser forTrumpand sentunsolicitedpolicypapersonissuessuchasforeignpolicy,trade,andRussianelectioninterferencetoBannon.1006

After the election, Prince frequently visited transition offices at TrumpTower,primarily tomeetwithBannonbutonoccasion tomeetMichaelFlynnand others.1007 Prince and Bannon would discuss, inter alia, foreign policy

issuesandPrince’srecommendationsregardingwhoshouldbeappointedtofillkeynationalsecuritypositions.1008AlthoughPrincewasnotformallyaffiliatedwiththetransition,NaderGrandJury███receivedassurancesGrandJury███thattheincomingAdministrationconsideredPrinceatrustedassociate.1009

b.KirillDmitriev’sPost-ElectionContactsWiththeIncomingAdministration

Soon after midnight on election night, Dmitriev messaged InvestigativeTechnique█████████whowas traveling toNewYorktoattendthe2016WorldChessChampionship.InvestigativeTechnique█████████DmitryPeskov,theRussianFederation’spresssecretary,whowasalsoattendingtheWorldChessChampionship.1010InvestigativeTechnique█████████1011 Investigative Technique█ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █1012 InvestigativeTechnique█████████1013

Atapproximately2:40a.m.onNovember9,2016,newsreportsstated thecandidateClintonhadcalledPresident-ElectTrumptoconcede.AtInvestigativeTechnique███1014InvestigativeTechnique███wrotetoDmitriev,“Putinhaswon.”1015

Later thatmorning, Dmitriev contactedNader, whowas inNewYork, torequestameetingwiththe“keypeople”intheincomingAdministrationassoonaspossibleinlightofthe“[g]reatresults.”1016HeaskedNadertoconveytotheincoming Administration that “we want to start rebuilding the relationship inwhatever isacomfortablepacefor them.Weunderstandallof thesensitivitiesandarenotinarush.”1017DmitrievandNaderhadpreviouslydiscussedNaderintroducing him to the contacts Nader had made within the TrumpCampaign.1018DmitrievalsotoldNaderthathewouldaskPutinforpermissiontotraveltotheUnitedStates,wherehewouldbeabletospeaktomediaoutletsabout the positive impact of Trump’s election and the need for reconciliationbetweentheUnitedStatesandRussia.1019

Later that day,Dmitriev flew toNewYork,where Peskovwas separatelytraveling to attend the chess tournament.1020 Dmitriev invited Nader to the

openingofthetournamentandnotedthat,iftherewas“achancetoseeanyonekey fromTrump camp,” he “would love to start building for the future.”1021DmitrievalsoaskedNadertoinviteKushnertotheeventsothathe(Dmitriev)couldmeethim.1022NaderdidnotpassalongDmitriev’s invitation toanyoneconnectedwith the incomingAdministration.1023Although oneWorld ChessFederationofficialrecalledhearingfromanattendeethatPresident-ElectTrumphadstoppedbythetournament,theinvestigationdidnotestablishthatTrumporany Campaign or Transition Team official attended the event.1024 And thePresident’swrittenanswersdeniedthathehad.1025

NaderstatedthatDmitrievcontinuedtopresshimtosetupameetingwithtransitionofficials,andwasparticularlyfocusedonKushnerandTrumpJr.1026Dmitriev told Nader that Putin would be very grateful to Nader and that ameetingwouldmakehistory.1027█████GrandJury███████████████GJ███1028GrandJury████████████1029According toNader,Dmitrievwasvery anxious to connectwith the incomingAdministration and toldNader that hewould tryother routes todo sobesidesNader himself.1030 Nader did not ultimately introduce Dmitriev to anyoneassociatedwiththeincomingAdministrationduringDmitriev’spost-electiontriptoNewYork.1031

In early December 2016, Dmitriev again broached the topic of meetingincoming Administration officials with Nader in January or February.1032Dmitriev sent Nader a list of publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speakingpositivelyaboutDonaldTrump“incasethey[were]helpful.”1033

c.ErikPrinceandKirillDmitrievMeetintheSeychelles

i.GeorgeNaderandErikPrinceArrangeSeychellesMeetingwithDmitriev

Nader traveled toNewYork inearlyJanuary2017andhad lunchtimeanddinnermeetingswithErikPrince ·on January3,2017.1034Nader andPrince

discussedDmitriev.1035NaderinformedPrincethattheRussianswerelookingtobuildalinkwiththeincomingTrumpAdministration.1036GrandJury██████hetoldPrincethatDmitrievhadbeenpushingNadertointroducehimtosomeonefromtheincomingAdministrationGrandJury████████████████████████.1037Nadersuggested,inlightofPrince’srelationship with Transition Team officials, that Prince and Dmitriev meet todiscussissuesofmutualconcern.1038GrandJury███████████████Prince toldNader thatheneeded to think furtherabout itand tocheckwithTransitionTeamofficials.1039

AfterhisdinnerwithPrince,NadersentPrincealinktoaWikipediaentryaboutDmitriev,andsentDmitrievamessagestatingthathehadjustmet“withsomekeypeoplewithinthefamilyandinnercircle”—areferencetoPrince—andthat he had spoken at length and positively about Dmitriev.1040 Nader toldDmitriev that the people he met had asked for Dmitriev’s bio, and Dmitrievreplied that he would update and send it.1041 Nader later received fromDmitrievtwofilesconcerningDmitriev:onewasatwo-pagebiography,andtheotherwasalistofDmitriev’spositivequotesaboutDonaldTrump.1042

Thenextmorning,NaderforwardedthemessageandattachmentsDmitrievhadsenthim toPrince.1043Naderwrote toPrince that thesedocumentswerethe versions “to be usedwith some additional details for them” (with “them”referring tomembers of the incomingAdministration).1044Prince opened theattachmentsatTrumpTowerwithinanhourofreceivingthem.1045Princestatedthat,whilehewasatTrumpTowerthatday,hespokewithKellyanneConway,WilburRoss,SteveMnuchin,andotherswhilewaitingtoseeBannon.1046Cell-site location data for Prince’smobile phone indicates that Prince remained atTrumpTowerforapproximatelythreehours.1047Princesaid thathecouldnotrecall whether, during those three hours, he met with Bannon and discussedDmitrievwithhim.1048GrandJury██████████████████1049

Prince booked a ticket to the Seychelles on January 7, 2017.1050 Thefollowingday,NaderwrotetoDmitrievthathehada“pleasantsurprise”forhim,

namelythathehadarrangedforDmitrievtomeet“aSpecialGuest”from“theNewTeam,”referringtoPrince.1051NaderaskedDmitrievifhecouldcometotheSeychellesforthemeetingonJanuary12,2017,andDmitrievagreed.1052

The following day, Dmitriev sought assurance from Nader that theSeychellesmeetingwouldbeworthwhile.1053GrandJury███Dmitrievwasnotenthusiasticabout the ideaofmeetingwithPrince, and thatNaderassuredhimthatPrincewieldedinfluencewiththeincomingAdministration.1054NaderwrotetoDmitriev,“Thisguy[Prince]isdesignatedbySteve[Bannon]tomeetyou! I know him and he is very verywell connected and trusted by theNewTeam. His sister is now a Minister of Education.”1055 According to Nader,Prince had led him to believe that Bannon was aware of Prince’s upcomingmeetingwithDmitriev, andPrince acknowledged that itwas fair forNader tothink that Prince would pass information on to the Transition Team.1056Bannon,however, told theOffice thatPrincedidnot tellhiminadvanceabouthismeetingwithDmitriev.1057

ii.TheSeychellesMeetings

Dmitrievarrivedwithhiswife in theSeychellesonJanuary11,2017,andchecked into the Four Seasons Resort where Crown Prince Mohammed andNaderwerestaying.1058Princearrivedthatsameday.1059PrinceandDmitrievmet for the first time that afternoon inNader’s villa,withNader present.1060

Theinitialmeetinglastedapproximately30-45minutes.1061

Grand Jury██ █ 1062 Prince described the eight years of the ObamaAdministration in negative terms, and stated that hewas looking forward to aneweraofcooperationandconflictresolution.1063AccordingtoPrince,hetoldDmitrievthatBannonwaseffectiveifnotconventional,andthatPrinceprovidedpolicypaperstoBannon.1064

GrandJury█████████████████████████████████1065GrandJury█████████████████████████████████GrandJury███████████████

██████████████████1066GrandJury█████████████████████████████████GrandJury█████████████████████████████████1067GrandJury█████████████████████████████████1068ThetopicofRussianinterferenceinthe2016electiondidnotcomeup.1069

GrandJury████████████████████████████ █ █ █ █ █ 1070 Prince added that he would inform Bannon about hismeeting with Dmitriev, and that if there was interest in continuing thediscussion,Bannonorsomeoneelseon theTransitionTeamwoulddoso.1071GrandJury█████████████████████████████████1072

Afterwards, Prince returned to his room,where he learned that aRussianaircraftcarrierhadsailedtoLibya,whichledhimtocallNaderandaskhimtoset up anothermeetingwithDmitriev.1073According toNader, Prince calledandsaidhehadcheckedwithhisassociatesbackhomeandneededtoconveytoDmitriev that Libya was “off the table.”1074 Nader wrote to Dmitriev thatPrince had “received an urgent message that he needs to convey to youimmediately,” and arranged for himself, Dmitriev, and Prince to meet at arestaurantontheFourSeasonsproperty.1075

Atthesecondmeeting,PrincetoldDmitrievthattheUnitedStatescouldnotaccept anyRussian involvement inLibyabecause itwouldmake the situationtheremuchworse.1076Grand███Jury█████████1077

After the brief second meeting concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussedwhat had transpired.1078Dmitriev toldNader that hewas disappointed in hismeetingswithPrincefortworeasons:first,hebelievedtheRussiansneededtobecommunicatingwith someonewhohadmoreauthoritywithin the incomingAdministrationthanPrincehad.1079Second,hehadhopedtohaveadiscussionofgreatersubstance,suchasoutliningastrategicroadmapforbothcountriestofollow.1080 Dmitriev told Nader that Grand Jury█ █ █ █ █ █ Prince’s

comments███GrandJury██████wereinsultingGrandJury██████1081

Hours after the secondmeeting,Prince sent two textmessages toBannonfromtheSeychelles.1082Asdescribedfurtherbelow,investigatorswereunabletoobtainthecontentoftheseorothermessagesbetweenPrinceandBannon,andthe investigation also did not identify evidence of any further communicationbetweenPrinceandDmitrievaftertheirmeetingsintheSeychelles.

iii.ErikPrince’sMeetingwithSteveBannonaftertheSeychellesTrip

After the Seychelles meetings, Prince told Nader that he would informBannon about his discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someonewithintheRussianpowerstructurewasinterestedinseekingbetterrelationswiththe incoming Administration.1083 On January 12, 2017, Prince contactedBannon’s personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week.1084Several days later, Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon’sschedule.1085

Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon’s home after returning to theUnitedStatesinmid-Januaryandbriefedhimaboutseveraltopics,includinghismeetingwithDmitriev.1086PrincetoldtheOfficethatheexplainedtoBannonthat Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund and wasinterested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.1087Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot of Dmitriev’sWikipedia page datedJanuary16,2017,andPrincetoldtheOfficethathelikelyshowedthatimagetoBannon.1088PrincealsobelievedheprovidedBannonwithDmitriev’scontactinformation.1089According to Prince,Bannon instructedPrince not to followupwithDmitriev,andPrincehadtheimpressionthattheissuewasnotapriorityforBannon.1090PrincerelatedthatBannondidnotappearangry,justrelativelyuninterested.1091

Bannon, by contrast, told the Office that he never discussed with PrinceanythingregardingDmitriev,RDIF,oranymeetingswithRussianindividualsor

peopleassociatedwithPutin.1092BannonalsostatedthathadPrincementionedsuch ameeting, Bannonwould have remembered it, and Bannonwould haveobjectedtosuchameetinghavingtakenplace.1093

The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not beindependentlyclarifiedbyreviewingtheircommunications,becauseneitheronewas able to produce any of the messages they exchanged in the time periodsurroundingtheSeychellesmeeting.Prince’sphonecontainednotextmessagesprior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and Bannonexchanged dozens ofmessages.1094 Prince denied deleting anymessages butclaimed he did not know why there were no messages on his device beforeMarch 2017.1095 Bannon’s devices similarly contained no messages in therelevanttimeperiod,andBannonalsostatedhedidnotknowwhymessagesdidnot appear on his device.1096 Bannon told the Office that, during both themonthsbeforeandafter theSeychellesmeeting,heregularlyusedhispersonalBlackberry and personal email for work-related communications (includingthose with Prince), and he took no steps to preserve these workcommunications.1097

d.KirillDmitriev’sPost-ElectionContactwithRickGersonRegardingU.S.-RussiaRelations

Dmitriev’s contacts during the transition periodwere not limited to thosefacilitated byNader. In approximately lateNovember 2016, theUAEnationalsecurityadvisorintroducedDmitrievtoRickGerson,afriendofJaredKushnerwhorunsahedgefundinNewYork.1098Gersonstatedhehadnoformalroleinthe transition and had no involvement in the Trump Campaign other thanoccasionalcasualdiscussionsabouttheCampaignwithKushner.1099Aftertheelection, Gerson assisted the transition by arranging meetings for transitionofficialswithformerUKprimeministerTonyBlairandaUAEdelegationledbyCrownPrinceMohammed.1100

WhenDmitriev andGersonmet, they principally discussed potential jointventuresbetweenGerson’shedgefundandRDIF.1101Dmitrievwas interestedin improved economic cooperation between theUnited States and Russia and

asked Gerson who he should meet with in the incoming Administration whowould be helpful towards this goal.1102 Gerson replied that he would try tofigure out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions, but noted thatconfidentiality would be required because of the sensitivity of holding suchmeetings before the new Administration took power, and before Cabinetnominees had been confirmed by the Senate.1103 Gerson said he would askKushnerandMichaelFlynnwhothe“keypersonorpeople”wereonthetopicsof reconciliation with Russia, joint security concerns, and economicmatters.1104

Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop andexecuteareconciliationplanbetweentheUnitedStatesandRussia.Henotedina text message to Gerson that if Russia was “approached with respect andwillingness to understand our position, we can have Major Breakthroughsquickly.”1105Gerson andDmitriev exchanged ideas inDecember 2016 aboutwhatsuchareconciliationplanwouldinclude.1106GersontoldtheOfficethatthe Transition Team had not asked him to engage in these discussions withDmitriev,andthathedidsoonhisowninitiativeandasaprivatecitizen.1107

OnJanuary9,2017,thesamedayheaskedNaderwhethermeetingPrincewouldbeworthwhile,DmitrievsenthisbiographytoGersonandaskedhimifhecould“shareitwithJared(orsomebodyelseveryseniorintheteam)–sothattheyknowthatwearefocusedfromoursideonimprovingtherelationshipandmybossaskedmetoplayakeyroleinthat”1108DmitrievalsoaskedGersonifheknewPrince,andifPrincewassomebodyimportantorworthspendingtimewith.1109AfterhistriptotheSeychelles,DmitrievtoldGersonthatBannonhadasked Prince to meet with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positivemeeting.1110

On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.-RussiareconciliationthatheandGersonhadbeendiscussingintoatwo-pagedocumentthatlistedfivemainpoints:(1)jointlyfightingterrorism;(2)jointlyengaginginanti-weapons ofmass destruction efforts; (3) developing “win-win” economicand investment initiatives; (4) maintaining an honest, open, and continualdialogue regarding issues of disagreement; and (5) ensuring propercommunication and trust by “key people” from each country.1111On January

18,2017,GersongaveacopyofthedocumenttoKushner.1112KushnerhadnotheardofDmitrievatthattime.1113GersonexplainedthatDmitrievwastheheadofRDIF,andGersonmayhavealludedtoDmitriev’sbeingwellconnected.1114Kushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the rightpeople.1115KushnerultimatelygaveonecopyofthedocumenttoBannonandanothertoRexTillerson;accordingtoKushner,neitherofthemfollowedupwithKushneraboutit.1116OnJanuary19,2017,DmitrievsentNaderacopyofthetwo-page document, telling him that this was “a view from our side that Idiscussedinmymeetingontheislandsandwithyouandwithourfriends.Pleasesharewiththem–webelievethisisagoodfoundationtostartfrom.”1117

GersoninformedDmitrievthathehadgiventhedocumenttoKushnersoonafterdeliveringit.1118OnJanuary26,2017,DmitrievwrotetoGersonthathis“boss”—an apparent reference to Putin—was asking if there had been anyfeedbackontheproposal.1119Dmitrievsaid,“[w]edonotwant torushthingsandmoveatacomfortablespeed.Atthesametime,mybossaskedmetotrytohavethekeyUSmeetingsinthenexttwoweeksifpossible.”1120HeinformedGersonthatPutinandPresidentTrumpwouldspeakbyphonethatSaturday,andnotedthatthatinformationwas“veryconfidential.”1121

The sameday,Dmitrievwrote toNader thathehad seenhis “boss”againyesterdaywhohad“emphasized that this is agreatpriority forusand thatweneed to build this communication channel to avoid bureaucracy.”1122 OnJanuary28,2017,DmitrievtextedNaderthathewanted“toseeifIcanconfirmtomybossthatyourfriendsmayusesomeoftheideasfromthe2pagerIsentyouinthetelephonecallthatwillhappenat12EST,”1123anapparentreferenceto the call scheduled between President Trump and Putin. Nader replied,“Definitely paper was so submitted to Team by Rick and me. They took itseriously!”1124 After the call between President Trump and Putin occurred,Dmitrievwrote toNader that “the callwent verywell.My bosswantsme tocontinuemakingsomepublicstatementsthatus[sic]Russiacooperationisgoodandimportant.”1125GersonalsowrotetoDmitrievtosaythatthecallhadgonewell,andDmitrievrepliedthatthedocumenttheyhaddraftedtogether“playedanimportantrole.”1126

GersonandDmitrievappeared tostopcommunicatingwithoneanother inapproximatelyMarch2017,whentheinvestmentdealtheyhadbeenworkingontogethershowednosignsofprogressing.1127

3.AmbassadorKislyak’sMeetingwithJaredKushnerandMichaelFlynninTrumpTowerFollowingtheElection

On November 16, 2016, Catherine Vargas, an executive assistant toKushner, received a request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador SergeyKislyak.1128 That same day, Vargas sent Kushner an email with the subject,“MISSED CALL: Russian Ambassador to the US, Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak....”1129Thetextoftheemailread,“RE:settingupatimetomeetw/youon12/1.LMKhowtoproceed.”Kushnerrespondedinrelevantpart,“I thinkIdothisone--confirmwithDimitri[SimesofCNI]thatthisistherightguy.”1130After reaching out to a colleague of Simes at CNI, Vargas reported back toKushner thatKislyakwas “the best go-to guy for routinematters in theUS,”whileYuriUshakov,aRussianforeignpolicyadvisor,wasthecontactfor“moredirect/substantialmatters.”1131

Bob Foresman, the UBS investment bank executive who had previouslytriedtotransmittocandidateTrumpaninvitationtospeakataneconomicforuminRussia, seeVolume I,Section IV.A.l.d.ii, supra,may have provided similarinformation to the Transition Team.According to Foresman, at the end of anearlyDecember2016meetingwithincomingNationalSecurityAdvisorMichaelFlynn and his designated deputy (K.T.McFarland) inNewYork, Flynn askedForesman forhis thoughtsonKislyak.ForesmanhadnotmetKislyakbut toldFlynnthat,whileKislyakwasanimportantperson,Kislyakdidnothaveadirectline to Putin.1132 Foresman subsequently traveled to Moscow, inquired of asource he believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from that source thatUshakovwouldbe theofficialchannel for the incomingU.S.national securityadvisor.1133ForesmanacknowledgedthatFlynnhadnotaskedhimtoundertakethat inquiry inRussia but told theOffice that he nonetheless felt obligated toreport the informationback toFlynn, and thatheworked toget a face-to-facemeeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he could do so.1134 Emailcorrespondence suggests that the meeting ultimately went forward,1135 butFlynn has no recollection of it or of the earlier Decembermeeting.1136 (The

investigation did not identify evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting withUshakovafterbeinggivenhisname.1137)

In the meantime, although he had already formed the impression thatKislyak was not necessarily the right point of contact,1138 Kushner wentforwardwith themeeting thatKislyakhad requestedonNovember16. It tookplace at Trump Tower on November 30, 2016.1139 At Kushner’s invitation,Flynn also attended; Bannon was invited but did not attend.1140 During themeeting,whichlastedapproximately30minutes,Kushnerexpressedadesireonthe part of the incoming Administration to start afresh with U.S.-Russianrelations.1141KushneralsoaskedKislyak to identify thebestperson(whetherKislyakorsomeoneelse)withwhomtodirectfuturediscussions-someonewhohadcontactwithPutinandtheabilitytospeakforhim.1142

ThethreemenalsodiscussedU.S.policytowardSyria,andKislyakfloatedtheideaofhavingRussiangeneralsbrieftheTransitionTeamonthetopicusinga secure communications line.1143 After Flynn explained that there was nosecurelineintheTransitionTeamoffices,KushneraskedKislyakiftheycouldcommunicate using secure facilities at the Russian Embassy.1144 Kislyakquicklyrejectedthatidea.1145

4.JaredKushner’sMeetingwithSergeyGorkov

On December 6, 2016, the Russian Embassy reached out to Kushner’sassistanttosetupasecondmeetingbetweenKislyakandKushner.1146Kushnerdeclinedseveralproposedmeetingdates,butKushner’sassistant indicated thatKislyakwasvery insistentaboutsecuringasecondmeeting.1147Kushner toldtheOfficethathedidnotwanttotakeanothermeetingbecausehehadalreadydecidedKislyakwasnottherightchannelforhimtocommunicatewithRussia,sohearrangedtohaveoneofhisassistants,AviBerkowitz,meetwithKislyakinhisstead.1148AlthoughembassyofficialSergeyKuznetsovwrotetoBerkowitzthat Kislyak thought it “important” to “continue the conversation with Mr.Kushner in person,”1149 Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet instead withBerkowitzonceitbecameapparentthatKushnerwasunlikelytotakeameeting.

BerkowitzmetwithKislyakonDecember12,2016,atTrumpTower.1150Themeetinglastedonlyafewminutes,duringwhichKislyakindicatedthathewantedKushnertomeetsomeonewhohadadirectlinetoPutin:SergeyGorkov,theheadoftheRussian-government-ownedbankVnesheconombank(VEB).

Kushner agreed to meet with Gorkov.1151 The one-on-one meeting tookplace the next day, December 13, 2016, at the Colony Capital building inManhattan,whereKushner had previously scheduledmeetings.1152VEBwas(and is) the subjectofDepartmentofTreasuryeconomic sanctions imposed inresponse to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.1153 Kushner did not, however,recallanydiscussionduringhismeetingwithGorkovaboutthesanctionsagainstVEBorsanctionsmoregenerally.1154KushnerstatedinaninterviewthathedidnotengageinanypreparationforthemeetingandthatnooneontheTransitionTeamevendidaGooglesearchforGorkov’sname.1155

At the start of the meeting, Gorkov presented Kushner with two gifts: apainting and a bag of soil from the town in Belarus where Kushner’s familyoriginated.1156

The accounts fromKushner andGorkov differ as towhether themeetingwasdiplomaticorbusiness innature.Kushner told theOffice that themeetingwas diplomatic, with Gorkov expressing disappointment with U.S.-Russiarelations under President Obama and hopes for improved relations with theincoming Administration.1157 According to Kushner, although Gorkov toldKushneralittlebitabouthisbankandmadesomestatementsabouttheRussianeconomy, the two did not discuss Kushner’s companies or private businessdealingsofanykind.1158(Atthetimeofthemeeting,KushnerCompanieshadadebtobligationcomingdueon thebuilding itownedat666FifthAvenue,andthere had been public reporting both about efforts to secure lending on theproperty and possible conflicts of interest for Kushner arising out of hiscompany’sborrowingfromforeignlenders.1159)

In contrast, in a 2017 public statement,VEB suggestedGorkovmetwithKushner inKushner’scapacityasCEOofKushnerCompaniesfor thepurposeof discussing business, rather than as part of a diplomatic effort. In particular,VEB characterized Gorkov’s meeting with Kushner as part of a series of

“roadshow meetings” with “representatives of major US banks and businesscircles,”which included “negotiations” anddiscussionof the “most promisingbusinesslinesandsectors.”1160

Foresman, the investmentbankexecutivementionedinVolumeI,SectionsIV.A.1 and IV.B.3, supra, told the Office that he met with Gorkov and VEBdeputy chairmanNikolay Tsekhomsky inMoscow just beforeGorkov left forNew York to meet Kushner.1161 According to Foresman, Gorkov andTsekhomsky told him that they were traveling to New York to discuss post-electionissueswithU.S.financialinstitutions,thattheirtripwassanctionedbyPutin,andthattheywouldbereportingbacktoPutinupontheirreturn.1162

The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts ofKushnerandGorkovordeterminewhetherthemeetingwasdiplomaticinnature(asKushnerstated),focusedonbusiness(asVEB’spublicstatementindicated),or whether it involved some combination of those matters or other matters.Regardless,theinvestigationdidnotidentifyevidencethatKushnerandGorkovengagedinanysubstantivefollow-upafterthemeeting.

Rather, a few days after themeeting,Gorkov’s assistant textedKushner’sassistant, “Hi, please inform your side that the information about themeetinghad a very positive response!”’1163 Over the following weeks, the twoassistants exchangedahandfulof additional cordial texts.1164OnFebruary8,2017,Gorkov’sassistanttextedKushner’sassistant(Berkowitz)totrytosetupanother meeting, and followed up by text at least twice in the days thatfollowed.1165 According to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meetingrequestinlightofthepresscoverageregardingtheRussiainvestigation,anddidnottellKushneraboutthemeetingrequest.1166

5.PetrAven’sOutreachEffortstotheTransitionTeam

InDecember2016,weeksaftertheone-on-onemeetingwithPutindescribedinVolumeI,SectionIV.B.1.b,supra,PetrAvenattendedwhathedescribedasaseparate “all-hands” oligarch meeting between Putin and Russia’s mostprominentbusinessmen.1167AsinAven’sone-on-onemeeting,amaintopicofdiscussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of

forthcomingU.S.economicsanctions.1168

After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, Aven tried to establish aconnection to the Trump team.Aven instructedRichardBurt tomake contactwiththeincomingTrumpAdministration.BurtwasontheboardofdirectorsforLetterOne(L1),anothercompanyheadedbyAven,andhaddoneworkforAlfa-Bank.1169 Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador to Germany andAssistantSecretaryofStateforEuropeanandCanadianAffairs,andoneofhisprimaryroleswithAlfa-BankandL1wastofacilitateintroductionstobusinesscontactsintheUnitedStatesandotherWesterncountries.1170

WhileataL1boardmeetingheld inLuxembourg in lateDecember2016,AvenpulledBurtasideandtoldhimthathehadspokentosomeonehighintheRussian government who expressed interest in establishing a communicationschannelbetweentheKremlinandtheTrumpTransitionTeam.1171Avenaskedfor Burt’s help in contacting members of the Transition Team.1172AlthoughBurthadbeenresponsibleforhelpingAvenbuildconnections in thepast,BurtviewedAven’srequestasunusualandoutsidethenormalrealmofhisdealingswithAven.1173

Burt,whoisamemberoftheboardofCNI(discussedatVolumeI,SectionIV.A.4,supra),1174decided toapproachCNIpresidentDimitriSimes forhelpfacilitating Aven’s request, recalling that Simes had some relationship withKushner.1175Atthetime,SimeswaslobbyingtheTrumpTransitionTeam,onBurt’sbehalf,toappointBurtU.S.ambassadortoRussia.1176

BurtcontactedSimesbytelephoneandaskedifhecouldarrangeameetingwith Kushner to discuss setting up a high-level communications channelbetweenPutinandtheincomingAdministration.1177SimestoldtheOfficethathedeclinedandstatedtoBurtthatsettingupsuchachannelwasnotagoodideain light of the media attention surrounding Russian influence in the U.S.presidential election.1178 According to Simes, he understood that Burt wasseeking a secret channel, and Simes did not want CNI to be seen as anintermediary between the Russian government and the incomingAdministration.1179BasedonwhatSimeshadreadinthemedia,hestatedthat

healreadyhadconcerns thatTrump’sbusiness connections couldbe exploitedbyRussia,andSimessaidthathedidnotwantCNItohaveanyinvolvementorapparentinvolvementinfacilitatinganyconnection.1180

In an email dated December 22, 2016, Burt recounted for Aven hisconversationwithSimes:

Througha trusted thirdparty, Ihavereachedout to thevery influentialperson Imentioned in Luxembourg concerning Project A. There is aninterest and an understanding for the need to establish such a channel.Buttheindividualemphasizedthatatthismoment,withsomuchintenseinterestintheCongressandthemediaoverthequestionofcyber-hacking(and who ordered what), Project A was too explosive to discuss. Theindividual agreed to discuss it again after the New Year. I trust theindividual’sinstinctsonthis.

Ifthisisunclearoryouwouldliketodiscuss,don’thesitatetocall.1181

According to Burt, the “very influential person” referenced in his email wasSimes,andthereferencetoa“trustedthirdparty”wasafabrication,asnosuchthirdpartyexisted.“ProjectA”wasatermthatBmtcreatedforAven’sefforttohelpestablishacommunicationschannelbetweenRussiaand theTrump team,whichheusedinlightofthesensitivitiessurroundingwhatAvenwasrequesting,especially in light of the recent attention to Russia’s influence in the U.S.presidentialelection.1182AccordingtoBurt,hisreportthattherewas“interest”in a communications channel reflectedSimes’sviews,notnecessarily thoseoftheTransitionTeam,andinanyevent,Burtacknowledgedthatheaddedsome“hype” to thatsentence tomake itsoundlike therewasmore interest fromtheTransitionTeamthanmayhaveactuallyexisted.1183

Aven replied to Burt’s email on the same day, saying “Thank you. Allclear.”1184AccordingtoAven,thisstatementindicatedthathedidnotwanttheoutreach to continue.1185 Burt spoke to Aven some time thereafter about hisattempt to make contact with the Trump team, explaining to Aven that thecurrentenvironmentmadeitimpossible,GrandJury████████████.1186BurtdidnotrecalldiscussingAven’srequestwithSimesagain,nordidherecallspeakingtoanyoneelseabouttherequest.1187

In the first quarter of 2017,Avenmet againwithPutin andotherRussianofficials.1188 At that meeting, Putin asked about Aven’s attem t to buildrelations with the Trump Administration, and Aven recounted his lack ofsuccess.1189GrandJury████████████1190PutincontinuedtoinquireaboutAven’sefforts toconnect to theTrumpAdministration inseveralsubsequentquarterlymeetings.1191

Aven also told Putin’s chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by theFBI.1192Aspartofthatconversation,hereportedthathehadbeenaskedbytheFBIaboutwhetherhehadworkedtocreateabackchannelbetweentheRussiangovernmentandtheTrumpAdministration.1193AccordingtoAven,theofficialshowednoemotioninresponsetothisreportanddidnotappeartocare.1194

6.CarterPageContactwithDeputyPrimeMinisterArkadyDvorkovich

InDecember2016,more than twomonthsafterhewas removed from theTrumpCampaign, former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page againvisited Moscow in an attempt to pursue business opportunities.1195 GrandJury█████████████████████████████████ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █1196 According toKonstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort’s associate, Page also gave someindividuals inRussia the impression thathehadmaintainedhisconnections toPresident-Elect Trump. In a December 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort,Kilimnik wrote, “Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending messages he isauthorized to talk to Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutualinterest,includingUkraine.”1197

OnDecember 9, 2016,Pagewent to dinnerwithNESemployeesShlomoWeberandAndrejKrickovic.1198WeberhadcontactedDvorkovich to lethimknowthatPagewasintownandtoinvitehimtostopbythedinnerifhewishedtodoso,andDvorkovichcametotherestaurantforafewminutestomeetwithPage.1199Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump’s election and expressedinterest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia.1200Dvorkovich asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich withindividuals involved in the transition to be in a discussion of future

cooperation.1201GrandJury██████████████████████████████████████████████████████1202GrandJury██████████████████████████████████████████████████████1203

Grand Jury█ █ █ █ █ █ Dvorkovich separately discussed workingtogetherinthefuturebyforminganacademicpartnership.1204GrandJury██████████████████████████████████████████████████████1205GrandJury██████████████████████████████████████████████████████1206

7.ContactsWithandThroughMichaelT.Flynn

Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was the TransitionTeam’sprimaryconduitforcommunicationswiththeRussianAmbassadoranddealtwithRussiaontwosensitivemattersduringthetransitionperiod:aUnitedNations Security Council vote and the Russian government’s reaction to theUnited States’s imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in the 2016election.1207DespiteKushner’sconclusionthatKislyakdidnotwieldinfluenceinside the Russian government, the Transition Team turned to Flynn’srelationshipwithKislyak on both issues.As to the sanctions, Flynn spoke byphonetoK.T.McFarland,hisincomingdeputy,toprepareforhiscalltoKislyak;McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior members of theTransitionTeamatMar-a-Lagoatthetime.AlthoughtransitionofficialsatMar-a-LagohadsomeconcernaboutpossibleRussianreactionstothesanctions,theinvestigation did not identify evidence that the President-Elect asked Flynn tomakeanyrequesttoKislyak.FlynnaskedKislyaknottoescalatethesituationinresponse toU.S. sanctions imposed onDecember 29, 2016, andKislyak laterreportedtoFlynnthatRussiaaccededtothatrequest.

a.UnitedNationsVoteonIsraeliSettlements

OnDecember21,2016,EgyptsubmittedaresolutiontotheUnitedNationsSecurity Council calling on Israel to cease settlement activities in Palestinianterritory1208 The Security Council, which includes Russia, was scheduled to

vote on the resolution the following day.1209 There was speculation in themediathattheObamaAdministrationwouldnotopposetheresolution.1210

AccordingtoFlynn,theTransitionTeamregardedthevoteasasignificantissue and wanted to support Israel by opposing the resolution.1211 OnDecember 22, 2016, multiple members of the Transition Team, as well asPresident-Elect Trump, communicated with foreign government officials todeterminetheirviewsontheresolutionandtorallysupporttodelaythevoteordefeattheresolution.1212KushnerledtheeffortfortheTransitionTeam;Flynnwas responsible for the Russian government.1213 Minutes after an earlymorningphonecallwithKushneronDecember22,FlynncalledKislyak.1214According to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the TransitionTeam’s opposition to the resolution, and requested thatRussia vote against ordelay the resolution.1215 Later that day, President-Elect Trump spoke withEgyptianPresidentAbdelFattah al-Sisi about the vote.1216Ultimately,Egyptpostponedthevote.1217

OnDecember 23, 2016,Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, andVenezuelaresubmittedtheresolution.1218Throughouttheday,membersoftheTransitionTeam continued to talk with foreign leaders about the resolution, with Flynncontinuing to lead the outreach with the Russian government throughKislyak.1219When Flynn again spokewithKislyak, Kislyak informed Flynnthatiftheresolutioncametoavote,Russiawouldnotvoteagainstit.1220Theresolutionlaterpassed14-0,withtheUnitedStatesabstaining.1221

b.U.S.SanctionsAgainstRussia

Flynnwas also theTransitionTeammemberwho spokewith theRussiangovernment when the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and othermeasures against Russia in response to Russia’s interference in the 2016presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-President Obama signedExecutiveOrder13757,which tookeffectat12:01a.m. thefollowingdayandimposedsanctionsonnineRussian individualsandentities.1222OnDecember29, 2016, the Obama Administration also expelled 35 Russian government

officials and closed twoRussian government-owned compounds in theUnitedStates.1223

During the rollout of the sanctions, President-Elect Trump and multipleTransition Team senior officials, including McFarland, Steve Bannon, andReince Priebus, were staying at theMar-a-Lago club in PalmBeach, Florida.FlynnwasonvacationintheDominicanRepublic,1224butwasindailycontactwithMcFarland.1225

TheTransitionTeamandPresident-ElectTrumpwereconcernedthat thesesanctions would harm the United States’s relationship with Russia.1226Although the details and timing of sanctionswere unknown onDecember 28,2016, the media began reporting that retaliatory measures from the ObamaAdministration against Russia were forthcoming.1227 When asked aboutimposingsanctionsonRussiaforitsallegedinterferenceinthe2016presidentialelection,President-ElectTrumptoldthemedia,“Ithinkweoughttogetonwithourlives.”1228

Russia initiated the outreach to the Transition Team. On the evening ofDecember28,2016,KislyaktextedFlynn,“canyoukindlycallmebackatyourconvenience.”1229 Flynn did not respond to the text message that evening.Someone from the Russian Embassy also called Flynn the next morning, at10:38a.m.,buttheydidnottalk.1230

ThesanctionswereannouncedpubliclyonDecember29,2016.1231At1:53p.m. that day, McFarland began exchanging emails with multiple TransitionTeammembersandadvisorsabout the impact thesanctionswouldhaveontheincomingAdministration.1232At2:07p.m.,aTransitionTeammember textedFlynnalinktoaNewYorkTimesarticleaboutthesanctions.1233At2:29p.m.,McFarland called Flynn, but they did not talk.1234 Shortly thereafter,McFarlandandBannondiscussed the sanctions.1235According toMcFarland,Bannon remarked that the sanctions would hurt their ability to have goodrelations with Russia, and that Russian escalation would make things moredifficult.1236McFarlandbelievedshetoldBannonthatFlynnwasscheduledtotalk to Kislyak later that night.1237 McFarland also believed she may have

discussed the sanctions with Priebus, and likewise told him that Flynn wasscheduled to talk to Kislyak that night.1238 At 3:14 p.m., Flynn texted aTransition Team member who was assisting McFarland, “Time for acall???”1239 The Transition Teammember responded thatMcFarlandwas onthephonewithTomBossert,aTransitionTeamseniorofficial, towhichFlynnresponded,“Tit for tatwRussianotgood.RussianAMBOreachingout tometoday.”1240

Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about thesanctionsuntilhehadheard from the teamatMar-a-Lago.1241HefirstspokewithMichaelLedeen,1242aTransitionTeammemberwhoadvisedon foreignpolicyandnationalsecuritymatters,for20minutes.1243FlynnthenspokewithMcFarlandforalmost20minutestodiscusswhat, ifanything,tocommunicatetoKislyakaboutthesanctions.1244Onthatcall,McFarlandandFlynndiscussedthe sanctions, including their potential impact on the incoming TrumpAdministration’sforeignpolicygoals.1245McFarlandandFlynnalsodiscussedthatTransitionTeammembersinMar-a-LagodidnotwantRussiatoescalatethesituation.1246 They both understood that Flynn would relay a message toKislyakinhopesofmakingsurethesituationwouldnotgetoutofhand1247

Immediately after speakingwithMcFarland, Flynn called and spokewithKislyak.1248 Flynn discussed multiple topics with Kislyak, including thesanctions,schedulingavideoteleconferencebetweenPresident-ElectTrumpandPutin,anupcomingterrorismconference,andRussia’sviewsabout theMiddleEast.1249Withrespecttothesanctions,FlynnrequestedthatRussianotescalatethesituation,notget intoa“tit for tat,”andonlyrespond to thesanctions inareciprocalmanner.1250

Multiple Transition Team members were aware that Flynn was speakingwithKislyakthatday.InadditiontoherconversationswithBannonandReincePriebus, at 4:43 p.m., McFarland sent an email to Transition Team membersaboutthesanctions,informingthegroupthat“Gen[F]lynnistalkingtorussianambassador this evening.”1251 Less than an hour later, McFarland briefedPresident-ElectTrump.Bannon,Priebus,SeanSpicer,andotherTransitionTeam

memberswere present.1252During the briefing, President-Elect Trump askedMcFarlandiftheRussiansdid“it,”meaningtheintrusionsintendedtoinfluencethe presidential election.1253McFarland said yes, and President-Elect Trumpexpressed doubt that it was the Russians.1254 McFarland also discussedpotentialRussian responses to thesanctions,andsaidRussia’s responsewouldbeanindicatorofwhattheRussianswantedgoingforward.1255President-ElectTrump opined that the sanctions provided him with leverage to use with theRussians.1256McFarlandrecalledthatattheendofthemeeting,someonemayhave mentioned to President-Elect Trump that Flynn was speaking to theRussianambassadorthatevening.1257

After thebriefing,FlynnandMcFarlandspokeover thephone.1258FlynnreportedonthesubstanceofhiscallwithKislyak,includingtheirdiscussionofthesanctions.1259According toMcFarland,Flynnmentioned that theRussianresponsetothesanctionswasnotgoingtobeescalatorybecausetheywantedagoodrelationshipwith the incomingAdministration.1260McFarlandalsogaveFlynnasummaryofherrecentbriefingwithPresident-ElectTrump.1261

Thenextday,December30,2016,RussianForeignMinisterSergeyLavrovremarked that Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions.1262 Putinsuperseded that comment two hours later, releasing a statement that Russiawould not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at thattime.1263HourslaterPresident-ElectTrumptweeted,“Greatmoveondelay(byV. Putin).”1264 Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarlandsummarizing his callwithKislyak from the day before,which she emailed toKushner,Bannon, Priebus, and other TransitionTeammembers.1265 The textmessageandemaildidnotincludesanctionsasoneofthetopicsdiscussedwithKislyak.1266Flynn told theOffice thathedidnotdocumenthisdiscussionofsanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the ObamaAdministration’sforeignpolicy.1267

OnDecember31,2016,KislyakcalledFlynnandtoldhimtherequesthadbeenreceivedatthehighestlevelsandthatRussiahadchosennottoretaliatetothesanctionsinresponsetotherequest.1268Twohourslater,Flynnspokewith

McFarland and relayed his conversation with Kislyak.1269 According toMcFarland,Flynn remarked that theRussianswanted abetter relationship andthattherelationshipwasbackontrack.1270FlynnalsotoldMcFarlandthathebelieved his phone call had made a difference.1271 McFarland recalledcongratulatingFlynninresponse.1272FlynnspokewithotherTransitionTeammembersthatday,butdoesnotrecallwhethertheydiscussedthesanctions.1273Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the next day and thatBannon appeared to know about Flynn’s conversation with Kislyak.1274Bannon,forhispart,recalledmeetingwithFlynnthatday,butsaidthathedidnotrememberdiscussingsanctionswithhim.1275

Additional information about Flynn’s sanctions-related discussions withKislyak,and thehandlingof thosediscussionsby theTransitionTeamand theTrumpAdministration,isprovidedinVolumeIIofthisreport.

***

In sum, the investigation established multiple links between TrumpCampaignofficialsandindividualstiedtotheRussiangovernment.ThoselinksincludedRussian offers of assistance to theCampaign. In some instances, theCampaign was receptive to the offer, while in other instances the Campaignofficials shied away. Ultimately, the investigation did not establish that theCampaigncoordinatedorconspiredwiththeRussiangovernmentinitselection-interferenceactivities.

288 For example, on August 18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaperVzglyad ,GeorgiAsatryanemailedcampaignpresssecretaryHopeHicksaskingforaphoneorin-personcandidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. One day earlier, the publication’s founder (andformerRussian parliamentarian)Konstantin Rykov had registered twoRussianwebsites—Trump2016.ruandDonaldTrump2016.ru.Nointerviewtookplace.

289See, e.g., Interview of:Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate JudiciaryCommittee, 115thCong. 151-52(Sept.7,2017)(discussinglicensingdealsofspecificprojects).

290AsnotedinVolumeI,SectionIII.D.1,supra,inNovember2018,Cohenpleadedguiltytomakingfalse statements toCongress concerning, amongother things, the duration of theTrumpTowerMoscowproject.See Information ¶ 7(a),United States v.Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y.Nov. 29, 2018),

Doc.2(“CohenInformation”).

291See Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7,2017)(“FollowingthepageanttheTrumpOrganizationandMr.Agalarov’scompany,CrocusGroup,beganpreliminarilydiscussion[sic]potentialrealestateprojectsinMoscow.”).Ashasbeenwidelyreported,theMissUniversepageant—whichTrumpco-ownedatthetime—washeldattheAgalarov-ownedCrocusCityHall in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and ArasAgalarov’ssonEminwasamusicalperformerattheevent,whichTrumpattended.

292Kaveladze11/16/17302,at2,4-6;GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████OSC-KAV_00385(12/6/13Email,TrumpJr.toKaveladze&E.Agalarov(IAEN)).

293GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████

294GrandJury███████████████████████████████████████

295OSC-KAV_00452(12/23/13Email,TrumpJr.toKaveladze&E.Agalarov).

296 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_01158 (Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr. & E. Agalarov); OSC-KAV_01147(1/20/14Email,KaveladzetoTrumpJr.etal.).

297See,e.g.,OSC-KAV_00972(10/14/14Email,McGeetoKhooetal.)(emailfromCrocusGroupcontractoraboutspecifications);OSC-KAV_00540(1/24/14Email,McGeetoTrumpJr.etal.).

298 See OSC-KAV_00631 (2/5/14 Email, E. Agalarov to Ivanka Trump, Trump Jr. & Kaveladze(IAEN));GoldstoneFacebookpost,2/4/14(8:01a.m.)InvestigativeTechnique█████████

299 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00791 (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.; OSC-KAV_00799(6/10/14Email,TrumpJr.toKaveladzeetal.);OSC-KAV_00817(6/16/14Email,TrumpJr.toKaveladzeetal.).

300OSC-KAV_00870(7/17/14Email,KhootoMcGeeetal.).

301OSC-KAV_00855(8/4/14Email,KhootoMcGeeetal.).

302OSC-KAV_00903(9/29/14Email,Tropea toMcGee&Kaveladze (noting last responsewasonAugust26,2014));OSC-KAV_00906(9/29/14Email,KaveladzetoTropea&McGee(suggestingsilence“proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project”)); OSC-KAV_00972 (10/14/14 Email,McGeetoKhooetal.)(emailfromCrocusGroupcontractoraboutdevelopmentspecifications)).

303OSC-KAV_01140(11/24/14Email,KhootoMcGeeetal.).

304 Sater provided information to our Office in two 2017 interviews conducted under a profferagreement(IAEN),GrandJury██████

305GrandJury██████

306Sater9/19/17302,at1-2,5.

307Sater9/19/17302,at3.

308Rozov1/25/18302,at1.

309Rozov1/25/18302,at1;seealso11/2/15Email,CohentoRozovetal.(sendingletterofintent).

310Cohen9/12/18302,at1-2,4-6.

311Cohen9/12/18302,at5.

312Cohen9/12/18302,at4-5.

313 Rtskhiladze was a U.S.-based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group. Inapproximately2011,SilkRoadGroupand theTrumpOrganizationentered intoa licensingagreement tobuildaTrump-brandedpropertyinBatumi,Georgia(IAEN).Rtskhiladzewasalsoinvolvedindiscussionsfor a Trump-branded project in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Office twice interviewed Rtskhiladze, █ ██GrandJury██████

314Cohen9/12/18302,at12;seealsoRtskhiladze5/10/18302,at1.

3159/22/15Email,RtskhiladzetoNizharadze.

3169/24/15Email,RtskhiladzetoCohen.

3179/24/15Email,RtskhiladzetoCohen.

3189/27/15Email,RtskhiladzetoCohen.

319Cohen9/12/18302,at12.

32011/2/15Email,CohentoRozovetal.(attachment)(hereinafter“LOI”);seealso10/13/15Email,SatertoCohen&Davis(attachingproposedletterofintent).

321LOI,p.2.

322TheLOIcalledfortheTrumpOrganizationtoreceive5%ofallgrosssalesupto$100million;4%of all gross sales from $100million to $250million; 3% of all gross sales from $250million to $500million;2%ofallgrosssalesfrom$500millionto$1billion;and1%ofallgrosssalesover$1billion.LOI,Schedule2.

323LOI,Schedule2.

324LOI,Schedule1.

325LOI,Schedule2.

326Cohen9/12/18302,at3.

32711/3/15Email,SatertoCohen(12:14p.m.).

32811/3/15Email,SatertoCohen(12:40p.m.).

329Cohen9/12/18302,at3-4;Cohen8/7/18302,at15.

330GrandJury███Sater12/15/17302,at2.

331Sater12/15/17302,at3-4.

33210/12/15Email,SatertoCohen(8:07a.m.).

333GrandJury███

334 IvankaTrumpreceivedanemail fromawomanwho identifiedherselfas“LanaE.Alexander,”whichsaidinpart,“IfyouaskanyonewhoknowsRussiantogooglemyhusbandDmitryKlokov,you’llseewhoheisclosetoandthathehasdonePutin’spoliticalcampaigns.”11/16/15Email,ErchovatoI.Trump.

33511/16/15Email,I.TrumptoCohen.

336Cohen8/7/18302,at17.Duringhis interviewswith theOffice,Cohenstillappeared tobelievethat theKlokovhespokewithwas thatOlympian.Theinvestigation,however,established that theemailaddressusedtocommunicatewithCohenbelongstoadifferentDmitryKlokov,asdescribedabove.

33711/18/15Email,KlokovtoCohen(6:51a.m.).

338InJuly2018,theOfficereceivedanunsolicitedemailpurportingtobefromErchova,inwhichshewrotethat“[a]t theendof2015andbeginningof2016Iwasaskedbymyex-husbandtocontactIvankaTrump . . . and offer cooperation to Trump’s team on behalf of the Russian officials.” 7/27/18 Email,ErchovatoSpecialCounsel’sOffice.TheemailclaimedthattheofficialswantedtooffercandidateTrump“land in Crimea among other things and unofficialmeetingwith Putin.” Id. In order to vet the email’sclaims,theOfficerespondedrequestingmoredetails.TheOfficedidnotreceiveanyreply.

33911/18/15Email,CohentoKlokov(7:15a.m.).

34011/18/15Email,KlokovtoCohen(6:51a.m.).

34111/18/15Email,KlokovtoCohen(6:51a.m.)(“Iwouldsuggestseparatingyournegotiationsandourproposaltomeet.Iassureyou,afterthemeetinglevelofprojectsandtheircapacitycanbecompletelydifferent,havingthemostimportantsupport.”).

34211/19/15Email,KlokovtoCohen(7:40a.m.).

34311/19/15Email,CohentoKlokov(12:56p.m.).

344Cohen9/18/18302,at12.

345FS00004(12/30/15TextMessage,CohentoSater(6:17p.m.)).

3461/11/16Email,Cohentopr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru(9:12a.m.).

3471/14/16Email,Cohentoinfo@prpress.gov.ru(9:21a.m.).

3481/16/16Email,Cohentopr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru(10:28a.m.).

349CohenInformation¶¶4,7.Cohen’sinteractionswithPresidentTrumpandthePresident’slawyerswhenpreparinghiscongressionaltestimonyarediscussedfurtherinVolumeII.SeeVol.II,SectionII.K.3,infra.

3501/20/16Email,Poliakova toCohen (5:57a.m.) (“Mr.Cohen[,] I can’tget through tobothyourphones.Pls,callme.”).

351Telephone records showa20-minute call on January20,2016betweenCohenand thenumberPoliakovaprovidedinheremail.CallRecordsofMichaelCohenGrandJury███Afterthecall,Cohensaved Poliakova’s contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact list. 1/20/16 CohenMicrosoftOutlookEntry(6:22a.m.).

352Cohen9/12/18302,at2-3.

353FS00011(1/21/16TextMessages,SatertoCohen).

354 The invitation purported to be from Genbank, a Russian bank that was, according to Sater,workingatthebehestofalargerbank,VTB,andwouldconsiderprovidingfinancing.FS00008(12/31/15TextMessages,Sater&Cohen).AdditionalinformationaboutGenbank(IAEN)canbefoundinfra.

355FS00011(1/21/16TextMessage,SatertoCohen(7:44p.m.));1/21/16Email,SatertoCohen(6:49p.m.).

3561/25/16Email,SatertoCohen(12:01p.m.)(attachment).

357Cohen9/12/18302,at6-7.

358See,e.g.,12/1/15Email,SatertoCohen(12:41p.m.)(“PleasescanandsendmeacopyofyourpassportfortheRussianMinistryofForeignAffairs.”).

359TollrecordsshowthatSaterwasspeakingtoEvgenyDvoskin(IAEN).CallRecordsofFelixSaterGrandJury███Dvoskin is an executive ofGenbank, a large bankwith lending focused inCrimea,Ukraine. At the time that Sater provided this financing letter to Cohen, Genbank was subject to U.S.governmentsanctions,seeRussia/Ukraine-relatedSanctionsandIdentifications,OfficeofForeignAssetsControl (Dec. 22, 2015), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20151222.aspx.Dvoskin,whohadbeendeported from theUnitedStates in 2000 forcriminalactivity,wasunderindictmentintheUnitedStatesforstockfraudunderthealiasesEugeneSluskerandGeneShustar.SeeUnitedStatesv.Rizzo,etal.,2:03-cr-63(E.D.N.Y.Feb.6,2003).

36012/19/15Email,SatertoCohen(10:50a.m.);FS00002(12/19/15TextMessages,SatertoCohen,(10:53a.m.).

361 FS00004 (12/19/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); ERT_0198-256 (12/19/15 Text Messages,

Cohen&Sater).

362Cohen9/12/18302,at5.

363OnDecember21,2015,SatersentCohenatextmessage(IAEN)thatread,“TheyneedacopyofDJTpassport,” towhichCohen responded, “After I return fromMoscowwithyouwithadate forhim.”FS00004(12/21/15TextMessages,Cohen&Sater).

364FS00014(4/20/16TextMessage,SatertoCohen(9:06p.m.)).

365FS00015(5/4/16TextMessage,SatertoCohen(7:38p.m.)).

366FS00015(5/4/16TextMessage,CohentoSater(8:03p.m.)).

367Sater12/15/17302,at4.

368FS00016(5/5/16TextMessages,SatertoCohen(6:26&6:27a.m.)).

369FS00016(5/6/16TextMessages,Cohen&Sater).

370FS00018(6/9/16TextMessages,Sater&Cohen).

3716/13/16Email,SatertoCohen(2:10p.m.).

372FS00018(6/13/16TextMessage,SatertoCohen(2:20p.m.));6/13/16Email,SatertoCohen.

373Cohen9/12/18302,at6-8.

374FS00019(6/14/16TextMessages,Cohen&Sater(12:06and2:50p.m.)).

375Cohen9/12/18302,at2.

376Cohen9/12/18302,at7.

377 12/21/15 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57 a.m.) (attachments); TRUMPORG_16_000057(1/7/16Email,I.TrumptoGraff(9:18a.m.)).

3781/14/16Email,GrafftoMira.

3791/15/16Email,MiratoGraff.

380 As explained in Volume II and Appendix C, on September 17, 2018, the Office sent writtenquestions to the President’s counsel.OnNovember 20, 2018, the President providedwritten answers tothosequestionsthroughcounsel.

381WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at17(ResponsetoQuestionIV,Part(e))(“[D]ocumentsshowthatMs.Graffpreparedformysignatureabriefresponsedecliningtheinvitation.”).

382WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at17(ResponsetoQuestionIV,Part(e));seealsoTRUMPORG_16_000134(unsignedletterdatedMarch31,2016).

383TRUMPORG_16_000134(unsignedletter).

384TRUMPORG_16_000133(3/31/16Email,GrafftoMacchia).

385Foresman10/17/18302,at3-4.

386See TRUMPORG_16_00136 (3/31/16 Email, Foresman toGraff); see also Foresman 10/17/18302,at3-4.

387SeeTRUMPORG_16_00136(4/4/16Email,GrafftoMacchia).

388 See TRUMPORG_16_00137 (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); TRUMPORG_16_00141(4/30/16Email,ForesmantoGraff).

389 See TRUMPORG_16_00139 (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Foresman); TRUMPORG_16_00137(4/27/16Email,GrafftoLewandowski).

390 TRUMPORG_16_00142 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller); see also TRUMPORG_16_00143(5/2/16Email,GrafftoS.Miller)(forwardingMarch2016emailfromForesman).

391Foresman’scontactsduringthetransitionperiodarediscussedfurtherinVolumeI,SectionIV.B.3,infra.

392Foresman10/17/18302,at4.

393Foresman10/17/18302,at8-9.

394PapadopoulosmetwithourOfficefordebriefingsonseveraloccasionsinthesummerandfallof2017,afterhewasarrestedandcharged inasealedcriminalcomplaintwithmakingfalsestatements inaJanuary 2017 FBI interview about, inter alia, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions andcommunications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals: Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev.Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him withmakingfalsestatementstotheFBI,inviolationof18U.S.C.§1001(a).

395ATranscriptofDonaldTrump’sMeetingwiththeWashingtonPostEditorialBoard,WashingtonPost(Mar.21,2016).

3967/15/15LinkedInMessage,PapadopoulostoLewandowski(6:57a.m.);9/30/15Email,GlassnertoPapadopoulos(7:42:21a.m.).

397Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at2.

398Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at2;2/4/16Email,PapadopoulostoIdris.

399LondonCentreofInternationalLawPractice,athttps://www.lcilp.org/(viaweb.archive.org).

4002/4/16Email,PapadopoulostoIdris.

4012/5/16Email,IdristoPapadopoulos(6:11:25p.m.);2/6/16Email,IdristoPapadopoulos(5:34:15

p.m.).

402 2/4/16 LinkedIn Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1:28 p.m.); 2/4/16 Email,PapadopoulostoGlassner(2:10:36p.m.).

4033/2/16Email,PapadopoulostoGlassner(11:17:23a.m.).

4043/2/16Email,LutestoPapadopoulos(10:08:15p.m.).

405Clovis10/3/17302(1of2),at4.

406Clovis10/3/17302(1of2),at4.

407GrandJury██████████████████; 3/3/16 Email, Lutes to Clovis &Papadopoulos(6:05:47p.m.).

4083/6/16Email,PapadopoulostoClovis(4:24:21p.m.).

409 Statement ofOffense ¶ 4,United States v.George Papadopoulos, 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C.Oct. 5,2017),Doc.19(“PapadopoulosStatementofOffense”).

410Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at2.

411Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at2-3;PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶5.

412Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at2-3;StephanieKirchgaessneretal.,JosephMifsud:morequestionsthan answers about mystery professor linked to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) (“Link CampusUniversity...isheadedbyaformerItalianinteriorministernamedVincenzoScotti.”).

413PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶5.

414Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at3.

415See,e.g.,InvestigativeTechnique████████████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

416PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶5.

417PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶5.

418Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at3;Papadopoulos8/11/17302,at2.

419PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶5.

420Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at2.

421 PhillipRucker&Robert Costa,TrumpQuestions Need for NATO,Outlines NoninterventionistForeignPolicy,WashingtonPost(Mar.21,2016).

422Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at3;3/24/16TextMessages,Mifsud&Papadopoulos.

423Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at3.

424Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at3;Papadopoulos2/10/17302,at2-3;PapadopoulosInternetSearchHistory (3/24/16) (IAEN) (revealing late-morning and early-afternoon searches on March 24, 2016 for“putin’sniece,”“olgaputin,”and“russianpresidentnieceolga,”amongotherterms).

425Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at3.

426PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶8n.l.

4273/24/16Email,PapadopoulostoPageetal.(8:48:21a.m.).

428Papadopoulos’sstatementstotheCampaignwerefalse.Asnotedabove,thewomanhemetwasnotPutin’s niece, hehadnotmet theRussianAmbassador inLondon, and theAmbassador didnot alsoserveasRussia’sDeputyForeignMinister.

4293/24/16Email,PapadopoulostoPageetal.(8:48:21a.m.).

430GrandJury███

4313/24/16Email,ClovistoPapadopoulosetal.(8:55:04a.m.).

432Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at4;Papadopoulos8/11/17302,at3.

433Sessions1/17/18302,at16-17.

434Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at4.

435Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at4.

436Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at4.

437PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶9;seeGordon8/29/17302,at14;Carafano9/12/17302,at2;Hoskins9/14/17302,at1.

438Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at4-5;Gordon9/7/17302,at4-5.

439Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at5;Papadopoulos8/11/17302,at3.

440Sessions1/17/18302,at17;Gordon9/7/17302,at5;Hoskins9/14/17302,at1;Carafano9/12/17302,at2.

441Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at4-5;Papadopoulos8/11/17302,at3;Papadopoulos9/20/17302,at2.

442PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶10.

443PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶¶10-15.

4443/29/16Emails,MifsudtoPolonskaya(3:39a.m.and5:36a.m.).

4454/10/16Email,PapadopoulostoPolonskaya(2:45:59p.m.).

4464/11/16Email,PolonskayatoPapadopoulos(3:11:24a.m.).

4474/11/l6Email,PapadopoulostoPolonskaya(9:21:56a.m.).

4484/11/16Email,MifsudtoPapadopoulos(11:43:53).

449PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶10(c).

450AntonTroianovski,PutinAllyWarnsofArmsRaceasRussiaConsidersResponsetoU.S.NuclearStance,WashingtonPost(Feb.10,2018).

4514/11/16Email,PapadopoulostoMifsud(11:51:53a.m.).

4524/12/16Email,PolonskayatoPapadopoulos(4:47:06a.m.).

453Papadopoulos9/19/17302,at7.

454 4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (5:44:39 a.m.) (forwarding Libya-related document);4/12/16Email,Mifsud toPapadopoulos&Obaid (10:28:20 a.m.);Papadopoulos InternetSearchHistory(Apr.11,201610:56:49p.m.)(searchfor“andazhotelliverpoolstreet”);4/12/16TextMessages,Mifsud&Papadopoulos.

455See,e.g.,4/18/16Email,MifsudtoPapadopoulos(8:04:54a.m.).

456Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at5.

457PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶11.

458Duringthecampaignperiod,PapadopoulosconnectedoverLinkedInwithseveralMFA-affiliatedindividuals in addition to Timofeev. On April 25, 2016, he connected with Dmitry Andreyko, publiclyidentifiedas aFirstSecretaryat theRussianEmbassy in Ireland. In July2016,he connectedwithYuriyMelnik, thespokespersonfor theRussianEmbassy inWashingtonandwithAlexeyKrasilnikov,publiclyidentifiedasacounselorwith theMFA.AndonSeptember16,2016,heconnectedwithSergeiNalobin,alsoidentifiedasanMFAofficial.SeePapadopoulosLinkedInConnectionsIT███

459PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶11.

460Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at5;Papadopoulos9/19/17302,at10.

4614/25/16Email,TimofeevtoPapadopoulos(8:16:35a.m.).

4624/22/16Email,MifsudtoPapadopoulos(12:41:01a.m.).

463PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶14;4/25/16TextMessages,Mifsud&Papadopoulos.

464PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶14.

465 This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials. Theinformation is law-enforcement sensitive (LES) and must be treated accordingly in any externaldissemination.TheforeigngovernmentconveyedthisinformationtotheU.S.governmentonJuly26,2016,afewdaysafterWikiLeaks’sreleaseofClinton-relatedemails.TheFBIopeneditsinvestigationofpotentialcoordinationbetweenRussiaandtheTrumpCampaignafewdayslaterbasedontheinformation.

4664/25/16Email,PapadopoulostoS.Miller(8:12:44p.m.).

4674/27/16Email,PapadopoulostoS.Miller(6:55:58p.m.).

4684/27/16Email,PapadopoulostoLewandowski(7:15:14p.m.).

4695/4/16Email,PapadopoulostoLewandowski(8:14:49a.m.).

4705/5/16Email,PapadopoulostoClovis(7:15:21p.m.).

4715/21/16Email,PapadopoulostoManafort(2:30:14p.m.).

472PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶19n.2.

4736/1/16Email,PapadopoulostoLewandowski(3:08:18p.m.).

474 6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 p.m.); 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos toClovis(3:29:14p.m.).

475 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). Papadopoulos’s email coincided in timewithanothermessagetoClovissuggestingaTrump-Putinmeeting.First,onMay15,2016,DavidKlein—adistant relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt—emailed Clovis about a potentialCampaignmeetingwithBerelLazar,theChiefRabbiofRussia.TheemailstatedthatKleinhadcontactedLazar inFebruaryaboutapossibleTrump-Putinmeetingand thatLazarwas“averycloseconfidanteofPutin.”DJTFP00011547 (5/15/16Email,Klein toClovis (5:45:24 p.m.)). The investigation did not findevidence thatClovis responded toKlein’s email or that any further contacts of significance cameout ofKlein’ssubsequentmeetingwithGreenblattandRabbiLazaratTrumpTower.Klein8/30/18302,at2.

476PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶21(a).

477GrandJury████████████

4786/19/16Email,PapadopoulostoLewandowski(1:11:11p.m.).

4796/19/16Email,PapadopoulostoLewandowski(1:11:11p.m.).

480Papadopoulos Statement ofOffense ¶ 21; 7/14/16Email, Papadopoulos toTimofeev (11:57:24p.m.);7/15/16Email,PapadopoulostoMifsud;7/27/16Email,PapadopoulostoMifsud(2:14:18p.m.).

481Papadopoulos9/19/17302,at16-17;9thTAGSummitinWashingtonDC,TransatlanticParliamentGrouponCounterTerrorism.

4829thTAGSummitinWashingtonDC,TransatlanticParliamentGrouponCounterTerrorism.

483GrandJury████████████

484Papadopoulos9/19/17302,at16-17.

4857/11/16Email,PharestoPapadopoulos.

4867/12/16Email,PharestoPapadopoulos(14:52:29).

4877/27/16Email,PapadopoulostoMifsud(14:14:18).

488Papadopoulos9/20/17302,at3.

489 Papadopoulosdeclined to assist in decipheringhis notes, telling investigators that he couldnotreadhisownhandwritingfromthejournal.Papadopoulos9/19/17302,at21.Thenotes,however,appeartoreadaslistedinthecolumntotheleftoftheimageabove.

4908/15/16Email,PapadopoulostoClovis(11:59:07a.m.).

4918/15/16Email,ClovistoPapadopoulos(12:01:45p.m.).

492GeorgePapadopoulos: SanctionsHaveDoneLittleMoreThan toTurnRussiaTowardsChina,Interfax(Sept.30,2016).

493 Papadopoulos 9/19/17302, at 14-15;Def.Sent.Mem.,United States v.GeorgePapadopoulos,1:17-cr-182(D.D.C.Aug.31,2018),Doc.45.

494Seefootnote465ofVolumeI,SectionIV.A.2.d,supra.

495Papadopoulos8/10/17302,at5;Papadopoulos8/11/17302,at5;Papadopoulos9/20/17302,at2.

496S.Miller12/14/17302,at10.

497GrandJury████████████

498GrandJury███████████████

499GrandJury████████████

5007/15/16LinkedInMessage,MilliantoPapadopoulos.

5017/15/16LinkedInMessage,MilliantoPapadopoulos.

502 7/22/16 Facebook Message, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (7:40:23 p.m.); 7/26/16 FacebookMessage,PapadopoulostoTimofeev(3:08:57p.m.).

503 7/23/16 Facebook Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (4:31:37 a.m.); 7/26/16 FacebookMessage,TimofeevtoPapadopoulos(3:37:16p.m.).

5047/16/16TextMessages,Papadopoulos&Millian(7:55:43p.m.).

505 7/30/16 TextMessages, Papadopoulos &Millian (5:38 & 6:05 p.m.); 7/31/16 TextMessages,Millian&Papadopoulos(3:48&4:18p.m.);8/1/16TextMessage,MilliantoPapadopoulos(8:19p.m.).

5068/2/16TextMessages,Millian&Papadopoulos(3:04&3:05p.m.);8/3/16FacebookMessages,Papadopoulos&Millian(4:07:37a.m.&1:11:58p.m.).

5077/31/16Email,PapadopoulostoDenysyk(12:29:59p.m.).

5087/31/16Email,DenysyktoPapadopoulos(21:54:52).

5098/23/16FacebookMessage,MilliantoPapadopoulos(2:55:36a.m.).

510Papadopoulos9/20/17302,at2.

51111/10/16FacebookMessage,MilliantoPapadopoulos(9:35:05p.m.).

51211/14/16FacebookMessage,MilliantoPapadopoulos(1:32:11a.m.).

513Papadopoulos9/19/17302,at19.

514E.g.,11/29/16FacebookMessages,Papadopoulos&Millian(5:09-5:11p.m.);12/7/16FacebookMessage,MilliantoPapadopoulos(5:10:54p.m.).

5151/20/17FacebookMessages,Papadopoulos&Millian(4:37-4:39a.m.).

516 Page was interviewed by the FBI during five meetings in March 2017, before the SpecialCounsel’sappointment.GrandJury████████████

517TestimonyofCarterPage,HearingBefore theU.S.HouseofRepresentatives,PermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,115thCong.40(Nov.2,2017)(exhibit).

518Page3/30/17302,at10.

519GrandJury████████████

520GrandJury████████████

521GrandJury████████████

522Page3/30/17302,at10;GrandJury████████████

523GrandJury█████████████████████

524GrandJury████████████

525GrandJury████████████Complaint¶¶22,24,32,UnitedStatesv.Buryakov,1:15-mj-215(S.D.N.Y.Jan.23,2015),Doc.1(“BuryakovComplaint”).

526BuryakovComplaint¶34.

527BuryakovComplaint¶34.

528BuryakovComplaint¶32.

529BuryakovComplaint.

530BuryakovComplaint.

531BuryakovComplaint.

532SeeBuryakovComplaint; see also Indictment;United States v.Buryakov, 1:15-cr-73 (S.D.N.Y.Feb.9,2015),Doc.10;GrandJury████████████

533BuryakovComplaint¶¶32-24;GrandJury████████████

534GrandJury████████████

535Page3/16/17302,at4;GrandJury████████████

536Page3/16/17302,at4;GrandJury████████████

537Page3/30/17302,at6;Page3/31/17302,at1.

538Page3/31/17302,at1.

539Page3/16/17302,at1;GrandJury████████████

540Page3/10/17302,at2.

541See, e.g., 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.; 3/17/16 Email, Page to Clovis (attaching a“President’sDailyBrief”preparedbyPagethatdiscussedthe“severedegradationofU.S.-RussiarelationsfollowingWashington’smeddling”inUkraine);GrandJury████████████

5421/30/16Email,PagetoGlassneretal.

5431/30/16Email,PagetoGlassneretal.

5441/30/16Email,PagetoGlassneretal.

545GrandJury████████████

546ATranscriptofDonaldTrump’sMeetingwiththeWashingtonPostEditorialBoard,WashingtonPost(Mar.21,2016);GrandJury████████████

547GrandJury████████████

548GrandJury████████████

549See,e.g.,3/28/16Email,Clovis toLewandowskietal. (forwardingnotespreparedbyPageandstating,“Iwantedtoletyouknowthetypeofworksomeofouradvisorsarecapableof.”).

550Page3/16/17302,at2-3;Page3/10/17302,at3.

551S.Weber7/28/17302,at3.

552Y.Weber6/1/17302,at4-5;S.Weber7/28/17302,at3.

553SeeY.Weber6/1/17302,at4;S.Weber7/28/17302,at3.

554De.Klimentov6/9/17302,at2.

555S.Weber7/28/17302,at3.

556See5/16/16Email,PagetoPharesetal.(referringtosubmissionofa“campaignadvisorrequestform”).

557GrandJury████████████;5/16/16Email,PagetoPharesetal.

5586/19/16Email,PagetoGordonetal.

5596/19/16Email,LewandowskitoPageetal.

560DmitriKlimentovisaNewYork-basedpublicrelationsconsultant.

5617/5/16Email,KlimentovtoZakharova(translated).

5627/5/16Email,KlimentovtoZakharova(translated).

5637/5/16Email,KlimentovtoZakharova(translated).

564Dm.Klimentov11/27/18302,at1-2.

5657/6/16Email,PeskovtoKlimentov(translated).

566Page3/10/17302,at3.

567SeeCarterW.Page,TheLectureofTrump’sAdvisorCarterPageinMoscow,YouTubeChannelKatehon Think Tank, Posted July 7, 2016, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=28&v=lCYF29saA9w.PagealsoprovidedtheFBIwithacopyofhisspeechandslidesfromthe speech. See Carter Page, “The Evolution of theWorld Economy: Trends and Potential,” Speech atNationalEconomicSpeech(July7,2016).

568Page3/10/17302,at3.

569Page3/16/17302,at3.

570S.Weber7/28/17302,at4.

571GrandJury█████████████████████

572Page3/10/17302,at3;Page3/30/17302,at3;Page3/31/17302,at2.

573Page3/30/17302,at3.

574Page3/30/17302,at9.GrandJury████████████

575GrandJury████████████Page3/30/17302,at3.

576Page3/10/17302,at3;Page3/30/17302,at7;Page3/31/17302,at2.

577GrandJury████████████7/8/16Email,PagetoDahl&Gordon.

578GrandJury████████████7/9/16Email,PagetoClovis.

579GrandJury████████████

580GrandJury████████████

581GrandJury████████████

582GrandJury████████████

583Page3/10/17302,at4;Page3/16/17302,at3.

584Page3/10/17302,at4;Page3/16/17302,at3.

585GrandJury████████████;7/23/16Email,PagetoClovis;7/25/16Email,PagetoGordon&Schmitz.

586GrandJury████████████

587See,e.g.,StevenMufson&TomHamburger,TrumpAdvisor’sPublicComments,TiestoMoscowStirUneaseinBothParties,WashingtonPost(Aug.5,2016).

588 Michael Isikoff,U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo!News(Sept.23,2016).

589 Michael Isikoff,U.S. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin, Yahoo!News(Sept.23,2016);seealso9/25/16Email,HickstoConway&Bannon(instructingthatinquiriesaboutPageshouldbeansweredwith“[h]ewasannouncedasaninformaladviserinMarch.Sincethenhehashadnoroleorofficialcontactwith thecampaign.Wehavenoknowledgeofactivitiespastorpresentandhenowofficiallyhasbeenremovedfromalllistsetc.”).

590Page3/16/17302,at2;see,e.g.,9/23/16Email,J.MillertoBannon&S.Miller(discussingplanstoremovePagefromthecampaign).

591GrandJury████████████,“TransitionOnlineForm,”11/14/16(████████████GrandJury████████████

592GrandJury████████████,“TransitionOnlineForm,”11/14/16GrandJury████████████

593Simes3/8/18302,at1-2.

594AbouttheCenter,CNI,availableathttps://cftni.org/about/.

595 Advisory Counsel, CNI, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20161030025331/http://cftni.org/about/advisory-council/; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 3-4; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 4; Sessions1/17/18302,at16.

596Simes3/8/18302,at2.

597Simes3/8/18302,at1-2;Simes3/27/18302,at19.

598Simes3/27/18302,at10-15.

599C00011656(RethinkingU.S.-RussiaRelations,CNI(Apr.18,2015)).

600Simes3/8/18302,at5;Saunders2/15/18302,at29-30;Zakheim1/25/18302,at3.

601 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; C00006784 (3/11/16 Email, Gilbride to Saunders (3:43:12 p.m.); cf.Zakheim1/25/18302,at1(KissingerwasCNI’s“HonoraryChairmanoftheBoard”);Boyd1/24/18302,at2;P.Sanders2/15/18302,at5.

602Simes3/8/18302,at5-6;Simes3/27/18302,at2.

603Simes3/8/18302,at6;Kushner4/11/18302at2.

604Kushner4/11/18302,at2.

605Simes3/8/18302,at6-7.

606GrandJury████████████seeVolumeI,SectionIV.A.2,supra.

607Simes3/8/18302,at7-9.

608Simes3/8/18302,at7-8.

609Simes3/8/18302,at8;seealsoBoyd1/24/18302,at2.

610C00008187(6/17/16Email,SimestoGordon(3:35:45p.m.)).

611Simes3/8/18302,at7.

612Simes3/8/18302,at8-11;C00008923(4/6/16Email,SimestoBurt(2:22:28p.m.));Burt2/9/18302,at7.

613 C00008551 (4/17/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (2:44:25 p.m.)); C00006759 (4/14/16 EmailKushnertoSimes&S.Miller(12:30p.m.)).

614Burt2/9/18302,at7;Saunders2/15/18302,at7-8.

615Simes3/8/18302,at13;Saunders2/15/18302,at7-8.

616Simes3/8/18302,at13;Saunders2/15/18302,at7-8.

617 Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 8; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12;C00003834-43 (4/22/16Email, Simes toBoydetal.(8:47a.m.)).

618Simes3/8/18302,at12,18;Saunders2/15/18302,at11.

619Saunders2/15/18302,at11-12;C00006651-57(MayflowerGroupSalesAgreement).

620Saunders2/15/18302,at12-13.

621Saunders2/15/18302,at12.

622C00002575(AttendeeList);C00008536(4/25/16Email,SimestoKushner(4:53:45p.m.)).

623Simes3/8/18302,at19-20.

624Simes3/8/18302,at21.

625Simes3/8/18302,at21.

626Simes3/8/18302,at21.

627Simes3/8/18302,at21.

628Kushner4/11/18302,at4.

629 See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Did Trump, Kushner, Sessions Have an Undisclosed Meeting WithRussian?,NBCNews(June1,2016);JuliaIoffe,WhyDidJeffSessionsReallyMeetWithSergeyKislyak,TheAtlantic(June13,2017).

630Sessions1/17/18302,at22.

631Simes3/8/18302,at21;Saunders2/15/18302,at14,21;Boyd1/24/18302,at3-4;Heilbrunn2/1/18 302, at 6; Statement Regarding President Trump’s April 27, 2016 Foreign Policy Speech at theCenterfortheNationalInterest,CNI(Mar.8,2017).

632Simes3/8/18302,at22;Heilbrunn2/1/18302,at7.

633Luff1/30/18302,at4.

634Saunders2/15/18302,at15.

635Sessions1/17/18302,at22;Saunders2/15/18302,at17.

636Saunders2/15/18302, at 17;C00004779-80 (5/23/16Email,Cantelmo toSaunders&Hagberg(9:30:12a.m.);C00004362(5/23/16Email,BaumantoCantelmoetal.(2:02:32a.m.).

637C00004362(5/23/16EmailBaumantoCantelmoetal.(2:02:32a.m.).

638Sessions1/17/18302,at22.

639Boyd1/24/18302,at4.

640Simes3/8/18302,at23;Saunders2/15/18302,at18;Heilbrunn2/1/18302,at7.

641Simes3/8/18302,at31;Saunders2/15/18302,at19;Burt2/9/18302,at9-10;Khalilzad1/9/18302,at5.

642Burt2/9/18302,at9-10;Khalilzad1/9/18302,at1-2,5.

643Khalilzad1/9/18302,at5-6.

644Simes3/8/18302,at31;Burt2/9/18302,at9-10;Khalilzad1/9/18302,at5.

645Saunders2/15/18302,at20.

646Khalilzad1/9/18302,at6.

647Saunders2/15/18302,at19-20.

648Simes3/8/18302,at27.

649Simes3/8/18302,at27.

650Simes3/8/18302,at27.

651Simes3/8/18302,at27.Duringthisperiodoftime,theCampaignreceivedarequestforahigh-levelCampaignofficial tomeetwith anofficer at aRussian state-ownedbank “todiscuss anoffer [thatofficer] claims to be carrying from President Putin to meet with” candidate Trump. NOSC00005653(5/17/16Email,DearborntoKushner(8:12a.m.)).CopyingManafortandGates,Kushnerresponded,“Passonthis.Alotofpeoplecomeclaimingtocarrymessages.Veryfewareabletoverify.FornowIthinkwedeclinesuchmeetings.Mostlikelythesepeoplegobackhomeandclaimtheyhavespecialaccesstogainimportanceforthemselves.Becareful.”NOSC00005653(5/17/16Email,KushnertoDearborn).

652Kushner4/11/18302,at11-13.

653 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6;Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12;C00007269(8/10/16MeetingInvitation,VargastoSimesetal.);DJTFP00023484(8/11/16Email,HagantoManafort(5:57:15p.m.)).

654C00007981-84(8/9/16Email,SimestoKushner(6:09:21p.m.)).Thememorandumrecommended“downplaying Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time” and suggested that “some tend toexaggerate Putin’s flaws.” The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russian-relatedquestionsintheframeworkof“howtoworkwithRussiatoadvanceimportantU.S.nationalinterests”andthataTrumpAdministration“notgoabroadinsearchofmonsterstodestroy.”Thememorandumdidnotdiscuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions, including questions aboutRussia’sinvasionandannexationofCrimea.

655C00007981(8/9/16Email,SimestoKushner(6:09:21p.m.)).

656DJTFP00023459(8/10/16Email,KushnertoS.Milleretal.(11:30:13a.m.)).

657DJTFP00023484(8/11/16Email,HagantoManafort(5:57:15p.m.)).

658Simes3/8/18302,at29-30;Simes3/27/18302,at6;Kushner4/11/18302,at12.

659Simes3/8/18302,at30;Simes3/27/l8302,at6.

660Simes3/8/18302,at30.

661Simes3/8/18302,at30;Simes3/27/18302,at6.

662Kushner4/11/18302,at12.

663Simes3/8/18302,at30.

664GrandJury████████████Goldstone2/8/18302,at4.

665GrandJury████████████Kaveladze11/16/17302,at3;Shugart9/25/17302,at2-3;GrandJury████████████

666GrandJury████████████Goldstone2/8/18302,at10;████████████GrandJury██ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ █ Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 5-6; 4/25/16 Email, Graff toGoldstone.

667RG000033-34(4/25/16Email,GrafftoGoldstone(attachment)).

668DJTJR00008(2/29/16Email,GoldstonetoTrumpJr.etal.);GrandJury████████████

669CallRecordsofRobertGoldstoneGrandJury████████████Goldstone2/8/18302,at6.

670Goldstone2/8/18302,at1-2;GrandJury████████████Beniaminov1/6/18302,at3.

671Goldstone2/8/18302,at1-5;GrandJury████████████DJTJR00008(2/29/19Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3; Shugart 9/25/17 302, at 2;TRUMPORG_18_001325(6/21/13Email,GoldstonetoGraff);TRUMPORG_18_001013(6/24/13Email,Goldstone to Graff); TRUMPORG_18_001014 (6/24/13 Email, Graff to Shugart);TRUMPORG_18_001018(6/26/13Email,GrafftoGoldstone);TRUMPORG_18_001022(6/27/13Email,GrafftoL.Kelly);TRUMPORG_18_001333(9/12/13Email,GoldstonetoGraff,Shugart);MUO00004289(7/27/13Email,GoldstonetoGraff,Shugart).

672GrandJury████████████seeGoldstone2/8/18302,at6-7.

673GrandJury████████████

674GrandJury████████████

675GrandJury████████████

676 InDecember 2018, a grand jury in the SouthernDistrict ofNewYork returned an indictmentchargingVeselnitskayawithobstructingthePrevezonlitigationdiscussedinthetextabove.SeeIndictment,United States v. Natalia Vladimirovna Veselnitskaya, No. 18-cr-904 (S.D.N.Y.). The indictment alleges,among other things, that Veselnitskaya lied to the district court about her relationship to the RussianProsecutor General’s Office and her involvement in responding to a U.S. document request sent to theRussiangovernment.

677Veselnitskaya11/20/17StatementtotheSenateCommitteeontheJudiciary,at2;████████████GrandJury████████████

678TestimonyofNataliaVeselnitskayaBeforetheSenateCommitteeonJudiciary(Nov.20,2017)at33;KeirSimmons&RachelElbaum,RussianLawyerVeselnitskayaSaysSheDidn’tGiveTrumpJr.InfoonClinton,NBCNews(July11,2017);MariaTsvetkova&JackStubbs,MoscowLawyerWhoMetTrumpJr.HadRussian Spy Agency AsClient, Reuters (July 21, 2017);Andrew E. Kramer & Sharon LaFraniere,LawyerWhoWasSaid toHaveDirtonClintonHadCloserTies toKremlin thanSheLetOn,NewYorkTimes(Apr.27,2018).

679SeePub.L.No.112-208§§402,404(a)(1),126Stat.1502,1502-1506.SergeiMagnitskywasaRussian tax specialist who worked forWilliam Browder, a former investment fundmanager in Russia.BrowderhiredMagnitsky to investigate tax fraudbyRussianofficials, andMagnitskywas chargedwithhelpingBrowderembezzlemoney.AfterMagnitskydiedinaRussianprison,BrowderlobbiedCongresstopasstheMagnitskyAct.See,e.g.,AndrewE.Kramer,TurningTablesinMagnitskyCase,RussiaAccusesNemesisofMurder,NewYorkTimes(Oct.22,2017);TestimonyofNataliaVeselnitskayaBeforetheSenateCommittee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017), Exhibits at 1-4; Rosie Gray,Bill Browder’s Testimony to theSenateJudiciaryCommittee,TheAtlantic(July25,2017).

680EllenBarry,RussiaBars18AmericansAfterSanctionsbyUS,NewYorkTimes(Apr.13,2013);TomPorter,Supporters of theMagnitsky ActClaim They’ve Been Targets of RussianAssassination andKidnappingBids,Newsweek(July16,2017).

681TestimonyofNataliaVeselnitskayaBeforetheSenateCommitteeonJudiciary(Nov.20,2017),at21.

682SeeVeselnitskayaDecl.,UnitedStatesv.PrevezonHoldings,Ltd.,No.13-cv-6326(S.D.N.Y.);seePrevezonHoldings,SecondAmendedComplaint;PrevezonHoldings,Mem.andOrder;PrevezonHoldings,DepositionofOlegLurie.

683 See Gribbin 8/31/17 302, at 1-2 & lA (undated one-page document given to congressionaldelegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with broad national responsibilities in theRussian legal system. See Federal Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation (1992,amended2004).

684 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone toDonaldTrumpJr.);@DonaldJTrumpJr07/11/17(11:00)Tweet.

685DJTJR00446(6/3/16Email,TrumpJr.toGoldstone);@DonaldJTrumpJr07/11/17(11:00)Tweet;RG000061(6/3/16Email,TrumpJr.toGoldstone).

686GrandJury████████████RG000062(6/3/16Email,Goldstone&TrumpJr.).

687 RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A. Agalarov to Goldstone (IAEN)); RG000064 (6/6/16 Email,GoldstonetoA.Agalarov).

688 RG000065 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone toTrumpJr.).

689DJTJR00445(6/6/16Email,GoldstoneandTrumpJr.);RG000065-67(6/6/16Email,GoldstoneandTrumpJr.);GrandJury████████████

690DJTJR00499(CallRecordsofDonaldTrumpJr.GrandJury████████████);CallRecordsofDonaldTrumpJr.GrandJury████████████.

691Kaveladze11/16/17302,at6;GrandJury██████

692Kaveladze11/16/17302,at1-2;GrandJury████████████Beniaminov1/6/18302,at2-3;GrandJury████████████

693Kaveladze11/16/17302,at6.

694DJTJR00467(6/7/16Email,GoldstonetoTrumpJr.);@DonaldJTrumpJr07/11/17(11:00)Tweet;RG000068(6/7/16Email,GoldstonetoTrumpJr.);GrandJury████████████

695DJTJR00469(6/7/16Email,TrumpJr.toGoldstone);@DonaldJTrumpJr07/11/17(11:00)Tweet;RG000071 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); OSC-KAV_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone toKaveladze);GrandJury████████████

696Goldstone2/8/18302,at7;GrandJury████████████

697GrandJury████████████seeKaveladze11/16/17302 at 7;OSC-KAV_00048(6/7/16Email,GoldstonetoKaveladze).

698Beniaminov1/6/18302,at3.

699NOSC0000007-08(6/8/18Email,KushnertoVargas).

700 NOSC00000039-42 (6/8/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort); DJTJR00485 (6/8/16Email,TrumpJr.toKushner&Manafort).

701NOSC0000004(6/8/16Email,KushnertoVargas).

7026/8/16Email,ManaforttoTrumpJr.

703Gates1/30/18302,at7;Gates3/1/18302,at3-4.AlthoughtheMarchl302refersto“June19,”thatislikelyatypographicalerror;externalemailsindicatethatameetingwiththoseparticipantsoccurredonJune6.SeeNOSC00023603(6/6/16Email,GatestoTrumpJr.etal.).

704 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reportingindicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. See NeilMacFarquhar,ARussianDeveloperHelpsOut theKremlin onOccasion.WasHe aConduit to Trump?,NewYorkTimes(July16,2017).

705Gates3/1/18302,at3-4.

706Hicks12/7/17302,at6.

707Kushner4/11/18302,at8.

708Cohen8/7/18302,at4-6.

709Cohen8/7/18302,at4-5.

710Cohen9/12/18302,at15-16.

711Interviewof:Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate JudiciaryCommittee, 115thCong. 28-29, 84, 94-95(Sept.7,2017).TheSenateJudiciaryCommitteeinterviewwasnotunderoath,butTrumpJr.wasadvisedthat it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to make materially false statements in a congressionalinvestigation.Id.at10-11.

712Manafort9/11/18302,at3-4;Kushner4/11/18302,at10.

713WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at8(ResponsetoQuestionI,Parts(a)-(c)).WeconsideredwhetheronesequenceofeventssuggestedthatcandidateTrumphadcontemporaneousknowledgeoftheJune9meeting.OnJune7,2016Trumpannouncedhisintentiontogive“amajorspeech”“probablyMonday of nextweek”—whichwould have been June 13—about “all of the things that havetakenplacewith theClintons.”See,e.g.,PhillipBump,Whatwe knowabout theTrumpTowermeeting,WashingtonPost(Aug.7,2018).FollowingtheJune9meeting,Trumpchangedthesubjectofhisplannedspeechtonationalsecurity.But theOfficedidnotfindevidencethat theoriginal ideafor thespeechwasconnectedtotheanticipatedJune9meetingorthatthechangeoftopicwasattributabletothefailureofthatmeetingtoproduceconcreteevidenceaboutClinton.Otherevents,suchasthePulsenightclubshootingonJune12,couldwellhavecausedthechange.ThePresident’swrittenanswerstoourquestionsstatethatthespeech’sfocuswasaltered“[i]nlightof”thePulsenightclubshooting.SeeWrittenResponses,supra.AsfortheoriginaltopicoftheJune13speech,Trumphassaidthat“heexpectedtogiveaspeechreferencing

thepubliclyavailable,negativeinformationabouttheClintons,”andthatthedraftofthespeechpreparedbyCampaign staff “was based on publicly availablematerial, including, in particular, information from thebookClintonCashbyPeterSchweizer.”WrittenResponses,supra. Ina later June22speech,TrumpdidspeakextensivelyaboutallegationsthatClintonwascorrupt,drawingfromtheClintonCashbook.SeeFullTranscript:DonaldTrumpNYCSpeechonStakesoftheElection,politico.com(June22,2016).

714TestimonyofNataliaVeselnitskayaBeforetheSenateCommitteeonJudiciary(Nov.20,2017)at41,42;AlisonFrankel,HowDidRussianLawyerVeselnitskayaGet intoU.S. forTrumpTowerMeeting?Reuters,(Nov.6,2017);MichaelKranishetal.,RussianLawyerwhoMetwithTrumpJr.HasLongHistoryFighting Sanctions,Washington Post (July 11, 2017); see OSC-KAV00113 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone toKaveladze);RG000073 (6/8/16Email,Goldstone toTrump Jr.); Lieberman 12/13/17 302, at 5; see alsoPrevezonHoldingsOrder(Oct.17,2016).

715GrandJury████████████

716Akhmetshin11/14/17302,at4-6;GrandJury████████████

717Kaveladze11/16/17302,at7;GrandJury████████████Samochornov7/13/17302,at2,4;GrandJury████████████

718GrandJury████████████.

719GrandJury████████████Kaveladze11/16/17302,at7;GrandJury████████████SamochornovdidnotrecalltheplannedsubjectmatteroftheTrumpTowermeetingcomingupatlunch.GrandJury████████████Samochomov7/12/17302,at4.InherlaterSenatestatementandinteractionswiththepress,VeselnitskayaproducedwhatsheclaimedwerethetalkingpointsthatshebroughttotheJune9meeting.

720GrandJury████████████

721E.g.,Samochornov7/12/17302,at4.

722E.g.,Samochornov7/12/17302,at4.

723E.g.,Samochornov7/12/17302,at4;Goldstone2/8/18302,at9.

724GrandJury████████████

725GrandJury████████████

726GrandJury████████████

727GrandJury████████████

728GrandJury████████████

729GrandJury████████████Akhmetsin11/14/17302,at12.

730Kaveladze11/16/17302,at8;GrandJury████████████

731Samochornov7/13/17302,at3;GrandJury████████████

732E.g.,Akhmetshin11/14/17302,at12-13;GrandJury████████████

733Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at 12-13;GrandJury████████████Samochornov7/13/17302,at3.TrumpJr.confirmedthisinastatementhemadeinJuly2017afternewsoftheJune2016meeting broke. Interview of:Donald J. Trump, Jr., Senate JudiciaryCommitteeU.S. SenateWashingtonDC,115thCong.57(Sept.7,2017).

734Manafort’snotesstate:

BillbrowderOffshore-Cyprus133msharesCompaniesNotinvest-loanValueinCyprusasinterIlliciActivesponsorsofRNCBrowderhiredJoannaGloverTiedintoCheneyRussianadoptionbyAmericanfamiliesPJM-SJC-00000001-02(NotesProducedtoSenateJudiciaryCommittee).

735NOSC00003992(6/9/16TextMessage,KushnertoManafort);Kushner4/11/18302,at9;Vargas4/4/18 302, at 7; NOSC00000044 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas); NOSC00000045 (6/9/16 Email,KushnertoCain).

736Samochornov7/12/17302,at4;GrandJury████████████Kushner4/11/18302,at9-10;seealsoInterviewof:DonaldJ.Trump,Jr.,SenateJudiciaryCommittee,115thCong.48-49(Sept.7,2017).

737RussianLawyerVeselnitskayaSaysSheDidn’tGiveTrumpJr.InfoonClinton,NBCNews(July11,2017).

738TestimonyofNataliaVeselnitskayabefore theUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeon theJudiciary,115thCong.10(Nov20,2017).

739TestimonyofNataliaVeselnitskayabefore theUnitedStatesSenateCommitteeon theJudiciary,115thCong.21(Nov.20,2017).

740SeanHannity,Transcript-DonaldTrumpJr,FoxNews(July11,2017).

741Interviewof:DonaldJ.Trump,Jr,SenateJudiciaryCommittee,115thCong.16(Sept.7,2017).

742 Interview of: Donald J. Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16-17 (Sept. 7,2017).

743Kaveladze11/16/17302,at8;GrandJury████████████Goldstone2/8/18302,at

9;GrandJury████████████

744GrandJury████████████

745GrandJury████████████TheweekaftertheJune9meeting,acybersecurityfirmand the DNC announced the Russian hack of the DNC, See Volume I, Section III.B.2, supra. █ █ ██GrandJury██████████████████(andonetextmessageshows)that,shortlyaftertheDNC announcement,Goldstonemade comments connecting theDNC hacking announcement to theJune9meeting.GrandJury████████████OSC-KAV_00029(6/14/16Email,GoldstonetoE.Agalarov&Kaveladze(10:09a.m.)).Theinvestigationdidnotidentifyevidenceconnectingtheeventsof June9 to theGRU’shack-and-dumpoperation.OSC-KAV_00029-30 (6/14/16Email,Goldstone toE.Agalarov).

746GrandJury████████████

747Kaveladze11/16/17302,at8;CallRecordsofIkeKaveladzeGrandJury████████████.

748Kaveladze11/16/17302,at8;CallRecordsofIkeKaveladzeGrandJury████████████.OnJune14,2016Kaveladze’steenagedaughteremailedaskinghowtheJune9meetinghadgone,andKaveladze responded, “meeting was boring. The Russians did not have an bad info on Hillary.” OSC-KAV_00257(6/14/16Email,I.KaveladzetoA.Kaveladze;GrandJury████████████.

749Goldstone2/8/18302,at11;GrandJury████████████.

750OSC-KAV_00138(11/23/16Email,GoldstonetoKaveladze);GrandJury████████████

751RG000196(11/26-29/16TextMessages,Goldstone&Kaveladze);GrandJury████████████

752Goldstone2/8/18302,at11;GrandJury████████████DJTJR00118(11/28/16Email,GoldstonetoGraff).

753GrandJury████████████

754GrandJury████████████

755GrandJury████████████

756RG000256(6/2/17Email,GoldstonetoGarten).

757GrandJury████████████

758RG000092(6/27/17Email,GoldstonetoE.Agalarov).

759RG000092(6/27/17Email,GoldstonetoE.Agalarov).GrandJury████████████████████████████████████

760OSC-KAV_01190(6/27/17TextMessage,E.AgalarovtoKaveladze).

761RG000286-87(7/9/17TextMessages,E.Agalarov&Goldstone);GrandJury████████████

762InvestigativeTechnique███████████████

763InvestigativeTechnique███████████████GrandJury██████████████████

764OSC-KAV_01197(7/11-12/17TextMessages,Kaveladze&E.Agalarov);GrandJury███████████████

765InvestigativeTechnique███████████████

766InvestigativeTechnique███████████████

7677/10/17Email,GoldstonetoFuterfas&Garten.

768GrandJury████████████

7697/10/17Email,GoldstonetoFuterfas&Garten.

770GrandJury████████████

771Samochornow7/13/17302,at1;GrandJury████████████

772GrandJury████████████Samochornov7/13/17302,at1.

773Samochornov7/13/17302,at1.

774GrandJury████████████

775Gordon8/29/17302,at9;Sessions1/17/18302,at22;AllanSmith,WeNowKnowMoreAboutwhy Jeff Sessions and a Russian Ambassador Crossed Paths at the Republican Convention, BusinessInsider(Mar.2,2017).

776Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Laura DeMarco,Global Cleveland and Sen. Bob Corker WelcomeInternationalRepublicanNationalConventionGuests,ClevelandPlainDealer(July20,2016).

777Gordon8/29/17302,at9;Sessions1/17/18302,at22.

778Gordon8/29/17302,at9.

779Sessions1/17/18302,at22;Luff1/30/18302,at3.

780Gordon8/29/17302,at9;Luff1/30/18302,at3.

781Gordon8/29/17302,at9.

782Sessions1/17/18302,at22;Luff1/30/18302,at3;seealsoVolumeI,Section IV.A.4.b,supra(explainingthatSessionsandKislyakmayhavemetthreemonthsbeforethisencounterduringareceptionheldonApril26,2016,attheMayflowerHotel).

783Sessions1/17/18302,at22.

784Gordon8/29/17302,at9-10

785Gordon8/29/17302,at9-10.

786 Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; see also Volume I, Section IV.A.3.d, supra (explaining that PageacknowledgedmeetingKislyakatthisevent).

787Gordon8/29/17302,at10.

788Gordon8/29/17302,at10.

789Gordon8/29/17302,at10.

790Gordon8/29/17302,at10;Hoff5/26/17302,at1-2.

791Hoff5/26/17302,at1;Gordon9/7/17302,at10.

792Mashburn6/25/18302,at4;Manafort9/20/18302,at7-8.

793Mashburn6/25/18302,at4;Gordon8/29/17302,at10.

794DENMAN000001-02,DENMAN000012,DENMAN000021-22;(IAEN)Denman12/4/17302,at1;Denman6/7/17302,at2.

795DENMAN000001-02,DENMAN000012,DENMAN000021-22.

796Gordon8/29/17302,at10-11.

797Gordon8/29/17302,at11;Gordon9/7/17302,at11;Gordon2/14/19302,at1-2,5-6.

798Gordon2/14/19302,at5-6.

799Denman6/7/17302,at2;seeDENMAN000014.

800 Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Hoff5/26/17302,at2.

801Denman6/7/17302,at3.

802M.Miller10/25/17302at3.

803Denman12/4/17302,at2;Denman6/7/17302,at2.

804Hoff5/26/17302,at2.

805Denman6/7/17302,at2-3,3-4;Denman12/4/17302,at2.

806Gordon2/14/19302,at7.

807CallRecordsofJ.D.GordonGrandJury████████████.GordonstatedtotheOfficethathiscallswithSessionswereunrelatedtotheplatformchange.Gordon2/14/19302,at7.

808WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at17(ResponsetoQuestionIV,Part(f)).

809Gordon2/14/19302,at6-7;Gordon9/7/17302,at11-12;seeGordon8/29/17302,at11.

810Dearborn11/28/17302,at7-8.

811Mashburn6/25/18302,at4.

812Hoff5/26/17302,at2-3;seeDenman12/4/17302,at2-3;Gordon8/29/17302,at11.

813Gordon8/29/17302,at11;Gordon9/7/17302,at12.

814Hoff5/26/17302,at2-3.

815Gordon2/14/19302,at6.

816Clovis10/3/17302,at10-11.

817Mashburn6/25/18302,at4.

818DJTFP00004828(8/3/16Email,Pchelyakov[embassy@russianembassy.org]toGordon).

819DJTFP00004953(8/8/16Email,Gordontoembassy@russianembassy.org).

820Luff1/30/18302,at5.

821Sessions1/17/18302,at23-24;Luff1/30/18302,at5.

822Sessions1/17/18302,at23-24;Luff1/30/18302,at5;Landrum2/27/18302,at3-5.

823Sessions1/17/18302,at23.

824Sessions1/17/18302,at23.

825Sessions1/17/18302, at23;Luff1/30/18302, at5-6;Landrum2/27/18302, at4-5 (statinghecouldnotrememberifelectionwasdiscussed).

826Luff1/30/18302,at6;Landrum2/27/18302,at5.

827Luff1/30/18302,at6;Landrum2/27/18302,at4-5.

828Luff1/30/18302,at6;Landrum2/27/18302at4-5.

829Landrum2/27/18302,at5.

830Sessions1/17/18302,at23.Sessionsalsonoted thatambassadorscame tohimfor informationaboutTrumpandhopedhewouldpassalonginformationtoTrump.Sessions1/17/18302,at23-24.

831Sessions1/17/18302,at23;Luff1/30/18302,at6;Landrum2/27/18302,at5.

832Luff1/30/18302,at5;Landrum2/27/18302,at4.

833Luff1/30/18302,at5.

834Luff1/30/18302,at6;Landrum2/27/18302,at4-5.

835Sessions1/17/l8302,at23.

836Sessions1/17/18302,at23.

837Sessions1/17/18302,at23.

838 OnAugust 21, 2018,Manafort was convicted in the EasternDistrict of Virginia on eight tax,ForeignBankAccountRegistration (FBAR), andbank fraudcharges.OnSeptember14,2018,ManafortpleadedguiltyintheDistrictofColumbiato(1)conspiracytodefraudtheUnitedStatesandconspiracytocommit offenses against the United States (money laundering, tax fraud, FBAR, Foreign AgentsRegistration Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and (2) conspiracy to obstruct justice (witnesstampering).ManafortalsoadmittedcriminalconductwithwhichhehadbeenchargedintheEasternDistrictofVirginia,butastowhichthejuryhung.TheconductatissueinbothcasesinvolvedManafort’sworkinUkraineandthemoneyheearnedforthatwork,aswellascrimesaftertheUkraineworkended.OnMarch7,2019,Manafortwassentencedto47monthsofimprisonmentintheVirginiaprosecution.OnMarch13,the district court in D.C. sentencedManafort to a total term of 73months: 60months on the Count 1conspiracy (with 30 of thosemonths to run concurrent to theVirginia sentence), and 13months on theCount1conspiracy, tobeservedconsecutive to theother twosentences.The twosentencesresulted inatotaltermof90months.

839AsnotedinVolumeI,SectionIII.D.1.b,supra,GatespleadedguiltytotwocriminalchargesintheDistrictofColumbia,includingmakingafalsestatementtotheFBI,pursuanttoapleaagreement.Hehasprovidedinformationandin-courttestimonythattheOfficehasdeemedtobereliable.SeealsoTranscriptat16,UnitedStatesv.PaulJ.Manafort,Jr.,l:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Feb.13,2019),Doc.514(“Manafort2/13/19Transcript”)(court’sexplanationofreasonstocreditGates’sstatementsinoneinstance).

840TheemailwasdraftedinKilimnik’sDMPemailaccount(inEnglish)InvestigativeTechnique██████████████████████████████

841AccordingtothePresident’swrittenanswers,hedoesnotrememberManafortcommunicatingtohim any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at16-17(ResponsetoQuestionIV,Part(d)).

842 Manafort made several false statements during debriefings. Based on that conduct, the Office

determined thatManafort hadbreachedhis plea agreement and could not be a cooperatingwitness.ThejudgepresidinginManafort’sD.C.criminalcasefoundbyapreponderanceoftheevidencethatManafortintentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the Office, and the grand jury concerning hisinteractions and communications with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues). Although the reportrefersattimestoManafort’sstatements,itdoessoonlywhenthosestatementsaresufficientlycorroboratedto be trustworthy, to identify issues on which Manafort’s untruthful responses may themselves be ofevidentiaryvalue,ortoprovideManafort’sexplanationsforcertainevents,evenwhenwewereunabletodeterminewhetherthatexplanationwascredible.

843Pinchuketal.,RussianTycoonDeripaskainPutinDelegationtoChina,Reuters(June8,2018).

8446/23/05Memo,Manafort&DavistoDeripaska&Rothchild.

845Gates2/2/18302,at7.

846Manafort9/20/18302,at2-5;ManafortIncomebyYear,2005–2015;ManafortLoansfromWireTransfers,2005–2015.

847Gates3/12/18302,at5.

848Manafort12/16/15Dep.,at157:8-11.

849Gates2/2/18302,at9.

850Gates2/2/18302,at6.

851Gates2/2/18302,at9-10.

852Manafort7/30/14302,at1;Manafort9/20/18302,at2.

853Manafort9/11/18302,at5-6.

854Gates3/16/18302,at1;Davis2/8/18302,at9;Devine7/6/18302,at2-3.

855 Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S.DepartmentofState.

856Gates1/29/18302,at18-19;Patten5/22/18302,at8;Gates1/31/18302,at4-5;Gates1/30/18302,at2;Gates2/2/18302,at11.

857Gates1/29/18302,at18;Patten5/22/18302,at8.

858BoyarkinVisaRecord,U.S.DepartmentofState.

859Manafort9/11/18302,at5.

860TheOfficehasnotedKilimnik’sassessedtiestoRussianintelligenceinpubliccourtfilings.E.g.,Gov’tOpp.toMot.toModify,UnitedStatesv.PaulJ.Manafort,Jr.,1:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Dec.4,2017),Doc.73,at2(“Manafort(D.D.C.)Gov’tOpp.toMot.toModify”).

86112/17/16KilimnikVisaRecord,U.S.DepartmentofState.

862 In August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the ForeignAgents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withhelddocumentsfromtheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceinthecourseofitsinvestigationofRussianelection interference. PleaAgreement,United States v.W. Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C.Aug. 31,2018),Doc. 6; Statement of Offense,United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31,2018),Doc.7.

863Patten5/22/18302,at5-6.

86410/28/97KilimnikVisaRecord,U.S.DepartmentofState.

865Nix3/30/18302,at1-2.

866Nix3/30/18302,at2.

867Lenzi1/30/18302,at2.

868Hawker1/9/18302,at13;3/18/14Email,Hawker&Tulukbaev.

869vanderZwaanpleadedguilty in theU.S.DistrictCourt for theDistrictofColumbia tomakingfalse statements to the SpecialCounsel’sOffice. PleaAgreement,United States v. Alex van der Zwaan,1:18-cr-31(D.D.C.Feb.20,2018),Doc.8.

870Hawker6/9/18302,at4;vanderZwaan11/3/17302,at22.Manafortsaid inan interviewthatGateshadjokedwithKilimnikaboutKilimnik’sgoingtomeetwithhisKGBhandler.Manafort10/16/18302,at7.

871PressRelease–Donald J. TrumpAnnouncesCampaignConventionManagerPaul J.Manafort,TheAmericanPresidencyProject–U.C.SantaBarbara(Mar.29,2016).

872Gates1/29/18302,at8;MeghanKeneally,TimelineofManafort’sroleintheTrumpCampaign,ABCNews(Oct.20,2017).

873Gates1/29/18302,at7-8;Manafort9/11/18302,at1-2;Barrack12/12/17302,at3.

874Barrack12/12/17302,at3;Gates1/29/18302,at7-8.

875Manafort10/16/18302,at6.

876Manafort10/16/18302,at6.

877Gates2/2/18302,at10.

878Gates1/30/18302,at4.

879Gates2/2/18302,at11.

880SeeSharonLaFraniere,Manafort’sTrialIsn’tAboutRussia,butItWillBeintheAir,NewYorkTimes (July 30, 2018); Tierney Sneed, Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made $60 Million Consulting inUkraine, Talking Points Memo (July 30, 2018); Mykola Vorobiov,How Pro-Russian Forces Will TakeRevengeonUkraine,AtlanticCouncil (Sept.23,2018);SergiiLeshchenko,Ukraine’sOligarchsAreStillCallingtheShotsForeignPolicy(Aug.14,2014);Interfax-Ukraine,Kolesnikov:InevitabilityofPunishmentNeededforRealFightAgainstSmugglinginUkraine,KyivPost(June23,2018);IgorKossov,KyivHotelIndustryMakesRoomforNewEntrants,KyivPost(Mar.7,2019);MarkianKuzmowycz,HowtheKremlinCanWinUkraine’sElections,AtlanticCouncil(Nov.19,2018).TheOppositionBlocisaUkrainepoliticalpartythatlargelyreconstitutedthePartyofRegions.

8813/30/16Email,GatestoKilimnik.

8824/11/16Email,Manafort&Kilimnik.

8834/11/16Email,Manafort&Kilimnik.

884Gates2/2/18302,at10.

885Gates2/2/18302,at11;Gates9/27/18302(serial740),at2.

886Gates2/2/18302,at12.

887Gates2/2/18302,at12.

888Gates1/31/18302,at17;Gates9/27/18302(serial740),at2.InalaterinterviewwiththeOffice,Gates stated thatManafort directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after aMay 7, 2016meetingbetweenManafort and Kilimnik in NewYork, discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.8.b.iii, infra.Gates11/7/18302,at3.

889Gates9/27/18302,PartII,at2;GrandJury█████████████████████

890Gates2/12/18302,at10;Gates1/31/18302,at17.

891Gates9/27/18302(serial740),at2;Gates2/7/18302,at15.

892Gates1/31/18302,at17.

893Gates 2/12/18 302, at 11-12.According toGates, his access to internal polling datawasmorelimitedbecauseFabriziowashimselfdistancedfromtheCampaignatthatpoint.

894GrandJury█████████████████████

8958/18/16Email,KilimniktoDirkse;8/18/16Email,KilimniktoSchultz;8/18/16Email,KilimniktoMarson;7/27/16Email,Kilimnik toAsh;8/18/16Email,Kilimnik toAsh;8/18/16Email,Kilimnik toJackson;8/18/16Email,KilimniktoMendoza-Wilson;8/19/16Email,KilimniktoPatten.

896GrandJury█████████████████████

8977/7/16Email,ManaforttoKilimnik.

898Gates2/2/18302,at13.

899Manafort9/11/18302,at6.

9007/8/16Email,KilimniktoManafort.

9017/8/16Email,KilimniktoManafort;Gates2/2/18302,at13.

902Manafort9/11/18302,at6.

903Manafort9/11/18302,at6.

904Manafort9/11/18302,at6.

905InvestigativeTechnique████████████

9064/26/16Email,KilimniktoPurcell,at2;Gates2/2/18302,at12;Patten5/22/18302,at6-7;Gates11/7/18302,at3.

9075/7/16Email,KilimniktoCharap&Kimmage;5/7/16Email,KasanoftoKilimnik.

9085/6/16Email,ManaforttoGates;5/6/16Email,GatestoKilimnik.

909Manafort10/11/18302,at1.

910Manafort10/11/18302,at1.

911Manafort10/11/18302,at1.

9127/25/16Email,Kilimniktokatrin@yana.kiev.ua(2:17:34a.m.).

9137/29/16Email,KilimniktoManafort(10:51a.111.).

9147/29/16Email,KilimniktoManafort(10:51a.m.).

915Manafort9/12/18302,at3.

916 7/29/16Email,Manafort toKilimnik; InvestigativeTechnique████████████;GrandJury█████████████████████

9177/29/16Email,ManaforttoKilimnik.

9187/31/16Email,ManaforttoKilimnik.

9197/31/16Email,ManaforttoKilimnik.

920Kilimnik8/2/16CBPRecord;CallRecordsofKonstantinKilimnikGrandJury█████████████████████;CallRecordsofRickGatesGrandJury█████████████████████;8/2-3/16,KilimnikParkLaneHotelReceipt.

921Deripaska’sprivateplanealsoflewtoTeterboroAirportinNewJerseyontheeveningofAugust2, 2016. According to Customs and Border Protection records, the only passengers on the plane wereDeripaska’swife,daughter,mother,andfather-in-law,andseparaterecordsobtainedbyourOfficeconfirmthatKilimnikflewonacommercialflighttoNewYork.

922TheLuhanskandDonetskPeople’sRepublics,whicharelocatedintheDonbasregionofUkraine,declared themselves independent in response to the popular unrest in 2014 that removed PresidentYanukovych from power. Pro-RussianUkrainianmilitia forces, with backing from the Russianmilitary,have occupied the region since 2014. Under the Yanukovych-backed plan, Russia would assist inwithdrawing themilitary,andDonbaswouldbecomeanautonomous regionwithinUkrainewith itsownprimeminister.Theplanemphasized thatYanukovychwouldbean idealcandidate tobringpeace to theregionasprimeministeroftherepublic,andfacilitatethereintegrationoftheregionintoUkrainewiththesupportoftheU.S.andRussianpresidents.Asnotedabove,accordingtoGJ█████████████████████ thewritten documentation describing the plan, for the plan towork, bothU.S. andRussiansupportwerenecessary.GrandJury█████████████████████2/21/18Email,Manafort,Ward,&Fabrizio,at3-5.

923Manafort9/11/18302,at4;GrandJury█████████████████████

924GrandJury█████████████████████

925Manafort9/11/18302,at4.

926Manafort9/12/18302,at4.

927GrandJury█████████████████████Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5;Manafort9/12/18302,at4.

928Manafort9/12/18302,at4;InvestigativeTechnique███

929GrandJury█████████████████████Documentaryevidenceconfirmsthepeace-plan discussions in 2018. 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward (forwarding email from Manafort);2/21/18Email,ManaforttoWard&Fabrizio.

930Manafort9/11/18302,at5.

931Gates1/30/18302,at3,5.

932GrandJury█████████████████████

933Gates1/30/18302,at2-4;Patten5/22/18302,at7.

934Gates1/30/18302,at5;Manafort9/11/18302,at5.

935Gates2/12/18302,at12.

936NOSC00021517-20(10/21/16Email,ManaforttoKushner).

937NOSC00021573-75(11/5/16Email,ManaforttoKushner).

938Manafort9/12/18302,at1,4-5;Gates1/30/18302,at4.

939Manafort9/12/18302,at1.

940 Kalashnikova 5/17/18 302, at 4; Gary Lee, Soviet Embassy’s Identity Crisis,Washington Post(Dec.20,1991);GeorgyS.OganovExecutiveProfile&Biography,Bloomberg(Mar.12,2019).

941Manafort9/11/18302,at7.

942TextMessage,Manafort&Kilimnik.

943TextMessage,Manafort&Kilimnik;Manafort9/12/18302,at5.

944TextMessage,Manafort&Kilimnik.

9451/15/17Email,Manafort,McFarland,&Flynn.

9461/15/17Email,Manafort,McFarland,&Flynn.

947Manafort9/11/18302,at7.

9481/15/17Email,Manafort,McFarland,&Flynn;McFarland12/22/17302,at18-19.

949GrandJury█████████████████████Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7;Manafort9/21/18302,at3;1/19/17&1/22/17KilimnikCBPRecords,Jan.19and22,2017;2016-17TextMessages,Kilimnik&Patten,at1-2.

950InvestigativeTechnique███

951Manafort9/11/18302,at6;GrandJury█████████████████████

952InvestigativeTechnique███

953GrandJury█████████████████████

954GrandJury█████████████████████.

955GrandJury█████████████████████.

9562/21/17Email,ZatynaikotoKilimnik.

957Manafort9/13/18302,at1.

958GrandJury█████████████████████InresolvingwhetherManafortbreachedhiscooperationpleaagreementbylyingtotheOffice,thedistrictcourtfoundthatManafortliedabout,amongother things,hiscontactswithKilimnik regarding thepeaceplan, including themeeting inMadrid.Manafort2/13/19Transcript,at29-31,40.

959Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov’t Opp. to Mot. to Modify, at 2; Superseding Indictment & ¶¶ 48-51,

UnitedStatesv.PaulJ.Manafort,Jr.,1:17-cr-201(D.D.C.June8,2018),Doc.318.

9602/12/18Email,FabriziotoManafort&Ward;2/16/18Email,FabriziotoManafort;2/19/18Email,FabriziotoWard;2/21/18Email,ManaforttoWard&Fabrizio.

9612/21/18Email,ManaforttoWard&Fabrizio(7:16:49a.m.)(attachment).

9623/9/18Email,WardtoManafort&Fabrizio(attachment).

963InvestigativeTechnique███

964Hicks12/8/17302,at3.

965Hicks12/8/17302,at3.

966Hicks12/8/17302,at3.

967NOSC00044381(11/9/16Email,KuznetsovtoHicks(5:27a.m.)).

968NOSC00044381-82(11/9/16Email,KuznetsovtoHicks(5:27a.m.)).

969NOSC00044382(11/9/16LetterfromPutintoPresident-ElectTrump(Nov.9,2016)(translation)).

970NOSC00044381(11/9/16Email,HickstoKushner(10:26a.m.)).

971StatementofJaredC.KushnertoCongressionalCommittees,at4(Jul.24,2017).

972NOSC00000058(11/9/16Email,Kushner toSimes(10:28a.m.));StatementofJaredKushner toCongressionalCommittees,at4(Jul.24,2017).

973NOSC00000058(11/9/16Email,KushnertoHicks(11:05:44a.m.)).

974Hicks12/8/17302,at3-4.

975 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-10; see Doug G.Ware,Trump, Russia’s Putin Talk about Syria, IcyRelationsinPhoneCall,UPI(Nov.14,2016).

976AvenprovidedinformationtotheOfficeinaninterviewandthroughanattorneyproffer,GrandJury█████████████████████

977Aven8/2/18302,at7.(IAEN)

978GrandJury█████████████████████

979Aven8/2/18302,at2-3.

980GrandJury█████████████████████andinterviewwiththeOffice,Avenreferredtothehigh-rankingRussiangovernmentofficialsusingnumbers(e.g.,Official1,Official2).AvenseparatelyconfirmedthroughanattorneyprofferthatOfficial1wasPutinandOfficial2wasPutin’schiefofstaff,Vaino.SeeAffidavitofRyanJunck(Aug.2,2018)(hardcopyonfile).

981AtthetimeofhisQ42016meetingwithPutin,AvenwasgenerallyawareofthepresscoverageaboutRussianinterferenceintheU.S.election.AccordingtoAven,hedidnotdiscussthattopicwithPutinatanypoint,andPutindidnotmentiontherationalebehindthethreatofnewsanctions.Aven8/2/18302,at5-7.

982GrandJury█████████████████████

983GrandJury█████████████████████

984GrandJury█████████████████████

985GrandJury█████████████████████

986GrandJury█████████████████████

987GrandJury█████████████████████Aven8/2/18302,at6.

988Aven8/2/18302,at4-8;GrandJury█████████████████████

989 Nader provided information to the Office in multiple interviews, all but one of which wereconductedunderaprofferagreement,GrandJury█████████████████████.Theinvestigators also interviewedPrince under a proffer agreement.Bannonwas interviewed by theOffice,GrandJury█████████████████████underaprofferagreement.

990 Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available athttps://rdif.ru/Eng_person_dmitriev_kirill/.SeealsoOverview,RussianDirect InvestmentFund,availableathttps://rdif.ru/Eng_About/.

991Gerson6/15/18302,at1.Seealso,e.g.,12/14/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoGerson;1/9/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoGerson.

992GrandJury█████████████████████

993 Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2; Nader 1/23/18 302, at 2-3; 5/3/16 Email, Nader to Phares;GrandJury█████████████████████

994Nader1/22/18302,at1-2.

995Nader1/22/18302,at3.

996Nader1/22/18302,at3;GrandJury█████████████████████

997Nader1/22/18302,at3;GrandJury█████████████████████

998GrandJury█████████████████████

999Nader1/22/18302,at3.

1000GrandJury█████████████████████

1001GrandJury█████████████████████

1002GrandJury█████████████████████

1003GrandJury█████████████████████

1004GrandJury█████████████████████

1005Prince4/4/18302,at1-5;Bannon2/14/18302,at21.

1006 Prince 4/4/18 302, at l, 3-4; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2;Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 19-20; 10/18/16Email,PrincetoBannon.

1007Flynn11/20/17302,at6;Flynn1/11/18302,at5;Flynn1/24/18302,at5-6;Flynn5/1/18302,at11;Prince4/4/18302,at5,8;Bannon2/14/18302,at20-21;11/12/16Email,PrincetoCorallo.

1008Prince4/4/18302,at5;Bannon2/14/18302,at21.

1009GrandJury█████████████████████

1010InvestigativeTechnique███Nader1/22/18302,at5-6;█████████████████████GrandJury█████████████████████

1011InvestigativeTechnique███

1012InvestigativeTechnique███

1013InvestigativeTechnique███

1014InvestigativeTechnique███

1015InvestigativeTechnique███

101611/9/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(9:34a.m.);Nader1/22/18302,at4.

101711/9/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(11:58p.m.).

1018Nader1/22/18302,at3.

101911/9/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(10:06a.m.);11/9/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(10:10a.m.);GrandJury█████████████████████

102011/9/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(10:08a.m.);11/9/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(3:40p.m.);Nader1/22/18302,at5.

102111/9/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(7:10p.m.).

102211/10/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(5:20a.m.).

1023Nader1/22/18302,at5-6.

1024Marinello5/31/18302,at2-3;Nader1/22/18302,at5-6.

1025WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at17-18(ResponsetoQuestionV,Part(a).

1026Nader1/22/18302,at6;GrandJury█████████████████████

1027Nader1/22/18302,at6;GrandJury█████████████████████

1028GrandJury█████████████████████

1029GrandJury█████████████████████

1030Nader1/22/18302,at6.

1031Nader1/22/18302,at5-7.

103212/8/16TextMessages,DmitrievtoNader(12:10:31a.m.);Nader1/22/18302,at11.

1033 12/8/16TextMessage,Dmitriev toNader (12:10:31 a.m.); 12/8/16TextMessage,Dmitriev toNader(12:10:57a.m.).

1034Prince4/4/18302,at8.

1035Prince5/3/18302,at3;GrandJury█████████████████████

1036GrandJury█████████████████████

1037GrandJury█████████████████████

1038GrandJury█████████████████████

1039GrandJury█████████████████████

10401/4/17TextMessage,Nader to Prince; 1/4/17TextMessages,Nader toDmitriev (5:24 a.m. –5:26a.m.);Nader1/22/18302,at8-9;GrandJury█████████████████████

10411/4/17TextMessages(IAEN),DmitrievtoNader(7:25-7:29a.m.).

10421/4/17TextMessages(IAEN),DmitrievtoNader(7:25-7:29a.m.)

10431/4/17TextMessages(IAEN),NadertoPrince.

10441/4/17TextMessages(IAEN),NadertoPrince;GrandJury█████████████████████

1045Prince5/3/18302,at1-3.

1046Prince5/3/18302,at2-3.

1047Cell-sitelocationdataforPrince’smobilephoneInvestigativeTechnique███

1048Prince5/3/18302,at3.

1049GrandJury█████████████████████

10501/5/17Email,KasbotoPrince.

10511/8/17TextMessages,NadertoDmitriev(6:05-6:10p.m.).

10521/8/17TextMessages,Nader&Dmitriev(6:10-7:27p.m.).

10531/9/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader.

1054GrandJury█████████████████████

10551/9/17TextMessage,NadertoDmitriev(2:12:56p.m.);Nader1/19/18302,at13;GrandJury█████████████████████

1056Nader1/19/18302,at13;GrandJury█████████████████████Prince5/3/18302,at3.

1057Bannon2/14/18302,at25-26.

1058 1/10/17 TextMessages, Dmitriev&Nader (2:05:54 – 3:30:25 p.m.); 1/11/17 TextMessages,Dmitriev&Nader(2:16:16–5:17:59p.m.).

10591/7/17Email,KasbotoPrince.

10601/11/17TextMessages,Nader&Dmitriev(5:18:24–5:37:14p.m.);GrandJury█████████████████████

1061Prince5/3/18,at4;GrandJury█████████████████████

1062GrandJury█████████████████████

1063GrandJury█████████████████████

1064Prince5/3/18302,at4.

1065GrandJury█████████████████████

1066GrandJury█████████████████████

1067GrandJury█████████████████████

1068GrandJury█████████████████████

1069Prince5/3/18302,at4-5.

1070GrandJury█████████████████████

1071Prince5/3/18302,at4;GrandJury█████████████████████

1072GrandJury█████████████████████

1073Prince4/4/18302,at10;Prince5/3/18302,at4;GrandJury█████████████████████

1074Nader1/22/18302,at14;GrandJury█████████████████████

1075GrandJury█████████████████████1/11/17TextMessages,Dmitriev&Nader(9:13:54–10:24:25p.m.).

1076GrandJury█████████████████████Prince,however,deniedthatandrecalledthathewasmakingtheseremarkstoDmitrievnotinanofficialcapacityforthetransitionbutbasedonhisexperienceasaformernavalofficer.Prince5/3/18302,at4.

1077GrandJury█████████████████████

1078Nader1/22/18302,at15;GrandJury█████████████████████

1079Nader1/22/18302,at9,15;GrandJury████████

1080Nader1/22/18302,at15.

1081GrandJury████████████Nader1/22/18302,at15.

1082CallRecordsofErikPrinceGrandJury████████.

1083Prince4/4/18302,at10;Prince5/3/18302,at4;GrandJury████████

10841/12/17TextMessages,PrincetoPreate.

10851/15/17TextMessage,PrincetoPreate.

1086Prince4/4/18302,at11;Prince5/3/18302,at5.

1087Prince4/4/18302,at11;Prince5/3/18302,at5.

1088Prince5/3/18302,at5;1/16/17ImageonPrincePhone(onfilewiththeOffice).

1089Prince5/3/18302,at5.

1090Prince5/3/18302,at5.

1091Prince5/3/18302,at5.

1092Bannon10/26/18302,at10-11.

1093Bannon10/26/18302,at10-11.

1094CallRecordsofErikPrinceGrandJury████████████.

1095Prince4/4/18302,at6.

1096Bannon10/26/18302,at11;Bannon2/14/18302,at36.

1097Bannon10/26/18302,at11.

1098Gerson6/5/18302,at1,3;11/26/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoGerson;1/25/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader.

1099Gerson6/5/18302,at1.

1100Gerson6/5/18302,at1-2;Kushner4/11/18302,at21.

1101Gerson6/5/18302,at3-4;see,e.g.,12/2/16TextMessages,Dmitriev&Gerson;12/14/16TextMessages,Dmitriev&Gerson;1/3/17TextMessage,GersontoDmitriev;12/2/16Email,TolokonnikovtoGerson.

1102Gerson6/5/18302,at3;12/14/16TextMessage,DmitrievtoGerson.

110312/14/16TextMessage,GersontoDmitriev.

110412/14/16TextMessage,GersontoDmitriev.

110512/14/16TextMessages,Dmitriev&Gerson;Gerson6/15/18302,at1.

110612/14/16TextMessages,Dmitriev&Gerson.

1107Gerson6/15/18302,at1.

11081/9/17TextMessages,DmitrievtoGerson;1/9/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader.

1109Gerson6/5/18302,at4.

11101/18/17TextMessages,Dmitriev&Gerson.

11111/16/17TextMessages;Dmitriev&Gerson.

1112Gerson6/5/18302,at3;Gerson6/15/18302,at2.

1113Gerson6/5/18302,at3.

1114Gerson6/5/18302,at3;Gerson6/15/18.302,at1-2;Kushner4/11/18302,at22.

1115Gerson6/5/18302,at3.

1116Kushner4/11/18302,at32.

11171/19/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(11:11:56a.m.).

11181/18/17TextMessage,GersontoDmitriev;Gerson6/15/18302,at2.

11191/26/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoGerson.

11201/26/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoGerson.

11211/26/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoGerson.

11221/26/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(10:04:41p.m.).

11231/28/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(11:05:39a.m.).

11241/28/17TextMessage,NadertoDmitriev(11:11:33a.m.).

11251/29/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoNader(11:06:35a.m.).

11261/28/17TextMessage,GersontoDmitriev;1/29/17TextMessage,DmitrievtoGerson.

1127Gerson6/15/18302,at4;3/21/17TextMessage,GersontoDmitriev.

1128StatementofJaredC.Kushner toCongressionalCommittees (“KushnerStmt.”),at6 (7/24/17)(writtenstatementbyKushnertotheSenateJudiciaryCommittee).

1129NOSC00004356(11/16/16Email,VargastoKushner(6:44p.m.)).

1130NOSC00004356(11/16/16Email,KushnertoVargas(9:54p.m.)).

113111/17/16Email,BrowntoSimes(10:41a.m.);Brown10/13/17302,at4;11/17/16Email,VargastoKushner(12:31:18).

1132Foresman10/17/18302,at17.

1133Foresman10/17/18302,at17-18.

1134Foresman10/17/18302,at18.

1135 RMF-SCO-00000015 (1/5/17 Email, Foresman to Atencio & Flaherty); RMF-SCO-00000015(1/5/17Email,FlahertytoForesman&Atencio).

1136 9/26/18Attorney Proffer fromCovington&Burling LLP (reflected in email on file with theOffice).

1137Vargas4/4/18302,at5.

1138Kushner11/1/17302,at4.

1139AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000016-019(11/29/16Email,VargastoKuznetsov).

1140Flynn1/11/18302,at2;NOS00004240(CalendarInvite,VargastoKushner&Flynn).

1141KushnerStmt.at6.

1142KushnerStmt.at6;Kushner4/11/18302,at18.

1143KushnerStmt.at7;Kushner4/11/18302,at18;Flynn1/11/18302,at2.

1144Kushner4/11/18302,at18.

1145Kushner4/11/18302,at18.

1146KushnerStmt.at7;NOSC00000123(12/6/16Email,VargastoKushner(12:11:40p.m.)).

1147Kushner4/11/18302,at19;NOSC00000130(12/12/16Email,KushnertoVargas(10:41p.m.)).

1148 Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; Kushner Stmt. at 7; DJTFP_SCO_01442290 (12/6/16 Email,BerkowitztoPP█████████

1149DJTFP_SCO_01442290(12/7/16Email,PP█████████toBerkowitz(12:31:39p.m.)).

1150 Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 7; AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_000001-04 (12/12/16 TextMessages,Berkowitz&202-701-8532).

1151Kushner4/11/18302,at19;NOSC00000130-135(12/12/16Email,KushnertoBerkowitz).

1152Kushner4/11/18302,at19;NOSC00000130-135(12/12/16Email,KushnertoBerkowitz).

1153 Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial Services and EnergySectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those Undermining Ukraine’sSovereignty,UnitedStatesDepartmentoftheTreasury(Jul.16,2014).

1154Kushner4/11/18302,at20.

1155Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19. Berkowitz, by contrast, stated to theOffice that he had googledGorkov’snameandtoldKushnerthatGorkovappearedtobeabanker.Berkowitz1/12/18302,at8.

1156Kushner4/11/18302,at19-20.

1157KushnerStmt.at8.

1158KushnerStmt.at8.

1159See,e.g.,PeterGrant,DonaldTrumpSon-in-LawJaredKushnerCouldFaceHisOwnConflict-of-InterestQuestions,WallStreetJournal(Nov.29,2016).

1160PatrickReevell&MatthewMosk,RussianBankerSergeyGorkovBrushesoffQuestionsAboutMeetingwithJaredKushner,ABCNews(June1,2017).

1161Foresman10/17/18302,at14-15

1162Foresman10/17/18302,at15-16.

1163AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000011(12/19/16TextMessage,IvanchenkotoBerkowitz(9:56a.m.)).

1164AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000011-15 (12/19/16 – 2/16/17TextMessages, Ivanchenko toBerkowitz).

1165AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000015(2/8/17TextMessage,IvanchenkotoBerkowitz(10:41a.m.)).

1166Berkowitz3/22/18302,at4-5.

1167Aven8/2/18302,at7;GrandJury█████████████████████

1168GrandJury█████████████████████

1169GrandJury█████████████████████Aven8/2/18302,at6.

1170GrandJury█████████████████████Aven8/2/18302,at6;Burt2/9/18302,at2.

1171Burt2/9/18302,at2;GrandJury█████████████████████

1172GrandJury█████████████████████

1173Burt2/9/18302,at4.

1174Burt2/9/18302,at5.

1175Burt2/9/18302,at3.

1176Burt2/9/18302,at3.

1177Burt2/9/18302,at3;Simes3/27/18302,at4.

1178Burt2/9/18302,at3;Simes3/27/18302,at4.

1179Simes3/27/18302,at5.

1180Simes3/27/18302,at5.

118112/22/16Email,BurttoAven(7:23p.m.).

1182Burt2/9/18302,at3.

1183Burt2/9/18302,at3-4.

118412/22/16Email,AventoBurt(4:58:22p.m.).

1185Aven8/2/18302,at7.

1186GrandJury█████████████████████

1187Burt2/9/18302,at3-4.

1188GrandJury█████████████████████

1189GrandJury█████████████████████Aven8/2/18302,at7.

1190GrandJury█████████████████████

1191GrandJury█████████████████████

1192Aven8/2/18302,at8.

1193Aven8/2/18302,at8;GrandJury█████████████████████

1194Aven8/2/18302,at8;GrandJury█████████████████████

1195Page3/10/17302,at4;Page3/16/17302,at3;GrandJury█████████████████████Amongothermeetings,PagecontactedAndreyBaranov,headofinvestorrelationsatRosneft,andtheydiscussedthesaleofRosneftandmeetingsBaranovhadattendedwithRosneftCEOIgorSechin.GrandJury█████████████████████

1196GrandJury█████████████████████

1197InvestigativeTechnique██████

1198Page3/16/17302,at3;Page3/30/17302,at8.

1199Weber7/28/17302,at4;Page3/16/17302,at3;GrandJury█████████████████████

1200Page3/16/17302,at3;GrandJury█████████████████████

1201Page3/16/17302,at3;GrandJury█████████████████████

1202GrandJury█████████████████████

1203GrandJury█████████████████████

1204GrandJury█████████████████████

1205GrandJury█████████████████████

1206GrandJury█████████████████████

1207 As discussed further inVolume I, SectionV.C.4, infra, Flynn pleaded guilty to making falsestatements to the FBI, in violation of 18U.S.C. § 1001, about these communications with AmbassadorKislyak.PleaAgreement,UnitedStatesv.MichaelT.Flynn,No.1:17-cr-232(D.D.C.Dec.1,2017),Doc.3.Flynn’spleaagreementrequiredthathecooperatewiththisOffice,andthestatementsfromFlynnin thisreportreflecthiscooperationoverthecourseofmultipledebriefingsin2017and2018.

1208 Karen DeYoung,How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution Condemning IsraeliSettlements,WashingtonPost(Dec.28,2016).

1209 Karen De Young,How the U.S. Came to Abstain on a U.N. Resolution Condemning IsraeliSettlements,WashingtonPost(Dec.28,2016).

1210MichelleNichols&LesleyWroughton,U.S.IntendedtoAllowPassageofU.N.DraftCriticalofIsrael,Reuters(Dec.21,2016).

1211Flynn11/16/17302,at12;Flynn11/17/17302,at2.

1212Flynn11/16/17302,at12-14;Flynn11/17/17302,at2.

1213 Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2;Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/22/16Email,KushnertoFlynn;12/22/16Email,McFarlandtoPersonalPrivacy███etal.

1214Flynn11/16/17302,at13;CallRecordsofMichaelT.FlynnGrandJury█████████████████████.

1215StatementofOffense¶3(d),UnitedStatesv.MichaelT.Flynn,No.1:17-cr-232(D.D.C.Dec.1,2017),Doc.4(“FlynnStatementofOffense”);Flynn11/16/17302,at12-13.

1216Flynn11/17/17302,at2;Flynn11/16/17302,at13.

1217UNVoteonIsraeliSettlementPostponed,“PotentiallyIndefinitely”,Reuters(Dec.22,2016).

1218 Somini Sengupta&RickGladstone,Rebuffing Israel, U.S. Allows CensureOver Settlements,NewYorkTimes(Dec.23,2016).

1219Flynn11/16/17302,at12-14;Kushner11/1/17302,at3;12/23/16Email,FlynntoKushneretal.

1220FlynnStatementofOffense¶3(g).

1221Israel’sSettlementsHaveNoLegalValidity,ConstituteFlagrantViolationofInternationalLaw,SecurityCouncilReaffirms,7853rdMeeting(PM),UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(Dec.23,2016).

1222 Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant

MaliciousCyber-EnabledActivities,TheWhiteHouse,OfficeofthePressSecretary(Dec.29,2016).

1223Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity andHarassment,TheWhiteHouse,OfficeofthePressSecretary(Dec.29,2016).

1224Flynn11/16/17302,at14;McFarland12/22/17302,at3-8;Bannon2/12/18302,at5.

1225Flynn11/17/17302,at5;Flynn1/19/18302,at1;McFarland11/22/17302,at3-9.

1226Flynn11/17/l7302,at3.

1227ChristineWang,UStoannouncenewsanctionsagainstRussiainresponsetoelectionhacking,CNBC(Dec.28,2016).

1228 John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: “Get on with our lives”,WashingtonPost(Dec.29,2016).

1229SF000006(12/28/16TextMessage,KislyaktoFlynn).

1230CallRecordsofMichaelT.FlynnGrandJury█████████████████████

1231Flynn11/17/17302,at2-3;McFarland12/22/17302,at4-5.

123212/29/16Email,McFarlandtoO’Brienetal.;12/29/16Email,McFarlandtoFlynnetal.

1233SF000001(12/29/16TextMessage,FlahertytoFlynn).

1234CallRecordsofK.T.McFarlandGrandJury█████████████████████.

1235McFarland12/22/17302,at5-6.

1236McFarland12/22/17302,at5-6.

1237McFarland12/22/17302,at6.

1238McFarland12/22/17302,at6.

1239SF000001(12/29/16TextMessage,FlynntoFlaherty).

1240SF000001(12/29/16TextMessage,FlynntoFlaherty).

1241Flynn11/20/17302,at3.

1242MichaelLedeen ismarried toBarbaraLedeen, theSenate stafferwhose2016efforts to locateHillaryClinton’smissingemailsaredescribedinVolumeI,SectionIII.D.2,supra.

1243Flynn11/17/17302,at3;CallRecordsofMichaelLedeenGrandJury█████████████████████.

1244Flynn11/17/17302,at3-4;FlynnStatementofOffense¶3(c);CallRecordsofK.T.McFarland

GrandJury█████████████████████;CallRecordsofMichaelT.FlynnGrandJury█████████████████████.

1245Flynn11/17/17302,at3-4

1246Flynn11/17/17302,at3-4;FlynnStatementofOffense¶3(c);McFarland12/22/17302,at6-7.

1247Flynn11/17/17302,at4;McFarland12/22/17302,at6-7.

1248FlynnStatementofOffense¶3(d).

1249 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense ¶ 3(c); 12/30/16 Email, Flynn toMcFarland.

1250Flynn11/17/17302,at1;FlynnStatementofOffense¶3(d).

125112/29/16Email,McFarlandtoFlynnetal.

125212/29/16Email,WesterhouttoFlaherty;McFarland12/22/17302,at7.

1253McFarland12/22/17302,at7.

1254McFarland12/22/17302,at7.

1255McFarland12/22/17302,at7.

1256McFarland12/22/17302,at7.

1257McFarland12/22/17302,at7.

1258McFarland12/22/17302,at7.

1259Flynn11/17/17302,at4;FlynnStatementofOffense¶3(e).

1260McFarland12/22/17302,at8.

1261McFarland12/22/17302,at8.

1262 Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion ofRussiandiplomats,Moscow,December20,2016,TheMinistryofForeignAffairsoftheRussianFederation(Dec.30,2016(5:32a.m.)).

1263StatementofthePresidentoftheRussianFederation,Kremlin,OfficeofthePresident(Dec.30,2016(7:15a.m.)).

1264@realDonaldTrump12/30/16(11:41a.m.)Tweet.

126512/30/16Email,FlynntoMcFarland;12/30/16Email,McFarlandtoKushneretal.

126612/30/16Email,McFarlandtoKushneretal.

1267Flynn11/17/17302,at4.

1268CallRecordsofMichaelT.FlynnGrandJury█████████████████████;Flynn11/17/17302,atl;Flynn1/19/17302,at3;FlynnStatementofOffense¶3(g).

1269CallRecordsofMichaelT.FlynnGrandJury█████████████████████;Flynn11/17/17302,at5;Flynn1/19/17302,at3;McFarland12/22/17302,at10.

1270McFarland12/22/17302,at10.

1271McFarland12/22/17302,at10.

1272McFarland12/22/17302,at10.

1273Flynn11/17/17302,at5-6.

1274Flynn11/21/17302,at1;Flynn11/20/17302,at3;Flynn1/19/17302,at5;FlynnStatementofOffense¶3(h).

1275Bannon2/12/18302,at9.

V.PROSECUTIONANDDECLINATIONDECISIONS

The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel’s Office “toprosecutefederalcrimesarisingfrom[its]investigation”ofthemattersassignedtoit.Indecidingwhethertoexercisethisprosecutorialauthority,theOfficehasbeen guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution set forth in the Justice(formerly U.S. Attorney’s) Manual. In particular, the Office has evaluatedwhether theconductof theindividualsconsideredforprosecutionconstitutedafederaloffenseandwhetheradmissibleevidencewouldprobablybesufficienttoobtainandsustainaconvictionforsuchanoffense.JusticeManual§9-27.220(2018). Where the answer to those questions was yes, the Office furtherconsideredwhethertheprosecutionwouldserveasubstantialfederalinterest,theindividuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, andthereexistedanadequatenon-criminalalternativetoprosecution.Id.

As explained below, those considerations led the Office to seek chargesagainst two sets ofRussian nationals for their roles in perpetrating the active-measures socialmedia campaign and computer-intrusion operations.Harm toOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████TheOfficesimilarlydeterminedthat the contacts between Campaign officials and Russia-linked individualseither did not involve the commission of a federal crime or, in the case ofcampaign-finance offenses, that our evidencewas not sufficient to obtain andsustain a criminal conviction.At the same time, theOffice concluded that thePrinciples of Federal Prosecution supported charging certain individualsconnected to the Campaign with making false statements or otherwiseobstructingthisinvestigationorparallelcongressionalinvestigations.

A.Russian“ActiveMeasures”SocialMediaCampaign

On February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbiareturnedanindictmentcharging13RussiannationalsandthreeRussianentities—includingtheInternetResearchAgency(IRA)andConcordManagementandConsulting LLC (Concord)—with violating U.S. criminal laws in order tointerferewithU.S.electionsandpoliticalprocesses.1276Theindictmentcharges

allofthedefendantswithconspiracytodefraudtheUnitedStates(CountOne),threedefendantswith conspiracy to commitwire fraudandbank fraud (CountTwo),andfivedefendantswithaggravatedidentitytheft(CountsThreethroughEight). Internet Research Agency Indictment. Concord, which is one of theentities charged in the Count One conspiracy, entered an appearance throughU.S.counselandmovedtodismissthechargeonmultiplegrounds.InordersandmemorandumopinionsissuedonAugust13andNovember15,2018,thedistrictcourt denied Concord’s motions to dismiss. United States v. ConcordManagement & Consulting LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018).UnitedStatesv.ConcordManagement&ConsultingLLC,317F.Supp.3d598(D.D.C.2018).Asofthiswriting,theprosecutionofConcordremainsongoingbeforetheU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofColumbia.Theotherdefendantsremainatlarge.

Althoughmembersof the IRAhadcontactwith individuals affiliatedwiththe Trump Campaign, the indictment does not charge any Trump Campaignofficial or any other U.S. person with participating in the conspiracy. That isbecause the investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. person whocoordinatedor communicatedwith the IRAknew that heor shewas speakingwithRussiannationalsengagedinthecriminalconspiracy.TheOfficethereforedetermined that such persons did not have the knowledge or criminal purposerequired to charge them in the conspiracy todefraud theUnitedStates (CountOne) or in the separate count alleging a wire- and bank-fraud conspiracyinvolvingtheIRAandtwoindividualRussiannationals(CountTwo).

TheOfficedid,however,chargeoneU.S.nationalforhisroleinsupplyingfalseorstolenbankaccountnumbersthatallowedtheIRAconspiratorstoaccessU.S.onlinepaymentsystemsbycircumventingthosesystems’securityfeatures.OnFebruary12,2018,RichardPinedopleadedguilty,pursuanttoasingle-countinformation,toidentityfraud,inviolationof18U.S.C.§1028(a)(7)and(b)(1)(D).PleaAgreement,UnitedStatesv.RichardPinedo,No.1:18-cr-24(D.D.C.Feb. 12, 2018), Doc. 10. The investigation did not establish that Pinedo wasawareoftheidentityoftheIRAmemberswhopurchasedbankaccountnumbersfrom him. Pinedo’s sales of account numbers enabled the IRA members toanonymously access a financial network through which they transacted withU.S. persons and companies. See Gov’t Sent. Mem. at 3, United States v.RichardPinedo,No.1:18-cr-24 (D.D.C.Sept.26,2018),Doc.24.OnOctober10,2018,Pinedowassentencedtosixmonthsofimprisonment,tobefollowedbysixmonthsofhomeconfinement,andwasorderedtocomplete100hoursof

communityservice.

B.RussianHackingandDumpingOperations

1.Section1030Computer-IntrusionConspiracy

a.Background

OnJuly13,2018,afederalgrandjuryintheDistrictofColumbiareturnedanindictmentchargingRussianmilitaryintelligenceofficersfromtheGRUwithconspiringtohackintovariousU.S.computersusedbytheClintonCampaign,DNC,DCCC,andotherU.S.persons,inviolationof18U.S.C.§§1030and371(Count One); committing identity theft and conspiring to commit moneylaunderinginfurtheranceofthathackingconspiracy,inviolationof18U.S.C.§§1028A and 1956(h) (Counts Two through Ten); and a separate conspiracy tohack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities responsible for theadministrationofthe2016U.S.election,inviolationof18U.S.C.§§1030and371 (Count Eleven). Netyksho Indictment.1277 As of this writing, all 12defendantsremainatlarge.

TheNetyksho indictment alleges that the defendants conspired with oneanotherandwithotherstohackintothecomputersofU.S.personsandentitiesinvolved in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, steal documents from thosecomputers,andstagereleasesofthestolendocumentstointerfereintheelection.Netyksho Indictment ¶ 2. The indictment also describes how, in staging thereleases,thedefendantsusedtheGuccifer2.0personatodisseminatedocumentsthroughWikiLeaks.OnJuly22,2016,WikiLeaks releasedover20,000emailsand other documents that the hacking conspirators had stolen from theDNC.Netyksho Indictment ¶ 48. In addition, onOctober 7, 2016,WikiLeaks beganreleasing emails that some conspirators had stolen from Clinton Campaignchairman John Podesta after a successful spearphishing operation. NetykshoIndictment¶49.

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████GrandJury█████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████

█████████████████████████████████████████

b.ChargingDecisionAstoHarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████1278HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████1279HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████Harm toOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

2.PotentialSection1030ViolationByPP█████████

PersonalPrivacy████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

PersonalPrivacy████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████SeeUnitedStatesv.Willis,476F.3d1121,1125n.1(10thCir.2007)(explainingthatthe1986amendmentstoSection1030reflectCongress’sdesiretoreach“‘intentionalactsofunauthorizedaccess—ratherthanmistaken,inadvertentorcarelessones’”)(quotingS.Rep.99-432,at5(1986)).Inaddition,thecomputerPersonalPrivacy███████████ likely qualifies as a “protected” one under the statute, which reaches“effectivelyallcomputerswithInternetaccess.”UnitedStatesv.Nosal,676F.3d854,859(9thCir.2012)(enbanc).PersonalPrivacy████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, however, the Officedeterminedthatprosecutionofthispotentialviolationwasnotwarranted.ThosePrinciples instruct prosecutors to consider, among other things, the nature andseriousness of the offense, the person’s culpability in connection with theoffense,andtheprobablesentencetobeimposediftheprosecutionissuccessful.JusticeManual§9-27.230.PersonalPrivacy█████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████PersonalPrivacy████████████████████████████████████████████████

C.RussianGovernmentOutreachandContacts

As explained in Section IV above, the Office’s investigation uncoveredevidenceof numerous links (i.e., contacts) betweenTrumpCampaign officialsandindividualshavingorclaimingtohavetiestotheRussiangovernment.TheOffice evaluated the contacts under several sets of federal laws, includingconspiracylawsandstatutesgoverningforeignagentswhooperateintheUnitedStates. After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursuechargesunder thesestatutesagainstanyof theindividualsdiscussedinSectionIV above—with the exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort andRichardGatesbasedontheiractivitiesonbehalfofUkraine.

OneoftheinteractionsbetweentheTrumpCampaignandRussian-affiliatedindividuals—theJune9,2016meetingbetweenhigh-rankingcampaignofficialsandRussianspromisingderogatory informationonHillaryClinton—implicatesan additional body of law: campaign-finance statutes. Schemes involving thesolicitationorreceiptofassistancefromforeignsourcesraisedifficultstatutoryand constitutional questions. As explained below, the Office evaluated thosequestionsinconnectionwiththeJune9meetingHarmtoOngoingMatter████████████ . The Office ultimately concluded that, even if theprincipal legal questions were resolved favorably to the government, aprosecution would encounter difficulties proving that Campaign officials orindividualsconnectedtotheCampaignwillfullyviolatedthelaw.

Finally,although theevidenceofcontactsbetweenCampaignofficialsand

Russia-affiliatedindividualsmaynothavebeensufficienttoestablishorsustaincriminal charges, severalU.S. persons connected to theCampaignmade falsestatements about those contacts and took other steps to obstruct the Office’sinvestigationandthoseofCongress.ThisOfficehasthereforechargedsomeofthoseindividualswithmakingfalsestatementsandobstructingjustice.

1.PotentialCoordination:ConspiracyandCollusion

Asan initialmatter, thisOfficeevaluatedpotentiallycriminalconduct thatinvolved the collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of“collusion,” but through the lens of conspiracy law. In so doing, the Officerecognized that theword“collud[e]”appears in theActingAttorneyGeneral’sAugust 2, 2017 memorandum; it has frequently been invoked in publicreporting;anditissometimesreferencedinantitrustlaw,see,e.g.,BrookeGroupv.Brown&WilliamsonTobaccoCorp.,509U.S.209,227(1993).ButcollusionisnotaspecificoffenseortheoryofliabilityfoundintheU.S.Code;norisitaterm of art in federal criminal law. To the contrary, even as defined in legaldictionaries,collusionislargelysynonymouswithconspiracyasthatcrimeissetforthinthegeneralfederalconspiracystatute,18U.S.C.§371.SeeBlack’sLawDictionary321(10thed.2014)(collusionis“[a]nagreementtodefraudanotheror to do or obtain something forbidden by law”); 1AlexanderBurrill,A LawDictionary and Glossary 311 (1871) (“An agreement between two or morepersons to defraud another by the forms of law, or to employ such forms asmeans of accomplishing some unlawful object.”); 1Bouvier’s LawDictionary352(1897)(“Anagreementbetweentwoormorepersonstodefraudapersonofhisrightsbytheformsoflaw,ortoobtainanobjectforbiddenbylaw.”).

Forthatreason,thisOffice’sfocusinresolvingthequestionofjointcriminalliability was on conspiracy as defined in federal law, not the commonlydiscussedterm“collusion.”TheOfficeconsideredinparticularwhethercontactsbetweenTrumpCampaignofficialsandRussia-linked individualscould triggerliability for the crimeof conspiracy—eitherunder statutes thathave theirownconspiracy language (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1951(a)), or under the generalconspiracystatute(18U.S.C.§371).TheinvestigationdidnotestablishthatthecontactsdescribedinVolumeI,SectionIV,supra,amountedtoanagreementtocommit any substantive violation of federal criminal law—including foreign-influenceandcampaign-financelaws,bothofwhicharediscussedfurtherbelow.TheOffice therefore did not charge any individual associatedwith theTrumpCampaign with conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia

contacts,eitherunderaspecificstatuteorunderSection371’soffensesclause.

The Office also did not charge any campaign official or associate with aconspiracy under Section 371’s defraud clause. That clause criminalizesparticipating in an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the U.S.governmentoritsagenciesthroughdeceitfulordishonestmeans.SeeDennisv.UnitedStates,384U.S.855,861(1966);Hammerschmidtv.UnitedStates,265U.S. 182, 188 (1924); see alsoUnited States v.ConcordMgmt.&ConsultingLLC,347F.Supp.3d38,46(D.D.C.2018).Theinvestigationdidnotestablishany agreement among Campaign officials—or between such officials andRussia-linked individuals—to interferewith or obstruct a lawful function of agovernmentagencyduringthecampaignortransitionperiod.And,asdiscussedinVolumeI,SectionV.A,supra,theinvestigationdidnotidentifyevidencethatanyCampaignofficial or associateknowingly and intentionallyparticipated intheconspiracy todefraud that theOfficecharged,namely, theactive-measuresconspiracydescribedinVolumeI,SectionII,supra.Accordingly,theOfficedidnot charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with conspiracy todefraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described inSectionIVabove.

2.PotentialCoordination:ForeignAgentStatutes(FARAand18U.S.C.§951)

The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliatedindividualsunderfederalstatutesregulatingactionsonbehalfof,orworkdonefor,aforeigngovernment.

a.GoverningLaw

Under18U.S.C.§951,itisgenerallyillegaltoactintheUnitedStatesasanagentofaforeigngovernmentwithoutprovidingnoticetotheAttorneyGeneral.Althoughthedefendantmustactonbehalfofaforeigngovernment(asopposedto other kinds of foreign entities), the acts need not involve espionage; rather,actsofanytypesufficeforliability.SeeUnitedStatesv.Duran,596F.3d1283,1293-94(11thCir.2010);UnitedStatesv.Latchin,554F.3d709,715(7thCir.2009);UnitedStatesv.Dumeisi,424F.3d566,581(7thCir.2005).An“agentofaforeigngovernment”isan“individual”who“agreestooperate”intheUnitedStates“subjecttothedirectionorcontrolofaforeigngovernmentorofficial.”18

U.S.C.§951(d).

ThecrimedefinedbySection951iscompleteuponknowinglyactingintheUnitedStatesasanunregisteredforeign-governmentagent.18U.S.C.§951(a).The statute does not require willfulness, and knowledge of the notificationrequirementisnotanelementoftheoffense.UnitedStatesv.Campa,529F.3d980,998-99(11thCir.2008);Duran,596F.3dat1291-94;Dumeisi,424F.3dat581.

TheForeignAgentsRegistrationAct (FARA)generallymakes it illegal toact as an agentof a foreignprincipalby engaging in certain (largelypolitical)activitiesintheUnitedStateswithoutregisteringwiththeAttorneyGeneral.22U.S.C. §§ 611-621.The triggering agency relationshipmust bewith a foreignprincipal or “a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectlysupervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in majorpart by a foreign principal.” 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1). That includes a foreigngovernment or political party and various foreign individuals and entities. 22U.S.C. § 611(b). A covered relationship exists if a person “acts as an agent,representative, employee, or servant” or “in any other capacity at the order,request, or under the [foreign principal’s] direction or control.” 22 U.S.C. §611(c)(1).Itissufficientiftheperson“agrees,consents,assumesorpurportstoact as, or who is or holds himself out to be, whether or not pursuant tocontractualrelationship,anagentofaforeignprincipal.”22U.S.C.§611(c)(2).

The triggering activity is that the agent “directly or through any otherperson” in the United States (1) engages in “political activities for or in theinterestsof[the]foreignprincipal,”whichincludesattemptstoinfluencefederalofficials or the public; (2) acts as “public relations counsel, publicity agent,information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests ofsuch foreign principal”; (3) “solicits, collects, disburses, or dispensescontributions,loans,money,orotherthingsofvaluefororintheinterestofsuchforeign principal”; or (4) “represents the interests of such foreign principal”beforeanyfederalagencyorofficial.22U.S.C.§611(c)(1).

Itisacrimetoengageina“[w]illfulviolationofanyprovisionoftheActoranyregulationthereunder.”22U.S.C.§618(a)(1).Itisalsoacrimewillfullytomake false statements or omissions of material facts in FARA registrationstatements or supplements. 22 U.S.C. § 618(a)(2). Most violations have amaximumpenaltyoffiveyearsofimprisonmentanda$10,000fine.22U.S.C.§

618.

b.Application

The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that PaulManafort’s andRichard Gates’s pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violatedFARA.Manafort and Gates were charged for that conduct and admitted to itwhentheypleadedguiltytosupersedingcriminalinformationsintheDistrictofColumbia prosecution.1280 The evidence underlying those charges is notaddressedinthisreportbecauseitwasdiscussedinpubliccourtdocumentsandin a separate prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting AttorneyGeneralbeforetheoriginalindictmentinthatcase.

In addition, the investigation produced evidence of FARA violationsinvolving Michael Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned acountryotherthanRussia(i.e.,Turkey)andwereresolvedwhenFlynnadmittedtotheunderlyingfactsintheStatementofOffensethataccompaniedhisguiltypleatoafalse-statementscharge.StatementofOffense,UnitedStatesv.MichaelT.Flynn,No.1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C.Dec.1,2017),Doc.4 (“FlynnStatementofOffense”).1281

Theinvestigationdidnot,however,yieldevidencesufficienttosustainanychargethatanyindividualaffiliatedwiththeTrumpCampaignactedasanagentofaforeignprincipalwithinthemeaningofFARAor,intermsofSection951,subject to thedirectionorcontrolof thegovernmentofRussia,oranyofficialthereof.Inparticular, theOfficedidnotfindevidencelikelytoprovebeyondareasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, GeorgePapadopoulos,andCarterPageactedasagentsof theRussiangovernment—orat its direction control, or request—during the relevant time period.1282PersonalPrivacy████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████Asaresult,theOfficedidnotchargePP███████████████anyotherTrumpCampaignofficialwithviolatingFARAorSection951,orattemptingorconspiringtodoso,basedoncontactswiththeRussiangovernmentoraRussianprincipal.

Finally,theOfficeinvestigatedwhetheroneoftheabovecampaignadvisors

—GeorgePapadopoulos—actedasanagentof,oratthedirectionandcontrolof,the government of Israel. While the investigation revealed significant tiesbetweenPapadopoulosandIsrael(andsearchwarrantswereobtainedinpartonthatbasis),theOfficeultimatelydeterminedthattheevidencewasnotsufficienttoobtainandsustainaconvictionunderFARAorSection951.

3.CampaignFinance

Several areas of the Office’s investigation involved efforts or offers byforeignnationalstoprovidenegativeinformationaboutcandidateClintontotheTrump Campaign or to distribute that information to the public, to theanticipatedbenefitoftheCampaign.Asexplainedbelow,theOfficeconsideredwhether twoof thoseefforts inparticular—theJune9,2016meetingatTrumpTowerHarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████ █ █ █—constituted prosecutable violations of the campaign-finance laws.The Office determined that the evidence was not sufficient to charge eitherincidentasacriminalviolation.

a.OverviewOfGoverningLaw

“[T]he United States has a compelling interest . . . in limiting theparticipationofforeigncitizensinactivitiesofdemocraticself-government,andintherebypreventingforeigninfluenceovertheU.S.politicalprocess.”Blumanv.FEC,800F.Supp.2d281,288(D.D.C.2011)(Kavanaugh,J.,forthree-judgecourt),aff’d,565U.S.1104(2012).To thatend, federalcampaign-finance lawbroadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions, donations,expenditures, orotherdisbursements in connectionwith federal, state, or localcandidateelections,andprohibitsanyonefromsoliciting,accepting,orreceivingsuch contributions or donations. As relevant here, foreign nationals may notmake—andnoonemay“solicit,accept,orreceive”fromthem—“acontributionordonationofmoneyorotherthingofvalue”or“anexpressorimpliedpromisetomakeacontributionordonation,inconnectionwithaFederal,State,orlocalelection.” 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).1283 The term “contribution,”which is used throughout the campaign-finance law, “includes” “any gift,subscription, loan,advance,ordepositofmoneyoranythingofvaluemadebyany person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” 52U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, “the value of

[volunteer]services.”52U.S.C.§30101(8)(B)(i).

Foreignnationalsarealsobarredfrommaking“anexpenditure,independentexpenditure,ordisbursementforanelectioneeringcommunication.”52U.S.C.§30121(a)(1)(C). The term “expenditure” “includes” “any purchase, payment,distribution,loan,advance,deposit,orgiftofmoneyoranythingofvalue,madebyanypersonforthepurposeofinfluencinganyelectionforFederaloffice.”52U.S.C.§30101(9)(A)(i).Itexcludes,amongotherthings,newsstoriesandnon-partisan get-out-the-vote activities. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(B)(i)-(ii). An“independentexpenditure”isanexpenditure“expresslyadvocatingtheelectionor defeat of a clearly identified candidate” and made independently of thecampaign. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17). An “electioneering communication” is abroadcast communication that “refers to a clearly identified candidate forFederal office” and is made within specified time periods and targeted at therelevantelectorate.52U.S.C.§30104(f)(3).

The statute defines “foreign national” by reference to FARA and theImmigration and Nationality Act, with minor modification. 52 U.S.C. §30121(b) (cross-referencing 22U.S.C. § 611(b)(1)-(3) and 8U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20), (22)). That definition yields five, sometimes-overlapping categories offoreignnationals,which include all of the individuals and entities relevant forpresentpurposes—namely,foreigngovernmentsandpoliticalparties,individualsoutsideoftheU.S.whoarenotlegalpermanentresidents,andcertainnon-U.S.entitieslocatedoutsideoftheU.S.

A“knowing[]andwillful[]”violationinvolvinganaggregateof$25,000ormoreinacalendaryearisafelony.52U.S.C.§30109(d)(1)(A)(i);seeBluman,800F.Supp.2dat292(notingthatawillfulviolationwillrequiresome“proofofthe defendant’s knowledge of the law”);United States v. Danielczyk, 917 F.Supp.2d573,577 (E.D.Va.2013) (applyingwillfulness standarddrawn fromBryanv.UnitedStates,524U.S.184,191-92(1998));seealsoWagnerv.FEC,793 F.3d 1, 19 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (same). A “knowing[] andwillful[]”violationinvolvinganaggregateof$2,000ormoreinacalendaryear,butlessthan$25,000,isamisdemeanor.52U.S.C.§30109(d)(1)(A)(ii).

b.ApplicationtoJune9TrumpTowerMeeting

The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials withcrimes in connectionwith the June 9meeting described inVolume I, Section

IV.A.5, supra. The Office concluded that, in light of the government’ssubstantial burden of proof on issues of intent (“knowing” and “willful”), andthe difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information, criminalcharges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that “the admissibleevidencewillprobablybesufficienttoobtainandsustainaconviction.”JusticeManual§9-27.220.

Inbrief, thekeyfactsarethat,onJune3,2016,RobertGoldstoneemailedDonaldTrumpJr.,topassalongfromEminandArasAgalarovan“offer”fromRussia’s “Crownprosecutor” to “theTrump campaign”of “official documentsandinformationthatwouldincriminateHillaryandherdealingswithRussiaandwouldbeveryusefulto[TrumpJr.’s]father.”Theemaildescribedthisas“veryhighlevelandsensitiveinformation”thatis“partofRussiaanditsgovernment’ssupporttoMr.Trump-helpedalongbyArasandEmin.”TrumpJr.responded:“ifit’swhatyousayI loveitespeciallylaterinthesummer.”TrumpJr.andEminAgalarov had follow-up conversations and, within days, scheduled a meetingwith Russian representatives that was attended by Trump Jr., Manafort, andKushner. The communications setting up the meeting and the attendance byhigh-level Campaign representatives support an inference that the Campaignanticipated receiving derogatory documents and information from officialRussiansourcesthatcouldassistcandidateTrump’selectoralprospects.

This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban oncontributions and donations by foreign nationals, 52U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A).Specifically, Goldstone passed along an offer purportedly from a Russiangovernment official to provide “official documents and information” to theTrump Campaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election.TrumpJr.appearstohaveacceptedthatofferandtohavearrangedameetingtoreceive those materials. Documentary evidence in the form of email chainssupports the inference thatKushner andManafortwere aware of that purposeandattendedtheJune9meetinganticipatingthereceiptofhelpfulinformationtotheCampaignfromRussiansources.

TheOfficeconsideredwhetherthisevidencewouldestablishaconspiracytoviolate the foreign contributions ban, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; thesolicitationofanillegalforeign-sourcecontribution;ortheacceptanceorreceiptof“anexpressorimpliedpromisetomakea[foreign-source]contribution,”bothin violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). There are reasonablearguments that the offered information would constitute a “thing of value”

within the meaning of these provisions, but the Office determined that thegovernmentwouldnotbelikelytoobtainandsustainaconvictionfortwootherreasons: first, theOffice didnot obtain admissible evidence likely tomeet thegovernment’sburdentoprovebeyondareasonabledoubtthattheseindividualsacted“willfully,”i.e.,withgeneralknowledgeoftheillegalityoftheirconduct;and,second,thegovernmentwouldlikelyencounterdifficultyinprovingbeyonda reasonable doubt that the value of the promised information exceeded thethresholdforacriminalviolation,see52U.S.C.§30109(d)(1)(A)(i).

i.Thing-of-ValueElement

Athresholdlegalquestioniswhetherprovidingtoacampaign“documentsand information” of the type involved here would constitute a prohibitedcampaign contribution. The foreign contribution ban is not limited tocontributions of money. It expressly prohibits “a contribution or donation ofmoneyorother thing of value.” 52U.S.C. § 30121(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (emphasisadded).Andtheterm“contribution”isdefinedthroughoutthecampaign-financelawsto“include[]”“anygift,subscription,loan,advance,ordepositofmoneyoranythingofvalue.”52U.S.C.§30101(8)(A)(i)(emphasisadded).

The phrases “thing of value” and “anything of value” are broad andinclusive enough to encompass at least some forms of valuable information.ThroughouttheUnitedStatesCode,thesephrasesserveas“term[s]ofart”thatareconstrued“broad[ly].”UnitedStatesv.Nilsen,967F.2d539,542(11thCir.1992)(percuriam)(“thingofvalue”includes“bothtangiblesandintangibles”);see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(1), 666(a)(2) (bribery statutes); id. § 641(theft of government property). For example, the term “thing of value”encompasses law enforcement reports that would reveal the identity ofinformants,UnitedStates v.Girard, 601F.2d 69, 71 (2dCir. 1979); classifiedmaterials, United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306, 310 (4th Cir. 1991);confidential information about a competitive bid,United States v.Matzkin, 14F.3d1014,1020(4thCir.1994);secretgrandjuryinformation,UnitedStatesv.Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 680 (6th Cir. 1985); and information about a witness’swhereabouts,United States v. Sheker, 618 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1980) (percuriam). And in the public corruption context, “‘thing of value’ is definedbroadly to include the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to theitems received.” United States v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731, 744 (9th Cir. 2014)

(internalquotationmarksomitted).

Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations recognize the value to acampaignofatleastsomeformsofinformation,statingthattheterm“anythingofvalue”includes“theprovisionofanygoodsorserviceswithoutcharge,”suchas “membership lists” and “mailing lists.” 11C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(1).TheFEChas concluded that the phrase includes a state-by-state list of activists. SeeCitizensforResponsibilityandEthicsinWashingtonv.FEC,475F.3d337,338(D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the FEC’s findings). Likewise, polling dataprovided to a campaign constitutes a “contribution.” FEC Advisory Opinion1990-12 (Strub), 1990WL 153454 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 106.4(b)). And in thespecific context of the foreign-contributions ban, the FEC has concluded that“election materials used in previous Canadian campaigns,” including “flyers,advertisements, door hangers, tri-folds, signs, and other printed material,”constitute“anythingofvalue,”eventhough“thevalueofthesematerialsmaybenominal or difficult to ascertain.” FEC Advisory Opinion 2007-22 (Hurysz),2007WL5172375,at*5.

Theseauthoritieswouldsupport theview thatcandidate-relatedoppositionresearch given to a campaign for the purpose of influencing an election couldconstitute a contribution to which the foreign-source ban could apply. Acampaign can be assisted not only by the provision of funds, but also by theprovision of derogatory information about an opponent. Political campaignsfrequently conduct and pay for opposition research. A foreign entity thatengaged in such research and provided resulting information to a campaigncouldexertagreatereffectonanelection,andagreater tendency to ingratiatethedonortothecandidate,thanagiftofmoneyortangiblethingsofvalue.Atthe same time, no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision ofuncompensated opposition research or similar information as a thing of valuethat could amount to a contribution under campaign-finance law. Such aninterpretation could have implications beyond the foreign-source ban, see 52U.S.C. § 30116(a) (imposingmonetary limits on campaign contributions), andraiseFirstAmendmentquestions.Thosequestionscouldbeespeciallydifficultwheretheinformationconsistedsimplyoftherecountingofhistoricallyaccuratefacts.Itisuncertainhowcourtswouldresolvethoseissues.

ii.Willfulness

Even assuming that the promised “documents and information thatwouldincriminateHillary”constitute a “thingofvalue”under campaign-finance law,the government would encounter other challenges in seeking to obtain andsustain a conviction. Most significantly, the government has not obtainedadmissibleevidencethatislikelytoestablishthescienterrequirementbeyondareasonabledoubt.Toprovethatadefendantacted“knowinglyandwillfully,”thegovernmentwouldhavetoshowthatthedefendanthadgeneralknowledgethathis conductwasunlawful.U.S.Department of Justice,FederalProsecutionofElectionOffenses 123 (8th ed.Dec. 2017) (“ElectionOffenses”); see Bluman,800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (noting that a willful violation requires “proof of thedefendant’s knowledge of the law”); Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 577(“knowledge of general unlawfulness”). “This standard creates an elevatedscienter element requiring, at the very least, that application of the law to thefacts in question be fairly clear. When there is substantial doubt concerningwhetherthelawappliestothefactsofaparticularmatter, theoffenderismorelikelytohaveanintentdefense.”ElectionOffenses123.

Onthefactshere,thegovernmentwouldunlikelybeabletoprovebeyondareasonable doubt that the June 9 meeting participants had general knowledgethat their conductwasunlawful.The investigationhasnotdevelopedevidencethat theparticipants in themeetingwere familiarwith the foreign-contributionban or the application of federal law to the relevant factual context. Thegovernmentdoesnothavestrongevidenceofsurreptitiousbehaviororeffortsatconcealment at the time of the June 9 meeting. While the government hasevidenceoflatereffortstopreventdisclosureofthenatureoftheJune9meetingthatcouldcircumstantiallyprovidesupportforashowingofscienter,seeVolumeII,SectionII.G,infra,thatconcealmentoccurredmorethanayearlater,involvedindividualswhodidnotattendtheJune9meeting,andmayreflectanintentionto avoid political consequences rather than any prior knowledge of illegality.Additionally, in light of the unresolved legal questions about whether giving“documents and information” of the sort offered here constitutes a campaigncontribution,TrumpJr.couldmountafactualdefensethathedidnotbelievehisresponse to theoffer and the June9meeting itselfviolated the law.Givenhisless direct involvement in arranging the June 9meeting,Kushner could likelymount a similar defense. And, while Manafort is experienced with politicalcampaigns,theOfficehasnotdevelopedevidenceshowingthathehadrelevantknowledgeoftheselegalissues.

iii.DifficultiesinValuingPromisedInformation

The Office would also encounter difficulty proving beyond a reasonabledoubt that the value of the promised documents and information exceeds the$2,000 threshold for a criminal violation, aswell as the$25,000 threshold forfelony punishment. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1). The type of evidencecommonlyused to establish thevalueofnon-monetarycontributions—suchaspricing the contribution on a commercialmarket or determining the upstreamacquisition cost or the cost of distribution—would likely be unavailable orineffective in this factual setting. Although damaging opposition research issurely valuable to a campaign, it appears that the information ultimatelydeliveredinthemeetingwasnotvaluable.Andwhilevalueinaconspiracymaywellbemeasuredbywhattheparticipantsexpectedtoreceiveatthetimeoftheagreement, see, e.g., United States v. Tombrello, 666 F.2d 485, 489 (11thCir.1982),Goldstone’s description of the offeredmaterial herewas quite general.His suggestion of the information’s value—i.e., that it would “incriminateHillary”and“wouldbeveryuseful to [TrumpJr.’s] father”—wasnon-specificandmayhavebeenunderstoodasbeingofuncertainworthorreliability,givenGoldstone’s lack of direct access to the original source. The uncertainty overwhatwouldbedeliveredcouldbereflectedinTrumpJr.’sresponse(“ifit’swhatyousayIloveit”)(emphasisadded).

Accordingly, taking into account the high burden to establish a culpablementalstateinacampaign-financeprosecutionandthedifficultyinestablishingthe required valuation, the Office decided not to pursue criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign officials for the eventsculminatingintheJune9meeting.

c.ApplicationtoHarmtoOngoingMatter

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i.QuestionsOverWhetherHarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

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ii.Willfulness

As discussed, to establish a criminal campaign-finance violation, thegovernmentmustprove that thedefendantacted“knowinglyandwillfully.”52U.S.C. § 30109(d)(1)(A)(i). That standard requires proof that the defendant

knewgenerallythathisconductwasunlawful.ElectionOffenses123.Giventheuncertainties noted above, the “willfulness” requirement would pose asubstantialbarriertoprosecution.

iii.ConstitutionalConsiderations

Finally, the First Amendment could pose constraints on a prosecution.HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

iv.AnalysisastoHOM██

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4.FalseStatementsandObstructionoftheInvestigation

TheOfficedeterminedthatcertainindividualsassociatedwiththeCampaignliedtoinvestigatorsaboutCampaigncontactswithRussiaandhavetakenotheractions to interfere with the investigation. As explained below, the Officetherefore charged some U.S. persons connected to the Campaign with falsestatementsandobstructionoffenses.

a.OverviewOfGoverningLaw

FalseStatements.Theprincipalfederalstatutecriminalizingfalsestatementstogovernmentinvestigatorsis18U.S.C.§1001.Asrelevanthere,underSection1001(a)(2),itisacrimetoknowinglyandwillfully“make[]anymateriallyfalse,fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” “in anymatterwithin thejurisdiction of the executive . . . branch of the Government.” An FBIinvestigation is a matter within the Executive Branch’s jurisdiction. UnitedStatesv.Rodgers,466U.S.475,479(1984).Thestatutealsoappliestoasubsetof legislativebranchactions—viz., administrativematters and “investigation[s]or review[s]” conducted by a congressional committee or subcommittee. 18U.S.C.§1001(c)(1)and(2);seeUnitedStatesv.Pickett,353F.3d62,66(D.C.Cir.2004).

Whether the statement was made to law enforcement or congressionalinvestigators, thegovernmentmustprovebeyonda reasonabledoubt the samebasic non-jurisdictional elements: the statement was false, fictitious, orfraudulent;thedefendantknewboththatitwasfalseandthatitwasunlawfultomakea false statement; and the false statementwasmaterial.See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Smith,831F.3d1207,1222n.27(9thCir.2017)(listingelements);seealsoNinthCircuitPattern Instruction8.73&cmt. (explaining that theSection1001 jury instruction was modified in light of the Department of Justice’sposition that the phrase “knowingly and willfully” in the statute requires thedefendant’s knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful). In the D.C.Circuit, the government must prove that the statement was actually false; astatementthatismisleadingbut“literallytrue”doesnotsatisfySection1001(a)(2).SeeUnitedStatesv.Milton,8F.3d39,45(D.C.Cir.1993);UnitedStatesv.Dale,991F.2d819,832-33&n.22(D.C.Cir.1993).Forthatfalsestatementtoqualifyas“material,”itmusthaveanaturaltendencytoinfluence,orbecapableofinfluencing,adiscretedecisionoranyotherfunctionoftheagencytowhichitis addressed.See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995);UnitedStatesv.Moore,612F.3d698,701(D.C.Cir.2010).

Perjury. Under the federal perjury statutes, it is a crime for a witnesstestifyingunderoathbeforeagrandjurytoknowinglymakeanyfalsematerialdeclaration.See 18U.S.C. § 1623.The governmentmust prove four elementsbeyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under Section 1623(a): thedefendant testified under oath before a federal grand jury; the defendant’stestimony was false in one or more respects; the false testimony concernedmattersthatwerematerialtothegrandjuryinvestigation;andthefalsetestimony

wasknowinglygiven.UnitedStatesv.Bridges,717F.2d1444,1449n.30(D.C.Cir.1983).Thegeneralperjurystatute,18U.S.C.§1621,alsoappliestograndjurytestimonyandhassimilarelements,exceptthatitrequiresthatthewitnesshave acted willfully and that the government satisfy “strict common-lawrequirementsforestablishingfalsity.”SeeDunnv.UnitedStates,442U.S.100,106&n.6(1979)(explaining“thetwo-witnessrule”andthecorroborationthatitdemands).

ObstructionofJustice.Threebasicelementsarecommontotheobstructionstatutes pertinent to this Office’s charging decisions: an obstructive act; someform of nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding; andcriminal (i.e., corrupt) intent.A detailed discussion of those elements, and thelawgoverningobstructionofjusticemoregenerally,isincludedinVolumeIIofthereport.

b.ApplicationtoCertainIndividuals

i.GeorgePapadopoulos

InvestigatorsapproachedPapadopoulosforaninterviewbasedonhisroleasaforeignpolicyadvisortotheTrumpCampaignandhissuggestiontoaforeigngovernment representative that Russia had indicated that it could assist theCampaignthroughtheanonymousreleaseofinformationdamagingtocandidateClinton.On January27, 2017,Papadopoulos agreed to be interviewedbyFBIagents,who informedhim that the interviewwaspartof the investigation intopotentialRussiangovernmentinterferenceinthe2016presidentialelection.

Duringtheinterview,Papadopoulosliedaboutthetiming,extent,andnatureof his communications with Joseph Mifsud, Olga Polonskaya, and IvanTimofeev.Withrespecttotiming,PapadopoulosacknowledgedthathehadmetMifsudandthatMifsudtoldhimtheRussianshad“dirt”onClintonintheformof “thousands of emails.” But Papadopoulos stated multiple times that thosecommunicationsoccurredbeforehejoinedtheTrumpCampaignandthatitwasa“verystrangecoincidence” tobe toldof the“dirt”beforehestartedworkingfortheCampaign.Thisaccountwasfalse.PapadopoulosmetMifsudforthefirsttimeonapproximatelyMarch14,2016,afterPapadopouloshadalreadylearnedhewouldbeaforeignpolicyadvisorfortheCampaign.MifsudshowedinterestinPapadopoulosonly after learningofhis roleon theCampaign.AndMifsud

toldPapadopoulosabouttheRussianspossessing“dirt”oncandidateClintoninlateApril2016,morethanamonthafterPapadopouloshadjoinedtheCampaignandbeenpubliclyannouncedbycandidateTrump.StatementofOffense¶¶25-26,United States v. George Papadopoulos, No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5,2017),Doc.19(“PapadopoulosStatementofOffense”).

PapadopoulosalsomadefalsestatementsinanefforttominimizetheextentandimportanceofhiscommunicationswithMifsud.Forexample,Papadopoulosstated that “[Mifsud]’s a nothing,” that he thought Mifsud was “just a guytalk[ing] up connections or something,” and that he believed Mifsud was“BS’ing to be completely honest with you.” In fact, however, Papadopoulosunderstood Mifsud to have substantial connections to high-level Russiangovernment officials and that Mifsud spoke with some of those officials inMoscow before telling Papadopoulos about the “dirt.” Papadopoulos alsoengaged in extensive communications over a period of months with Mifsudabout foreign policy issues for the Campaign, including efforts to arrange a“history making” meeting between the Campaign and Russian governmentofficials. In addition, Papadopoulos failed to inform investigators thatMifsudhad introduced him to Timofeev, the Russian national who Papadopoulosunderstoodtobeconnected to theRussianMinistryofForeignAffairs,despitebeingasked ifhehadmetwithRussiannationalsor“[a]nyonewithaRussianaccent”duringthecampaign.PapadopoulosStatementofOffense¶¶27-29.

PapadopoulosalsofalselyclaimedthathemetPolonskayabeforehejoinedtheCampaign,andfalselytoldtheFBIthathehad“no”relationshipatallwithher.He stated that the extent of their communicationswasher sending emails—“Just, ‘Hi, how are you?’ That’s it.” In truth, however, Papadopoulos metPolonskayaonMarch24,2016,afterhehadjoinedtheCampaign;hebelievedthat shehad connections to high-levelRussiangovernment officials and couldhelphimarrangeapotentialforeignpolicytriptoRussia.Duringthecampaignhe emailed and spoke with her over Skype on numerous occasions about thepotential foreign policy trip toRussia.Papadopoulos Statement ofOffense ¶¶30-31.

Papadopoulos’s false statements in January 2017 impeded the FBI’sinvestigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.Mostimmediately, those statements hindered investigators’ ability to effectivelyquestionMifsudwhenhewas interviewed in the lobbyof aWashington,D.C.hotelonFebruary10,2017.SeeGov’tSent.Mem.at6,UnitedStatesv.George

Papadopoulos,No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C.Aug. 18, 2017),Doc. 44.During thatinterview,MifsudadmittedtoknowingPapadopoulosandtohavingintroducedhim to Polonskaya and Timofeev. But Mifsud denied that he had advanceknowledge that Russia was in possession of emails damaging to candidateClinton, stating that he and Papadopoulos had discussed cybersecurity andhackingasalargerissueandthatPapadopoulosmusthavemisunderstoodtheirconversation.MifsudalsofalselystatedthathehadnotseenPapadopoulossincethemeetingatwhichMifsudintroducedhimtoPolonskaya,eventhoughemails,textmessages,andotherinformationshowthatMifsudmetwithPapadopouloson at least two other occasions—April 12 and April 26, 2016. In addition,Mifsud omitted that he had drafted (or edited) the follow-up message thatPolonskaya sent to Papadopoulos following the initial meeting and that, asreflectedinthelanguageofthatemailchain(“Baby,thankyou!”),MifsudmayhavebeeninvolvedinapersonalrelationshipwithPolonskayaatthetime.Thefalse information and omissions in Papadopoulos’s January 2017 interviewundermined investigators’ ability to challenge Mifsud when he made theseinaccuratestatements.

GiventheseriousnessoftheliesandomissionsandtheireffectontheFBI’sinvestigation,theOfficechargedPapadopouloswithmakingfalsestatementstotheFBI,inviolationof18U.S.C.§1001.Information,UnitedStatesv.GeorgePapadopoulos,No. 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C.Oct. 3, 2017),Doc. 8.OnOctober 7,2017,Papadopoulospleadedguiltytothatchargepursuanttoapleaagreement.OnSeptember7,2018,hewassentencedto14daysofimprisonment,a$9,500fine,and200hoursofcommunityservice.

ii.PP███

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iii.MichaelFlynn

Michael Flynn agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on January 24, 2017,fourdaysafterhehadofficiallyassumedhisdutiesasNationalSecurityAdvisorto the President. During the interview, Flynn made several false statementspertainingtohiscommunicationswiththeRussianambassador.

First,FlynnmadetwofalsestatementsabouthisconversationswithRussianAmbassadorKislyak in lateDecember2016,at a timewhen theUnitedStateshad imposed sanctions on Russia for interfering with the 2016 presidentialelection and Russia was considering its response. See Flynn Statement ofOffense. Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain fromescalating the situation in response to the United States’s imposition ofsanctions. That statement was false. On December 29, 2016, Flynn calledKislyak to request Russian restraint. Flynn made the call immediately afterspeaking to a senior Transition Team official (K.T.McFarland) aboutwhat tocommunicate to Kislyak. Flynn then spoke with McFarland again after theKislyakcall to reporton the substanceof that conversation.Flynnalso falselytoldtheFBIthathedidnotrememberafollow-upconversationinwhichKislyakstatedthatRussiahadchosentomoderateitsresponsetotheU.S.sanctionsasaresult of Flynn’s request. On December 31, 2016, Flynn in fact had such aconversationwithKislyak,andheagainspokewithMcFarlandwithinhoursofthe call to relay the substance of his conversation with Kislyak. See FlynnStatementofOffense¶3.

Second,FlynnmadefalsestatementsaboutcallshehadpreviouslymadetorepresentativesofRussiaandothercountriesregardingaresolutionsubmittedbyEgypt to the United Nations Security Council on December 21, 2016.Specifically,Flynnstatedthatheonlyaskedthecountries’positionsonhowtheywouldvoteontheresolutionandthathedidnotrequestthatanyofthecountriestake any particular action on the resolution. That statement was false. OnDecember22,2016,FlynncalledKislyak,informedhimoftheincomingTrumpAdministration’s opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia voteagainst or delay the resolution. Flynn also falsely stated that Kislyak neverdescribedRussia’sresponsetohisDecember22requestregardingtheresolution.KislyakinfacttoldFlynninaconversationonDecember23,2016,thatRussiawouldnotvoteagainsttheresolutionifitcametoavote.SeeFlynnStatementofOffense¶4.

FlynnmadethesefalsestatementstotheFBIatatimewhenhewasservingasNationalSecurityAdvisorandwhen theFBIhadanopen investigation intoRussian interference in the 2016 presidential election, including the nature ofanylinksbetweentheTrumpCampaignandRussia.Flynn’sfalsestatementsandomissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on that ongoinginvestigation.FlynnStatementofOffense¶¶1-2.TheyalsocameshortlybeforeFlynn made separate submissions to the Department of Justice, pursuant toFARA, that also containedmaterially false statements and omissions. Id. ¶ 5.Basedon the totalityof that conduct, theOfficedecided to chargeFlynnwithmaking false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). OnDecember 1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty tothatchargeandalsoadmittedhisfalsestatementstotheDepartmentinhisFARAfiling.Seeid.;PleaAgreement,UnitedStatesv.MichaelT.Flynn,No.1:17-cr-232(D.D.C.Dec.1,2017),Doc.3.Flynnisawaitingsentencing.

iv.MichaelCohen

MichaelCohenwastheexecutivevicepresidentandspecialcounseltotheTrump Organization when Trump was president of the Trump Organization.Information ¶ 1,United States v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29,2018), Doc. 2 (“Cohen Information”). From the fall of 2015 throughapproximately June 2016,Cohenwas involved in a project to build aTrump-brandedtowerandadjoiningdevelopmentinMoscow.TheprojectwasknownasTrumpTowerMoscow.

In 2017, Cohen was called to testify before the House Permanent SelectCommittee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee onIntelligence(SSCI),bothofwhichwereinvestigatingRussianinterferenceinthe2016presidentialelectionandpossiblelinksbetweenRussiaandthepresidentialcampaigns. In lateAugust 2017, in advance of his testimony,Cohen caused atwo-page statement to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump TowerMoscow.Cohen Information ¶¶ 2-3. The letter contained three representationsrelevanthere.First,Cohenstatedthat theTrumpMoscowprojecthadendedinJanuary2016andthathehadbriefedcandidateTrumpontheprojectonlythreetimes before making the unilateral decision to terminate it. Second, Cohenrepresented that he never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with theproject and never considered asking Trump to travel for the project. Third,Cohen stated that he did not recall anyRussian government contact about the

project, including any response to an email that he had sent to a Russiangovernment email account.Cohen Information ¶ 4.Cohen later asked that histwo-pagestatementbeincorporatedintohistestimony’stranscriptbeforeSSCI,and he ultimately gave testimony to SSCI that was consistent with thatstatement.CohenInformation¶5.

Each of the foregoing representations in Cohen’s two-page statementwasfalse and misleading. Consideration of the project had extended throughapproximately June 2016 and includedmore than three progress reports fromCohentoTrump.CohenhaddiscussedwithFelixSaterhisowntraveltoRussiaas part of the project, and he had inquired about the possibility of Trumptraveling there—both with the candidate himself and with senior campaignofficialCoreyLewandowski.Cohendidrecallthathehadreceivedaresponsetothe email that he sent to Russian government spokesman Dmitry Peskov—inparticular, that he received an email reply and had a follow-up phoneconversationwithanEnglish-speakingassistanttoPeskovinmid-January2016.CohenInformation¶7.Cohenknewthestatementsinthelettertobefalseatthetime, and admitted that he made them in an effort (1) to minimize the linksbetweentheprojectandTrump(whobythistimewasPresident),and(2)togivethe false impression that the project had ended before the first vote in theRepublicanPartyprimaryprocess, in thehopesof limiting theongoingRussiainvestigations.Id.

Giventhenatureofthefalsestatementsandthefact thatherepeatedthemduring his initial interviewwith the Office, we charged Cohenwith violatingSection1001.OnNovember29,2018,Cohenpleadedguiltypursuanttoapleaagreement to a single-count information charging him with making falsestatements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, inviolationof18U.S.C.§1001(a)(2)and (c).Cohen Information.ThecasewastransferredtothedistrictjudgepresidingovertheseparateprosecutionofCohenpursuedbytheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(afterareferralfromourOffice).OnDecember7,2018,thisOfficesubmittedalettertothatjudgerecommendingthat Cohen’s cooperation with our investigation be taken into account insentencing Cohen on both the false-statements charge and the offenses in theSouthern District prosecution. On December 12, 2018, the judge sentencedCohen to two months of imprisonment on the false-statements count, to runconcurrentlywitha36-monthsentenceimposedontheothercounts.

v.HOM███

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vi.JeffSessions

AssetforthinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.6,supra,theinvestigationestablishedthat, while a U.S. Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor, former AttorneyGeneral Jeff Sessions interactedwithRussianAmbassadorKislyak during theweek of the Republican National Convention in July 2016 and again at ameeting inSessions’sSenate office inSeptember 2016.The investigation alsoestablished that Sessions and Kislyak both attended a reception held beforecandidateTrump’sforeignpolicyspeechattheMayflowerHotelinWashington,D.C.,inApril2016,andthatitispossiblethattheymetbrieflyatthatreception.

The Office considered whether, in light of these interactions, Sessionscommittedperjurybefore,ormadefalsestatements to,Congress inconnectionwithhisconfirmationasAttorneyGeneral.InJanuary2017testimonyduringhisconfirmation hearing, Sessions stated in response to a question about Trump

Campaign communications with the Russian government that he had “beencalledasurrogateatatimeortwointhatcampaignandIdidn’thave–didnothave communications with the Russians.” In written responses submitted onJanuary17,2017,Sessionsanswered“[n]o”toaquestionaskingwhetherhehad“beenincontactwithanyoneconnectedtoanypartoftheRussiangovernmentabout the 2016 election, either before or after election day.”And, in aMarch2017 supplement to his testimony, Sessions identified two of the campaign-periodcontactswithAmbassadorKislyaknotedabove,whichhadbeenreportedinthemediafollowingtheJanuary2017confirmationhearing.Sessionsstatedinthe supplemental response that he did “not recall any discussions with theRussianAmbassador, or any other representatives of theRussian government,regardingthepoliticalcampaignontheseoccasionsoranyotheroccasion.”

AlthoughtheinvestigationestablishedthatSessionsinteractedwithKislyakon the occasions described above and thatKislyakmentioned the presidentialcampaignonat least oneoccasion, the evidence isnot sufficient toprove thatSessionsgaveknowinglyfalseanswerstoRussia-relatedquestionsinlightofthewording and context of those questions.With respect to Sessions’s statementsthat he did “not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador . . .regarding the political campaign” and he had not been in contact with anyRussianofficial“aboutthe2016election,”theevidenceconcerningthenatureofSessions’s interactions with Kislyak makes it plausible that Sessions did notrecall discussing the campaign with Kislyak at the time of his statements.Similarly,whileSessionsstatedinhisJanuary2017oraltestimonythathe“didnot have communicationswithRussians,” he did so in response to a questionthat had linked such communications to an alleged “continuing exchange ofinformation” between the Trump Campaign and Russian governmentintermediaries.Sessions laterexplained to theSenateand to theOffice thatheunderstood thequestion as narrowly calling for disclosureof interactionswithRussians that involvedtheexchangeofcampaigninformation,asdistinguishedfrommoreroutinecontactswithRussiannationals.Giventhecontext inwhichthequestionwasasked,thatunderstandingisplausible.

Accordingly, the Office concluded that the evidence was insufficient toprovethatSessionswaswillfullyuntruthfulinhisanswersandthusinsufficienttoobtainorsustainaconvictionforperjuryorfalsestatements.Consistentwiththe Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Office therefore determined not topursue charges against Sessions and informed his counsel of that decision inMarch2018.

vii.OthersInterviewedDuringtheInvestigation

TheOfficeconsideredwhether,duringthecourseoftheinvestigation,otherindividuals interviewed either omitted material information or providedinformation determined to be false. Applying the Principles of FederalProsecution, the Office did not seek criminal charges against any individualsother than those listed above. In some instances, that decision was due toevidentiaryhurdles toproving falsity. Inothers, theOfficedetermined that thewitness ultimately provided truthful information and that considerations ofculpability, deterrence, and resource-preservationweighed against prosecution.SeeJusticeManual§§9-27.2209-27.230.███████████████████████████████████████████████PersonalPrivacy███████████████████████████████████████████████

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1276 A more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate

memorandumprovidedtotheActingAttorneyGeneralbeforetheindictment.

1277TheOfficeprovidedamoredetailedexplanationofthechargingdecisioninthiscaseinmeetingswiththeOfficeoftheActingAttorneyGeneralbeforetheindictment.

1278TheOfficealsoconsidered,butruledout,chargesonthetheorythatthepost-hackingsharinganddissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen property under the NationalStolenPropertyAct(NSPA),18U.S.C.§§2314and2315.ThestatutescomprisingtheNSPAcover“goods,wares,ormerchandise,”andlowercourtshavelargelyunderstoodthatphrasetobelimitedtotangibleitemssincetheSupremeCourt’sdecisioninDowlingv.UnitedStates,473U.S.207(1985).SeeUnitedStatesv.YijiaZhang, 995F.Supp.2d340,344-48 (E.D.Pa.2014) (collectingcases).Oneof thosepost-Dowlingdecisions—UnitedStatesv.Brown,925F.2d1301(10thCir.1991)—specificallyheldthattheNSPAdoesnotreach“acomputerprograminsourcecodeform,”eventhoughthatcodewasstoredintangibleitems(i.e.,aharddiskandinathree-ringnotebook).Id.at1302-03.Congress,inturn,citedtheBrownopinioninexplaining the need for amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) that “would ensure that the theft ofintangibleinformationbytheunauthorizeduseofacomputerisprohibitedinthesamewaytheftofphysicalitems[is]protected.”S.Rep.104-357,at7(1996).Thatsequenceofeventswouldmakeitdifficulttoarguethathackedemailsinelectronicform,whicharetherelevantstolenitemshere,constitute“goods,wares,ormerchandise”withinthemeaningoftheNSPA.

1279HarmtoOngoingMatter████████

1280Gates Superseding Criminal Information; Waiver of Indictment,United States v. Richard W.GatesIII,1:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Feb.23,2018),Doc.203;WaiverofTrialbyJury,UnitedStatesv.RichardWGatesIII, l:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Feb.23,2018),Doc.204;GatesPleaAgreement;StatementofOffense,United States v. RichardW. Gates III, l:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 206; Plea Agreement,UnitedStatesv.PaulJ.Manafort,Jr.,1:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Sept.14,2018),Doc.422;StatementofOffense,UnitedStatesv.PaulJ.Manafort,Jr.,1:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Sept.14,2018),Doc.423.

1281HarmtoOngoingMatter████████

1282Onfouroccasions,theForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourt(FISC)issuedwarrantsbasedonafinding of probable cause to believe that Pagewas an agent of a foreign power. 50U.S.C. §§ 1801(b),1805(a)(2)(A).TheFISC’sprobable-causefindingwasbasedonadifferent(andlower)standardthantheonegoverning theOffice’s decisionwhether to bring charges against Page,which iswhether admissibleevidencewouldlikelybesufficienttoprovebeyondareasonabledoubtthatPageactedasanagentoftheRussianFederationduringtheperiodatissue.Cf.UnitedStatesv.Cardoza,713F.3d656,660(D.C.Cir.2013)(explainingthatprobablecauserequiresonly“afairprobability,”andnot“certainty,orproofbeyondareasonabledoubt,orproofbyapreponderanceoftheevidence”).

1283Campaign-finance lawalsoplaces financial limitsoncontributions,52U.S.C.§30116(a), andprohibits contributions from corporations, banks, and labor unions, 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a); see CitizensUnitedv.FEC,558U.S.310,320(2010).BecausetheconductthattheOfficeinvestigatedinvolvedpossibleelectoral activity by foreign nationals, the foreign-contributions ban is the most readily applicableprovision.

ReportOnTheInvestigationIntoRussianInterferenceInThe2016

PresidentialElection

VolumeIIofII

SpecialCounselRobertS.Mueller,III

SubmittedPursuantto28C.F.R.§600.8(c)

Washington,D.C.

March2019

TABLEOFCONTENTS–VOLUMEIIINTRODUCTIONTOVOLUMEIIEXECUTIVESUMMARYTOVOLUMEII

I.BACKGROUNDLEGALANDEVIDENTIARYPRINCIPLESA.LegalFrameworkofObstructionofJustice

B.InvestigativeandEvidentiaryConsiderations

II.FACTUALRESULTSOFTHEOBSTRUCTIONINVESTIGATIONA.TheCampaign’sResponsetoReportsAboutRussianSupportforTrump

1.PressReportsAllegeLinksBetweentheTrumpCampaignandRussia2.TheTrumpCampaignReactstoWikiLeaks’sReleaseofHackedEmails3.TheTrumpCampaignReactstoAllegationsThatRussiawasSeekingtoAidCandidateTrump4.AftertheElection,TrumpContinuestoDenyAnyContactsorConnectionswithRussiaorThat

RussiaAidedhisElectionB.ThePresident’sConductConcerningtheInvestigationofMichaelFlynn

1.IncomingNationalSecurityAdvisorFlynnDiscussesSanctionsonRussiawithRussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyak

2.President-ElectTrumpisBriefedontheIntelligenceCommunity’sAssessmentofRussianInterferenceintheElectionandCongressOpensElection-InterferenceInvestigations

3.FlynnMakesFalseStatementsAbouthisCommunicationswithKislyaktoIncomingAdministrationOfficials,theMedia,andtheFBI

4.DOJOfficialsNotifytheWhiteHouseofTheirConcernsAboutFlynn5.McGahnhasaFollow-UpMeetingAboutFlynnwithYates;PresidentTrumphasDinnerwith

FBIDirectorComey6.Flynn’sResignation7.ThePresidentDiscussesFlynnwithFBIDirectorComey8.TheMediaRaisesQuestionsAboutthePresident’sDelayinTerminatingFlynn9.ThePresidentAttemptstoHaveK.T.McFarlandCreateaWitnessStatementDenyingthathe

DirectedFlynn’sDiscussionswithKislyakC.ThePresident’sReactiontoPublicConfirmationoftheFBI’sRussiaInvestigation

1.AttorneyGeneralSessionsRecusesFromtheRussiaInvestigation2.FBIDirectorComeyPubliclyConfirmstheExistenceoftheRussiaInvestigationinTestimony

BeforeHPSCI3.ThePresidentAsksIntelligenceCommunityLeaderstoMakePublicStatementsthathehadNo

ConnectiontoRussia4.ThePresidentAsksComeyto“LifttheCloud”CreatedbytheRussiaInvestigation

D.EventsLeadingUpToandSurroundingtheTerminationofFBIDirectorComey1.ComeyTestifiesBeforetheSenateJudiciaryCommitteeandDeclinestoAnswerQuestions

AboutWhetherthePresidentisUnderInvestigation2.ThePresidentMakestheDecisiontoTerminateComey

E.ThePresident’sEffortstoRemovetheSpecialCounsel1.TheAppointmentoftheSpecialCounselandthePresident’sReaction2.ThePresidentAssertsthattheSpecialCounselhasConflictsofInterest3.ThePressReportsthatthePresidentisBeingInvestigatedforObstructionofJusticeandthe

PresidentDirectstheWhiteHouseCounseltoHavetheSpecialCounselRemovedF.ThePresident’sEffortstoCurtailtheSpecialCounselInvestigation

1.ThePresidentAsksCoreyLewandowskitoDeliveraMessagetoSessionstoCurtailtheSpecialCounselInvestigation

2.ThePresidentFollowsUpwithLewandowski3.ThePresidentPubliclyCriticizesSessionsinaNewYorkTimesInterview4.ThePresidentOrdersPriebustoDemandSessions’sResignation

G.ThePresident’sEffortstoPreventDisclosureofEmailsAbouttheJune9,2016MeetingBetweenRussiansandSeniorCampaignOfficials

1.ThePresidentLearnsAbouttheExistenceofEmailsConcerningtheJune9,2016TrumpTowerMeeting

2.ThePresidentDirectsCommunicationsStaffNottoPubliclyDiscloseInformationAbouttheJune9Meeting

3.ThePresidentDirectsTrumpJr.’sResponsetoPressInquiriesAbouttheJune9Meeting4.TheMediaReportsontheJune9,2016Meeting

H.ThePresident’sFurtherEffortstoHavetheAttorneyGeneralTakeOvertheInvestigation1.ThePresidentAgainSeekstoHaveSessionsReversehisRecusal2.AdditionalEffortstoHaveSessionsUnrecuseorDirectInvestigationsCoveredbyhisRecusal

I.ThePresidentOrdersMcGahntoDenythatthePresidentTriedtoFiretheSpecialCounsel1.ThePressReportsthatthePresidentTriedtoFiretheSpecialCounsel2.ThePresidentSeekstoHaveMcGahnDisputethePressReports

J.ThePresident’sConductTowardsFlynn,Manafort,HOM████1.ConductDirectedatMichaelFlynn2.ConductDirectedatPaulManafort3.HarmtoOngoingMatter████

K.ThePresident’sConductInvolvingMichaelCohen1.CandidateTrump’sAwarenessofandInvolvementintheTrumpTowerMoscowProject2.CohenDeterminestoAdheretoa“PartyLine”DistancingCandidateTrumpFromRussia3.CohenSubmitsFalseStatementstoCongressMinimizingtheTrumpTowerMoscowProjectin

AccordancewiththePartyLine4.ThePresidentSendsMessagesofSupporttoCohen5.ThePresident’sConductAfterCohenBeganCooperatingwiththeGovernment

L.OverarchingFactualIssues

III.LEGALDEFENSESTOTHEAPPLICATIONOFOBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICESTATUTESTOTHEPRESIDENT

A.StatutoryDefensestotheApplicationofObstruction-Of-JusticeProvisionstotheConductUnderInvestigation

1.TheTextofSection1512(c)(2)ProhibitsaBroadRangeofObstructiveActs2.JudicialDecisionsSupportaBroadReadingofSection1512(c)(2)3.TheLegislativeHistoryofSection1512(c)(2)DoesNotJustifyNarrowingItsText4.GeneralPrinciplesofStatutoryConstructionDoNotSuggestThatSection1512(c)(2)is

InapplicabletotheConductinthisInvestigation5.OtherObstructionStatutesMightApplytotheConductinthisInvestigation

B.ConstitutionalDefensestoApplyingObstruction-Of-JusticeStatutestoPresidentialConduct1.TheRequirementofaClearStatementtoApplyStatutestoPresidentialConductDoesNot

LimittheObstructionStatutes2.Separation-of-PowersPrinciplesSupporttheConclusionthatCongressMayValidlyProhibit

CorruptObstructiveActsCarriedOutThroughthePresident’sOfficialPowersa.TheSupremeCourt’sSeparation-of-PowersBalancingTestAppliesInThisContextb.TheEffectofObstruction-of-JusticeStatutesonthePresident’sCapacitytoPerformHis

ArticleIIResponsibilitiesisLimitedc.CongressHasPowertoProtectCongressional,GrandJury,andJudicialProceedings

AgainstCorruptActsfromAnySource3.AscertainingWhetherthePresidentViolatedtheObstructionStatutesWouldNotChillhis

PerformanceofhisArticleIIDuties

IV.CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTIONTOVOLUMEII

ThisreportissubmittedtotheAttorneyGeneralpursuantto28C.F.R.§600.8(c),whichstatesthat,“[a]ttheconclusionoftheSpecialCounsel’swork,he...shallprovidetheAttorneyGeneralaconfidentialreportexplainingtheprosecutionordeclinationdecisions[theSpecialCounsel]reached.”

Beginningin2017,thePresidentoftheUnitedStatestookavarietyofactionstowardstheongoingFBIinvestigationintoRussia’sinterferenceinthe2016presidentialelectionandrelatedmattersthatraisedquestions about whether he had obstructed justice. TheOrder appointing the Special Counsel gave thisOfficejurisdictiontoinvestigatemattersthatarosedirectlyfromtheFBI’sRussiainvestigation,includingwhetherthePresidenthadobstructedjusticeinconnectionwithRussia-relatedinvestigations.TheSpecialCounsel’sjurisdictionalsocoveredpotentiallyobstructiveactsrelatedtotheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigationitself.ThisVolumeofourreportsummarizesourobstruction-of-justiceinvestigationofthePresident.

We first describe the considerations that guided our obstruction-of-justice investigation, and thenprovideanoverviewofthisVolume:

First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate ordeclineaprosecution,butwedeterminednot tomakea traditionalprosecutorial judgment.TheOfficeofLegalCounsel(OLC)hasissuedanopinionfindingthat“theindictmentorcriminalprosecutionofasittingPresident would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform itsconstitutionally assigned functions” in violation of “the constitutional separation of powers.”1 Given theroleof theSpecialCounselasanattorneyintheDepartmentofJusticeandtheframeworkoftheSpecialCounselregulations,see28U.S.C.§515;28C.F.R.§600.7(a),thisOfficeacceptedOLC’slegalconclusionfor the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC’s constitutional view, werecognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on thePresident’scapacitytogovernandpotentiallypreemptconstitutionalprocessesforaddressingpresidentialmisconduct.2

Second,whiletheOLCopinionconcludesthatasittingPresidentmaynotbeprosecuted,itrecognizesthatacriminalinvestigationduringthePresident’stermispermissible.3TheOLCopinionalsorecognizesthataPresidentdoesnothaveimmunityafterheleavesoffice.4AndifindividualsotherthanthePresidentcommittedanobstructionoffense,theymaybeprosecutedatthistime.Giventhoseconsiderations,thefactsknowntous,andthestrongpublicinterestinsafeguardingtheintegrityofthecriminaljusticesystem,weconductedathoroughfactualinvestigationinordertopreservetheevidencewhenmemorieswerefreshanddocumentarymaterialswereavailable.

Third, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice Manualstandardsgoverningprosecutionanddeclinationdecisions,butwedeterminednottoapplyanapproachthatcouldpotentially result in a judgment that thePresident committed crimes.The threshold stepunder theJusticeManualstandardsistoassesswhetheraperson’sconduct“constitutesafederaloffense.”U.S.Dep’tof Justice, Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018) (Justice Manual). Fairness concerns counseled againstpotentiallyreachingthatjudgmentwhennochargescanbebrought.Theordinarymeansforanindividualtorespond to an accusation is through a speedy and public trial, with all the procedural protections thatsurroundacriminalcase.Anindividualwhobelieveshewaswronglyaccusedcanusethatprocesstoseektoclearhisname.Incontrast,aprosecutor’sjudgmentthatcrimeswerecommitted,butthatnochargeswillbe brought, affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name-clearing before an impartialadjudicator.5

TheconcernsaboutthefairnessofsuchadeterminationwouldbeheightenedinthecaseofasittingPresident, where a federal prosecutor’s accusation of a crime, even in an internal report, could carryconsequences thatextendbeyond therealmofcriminal justice.OLCnotedsimilarconcernsaboutsealedindictments.Even if an indictmentwere sealedduring thePresident’s term,OLC reasoned, “itwouldbeverydifficulttopreserve[anindictment’s]secrecy,”andifanindictmentbecamepublic,“[t]hestigmaandopprobrium” could imperil the President’s ability to govern.”6 Although a prosecutor’s internal reportwouldnotrepresentaformalpublicaccusationakintoanindictment,thepossibilityofthereport’spublicdisclosure and the absence of a neutral adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled againstpotentiallydetermining“thattheperson’sconductconstitutesafederaloffense.”JusticeManual§9-27.220.

Fourth,ifwehadconfidenceafterathoroughinvestigationofthefactsthatthePresidentclearlydidnotcommitobstructionofjustice,wewouldsostate.Basedonthefactsandtheapplicablelegalstandards,however,weareunabletoreachthatjudgment.TheevidenceweobtainedaboutthePresident’sactionsandintent presents difficult issues that prevent us from conclusively determining that no criminal conductoccurred.Accordingly,while this report does not conclude that thePresident committed a crime, it alsodoesnotexoneratehim.

***

Thisreportonourinvestigationconsistsoffourparts.SectionIprovidesanoverviewofobstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary considerations. Section II setsforth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and analyzes the evidence.Section III addressesstatutoryandconstitutionaldefenses.SectionIVstatesourconclusion.

1ASittingPresident’sAmenabilitytoIndictmentandCriminalProsecution,24Op.O.L.C.222,222,260(2000)(OLCOp.).

2SeeU.S.CONST.Art.I§2,cl.5;§3,cl.6;cf.OLCOp.at257-258(discussingrelationshipbetweenimpeachmentandcriminalprosecutionofasittingPresident).

3OLCOp.at257n.36 (“Agrand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period ofimmunity”).

4OLCOp.at255 (“Recognizing an immunity fromprosecution for as sittingPresidentwould notpreclude such prosecution once the President’s term is over or he is otherwise removed from office byresignationorimpeachment”).

5 For that reason, criticisms have been lodged against the practice of naming unindicted co-conspiratorsinanindictment.SeeUnitedStatesv.Briggs,514F.2d794,802(5thCir.1975)(“Thecourtshavestruckdownwithstronglanguageeffortsbygrandjuriestoaccusepersonsofcrimewhileaffordingthemnoforuminwhichtovindicatethemselves.”);seealsoJusticeManual§9-11.130.

6OLCOp.at259&n.38(citationomitted).

EXECUTIVESUMMARYTOVOLUMEII

Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by thePresident that related to the Russian-interference investigations, including thePresident’s conduct towards the law enforcement officials overseeing theinvestigationsandthewitnessestorelevantevents.

FACTUALRESULTSOFTHEOBSTRUCTIONINVESTIGATION

Thekeyissuesandeventsweexaminedincludethefollowing:

The Campaign’s response to reports about Russian support for Trump.During the 2016 presidential campaign, questions arose about the Russiangovernment’s apparent support for candidateTrump.AfterWikiLeaks releasedpolitically damagingDemocraticParty emails thatwere reported to have beenhacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia wasresponsibleforthehacksatthesametimethatheandotherCampaignofficialsprivatelysoughtinformationHarmtoOngoingMatter████████aboutanyfurtherplannedWikiLeaksreleases.Trumpalsodeniedhavinganybusinessin or connections to Russia, even though as late as June 2016 the TrumpOrganizationhadbeenpursuinga licensingdeal foraskyscraper tobebuilt inRussiacalledTrumpTowerMoscow.Aftertheelection,thePresidentexpressedconcernstoadvisorsthatreportsofRussia’selectioninterferencemightleadthepublictoquestionthelegitimacyofhiselection.

Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January2017,incomingNationalSecurityAdvisorMichaelFlynnfalselydeniedtotheVicePresident,otheradministrationofficials,andFBIagentsthathehadtalked toRussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyakaboutRussia’s response toU.S.sanctionsonRussiaforitselectioninterference.OnJanuary27,thedayafterthePresidentwastoldthatFlynnhadliedtotheVicePresidentandhadmadesimilarstatements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Comey to a privatedinnerattheWhiteHouseandtoldComeythatheneededloyalty.OnFebruary14, thedayafter thePresidentrequestedFlynn’sresignation, thePresident toldan outside advisor, “Now that we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over.” Theadvisordisagreedandsaidtheinvestigationswouldcontinue.

Laterthatafternoon,thePresidentclearedtheOvalOfficetohaveaone-on-one meeting with Comey. Referring to the FBI’s investigation of Flynn, the

Presidentsaid,“Ihopeyoucanseeyourwayclear to letting thisgo, to lettingFlynngo.Heisagoodguy.Ihopeyoucanletthisgo.”ShortlyafterrequestingFlynn’s resignation and speaking privately to Comey, the President sought tohaveDeputyNationalSecurityAdvisorK.T.McFarlanddraftan internal letterstating that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions withKislyak.McFarlanddeclinedbecause shedidnotknowwhether thatwas true,and aWhite House Counsel’s Office attorney thought that the request wouldlooklikeaquidproquoforanambassadorshipshehadbeenoffered.

The President’s reaction to the continuing Russia investigation. InFebruary2017,AttorneyGeneralJeffSessionsbegantoassesswhetherhehadtorecuse himself from campaign-related investigations because of his role in theTrump Campaign. In early March, the President told White House CounselDonaldMcGahntostopSessionsfromrecusing.AndafterSessionsannouncedhis recusalonMarch2, thePresident expressedanger at thedecisionand toldadvisorsthatheshouldhaveanAttorneyGeneralwhowouldprotecthim.Thatweekend, the President took Sessions aside at an event and urged him to“unrecuse.”LaterinMarch,ComeypubliclydisclosedatacongressionalhearingthattheFBIwasinvestigating“theRussiangovernment’seffortstointerfereinthe2016presidentialelection,”includinganylinksorcoordinationbetweentheRussian government and the Trump Campaign. In the following days, thePresidentreachedouttotheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceandtheleadersoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)andtheNationalSecurityAgency(NSA)to ask them what they could do to publicly dispel the suggestion that thePresident had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort. ThePresident also twice called Comey directly, notwithstanding guidance fromMcGahn to avoid direct contacts with the Department of Justice. Comey hadpreviously assured the President that the FBI was not investigating himpersonally, and the President asked Comey to “lift the cloud” of the Russiainvestigationbysayingthatpublicly.

ThePresident’sterminationofComey.OnMay3,2017,Comeytestifiedina congressional hearing, but declined to answer questions about whether thePresidentwaspersonallyunderinvestigation.Withindays,thePresidentdecidedtoterminateComey.ThePresidentinsistedthattheterminationletter,whichwaswritten forpublic release, state thatComeyhad informed thePresident thathewasnotunderinvestigation.Thedayofthefiring,theWhiteHousemaintainedthatComey’sterminationresultedfromindependentrecommendationsfromtheAttorney General and Deputy Attorney General that Comey should be

discharged for mishandling the Hillary Clinton email investigation. But thePresident had decided to fire Comey before hearing from the Department ofJustice.ThedayafterfiringComey,thePresidenttoldRussianofficialsthathehad “faced great pressure because ofRussia,”which had been “taken off” byComey’s firing. The next day, the President acknowledged in a televisioninterview that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the Department ofJustice’s recommendation and that when he “decided to just do it,” he wasthinkingthat“thisthingwithTrumpandRussiaisamade-upstory.”Inresponseto a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russiainvestigation,thePresidentsaid,“AsfarasI’mconcerned,Iwantthatthingtobeabsolutelydoneproperly,”addingthatfiringComey“mightevenlengthenouttheinvestigation.”

TheappointmentofaSpecialCounselandeffortstoremovehim.OnMay17,2017,theActingAttorneyGeneralfortheRussiainvestigationappointedaSpecialCounseltoconducttheinvestigationandrelatedmatters.ThePresidentreacted tonews that aSpecialCounselhadbeenappointedby telling advisorsthat it was “the end of his presidency” and demanding that Sessions resign.Sessionssubmittedhisresignation,butthePresidentultimatelydidnotacceptit.ThePresident told aides that theSpecialCounsel had conflicts of interest andsuggested that the Special Counsel therefore could not serve. The President’sadvisors told him the asserted conflicts were meritless and had already beenconsideredbytheDepartmentofJustice.

OnJune14,2017,themediareportedthattheSpecialCounsel’sOfficewasinvestigatingwhether thePresident hadobstructed justice. Press reports calledthis “a major turning point” in the investigation: while Comey had told thePresident he was not under investigation, following Comey’s firing, thePresidentnowwasunderinvestigation.ThePresidentreactedtothisnewswithaseriesoftweetscriticizingtheDepartmentofJusticeandtheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigation. On June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn at home anddirected him to call the Acting Attorney General and say that the SpecialCounselhadconflictsof interest andmustbe removed.McGahndidnotcarryoutthedirection,however,decidingthathewouldresignratherthantriggerwhatheregardedasapotentialSaturdayNightMassacre.

Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel’s investigation. Two days afterdirecting McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President madeanother attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation. On June 19,

2017,thePresidentmetone-on-oneintheOvalOfficewithhisformercampaignmanager Corey Lewandowski, a trusted advisor outside the government, anddictated amessage forLewandowski to deliver toSessions.Themessage saidthat Sessions should publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal fromtheRussiainvestigation,theinvestigationwas“veryunfair”tothePresident,thePresident had done nothing wrong, and Sessions planned to meet with theSpecial Counsel and “let [him] move forward with investigating electionmeddling for future elections.” Lewandowski said he understood what thePresidentwantedSessionstodo.

Onemonthlater,inanotherprivatemeetingwithLewandowskionJuly19,2017, thePresidentaskedabout thestatusofhismessage forSessions to limittheSpecialCounsel investigation to futureelection interference.Lewandowskitold the President that themessagewould be delivered soon.Hours after thatmeeting,thePresidentpubliclycriticizedSessionsinaninterviewwiththeNewYorkTimes,andthenissuedaseriesoftweetsmakingitclearthatSessions’sjobwas in jeopardy.Lewandowskididnotwant todeliver thePresident’smessagepersonally,soheaskedseniorWhiteHouseofficialRickDearborntodeliveritto Sessions. Dearborn was uncomfortable with the task and did not followthrough.

Effortstopreventpublicdisclosureofevidence.Inthesummerof2017,thePresident learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June 9,2016 meeting at Trump Tower between senior campaign officials, includingDonaldTrumpJr.,andaRussianlawyerwhowassaidtobeofferingdamaginginformation about Hillary Clinton as “part of Russia and its government’ssupportforMr.Trump.”Onseveraloccasions,thePresidentdirectedaidesnottopubliclydisclose the emails settingup the June9meeting, suggesting that theemailswouldnotleakandthatthenumberoflawyerswithaccesstothemshouldbe limited. Before the emails became public, the President edited a pressstatement forTrump Jr. bydeleting a line that acknowledged that themeetingwas with “an individual who [Trump Jr.] was told might have informationhelpful to the campaign” and instead said only that the meeting was aboutadoptions of Russian children. When the press asked questions about thePresident’sinvolvementinTrumpJr.’sstatement,thePresident’spersonallawyerrepeatedlydeniedthePresidenthadplayedanyrole.

Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of theinvestigation.Inearlysummer2017,thePresidentcalledSessionsathomeand

again askedhim to reverse his recusal from theRussia investigation.Sessionsdid not reverse his recusal. InOctober 2017, the Presidentmet privatelywithSessions in theOvalOffice and asked him to “take [a] look” at investigatingClinton. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty pursuant to acooperationagreement, thePresidentmetwithSessionsintheOvalOfficeandsuggested, according to notes taken by a senior advisor, that if SessionsunrecusedandtookbacksupervisionoftheRussiainvestigation,hewouldbea“hero.”ThePresidenttoldSessions,“I’mnotgoingtodoanythingordirectyoutodoanything.Ijustwanttobetreatedfairly.”Inresponse,Sessionsvolunteeredthat he had never seen anything “improper” on the campaign and told thePresident there was a “whole new leadership team” in place. He did notunrecuse.

EffortstohaveMcGahndenythatthePresidenthadorderedhimtohavethe Special Counsel removed. In early 2018, the press reported that thePresident had directedMcGahn to have the Special Counsel removed in June2017andthatMcGahnhadthreatenedtoresignratherthancarryouttheorder.ThePresidentreactedtothenewsstoriesbydirectingWhiteHouseofficialstotellMcGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had not beenorderedtohavetheSpecialCounselremoved.McGahntoldthoseofficialsthatthe media reports were accurate in stating that the President had directedMcGahn to have the Special Counsel removed. The President then met withMcGahnintheOvalOfficeandagainpressuredhimtodenythereports.Inthesamemeeting, the President also askedMcGahnwhy he had told the SpecialCounsel about the President’s effort to remove the Special Counsel and whyMcGahntooknotesofhisconversationswiththePresident.McGahnrefusedtobackawayfromwhatherememberedhappeningandperceivedthePresidenttobetestinghismettle.

Conduct towardsFlynn,Manafort,HOM████AfterFlynnwithdrewfroma jointdefenseagreementwith thePresident andbegancooperatingwiththe government, the President’s personal counsel left a message for Flynn’sattorneysremindingthemofthePresident’swarmfeelingstowardsFlynn,whichhesaid“stillremains,”andaskingfora“headsup”ifFlynnknew“informationthatimplicatesthePresident.”WhenFlynn’scounselreiteratedthatFlynncouldno longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, thePresident’s personal counsel said hewouldmake sure that thePresident knewthat Flynn’s actions reflected “hostility” towards the President. DuringManafort’sprosecutionandwhenthejuryinhiscriminaltrialwasdeliberating,

thePresident praisedManafort inpublic, said thatManafortwasbeing treatedunfairly, anddeclined to rule out a pardon.AfterManafortwas convicted, thePresident calledManafort “a braveman” for refusing to “break” and said that“flipping”“almostoughttobeoutlawed.”HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The President’s conduct towardsMichaelCohen, a former TrumpOrganization executive, changed from praiseforCohenwhenhefalselyminimizedthePresident’sinvolvementintheTrumpTowerMoscowproject,tocastigationofCohenwhenhebecameacooperatingwitness. From September 2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the TrumpTowerMoscow project on behalf of the TrumpOrganization and had briefedcandidateTrumpon the project numerous times, including discussingwhetherTrump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. In 2017, Cohen providedfalsetestimonytoCongressabouttheproject,includingstatingthathehadonlybriefedTrumpon the project three times and never discussed travel toRussiawithhim,inanefforttoadheretoa“partyline”thatCohensaidwasdevelopedto minimize the President’s connections to Russia. While preparing for hiscongressional testimony,Cohen had extensive discussionswith the President’spersonal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should “stay onmessage”andnotcontradictthePresident.AftertheFBIsearchedCohen’shomeandoffice inApril2018, thePresidentpubliclyasserted thatCohenwouldnot“flip,”contactedhimdirectly to tellhimto“staystrong,”andprivatelypassedmessagesofsupporttohim.CohenalsodiscussedpardonswiththePresident’spersonalcounselandbelieved that ifhestayedonmessagehewouldbe takencareof.ButafterCohenbegancooperatingwiththegovernmentinthesummerof2018,thePresidentpubliclycriticizedhim,calledhima“rat,”andsuggestedthathisfamilymembershadcommittedcrimes.

Overarching factual issues. We did not make a traditional prosecutiondecisionaboutthesefacts,buttheevidenceweobtainedsupportsseveralgeneralstatementsaboutthePresident’sconduct.

Several features of the conductwe investigateddistinguish it from typicalobstruction-of-justicecases.First,theinvestigationconcernedthePresident,andsomeofhisactions,suchasfiringtheFBIdirector,involvedfaciallylawfulactswithinhisArticleIIauthority,whichraisesconstitutionalissuesdiscussedbelow.

Atthesametime, thePresident’spositionas theheadof theExecutiveBranchprovided him with unique and powerful means of influencing officialproceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses—all of which isrelevant to a potential obstruction-of-justice analysis. Second, unlike cases inwhich a subject engages in obstruction of justice to cover up a crime, theevidence we obtained did not establish that the President was involved in anunderlying crime related to Russian election interference. Although theobstruction statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of thatevidenceaffectstheanalysisofthePresident’sintentandrequiresconsiderationof other possiblemotives for his conduct. Third,many of the President’s actsdirected at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with thegovernment and suggestions of possible future pardons, took place in publicview.Thatcircumstanceisunusual,butnoprincipleoflawexcludespublicactsfrom the reach of the obstruction laws. If the likely effect of public acts is toinfluence witnesses or alter their testimony, the harm to the justice system’sintegrityisthesame.

Although the series of events we investigated involved discrete acts, theoverall pattern of the President’s conduct towards the investigations can shedlighton thenatureof thePresident’sactsand the inferences thatcanbedrawnabouthisintent.Inparticular,theactionsweinvestigatedcanbedividedintotwophases, reflecting a possible shift in the President’s motives. The first phasecovered the period from the President’s first interactionswithComey throughthe President’s firing of Comey. During that time, the President had beenrepeatedly toldhewasnotpersonallyunder investigation.Soonafter thefiringofComeyand theappointmentof theSpecialCounsel,however, thePresidentbecameawarethathisownconductwasbeinginvestigatedinanobstruction-of-justice inquiry. At that point, the President engaged in a second phase ofconduct, involving public attacks on the investigation, non-public efforts tocontrol it, andefforts inbothpublic andprivate toencouragewitnessesnot tocooperatewith the investigation.Judgmentsabout thenatureof thePresident’smotivesduringeachphasewouldbeinformedbythetotalityoftheevidence.

STATUTORYANDCONSTITUTIONALDEFENSES

The President’s counsel raised statutory and constitutional defenses to apossible obstruction-of-justice analysis of the conduct we investigated. Weconcluded that none of those legal defenses provided a basis for declining toinvestigatethefacts.

Statutory defenses. Consistent with precedent and the Department ofJustice’sgeneralapproachtointerpretingobstructionstatutes,weconcludedthatseveral statutes could apply here. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(b)(3),1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c)(2) is an omnibus obstruction-of-justice provisionthat covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or contemplatedofficial proceedings.No principle of statutory construction justifies narrowingtheprovision tocoveronlyconduct that impairs the integrityoravailabilityofevidence.Sections1503and1505alsoofferbroadprotectionagainstobstructiveacts directed at pending grand jury, judicial, administrative, and congressionalproceedings,andtheyaresupplementedbyaprovisioninSection1512(b)aimedspecificallyatconductintendedtopreventorhinderthecommunicationtolawenforcementofinformationrelatedtoafederalcrime.

Constitutional defenses. As for constitutional defenses arising from thePresident’s status as theheadof theExecutiveBranch,we recognized that theDepartmentofJusticeandthecourtshavenotdefinitivelyresolvedtheseissues.We therefore examined those issues through the framework established bySupreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues. TheDepartmentofJusticeandthePresident’spersonalcounselhaverecognizedthatthePresidentissubjecttostatutesthatprohibitobstructionofjusticebybribingawitness or suborning perjury because that conduct does not implicate hisconstitutional authority.With respect towhether thePresident canbe found tohave obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of theConstitution,weconcludedthatCongresshasauthoritytoprohibitaPresident’scorruptuseofhisauthorityinordertoprotecttheintegrityoftheadministrationofjustice.

Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does notcategorically and permanently immunize a President for obstructing justicethrough the use of his Article II powers. The separation-of-powers doctrineauthorizesCongresstoprotectofficialproceedings,includingthoseofcourtsandgrand juries, fromcorrupt, obstructive acts regardless of their source.We alsoconcluded that any inroad on presidential authority that would occur fromprohibitingcorruptactsdoesnotundermine thePresident’sability to fulfillhisconstitutional mission. The term “corruptly” sets a demanding standard. Itrequires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain animproperadvantageforhimselforsomeoneelse,inconsistentwithofficialdutyand the rights of others. A preclusion of “corrupt” official action does notdiminish thePresident’sability toexerciseArticle IIpowers.Forexample, the

propersupervisionofcriminallawdoesnotdemandfreedomforthePresidenttoact with a corrupt intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment,avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To thecontrary, a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corruptpurposes furthers, rather than hinders, the impartial and evenhandedadministrationofthelaw.ItalsoalignswiththePresident’sconstitutionaldutytofaithfullyexecutethelaws.Finally,weconcludedthatintherarecaseinwhichacriminal investigation of the President’s conduct is justified, inquiries todetermine whether the President acted for a corrupt motive should notimpermissiblychillhisperformanceofhisconstitutionallyassignedduties.Theconclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction laws to the President’scorruptexerciseofthepowersofofficeaccordswithourconstitutionalsystemofchecksandbalancesandtheprinciplethatnopersonisabovethelaw.

CONCLUSION

Becausewedeterminednottomakeatraditionalprosecutorialjudgment,wedidnotdrawultimateconclusionsabout thePresident’sconduct.TheevidenceweobtainedaboutthePresident’sactionsandintentpresentsdifficultissuesthatwould need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorialjudgment.Atthesametime,ifwehadconfidenceafterathoroughinvestigationofthefacts that thePresidentclearlydidnotcommitobstructionofjustice,wewould so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we areunabletoreachthatjudgment.Accordingly,whilethisreportdoesnotconcludethatthePresidentcommittedacrime,italsodoesnotexoneratehim.

I.BACKGROUNDLEGALANDEVIDENTIARYPRINCIPLES

A.LegalFrameworkofObstructionofJustice

TheMay17,2017AppointmentOrderandtheSpecialCounselregulationsprovidethisOfficewithjurisdictiontoinvestigate“federalcrimescommittedinthe course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel’sinvestigation,suchasperjury,obstructionofjustice,destructionofevidence,andintimidationofwitnesses.”28C.F.R.§600.4(a).Becauseofthatdescriptionofourjurisdiction,wesoughtevidenceforourobstruction-of-justiceinvestigationwith the elements of obstruction offenses inmind.Our evidentiary analysis issimilarly focused on the elements of such offenses, althoughwe do not drawconclusionsontheultimatequestionsthatgovernaprosecutorialdecisionunderthe Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual § 9-27.000 et seq.(2018).

Here,wesummarizethelawinterpretingtheelementsofpotentiallyrelevantobstruction statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address theunique constitutional issues that arise in an inquiry into official acts by thePresident.Thoseissuesarediscussedinalatersectionofthisreportaddressingconstitutionaldefenses that thePresident’scounselhaveraised.SeeVolumeII,SectionIII.B,infra.

Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstructionstatutes: (1)anobstructiveact; (2)anexusbetween theobstructiveact andanofficialproceeding;and(3)acorruptintent.See,e.g.,18U.S.C.§§1503,1505,1512(c)(2).We describe those elements as they have been interpreted by thecourts.Wethendiscussamorespecificstatuteaimedatwitnesstampering,see18U.S.C.§1512(b),anddescribe therequirementsforattemptedoffensesandendeavorstoobstructjustice,see18U.S.C.§§1503,1512(c)(2).

Obstructive act. Obstruction-of-justice law “reaches all corrupt conductcapable of producing an effect that prevents justice from being dulyadministered, regardless of themeans employed.”United States v. Silverman,745F.2d1386,1393(11thCir.1984)(interpreting18U.S.C.§1503).An“efforttoinfluence”aproceedingcanqualifyasanendeavortoobstructjusticeevenif

the effort was “subtle or circuitous” and “however cleverly or with whatevercloakingofpurpose”itwasmade.UnitedStatesv.Roe,529F.2d629,632(4thCir.1975);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Quattrone,441F.3d153,173(2dCir.2006).The verbs ‘“obstruct or impede’ are broad” and “can refer to anything thatblocks,makesdifficult,orhinders.”Marinellov.UnitedStates,138S.Ct.1101,1106(2018)(internalbracketsandquotationmarksomitted).

Animpropermotivecanrenderanactor’sconductcriminalevenwhentheconductwouldotherwisebelawfulandwithintheactor’sauthority.SeeUnitedStates v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 631 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming obstructionconviction of a criminal defense attorney for “litigation-related conduct”);UnitedStatesv.Cintolo,818F.2d980,992(1stCir.1987)(“anyactbyanyparty—whether lawful or unlawful on its face—may abridge § 1503 if performedwithacorruptmotive”).

Nexus to a pending or contemplated official proceeding. Obstruction-of-justicelawgenerallyrequiresanexus,orconnection,toanofficialproceeding.In Section 1503, the nexus must be to pending “judicial or grand juryproceedings.”United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). In Section1505, the nexus can include a connection to a “pending” federal agencyproceedingoracongressional inquiryor investigation.Underbothstatutes, thegovernment must demonstrate “a relationship in time, causation, or logic”betweentheobstructiveactandtheproceedingorinquirytobeobstructed.Id.at599; see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707-708(2005). Section 1512(c) prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at officialproceedingsincludingjudicialorgrandjuryproceedings.18U.S.C.§1515(a)(1)(A). “For purposes of” Section 1512, “an official proceeding need not bependingorabouttobeinstitutedatthetimeoftheoffense.”18U.S.C.§1512(f)(1).Although a proceeding need not already be in progress to trigger liabilityunder Section 1512(c), a nexus to a contemplated proceeding still must beshown.UnitedStatesv.Young,916F.3d368,386(4thCir.2019);UnitedStatesv.Petruk,781F.3d438,445(8thCir.2015);UnitedStatesv.Phillips,583F.3d1261,1264(10thCir.2009);UnitedStatesv.Reich,479F.3d179,186(2dCir.2007).Thenexusrequirementnarrowsthescopeofobstructionstatutestoensurethat individuals have “fair warning” of what the law proscribes.Aguilar, 515U.S.at600(internalquotationmarksomitted).

The nexus showing has subjective and objective components. As an

objective matter, a defendant must act “in a manner that is likely to obstructjustice,”suchthatthestatute“excludesdefendantswhohaveanevilpurposebutusemeansthatwouldonlyunnaturallyandimprobablybesuccessful.”Aguilar,515U.S.at601-602(emphasisadded;internalquotationmarksomitted).“[T]heendeavormusthave thenaturalandprobableeffectof interferingwith thedueadministration of justice.” Id. at 599 (citation and internal quotation marksomitted).Asasubjectivematter,theactormusthave“contemplatedaparticular,foreseeable proceeding.” Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445-446. A defendant need notdirectly impede theproceeding.Rather,anexusexists if“discretionaryactionsofathirdpersonwouldberequiredtoobstructthejudicialproceedingifitwasforeseeable to thedefendant that the thirdpartywouldacton the[defendant’s]communication in such a way as to obstruct the judicial proceeding.”UnitedStates v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017) (brackets, ellipses, andinternalquotationmarksomitted).

Corruptly.Theword“corruptly”providestheintentelementforobstructionofjusticeandmeansacting“knowinglyanddishonestly”or“withanimpropermotive.”UnitedStatesv.Richardson,676F.3d491,508(5thCir.2012);UnitedStatesv.Gordon,710F.3d1124,1151(10thCir.2013)(toactcorruptlymeansto“act[] with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly anddishonestlywiththespecificintenttosubvert, impedeorobstruct”therelevantproceeding)(somequotationmarksomitted);see18U.S.C.§1515(b)(“Asusedin section 1505, the term ‘corruptly’means actingwith an improper purpose,personallyorby influencinganother.”); seealsoArthurAndersen, 544U.S. at705-706 (interpreting “corruptly” to mean “wrongful, immoral, depraved, orevil”andholdingthatacting“knowingly...corruptly”in18U.S.C.§1512(b)requires“consciousnessofwrongdoing”).Therequisiteshowingismadewhenaperson actedwith an intent to obtain an “improper advantage for [him]self orsomeone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.”BALLENTINE’SLAWDICTIONARY276(3ded.1969);seeUnitedStatesv.Pasha,797F.3d1122,1132(D.C.Cir.2015);Aguilar,515U.S.at616(Scalia,J.,concurringinpartanddissentinginpart)(characterizingthisdefinitionasthe“longstandingandwell-acceptedmeaning”of“corruptly”).

Witness tampering. A more specific provision in Section 1512 prohibitstamperingwithawitness.See18U.S.C.§1512(b)(1),(3)(makingitacrimeto“knowingly use[] intimidation . . . or corruptly persuade[] another person,” or“engage[] in misleading conduct towards another person,” with the intent to

“influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an officialproceeding” or to “hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a lawenforcement officer . . . of information relating to the commission or possiblecommission of a Federal offense”). To establish corrupt persuasion, it issufficient that thedefendant askedapotentialwitness to lie to investigators incontemplationofalikelyfederalinvestigationintohisconduct.UnitedStatesv.Edlind, 887 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir. 2018);United States v. Sparks, 791 F.3d1188, 1191-1192 (10thCir. 2015);UnitedStates v.Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 23-26(1stCir.2006);UnitedStatesv.LaShay,417F.3d715,718-719(7thCir.2005);UnitedStatesv.Burns,298F.3d523,539-540(6thCir.2002);UnitedStatesv.Pennington,168F.3d1060,1066(8thCir.1999).The“persuasion”neednotbecoercive, intimidating, or explicit; it is sufficient to “urge,” “induce,” “ask[],”“argu[e],” “giv[e] reasons,”Sparks, 791F.3d at 1192, or “coach[] or remind[]witnesses by planting misleading facts,” Edlind, 887 F.3d at 174. Corruptpersuasionisshown“whereadefendanttellsapotentialwitnessafalsestoryasifthestoryweretrue,intendingthatthewitnessbelievethestoryandtestifytoit.”UnitedStatesv.Rodolitz,786F.2d77,82(2dCir.1986);seeUnitedStatesv.Gabriel,125F.3d89,102(2dCir.1997).Italsocoversurgingawitnesstorecalla fact that the witness did not know, even if the fact was actually true. SeeLaShay, 417 F.3d at 719. Corrupt persuasion also can be shown in certaincircumstanceswhenaperson,withan impropermotive,urgesawitnessnot tocooperate with law enforcement. See United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289,1301(11thCr.1998) (tellingSecretary“not to [say]anything[to theFBI]and[she]wouldnotbebothered”).

When the charge is actingwith the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent thecommunicationofinformationtolawenforcementunderSection1512(b)(3),the“nexus”toaproceedinginquiryarticulatedinAguilar—thatanindividualhave“knowledgethathisactionsarelikelytoaffectthejudicialproceeding,”515U.S.at 599—does not apply because the obstructive act is aimed at thecommunication of information to investigators, not at impeding an officialproceeding.

Acting “knowingly . . . corruptly” requires proof that the individual was“consciousofwrongdoing.”ArthurAndersen,544U.S.at705-706(decliningtoexplore“[t]heouterlimitsofthiselement”butindicatingthataninstructionwasinfirm where it permitted conviction even if the defendant “honestly andsincerelybelieved that [the] conductwas lawful”). It is an affirmativedefense

that“theconductconsistedsolelyoflawfulconductandthatthedefendant’ssoleintention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testifytruthfully.”18U.S.C.§1512(e).

Attempts and endeavors. Section 1512(c)(2) covers both substantiveobstructionoffensesandattemptstoobstructjustice.Undergeneralprinciplesofattemptlaw,apersonisguiltyofanattemptwhenhehastheintenttocommitasubstantive offense and takes an overt act that constitutes a substantial steptowardsthatgoal.SeeUnitedStatesv.Resendiz-Ponce,549U.S.102,106-107(2007).“[T]heact[mustbe]substantial,inthatitwasstronglycorroborativeofthedefendant’scriminalpurpose.”UnitedStatesv.Pratt,351F.3d131,135(4thCir. 2003). While “mere abstract talk” does not suffice, any “concrete andspecific”actsthatcorroboratethedefendant’sintentcanconstitutea“substantialstep.”UnitedStatesv.Irving,665F.3d1184,1198-1205(10thCir.2011).Thus,“solicitinganinnocentagenttoengageinconductconstitutinganelementofthecrime”may qualify as a substantial step.Model PenalCode § 5.01(2)(g); seeUnitedStatesv.Lucas,499F.3d769,781(8thCir.2007).

Theomnibusclauseof18U.S.C.§1503prohibitsan“endeavor”toobstructjustice,whichsweepsmorebroadlythanSection1512’sattemptprovision.SeeUnited States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir. 2018);United States v.Leisure,844F.2d1347,1366-1367(8thCir.1988)(collectingcases).“Itiswellestablished that a[n] [obstruction-of-justice] offense is complete when onecorruptlyendeavorstoobstructorimpedethedueadministrationofjustice;theprosecution need not prove that the due administration of justicewas actuallyobstructedorimpeded.”UnitedStatesv.Davis,854F.3d1276,1292(11thCir.2017)(internalquotationmarksomitted).

B.InvestigativeandEvidentiaryConsiderations

AftertheappointmentoftheSpecialCounsel,thisOfficeobtainedevidenceabout the following events relating topotential issuesof obstructionof justiceinvolvingthePresident:

a. ThePresident’sJanuary27,2017dinnerwithformerFBIDirectorJamesComeyinwhichthePresidentreportedlyaskedforComey’sloyalty,onedayaftertheWhiteHousehadbeenbriefedbytheDepartmentofJusticeoncontactsbetweenformerNationalSecurityAdvisorMichaelFlynnandtheRussianAmbassador;

b. ThePresident’sFebruary14,2017meetingwithComeyinwhichthePresidentreportedlyaskedComeynottopursueaninvestigationofFlynn;

c. ThePresident’sprivaterequeststoComeytomakepublicthefactthatthePresidentwasnotthesubjectofanFBIinvestigationandtoliftwhatthePresidentregardedasacloud;

d. ThePresident’soutreachtotheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceandtheDirectorsoftheNationalSecurityAgencyandtheCentralIntelligenceAgencyabouttheFBI’sRussiainvestigation;

e. ThePresident’sstatedrationalesforterminatingComeyonMay9,2017,includingstatementsthatcouldreasonablybeunderstoodasacknowledgingthattheFBI’sRussiainvestigationwasafactorinComey’stermination;and

f. ThePresident’sreportedinvolvementinissuingastatementabouttheJune9,2016TrumpTowermeetingbetweenRussiansandseniorTrumpCampaignofficialsthatsaidthemeetingwasaboutadoptionandomittedthattheRussianshadofferedtoprovidetheTrumpCampaignwithderogatoryinformationaboutHillaryClinton.

Takingintoaccountthatinformationandouranalysisofapplicablestatutoryandconstitutional principles (discussedbelow inVolume II, Section III, infra),wedetermined that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to furtherinvestigatepotentialobstruction-of-justiceissuesinvolvingthePresident.

Manyofthecoreissuesinanobstruction-of-justiceinvestigationturnonanindividual’s actions and intent. We therefore requested that the White Houseprovideuswithdocumentaryevidencein itspossessionontherelevantevents.WealsosoughtandobtainedtheWhiteHouse’sconcurrenceinourconductinginterviews ofWhite House personnel who had relevant information. And weinterviewedotherwitnesseswhohadpertinentknowledge,obtaineddocumentsonavoluntarybasiswhenpossible, andused legalprocesswhere appropriate.Theseinvestigativestepsallowedustogatherasubstantialamountofevidence.

WealsosoughtavoluntaryinterviewwiththePresident.Aftermorethanayearofdiscussion,thePresidentdeclinedtobeinterviewed.GrandJury████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████During the course of our discussions, the President did agree toanswer written questions on certain Russia-related topics, and he provided uswithanswers.Hedidnotsimilarlyagreetoprovidewrittenanswerstoquestionson obstruction topics or questions on events during the transition. Ultimately,while we believed that we had the authority and legal justification to issue agrandjurysubpoenatoobtainthePresident’stestimony,wechosenottodoso.Wemadethatdecisioninviewofthesubstantialdelaythatsuchaninvestigativestepwouldlikelyproduceata latestageinourinvestigation.Wealsoassessedthat basedon the significant bodyof evidencewehad alreadyobtainedof thePresident’sactionsandhispublicandprivatestatementsdescribingorexplainingthose actions,we had sufficient evidence to understand relevant events and to

make certain assessments without the President’s testimony. The Office’sdecision-makingprocessonthisissueisdescribedinmoredetailinAppendixC,infra,inanotethatprecedesthePresident’swrittenresponses.

Inassessingtheevidenceweobtained,wereliedoncommonprinciplesthatapply in any investigation. The issue of criminal intent is often inferred fromcircumstantialevidence.See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Croteau,819F.3d1293,1305(11th Cir. 2016) (“[G]uilty knowledge can rarely be established by directevidence....Therefore,mensreaelementssuchasknowledgeorintentmaybeprovedbycircumstantialevidence.”)(internalquotationmarksomitted);UnitedStates v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The government’s caserestedoncircumstantialevidence,butthemensreaelementsofknowledgeandintent can often be proved through circumstantial evidence and the reasonableinferencesdrawntherefrom.”)(internalquotationmarksomitted).Theprinciplethatintentcanbeinferredfromcircumstantialevidenceisanecessityincriminalcases,giventherightofasubjecttoasserthisprivilegeagainstcompelledself-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and therefore decline to testify.Accordingly, determinations on intent are frequently reached without theopportunitytointerviewaninvestigatorysubject.

Obstruction-of-justicecasesareconsistentwith this rule.See, e.g.,Edlind,887F.3d at 174, 176 (relying on “significant circumstantial evidence that [thedefendant]wasconsciousofherwrongdoing”inanobstructioncase;“[b]ecauseevidence of intent will almost always be circumstantial, a defendant may befoundculpablewhere the reasonableand foreseeableconsequencesofher actsare the obstruction of justice”) (internal quotation marks, ellipses, andpunctuationomitted);Quattrone,441F.3dat173-174.Circumstantialevidencethatilluminatesintentmayincludeapatternofpotentiallyobstructiveacts.Fed.R. Evid. 404(b) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act . . . may beadmissible . . . [to] prov[e] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,knowledge,identity,absenceofmistake,orlackofaccident.”);see,e.g.,UnitedStates v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648-650 (1st Cir. 1996);United States v.Arnold,773F.2d823,832-834(7thCir.1985);Cintolo,818F.2dat1000.

Credibility judgments may also be made based on objective facts andcircumstantialevidence.Standardjuryinstructionshighlightavarietyoffactorsthatareoftenrelevantinassessingcredibility.Theseincludewhetherawitnesshad a reason not to tell the truth; whether the witness had a good memory;whether thewitnesshad theopportunity toobserve the events aboutwhichhe

testified;whether thewitness’s testimonywascorroboratedbyotherwitnesses;and whether anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts histestimony.See,e.g.,FirstCircuitPatternJuryInstructions§1.06(2018);FifthCircuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 1.08 (2012); SeventhCircuitPatternJuryInstruction§3.01(2012).

In addition to those general factors, we took into account more specificfactors in assessing the credibility of conflicting accounts of the facts. Forexample, contemporaneous written notes can provide strong corroboratingevidence.SeeUnitedStatesv.Nobles,422U.S.225,232(1975)(thefactthata“statementappeared in thecontemporaneously recordedreport . . .would tendstronglytocorroboratetheinvestigator’sversionoftheinterview”).Similarly,awitness’s recitation of his account before he had anymotive to fabricate alsosupportsthewitness’scredibility.SeeTomev.UnitedStates,513U.S.150,158(1995)(“Aconsistentstatement thatpredates themotiveisasquarerebuttalofthechargethatthetestimonywascontrivedasaconsequenceofthatmotive.”).Finally,awitness’sfalsedescriptionofanencountercanimplyconsciousnessofwrongdoing. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010)(notingthe“well-settledprinciplethatfalseexculpatorystatementsareevidence—oftenstrongevidence—ofguilt”).Weappliedthosesettledlegalprinciplesinevaluatingthefactualresultsofourinvestigation.

II.FACTUALRESULTSOFTHEOBSTRUCTIONINVESTIGATIONThissectionofthereportdetailstheevidenceweobtained.Wefirstprovide

anoverviewofhowRussiabecameanissueinthe2016presidentialcampaign,and how candidate Trump responded.We then turn to the key events thatweinvestigated: the President’s conduct concerning the FBI investigation ofMichael Flynn; the President’s reaction to public confirmation of the FBI’sRussia investigation; events leading up to and surrounding the termination ofFBIDirectorComey;effortstoterminatetheSpecialCounsel;effortstocurtailthescopeoftheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigation;effortstopreventdisclosureofinformationabouttheJune9,2016TrumpTowermeetingbetweenRussiansandsenior campaign officials; efforts to have the Attorney General unrecuse; andconducttowardsMcGahn,Cohen,andotherwitnesses.

Wesummarizetheevidencewefoundandthenanalyzeitbyreferencetothethree statutory obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act, nexus to aproceeding,andintent.Wefocusonelementsbecause,byregulation,theSpecialCounselhas“jurisdiction...toinvestigate...federalcrimescommittedinthecourseof,andwithintenttointerferewith,theSpecialCounsel’sinvestigation,suchasperjury,obstructionofjustice,destructionofevidence,andintimidationof witnesses.” 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Consistent with our jurisdiction toinvestigate federalobstructioncrimes,wegatheredevidence that is relevant totheelementsofthosecrimesandanalyzedthemwithinanelementsframework—while refraining from reaching ultimate conclusions about whether crimeswere committed, for the reasons explained above. This section also does notaddress legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President;thosedefensesareanalyzedinVolumeII,SectionIII,infra.

A.TheCampaign’sResponsetoReportsAboutRussianSupportforTrump

During the 2016 campaign, the media raised questions about a possibleconnectionbetweentheTrumpCampaignandRussia.7Thequestionsintensifiedafter WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails thatwere reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump responded to questionsabout possible connections toRussia by denying any business involvement inRussia—eventhoughtheTrumpOrganizationhadpursuedabusinessprojectin

Russia as late as June2016.Trumpalso expressed skepticism thatRussia hadhackedtheemailsatthesametimeasheandotherCampaignadvisorsprivatelysought information HOM███████████ about any further plannedWikiLeaksreleases.Aftertheelection,whenquestionspersistedaboutpossiblelinksbetweenRussiaandtheTrumpCampaign,thePresident-ElectcontinuedtodenyanyconnectionstoRussiaandprivatelyexpressedconcernsthatreportsofRussianelectioninterferencemightleadthepublictoquestionthelegitimacyofhiselection.8

1.PressReportsAllegeLinksBetweentheTrumpCampaignandRussia

OnJune16,2015,DonaldJ.Trumpdeclaredhisintenttoseeknominationas the Republican candidate for President.9 By early 2016, he distinguishedhimselfamongRepublicancandidatesbyspeakingofclosertieswithRussia,10

saying he would get along well with Russian President Vladimir Putin,11

questioningwhethertheNATOalliancewasobsolete,12andpraisingPutinasa“strong leader.”13 The press reported that Russian political analysts andcommentatorsperceivedTrumpasfavorabletoRussia.14

BeginninginFebruary2016andcontinuingthroughthesummer,themediareportedthatseveralTrumpcampaignadvisorsappearedtohavetiestoRussia.Forexample,thepressreportedthatcampaignadvisorMichaelFlynnwasseatednext to Vladimir Putin at an RT gala inMoscow inDecember 2015 and thatFlynnhadappearedregularlyonRTasananalyst.15Thepressalsoreportedthatforeign policy advisor Carter Page had ties to a Russian state-run gascompany,16andthatcampaignchairmanPaulManaforthaddoneworkfor the“Russian-backed former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych.”17 Inaddition,thepressraisedquestionsduringtheRepublicanNationalConventionabouttheTrumpCampaign’sinvolvementinchangingtheRepublicanplatform’sstanceongiving“weaponstoUkrainetofightRussianandrebelforces.”18

2.TheTrumpCampaignReactstoWikiLeaks’sReleaseofHackedEmails

OnJune14,2016,acybersecurityfirmthathadconductedin-houseanalysis

for the Democratic National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement thatRussian government hackers had infiltrated theDNC’s computer and obtainedaccesstodocuments.19

On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention,WikiLeaks posted thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitiveinternal deliberations.20 Soon thereafter, Hillary Clinton’s campaign managerpubliclycontended thatRussiahadhacked theDNCemailsandarranged theirrelease in order to help candidate Trump.21On July 26, 2016, theNewYorkTimesreportedthatU.S.“intelligenceagenciesha[d]toldtheWhiteHousetheynowhave‘highconfidence’thattheRussiangovernmentwasbehindthetheftofemailsanddocumentsfromtheDemocraticNationalCommittee.”22

WithintheTrumpCampaign,aidesreactedwithenthusiasmtoreportsofthehacks.23HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████discussedwithCampaignofficialsthatWikiLeakswould release thehackedmaterial.24Somewitnesses said thatTrumphimselfdiscussedthepossibilityofupcomingreleasesHOM████.MichaelCohen,then-executivevicepresidentoftheTrumpOrganizationandspecialcounseltoTrump,recalledhearingHarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████.25Cohen recalled thatTrump responded, “oh good, alright,” andHarmtoOngoingMatter██████████.26ManafortsaidshortlyafterWikiLeak’s July 22, 2016 release of hacked documents, he spoke to TrumpHarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████;ManafortrecalledthatTrumprespondedthatManafortshouldHOM█████████keepTrumpupdated.27 Deputy campaign manager Rick Gates said that Manafort wasgettingpressureaboutHOM█████████████statusupdatesonupcomingreleases.28Aroundthesametime,GateswaswithTrumponatriptoanairportHOM█████████████████████████████, and shortly after the call ended, Trump toldGates thatmore releases ofdamaginginformationwouldbecoming.29HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████werediscussedwithintheCampaign,30andinthesummerof2016,the Campaignwas planning a communications strategy based on the possible

releaseofClintonemailsbyWikiLeaks.31

3.TheTrumpCampaignReactstoAllegationsThatRussiawasSeekingtoAidCandidateTrump

InthedaysthatfollowedWikiLeaks’sJuly22,2016releaseofhackedDNCemails, the Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia wasseeking to aid candidateTrump.On July26, 2016,Trump tweeted that itwas“[c]razy”tosuggestthatRussiawas“dealingwithTrump”32andthat“[f]ortherecord,”hehad“ZEROinvestmentsinRussia.”33

Inapressconferencethenextday,July27,2016,Trumpcharacterized“thiswhole thing with Russia” as “a total deflection” and stated that it was“farfetched” and “ridiculous.”34Trump said that the assertion thatRussia hadhackedtheemailswasunproven,butstatedthatitwouldgivehim“nopause”ifRussiahadClinton’semails.35Trumpadded,“Russia,ifyou’relistening,Ihopeyou’reabletofindthe30,000emailsthataremissing.Ithinkyouwillprobablyberewardedmightilybyourpress.”36Trumpalsosaidthat“there’snothingthatIcanthinkofthatI’dratherdothanhaveRussiafriendlyasopposedtothewaythey are right now,” and in response to a question about whether he wouldrecognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting sanctions, Trumpreplied,“We’llbelookingatthat.Yeah,we’llbelooking.”37

During the press conference, Trump repeated “I have nothing to do withRussia”fivetimes.38Hestatedthat“theclosest[he]cametoRussia”wasthatRussiansmayhavepurchasedahomeorcondosfromhim.39HesaidthatafterheheldtheMissUniversepageantinMoscowin2013hehadbeeninterestedinworking with Russian companies that “wanted to put a lot of money intodevelopmentsinRussia”but“itneverworkedout.”40Heexplained,“[f]rankly,Ididn’t want to do it for a couple of different reasons. But we had a majordeveloper...thatwantedtodeveloppropertyinMoscowandotherplaces.Butwe decided not to do it.”41 The Trump Organization, however, had beenpursuing a building project inMoscow—theTrumpTowerMoscow project—fromapproximatelySeptember2015throughJune2016,andthecandidatewasregularlyupdatedondevelopments, includingpossible tripsbyMichaelCohen

toMoscowtopromotethedealandbyTrumphimselftofinalizeit.42

Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference aboutTrump’s denial of any business dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded asuntrue.43TrumptoldCohenthatTrumpTowerMoscowwasnotadealyetandsaid,“Whymentionitifitisnotadeal?”44AccordingtoCohen,ataroundthistime, in response to Trump’s disavowal of connections to Russia, campaignadvisorshaddevelopeda“party line” thatTrumphadnobusinesswithRussiaandnoconnectionstoRussia.45

In addition todenyinganyconnectionswithRussia, theTrumpCampaignreacted to reports of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign byseekingtodistance itself fromRussiancontacts.Forexample, inAugust2016,foreign policy advisor J.D. Gordon declined an invitation to RussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyak’sresidencebecausethetimingwas“notoptimal”inview of media reports about Russian interference.46 On August 19, 2016,Manafortwasaskedtoresignamidmediacoveragescrutinizinghistiestoapro-Russianpolitical party inUkraine and links toRussianbusiness.47Andwhenthe media published stories about Page’s connections to Russia in September2016, Trump Campaign officials terminated Page’s association with theCampaignandtoldthepressthathehadplayed“norole”intheCampaign.48

OnOctober7,2016,WikiLeaksreleasedthefirstsetofemailsstolenbyaRussian intelligenceagencyfromClintonCampaignchairmanJohnPodesta.49Thesameday,thefederalgovernmentannouncedthat“theRussianGovernmentdirected the recent compromises of e-mails fromUS persons and institutions,including from US political organizations.”50 The government statementdirectly linkedRussianhacking to the releasesonWikiLeaks,with thegoalofinterfering with the presidential election, and concluded “that only Russia’ssenior-most officials could have authorized these activities” based on their“scopeandsensitivity.”51

OnOctober11,2016,PodestastatedpubliclythattheFBIwasinvestigatingRussia’shackingandsaid thatcandidateTrumpmighthaveknown inadvancethatthehackedemailsweregoingtobereleased.52VicePresidentialCandidateMike Pence was asked whether the Trump Campaign was “in cahoots” with

WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information and responded,“Nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth.”53

4.AftertheElection,TrumpContinuestoDenyAnyContactsorConnectionswithRussiaorThatRussiaAidedhisElection

On November 8, 2016, Trump was elected President. Two days later,Russian officials told the press that the Russian government had maintainedcontacts with Trump’s “immediate entourage” during the campaign.54 Inresponse,HopeHicks,whohadbeentheTrumpCampaignspokesperson,said,“Wearenotawareofanycampaignrepresentativesthatwereintouchwithanyforeign entities before yesterday, when Mr. Trump spoke with many worldleaders.”55Hicks gave an additional statement denying any contacts betweenthe Campaign and Russia: “It never happened. There was no communicationbetweenthecampaignandanyforeignentityduringthecampaign.”56

OnDecember 10, 2016, the press reported thatU.S. intelligence agencieshad “concluded that Russia interfered in last month’s presidential election toboost Donald Trump’s bid for theWhite House.”57 Reacting to the story thenextday,President-ElectTrumpstated, “I think it’s ridiculous. I think it’s justanotherexcuse.”58Hecontinuedthatnoonereallyknewwhowasresponsiblefor thehacking,suggestingthat the intelligencecommunityhad“noideaif it’sRussia or China or somebody. It could be somebody sitting in a bed someplace.”59ThePresident-ElectalsosaidthatDemocratswere“putting[]out”thestoryofRussianinterference“becausetheysufferedoneofthegreatestdefeatsinthehistoryofpolitics.”60

On December 18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was“distorted by the Russian intervention” and questioned whether TrumpCampaign officials had been “in touch with the Russians.”61 The same day,incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus appeared on Fox News Sunday anddeclined to say whether the President-Elect accepted the intelligencecommunity’sdeterminationthatRussiaintervenedintheelection.62Whenaskedabout any contact or coordination between theCampaign andRussia, Priebussaid, “Even this question is insane. Of course we didn’t interface with theRussians.”63Priebusaddedthat“thiswhole thing isaspin job”andsaid,“the

real question is, why the Democrats . . . are doing everything they can todelegitimizetheoutcomeoftheelection?”64

On December 29, 2016, the Obama Administration announced that inresponsetoRussiancyberoperationsaimedattheU.S.election,itwasimposingsanctions and other measures on several Russian individuals and entities.65When first asked about the sanctions,President-ElectTrump said, “I thinkweoughttogetonwithourlives.”66Hethenputoutastatementthatsaid“It’stimefor our country tomove on to bigger and better things,” but indicated that hewould meet with intelligence community leaders the following week for abriefingonRussianinterference.67ThebriefingoccurredonJanuary6,2017.68Followingthebriefing,theintelligencecommunityreleasedthepublicversionofitsassessment,whichconcludedwithhighconfidencethatRussiahadintervenedin the election through a variety ofmeanswith the goal of harmingClinton’selectability.69TheassessmentfurtherconcludedwithhighconfidencethatPutinandtheRussiangovernmenthaddevelopedaclearpreferenceforTrump.70

Severaldays later,BuzzFeedpublishedunverifiedallegationscompiledbyformerBritishintelligenceofficerChristopherSteeleduringthecampaignaboutcandidateTrump’sRussiaconnectionsundertheheadline“TheseReportsAllegeTrump Has Deep Ties To Russia.”71 In a press conference the next day, thePresident-Elect called the release “an absolute disgrace” and said, “I have nodealingswithRussia.IhavenodealsthatcouldhappeninRussia,becausewe’vestayedaway....SoIhavenodeals,IhavenoloansandIhavenodealings.Wecouldmake deals in Russia very easily if we wanted to, I just don’t want tobecauseIthinkthatwouldbeaconflict.”72

Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about hisRussianconnections, theRussiainvestigations,andtheintelligencecommunityassessmentofRussianinterferenceasathreat tothelegitimacyofhiselectoralvictory.73 Hicks, for example, said that the President-Elect viewed theintelligence community assessment as his “Achilles heel” because, even ifRussia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped himwin,takingawayfromwhathehadaccomplished.74SeanSpicer,thefirstWhiteHouse communications director, recalled that thePresident thought theRussiastorywasdeveloped toundermine the legitimacyofhis election.75Gatessaid

thePresidentviewedtheRussia investigationasanattackon the legitimacyofhiswin.76AndPriebusrecalledthatwhentheintelligenceassessmentcameout,thePresident-Electwasconcernedpeoplewouldquestion the legitimacyofhiswin.77

B.ThePresident’sConductConcerningtheInvestigationofMichaelFlynn

Overview

During the presidential transition, incoming National Security AdvisorMichaelFlynnhadtwophonecallswiththeRussianAmbassadortotheUnitedStatesabouttheRussianresponsetoU.S.sanctionsimposedbecauseofRussia’selection interference. After the press reported on Flynn’s contacts with theRussianAmbassador,FlynnliedtoincomingAdministrationofficialsbysayinghehadnotdiscussedsanctionsonthecalls.Theofficialspubliclyrepeatedthoseliesinpressinterviews.TheFBI,whichpreviouslywasinvestigatingFlynnforother matters, interviewed him about the calls in the first week after theinauguration, and Flynn told similar lies to the FBI. On January 26, 2017,DepartmentofJustice (DOJ)officialsnotified theWhiteHouse thatFlynnandthe Russian Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Flynn had beeninterviewedbytheFBI.Thenextnight,thePresidenthadaprivatedinnerwithFBIDirectorJamesComeyinwhichheaskedforComey’sloyalty.OnFebruary13,2017,thePresidentaskedFlynntoresign.Thefollowingday,thePresidenthadaone-on-oneconversationwithComey inwhichhesaid,“Ihopeyoucanseeyourwaycleartolettingthisgo,tolettingFlynngo.”

Evidence

1.IncomingNationalSecurityAdvisorFlynnDiscussesSanctionsonRussiawithRussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyak

Shortly after the election, President-Elect Trump announced he wouldappoint Michael Flynn as his National Security Advisor.78 For the next twomonths,FlynnplayedanactiveroleonthePresidentialTransitionTeam(PTT)coordinating policy positions and communicating with foreign governmentofficials,includingRussianAmbassadortotheUnitedStatesSergeyKislyak.79

OnDecember 29, 2016, as noted inVolume II, Section II.A.4, supra, theObama Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and othermeasures on several Russian individuals and entities.80 That day, multiplemembersofthePTTexchangedemailsaboutthesanctionsandtheimpacttheywould have on the incomingAdministration, andFlynn informedmembers ofthePTTthathewouldbespeakingtotheRussianAmbassadorlaterintheday.81Flynn,whowas in theDominicanRepublic at the time, andK.T.McFarland,whowasslatedtobecometheDeputyNationalSecurityAdvisorandwasattheMar-a-Lago resort in Florida with the President-Elect and other senior staff,talkedbyphoneaboutwhat,ifanything,FlynnshouldcommunicatetoKislyakabout the sanctions.82 McFarland had spoken with incoming AdministrationofficialsaboutthesanctionsandRussia’spossibleresponsesandthoughtshehadmentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak withKislyak.83 Based on those conversations, McFarland informed Flynn thatincomingAdministrationofficialsatMar-a-LagodidnotwantRussiatoescalatethesituation.84At4:43p.m.thatafternoon,McFarlandsentanemailtoseveralofficialsaboutthesanctionsandinformedthegroupthat“Gen[F]lynnistalkingtorussianambassadorthisevening.”85

Approximatelyonehourlater,McFarlandmetwiththePresident-Electandsenior officials and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia’s possibleresponses.86 Incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus recalled thatMcFarlandmayhavementionedatthemeetingthatthesanctionssituationcouldbe“cooleddown”andnotescalated.87McFarlandrecalled thatat theendof themeeting,someonemayhavementionedtothePresident-ElectthatFlynnwasspeakingtotheRussianAmbassadorthatevening.88McFarlanddidnotrecallanyresponseby the President-Elect.89 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect viewed thesanctions as an attempt by the Obama Administration to embarrass him bydelegitimizinghiselection.90

Immediately after discussing the sanctions withMcFarland on December29, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak and requested that Russia respond to thesanctionsonly ina reciprocalmanner,withoutescalating thesituation.91Afterthecall,FlynnbriefedMcFarlandonitssubstance.92FlynntoldMcFarlandthatthe Russian response to the sanctionswas not going to be escalatory because

Russia wanted a good relationship with the Trump Administration.93 OnDecember 30, 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russiawouldnottakeretaliatorymeasuresinresponsetothesanctionsatthattimeandwould instead“plan . . . furthersteps torestoreRussian-USrelationsbasedonthepoliciesoftheTrumpAdministration.”94Followingthatannouncement,thePresident-Electtweeted,“Greatmoveondelay(byV.Putin)-Ialwaysknewhewasverysmart!”95

On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn’srequest had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not toretaliateinresponsetotherequest.96Laterthatday,FlynntoldMcFarlandaboutthis follow-up conversationwithKislyak andRussia’s decisionnot to escalatethe sanctions situation based on Flynn’s request.97 McFarland recalled thatFlynn thoughthisphonecallhadmadeadifference.98Flynnspokewithotherincoming Administration officials that day, but does not recall whether theydiscussedthesanctions.99

FlynnrecalleddiscussingthesanctionsissuewithincomingAdministrationofficial StephenBannon the next day.100Flynn said thatBannon appeared toknowaboutFlynn’sconversationswithKislyak,andheandBannonagreedthatthey had “stopped the train on Russia’s response” to the sanctions.101 OnJanuary 3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect in person and thought theydiscussedtheRussianreactiontothesanctions,butFlynndidnothaveaspecificrecollectionof telling thePresident-Elect about the substanceof his callswithKislyak.102

MembersoftheintelligencecommunityweresurprisedbyRussia’sdecisionnot to retaliate in response to the sanctions.103 When analyzing Russia’sresponse, they became aware of Flynn’s discussion of sanctions withKislyak.104Previously,theFBIhadopenedaninvestigationofFlynnbasedonhisrelationshipwiththeRussiangovemment.105Flynn’scontactswithKislyakbecameakeycomponentofthatinvestigation.106

2.President-ElectTrumpisBriefedontheIntelligenceCommunity’sAssessmentofRussianInterferenceintheElectionandCongress

OpensElection-InterferenceInvestigations

On January 6, 2017, as noted in Volume II, Section II.A.4, supra,intelligence officials briefed President-Elect Trump and the incomingAdministration on the intelligence community’s assessment that Russia hadinterfered in the 2016 presidential election.107When the briefing concluded,Comey spoke with the President-Elect privately to brief him on unverified,personally sensitive allegations compiled by Steele.108 According to amemorandum Comey drafted immediately after their private discussion, thePresident-Electbegan themeetingby tellingComeyhehadconductedhimselfhonorablyovertheprioryearandhadagreatreputation.109ThePresident-Electstated that he thought highly ofComey, looked forward toworkingwith him,andhopedthatheplannedtostayonasFBIdirector.110Comeyrespondedthathe intended to continue serving in that role.111 Comey then briefed thePresident-Elect on the sensitive material in the Steele reporting.112 ComeyrecalledthatthePresident-Electseemeddefensive,soComeydecidedtoassurehimthattheFBIwasnotinvestigatinghimpersonally.113ComeyrecalledhedidnotwantthePresident-Electtothinkoftheconversationasa“J.EdgarHoovermove.”114

On January 10, 2017, the media reported that Comey had briefed thePresident-Elect on the Steele reporting,115 and BuzzFeed News publishedinformation compiled by Steele online, stating that the information included“specific,unverified,andpotentiallyunverifiableallegationsofcontactbetweenTrump aides and Russian operatives.”116 The next day, the President-Electexpressed concern to intelligence community leaders about the fact that theinformation had leaked and askedwhether they couldmake public statementsrefutingtheallegationsintheSteelereports.117

In the following weeks, three Congressional committees openedinvestigations toexamineRussia’s interference in theelectionandwhether theTrumpCampaignhadcolludedwithRussia.118OnJanuary13,2017,theSenateSelect Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) announced that it would conduct abipartisaninquiryintoRussianinterferenceintheelection,includingany“linksbetween Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns.”119 On

January 25, 2017, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence(HPSCI) announced that it had been conducting an investigation intoRussianelectioninterferenceandpossiblecoordinationwiththepoliticalcampaigns.120AndonFebruary2,2017,theSenateJudiciaryCommitteeannouncedthatittoowouldinvestigateRussianeffortstointerveneintheelection.121

3.FlynnMakesFalseStatementsAbouthisCommunicationswithKislyaktoIncomingAdministrationOfficials,theMedia,andtheFBI

OnJanuary12,2017,aWashingtonPostcolumnistreportedthatFlynnandKislyak communicated on the day the Obama Administration announced theRussiasanctions.122ThecolumnquestionedwhetherFlynnhadsaidsomethingto “undercut the U.S. sanctions” and whether Flynn’s communications hadviolatedtheletterorspiritoftheLoganAct.123

President-Elect Trump called Priebus after the story was published andexpressed anger about it.124 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked,“Whatthehellisthisallabout?”125PriebuscalledFlynnandtoldhimthatthePresident-Elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn’s conversations withKislyak.126 Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus hadspokentothe“boss”andsaidFlynnneededto“killthestory.”127FlynndirectedMcFarland to call the Washington Post columnist and inform him that nodiscussion of sanctions had occurred.128 McFarland recalled that Flynn saidwordstotheeffectof,“Iwanttokillthestory.”129McFarlandmadethecallasFlynnhadrequestedalthoughsheknewshewasprovidingfalseinformation,andtheWashingtonPostupdated thecolumn to reflect thata“Trumpofficial”haddeniedthatFlynnandKislyakdiscussedsanctions.130

WhenPriebusandotherincomingAdministrationofficialsquestionedFlynninternallyabouttheWashingtonPostcolumn,Flynnmaintainedthathehadnotdiscussed sanctions with Kislyak.131 Flynn repeated that claim to VicePresident-ElectMichaelPenceandtoincomingpresssecretarySeanSpicer.132In subsequent media interviews in mid-January, Pence, Priebus, and SpicerdeniedthatFlynnandKislyakhaddiscussedsanctions,basingthosedenialson

theirconversationswithFlynn.133

The public statements of incoming Administration officials denying thatFlynn andKislyak had discussed sanctions alarmed seniorDOJ officials,whowereawarethatthestatementswerenottrue.134ThoseofficialswereconcernedthatFlynnhad lied to his colleagues—who in turnhadunwittinglymisled theAmerican public—creating a compromise situation for Flynn because theDepartmentofJusticeassessedthattheRussiangovernmentcouldproveFlynnlied.135TheFBIinvestigativeteamalsobelievedthatFlynn’scallswithKislyakand subsequent denials about discussing sanctions raised potential Logan ActissuesandwererelevanttotheFBI’sbroaderRussiainvestigation.136

On January 20, 2017, President Trump was inaugurated and Flynn wassworn in asNationalSecurityAdvisor.On January23, 2017,Spicer deliveredhisfirstpressbriefingandstatedthathehadspokenwithFlynnthenightbefore,who confirmed that the calls with Kislyak were about topics unrelated tosanctions.137Spicer’sstatementsaddedtotheDepartmentofJustice’sconcernsthat Russia had leverage over Flynn based on his lies and could use thatderogatoryinformationtocompromisehim.138

On January 24, 2017, Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from theFBI.139 During the interview, which took place at the White House, FlynnfalselystatedthathedidnotaskKislyaktorefrainfromescalatingthesituationin response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the ObamaAdministration.140Flynnalsofalselystatedthathedidnotrememberafollow-upconversationinwhichKislyakstatedthatRussiahadchosentomoderateitsresponsetothosesanctionsasaresultofFlynn’srequest.141

4.DOJOfficialsNotifytheWhiteHouseofTheirConcernsAboutFlynn

OnJanuary26,2017,ActingAttorneyGeneralSallyYatescontactedWhiteHouseCounselDonaldMcGahnandinformedhimthatsheneededtodiscussasensitivematterwithhiminperson.142Laterthatday,YatesandMaryMcCord,aseniornationalsecurityofficialattheDepartmentofJustice,metattheWhiteHouse with McGahn and White House Counsel’s Office attorney James

Burnham.143Yatessaid that thepublicstatementsmadeby theVicePresidentdenyingthatFlynnandKislyakdiscussedsanctionswerenottrueandputFlynninapotentiallycompromisedpositionbecausetheRussianswouldknowhehadlied.144Yates disclosed that Flynn had been interviewed by the FBI.145 Shedeclined to answer a specificquestionabouthowFlynnhadperformedduringthat interview, 146 but she indicated that Flynn’s statements to the FBI weresimilartothestatementshehadmadetoPenceandSpicerdenyingthathehaddiscussed sanctions.147 McGahn came away from the meeting with theimpressionthattheFBIhadnotpinnedFlynndowninlies,148butheaskedJohnEisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the National Security Council, toexaminepotentiallegalissuesraisedbyFlynn’sFBIinterviewandhiscontactswithKislyak.149

Thatafternoon,McGahnnotified thePresident thatYateshadcome to theWhiteHousetodiscussconcernsaboutFlynn.150McGahndescribedwhatYateshad toldhim,and thePresidentaskedhim to repeat it, sohedid.151McGahnrecalled thatwhenhedescribed theFBI interviewofFlynn,hesaid thatFlynndidnotdisclosehavingdiscussedsanctionswithKislyak,butthattheremaynothavebeenaclearviolationof18U.S.C.§1001.152ThePresidentaskedaboutSection 1001, andMcGahn explained the law to him, and also explained theLogan Act.153 The President instructed McGahn to work with Priebus andBannontolookintothematterfurtheranddirectedthattheynotdiscussitwithanyotherofficials.154PriebusrecalledthatthePresidentwasangrywithFlynninlightofwhatYateshadtold theWhiteHouseandsaid,“notagain, thisguy,thisstuff.”155

Thatevening,thePresidentdinedwithseveralsenioradvisorsandaskedthegroupwhat theythoughtaboutFBIDirectorComey.156AccordingtoDirectorof National Intelligence Dan Coats, who was at the dinner, no one openlyadvocated terminating Comey but the consensus on himwas not positive.157

Coats told the group that he thought Comey was a good director.158 CoatsencouragedthePresidenttomeetComeyface-to-faceandspendtimewithhimbeforemakingadecisionaboutwhethertoretainhim.159

5.McGahnhasaFollow-UpMeetingAboutFlynnwithYates;PresidentTrumphasDinnerwithFBIDirectorComey

The next day, January 27, 2017, McGahn and Eisenberg discussed theresultsofEisenberg’sinitiallegalresearchintoFlynn’sconduct,andspecificallywhether Flynn may have violated the Espionage Act, the Logan Act, or 18U.S.C. § 1001.160 Based on his preliminary research, Eisenberg informedMcGahn that therewasapossibility thatFlynnhadviolated18U.S.C.§1001and the Logan Act. 161 Eisenberg noted that the United States had neversuccessfullyprosecutedanindividualundertheLoganActandthatFlynncouldhavepossibledefenses,andtoldMcGahnthathebelieveditwasunlikelythataprosecutorwouldpursueaLoganActchargeunderthecircumstances.162

That samemorning,McGahnaskedYates to return to theWhiteHouse todiscussFlynnagain.163Inthatsecondmeeting,McGahnexpresseddoubtsthattheDepartmentofJusticewouldbringaLoganActprosecutionagainstFlynn,butstatedthattheWhiteHousedidnotwanttotakeactionthatwouldinterferewith an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn.164 Yates responded thatDepartmentofJusticehadnotifiedtheWhiteHousesothatitcouldtakeactionin response to the information provided.165 McGahn ended the meeting byaskingYatesforaccesstotheunderlyinginformationtheDepartmentofJusticepossessedpertainingtoFlynn’sdiscussionswithKislyak.166

Alsoon January27, thePresident calledFBIDirectorComey and invitedhimtodinnerthatevening.167Priebusrecalledthatbeforethedinner,hetoldthePresident something like, “don’t talk aboutRussia,whatever youdo,” and thePresident promised hewould not talk aboutRussia at the dinner.168McGahnhad previously advised the President that he should not communicate directlywith the Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of politicalinterferenceinlawenforcement.169WhenBannonlearnedaboutthePresident’splanneddinnerwithComey,hesuggestedthatheorPriebusalsoattend,butthePresidentstatedthathewantedtodinewithComeyalone.170Comeysaidthatwhenhearrivedforthedinnerthatevening,hewassurprisedandconcernedtoseethatnooneelsehadbeeninvited.171

Comeyprovidedanaccountofthedinnerinacontemporaneousmemo,aninterviewwith thisOffice,andcongressional testimony.AccordingtoComey’saccount of the dinner, the President repeatedly brought up Comey’s future,askingwhetherhewantedtostayonasFBIdirector.172BecausethePresidenthad previously said he wanted Comey to stay on as FBI director, Comeyinterpreted the President’s comments as an effort to create a patronagerelationshipbyhavingComeyaskforhisjob.173ThePresidentalsobroughtuptheSteelereportingthatComeyhadraisedin theJanuary6,2017briefingandstatedthathewasthinkingaboutorderingtheFBItoinvestigatetheallegationstoprove theywere false.174Comeyresponded that thePresident should thinkcarefullyaboutissuingsuchanorderbecauseitcouldcreateanarrativethattheFBI was investigating him personally, which was incorrect.175 Later in thedinner,thePresidentbroughtupFlynnandsaid,“theguyhasseriousjudgmentissues.”176 Comey did not comment on Flynn and the President did notacknowledgeanyFBIinterestinorcontactwithFlynn.177

AccordingtoComey’saccount,atonepointduringthedinnerthePresidentstated, “I need loyalty, I expect loyalty.”178 Comey did not respond and theconversationmovedontoothertopics,butthePresidentreturnedtothesubjectof Comey’s job at the end of the dinner and repeated, “I need loyalty.”179

Comey responded, “Youwill always get honesty fromme.”180ThePresidentsaid, “That’swhat Iwant, honest loyalty.”181Comey said, “Youwill get thatfromme.”182

AfterComey’saccountof thedinnerbecamepublic, thePresident andhisadvisorsdisputedthathehadaskedforComey’sloyalty.183ThePresidentalsoindicated that he had not invited Comey to dinner, telling a reporter that hethoughtComeyhad“askedforthedinner”because“hewantedtostayon.”184ButsubstantialevidencecorroboratesComey’saccountof thedinner invitationand the request for loyalty. The President’s Daily Diary confirms that thePresident “extend[ed] a dinner invitation” to Comey on January 27.185 Withrespect to the substance of the dinner conversation, Comey documented thePresident’srequestforloyaltyinamemorandumhebegandraftingthenightofthedinner;186seniorFBIofficialsrecallthatComeytoldthemabouttheloyalty

request shortlyafter thedinneroccurred;187andComeydescribed the requestwhile under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interviewwith investigators subject to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.Comey’s memory of the details of the dinner, including that the Presidentrequestedloyalty,hasremainedconsistentthroughout.188

6.Flynn’sResignation

On February 2, 2017, Eisenberg reviewed the underlying informationrelatingtoFlynn’scallswithKislyak.189EisenbergrecalledthathepreparedamemorandumaboutcriminalstatutesthatcouldapplytoFlynn’sconduct,buthedidnot believe theWhiteHousehad enough information tomake a definitiverecommendation to the President.190 Eisenberg and McGahn discussed thatEisenberg’s review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminaryconclusion that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted for violating the LoganAct.191BecauseWhiteHouseofficialswereuncertainwhatFlynnhadtoldtheFBI,however,theycouldnotassesshisexposuretoprosecutionforviolating18U.S.C.§1001.192

The week of February 6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with thePresident in theOvalOfficeabout thenegativemediacoverageofhiscontactswithKislyak.193FlynnrecalledthatthePresidentwasupsetandaskedhimforinformationontheconversations.194FlynnlistedthespecificdatesonwhichherememberedspeakingwithKislyak,butthePresidentcorrectedoneofthedateshe listed.195 The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed andFlynnrespondedthathemighthavetalkedaboutsanctions.196

On February 9, 2017, theWashington Post reported that Flynn discussedsanctionswithKislyakthemonthbeforethePresidenttookoffice.197Afterthepublication of that story, Vice President Pence learned of the Department ofJustice’snotificationtotheWhiteHouseaboutthecontentofFlynn’scalls.198He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the underlyinginformation about Flynn’s contacts with Kislyak.199 FBI Deputy DirectorAndrew McCabe, who provided the White House officials access to theinformationandwaspresentwhentheyreviewedit,recalledtheofficialsasking

him whether Flynn’s conduct violated the Logan Act.200McCabe respondedthathedidnotknow,buttheFBIwasinvestigatingthematterbecauseitwasapossibility.201BasedontheevidenceofFlynn’scontactswithKislyak,McGahnand Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of thediscussionsofsanctionsandhadinsteadbeenlyingaboutwhathediscussedwithKislyak.202FlynnhadalsotoldWhiteHouseofficialsthattheFBIhadtoldhimthat theFBIwasclosingout its investigationofhim,203butEisenbergdidnotbelieve him.204 After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn,McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn should be terminated andrecommendedthatcourseofactiontothePresident.205

Thatweekend,Flynnaccompanied thePresident toMar-a-Lago.206 FlynnrecalledthatonFebruary12,2017,onthereturnflighttoD.C.onAirForceOne,the President asked himwhether he had lied to the Vice President.207 Flynnrespondedthathemayhaveforgottendetailsofhiscalls,buthedidnotthinkhelied.208ThePresidentresponded,“Okay.That’sfine.Igotit.”209

OnFebruary13,2017,PriebustoldFlynnhehadtoresign.210Flynnsaidhewanted to say goodbye to the President, so Priebus brought him to the OvalOffice.211PriebusrecalledthatthePresidenthuggedFlynn,shookhishand,andsaid, “We’ll give you a good recommendation.You’re a good guy.We’ll takecareofyou.”212

Talking points on the resignation prepared by theWhiteHouseCounsel’sOffice and distributed to the White House communications team stated thatMcGahnhadadvisedthePresidentthatFlynnwasunlikelytobeprosecuted,andthe President had determined that the issue with Flynn was one of trust.213SpicertoldthepressthenextdaythatFlynnwasforcedtoresign“notbasedonalegal issue, but based on a trust issue, [where] a level of trust between thePresidentandGeneralFlynnhaderodedtothepointwhere[thePresident]felthehadtomakeachange.”214

7.ThePresidentDiscussesFlynnwithFBIDirectorComey

OnFebruary14,2017, thedayafterFlynn’sresignation, thePresidenthad

lunch at the White House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.215According toChristie, at one point during the lunch thePresident said, “Nowthat we fired Flynn, the Russia thing is over.”216 Christie laughed andresponded, “No way.”217 He said, “this Russia thing is far from over” and“[w]e’llbehereonValentine’sDay2018talkingaboutthis.”218ThePresidentsaid,“[w]hatdoyoumean?FlynnmetwiththeRussians.Thatwastheproblem.I fired Flynn. It’s over.”219 Christie recalled responding that based on hisexperience both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been investigated,firingFlynnwouldnotendtheinvestigation.220Christiesaidtherewasnowaytomake an investigation shorter, but a lot ofways tomake it longer.221 ThePresident askedChristiewhat hemeant, andChristie told thePresident not totalkabout the investigationevenifhewasfrustratedat times.222ChristiealsotoldthePresidentthathewouldneverbeabletogetridofFlynn,“likegumonthebottomofyourshoe.”223

Towardstheendofthelunch,thePresidentbroughtupComeyandaskedifChristiewasstillfriendlywithhim.224Christiesaidhewas.225ThePresidenttoldChristie to callComeyand tell him that thePresident “really like[s] him.Tell him he’s part of the team.”226 At the end of the lunch, the Presidentrepeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey.227 Christie had nointentionof complyingwith thePresident’s request thathecontactComey.228HethoughtthePresident’srequestwas“nonsensical”andChristiedidnotwanttoputComeyinthepositionofhavingtoreceivesuchaphonecall.229Christiethoughtitwouldhavebeenuncomfortabletopassonthatmessage.230

At4p.m.thatafternoon,thePresidentmetwithComey,Sessions,andotherofficials for a homeland security briefing.231 At the end of the briefing, thePresident dismissed the other attendees and stated that hewanted to speak toComey alone.232 Sessions and senior advisor to the President Jared KushnerremainedintheOvalOfficeasotherparticipantsleft,butthePresidentexcusedthem, repeating that hewanted to speak onlywithComey.233 At some pointafterothershadlefttheOvalOffice,Priebusopenedthedoor,butthePresidentsenthimaway.234

According toComey’s account of themeeting, once theywere alone, thePresident began the conversation by saying, “I want to talk about MikeFlynn.”235 The President stated that Flynn had not done anything wrong inspeakingwiththeRussians,buthadtobeterminatedbecausehehadmisledtheVice President.236 The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classifiedinformation,but thePresident returned toFlynn,saying“he isagoodguyandhasbeenthroughalot.”237ThePresidentstated,“Ihopeyoucanseeyourwaycleartolettingthisgo,tolettingFlynngo.Heisagoodguy.Ihopeyoucanletthisgo.”238ComeyagreedthatFlynn“ isagoodguy,”butdidnotcommit toending the investigationofFlynn.239Comey testified under oath that he tookthePresident’sstatement“asadirection”becauseofthePresident’spositionandthecircumstancesoftheone-on-onemeeting.240

Shortly after meeting with the President, Comey began drafting amemorandum documenting their conversation.241 Comey also met with hisseniorleadershipteamtodiscussthePresident’srequest,andtheyagreednottoinformFBIofficialsworkingontheFlynncaseofthePresident’sstatementssotheofficialswouldnotbeinfluencedbytherequest.242ComeyalsoaskedforameetingwithSessionsandrequestedthatSessionsnotleaveComeyalonewiththePresidentagain.243

8.TheMediaRaisesQuestionsAboutthePresident’sDelayinTerminatingFlynn

AfterFlynnwasforcedtoresign, thepressraisedquestionsaboutwhythePresident waited more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to removeFlynnandwhetherthePresidenthadknownaboutFlynn’scontactswithKislyakbefore the DOJ notification.244 The press also continued to raise questionsabout connections between Russia and the President’s campaign.245 OnFebruary15,2017, thePresident told reporters,“GeneralFlynn isawonderfulman.Ithinkhe’sbeentreatedvery,veryunfairlybythemedia.”246OnFebruary16,2017,thePresidentheldapressconferenceandsaidthatheremovedFlynnbecauseFlynn“didn’ttelltheVicePresidentoftheUnitedStatesthefacts,andthen he didn’t remember. And that just wasn’t acceptable to me.”247 ThePresidentsaidhedidnotdirectFlynntodiscusssanctionswithKislyak,but“it

certainlywouldhavebeenokaywithmeifhedid.IwouldhavedirectedhimtodoitifIthoughthewasn’tdoingit.Ididn’tdirecthim,butIwouldhavedirectedhimbecausethat’shisjob.”248InlistingthereasonsforterminatingFlynn,thePresidentdidnotsay thatFlynnhadlied tohim.249ThePresidentalsodeniedhavinganyconnection toRussia, stating, “Ihavenothing todowithRussia. Itoldyou,Ihavenodealsthere.Ihavenoanything.”250ThePresidentalsosaidhe“hadnothingtodowith”WikiLeaks’spublicationofinformationhackedfromtheClintoncampaign.251

9.ThePresidentAttemptstoHaveK.T.McFarlandCreateaWitnessStatementDenyingthatheDirectedFlynn’sDiscussionswithKislyak

On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland that thePresidentwanted her to resign asDeputyNational SecurityAdvisor, but theysuggested to her that the Administration could make her the ambassador toSingapore.252 The next day, the President asked Priebus to have McFarlanddraftaninternalemailthatwouldconfirmthatthePresidentdidnotdirectFlynnto call the Russian Ambassador about sanctions.253 Priebus said he told thePresident he would only direct McFarland to write such a letter if she werecomfortablewith it.254PriebuscalledMcFarland intohisoffice toconvey thePresident’s request that she memorialize in writing that the President did notdirect Flynn to talk to Kislyak.255McFarland told Priebus she did not knowwhetherthePresidenthaddirectedFlynntotalktoKislyakaboutsanctions,andshe declined to say yes or no to the request.256 Priebus understood thatMcFarland was not comfortable with the President’s request, and herecommendedthatshetalktoattorneysintheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOffice.257

McFarlandthenreachedout toEisenberg.258McFarlandtoldhimthatshehadbeenfiredfromherjobasDeputyNationalSecurityAdvisorandofferedtheambassadorshipinSingaporebutthatthePresidentandPriebuswantedaletterfrom her denying that the President directed Flynn to discuss sanctions withKislyak.259EisenbergadvisedMcFarlandnot towrite the requested letter.260As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous “Memorandum for theRecord” that shewrotebecause shewas concernedby thePresident’s request:

“Eisenberg...thoughttherequestedemailandletterwouldbeabadidea—frommysidebecausetheemailwouldbeawkward.WhywouldIbeemailingPriebusto make a statement for the record? But it would also be a bad idea for thePresident because it looked as ifmy ambassadorial appointmentwas in someway a quid pro quo.”261 Later that evening, Priebus stopped byMcFarland’sofficeandtoldhernottowritetheemailandtoforgetheevenmentionedit.262

Aroundthesametime,thePresidentaskedPriebustoreachouttoFlynnandlethimknow that thePresident still caredabouthim.263PriebuscalledFlynnand said that he was checking in and that Flynn was an American hero.264Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn saying bad things abouthim.265

OnMarch31,2017,followingnewsthatFlynnhadofferedtotestifybeforetheFBIandcongressionalinvestigatorsinexchangeforimmunity,thePresidenttweeted, “Mike Flynn should ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt(excuseforbigelectionloss),bymedia&Dems,ofhistoricproportion!”266InlateMarchorearlyApril, thePresidentaskedMcFarland topassamessage toFlynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should staystrong.267

Analysis

Inanalyzing thePresident’sconduct related to theFlynn investigation, thefollowingevidenceisrelevanttotheelementsofobstructionofjustice:

a.Obstructiveact.AccordingtoComey’saccountofhisFebruary14,2017meetingintheOvalOffice,thePresidenttoldhim,“Ihopeyoucanseeyourwayclear to letting thisgo, to lettingFlynngo. . . . Ihopeyoucan let thisgo.” Inanalyzing whether these statements constitute an obstructive act, a thresholdquestion iswhetherComey’s account of the interaction is accurate, and, if so,whether the President’s statements had the tendency to impede theadministrationofjusticebyshuttingdownaninquirythatcouldresultinagrandjuryinvestigationandacriminalcharge.

AfterComey’saccountofthePresident’srequestto“let[]Flynngo”becamepublic,thePresidentpubliclydisputedseveralaspectsofthestory.ThePresident

told theNewYorkTimes thathedidnot “shoootherpeopleoutof the room”when he talked toComey and that he did not remember having a one-on-oneconversation with Comey.268 The President also publicly denied that he hadaskedComeyto“let[]Flynngo”orotherwisecommunicatedthatComeyshoulddrop the investigationofFlynn.269 In private, thePresident denied aspects ofComey’saccounttoWhiteHouseadvisors,butacknowledgedtoPriebusthathebroughtFlynnupinthemeetingwithComeyandstatedthatFlynnwasagoodguy.270 Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates Comey’saccount.

First, Comey wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with thePresident on the same day it occurred. Comey also told senior FBI officialsabout themeetingwith the President that day, and their recollections ofwhatComeytoldthematthetimeareconsistentwithComey’saccount.271

Second, Comey provided testimony about the President’s request that he“let[]Flynngo”underoathincongressionalproceedingsandininterviewswithfederal investigators subject to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.Comey’srecollectionsoftheencounterhaveremainedconsistentovertime.

Third, the objective, corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-onemeeting came to occur support Comey’s description of the event. Comeyrecalled that thePresidentcleared theroomtospeakwithComeyaloneafterahomeland security briefing in the Oval Office, that Kushner and Sessionslingered and had to be shooed out by the President, and that Priebus brieflyopenedthedoorduringthemeeting,promptingthePresidenttowavehimaway.While the President has publicly denied those details, other AdministrationofficialswhowerepresenthaveconfirmedComey’saccountofhowheendedupinaone-on-onemeetingwiththePresident.272AndthePresidentacknowledgedtoPriebusandMcGahnthatheinfactspoketoComeyaboutFlynnintheirone-on-onemeeting.

Fourth, the President’s decision to clear the room and, in particular, toexcludetheAttorneyGeneralfromthemeetingsignalsthatthePresidentwantedtobealonewithComey,which isconsistentwith thedeliveryofamessageofthe type that Comey recalls, rather than a more innocuous conversation thatcouldhaveoccurredinthepresenceoftheAttorneyGeneral.

Finally,Comey’sreactiontothePresident’sstatementsisconsistentwiththePresident having asked him to “let[] Flynn go.” Comey met with the FBIleadership team,which agreed to keep the President’s statements closely heldand not to inform the team working on the Flynn investigation so that theywouldnot be influencedby thePresident’s request.Comey also promptlymetwith the Attorney General to ask him not to be left alone with the Presidentagain, anaccountverifiedbySessions,FBIChiefofStaff JamesRybicki, andJodyHunt,whowasthentheAttorneyGeneral’schiefofstaff.

A second question is whether the President’s statements, which were notphrased as a direct order to Comey, could impede or interferewith the FBI’sinvestigationofFlynn.WhilethePresidentsaidhe“hope[d]”Comeycould“let[]Flynngo,”ratherthanaffirmativelydirectinghimtodoso,thecircumstancesoftheconversationshowthat thePresidentwasaskingComey toclose theFBI’sinvestigation intoFlynn.First, thePresidentarranged themeetingwithComeysothattheywouldbealoneandpurposelyexcludedtheAttorneyGeneral,whichsuggests that thePresidentmeant tomake a request toComey that hedidnotwant anyone else to hear. Second, because the President is the head of theExecutive Branch, when he says that he “hopes” a subordinate will dosomething, it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what thePresidentwants. Indeed, thePresident repeatedaversionof“let thisgo” threetimes, and Comey testified that he understood the President’s statements as adirective,whichiscorroboratedbythewayComeyreactedatthetime.

b.Nexustoaproceeding.Toestablishanexustoaproceeding,itwouldbenecessary to show that the President could reasonably foresee and actuallycontemplated that the investigationofFlynnwas likely to lead toagrand juryinvestigationorprosecution.

At the time of the President’s one-on-onemeetingwithComey, no grandjurysubpoenashadbeenissuedaspartoftheFBI’sinvestigationintoFlynn.ButFlynn’sliestotheFBIviolatedfederalcriminallaw,GrandJury██████,andresultedinFlynn’sprosecutionforviolating18U.S.C.§1001.BythetimethePresidentspoketoComeyaboutFlynn,DOJofficialshadinformedMcGahn,who informed the President, that Flynn’s statements to senior White HouseofficialsabouthiscontactswithKislyakwerenot trueand thatFlynnhad toldthesameversionofeventstotheFBI.McGahnalsoinformedthePresidentthatFlynn’s conduct could violate 18U.S.C. § 1001.After theVicePresident andseniorWhiteHouseofficialsreviewedtheunderlyinginformationaboutFlynn’s

callsonFebruary10,2017,theybelievedthatFlynncouldnothaveforgottenhisconversationswithKislyak and concluded that hehadbeen lying. In addition,thePresident’s instruction to theFBIDirector to “let[]Flynngo” suggests hisawareness thatFlynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct andwas atriskofprosecution.

c. Intent.Aspartofour investigation,weexaminedwhether thePresidenthadapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofaninvestigationintoFlynn—forexample,whetherthePresidentwasawareofFlynn’scommunicationswithKislyakcloseintimetowhentheyoccurred,suchthatthePresidentknewthatFlynnhadliedto seniorWhiteHouse officials and that those lies had been passed on to thepublic.SomeevidencesuggeststhatthePresidentknewabouttheexistenceandcontentofFlynn’scallswhentheyoccurred,buttheevidenceisinconclusiveandcouldnotbe reliedupon toestablish thePresident’sknowledge. InadvanceofFlynn’s initial call with Kislyak, the President attended a meeting where thesanctionswere discussed and an advisormay havementioned that Flynnwasscheduled to talk toKislyak.Flynn toldMcFarland about the substanceofhiscalls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia’sresponse,andFlynnrecalledtalkingtoBannoninearlyJanuary2017abouthowtheyhadsuccessfully“stoppedthetrainonRussia’sresponse”tothesanctions.ItwouldhavebeenreasonableforFlynntohavewantedthePresidenttoknowofhis communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his request hadbeenreceivedatthehighestlevelsinRussiaandthatRussiahadchosennottoretaliateinresponsetotherequest,andthePresidentwaspleasedbytheRussianresponse, calling it a “[g]reatmove.”And thePresidentnever saidpubliclyorinternallythatFlynnhadliedtohimaboutthecallswithKislyak.

But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn’sread-out of his calls with Kislyak, and Flynn does not have a specificrecollectionof telling thePresident-Elect directly about the calls.Bannon alsosaidhedidnotrecallhearingaboutthecallsfromFlynn.AndinFebruary2017,thePresidentaskedFlynnwhatwasdiscussedon thecallsandwhetherhehadlied to the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Ourinvestigation accordingly did not produce evidence that established that thePresidentknewaboutFlynn’sdiscussionsofsanctionsbeforetheDepartmentofJusticenotifiedtheWhiteHouseofthosediscussionsinlateJanuary2017.Theevidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise possessed informationdamagingtothePresidentthatwouldgivethePresidentapersonalincentivetoendtheFBI’sinquiryintoFlynn’sconduct.

EvidencedoesestablishthatthePresidentconnectedtheFlynninvestigationto the FBI’s broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he toldChristie, that terminating Flynn would end “the whole Russia thing.” Flynn’sfiringoccurredat a timewhen themediaandCongresswere raisingquestionsabout Russia’s interference in the election and whether members of thePresident’scampaignhadcolludedwithRussia.MultiplewitnessesrecalledthatthePresidentviewedtheRussiainvestigationsasachallengetothelegitimacyofhiselection.ThePresidentpaidcarefulattentiontonegativecoverageofFlynnand reacted with annoyance and anger when the story broke disclosing thatFlynnhaddiscussedsanctionswithKislyak.Justhoursbeforemeetingone-on-onewithComey,thePresidenttoldChristiethatfiringFlynnwouldputanendtotheRussia inquiries.And afterChristie pushedback, telling thePresident thatfiringFlynnwouldnotendtheRussiainvestigation,thePresidentaskedChristietoreachouttoComeyandconveythatthePresidentlikedhimandhewaspartof“theteam.”Thatafternoon,thePresidentclearedtheroomandaskedComeyto“let[]Flynngo.”

We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President’sdirection to Comey was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. In publicstatements thePresident repeatedlydescribedFlynnasagoodpersonwhohadbeenharmedbytheRussiainvestigation,andthePresidentdirectedadvisorstoreachouttoFlynntotellhimthePresident“care[d]”abouthimandfeltbadforhim.Atthesametime,multiplesenioradvisors,includingBannon,Priebus,andHicks,saidthatthePresidenthadbecomeunhappywithFlynnwellbeforeFlynnwasforcedtoresignandthat thePresidentwasfrequentlyirritatedwithFlynn.PriebussaidhebelievedthePresident’sinitialreluctancetofireFlynnstemmednotfrompersonalregard,butfromconcernaboutthenegativepressthatwouldbe generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early in theAdministration. And Priebus indicated that the President’s post-firingexpressions of support for Flynn were motivated by the President’s desire tokeepFlynnfromsayingnegativethingsabouthim.

ThewayinwhichthePresidentcommunicatedtherequesttoComeyalsoisrelevanttounderstandingthePresident’sintent.WhenthePresidentfirstlearnedabout theFBI investigation intoFlynn, he toldMcGahn,Bannon, andPriebusnottodiscussthematterwithanyoneelseintheWhiteHouse.Thenextday,thePresident invitedComeyforaone-on-onedinneragainst theadviceofanaidewho recommended thatotherWhiteHouseofficials alsoattend.At thedinner,the President asked Comey for “loyalty” and, at a different point in the

conversation, mentioned that Flynn had judgment issues.When the PresidentmetwithComey thedayafterFlynn’s termination—shortlyafterbeing toldbyChristiethatfiringFlynnwouldnotendtheRussiainvestigation—thePresidentcleared the room,evenexcluding theAttorneyGeneral, so thathecouldagainspeaktoComeyalone.ThePresident’sdecisiontomeetone-on-onewithComeycontravenedtheadviceoftheWhiteHouseCounselthatthePresidentshouldnotcommunicatedirectlywiththeDepartmentofJusticetoavoidanyappearanceofinterferinginlawenforcementactivities.AndthePresidentlaterdeniedthathecleared the room and asked Comey to “let[] Flynn go”—a denial that wouldhave been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise ofprosecutorialdiscretion.

Finally, the President’s effort to have McFarland write an internal emaildenyingthatthePresidenthaddirectedFlynntodiscusssanctionswithKislyakhighlightsthePresident’sconcernaboutbeingassociatedwithFlynn’sconduct.TheevidencedoesnotestablishthatthePresidentwastryingtohaveMcFarlandlie.ThePresident’srequest,however,wassufficiently irregular thatMcFarland—who did not know the full extent of Flynn’s communications with thePresidentandthuscouldnotmaketherepresentationthePresidentwanted—felttheneedtodraftaninternalmemorandumdocumentingthePresident’srequest,andEisenbergwasconcernedthattherequestwouldlooklikeaquidproquoinexchangeforanambassadorship.

C.ThePresident’sReactiontoPublicConfirmationoftheFBI’sRussiaInvestigation

Overview

In earlyMarch 2017, the President learned that Sessionswas consideringrecusing from the Russia investigation and tried to prevent the recusal. AfterSessions announced his recusal onMarch 2, the President expressed anger atSessions for the decision and then privately askedSessions to “unrecuse.”OnMarch 20, 2017, Comey publicly disclosed the existence of the FBI’s Russiainvestigation. In the days that followed, the President contacted Comey andother intelligenceagency leadersandasked them topushbackpubliclyon thesuggestion that the President had any connection to the Russian election-interferenceeffortinorderto“liftthecloud”oftheongoinginvestigation.

Evidence

1.AttorneyGeneralSessionsRecusesFromtheRussiaInvestigation

InlateFebruary2017,theDepartmentofJusticebegananinternalanalysisofwhether Sessions should recuse from theRussia investigation based on hisrole in the 2016 TrumpCampaign.273 OnMarch 1, 2017, the press reportedthat, inhis Januaryconfirmationhearing tobecomeAttorneyGeneral,SenatorSessions had not disclosed two meetings he had with Russian AmbassadorKislyak before the presidential election, leading to congressional calls forSessionstorecuseorforaspecialcounseltoinvestigateRussia’sinterferenceinthepresidentialelection.274

AlsoonMarch1,thePresidentcalledComeyandsaidhewantedtocheckinand see howComeywas doing.275According to an emailComey sent to hischiefofstaffafterthecall,thePresident“talkedaboutSessionsabit,”saidthathehadheardComeywas“doinggreat,”andsaid thathehopedComeywouldcomeby tosayhellowhenhewasat theWhiteHouse.276Comey interpretedthecallasaneffortbythePresidentto“pull[him]in,”buthedidnotperceivethecallasanattemptbythePresidenttofindoutwhatComeywasdoingwiththeFlynninvestigation.277

Thenextmorning, thePresident calledMcGahnandurgedhim to contactSessions to tell him not to recuse himself from the Russia investigation.278McGahn understood the President to be concerned that a recusalwouldmakeSessions lookguilty foromittingdetails inhis confirmationhearing; leave thePresidentunprotectedfromaninvestigationthatcouldhobblethepresidencyandderail his policy objectives; and detract from favorable press coverage of aPresidential Address to Congress the President had delivered earlier in theweek.279McGahnreachedout toSessionsandreportedthat thePresidentwasnothappyaboutthepossibilityofrecusal.280Sessionsrepliedthatheintendedtofollowtherulesonrecusal.281McGahnreportedbacktothePresidentaboutthecallwithSessions,andthePresidentreiteratedthathedidnotwantSessionsto recuse.282 Throughout the day,McGahn continued trying on behalf of thePresident to avertSession’s recusalby speaking toSession’spersonal counsel,Session’schiefof staff, andSenateMajorityLeaderMitchMcConnell, andbycontacting Sessions himself two more times.283 Sessions recalled that other

WhiteHouseadvisorsalsocalledhimthatdaytoargueagainsthisrecusal.284

That afternoon, Sessions announced his decision to recuse “from anyexisting or future investigations of any matters related in any way to thecampaignsforPresidentoftheUnitedStates.”285Sessionsbelievedthedecisionto recuse was not a close call, given the applicable language in the Code ofFederal Regulations (CFR), which Sessions considered to be clear anddecisive.286Sessionsthought thatanyargument that theCFRdidnotapplytohimwas“verythin.”287Sessionsgottheimpression,basedoncallshereceivedfromWhiteHouseofficials,thatthePresidentwasveryupsetwithhimanddidnotthinkhehaddonehisdutyasAttorneyGeneral.288

Shortly after Sessions announced his recusal, theWhite House Counsel’sOffice directed that Sessions should not be contacted about the matter.289InternalWhite House Counsel’s Office notes fromMarch 2, 2017, state “Nocontactw/Sessions”and“Nocomms/Seriousconcernsaboutobstruction.”290

OnMarch3, thedayafterSessions’s recusal,McGahnwascalled into theOvalOffice.291Other advisorswere there, includingPriebus andBannon.292

ThePresidentopened the conversationby saying, “Idon’thavea lawyer.”293ThePresidentexpressedangeratMcGahnabouttherecusalandbroughtupRoyCohn,statingthathewishedCohnwashisattorney.294McGahninterpretedthiscommentasdirectedathim,suggestingthatCohnwouldfightforthePresidentwhereas McGahn would not.295 The President wanted McGahn to talk toSessions about the recusal, but McGahn told the President that DOJ ethicsofficialshadweighedinonSession’sdecisiontorecuse.296ThePresidentthenbroughtupformerAttorneysGeneralRobertKennedyandEricHolderandsaidthat theyhadprotected theirpresidents.297ThePresidentalsopushedbackontheDOJcontactspolicy,andsaidwordstotheeffectof,“You’retellingmethatBobby and Jack didn’t talk about investigations? Or Obama didn’t tell EricHolderwhotoinvestigate?”298BannonrecalledthatthePresidentwasasmadasBannonhadeverseenhimandthathescreamedatMcGahnabouthowweakSessionswas.299 Bannon recalled telling the President that Session’s recusalwas not a surprise and that before the inauguration they had discussed that

Sessionswouldhavetorecusefromcampaign-relatedinvestigationsbecauseofhisworkontheTrumpCampaign.300

Thatweekend,SessionsandMcGahnflewtoMar-a-LagotomeetwiththePresident.301Sessions recalled that thePresidentpulledhimaside to speak tohim alone and suggested that Sessions should “unrecuse” from the Russiainvestigation.302 The President contrasted Sessions with Attorneys GeneralHolder and Kennedy, who had developed a strategy to help their presidentswhere Sessions had not.303 Sessions said he had the impression that thePresidentfeared that the investigationcouldspinoutofcontrolanddisrupthisability to govern, which Sessions could have helped avert if he were stilloverseeingit.304

OnMarch5,2017,theWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficewasinformedthattheFBIwas asking for transition-period records relating toFlynn—indicating thattheFBIwasstillactivelyinvestigatinghim.305OnMarch6,thePresidenttoldadvisorshewantedtocall theActingAttorneyGeneraltofindoutwhethertheWhite House or the President was being investigated, although it is not clearwhether thePresidentknewat that timeof theFBI’srecentrequestconcerningFlynn.306

2.FBIDirectorComeyPubliclyConfirmstheExistenceoftheRussiaInvestigationinTestimonyBeforeHPSCI

On March 9, 2017, Comey briefed the “Gang of Eight” congressionalleaders about the FBI’s investigation of Russian interference, including anidentificationoftheprincipalU.S.subjectsoftheinvestigation.307AlthoughitisunclearwhetherthePresidentknewofthatbriefingatthetime,notestakenbyAnnie Donaldson, then McGahn’s chief of staff, on March 12, 2017, state,“POTUS in panic/chaos . . . Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) AllthingsrelatedtoRussia.”308TheweekafterComey’sbriefing,theWhiteHouseCounsel’s Office was in contact with SSCI Chairman Senator Richard BurrabouttheRussiainvestigationsandappearstohavereceivedinformationaboutthestatusoftheFBIinvestigation.309

OnMarch20,2017,ComeywasscheduledtotestifybeforeHPSCI.310In

advance of Comey’s testimony, congressional officials made clear that theywantedComeytoprovideinformationabouttheongoingFBIinvestigation.311DanaBoente,whoatthattimewastheActingAttorneyGeneralfortheRussiainvestigation, authorized Comey to confirm the existence of the RussiainvestigationandagreedthatComeyshoulddeclinetocommentonwhetheranyparticularindividuals,includingthePresident,werebeinginvestigated.312

In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted inconsultation with the Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had “beenauthorizedbytheDepartmentofJusticetoconfirmthattheFBI,aspartof[its]counterintelligencemission,isinvestigatingtheRussiangovernment’seffortstointerfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating thenatureofanylinksbetweenindividualsassociatedwiththeTrumpcampaignandthe Russian government andwhether therewas any coordination between thecampaign and Russia’s efforts. As with any counterintelligence investigation,thiswillalsoincludeanassessmentofwhetheranycrimeswerecommitted.”313Comeyadded thathewouldnotcomment furtheronwhat theFBIwas“doingandwhoseconduct[it][was]examining”becausetheinvestigationwasongoingand classified—but he observed that he had “taken the extraordinary step inconsultationwith theDepartmentof Justiceofbriefing thisCongress’s leaders. . . in a classified setting in detail about the investigation.”314 Comey wasspecificallyaskedwhetherPresidentTrumpwas“underinvestigationduringthecampaign”or“underinvestigationnow.”315Comeydeclinedtoanswer,stating,“Pleasedon’tover interpretwhat I’vesaidas—as thechairand rankingknow,wehavebriefedhimingreatdetailonthesubjectsoftheinvestigationandwhatwe’redoing,butI’mnotgonnaansweraboutanybodyinthisforum.”316ComeywasalsoaskedwhethertheFBIwasinvestigatingtheinformationcontainedintheSteelereporting,andhedeclinedtoanswer.317

According to McGahn and Donaldson, the President had expressedfrustrationwithComeybeforehisMarch20testimony,andthetestimonymadematters worse.318 The President had previously criticized Comey for toofrequentlymaking headlines and for not attending intelligence briefings at theWhiteHouse,andthePresidentsuspectedComeyofleakingcertaininformationtothemedia.319McGahnsaidthePresidentthoughtComeywasactinglike“hisownbranchofgovernment.”320

PressreportsfollowingComey’sMarch20testimonysuggestedthattheFBIwasinvestigatingthePresident,contrarytowhatComeyhadtoldthePresidentattheendoftheJanuary6,2017intelligenceassessmentbriefing.321McGahn,Donaldson, and senior advisor StephenMiller recalled that the President wasupsetwithComey’stestimonyandthepresscoveragethatfollowedbecauseofthe suggestion that the President was under investigation.322 Notes from theWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficedatedMarch21,2017,indicatethatthePresidentwas“besidehimself”overComey’stestimony.323ThePresidentcalledMcGahnrepeatedlythatdaytoaskhimtointervenewiththeDepartmentofJustice,and,accordingtothenotes,thePresidentwas“gettinghotterandhotter,getrid?”324Officials in theWhite House Counsel’s Office became so concerned that thePresident would fire Comey that they began drafting a memorandum thatexaminedwhetherthePresidentneededcausetoterminatetheFBIdirector.325

AtthePresident’surging,McGahncontactedBoenteseveraltimesonMarch21, 2017, to seek Boente’s assistance in having Comey or the Department ofJusticecorrectthemisperceptionthatthePresidentwasunderinvestigation.326Boentedidnot specifically recall theconversations,althoughhedid rememberoneconversationwithMcGahnaround this timewhereMcGahnasked if therewasawaytospeeduporendtheRussiainvestigationasquicklyaspossible.327Boente saidMcGahn toldhim thePresidentwasunder a cloud and itmade ithard for him togovern.328Boente recalled tellingMcGahn that therewas nogood way to shorten the investigation and attempting to do so could erodeconfidence in the investigation’s conclusions.329Boente saidMcGahn agreedand dropped the issue.330 The President also sought to speak with Boentedirectly,butMcGahntold thePresident thatBoentedidnotwant to talk to thePresident about the request to intervene with Comey.331 McGahn recalledBoente tellinghimincalls thatday thathedidnot think itwassustainableforComeytostayonasFBIdirectorforthenextfouryears,whichMcGahnsaidheconveyedtothePresident.332BoentedidnotrecalldiscussingwithMcGahnoranyoneelsetheideathatComeyshouldnotcontinueasFBIdirector.333

3.ThePresidentAsksIntelligenceCommunityLeaderstoMakePublicStatementsthathehadNoConnectiontoRussia

In theweeks followingComey’sMarch 20, 2017 testimony, thePresidentrepeatedlyaskedintelligencecommunityofficialstopushbackpubliclyonanysuggestion that the President had a connection to the Russian election-interferenceeffort.

OnMarch 22, 2017, the President askedDirector ofNational IntelligenceDaniel Coats and CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the OvalOfficeafteraPresidentialDailyBriefing.334AccordingtoCoats,thePresidentasked themwhether they could say publicly that no link existed between himand Russia.335 Coats responded that the Office of the Director of NationalIntelligence(ODNI)hasnothingtodowithinvestigationsanditwasnothisroleto make a public statement on the Russia investigation.336 Pompeo had norecollection of being asked to stay behind after theMarch 22 briefing, but herecalled that thePresident regularlyurgedofficials toget thewordout thathehadnotdoneanythingwrongrelatedtoRussia.337

CoatstoldthisOfficethatthePresidentneveraskedhimtospeaktoComeyabout theFBI investigation.338SomeODNIstaffers,however,hadadifferentrecollectionofhowCoatsdescribed themeeting immediatelyafter itoccurred.According to senior ODNI official Michael Dempsey, Coats said after themeeting that the President had brought up the Russia investigation and askedhimtocontactComeytoseeiftherewasawaytogetpasttheinvestigation,getit over with, end it, or words to that effect.339 Dempsey said that Coatsdescribed the President’s comments as falling “somewhere between musingabout hating the investigation” and wanting Coats to “do something to stopit.”340DempseysaidCoatsmadeitclearthathewouldnotgetinvolvedwithanongoingFBIinvestigation.341EdwardGistaro,anotherODNIofficial,recalledthat right after Coat’smeetingwith the President, on thewalk from theOvalOffice back to the Eisenhower ExecutiveOffice Building, Coats said that thePresident hadkept himbehind to askhimwhat he coulddo to “helpwith theinvestigation.”342 Another ODNI staffer who had been waiting for CoatsoutsidetheOvalOfficetalkedtoGistaroafewminuteslaterandrecalledGistaroreporting thatCoatswasupsetbecause thePresidenthadaskedhim tocontactComeytoconvincehimtherewasnothingtotheRussiainvestigation.343

On Saturday, March 25, 2017, three days after the meeting in the Oval

Office, the President called Coats and again complained about the Russiainvestigations, sayingwords to theeffectof, “I can’tdoanythingwithRussia,there’s thingsI’d like todowithRussia,with trade,withISIS, they’reallovermewiththis.”344CoatstoldthePresidentthattheinvestigationsweregoingtogoonandthebest thingtodowasto let themruntheircourse.345Coatslatertestifiedinacongressionalhearingthathehad“neverfeltpressuretointerveneorinterfereinanywayandshape—withshapingintelligenceinapoliticalway,orinrelationship...toanongoinginvestigation.”346

OnMarch26,2017, thedayafter thePresidentcalledCoats, thePresidentcalled NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers.347 The President expressedfrustrationwith theRussia investigation, saying that itmade relationswith theRussians difficult.348 The President told Rogers “the thingwith the Russians[wa]smessingup”hisabilitytogetthingsdonewithRussia.349ThePresidentalsosaidthatthenewsstorieslinkinghimwithRussiawerenottrueandaskedRogersifhecoulddoanythingtorefutethestories.350DeputyDirectoroftheNSARichardLedgett,whowaspresentforthecall,saiditwasthemostunusualthinghehadexperienced in40yearsofgovernment service.351After the callconcluded, Ledgett prepared a memorandum that he and Rogers both signeddocumenting the content of the conversation and the President’s request, andthey placed the memorandum in a safe.352 But Rogers did not perceive thePresident’srequesttobeanorder,andthePresidentdidnotaskRogerstopushback on the Russia investigation itself.353 Rogers later testified in acongressionalhearing that asNSADirectorhehad “neverbeendirected todoanything[he]believe[d] tobe illegal, immoral,unethicalor inappropriate”anddid“notrecalleverfeelingpressuredtodoso.”354

Inaddition to thespecificcommentsmade toCoats,Pompeo,andRogers,the President spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligencecommunityofficials about theRussia investigation and stated that it interferedwithhisability toconduct foreign relations.355Onat least twooccasions, thePresident began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was nocollusion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could beissued.356PompeorecalledthatthePresidentventedabouttheinvestigationonmultipleoccasions,complainingthattherewasnoevidenceagainsthimandthat

nobodywouldpublicly defendhim.357Rogers recalled aprivate conversationwith thePresident inwhichhe “vent[ed]” about the investigation, saidhehaddone nothingwrong, and said something like the “Russia thing has got to goaway.”358 Coats recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigationseveraltimes,andCoatssaidhefinallytoldthePresidentthatCoat’sjobwastoprovideintelligenceandnotgetinvolvedininvestigations.359

4.ThePresidentAsksComeyto“LifttheCloud”CreatedbytheRussiaInvestigation

On themorning ofMarch 30, 2017, the President reached out to Comeydirectly about the Russia investigation.360 According to Comey’scontemporaneousrecordoftheconversation,thePresidentsaid“hewastryingtorun the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making thatdifficult.”361 The President asked Comey what could be done to “lift thecloud.”362 Comey explained “that we were running it down as quickly aspossibleandthattherewouldbegreatbenefit,ifwedidn’tfindanything,toourGoodHousekeepingsealofapproval,butwehad todoourwork.”363Comeyalso told thePresident that congressional leaderswereaware that theFBIwasnotinvestigatingthePresidentpersonally.364ThePresidentsaidseveral times,“Weneed toget that factout.”365ThePresident commented that if therewas“somesatellite”(whichComeytooktomeananassociateof thePresident’sorthecampaign)thatdidsomething,“itwouldbegoodtofindthatout”butthathehimselfhadnotdoneanythingwrongandhehopedComey“wouldfindawaytoget out that we weren’t investigating hirn.”366 After the call ended, ComeycalledBoenteandtoldhimabouttheconversation,askedforguidanceonhowtorespond,andsaidhewasuncomfortablewithdirectcontact fromthePresidentabouttheinvestigation.367

On themorning ofApril 11, 2017, the President calledComey again.368According to Comey’s contemporaneous record of the conversation, thePresidentsaidhewas“followingup tosee if[Comey]didwhat [thePresident]had asked last time—getting out that he personally is not underinvestigation.”369Comey responded that he had passed the request toBoentebutnotheardback,andheinformedthePresidentthatthetraditionalchannelfor

such a request would be to have the White House Counsel contact DOJleadership.370ThePresidentsaidhewouldtakethatstep.371ThePresidentthenadded, “Because I havebeenvery loyal toyou, very loyal,wehad that thing,youknow.”372Inatelevisedinterviewthatwastapedearlythatafternoon,thePresidentwasasked if itwas too late forhim toaskComey tostepdown; thePresidentresponded,“No, it’snot toolate,butyouknow,Ihaveconfidenceinhim.We’llseewhathappens.Youknow,it’sgoingtobeinteresting.”373Afterthe interview, Hicks told the President she thought the President’s commentaboutComey should be removed from the broadcast of the interview, but thePresidentwantedtokeepitin,whichHicksthoughtwasunusual.374

Later that day, the President told senior advisors, includingMcGahn andPriebus, that he had reached out to Comey twice in recent weeks.375 ThePresident acknowledged that McGahn would not approve of the outreach toComeybecauseMcGahnhadpreviouslycautionedthePresidentthatheshouldnottalktoComeydirectlytopreventanyperceptionthattheWhiteHousewasinterferingwithinvestigations.376ThePresidenttoldMcGahnthatComeyhadindicatedtheFBIcouldmakeapublicstatementthatthePresidentwasnotunderinvestigation if the Department of Justice approved that action.377 Afterspeaking with the President, McGahn followed up with Boente to relay thePresident’sunderstandingthattheFBIcouldmakeapublicannouncementiftheDepartmentofJusticecleared it.378McGahn recalled thatBoente saidComeyhad toldhim therewasnothingobstructive about the calls from thePresident,but they made Comey uncomfortable.379 According to McGahn, BoenterespondedthathedidnotwanttoissueastatementaboutthePresidentnotbeingunder investigation because of the potential political ramifications and did notwanttoorderComeytodoitbecausethatactioncouldprompttheappointmentof aSpecialCounsel.380Boente did not recall that aspect of his conversationwithMcGahn,butdidrecalltellingMcGahnthatthedirectoutreachesfromthePresident toComeywere a problem.381Boente recalled thatMcGahn agreedandsaidhewoulddowhathecouldtoaddressthatissue.382

Analysis

InanalyzingthePresident’sreactiontoSession’srecusalandtherequestshe

madetoCoats,Pompeo,Rogers,andComey,thefollowingevidenceisrelevanttotheelementsofobstructionofjustice:

a.Obstructiveact.Theevidenceshowsthat,afterComey’sMarch20,2017testimony,thePresidentrepeatedlyreachedouttointelligenceagencyleaderstodiscuss theFBI’s investigation.Butwitnesseshaddifferentrecollectionsof theprecise content of those outreaches. Some ODNI officials recalled that CoatstoldthemimmediatelyaftertheMarch22OvalOfficemeetingthatthePresidentaskedCoatstointervenewithComeyand“stop”theinvestigation.Butthefirst-handwitnessestotheencounterremembertheconversationdifferently.Pompeohad no memory of the specific meeting, but generally recalled the Presidenturging officials to get the word out that the President had not done anythingwrongrelatedtoRussia.CoatsrecalledthatthePresidentaskedthatCoatsstatepublicly thatno linkexistedbetweenthePresidentandRussia,butdidnotaskhimtospeakwithComeyortohelpendtheinvestigation.TheotheroutreachesbythePresidentduring thisperiodweresimilar innature.ThePresidentaskedRogers if he could do anything to refute the stories linking the President toRussia,and thePresidentaskedComey tomakeapublic statement thatwould“lift thecloud”of theongoinginvestigationbymakingclear that thePresidentwasnotpersonallyunderinvestigation.Theserequests,whilesignificantenoughthat Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a writtenmemorandum, were not interpreted by the officials who received them asdirectivestoimproperlyinterferewiththeinvestigation.

b. Nexus to a proceeding. At the time of the President’s outreaches toleadersoftheintelligenceagenciesinlateMarchandearlyApril2017,theFBI’sRussiainvestigationdidnotyetinvolvegrandjuryproceedings.Theoutreaches,however, came after and were in response to Comey’s March 20, 2017announcement that the FBI, as a part of its counterintelligence mission, wasconducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidentialelection. Comey testified that the investigation included any links orcoordinationwithTrumpcampaignofficialsandwould“includeanassessmentofwhetheranycrimeswerecommitted.”

c. Intent. As described above, the evidence does not establish that thePresidentaskedordirectedintelligenceagencyleaderstostoporinterferewiththeFBI’sRussiainvestigation—andthePresidentaffirmativelytoldComeythatif “some satellite”was involved in Russian election interference “itwould begood to find thatout.”But thePresident’s intent in trying topreventSession’s

recusal, and in reaching out toCoats, Pompeo,Rogers, andComey followingComey’spublicannouncementoftheFBI’sRussiainvestigation,isneverthelessrelevant tounderstandingwhatmotivated thePresident’sotheractions towardstheinvestigation.

The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russiainvestigation’s implications forhispresidency—and, specifically, ondispellinganysuggestion thathewasunder investigationorhad links toRussia. InearlyMarch, the President attempted to prevent Session’s recusal, even after beingtold that Sessionswas followingDOJ conflict-of-interest rules.After Sessionsrecused, theWhiteHouseCounsel’sOffice triedtocutofffurthercontactwithSessions about the matter, although it is not clear whether that direction wasconveyedtothePresident.ThePresidentcontinuedtoraisetheissueofSession’srecusal and,when he had the opportunity, he pulled Sessions aside and urgedhim to unrecuse. The President also told advisors that hewanted anAttorneyGeneralwhowouldprotecthim,thewayheperceivedRobertKennedyandEricHoldertohaveprotectedtheirpresidents.ThePresidentmadestatementsaboutbeing able to direct the course of criminal investigations, sayingwords to theeffect of, “You’re telling me that Bobby and Jack didn’t talk aboutinvestigations?OrObamadidn’ttellEricHolderwhotoinvestigate?”

After Comey publicly confirmed the existence of the FBI’s Russiainvestigation on March 20, 2017, the President was “beside himself” andexpressed anger that Comey did not issue a statement correcting anymisperceptionthatthePresidenthimselfwasunderinvestigation.ThePresidentsoughttospeakwithActingAttorneyGeneralBoentedirectlyandtoldMcGahnto contact Boente to request that Comey make a clarifying statement. ThePresident then asked other intelligence community leaders to make publicstatementstorefutethesuggestionthatthePresidenthadlinkstoRussia,buttheleaders told him they could not publicly comment on the investigation. OnMarch 30 andApril 11, against the advice ofWhiteHouse advisorswho hadinformed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived asimproper interference inanongoing investigation, thePresidentmadepersonaloutreaches toComeyaskinghimto“lift thecloud”of theRussia investigationby making public the fact that the President was not personally underinvestigation.

Evidenceindicates that thePresidentwasangeredbyboththeexistenceoftheRussiainvestigationandthepublicreportingthathewasunderinvestigation,

whichhe knewwas not true basedonComey’s representations.ThePresidentcomplained to advisors that if people thought Russia helped him with theelection,itwoulddetractfromwhathehadaccomplished.

OtherevidenceindicatesthatthePresidentwasconcernedabouttheimpactof theRussia investigationonhis ability to govern.ThePresident complainedthat the perception that he was under investigation was hurting his ability toconductforeignrelations,particularlywithRussia.ThePresident toldCoatshe“can’t do anything with Russia,” he told Rogers that “the thing with theRussians”wasinterferingwithhisabilitytoconductforeignaffairs,andhetoldComey that “he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russiabusinesswasmakingthatdifficult.”

D.EventsLeadingUpToandSurroundingtheTerminationofFBIDirectorComey

Overview

ComeywasscheduledtotestifybeforeCongressonMay3,2017.Leadingup to that testimony, the President continued to tell advisors that he wantedComey tomake public that the President was not under investigation. At thehearing,ComeydeclinedtoanswerquestionsaboutthescopeorsubjectsoftheRussiainvestigationanddidnotstatepubliclythatthePresidentwasnotunderinvestigation.Twodayslater,onMay5,2017,thePresidenttoldcloseaideshewasgoingtofireComey,andonMay9,hedidso,usinghisofficialterminationlettertomakepublicthatComeyhadonthreeoccasionsinformedthePresidentthathewasnotunderinvestigation.ThePresidentdecidedtofireComeybeforereceiving advice or a recommendation from theDepartment of Justice, but heapproved an initial public account of the termination that attributed it to arecommendationfromtheDepartmentofJusticebasedonComey’shandlingoftheClintonemailinvestigation.AfterDeputyAttorneyGeneralRodRosensteinresisted attributing the firing to his recommendation, the Presidentacknowledged that he intended to fire Comey regardless of the DOJrecommendationandwasthinkingoftheRussiainvestigationwhenhemadethedecision.ThePresidentalsotoldtheRussianForeignMinister,“I justfiredtheheadoftheF.B.I.Hewascrazy,arealnutjob.IfacedgreatpressurebecauseofRussia.That’stakenoff.....I’mnotunderinvestigation.”

Evidence

1.ComeyTestifiesBeforetheSenateJudiciaryCommitteeandDeclinestoAnswerQuestionsAboutWhetherthePresidentisUnderInvestigation

On May 3, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify at an FBI oversighthearingbeforetheSenateJudiciaryCommittee.383McGahnrecalledthatintheweekleadinguptothehearing,thePresidentsaidthatitwouldbethelaststrawif Comey did not take the opportunity to set the record straight by publiclyannouncingthatthePresidentwasnotunderinvestigation.384ThePresidenthadpreviously told McGahn that the perception that the President was underinvestigationwashurtinghisabilitytocarryouthispresidentialdutiesanddealwith foreign leaders.385At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questionsaboutthestatusoftheRussiainvestigation,stating“[t]heDepartmentofJusticeha[d]authorized[him]toconfirmthat[theRussiainvestigation]exists,”butthathe was “not going to say another word about it” until the investigation wascompleted.386Comey also declined to answer questions about whetherinvestigators had “ruled out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially atargetofth[e]criminalinvestigation,“includingwhethertheFBIhad“ruledoutthepresidentoftheUnitedStates.“387

Comeywasalsoaskedatthehearingabouthisdecisiontoannounce11daysbefore the presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton emailinvestigation.388Comeystatedthatitmadehim“mildlynauseoustothinkthatwe might have had some impact on the election,” but added that “even inhindsight”he“wouldmakethesamedecision.”389Helaterrepeatedthathehadnoregretsabouthowhehadhandledtheemailinvestigationandbelievedhehad“donetherightthingateachturn.”390

In the afternoon following Comey’s testimony, the President met withMcGahn,Sessions,andSession’sChiefofStaffJodyHunt.391Atthatmeeting,the President asked McGahn how Comey had done in his testimony andMcGahnrelayedthatComeyhaddeclinedtoanswerquestionsaboutwhetherthePresident was under investigation.392 The President became very upset anddirected his anger at Sessions.393 According to notes written by Hunt, thePresidentsaid,“ThisisterribleJeff.It’sallbecauseyourecused.AGissupposedto be most important appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama

appointedHolder.Iappointedyouandyourecusedyourself.Youleftmeonanisland. I can’tdoanything.”394ThePresident said that the recusalwasunfairand that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining hisauthoritywithforeignleaders.395Sessionsrespondedthathehadhadnochoicebuttorecuse,anditwasamandatoryratherthandiscretionarydecision.396Huntrecalled that Sessions also stated at some point during the conversation that anew start at the FBI would be appropriate and the President should considerreplacingComeyasFBIdirector.397AccordingtoSessions,whenthemeetingconcluded,itwasclearthatthePresidentwasunhappywithComey,butSessionsdidnotthinkthePresidenthadmadethedecisiontoterminateComey.398

BannonrecalledthatthePresidentbroughtComeyupwithhimatleasteighttimesonMay3andMay4,2017.399AccordingtoBannon,thePresidentsaidthesamethingeachtime:“HetoldmethreetimesI’mnotunderinvestigation.He’sashowboater.He’sagrandstander.Idon’tknowanyRussians.Therewasno collusion.”400 Bannon told the President that he could not fire Comeybecause “that ship had sailed.”401 Bannon also told the President that firingComeywasnotgoingtostoptheinvestigation,cautioninghimthathecouldfiretheFBIdirectorbutcouldnotfiretheFBI.402

2.ThePresidentMakestheDecisiontoTerminateComey

The weekend following Comey’s May 3, 2017 testimony, the PresidenttraveledtohisresortinBedminster,NewJersey.403AtadinneronFriday,May5,attendedbythePresidentandvariousadvisorsandfamilymembers,includingJaredKushner and senior advisor StephenMiller, the President stated that hewantedtoremoveComeyandhadideasforaletterthatwouldbeusedtomaketheannouncement.404ThePresident dictated arguments and specific languagefortheletter,andMillertooknotes.405Asreflectedinthenotes, thePresidenttoldMillerthatthelettershouldstart,“WhileIgreatlyappreciateyouinformingme that I amnot under investigation concerningwhat I have often stated is afabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship — pertaining to the 2016presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the Americanpublic–includingDsandRs–havelostfaithinyouasDirectoroftheFBI.”406Followingthedinner,Millerprepareda termination letterbasedon thosenotes

and research he conducted to support the President’s arguments.407 Over theweekend, thePresidentprovided several roundsof editson thedraft letter.408MillersaidthePresidentwasadamantthathenottellanyoneattheWhiteHousewhattheywerepreparingbecausethePresidentwasworriedaboutleaks.409

InhisdiscussionswithMiller, thePresidentmadeclear thathewantedtheletter toopenwitha reference tohimnotbeingunder investigation.410MillersaidhebelievedthatfactwasimportanttothePresidenttoshowthatComeywasnotbeing terminatedbasedonanysuch investigation.411According toMiller,thePresidentwantedtoestablishasafactualmatterthatComeyhadbeenundera“reviewperiod”anddidnothaveassurancefromthePresidentthathewouldbepermittedtokeephisjob.412

The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and thePresidentbeganinawaythatcloselytrackedwhatthePresidenthaddictatedtoMiller at theMay5dinner: “DearDirectorComey,While I greatly appreciateyour informing me, on three separate occasions, that 1 am not underinvestigationconcerningthefabricatedandpolitically-motivatedallegationsofaTrump-Russiarelationshipwithrespecttothe2016PresidentialElection,pleasebe informed that I, along with members of both political parties and, mostimportantly, theAmericanPublic, have lost faith inyouas theDirectorof theFBIandyouareherebyterminated.”413Thefour-pageletterwentontocritiqueComey’s judgment and conduct, including his May 3 testimony before theSenateJudiciaryCommittee,hishandlingoftheClintonemailinvestigation,andhis failure to hold leakers accountable.414 The letter stated that Comey had“asked[thePresident]atdinnershortlyafterinaugurationtolet[Comey]stayonintheDirector’srole,and[thePresident]said that[he]wouldconsider it,”butthe President had “concluded that [he] ha[d] no alternative but to find newleadershipfortheBureau–aleaderthatrestoresconfidenceandtrust.”415

In the morning of Monday, May 8, 2017, the President met in the OvalOffice with senior advisors, including McGahn, Priebus, and Miller, andinformedthemhehaddecidedtoterminateComey.416ThePresidentreadaloudthefirstparagraphsoftheterminationletterhewrotewithMillerandconveyedthatthedecisionhadbeenmadeandwasnotupfordiscussion.417ThePresidenttoldthegroupthatMillerhadresearchedtheissueanddeterminedthePresident

had the authority to terminate Comey without cause.418 In an effort to slowdown the decision-making process, McGahn told the President that DOJleadership was currently discussing Comey’s status and suggested thatWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficeattorneysshouldtalkwithSessionsandRodRosenstein,whohadrecentlybeenconfirmedastheDeputyAttorneyGeneral.419McGahnsaid thatpreviouslyscheduledmeetingswithSessionsandRosenstein thatdaywouldbeanopportunitytofindoutwhattheythoughtaboutfiringComey.420

At noon, Sessions, Rosenstein, and Hunt met with McGahn and WhiteHouse Counsel’s Office attorney Uttam Dhillon at the White House.421McGahn said that the President had decided to fire Comey and asked forSession’sandRosenstein’sviews.422SessionsandRosensteincriticizedComeyanddid not raise concerns about replacing him.423McGahn andDhillon saidthefactthatneitherSessionsnorRosensteinobjectedtoreplacingComeygavethem peace of mind that the President’s decision to fire Comey was not anattempttoobstructjustice.424AnOvalOfficemeetingwasscheduledlaterthatday so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the issue with thePresident.425

Ataround5p.m.,thePresidentandseveralWhiteHouseofficialsmetwithSessionsandRosensteintodiscussComey.426ThePresidenttoldthegroupthathehadwatchedComey’sMay3 testimonyover theweekendand thought thatsomething was “not right” with Comey.427 The President said that ComeyshouldberemovedandaskedSessionsandRosensteinfortheirviews.428Hunt,whowas in the room, recalled thatSessions responded that hehadpreviouslyrecommendedthatComeybereplaced.429McGahnandDhillonsaidRosensteindescribed his concerns about Comey’s handling of the Clinton emailinvestigation.430

ThePresidentthendistributedcopiesoftheterminationletterhehaddraftedwithMiller, and thediscussion turned to themechanicsofhow to fireComeyand whether the President’s letter should be used.431 McGahn and Dhillonurged thePresident topermitComey to resign,but thePresidentwasadamantthat he be fired.432 The group discussed the possibility that Rosenstein and

Sessions could provide a recommendation in writing that Comey should beremoved.433ThePresidentagreedandtoldRosensteintodraftamemorandum,but said hewanted to receive it first thing the nextmorning.434Hunt’s notesreflect that thePresident toldRosenstein to include inhis recommendation thefact that Comey had refused to confirm that the Presidentwas not personallyunder investigation.435,According to notes taken by a seniorDOJ official ofRosenstein’s description of hismeetingwith the President, the President said,“Put theRussia stuff in thememo.”436 Rosenstein responded that the Russiainvestigation was not the basis of his recommendation, so he did not thinkRussia should be mentioned.437 The President told Rosenstein he wouldappreciateit ifRosensteinput it inhis letteranyway.438WhenRosenstein leftthe meeting, he knew that Comey would be terminated, and he told DOJcolleaguesthathisownreasonsforreplacingComeywere“not[thePresident’s]reasons.”439

On May 9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessionsrecommending Comey’s removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein,addressed to theAttorneyGeneral, titled “Restoring Public Confidence in theFBI.“440McGahn recalled that thePresident liked theDOJ letters andagreedthattheyshouldprovidethefoundationforanewcoverletterfromthePresidentaccepting the recommendation to terminate Comey.441 Notes taken byDonaldson onMay 9 reflected the viewof theWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficethatthePresident’soriginalterminationlettershould“[n]ot[seethe]lightofday”andthatitwouldbebettertooffer“[n]ootherrationales”forthefiringthanwhatwasinRosenstein’sandSession’smemoranda.442ThePresidentaskedMillertodraftanewterminationletteranddirectedMillertosayintheletterthatComeyhadinformedthePresident three times thathewasnotunder investigation.443McGahn, Priebus, and Dhillon objected to including that language, but thePresidentinsistedthatitbeincluded.444McGahn,Priebus,andothersperceivedthat language to be the most important part of the letter to the President.445Dhillonmadea finalpitch to thePresident thatComeyshouldbepermitted toresign,butthePresidentrefused.446

Around the time the President’s letter was finalized, Priebus summonedSpicerandthepressteamtotheOvalOffice,wheretheyweretoldthatComey

had been terminated for the reasons stated in the letters by Rosenstein andSessions.447 To announce Comey’s termination, the White House released astatement,whichPriebusthoughthadbeendictatedbythePresident.448Infull,the statement read: “Today,PresidentDonald J.Trump informedFBIDirectorJamesComey’sthathehasbeenterminatedandremovedfromoffice.PresidentTrump acted based on the clear recommendations of both Deputy AttorneyGeneralRodRosensteinandAttorneyGeneralJeffSessions.”449

That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned tomeetwiththePresidentattheWhiteHouse.450ThePresidenttoldMcCabethathe had firedComeybecause of the decisionsComeyhadmade in theClintonemailinvestigationandformanyotherreasons.451ThePresidentaskedMcCabeifhewasaware thatComeyhad told thePresident three times thathewasnotunderinvestigation.452ThePresidentalsoaskedMcCabewhethermanypeopleintheFBIdislikedComeyandwhetherMcCabewaspartofthe“resistance”thathaddisagreedwithComey’sdecisionsintheClintoninvestigation.453McCabetoldthePresidentthatheknewComeyhadtoldthePresidenthewasnotunderinvestigation,thatmostpeopleintheFBIfeltpositivelyaboutComey,andthatMcCabeworked “very closely“withComey andwas part of all the decisionsthathadbeenmadeintheClintoninvestigation.454

Later that evening, the President told his communications team he wasunhappywiththepresscoverageofComey’sterminationandorderedthemtogooutanddefendhim.455ThePresidentalsocalledChrisChristieand,accordingto Christie, said he was getting “killed” in the press over Comey’stermination.456ThePresidentaskedwhatheshoulddo.457Christieasked,“Didyoufire[Comey]becauseofwhatRodwroteinthememo?”,andthePresidentresponded,“Yes.”458ChristiesaidthatthePresidentshould“getRodoutthere”andhavehimdefendthedecision.459ThePresidenttoldChristiethatthiswasa“goodidea”andsaidhewasgoingtocallRosensteinrightaway.460

Thatnight, theWhiteHousePressOfficecalled theDepartmentofJusticeand said the White House wanted to put out a statement saying that it wasRosenstein’sideatofireComey.461RosensteintoldotherDOJofficialsthathe

wouldnotparticipateinputtingouta“falsestory.”462ThePresidentthencalledRosensteindirectlyandsaidhewaswatchingFoxNews,thatthecoveragehadbeen great, and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference.463Rosenstein responded that thiswasnot agood ideabecause if thepressaskedhim,hewould tell the truth thatComey’s firingwasnothis idea.464Sessionsalso informed theWhiteHouseCounsel’sOffice that evening that RosensteinwasupsetthathismemorandumwasbeingportrayedasthereasonforComey’stermination.465

InanunplannedpressconferencelateintheeveningofMay9,2017,Spicertoldreporters,“Itwasall[Rosenstein].NoonefromtheWhiteHouse.ItwasaDOJdecision.”466That evening and the nextmorning,WhiteHouse officialsand spokespeople continued to maintain that the President’s decision toterminate Comey was driven by the recommendations the President receivedfromRosensteinandSessions.467

InthemorningonMay10,2017,PresidentTrumpmetwithRussianForeignMinister Sergey Lavrov and RussianAmbassador SergeyKislyak in theOvalOffice.468ThemediasubsequentlyreportedthatduringtheMay10meetingthePresident brought up his decision the prior day to terminate Comey, tellingLavrovandKislyak:“IjustfiredtheheadoftheF.B.I.Hewascrazy,arealnutjob.IfacedgreatpressurebecauseofRussia.That’stakenoff....I’mnotunderinvestigation.”469ThePresidentneverdeniedmakingthosestatements,andtheWhiteHousedidnotdispute theaccount, instead issuingastatement thatsaid:“BygrandstandingandpoliticizingtheinvestigationintoRussia’sactions,JamesComeycreatedunnecessarypressureonourabilitytoengageandnegotiatewithRussia. The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, theterminationofComeywouldnothaveendedit.Onceagain,therealstoryisthatournationalsecurityhasbeenunderminedbytheleakingofprivateandhighlyclassifiedinformation.“470HickssaidthatwhenshetoldthePresidentaboutthereports on his meeting with Lavrov, he did not look concerned and said ofComey’s, “he is crazy.”471 When McGahn asked the President about hiscomments to Lavrov, the President said it was good that Comey was firedbecause that took the pressure off by making it clear that he was not underinvestigationsohecouldgetmoreworkdone.472

That same morning, on May 10, 2017, the President called McCabe.473According to amemorandumMcCabewrote following the call, the PresidentaskedMcCabetocomeovertotheWhiteHousetodiscusswhetherthePresidentshould visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to employees.474 ThePresident said he had received “hundreds” of messages from FBI employeesindicating their support for terminating Comey.475 The President also toldMcCabe that Comey should not have been permitted to travel back toWashington,D.C.ontheFBI’sairplaneafterhehadbeenterminatedandthathedidnotwantComey“inthebuildingagain,“eventocollecthisbelongings.476When McCabe met with the President that afternoon, the President, withoutprompting, toldMcCabe that people in theFBI loved thePresident, estimatedthatatleast80%oftheFBIhadvotedforhim,andaskedMcCabewhohehadvotedforinthe2016presidentialelection.477

In the afternoon of May 10, 2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sandersspoke to the President about his decision to fire Comey and then spoke toreporters in a televised press conference.478 Sanders told reporters that thePresident, theDepartmentof Justice, andbipartisanmembersofCongresshadlostconfidenceinComey,“[a]ndmostimportantly,therankandfileoftheFBIhad lost confidence in their director. Accordingly, the President accepted therecommendationofhisDeputyAttorneyGeneraltoremoveJamesComeyfromhis position.”479 In response to questions from reporters, Sanders said thatRosenstein decided “on his own” to review Comey’s performance and thatRosensteindecided“onhisown”tocometothePresidentonMonday,May8toexpress his concerns about Comey. When a reporter indicated that the “vastmajority” of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders said, “Look, we’ve heardfromcountlessmembersoftheFBIthatsayverydifferentthings.”480Followingthepressconference,SandersspoketothePresident,whotoldhershedidagoodjobanddidnotpointoutanyinaccuraciesinhercomments.481SanderstoldthisOfficethatherreferencetohearingfrom“countlessmembersoftheFBI”wasa“slipofthetongue.”482Shealsorecalledthatherstatementinaseparatepressinterview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey was acomment she made “in the heat of the moment” that was not founded onanything.483

AlsoonMay10,2017,SessionsandRosensteineachspoketoMcGahnand

expressedconcernthattheWhiteHousewascreatinganarrativethatRosensteinhadinitiatedthedecisiontofireComey.484TheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficeagreed that it was factually wrong to say that the Department of Justice hadinitiated Comey’s termination,485 and McGahn asked attorneys in the WhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficetoworkwiththepressofficetocorrectthenarrative.486

Thenextday,onMay11,2017, thePresidentparticipated inan interviewwithLesterHolt.ThePresidenttoldWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficeattorneysinadvanceof the interviewthat thecommunications teamcouldnotget thestoryright, sohewasgoingonLesterHolt to saywhat reallyhappened.487Duringtheinterview,thePresidentstatedthathehadmadethedecisiontofireComeybeforethePresidentmetwithRosensteinandSessions.ThePresidenttoldHolt,“Iwas going to fire regardless of recommendation . . . . [Rosenstein]made arecommendation.Butregardlessofrecommendation,IwasgoingtofireComeyknowingtherewasnogoodtimetodoit.”488ThePresidentcontinued,“Andinfact,whenIdecidedtojustdoit,Isaidtomyself—Isaid,youknow,thisRussiathingwithTrumpandRussiaisamade-upstory.It’sanexcusebytheDemocratsforhavinglostanelectionthattheyshould’vewon.”489

InresponsetoaquestionaboutwhetherhewasangrywithComeyabouttheRussia investigation, thePresident said, “As far as I’mconcerned, Iwant thatthing tobeabsolutelydoneproperly.”490ThePresidentadded thatherealizedhisterminationofComey“probablymaybewillconfusepeople”withtheresultthatit“mightevenlengthenouttheinvestigation,”buthe“ha[d]todotherightthing for the American people” and Comey was “the wrong man for thatposition.”491 The President described Comey as “a showboat” and “agrandstander,”saidthat“[t]heFBIhasbeeninturmoil,”andsaidhewanted“tohave a really competent, capable director.”492 The President affirmed that heexpectedthenewFBIdirectortocontinuetheRussiainvestigation.493

On the eveningofMay11, 2017, following theLesterHolt interview, thePresident tweeted, “Russiamust be laughing up their sleeveswatching as theU.S.tearsitselfapartoveraDemocratEXCUSEforlosingtheelection.”494Thesame day, the media reported that the President had demanded that ComeypledgehisloyaltytothePresidentinaprivatedinnershortlyafterbeingsworn

in.495LateinthemorningofMay12,2017,thePresidenttweeted,“Again,thestory that there was collusion between the Russians & Trump campaign wasfabricatedbyDemsasanexcuseforlosingtheelection.”496ThePresidentalsotweeted,“JamesComeybetterhopethatthereareno‘tapes’ofourconversationsbefore he starts leaking to thepress!” and “When JamesClapper himself, andvirtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there is nocollusion,whendoesitend?”497

Analysis

InanalyzingthePresident’sdecisiontofireComey,thefollowingevidenceisrelevanttotheelementsofobstructionofjustice:

a. Obstructive act. The act of firing Comey removed the individualoverseeingtheFBI’sRussiainvestigation.ThePresidentknewthatComeywaspersonallyinvolvedintheinvestigationbasedonComey’sbriefingoftheGangofEight,Comey’sMarch20,2017publictestimonyabouttheinvestigation,andthePresident’sone-on-oneconversationswithComey.

FiringComeywouldqualifyasanobstructiveact if ithad thenaturalandprobableeffectofinterferingwithorimpedingtheinvestigation—forexample,iftheterminationwouldhavetheeffectofdelayingordisruptingtheinvestigationorprovidingthePresidentwiththeopportunitytoappointadirectorwhowouldtake a different approach to the investigation that the President perceived asmoreprotectiveofhispersonalinterests.Relevantcircumstancesbearingonthatissue includewhether thePresident’s actions had the potential to discourage asuccessor director or other law enforcement officials in their conduct of theRussia investigation.ThePresident firedComeyabruptlywithoutofferinghimanopportunitytoresign,bannedhimfromtheFBIbuilding,andcriticizedhimpublicly,callinghima“showboat”andclaiming that theFBIwas“in turmoil”under his leadership. And the President followed the termination with publicstatementsthatwerehighlycriticaloftheinvestigation;forexample,threedaysafterfiringComey,thePresidentreferredtotheinvestigationasa“witchhunt”and asked, “when does it end?” Those actions had the potential to affect asuccessordirector’sconductoftheinvestigation.

The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however, would notnecessarilybetopreventorimpedetheFBIfromcontinuingitsinvestigation.As

ageneralmatter,FBI investigations rununder theoperationaldirectionofFBIpersonnel levelsbelowtheFBIdirector.BannonmadeasimilarpointwhenhetoldthePresidentthathecouldfiretheFBIdirector,butcouldnotfiretheFBI.TheWhiteHouse issuedapress statement thedayafterComeywas fired thatsaid, “The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, thetermination of Comey would not have ended it.” In addition, in his May 11interview with Lester Holt, the President stated that he understood when hemadethedecisiontofireComeythattheactionmightprolongtheinvestigation.And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim director, even thoughMcCabetoldthePresidenthehadworked“veryclosely”withComeyandwaspartofallthedecisionsmadeintheClintoninvestigation.

b.Nexustoaproceeding.Thenexuselementwouldbesatisfiedbyevidenceshowing that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from anFBIinvestigationwasobjectivelyforeseeableandactuallycontemplatedbythePresidentwhenheterminatedComey.

Severalfactswouldberelevanttosuchashowing.AtthetimethePresidentfiredComey,agrandjuryhadnotbeguntohearevidencerelatedtotheRussiainvestigationandnograndjurysubpoenashadbeenissued.OnMarch20,2017,however, Comey had announced that the FBI was investigating Russia’sinterference in the election, including “an assessment of whether any crimeswere committed.” It was widely known that the FBI, as part of the Russiainvestigation,was investigating the hacking of theDNC’s computers—a clearcriminaloffense.

In addition, at the time the President firedComey, evidence indicates thePresident knew that Flynn was still under criminal investigation and couldpotentiallybeprosecuted,despitethePresident’sFebruary14,2017requestthatComey“let[]Flynngo.”OnMarch5,2017,theWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficewas informed that theFBIwas asking for transition-period records relating toFlynn—indicating that the FBIwas still actively investigating him. The sameday,thePresidenttoldadvisorshewantedtocallDanaBoente,thentheActingAttorney General for the Russia investigation, to find out whether theWhiteHouseorthePresidentwasbeinginvestigated.OnMarch31,2017,thePresidentsignaledhis awareness thatFlynn remained in legal jeopardyby tweeting that“MikeFlynnshouldaskforimmunity”beforeheagreedtoprovidetestimonytothe FBI or Congress. And in late March or early April, the President askedMcFarlandtopassamessagetoFlynntellinghimthatthePresidentfeltbadfor

him and that he should stay strong, further demonstrating the President’sawarenessofFlynn’scriminalexposure.

c.Intent.Substantialevidenceindicatesthat thecatalystfor thePresident’sdecision to fire Comey was Comey’s unwillingness to publicly state that thePresidentwasnotpersonallyunderinvestigation,despitethePresident’srepeatedrequests that Comeymake such an announcement. In theweek leading up toComey’sMay3,2017SenateJudiciaryCommitteetestimony,thePresidenttoldMcGahnthatitwouldbethelaststrawifComeydidnotsettherecordstraightandpubliclyannouncethatthePresidentwasnotunderinvestigation.Butduringhis May 3 testimony, Comey refused to answer questions about whether thePresidentwas being investigated.Comey’s refusal angered the President,whocriticizedSessionsforleavinghimisolatedandexposed,saying“Youleftmeonan island.” Two days later, the President told advisors he had decided to fireComeyanddictatedalettertoStephenMillerthatbeganwithareferencetothefact that the Presidentwas not being investigated: “While I greatly appreciateyouinformingmethatIamnotunderinvestigationconcerningwhatIhaveoftenstated isafabricatedstoryonaTrump-Russiarelationship. . . .”ThePresidentlateraskedRosenstein to include“Russia” inhismemorandumand tosay thatComey had told the President that he was not under investigation. And thePresident’s final termination letter included a sentence, at the President’sinsistence and against McGahn’s advice, stating that Comey had told thePresidentonthreeseparateoccasionsthathewasnotunderinvestigation.

The President’s other stated rationales for why he fired Comey are notsimilarly supported by the evidence. The termination letter the President andStephenMiller prepared inBedminster citedComey’s handling of theClintonemail investigation, and the President toldMcCabe he fired Comey’s for thatreason. But the facts surrounding Comey’s handling of the Clinton emailinvestigationwerewell known to thePresident at the timehe assumedoffice,and the President hadmade it clear to bothComey and the President’s seniorstaffinearly2017thathewantedComeytostayonasdirector.AndRosensteinarticulatedhis criticismofComey’shandlingof theClinton investigationafterthe President had already decided to fire Comey. The President’s draftterminationletteralsostatedthatmorale in theFBIwasatanall-timelowandSanderstoldthepressafterComey’sterminationthattheWhiteHousehadheardfrom “countless” FBI agents who had lost confidence in Comey. But theevidence does not support those claims. The President told Comey at theirJanuary 27 dinner that “the people of the FBI really like [him],” no evidence

suggeststhatthePresidentheardotherwisebeforedecidingtoterminateComey,andSandersacknowledgedtoinvestigatorsthathercommentswerenotfoundedonanything.

We also considered why it was important to the President that Comeyannouncepubliclythathewasnotunderinvestigation.Someevidenceindicatesthat the President believed that the erroneous perception he was underinvestigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and foreign affairs,particularlyindealingswithRussia.ThePresidenttoldComeythatthe“cloud”of “this Russia business” was making it difficult to run the country. ThePresident told Sessions and McGahn that foreign leaders had expressedsympathy to him for being under investigation and that the perception hewasunder investigation was hurting his ability to address foreign relations issues.The President complained to Rogers that “the thing with the Russians [was]messingup”hisabilitytogetthingsdonewithRussia,andtoldCoats,“Ican’tdo anythingwithRussia, there’s things I’d like to dowithRussia,with trade,withISIS, they’reallovermewith this.”ThePresidentalsomayhaveviewedComeyasinsubordinateforhisfailuretomakeclearintheMay3testimonythatthePresidentwasnotunderinvestigation.

Other evidence, however, indicates that the President wanted to protecthimselffromaninvestigationintohiscampaign.ThedayafterlearningabouttheFBI’s interview of Flynn, the President had a one-on-one dinnerwithComey,againsttheadviceofsenioraides,andtoldComeyheneededComey’s“loyalty.”WhenthePresidentlateraskedComeyforasecondtimetomakepublicthathewasnotunderinvestigation,hebroughtuployaltyagain,saying“BecauseIhavebeen very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know.” After thePresident learned of Session’s recusal from the Russia investigation, thePresident was furious and said he wanted an Attorney General who wouldprotect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to haveprotectedtheirpresidents.ThePresidentalsosaidhewantedtobeabletotellhisAttorneyGeneral“whotoinvestigate.”

Inaddition,thePresidenthadamotivetoputtheFBI’sRussiainvestigationbehindhim.TheevidencedoesnotestablishthattheterminationofComeywasdesignedtocoverupaconspiracybetweentheTrumpCampaignandRussia:Asdescribed in Volume I, the evidence uncovered in the investigation did notestablish that thePresidentor thoseclose tohimwere involved in thechargedRussiancomputer-hackingoractive-measureconspiracies,orthat thePresident

otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian official. But theevidence does indicate that a thorough FBI investigationwould uncover factsabout the campaignand thePresidentpersonally that thePresident couldhaveunderstood to be crimes or that would give rise to personal and politicalconcerns. Although the President publicly stated during and after the electionthathehadnoconnectiontoRussia, theTrumpOrganization, throughMichaelCohen,waspursuingtheproposedTrumpTowerMoscowprojectthroughJune2016 and candidate Trump was repeatedly briefed on the progress of thoseefforts.498Inaddition,somewitnessessaidthatTrumpwasawarethatHarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████atatimewhenpublicreportsstatedthatRussianintelligenceofficialswerebehindthehacks,andthatTrumpprivatelysoughtinformationaboutfutureWikiLeaks releases.499 More broadly, multiple witnesses described thePresident’spreoccupationwithpresscoverageoftheRussiainvestigationandhispersistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of hiselection.500

Finally,thePresidentandWhiteHouseaidesinitiallyadvancedapretextualreason to the press and the public for Comey’s termination. In the immediateaftermathof the firing, thePresidentdictatedapressstatementsuggesting thathe had acted based on the DOJ recommendations, and White House pressofficialsrepeatedthatstory.ButthePresidenthaddecidedtofireComeybeforethe White House solicited those recommendations. Although the Presidentultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Comey regardless of theDepartment of Justice’s recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officialsmadecleartohimthattheywouldresisttheWhiteHouse’ssuggestionthattheyhadpromptedtheprocessthatledtoComey’stermination.Theinitialrelianceona pretextual justification could support an inference that the President hadconcerns about providing the real reason for the firing, although the evidencedoesnotresolvewhetherthoseconcernswerepersonal,political,orboth.

E.ThePresident’sEffortstoRemovetheSpecialCounsel

Overview

TheActingAttorneyGeneralappointedaSpecialCounselonMay17,2017,prompting thePresident to state that itwas the endofhis presidencyand thatAttorneyGeneralSessionshadfailedtoprotecthimandshouldresign.Sessions

submitted his resignation, which the President ultimately did not accept. ThePresidenttoldsenioradvisorsthattheSpecialCounselhadconflictsofinterest,buttheyrespondedthatthoseclaimswere“ridiculous”andposednoobstacletothe Special Counsel’s service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarlyclearedtheSpecialCounsel’sservice.OnJune14,2017,thepressreportedthatthePresidentwasbeingpersonallyinvestigatedforobstructionofjusticeandthePresident responded with a series of tweets criticizing the Special Counsel’sinvestigation.Thatweekend, thePresidentcalledMcGahnanddirectedhim tohave the Special Counsel removed because of asserted conflicts of interest.McGahn did not carry out the instruction for fear of being seen as triggeringanother Saturday Night Massacre and instead prepared to resign. McGahnultimatelydidnotquitandthePresidentdidnotfollowupwithMcGahnonhisrequesttohavetheSpecialCounselremoved.

Evidence

1.TheAppointmentoftheSpecialCounselandthePresident’sReaction

OnMay17,2017,ActingAttorneyGeneralRosensteinappointedRobertS.Mueller, III as Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the Russiainvestigation and matters that arose from the investigation.501 The PresidentlearnedoftheSpecialCounsel’sappointmentfromSessions,whowaswiththePresident,Hunt,andMcGahnconductinginterviewsforanewFBIDirector.502SessionssteppedoutoftheOvalOfficetotakeacallfromRosenstein,whotoldhim about the Special Counsel appointment, and Sessions then returned toinformthePresidentofthenews.503AccordingtonoteswrittenbyHunt,whenSessions told the President that a Special Counsel had been appointed, thePresidentslumpedbackinhischairandsaid,“OhmyGod.Thisisterrible.ThisistheendofmyPresidency.I’mfucked.”504ThePresidentbecameangryandlambastedtheAttorneyGeneralforhisdecisiontorecusefromtheinvestigation,stating, “How could you let this happen, Jeff?”505 The President said theposition of Attorney General was his most important appointment and thatSessions had “let [him] down,” contrasting him to Eric Holder and RobertKennedy.506 Sessions recalled that the President said to him, “you weresupposed toprotectme,”orwords to that effect.507ThePresident returned totheconsequencesoftheappointmentandsaid,“Everyonetellsmeifyougetone

oftheseindependentcounselsitruinsyourpresidency.It takesyearsandyearsandIwon’tbeabletodoanything.Thisistheworstthingthateverhappenedtome.”508

ThePresident thentoldSessionsheshouldresignasAttorneyGeneral.509

SessionsagreedtosubmithisresignationandlefttheOvalOffice.510HickssawthePresidentshortlyafterSessionsdepartedanddescribedthePresidentasbeingextremelyupset by theSpecialCounsel’s appointment.511Hicks said that shehadonlyseenthePresidentlikethatoneothertime,whentheAccessHollywoodtapecameoutduringthecampaign.512

Thenextday,May18,2017,FBIagentsdeliveredtoMcGahnapreservationnotice that discussed an investigation related to Comey’s termination anddirected the White House to preserve all relevant documents.513 When hereceived the letter,McGahn issued adocumenthold toWhiteHouse staff andinstructedthemnottosendoutanyburnbagsovertheweekendwhilehesortedthingsout.514

AlsoonMay18,Sessionsfinalizedaresignationletterthatstated,“Pursuantto our conversation of yesterday, and at your request, I hereby offer myresignation.”515Sessions,accompaniedbyHunt,broughtthelettertotheWhiteHouseandhandedittothePresident.516ThePresidentputtheresignationletterinhispocket andaskedSessions several timeswhetherhewanted to continueserving as Attorney General.517 Sessions ultimately told the President hewantedtostay,butitwasuptothePresident.518ThePresidentsaidhewantedSessions to stay.519 At the conclusion of the meeting, the President shookSession’shandbutdidnotreturntheresignationletter.520

When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding ontoSession’s resignation letter, they became concerned that it could be used toinfluence theDepartment of Justice.521Priebus toldSessions itwas not goodforthePresidenttohavetheletterbecauseitwouldfunctionasakindof“shockcollar” that the President could use any time he wanted; Priebus said thePresidenthad“DOJby the throat.”522PriebusandBannon toldSessions theywouldattempt toget the letterback from thePresidentwithanotation thathe

wasnotacceptingSession’sresignation.523

OnMay19,2017,thePresidentleftforatriptotheMiddleEast.524Hicksrecalled that on the President’s flight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, thePresident pulled Session’s resignation letter from his pocket, showed it to agroupofsenioradvisors,andaskedthemwhatheshoulddoaboutit.525Duringthe trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it toSessions,butthePresidenttoldhimthattheletterwasbackattheWhiteHouse,somewhere in the residence.526 Itwas not untilMay 30, three days after thePresidentreturnedfromthetrip,thatthePresidentreturnedthelettertoSessionswithanotationsaying,“Notaccepted.”527

2.ThePresidentAssertsthattheSpecialCounselhasConflictsofInterest

In the days following the Special Counsel’s appointment, the Presidentrepeatedly toldadvisors, includingPriebus,Bannon,andMcGahn, thatSpecialCounselMueller had conflicts of interest.528 The President cited as conflictsthatMuellerhadinterviewedfortheFBIDirectorpositionshortlybeforebeingappointedasSpecialCounsel,thathehadworkedforalawfirmthatrepresentedpeopleaffiliatedwith thePresident, and thatMuellerhaddisputedcertain feesrelatingtohismembershipinaTrumpgolfcourseinNorthernVirginia.529ThePresident’s advisors pushed back on his assertion of conflicts, telling thePresident they did not count as true conflicts.530 Bannon recalled telling thePresident that the purported conflictswere “ridiculous” and that noneof themwas realor couldcomeclose to justifyingprecludingMueller fromservingasSpecial Counsel.531 As for Mueller’s interview for FBI Director, Bannonrecalled that theWhiteHousehad invitedMueller to speak to thePresident toofferaperspectiveontheinstitutionoftheFBI.532Bannonsaidthat,althoughtheWhiteHousethoughtaboutbeseechingMuellertobecomeDirectoragain,hedidnotcomeinlookingforthejob.533BannonalsotoldthePresidentthatthelawfirmpositiondidnotamounttoaconflict inthelegalcommunity.534AndBannontoldthePresidentthatthegolfcoursedisputedidnotrisetothelevelofaconflictandclaimingonewas“ridiculousandpetty.”535ThePresidentdidnotrespondwhenBannonpushedbackonthestatedconflictsofinterest.536

OnMay23,2017,theDepartmentofJusticeannouncedthatethicsofficialshaddeterminedthattheSpecialCounsel’spriorlawfirmpositiondidnotbarhisservice, generating media reports that Mueller had been cleared to serve.537McGahnrecalledthataroundthesametime,thePresidentcomplainedabouttheasserted conflicts and proddedMcGahn to reach out to Rosenstein about theissue.538McGahnsaidherespondedthathecouldnotmakesuchacallandthatthe President should instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not aWhiteHouseissue.539ContemporaneousnotesofaMay23,2017conversationbetweenMcGahnandthePresidentreflect thatMcGahntoldthePresidentthathewouldnot callRosenstein and that hewould suggest that thePresident notmakesuchacalleither.540McGahnadvisedthatthePresidentcoulddiscusstheissuewithhispersonalattorneybutitwould“looklikestilltryingtomeddlein[the]investigation”and“knockingoutMueller”wouldbe“[a]notherfactusedtoclaimobst[ruction]ofjust[ice].”541McGahntoldthePresidentthathis“biggestexposure”wasnothisactoffiringComeybuthis“othercontacts”and“calls,”and his “ask re: Flynn.”542 By the timeMcGahn provided this advice to thePresident, there had been widespread reporting on the President’s request forComey’s loyalty,which the President publicly denied; his request thatComey“let[]Flynngo,”whichthePresidentalsodenied;andthePresident’sstatementto the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination of Comey had relieved“greatpressure”relatedtoRussia,whichthePresidentdidnotdeny.543

On June 8, 2017, Comey testified before Congress about his interactionswith thePresidentbeforehis termination, including the request for loyalty, therequestthatComey“let[]Flynngo,”andtherequestthatComey“liftthecloud”overthepresidencycausedbytheongoinginvestigation.544Comey’stestimonyled to a series of news reports about whether the President had obstructedjustice.545On June9, 2017, theSpecialCounsel’sOffice informed theWhiteHouse Counsel’s Office that investigators intended to interview intelligencecommunityofficialswhohadallegedlybeenaskedbythePresidenttopushbackagainsttheRussiainvestigation.546

On Monday, June 12, 2017, Christopher Ruddy, the chief executive ofNewsmax Media and a longtime friend of the President’s, met at the WhiteHouse with Priebus and Bannon.547 Ruddy recalled that they told him thePresidentwasstronglyconsideringfiringtheSpecialCounselandthathewould

do so precipitously, without vetting the decision through Administrationofficials.548 Ruddy asked Priebus if Ruddy could talk publicly about thediscussion they had about the SpecialCounsel, andPriebus said he could.549Priebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up like the one that followed thetermination of Comey did not happen.550 Later that day, Ruddy stated in atelevisedinterviewthat thePresidentwas“consideringperhaps terminatingtheSpecialCounsel”basedonpurportedconflictsof interest.551Ruddy later toldanother news outlet that “Trump is definitely considering” terminating theSpecial Counsel and “it’s not something that’s being dismissed.”552 Ruddy’scomments led to extensive coverage in the media that the President wasconsideringfiringtheSpecialCounsel.553

WhiteHouse officials were unhappywith that press coverage and RuddyheardfromfriendsthatthePresidentwasupsetwithhim.554OnJune13,2017,Sandersasked thePresident forguidanceonhow to respond topress inquiriesabout thepossible firingof theSpecialCounsel.555The President dictated ananswer,which Sanders delivered, saying that “[w]hile the president has everyrightto”firetheSpecialCounsel,“hehasnointentiontodoso.”556

Also on June 13, 2017, the President’s personal counsel contacted theSpecialCounsel’sOffice and raised concerns about possible conflicts.557 ThePresident’s counsel cited Mueller’s previous partnership in his law firm, hisinterviewfortheFBIDirectorposition,andanassertedpersonalrelationshiphehad with Comey.558 That same day, Rosenstein had testified publicly beforeCongress and said he sawno evidenceof good cause to terminate theSpecialCounsel, including for conflicts of interest. 559 Two days later, on June 15,2017, the Special Counsel’s Office informed the Acting Attorney General’sofficeabouttheareasofconcernraisedbythePresident’scounselandtoldthePresident’scounselthattheirconcernshadbeencommunicatedtoRosensteinsothattheDepartmentofJusticecouldtakeanyappropriateaction.560

3.ThePressReportsthatthePresidentisBeingInvestigatedforObstructionofJusticeandthePresidentDirectstheWhiteHouseCounseltoHavetheSpecialCounselRemoved

OntheeveningofJune14,2017,theWashingtonPostpublishedanarticlestating that the Special Counsel was investigating whether the President hadattempted to obstruct justice.561 This was the first public report that thePresidenthimselfwasunder investigationby theSpecialCounsel’sOffice,andcablenewsnetworksquicklypickeduponthereport.562ThePoststorystatedthat the Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders,includingCoatsandRogers,aboutwhat thePresidenthadasked themtodo inresponsetoComey’sMarch20,2017testimony;thattheinquiryintoobstructionmarked“amajorturningpoint”intheinvestigation;andthatwhile“Trumphadreceivedprivateassurancesfromthen-FBIDirectorJamesB.ComeystartinginJanuary that he was not personally under investigation,” “[o]fficials say thatchangedshortlyafterComey’sfiring.”563Thatevening,atapproximately10:31p.m., thePresident calledMcGahnonMcGahn’spersonal cellphoneand theyspokeforabout15minutes.564McGahndidnothaveaclearmemoryofthecallbut thought theymight have discussed the stories reporting that the Presidentwasunderinvestigation.565

Beginningearlythenextday,June15,2017,thePresidentissuedaseriesoftweets acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation andcriticizing it. He wrote: “They made up a phony collusion with the Russiansstory,foundzeroproof,sonowtheygoforobstructionofjusticeonthephonystory. Nice”;566 “You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH HUNT inAmericanpoliticalhistory—ledbysomeverybadandconflictedpeople!”;567and “Crooked H destroyed phones w/ hammer, ‘bleached’ emails, & hadhusband meet w/AG days before she was cleared—& they talk aboutobstruction?”568 The next day, June 16, 2017, the President wrote additionaltweets criticizing the investigation: “After 7 months of investigations &committee hearings aboutmy ‘collusionwith the Russians,’ nobody has beenable to showanyproof.Sad!”;569 and “I ambeing investigated for firing theFBIDirectorbythemanwhotoldmetofiretheFBIDirector!WitchHunt.”570

OnSaturday,June17,2017,thePresidentcalledMcGahnanddirectedhimto have the Special Counsel removed.571 McGahn was at home and thePresident was at Camp David.572 In interviews with this Office, McGahnrecalled that the President called him at home twice and on both occasions

directedhimtocallRosensteinandsaythatMuellerhadconflictsthatprecludedhimfromservingasSpecialCounsel.573

On the first call,McGahn recalled that the President said something like,“Yougottadothis.YougottacallRod.”574McGahnsaidhetoldthePresidentthathewouldseewhathecoulddo.575McGahnwasperturbedbythecallanddid not intend to act on the request.576 He and other advisors believed theasserted conflicts were “silly” and “not real,” and they had previouslycommunicatedthatviewtothePresident.577McGahnalsohadmadecleartothePresidentthattheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficeshouldnotbeinvolvedinanyeffort topress the issueof conflicts.578McGahnwas concerned about havingany role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the Special Counselbecausehehadgrownup in theReaganeraandwanted tobemore likeJudgeRobertBorkandnot“SaturdayNightMassacreBork.”579McGahnconsideredthe President’s request to be an inflection point and he wanted to hit thebrakes.580

WhenthePresidentcalledMcGahnasecondtimetofollowupontheordertocalltheDepartmentofJustice,McGahnrecalledthatthePresidentwasmoredirect,sayingsomethinglike,“CallRod,tellRodthatMuellerhasconflictsandcan’t be the Special Counsel.”581McGahn recalled the President telling him“Muellerhastogo”and“Callmebackwhenyoudoit.”582McGahnunderstoodthe President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed byRosenstein.583 To end the conversation with the President, McGahn left thePresidentwiththeimpressionthatMcGahnwouldcallRosenstein.584McGahnrecalledthathehadalreadysaidnotothePresident’srequestandhewasworndown,sohejustwantedtogetoffthephone.585

McGahn recalled feeling trapped because he did not plan to follow thePresident’s directive but did not know what he would say the next time thePresident called.586 McGahn decided he had to resign.587 He called hispersonal lawyerand thencalledhischiefof staff,AnnieDonaldson, to informherofhisdecision.588He thendrove to theoffice topackhisbelongingsandsubmit his resignation letter.589Donaldson recalled thatMcGahn told her the

PresidenthadcalledanddemandedhecontacttheDepartmentofJusticeandthatthePresidentwantedhimtodosomethingthatMcGahndidnotwanttodo.590McGahntoldDonaldsonthatthePresidenthadcalledatleasttwiceandinoneofthe calls asked “have you done it?”591 McGahn did not tell Donaldson thespecifics of the President’s request because he was consciously trying not toinvolve her in the investigation, but Donaldson inferred that the President’sdirective was related to the Russia investigation.592 Donaldson prepared toresignalongwithMcGahn.593

Thatevening,McGahncalledbothPriebusandBannonandtoldthemthatheintendedtoresign.594McGahnrecalledthat,afterspeakingwithhisattorneyandgiventhenatureofthePresident’srequest,hedecidednottosharedetailsofthe President’s requestwith otherWhiteHouse staff.595 Priebus recalled thatMcGahnsaidthatthePresidenthadaskedhimto“docrazyshit,”buthethoughtMcGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President’s request becauseMcGahnwas trying toprotectPriebusfromwhathedidnotneed toknow.596Priebus and Bannon both urgedMcGahn not to quit, andMcGahn ultimatelyreturnedtoworkthatMondayandremainedinhisposition.597HehadnottoldthePresident directly that he planned to resign, andwhen they next saw eachotherthePresidentdidnotaskMcGahnwhetherhehadfollowedthroughwithcallingRosenstein.598

Around the same time, Chris Christie recalled a telephone call with thePresidentinwhichthePresidentaskedwhatChristiethoughtaboutthePresidentfiring theSpecialCounsel.599Christie advised against doing sobecause therewas no substantive basis for the President to fire the Special Counsel, andbecausethePresidentwouldlosesupportfromRepublicansinCongressifhedidso.600

Analysis

In analyzing the President’s direction to McGahn to have the SpecialCounsel removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements ofobstructionofjustice:

a.Obstructiveact.Aswith thePresident’s firingofComey, theattempt to

remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it wouldnaturally obstruct the investigation and any grand jury proceedings thatmightflow from the inquiry. Even if the removal of the lead prosecutor would notprevent the investigation from continuing under a new appointee, a factfinderwouldneedtoconsiderwhethertheacthadthepotentialtodelayfurtheractionin the investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel, orotherwiseimpedetheinvestigation.

A threshold question iswhether the President in fact directedMcGahn tohave the Special Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that inJune 2017 the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counselremoved, the President publicly disputed these accounts, and privately toldMcGahnthathehadsimplywantedMcGahntobringconflictsofinteresttotheDepartmentofJustice’sattention.SeeVolumeII,SectionII.I,infra.SomeofthePresident’sspecific language thatMcGahnrecalled fromthecalls isconsistentwith that explanation. Substantial evidence, however, supports the conclusionthatthePresidentwentfurtherandinfactdirectedMcGahntocallRosensteintohavetheSpecialCounselremoved.

First,McGahn’sclearrecollectionwasthatthePresidentdirectedhimtotellRosenstein not only that conflicts existed but also that “Mueller has to go.”McGahn is a credible witness with no motive to lie or exaggerate given thepositionheheldintheWhiteHouse.601McGahnspokewiththePresidenttwiceandunderstoodthedirectivethesamewaybothtimes,makingitunlikelythathemisheardormisinterpreted thePresident’s request. In response to that request,McGahndecidedtoquitbecausehedidnotwanttoparticipateineventsthathedescribedasakintotheSaturdayNightMassacre.Hecalledhislawyer,drovetotheWhiteHouse, packeduphis office, prepared to submit a resignation letterwithhischiefofstaff,toldPriebusthatthePresidenthadaskedhimto“docrazyshit,”andinformedPriebusandBannonthathewasleaving.Thoseactswouldbe a highly unusual reaction to a request to convey information to theDepartmentofJustice.

Second, in thedaysbeforethecalls toMcGahn, thePresident, throughhiscounsel, had already brought the asserted conflicts to the attention of theDepartment of Justice. Accordingly, the President had no reason to haveMcGahncallRosensteinthatweekendtoraiseconflictsissuesthatalreadyhadbeenraised.

Third,thePresident’ssenseofurgencyandrepeatedrequeststoMcGahntotake immediate action on a weekend—“You gotta do this. You gotta callRod.”—support McGahn’s recollection that the President wanted theDepartment of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel. Had thePresident instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examineassertedconflicts to evaluatewhether theyposedanethicalbar, itwouldhavebeen unnecessary to set the process in motion on a Saturday and to makerepeatedcallstoMcGahn.

Finally, the President had discussed “knocking out Mueller” and raisedconflicts of interest in aMay 23, 2017 call withMcGahn, reflecting that thePresidentconnectedtheconflictstoaplantoremovetheSpecialCounsel.AndinthedaysleadinguptoJune17,2017,thePresidentmadecleartoPriebusandBannon,whothentoldRuddy,thatthePresidentwasconsideringterminatingtheSpecial Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out toChristietogethisthoughtsonfiringtheSpecialCounsel.Thisevidenceshowsthat the President was not just seeking an examination of whether conflictsexistedbut insteadwas looking touseassertedconflictsasaway to terminatetheSpecialCounsel.

b.Nexustoanofficialproceeding.Tosatisfytheproceedingrequirement,itwouldbenecessarytoestablishanexusbetweenthePresident’sactofseekingtoterminate the Special Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand juryproceeding.

SubstantialevidenceindicatesthatbyJune17,2017,thePresidentknewhisconductwasunderinvestigationbyafederalprosecutorwhocouldpresentanyevidenceoffederalcrimestoagrandjury.OnMay23,2017,McGahnexplicitlywarnedthePresidentthathis“biggestexposure”wasnothisactoffiringComeybuthis “other contacts” and“calls,” andhis “ask re:Flynn.”Byearly June, itwaswidelyreportedinthemediathatfederalprosecutorshadissuedgrandjurysubpoenasintheFlynninquiryandthattheSpecialCounselhadtakenovertheFlynninvestigation.602OnJune9,2017,theSpecialCounsel’sOfficeinformedtheWhiteHouse that investigatorswould be interviewing intelligence agencyofficialswhoallegedlyhadbeenaskedbythePresidenttopushbackagainsttheRussia investigation.On June 14, 2017, news outlets began reporting that thePresident was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based onwidespread reporting, the President knew that such an investigation couldincludehisrequestforComey’sloyalty;hisrequestthatComey“let[]Flynngo”;

hisoutreachtoCoatsandRogers;andhisterminationofComeyandstatementtotheRussianForeignMinister that theterminationhadrelieved“greatpressure”relatedtoRussia.AndonJune16,2017,thedaybeforehedirectedMcGahntohavetheSpecialCounselremoved,thePresidentpubliclyacknowledgedthathisconductwasunder investigationbyafederalprosecutor, tweeting,“IambeinginvestigatedforfiringtheFBIDirectorbythemanwhotoldmetofiretheFBIDirector!”

c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President’s attempts toremove theSpecialCounselwere linked to theSpecialCounsel’s oversight ofinvestigationsthatinvolvedthePresident’sconduct—and,mostimmediately,toreports that the President was being investigated for potential obstruction ofjustice.

BeforethePresidentterminatedComey,thePresidentconsidereditcriticallyimportantthathewasnotunderinvestigationandthatthepublicnoterroneouslythinkhewasbeinginvestigated.AsdescribedinVolumeII,SectionII.D,supra,advisorsperceivedthePresident,whilehewasdrafting theComeyterminationletter,tobeconcernedmorethananythingelseaboutgettingoutthathewasnotpersonallyunder investigation.When thePresident learnedof the appointmentoftheSpecialCounselonMay17,2017,heexpressedfurtherconcernabouttheinvestigation, saying “[t]his is the end of my Presidency.” The President alsofaultedSessionsforrecusing,saying“youweresupposedtoprotectme.”

On June 14, 2017, when the Washington Post reported that the SpecialCounselwasinvestigatingthePresidentforobstructionofjustice,thePresidentwasfacingwhathehadwanted toavoid:acriminal investigation intohisownconduct that was the subject of widespread media attention. The evidenceindicates that news of the obstruction investigation prompted the President tocallMcGahnandseektohavetheSpecialCounselremoved.Bymid-June, theDepartmentofJusticehadalreadyclearedtheSpecialCounsel’sserviceandthePresident’s advisors had told him that the claimed conflicts of interest were“silly”anddidnotprovideabasistoremovetheSpecialCounsel.OnJune13,2017,theActingAttorneyGeneraltestifiedbeforeCongressthatnogoodcausefor removing the Special Counsel existed, and the President dictated a pressstatement toSanders sayinghehadno intentionof firing theSpecialCounsel.Butthenextday, themediareportedthat thePresidentwasunderinvestigationfor obstruction of justice and the Special Counsel was interviewingwitnessesabout events related to possible obstruction—spurring the President to write

critical tweets about the Special Counsel’s investigation. The President calledMcGahnathomethatnightandthencalledhimonSaturdayfromCampDavid.The evidence accordingly indicates that news that an obstruction investigationhadbeenopened iswhat led thePresident tocallMcGahn tohave theSpecialCounselterminated.

TherealsoisevidencethatthePresidentknewthatheshouldnothavemadethosecallstoMcGahn.ThePresidentmadethecallstoMcGahnafterMcGahnhadspecificallytoldthePresidentthattheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOffice—andMcGahn himself—could not be involved in pressing conflicts claims and thatthe President should consult with his personal counsel if he wished to raiseconflicts. Instead of relying on his personal counsel to submit the conflictsclaims, the President sought to use his official powers to remove the SpecialCounsel.AndafterthemediareportedonthePresident’sactions,hedeniedthathe ever ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated and maderepeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in Volume II,Section II.I, infra. Those denials are contrary to the evidence and suggest thePresident’sawarenessthatthedirectiontoMcGahncouldbeseenasimproper.

F.ThePresident’sEffortstoCurtailtheSpecialCounselInvestigation

Overview

TwodaysafterthePresidentdirectedMcGahntohavetheSpecialCounselremoved,thePresidentmadeanotherattempttoaffect thecourseoftheRussiainvestigation. On June 19, 2017, the President met one-on-one with CoreyLewandowski in the Oval Office and dictated a message to be delivered toAttorneyGeneralSessionsthatwouldhavehadtheeffectoflimitingtheRussiainvestigationtofutureelectioninterferenceonly.Onemonthlater,thePresidentmetagainwithLewandowskiandfollowedupon therequest tohaveSessionslimitthescopeoftheRussiainvestigation.LewandowskitoldthePresidentthemessagewouldbedeliveredsoon.Hours later, thePresidentpubliclycriticizedSessionsinanunplannedpressinterview,raisingquestionsaboutSessions’sjobsecurity.

1.ThePresidentAsksCoreyLewandowskitoDeliveraMessagetoSessionstoCurtailtheSpecialCounselInvestigation

OnJune19,2017,twodaysafterthePresidentdirectedMcGahntohavethe

SpecialCounselremoved,thePresidentmetone-on-oneintheOvalOfficewithhis former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski.603 Senior White Houseadvisors described Lewandowski as a “devotee” of the President and said therelationshipbetweenthePresidentandLewandowskiwas“close.”604

During the June19meeting,Lewandowski recalled that, after some smalltalk,thePresidentbroughtupSessionsandcriticizedhisrecusalfromtheRussiainvestigation.605,ThePresidenttoldLewandowskithatSessionswasweakandthat if thePresident hadknownabout the likelihoodof recusal in advance, hewouldnothaveappointedSessions.606ThePresidentthenaskedLewandowskito deliver amessage toSessions and said “write this down.”607Thiswas thefirst time the President had asked Lewandowski to take dictation, andLewandowski wrote as fast as possible to make sure he captured the contentcorrectly.608

The President directed that Sessions should give a speech publiclyannouncing:

I know that I recusedmyself from certain things having to do withspecificareas.ButourPOTUS. . . isbeing treatedveryunfairly.Heshouldn’t have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel b/c he hasn’t doneanythingwrong.Iwasonthecampaignw/himforninemonths,therewere noRussians involvedwith him. I know it for a fact b/c Iwasthere. He didn’t do anything wrong except he ran the greatestcampaigninAmericanhistory.609

ThedictatedmessagewentontostatethatSessionswouldmeetwiththeSpecialCounseltolimithisjurisdictiontofutureelectioninterference:

NowagroupofpeoplewanttosubverttheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.IamgoingtomeetwiththeSpecialProsecutortoexplainthisisvery unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward withinvestigatingelectionmeddlingforfutureelectionssothatnothingcanhappeninfutureelections.610

The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the“most popular guy in the country.”611 Lewandowski told the President he

understoodwhatthePresidentwantedSessionstodo.612

LewandowskiwantedtopassthemessagetoSessionsinpersonratherthanoverthephone.613HedidnotwanttomeetattheDepartmentofJusticebecausehedidnotwantapublic logofhisvisit anddidnotwantSessions tohaveanadvantageoverhimbymeetingonwhatLewandowskidescribedasSessions’sturf.614LewandowskicalledSessionsandarrangedameetingforthefollowingeveningatLewandowski’soffice,butSessionshadtocancelduetoalastminuteconflict.615 Shortly thereafter, Lewandowski left Washington, D.C., withouthaving had an opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the President’smessage. 616 Lewandowski stored the notes in a safe at his home, which hestatedwashisstandardprocedurewithsensitiveitems.617

2.ThePresidentFollowsUpwithLewandowski

Following his June meeting with the President, Lewandowski contactedRickDearborn,thenaseniorWhiteHouseofficial,andaskedifDearborncouldpass a message to Sessions.618 Dearborn agreed without knowing what themessagewas,andLewandowskilaterconfirmedthatDearbornwouldmeetwithSessions for dinner in late July and could deliver the message then.619Lewandowski recalled thinking that the President had asked him to pass themessage because the President knew Lewandowski could be trusted, butLewandowskibelievedDearbornwouldbeabettermessengerbecausehehadalongstanding relationship with Sessions and because Dearborn was in thegovernmentwhileLewandowskiwasnot.620

OnJuly19,2017, thePresidentagainmetwithLewandowskialone in theOvalOffice.621Intheprecedingdays,asdescribedinVolumeII,SectionII.G,infra, emails and other information about the June 9, 2016 meeting betweenseveralRussiansandDonaldTrumpJr.,JaredKushner,andPaulManaforthadbeenpubliclydisclosed.IntheJuly19meetingwithLewandowski,thePresidentraisedhispreviousrequestandaskedifLewandowskihadtalkedtoSessions.622

Lewandowski told thePresident that themessagewouldbedeliveredsoon.623Lewandowskirecalledthat thePresident toldhimthat ifSessionsdidnotmeetwithhim,LewandowskishouldtellSessionshewasfired.624

Immediately following themeetingwith the President, Lewandowski sawDearborn in the anteroomoutside theOvalOffice andgavehima typewrittenversionofthemessagethePresidenthaddictatedtobedeliveredtoSessions.625LewandowskitoldDearbornthatthenoteswerethemessagetheyhaddiscussed,butDearborndidnot recallwhetherLewandowski said themessagewas fromthePresident.626Themessage“definitelyraisedaneyebrow”forDearborn,andherecallednotwantingtoaskwhereitcamefromorthinkfurtheraboutdoinganythingwithit.627DearbornalsosaidthatbeingaskedtoserveasamessengertoSessionsmadehimuncomfortable.628HerecalledlatertellingLewandowskithat he had handled the situation, but he did not actually follow throughwithdeliveringthemessagetoSessions,andhedidnotkeepacopyofthetypewrittennotesLewandowskihadgivenhim.629

3.ThePresidentPubliclyCriticizesSessionsinaNewYorkTimesInterview

Within hours of the President’s meeting with Lewandowski on July 19,2017, the President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times inwhich he criticized Sessions’s decision to recuse from the Russiainvestigation.630ThePresident said that “Sessions should have never recusedhimself,andifhewasgoingtorecusehimself,heshouldhavetoldmebeforehetook the job, and Iwouldhavepicked somebodyelse.”631Sessions’s recusal,thePresidentsaid,was“veryunfairtothepresident.Howdoyoutakeajobandthenrecuseyourself?Ifhewouldhaverecusedhimselfbeforethejob,Iwouldhavesaid,‘Thanks,Jeff,butIcan’t,youknow,I’mnotgoingtotakeyou.’It’sextremelyunfair,andthat’samildword,tothepresident.”632Hicks,whowaspresent for the interview, recalled trying to “throw [herself] between thereporters and [the President]” to stop parts of the interview, but the President“lovedtheinterview.”633

Later that day, Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed thePresident’sNewYorkTimesinterview.634LewandowskirecalledtellingHicksabout the President’s request that he meet with Sessions and joking with herabouttheideaoffiringSessionsasaprivatecitizenifSessionswouldnotmeetwithhim.635AsHicksrememberedtheconversation,LewandowskitoldherthePresidenthad recentlyaskedhim tomeetwithSessionsanddeliveramessage

that he needed to do the “right thing” and resign.636 While Hicks andLewandowski were together, the President called Hicks and told her he washappywithhowcoverageofhisNewYorkTimesinterviewcriticizingSessionswasplayingout.637

4.ThePresidentOrdersPriebustoDemandSessions’sResignation

Threedayslater,onJuly21,2017, theWashingtonPostreportedthatU.S.intelligence intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-relatedmatters with the Russian ambassador, contrary to what Sessions had saidpublicly.638That evening,Priebus calledHunt to talk aboutwhetherSessionsmightbefiredormightresign.639PriebushadpreviouslytalkedtoHuntwhenthe media had reported on tensions between Sessions and the President, and,afterspeakingtoSessions,HunthadtoldPriebusthatthePresidentwouldhavetofireSessionsifhewantedtoremoveSessionsbecauseSessionswasnotgoingtoquit.640AccordingtoHunt,whotookcontemporaneousnotesoftheJuly21call,Hunt toldPriebus that, as theyhadpreviouslydiscussed,Sessionshadnointention of resigning.641 Hunt asked Priebus what the President wouldaccomplishbyfiringSessions,pointingouttherewasaninvestigationbeforeandtherewouldbeaninvestigationafter.642

Earlythefollowingmorning,July22,2017,thePresidenttweeted,“AnewINTELLIGENCELEAK from theAmazonWashingtonPost, this time againstA.G. Jeff Sessions. These illegal leaks, like Comey’s, must stop!”643Approximately one hour later, the President tweeted, “So many people areaskingwhyisn’ttheA.G.orSpecialCouncillookingatthemanyHillaryClintonorComeycrimes.33,000e-mailsdeleted?”644Laterthatmorning,whileaboardMarineOneonthewaytoNorfolk,Virginia, thePresidenttoldPriebusthathehadtogetSessionstoresignimmediately.645ThePresidentsaidthatthecountryhadlostconfidenceinSessionsandthenegativepublicitywasnottolerable.646According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus, the President toldPriebus to say that he “need[ed] a letter of resignation on [his] deskimmediately” and that Sessions had “no choice” but “must immediatelyresign.”647Priebus replied that if they firedSessions, theywould never get anew Attorney General confirmed and that the Department of Justice and

CongresswouldturntheirbacksonthePresident,butthePresidentsuggestedhecouldmakearecessappointmenttoreplaceSessions.648

Priebus believed that the President’s request was a problem, so he calledMcGahnandaskedforadvice,explainingthathedidnotwanttopullthetriggeronsomethingthatwas“allwrong.”649AlthoughthePresidenttiedhisdesireforSessions to resign to Sessions’s negative press and poor performance incongressional testimony,Priebusbelieved that thePresident’sdesire to replaceSessions was driven by the President’s hatred of Sessions’s recusal from theRussia investigation.650 McGahn told Priebus not to follow the President’sorderandsaidtheyshouldconsult theirpersonalcounsel,withwhomtheyhadattorney-clientprivilege.651McGahnandPriebusdiscussedthepossibility thattheywouldbothhavetoresignratherthancarryoutthePresident’sordertofireSessions.652

That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demandingSessions’s resignation, usingwords to the effect of, “Did you get it?Are youworking on it?”653 Priebus said that he believed that his job depended onwhether he followed the order to removeSessions, although the President didnot directly say so.654 Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out thePresident’sdirective,he told thePresidenthewouldgetSessions to resign.655Later in theday,Priebus called thePresident andexplained that itwouldbeacalamity if Sessions resigned because Priebus expected that Rosenstein andAssociateAttorneyGeneralRachelBrandwould also resignand thePresidentwouldbeunabletogetanyoneelseconfirmed.656ThePresidentagreedtoholdoffondemandingSessions’s resignationuntil after theSunday shows thenextday,topreventtheshowsfromfocusingonthefiring.657

Bytheendofthatweekend,PriebusrecalledthatthePresidentrelentedandagreed not to ask Sessions to resign.658 Over the next several days, thePresidenttweetedaboutSessions.OnthemorningofMonday,July24,2017,thePresidentcriticizedSessionsforneglectingtoinvestigateClintonandcalledhim“beleaguered.”659 On July 25, the President tweeted, “Attorney General JeffSessionshastakenaVERYweakpositiononHillaryClintoncrimes(whereareE-mails&DNC server)& Intel leakers!”660 The following day, July 26, the

President tweeted, “Why didn’t A.G. Sessions replace Acting FBI DirectorAndrew McCabe, a Comey friend who was in charge of Clintoninvestigation.”661AccordingtoHunt,inlightofthePresident’sfrequentpublicattacks,SessionspreparedanotherresignationletterandfortherestoftheyearcarrieditwithhiminhispocketeverytimehewenttotheWhiteHouse.662

Analysis

InanalyzingthePresident’seffortstohaveLewandowskideliveramessagedirecting Sessions to publicly announce that the SpecialCounsel investigationwould be confined to future election interference, the following evidence isrelevanttotheelementsofobstructionofjustice:

a.Obstructiveact.ThePresident’sefforttosendSessionsamessagethroughLewandowskiwouldqualifyasanobstructiveactif itwouldnaturallyobstructthe investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from theinquiry.

The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President“shouldn’t have aSpecialProsecutor/Counsel” and thatSessionswasgoing to“meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let theSpecialProsecutormoveforwardwithinvestigatingelectionmeddlingforfutureelectionssothatnothingcanhappeninfutureelections.”ThePresidentwantedSessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followedfromaformalDOJethicsreview,andhaveSessionsdeclarethatheknew“forafact”that“therewerenoRussiansinvolvedwiththecampaign”becausehe“wasthere.” The President further directed that Sessions should explain that thePresident should not be subject to an investigation “because he hasn’t doneanything wrong.” Taken together, the President’s directives indicate thatSessions was being instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existinginvestigation into the President and his campaign, with the Special Counselbeing permitted to “move forward with investigating election meddling forfutureelections.”

b.Nexus toanofficialproceeding.Asdescribedabove,by the timeof thePresident’sinitialone-on-onemeetingwithLewandowskionJune19,2017,theexistenceof a grand jury investigation supervisedby theSpecialCounselwaspublic knowledge. By the time of the President’s follow-up meeting with

Lewandowski,Grand Jury██ ███See Volume II, Section II.G, infra. Tosatisfy the nexus requirement, itwould be necessary to show that limiting theSpecial Counsel’s investigationwould have the natural and probable effect ofimpedingthatgrandjuryproceeding.

c. Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President’s effort to haveSessionslimitthescopeoftheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigationtofutureelectioninterference was intended to prevent further investigative scrutiny of thePresident’sandhiscampaign’sconduct.

Aspreviouslydescribed, seeVolume II,Section II.B, supra, the PresidentknewthattheRussiainvestigationwasfocusedinpartonhiscampaign,andheperceivedallegationsofRussianinterferencetocastdoubtonthelegitimacyofhiselection.ThePresidentfurtherknewthattheinvestigationhadbroadenedtoinclude his own conduct and whether he had obstructed justice. Thoseinvestigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel’s jurisdiction werelimitedtofutureelectioninterferenceonly.

The timing and circumstances of the President’s actions support theconclusion that he sought that result. The President’s initial direction thatSessions should limit the Special Counsel’s investigation came just two daysafter thePresidenthadorderedMcGahn tohave theSpecialCounsel removed,which itself followed public reports that the President was personally underinvestigation forobstructionof justice.The sequenceof thoseevents raisesaninference that after seeking to terminate the Special Counsel, the Presidentsoughttoexcludehisandhiscampaign’sconductfromtheinvestigation’sscope.ThePresidentraisedthematterwithLewandowskiagainonJuly19,2017,justdays after emails and information about the June 9, 2016 meeting betweenRussiansandseniorcampaignofficialshadbeenpubliclydisclosed,generatingsubstantialmediacoverageandinvestigativeinterest.

ThemannerinwhichthePresidentactedprovidesadditionalevidenceofhisintent. Rather than rely on official channels, the President met withLewandowskialoneintheOvalOffice.ThePresidentselectedaloyal“devotee”outsidetheWhiteHousetodeliverthemessage,supportinganinferencethathewas working outside White House channels, including McGahn, who hadpreviously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the SpecialCounsel.ThePresident alsodidnot contact theActingAttorneyGeneral,whohadjusttestifiedpubliclythattherewasnocausetoremovetheSpecialCounsel.

Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and redirect the SpecialCounsel’sinvestigationwhenSessionswasrecusedandcouldnotproperlytakeanyactiononit.

TheJuly19,2017eventsprovidefurtherevidenceofthePresident’sintent.ThePresidentfollowedupwithLewandowskiinaseparateone-on-onemeetingonemonthafterhefirstdictatedthemessageforSessions,demonstratinghestillsought to pursue the request. And just hours after Lewandowski assured thePresident that themessagewould soon be delivered toSessions, thePresidentgave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publiclyattackedSessionsandraisedquestionsabouthisjobsecurity.Fourdayslater,onJuly 22, 2017, the President directed Priebus to obtain Sessions’s resignation.That evidence could raise an inference that the President wanted Sessions torealizethathisjobmightbeonthelineasheevaluatedwhethertocomplywiththe President’s direction that Sessions publicly announce that, notwithstandinghisrecusal,hewasgoingtoconfinetheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigationtofutureelectioninterference.

G.ThePresident’sEffortstoPreventDisclosureofEmailsAbouttheJune9,2016MeetingBehveenRussiansandSeniorCampaignOfficials

Overview

ByJune2017,thePresidentbecameawareofemailssettinguptheJune9,2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians who offeredderogatory information on Hillary Clinton as “part of Russia and itsgovernment’s support forMr.Trump.”Onmultiple occasions in late June andearlyJuly2017,thePresidentdirectedaidesnottopubliclydisclosetheemails,and he then dictated a statement about the meeting to be issued by DonaldTrumpJr.describingthemeetingasaboutadoption.

Evidence

1.ThePresidentLearnsAbouttheExistenceofEmailsConcerningtheJune9,2016TrumpTowerMeeting

In mid-June 2017—the same week that the President first askedLewandowski to pass a message to Sessions—senior Administration officials

became aware of emails exchanged during the campaign arranging ameetingbetween Donald Trump Jr., Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and a Russianattorney.663AsdescribedinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.5,supra, theemailsstatedthat the “Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia” had offered “to provide the TrumpcampaignwithsomeofficialdocumentsandinformationthatwouldincriminateHillary andher dealingswithRussia” as part of “Russia and its government’ssupportforMr.Trump.”664TrumpJr.responded,“[I]fit’swhatyousayIloveit,”665andhe,Kushner,andManafortmetwiththeRussianattorneyandseveralotherRussianindividualsatTrumpToweronJune9,2016.666Atthemeeting,theRussianattorneyclaimedthatfundsderivedfromillegalactivitiesinRussiawereprovidedtoHillaryClintonandotherDemocrats,andtheRussianattorneythenspokeabouttheMagnitskyAct,a2012U.S.statutethatimposedfinancialandtravelsanctionsonRussianofficialsandthathadresultedinaretaliatorybaninRussiaonU.S.adoptionsofRussianchildren.667

According to written answers submitted by the President in response toquestions fromthisOffice, thePresidenthadno recollectionof learningof themeeting or the emails setting it up at the time themeeting occurred or at anyothertimebeforetheelection.668

The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request fromSSCI that called for the production of various information, including, “[a] listand a description of allmeetings” between any “individual affiliatedwith theTrumpcampaign”and“anyindividualformallyorinformallyaffiliatedwiththeRussian government or Russian business interests which took place betweenJune 16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017,” and associated records.669TrumpOrganizationattorneysbecameawareoftheJune9meetingnolaterthanthe first week of June 2017, when they began interviewing the meetingparticipants, and theTrumpOrganizationattorneysprovided theemails settingup themeeting to thePresident’spersonalcounsel.670MarkCorallo,whohadbeenhiredasaspokesmanforthePresident’spersonallegalteam,recalledthathe learnedabout the June9meeting around June21or22,2017.671PriebusrecalledlearningabouttheJune9meetingfromFoxNewshostSeanHannityinlate June 2017.672 Priebus notified one of the President’s personal attorneys,whotoldPriebushewasalreadyworkingonit.673BylateJune,severaladvisors

recalledreceivingmediainquiriesthatcouldrelatetotheJune9meeting.674

2.ThePresidentDirectsCommunicationsStaffNottoPubliclyDiscloseInformationAbouttheJune9Meeting

Communications advisorsHopeHicks and JoshRaffel recalled discussingwithJaredKushnerandIvankaTrumpthattheemailsweredamagingandwouldinevitablybeleaked.675HicksandRaffeladvisedthat thebeststrategywastoproactivelyreleasetheemailstothepress.676OnoraboutJune22,2017,Hicksattended ameeting in theWhiteHouse residencewith thePresident,Kushner,andIvankaTrump.677AccordingtoHicks,KushnersaidthathewantedtofillthePresidentinonsomethingthathadbeendiscoveredinthedocumentshewasto provide to the congressional committees involving a meeting with him,Manafort, and Trump Jr.678 Kushner brought a folder of documents to themeeting and tried to show them to the President, but the President stoppedKushner and said he did notwant to know about it, shutting the conversationdown.679

On June 28, 2017, Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner’s attorney’soffice.680Sherecalledbeingshockedbytheemailsbecausetheylooked“reallybad.”681Thenextday,HicksspokeprivatelywiththePresidenttomentionherconcernabout theemails,which sheunderstoodwere soongoing tobe sharedwithCongress.682ThePresidentseemedupsetbecausetoomanypeopleknewabout the emails and he toldHicks that just one lawyer should deal with thematter.683ThePresidentindicatedthathedidnotthinktheemailswouldleak,butsaidtheywouldleakifeveryonehadaccesstothem.684

Later thatday,Hicks,Kushner,andIvankaTrumpwent together to talk tothe President.685 Hicks recalled that Kushner told the President the June 9meeting was not a big deal and was about Russian adoption, but that emailsexistedsettingupthemeeting.686Hickssaidshewanted toget in frontof thestoryandhaveTrumpJr.releasetheemailsaspartofaninterviewwith“softballquestions.”687 The President said he did notwant to know about it and theyshouldnotgotothepress.688HickswarnedthePresidentthattheemailswere“reallybad”andthestorywouldbe“massive”whenitbroke,butthePresident

was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and said he did not wantdetails.689HicksrecalledthatthePresidentaskedKushnerwhenhisdocumentproductionwasdue.690Kushnerrespondedthatitwouldbeacoupleofweeksand the President said, “then leave it alone.”691 Hicks also recalled that thePresidentsaidKushner’sattorneyshouldgivetheemailstowhomeverheneededto give them to, but the President did not think they would be leaked to thepress.692RaffellaterheardfromHicksthatthePresidenthaddirectedthegroupnottobeproactiveindisclosingtheemailsbecausethePresidentbelievedtheywouldnotleak.693

3.ThePresidentDirectsTrumpJr.’sResponsetoPressInquiriesAbouttheJune9Meeting

Thefollowingweek,thePresidentdepartedonanoverseastripfortheG20summit in Hamburg, Germany, accompanied by Hicks, Raffel, Kushner, andIvanka Trump, among others.694 On July 7, 2017, while the President wasoverseas,HicksandRaffellearnedthattheNewYorkTimeswasworkingonastoryabouttheJune9meeting.695Thenextday,HickstoldthePresidentaboutthestoryandhedirectedhernottocomment.696HicksthoughtthePresident’sreactionwasoddbecauseheusuallyconsiderednotrespondingtothepresstobetheultimatesin.697Later thatday,Hicks and thePresident again spokeaboutthestory.698Hicks recalled that thePresidentaskedherwhat themeetinghadbeenabout,andshesaidthatshehadbeentoldthemeetingwasaboutRussianadoption.699ThePresidentresponded,“thenjustsaythat.”700

On the flight home from theG20on July8, 2017,Hicksobtained a draftstatement about themeeting to be released byTrump Jr. and brought it to thePresident.701Thedraftstatementbeganwithareferencetotheinformationthatwasofferedby theRussians in settingup themeeting:“Iwasasked tohaveameetingbyanacquaintanceIknewfromthe2013MissUniversepageantwithan individual who I was told might have information helpful to thecampaign.”702Hicksagainwantedtodisclosetheentirestory,butthePresidentdirected that the statement not be issued because it said too much.703 ThePresidenttoldHickstosayonlythatTrumpJr.tookabriefmeetinganditwas

about Russian adoption.704 After speaking with the President, Hicks textedTrumpJr.arevisedstatementontheJune9meetingthatread:

Itwasashortmeeting.IaskedJaredandPaultostopby.WediscussedaprogramabouttheadoptionofRussianchildrenthatwasactiveandpopularwithAmericanfamiliesyearsagoandwassinceendedbytheRussiangovernment,butitwasnotacampaignissueatthattimeandtherewasnofollowup.705

Hicks’stextconcluded,“Areyouokwiththis?Attributedtoyou.”706TrumpJr.respondedby textmessage that hewanted to add theword “primarily”before“discussed” so that the statement would read, “We primarily discussed aprogram about the adoption ofRussian children.”707Trump Jr. texted that hewantedthechangebecause“[t]heystartedwithsomeHillarythingwhichwasbsandsomeothernonsensewhichweshotdown fast.”708Hicks textedback, “Ithink that’s right too but boss man worried it invites a lot of questions[.][U]ltimately [d]efer to you and [your attorney] on that word Bc I know it’simportantand I think thementionofacampaign issueaddssomething to it incasewehavetogofurther.”709TrumpJr.responded,“ifIdon’thaveitinthereit appears as though I’m lying laterwhen they inevitably leak something.”710Trump Jr.’s statement—adding the word “primarily” and making other minoradditions—was then provided to the NewYork Times.711 The full statementprovidedtotheTimesstated:

Itwasashortintroductorymeeting.IaskedJaredandPaultostopby.We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of RussianchildrenthatwasactiveandpopularwithAmericanfamiliesyearsagoand was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not acampaignissueatthetimeandtherewasnofollowup.Iwasaskedtoattend themeetingbyanacquaintance,butwasnot told thenameofthepersonIwouldbemeetingwithbeforehand.712

ThestatementdidnotmentiontheofferofderogatoryinformationaboutClintonor any discussion of the Magnitsky Act or U.S. sanctions, which were theprincipal subjects of the meeting, as described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5,supra.

Ashortwhilelater,whilestillonAirForceOne,HickslearnedthatPriebusknewabouttheemails,whichfurtherconvincedherthatadditionalinformationabouttheJune9meetingwouldleakandtheWhiteHouseshouldbeproactiveandget in frontof thestory.713Hicksrecalledagaingoing to thePresident tourgehimthattheyshouldbefullytransparentabouttheJune9meeting,butheagainsaidno,tellingHicks,“You’vegivenastatement.We’redone.”714

Later on the flight home, Hicks went to the President’s cabin, where thePresidentwasonthephonewithoneofhispersonalattorneys.715AtonepointthePresidenthandedthephonetoHicks,andtheattorneytoldHicksthathehadbeenworkingwithCircaNewsonaseparatestory,andthatsheshouldnottalktotheNewYorkTimes.716

4.TheMediaReportsontheJune9,2016Meeting

Before the President’s flight home from the G20 landed, the New YorkTimespublisheditsstoryabouttheJune9,2016meeting.717InadditiontothestatementfromTrumpJr.,theTimesstoryalsoquotedastatementfromCoralloonbehalfof thePresident’s legal teamsuggesting that themeetingmighthavebeen a setup by individuals working with the firm that produced the Steelereporting.718CoralloalsoworkedwithCircaNewsonastorypublishedanhourlater that questioned whether Democratic operatives had arranged the June 9meeting tocreate theappearanceof improperconnectionsbetweenRussiaandTrump familymembers.719Hickswas upset about Corallo’s public statementand called him that evening to say the President had not approved thestatement.720

Thenextday,July9,2017,HicksandthePresidentcalledCorallotogetherandthePresidentcriticizedCoralloforthestatementhehadreleased.721Corallotold thePresident the statementhadbeen authorized and further observed thatTrump Jr.’s statement was inaccurate and that a document existed that wouldcontradict it.722 Corallo said that he purposely used the term “document” torefertotheemailssettinguptheJune9meetingbecausehedidnotknowwhatthePresidentknewabouttheemails.723Corallorecalledthatwhenhereferredto the “document”on the callwith thePresident,Hicks responded that only a

few people had access to it and said “it will never get out.”724 Corallo tookcontemporaneous notes of the call that say: “Also mention existence of doc.Hopesays‘onlyafewpeoplehaveit.Itwillnevergetout.”’725Hickslatertoldinvestigatorsthatshehadnomemoryofmakingthatcommentandhadalwaysbelieved the emails would eventually be leaked, but she might have beenchannelingthePresidentonthephonecallbecauseitwascleartoherthroughouther conversations with the President that he did not think the emails wouldleak.726

OnJuly11,2017,TrumpJr.postedredactedimagesoftheemailssettingupthe June 9 meeting on Twitter; the New York Times reported that he did so“[a]fter being told that The Times was about to publish the content of theemails.”727 Later that day, the media reported that the President had beenpersonally involved inpreparingTrumpJr.’s initial statement to theNewYorkTimesthathadclaimedthemeeting“primarily”concerned“aprogramabouttheadoption of Russian children.”728Over the next several days, the President’spersonal counsel repeatedly and inaccurately denied that the President playedany role in drafting Trump Jr.’s statement.729 After consulting with thePresident on the issue, White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told themedia that the President “certainly didn’t dictate” the statement, but that “heweighed in,offered suggestions likeany fatherwoulddo.”730Severalmonthslater, thePresident’spersonalcounsel stated inaprivatecommunication to theSpecial Counsel’s Office that “the President dictated a short but accurateresponse to theNewYork Times article on behalf of his son,Donald Trump,Jr.”731 The President later told the press that it was “irrelevant” whether hedictated the statement and said, “It’s a statement to theNewYorkTimes. . . .That’snotastatementtoahightribunalofjudges.”732

On July 12, 2017, the Special Counsel’s OfficeGrand Jury█ Trump Jr.GrandJury█relatedtotheJune9meetingandthosewhoattendedtheJune9meeting.733

On July 19, 2017, the President had his follow-up meeting withLewandowskiandthenmetwithreportersfortheNewYorkTimes.InadditiontocriticizingSessionsinhisTimesinterview,thePresidentaddressedtheJune9,2016 meeting and said he “didn’t know anything about the meeting” at the

time.734 The President added, “As I’ve said—most other people, you know,whentheycallupandsay,‘Bytheway,wehaveinformationonyouropponent,’Ithinkmostpoliticians—Iwasjustwithalotofpeople,theysaid...,‘Whowouldn’thavetakenameetinglikethat?”’735

Analysis

InanalyzingthePresident’sactionsregardingthedisclosureofinformationabouttheJune9meeting,thefollowingevidenceisrelevanttotheelementsofobstructionofjustice:

a.Obstructiveact.Onat least threeoccasionsbetweenJune29,2017,andJuly 9, 2017, the President directedHicks and others not to publicly discloseinformationabout the June9,2016meetingbetweenseniorcampaignofficialsandaRussianattorney.OnJune29,HickswarnedthePresidentthattheemailssetting up the June 9 meeting were “really bad” and the story would be“massive” when it broke, but the President told her andKushner to “leave italone.”EarlyonJuly8,afterHickstoldthePresidenttheNewYorkTimeswasworkingonastoryabout theJune9meeting, thePresidentdirectedhernot tocomment, even though Hicks said that the President usually considered notresponding to the press to be the ultimate sin. Later that day, the Presidentrejected Trump Jr.’s draft statement that would have acknowledged that themeetingwaswith“anindividualwhoIwastoldmighthaveinformationhelpfultothecampaign.”ThePresidentthendictatedastatementtoHicksthatsaidthemeetingwasaboutRussianadoption (which thePresidenthad twicebeen toldwasdiscussedat themeeting).Thestatementdictatedby thePresidentdidnotmentiontheofferofderogatoryinformationaboutClinton.

Each of these efforts by the President involved his communications teamandwasdirectedatthepress.TheywouldamounttoobstructiveactsonlyifthePresident, by taking these actions, sought to withhold information from ormisleadcongressional investigatorsor theSpecialCounsel.OnMay17,2017,the President’s campaign received a document request from SSCI that clearlycovered the June 9meeting and underlying emails, and those documents alsoplainlywouldhavebeenrelevanttotheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigation.

ButtheevidencedoesnotestablishthatthePresidenttookstepstopreventtheemailsorotherinformationabouttheJune9meetingfrombeingprovidedtoCongress or the Special Counsel. The series of discussions in which the

President sought to limit access to the emails and prevent their public releaseoccurred in the context of developing a press strategy. The only evidencewehaveofthePresidentdiscussingtheproductionofdocumentstoCongressortheSpecialCounsel is theconversationonJune29,2017,whenHicksrecalledthePresidentacknowledgingthatKushner’sattorneyshouldprovideemailsrelatedtotheJune9meetingtowhomeverheneededtogivethemto.WedonothaveevidenceofwhatthePresidentdiscussedwithhisownlawyersatthattime.

b.Nexus toanofficialproceeding.Asdescribedabove,by the timeof thePresident’s attempts to prevent the public release of the emails regarding theJune 9meeting, the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by theSpecialCounselwaspublicknowledge,andthePresidenthadbeentoldthattheemails were responsive to congressional inquiries. To satisfy the nexusrequirement,however,itwouldbenecessarytoshowthatpreventingthereleaseof the emails to the public would have the natural and probable effect ofimpedingthegrandjuryproceedingorcongressionalinquiries.Asnotedabove,theevidencedoesnotestablishthatthePresidentsoughttopreventdisclosureoftheemailsinthoseofficialproceedings.

c.Intent.TheevidenceestablishesthePresident’ssubstantialinvolvementinthe communications strategy related to information about his campaign’sconnectionstoRussiaandhisdesiretominimizepublicdisclosuresaboutthoseconnections.ThePresident becameawareof the emails no later than June29,2017,whenhediscussedthemwithHicksandKushner,andhecouldhavebeenaware of them as early as June 2, 2017, when lawyers for the TrumpOrganization began interviewing witnesses who participated in the June 9meeting. The President thereafter repeatedly rejected the advice of Hicks andother staffers to publicly release information about the June 9 meeting. ThePresident expressed concern thatmultiplepeoplehad access to the emails andinstructed Hicks that only one lawyer should deal with the matter. And thePresidentdictatedastatementtobereleasedbyTrumpJr.inresponsetothefirstpressaccountsoftheJune9meetingthatsaidthemeetingwasaboutadoption.

But as described above, the evidence does not establish that thePresidentintendedtopreventtheSpecialCounsel’sOfficeorCongressfromobtainingtheemails setting up the June 9meeting or other information about thatmeeting.ThestatementrecordedbyCorallo—thattheemails“willnevergetout”—canbeexplainedasreflectingabeliefthattheemailswouldnotbemadepublicifthePresident’s press strategywere followed, even if the emails were provided to

CongressandtheSpecialCounsel.

H.ThePresident’sFurtherEffortstoHavetheAttorneyGeneralTakeOvertheInvestigation

Overview

Fromsummer2017through2018,thePresidentattemptedtohaveAttorneyGeneral Sessions reverse his recusal, take control of the Special Counsel’sinvestigation,andorderaninvestigationofHillaryClinton.

Evidence

1.ThePresidentAgainSeekstoHaveSessionsReversehisRecusal

After returning Sessions’s resignation letter at the end of May 2017, butbefore the President’s July 19, 2017 New York Times interview in which hepublicly criticized Sessions for recusing from the Russia investigation, thePresidenttookadditionalstepstohaveSessionsreversehisrecusal.Inparticular,at some point after the May 17, 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel,Sessionsrecalled,thePresidentcalledhimathomeandaskedifSessionswould“unrecuse” himself.736 According to Sessions, the President asked him toreverse his recusal so that Sessions could direct the Department of Justice toinvestigateandprosecuteHillaryClinton,andthe“gist”oftheconversationwasthat the President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from “all of it,” including theSpecial Counsel’s Russia investigation.737 Sessions listened but did notrespond, and he did not reverse his recusal or order an investigation ofClinton.738

InearlyJuly2017,thePresidentaskedStaffSecretaryRobPorterwhathethoughtofAssociateAttorneyGeneralRachelBrand.739PorterrecalledthatthePresident asked him if Brand was good, tough, and “on the team.”740 ThePresidentalsoaskedifPorterthoughtBrandwasinterestedinbeingresponsiblefor the Special Counsel’s investigation and whether she would want to beAttorneyGeneraloneday.741BecausePorterknewBrand,thePresidentaskedhimtosoundheroutabouttakingresponsibilityfortheinvestigationandbeingAttorney General.742 Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show that the

President told Porter to “Keep in touch with your friend,” in reference toBrand.743Later, thePresidentaskedPortera few times inpassingwhetherhehad spoken to Brand, but Porter did not reach out to her because he wasuncomfortable with the task.744 In asking him to reach out to Brand, PorterunderstoodthePresidenttowanttofindsomeonetoendtheRussiainvestigationor fire theSpecialCounsel, although thePresidentnever said soexplicitly.745PorterdidnotcontactBrandbecausehewassensitivetotheimplicationsofthatactionanddidnotwant tobe involved inachainofeventsassociatedwithanefforttoendtheinvestigationorfiretheSpecialCounsel.746

McGahn recalled that during the summer of 2017, he and the Presidentdiscussed the fact that if Sessions were no longer in his position the SpecialCounselwould reportdirectly toanon-recusedAttorneyGeneral.747McGahntold the President that things might not change much under a new AttorneyGeneral.748McGahn also recalled that in or around July 2017, the PresidentfrequentlybroughtuphisdispleasurewithSessions.749Hicksrecalledthat thePresident viewedSessions’s recusal from theRussia investigation as an act ofdisloyalty.750 In addition to criticizingSessions’s recusal, thePresident raisedother concerns about Sessions and his job performance with McGahn andHicks.751

2.AdditionalEffortstoHaveSessionsUnrecuseorDirectInvestigationsCoveredbyhisRecusal

Laterin2017,thePresidentcontinuedtourgeSessionstoreversehisrecusalfromcampaign-relatedinvestigationsandconsideredreplacingSessionswithanAttorneyGeneralwhowouldnotberecused.

OnOctober16,2017,thePresidentmetprivatelywithSessionsandsaidthattheDepartmentofJusticewasnot investigating individualsandevents that thePresident thought the Department should be investigating.752 According tocontemporaneousnotes takenbyPorter,whowasat themeeting, thePresidentmentioned Clinton’s emails and said, “Don’t have to tell us, just take [a]look.”753SessionsdidnotofferanyassurancesorpromisestothePresidentthattheDepartmentofJusticewouldcomplywiththatrequest.754Twodayslater,

on October 18, 2017, the President tweeted, “Wow, FBI confirms report thatJames Comey drafted letter exonerating Crooked Hillary Clinton long beforeinvestigation was complete. Many people not interviewed, including Clintonherself.Comeystatedunderoaththathedidn’tdothis-obviouslyafix?WhereisJusticeDept?”755OnOctober 29, 2017, the President tweeted that therewas“ANGER&UNITY”overa“lackofinvestigation”ofClintonarid“theComeyfix,”andconcluded:“DOSOMETHING!”756

OnDecember6,2017, fivedaysafterFlynnpleadedguilty to lyingabouthis contacts with the Russian government, the President asked to speak withSessionsintheOvalOfficeattheendofacabinetmeeting.757DuringthatOvalOffice meeting, which Porter attended, the President again suggested thatSessionscould“unrecuse,”whichPorterlinkedtotakingbacksupervisionoftheRussia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton.758AccordingtocontemporaneousnotestakenbyPorter,thePresidentsaid,“Idon’tknow if you could un-recuse yourself.You’d be a hero.Not telling you to doanything. Dershowitz says POTUS can get involved. Can order AG toinvestigate.Idon’twanttogetinvolved.I’mnotgoingtogetinvolved.I’mnotgoing to do anything or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treatedfairly.”759 According to Porter’s notes, Sessions responded, “We are takingsteps;whole new leadership team.Professionals;will operate according to thelaw.”760Sessions also said, “I never saw anything thatwas improper,”whichPorterthoughtwasnoteworthybecauseitdidnotfitwiththepreviousdiscussionaboutClinton.761PorterunderstoodSessionstobereassuringthePresidentthathewasonthePresident’steam.762

AttheendofDecember,thePresidenttoldtheNewYorkTimesitwas“toobad”thatSessionshadrecusedhimselffromtheRussiainvestigation.763Whenasked whether Holder had been a more loyal Attorney General to PresidentObama thanSessionswas tohim, thePresident said, “Idon’twant toget intoloyalty,butIwilltellyouthat,Iwillsaythis:HolderprotectedPresidentObama.Totally protected him.When you look at the things that they did, andHolderprotected the president. And I have great respect for that, I’ll be honest.”764LaterinJanuary,thePresidentbroughtuptheideaofreplacingSessionsandtoldPorter that he wanted to “clean house” at the Department of Justice.765 In ameetingintheWhiteHouseresidencethatPorterattendedonJanuary27,2018,

Porterrecalled that thePresident talkedabout thegreatattorneyshehad in thepastwithsuccessfulwinrecords,suchasRoyCohnandJayGoldberg,andsaidthat one of his biggest failings as President was that he had not surroundedhimselfwith good attorneys, citing Sessions as an example.766 The Presidentraised Sessions’s recusal and brought up and criticized the Special Counsel’sinvestigation.767

Over thenextseveralmonths, thePresidentcontinuedtocriticizeSessionsin tweets andmedia interviews and on several occasions appeared to publiclyencouragehimtotakeactionintheRussiainvestigationdespitehisrecusal.768OnJune5,2018,forexample,thePresidenttweeted,“TheRussianWitchHuntHoaxcontinues,allbecauseJeffSessionsdidn’ttellmehewasgoingtorecusehimself. . . . I would have quickly picked someone else. So much time andmoneywasted,somanylivesruined...andSessionsknewbetterthanmostthatthere was No Collusion!”769 On August 1, 2018, the President tweeted that“Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt rightnow.”770OnAugust 23, 2018, the President publicly criticized Sessions in apress interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of Justicewere politically motivated because Paul Manafort had been prosecuted butDemocrats hadnot.771ThePresident said, “I put in anAttorneyGeneral thatnever took control of the Justice Department, Jeff Sessions.”772 That day,Sessionsissuedapressstatementthatsaid,“ItookcontroloftheDepartmentofJusticethedayIwasswornin....WhileIamAttorneyGeneral,theactionsofthe Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by politicalconsiderations.”773 The next day, the President tweeted a response:‘“Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by politicalconsiderations.’Jeff,thisisGREAT,whateveryonewants,solookintoallofthecorruption on the ‘other side’ including deleted Emails, Comey lies & leaks,Muellerconflicts,McCabe,Strzok,Page,Ohr,FISAabuse,ChristopherSteele&his phony and corruptDossier, the Clinton Foundation, illegal surveillance ofTrumpcampaign,RussiancollusionbyDems–andsomuchmore.Openupthepapers&documentswithoutredaction?ComeonJeff,youcandoit,thecountryiswaiting!”774

OnNovember 7, 2018, the day after themidterm elections, the PresidentreplacedSessionswithSessions’schiefofstaffasActingAttorneyGeneral.775

Analysis

In analyzing thePresident’s efforts tohaveSessionsunrecusehimself andregain control of the Russia investigation, the following considerations andevidencearerelevanttotheelementsofobstructionofjustice:

a. Obstructive act. To determine if the President’s efforts to have theAttorney General unrecuse could qualify as an obstructive act, it would benecessary toassess evidenceonwhether thoseactionswouldnaturally impedetheRussia investigation.That inquirywould take into account the supervisoryrole that the Attorney General, if unrecused, would play in the Russiainvestigation.ItalsowouldhavetotakeintoaccountthattheAttorneyGeneral’srecusalcoveredothercampaign-relatedmatters.Theinquirywouldnot turnonwhatAttorneyGeneralSessionswouldactuallydoifunrecused,butonwhethertheeffortstoreversehisrecusalwouldnaturallyhavehadtheeffectofimpedingtheRussiainvestigation.

On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions aboutreversing his recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation andbeginaninvestigationandprosecutionofHillaryClinton.Forexample,inearlysummer 2017, Sessions recalled the President asking him to unrecuse, butSessionsdidnottakeitasadirective.WhenthePresidentraisedtheissueagaininDecember2017,thePresidentsaid,asrecordedbyPorter,“Nottellingyoutodoanything....I’mnotgoingtogetinvolved.I’mnotgoingtodoanythingordirectyou todoanything. I justwant tobe treated fairly.”Thedurationof thePresident’sefforts—whichspannedfromMarch2017toAugust2018—andthefactthatthePresidentrepeatedlycriticizedSessionsinpublicandinprivateforfailingtotellthePresidentthathewouldhavetorecuseisrelevanttoassessingwhether the President’s efforts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify asobstructiveacts.

b.Nexustoanofficialproceeding.Asdescribedabove,bymid-June2017,the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counselwas public knowledge. In addition, in July 2017, a different grand jurysupervisedby theSpecialCounselwasempaneled in theDistrictofColumbia,and the press reported on the existence of this grand jury in early August2017.776 Whether the conduct towards the Attorney General would have aforeseeable impact on those proceedings turns onmuch of the same evidencediscussedabovewithrespecttotheobstructive-actelement.

c. Intent. There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President’sconduct towardSessionswas tohaveSessionsassumecontrolover theRussiainvestigation and supervise it in a way that would restrict its scope. By thesummer of 2017, the President was aware that the Special Counsel wasinvestigatinghimpersonally forobstructionof justice.And in thewakeof thedisclosures of emails about the June 9 meeting between Russians and seniormembersofthecampaign,seeVolumeII,SectionII.G,supra,itwasevidentthattheinvestigationintothecampaignnowincludedthePresident’sson,son-in-law,andformercampaignmanager.ThePresidenthadpreviouslyandunsuccessfullysoughttohaveSessionspubliclyannouncethattheSpecialCounselinvestigationwould be confined to future election interference. Yet Sessions remainedrecused. In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty, the PresidentspoketoSessionsintheOvalOfficewithonlyPorterpresentandtoldSessionsthat he would be a hero if he unrecused. Porter linked that request to thePresident’sdesirethatSessionstakebacksupervisionoftheRussiainvestigationanddirectaninvestigationofHillaryClinton.ThePresidentsaidinthatmeetingthathe“justwant[ed]tobetreatedfairly,”whichcouldreflecthisperceptionthatitwasunfairthathewasbeinginvestigatedwhileHillaryClintonwasnot.Butaprincipal effect of that act would be to restore supervision of the Russiainvestigation to theAttorneyGeneral—aposition that thePresident frequentlysuggestedshouldbeoccupiedbysomeonelikeEricHolderandBobbyKennedy,who the President described as protecting their presidents. A reasonableinferencefromthosestatementsandthePresident’sactionsisthatthePresidentbelieved that an unrecusedAttorneyGeneralwould play a protective role andcouldshieldthePresidentfromtheongoingRussiainvestigation.

I.ThePresidentOrdersMcGahntoDenythatthePresidentTriedtoFiretheSpecialCounsel

Overview

InlateJanuary2018,themediareportedthatinJune2017thePresidenthadorderedMcGahntohavetheSpecialCounselfiredbasedonpurportedconflictsofinterestbutMcGahnhadrefused,sayinghewouldquitinstead.Afterthestorybroke,thePresident,throughhispersonalcounselandtwoaides,soughttohaveMcGahn deny that he had been directed to remove theSpecialCounsel. Eachtimehewasapproached,McGahnrespondedthathewouldnotrefutethepressaccounts because they were accurate in reporting on the President’s effort tohave the Special Counsel removed. The President later personally met with

McGahnintheOvalOfficewithonlytheChiefofStaffpresentandtriedtogetMcGahntosaythatthePresidentneverorderedhimtofiretheSpecialCounsel.McGahnrefusedandinsistedhismemoryofthePresident’sdirectiontoremovetheSpecialCounselwasaccurate.Inthatsamemeeting,thePresidentchallengedMcGahnfortakingnotesofhisdiscussionswiththePresidentandaskedwhyhehad told Special Counsel investigators that he had been directed to have theSpecialCounselremoved.

Evidence

1.ThePressReportsthatthePresidentTriedtoFiretheSpecialCounsel

OnJanuary25,2018, theNewYorkTimesreportedthat inJune2017, thePresidenthadorderedMcGahntohavetheDepartmentofJusticefiretheSpecialCounsel.777 According to the article, “[a]mid the first wave of news mediareportsthatMr.Muellerwasexaminingapossibleobstructioncase,thepresidentbegantoargue thatMr.Muellerhad threeconflictsof interest thatdisqualifiedhim from overseeing the investigation.”778 The article further reported that“[a]fter receiving the President’s order to fire Mr. Mueller, the White Housecounsel...refusedtoasktheJusticeDepartmenttodismissthespecialcounsel,saying he would quit instead.”779 The article stated that the president“ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to resignrather than carry out the directive.”780 After the article was published, thePresident dismissed the storywhen asked about it by reporters, saying, “Fakenews,folks.Fakenews.AtypicalNewYorkTimesfakestory.”781

The next day, theWashington Post reported on the same event but addedthatMcGahnhadnottoldthePresidentdirectlythatheintendedtoresignratherthancarryout thedirective tohave theSpecialCounsel terminated.782In thatrespect,thePoststoryclarifiedtheTimesstory,whichcouldbereadtosuggestthatMcGahnhadtoldthePresidentofhisintentiontoquit,causingthePresidenttobackdownfromtheordertohavetheSpecialCounselfired.783

2.ThePresidentSeekstoHaveMcGahnDisputethePressReports

On January 26, 2018, the President’s personal counsel called McGahn’sattorney and said that the President wanted McGahn to put out a statement

denying that he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel and that he hadthreatenedtoquit inprotest.784McGahn’sattorneyspokewithMcGahnaboutthat request and then called the President’s personal counsel to relay thatMcGahn would not make a statement.785 McGahn’s attorney informed thePresident’spersonalcounselthattheTimesstorywasaccurateinreportingthatthePresidentwantedtheSpecialCounselremoved.786Accordingly,McGahn’sattorney said, although the article was inaccurate in some other respects,McGahncouldnotcomplywiththePresident’srequesttodisputethestory.787HicksrecalledrelayingtothePresidentthatoneofhisattorneyshadspokentoMcGahn’sattorneyabouttheissue.788

AlsoonJanuary26,2017,HicksrecalledthatthePresidentaskedSanderstocontactMcGahnaboutthestory.789McGahntoldSanderstherewasnoneedtorespondandindicatedthatsomeofthearticlewasaccurate.790Consistentwiththatposition,McGahndidnotcorrecttheTimesstory.

OnFebruary4,2018,PriebusappearedonMeet thePressandsaidhehadnotheard thePresidentsay thathewanted theSpecialCounsel fired.791AfterPriebus’sappearance,thePresidentcalledPriebusandsaidhedidagreatjobonMeetthePress.792ThePresidentalsotoldPriebusthatthePresidenthad“neversaidanyofthosethingsabout”theSpecialCounsel.793

The next day, on February 5, 2018, the President complained about theTimes article to Porter.794 The President told Porter that the article was“bullshit” and he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel.795 ThePresidentsaidthatMcGahnleakedtothemediatomakehimselflookgood.796The President then directed Porter to tellMcGahn to create a record tomakeclear that thePresidentneverdirectedMcGahntofire theSpecialCounsel.797Porter thought the matter should be handled by the White Housecommunications office, but the President said he wanted McGahn to write aletter to the file “for our records” and wanted something beyond a pressstatement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate.798 The PresidentreferredtoMcGahnasa“lyingbastard”andsaidthathewantedarecordfromhim.799Porter recalled thePresident saying something to the effect of, “If he

doesn’twritealetter,thenmaybeI’llhavetogetridofhim.”800

Later that day, Porter spoke to McGahn to deliver the President’smessage.801PortertoldMcGahnthathehadtowritealettertodisputethathewaseverorderedtoterminatetheSpecialCounsel.802McGahnshruggedofftherequest,explainingthatthemediareportsweretrue.803McGahntoldPorterthatthePresidenthadbeeninsistentonfiringtheSpecialCounselandthatMcGahnhad planned to resign rather than carry out the order, although he had notpersonallytoldthePresidentheintendedtoquit.804PortertoldMcGahnthatthePresidentsuggestedthatMcGahnwouldbefiredifhedidnotwritetheletter.805McGahn dismissed the threat, saying that the optics would be terrible if thePresident followed throughwith firing him on that basis.806McGahn said hewouldnotwritetheletterthePresidenthadrequested.807PortersaidthattohisknowledgetheissueofMcGahn’sletternevercameupwiththePresidentagain,butPorterdidrecalltellingKellyabouthisconversationwithMcGahn.808

The next day, on February 6, 2018,Kelly scheduled time forMcGahn tomeet with him and the President in the Oval Office to discuss the Timesarticle.809Themorningofthemeeting,thePresident’spersonalcounselcalledMcGahn’s attorney and said that the Presidentwas going to be speakingwithMcGahnandMcGahncouldnotresignnomatterwhathappenedinthemeeting.810

The President began theOvalOfficemeeting by tellingMcGahn that theNewYorkTimesstorydidnot“lookgood”andMcGahnneededtocorrectit.811McGahn recalled thePresident said, “Inever said to fireMueller. Inever said‘fire.’Thisstorydoesn’tlookgood.Youneedtocorrectthis.You’retheWhiteHousecounsel.”812

In response, McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the Presidentdirectly that he planned to resign, but said that the story was otherwiseaccurate.813 The President asked McGahn, “Did I say the word ‘fire’?”814McGahn responded, “What you said is, ‘Call Rod [Rosenstein], tell Rod thatMueller has conflicts and can’t be the Special Counsel. ’”815 The Presidentresponded,“Ineversaidthat.”816ThePresidentsaidhemerelywantedMcGahn

toraisetheconflictsissuewithRosensteinandleaveittohimtodecidewhattodo.817McGahn told thePresidenthedidnotunderstand theconversation thatway and instead had heard, “Call Rod. There are conflicts. Mueller has togo.”818ThePresidentaskedMcGahnwhetherhewould“doacorrection,”andMcGahnsaidno.819McGahnthoughtthePresidentwastestinghismettletoseehowcommittedMcGahnwastowhathappened.820Kellydescribedthemeetingas“alittletense.”821

ThePresidentalsoaskedMcGahn in themeetingwhyhehad toldSpecialCounsel’sOfficeinvestigatorsthatthePresidenthadtoldhimtohavetheSpecialCounsel removed.822 McGahn responded that he had to and that hisconversations with the President were not protected by attorney-clientprivilege.823ThePresident thenasked,“Whatabout thesenotes?Whydoyoutakenotes?Lawyersdon’ttakenotes.Ineverhadalawyerwhotooknotes.”824McGahn responded that he keeps notes because he is a “real lawyer” andexplained thatnotescreatea recordandarenotabad thing.825ThePresidentsaid,“I’vehadalotofgreatlawyers,likeRoyCohn.Hedidnottakenotes.”826

After the Oval Office meeting concluded, Kelly recalledMcGahn tellinghimthatMcGahnandthePresident“didhavethatconversation”aboutremovingtheSpecialCounsel.827McGahnrecalledthatKellysaidthathehadpointedoutto the President after theOvalOffice thatMcGahn had not backed down andwould not budge.828 Following the Oval Office meeting, the President’spersonal counsel calledMcGahn’s counsel and relayed that the President was“fine”withMcGahn.829

Analysis

InanalyzingthePresident’seffortstohaveMcGahndenythathehadbeenorderedtohavetheSpecialCounselremoved,thefollowingevidenceisrelevanttotheelementsofobstructionofjustice:

a.Obstructiveact.ThePresident’srepeatedeffortstogetMcGahntocreatea record denying that the President had directed him to remove the SpecialCounsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to

constrainMcGahnfromtestifyingtruthfullyortounderminehiscredibilityasapotentialwitness if he testified consistentlywith hismemory, rather thanwithwhattherecordsaid.

There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times andWashington Post stories were published in late January 2018, the Presidentbelieved the stories were wrong and that he had never toldMcGahn to haveRosensteinremovetheSpecialCounsel.ThePresidentcorrectlyunderstoodthatMcGahnhadnottoldthePresidentdirectlythatheplannedtoresign.Inaddition,the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate theSpecial Counsel, and in theOvalOfficemeetingwithMcGahn, the Presidentsaid, “I never said to fire Mueller. I never said ‘fire.’” That evidence couldindicatethatthePresidentwasnotattemptingtopersuadeMcGahntochangehisstory but was instead offering his own—but different—recollection of thesubstanceofhisJune2017conversationswithMcGahnandMcGahn’sreactiontothem.

Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President’s conduct.Aspreviouslydescribed,seeVolumeII,SectionII.E,supra,substantialevidencesupports McGahn’s account that the President had directed him to have theSpecial Counsel removed, including the timing and context of the President’sdirective;themannerinwhichMcGahnreacted;andthefactthatthePresidenthad been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by theDepartment of Justice, and should be raised with the President’s personalcounselratherthanbroughttoMcGahn.Inaddition,thePresident’ssubsequentdenials that he had toldMcGahn to have the Special Counsel removed werecarefully worded. When first asked about the New York Times story, thePresident said,“Fakenews, folks.Fakenews.A typicalNewYorkTimes fakestory.” And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, hefocused onwhether he had used theword “fire,” saying, “I never said to fireMueller. I never said ‘fire’” and “Did I say theword ‘fire’?” The President’sassertionintheOvalOfficemeetingthathehadneverdirectedMcGahntohavetheSpecialCounselremovedthusrunscountertotheevidence.

In addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with McGahn’smemoryof the June17, 2017events, the evidence indicates that thePresidentknewby the time of theOvalOfficemeeting thatMcGahn’s account differedand that McGahn was firm in his views. Shortly after the story broke, thePresident’scounseltoldMcGahn’scounselthatthePresidentwantedMcGahnto

make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, butMcGahnrespondedthroughhiscounselthatthataspectofthestorywasaccurateand he therefore could not complywith thePresident’s request.ThePresidentthendirectedSanderstotellMcGahntocorrectthestory,butMcGahntoldherhewouldnotdosobecausethestorywasaccurateinreportingonthePresident’sorder. Consistent with that position,McGahn never issued a correction.Morethan aweek later, the President brought up the issue againwith Porter,madecomments indicating the President thoughtMcGahn had leaked the story, anddirectedPorter tohaveMcGahncreatearecorddenyingthat thePresidenthadtriedtofiretheSpecialCounsel.Atthatpoint,thePresidentsaidhemight“havetoget ridof”McGahn ifMcGahndidnotcomply.McGahnagain refusedandtoldPorter, as hehad toldSanders and as his counsel had told thePresident’scounsel, that thePresidenthad in factorderedhim tohaveRosenstein removetheSpecialCounsel.ThatevidenceindicatesthatbythetimeoftheOvalOfficemeetingthePresidentwasawarethatMcGahndidnotthinkthestorywasfalseanddidnotwanttoissueastatementorcreateawrittenrecorddenyingfactsthatMcGahn believed to be true. The President nevertheless persisted and askedMcGahntorepudiatefactsthatMcGahnhadrepeatedlysaidwereaccurate.

b.Nexustoanofficialproceeding.ByJanuary2018,theSpecialCounsel’suse of a grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of severalindictments. The President also was aware that the Special Counsel wasinvestigating obstruction-related events because, among other reasons, onJanuary 8, 2018, the Special Counsel’s Office provided his counsel with adetailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President.830 ThePresidentknewthatMcGahnhadpersonalknowledgeofmanyoftheeventstheSpecial Counsel was investigating and that McGahn had already beeninterviewedbySpecialCounsel investigators.And in theOvalOfficemeeting,the President indicated he knew thatMcGahn had told the Special Counsel’sOfficeaboutthePresident’sefforttoremovetheSpecialCounsel.ThePresidentchallengedMcGahnfordisclosingthatinformationandfortakingnotesthatheviewed as creating unnecessary legal exposure. That evidence indicates thePresident’sawarenessthattheJune17,2017eventswererelevanttotheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigationandanygrandjuryinvestigationthatmightgrowoutofit.

To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the President’sactionswouldhavethenaturaltendencytoaffectsuchaproceedingorthattheywould hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to

investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel investigatorsbeforeJanuary2018,thePresidentcouldnothavebeenseekingtoinfluencehisprior statements in those interviews. But because McGahn had repeatedlyspoken to investigators and the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it wasforeseeablethathewouldbeinterviewedagainonobstruction-relatedtopics.IfthePresidentwerefocusedsolelyonapressstrategyinseekingtohaveMcGahnrefute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to furtherinvestigativeinterviewswouldnotbeshown.ButthePresident’seffortstohaveMcGahnwritealetter“forourrecords”approximatelytendaysafterthestorieshadcomeout—wellpastthetypicaltimetoissueacorrectionforanewsstory—indicates the Presidentwas not focused solely on a press strategy, but insteadlikelycontemplatedtheongoinginvestigationandanyproceedingsarisingfromit.

c.Intent.SubstantialevidenceindicatesthatinrepeatedlyurgingMcGahntodispute that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated, thePresident acted for the purpose of influencingMcGahn’s account in order todeflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President’s conduct towards theinvestigation.

Severalfactssupportthatconclusion.ThePresidentmaderepeatedattemptstogetMcGahntochangehisstory.Asdescribedabove,bythetimeofthelastattempt, the evidence suggests that the President had been told on multipleoccasions that McGahn believed the President had ordered him to have theSpecial Counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his encounter with thePresident in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle and see howcommitted he was to his memory of what had occurred. The President hadalreadylaidthegroundworkforpressingMcGahntoalterhisaccountbytellingPorterthatitmightbenecessarytofireMcGahnifhedidnotdenythestory,andPorterrelayedthatstatementtoMcGahn.AdditionalevidenceofthePresident’sintentmaybegleanedfromthefactthathiscounselwassufficientlyalarmedbytheprospectof thePresident’smeetingwithMcGahn thathecalledMcGahn’scounselandsaidthatMcGahncouldnotresignnomatterwhathappenedintheOval Office that day. The President’s counsel was well aware of McGahn’sresolvenottoissuewhathebelievedtobeafalseaccountofeventsdespitethePresident’srequest.Finally,asnotedabove,thePresidentbroughtuptheSpecialCounsel investigation in hisOvalOfficemeetingwithMcGahn and criticizedhim for telling this Office about the June 17, 2017 events. The President’sstatements reflect his understanding—and his displeasure—that those events

wouldbepartofanobstruction-of-justiceinquiry.

J.ThePresident’sConductTowardsFlynn,Manafort,HOM███

Overview

InadditiontotheinteractionswithMcGahndescribedabove,thePresidenthas takenother actions directed at possiblewitnesses in theSpecialCounsel’sinvestigation, includingFlynn,Manafort,HOM█and as described in thenextsection,Cohen.WhenFlynnwithdrewfromajointdefenseagreementwiththePresident, thePresident’spersonalcounselstatedthatFlynn’sactionswouldbeviewed as reflecting “hostility” towards the President. During Manafort’sprosecutionandwhilethejurywasdeliberating,thePresidentrepeatedlystatedthatManafortwasbeingtreatedunfairlyandmadeitknownthatManafortcouldreceiveapardon.HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████.

Evidence

1.ConductDirectedatMichaelFlynn

Aspreviouslynoted,seeVolumeII,SectionII.B,supra,thePresidentaskedforFlynn’sresignationonFebruary13,2017.FollowingFlynn’sresignation,thePresident made positive public comments about Flynn, describing him as a“wonderfulman,”“afineperson,”anda“verygoodperson.”831ThePresidentalso privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying that thePresidentstillcaredabouthimandencouraginghimtostaystrong.832

In late November 2017, Flynn began to cooperate with this Office. OnNovember22,2017,Flynnwithdrewfromajointdefenseagreementhehadwiththe President.833 Flynn’s counsel told the President’s personal counsel andcounsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have confidentialcommunicationswiththeWhiteHouseorthePresident.834Laterthatnight,thePresident’spersonalcounselleftavoicemailforFlynn’scounselthatsaid:

Iunderstandyoursituation,butletmeseeifIcan’tstateitinstarkerterms....[I]twouldn’tsurprisemeifyou’vegoneontomakeadealwith . . . the government. . . . [I]f . . . there’s information that

implicatesthePresident,thenwe’vegotanationalsecurityissue,...so,youknow, . . .weneed somekindofheadsup.Um, just for thesake of protecting all our interests ifwe can. . . . [R]ememberwhatwe’vealwayssaidabout thePresidentandhis feelings towardFlynnand,thatstillremains....835

On November 23, 2017, Flynn’s attorneys returned the call from thePresident’s personal counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail.836Flynn’s attorneys reiterated that they were no longer in a position to shareinformationunderanysortofprivilege.837AccordingtoFlynn’sattorneys,thePresident’s personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement.838ThePresident’spersonalcounselsaidthatheinterpretedwhattheysaidtohimasa reflection of Flynn’s hostility towards the President and that he planned toinform his client of that interpretation.839 Flynn’s attorneys understood thatstatement tobe an attempt tomake them reconsider their positionbecause thePresident’spersonalcounselbelievedthatFlynnwouldbedisturbedtoknowthatsuchamessagewouldbeconveyedtothePresident.840

On December 1, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statementspursuant to a cooperation agreement.841 The next day, the President told thepress that he was not concerned about what Flynn might tell the SpecialCounsel.842 In response to a question aboutwhether the President still stoodbehindFlynn,thePresidentresponded,“We’llseewhathappens.”843Overthenextseveraldays,thePresidentmadepublicstatementsexpressingsympathyforFlynnandindicatinghehadnotbeentreatedfairly.844OnDecember15,2017,thePresident responded toapress inquiryaboutwhetherhewasconsideringapardon for Flynn by saying, “I don’t want to talk about pardons forMichaelFlynnyet.We’llseewhathappens.Let’ssee.Icansaythis:Whenyoulookatwhat’sgoneonwiththeFBIandwiththeJusticeDepartment,peoplearevery,veryangry.”845

2.ConductDirectedatPaulManafort

On October 27, 2017, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indictedManafort and former deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiplefelonycounts,andonFebruary22,2018,agrandjuryintheEasternDistrictof

Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony counts.846 ThechargesinbothcasesallegedcriminalconductbyManafortthatbeganasearlyas2005andcontinuedthrough2018.847

InJanuary2018,Manafort toldGates thathehad talked to thePresident’spersonal counsel and theywere “going to take care of us.”848Manafort toldGates it was stupid to plead, saying that he had been in touch with thePresident’spersonalcounselandrepeatingthattheyshould“sittight”and“we’llbe taken care of.”849 Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentionedpardonsandManafortsaidnooneusedthatword.850

AstheproceedingsagainstManafortprogressedincourt,thePresidenttoldPorterthatheneverlikedManafortandthatManafortdidnotknowwhathewasdoingon thecampaign.851ThePresidentdiscussedwithaideswhetherand inwhat way Manafort might be cooperating with the Special Counsel’sinvestigation, and whether Manafort knew any information that would beharmfultothePresident.852

In public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution andsuggestingthatManafortwasbeingtreatedunfairly.OnJune15,2018,beforeascheduledcourthearingthatdayonwhetherManafort’sbailshouldberevokedbasedonnewchargesthatManaforthadtamperedwithwitnesseswhileoutonbail,thePresidenttoldthepress,“IfeelbadlyaboutalotofthembecauseIthinkalotofitisveryunfair.Imean,Ilookatsomeofthemwheretheygoback12years.LikeManaforthasnothingtodowithourcampaign.ButIfeelso—Itellyou,Ifeelalittlebadlyaboutit.Theywentback12yearstogetthingsthathedid12yearsago?...Ifeelbadlyforsomepeople,becausethey’vegoneback12 years to find things about somebody, and I don’t think it’s right.”853 InresponsetoaquestionaboutwhetherhewasconsideringapardonforManafortor other individuals involved in the Special Counsel’s investigation, thePresident said, “Idon’twant to talk about that.No, Idon’twant to talk aboutthat. . . . But look, I dowant to see people treated fairly. That’swhat it’s allabout.”854Hourslater,Manafort’sbailwasrevokedandthePresidenttweeted,“Wow,what a tough sentence for PaulManafort,who has representedRonaldReagan,BobDole andmanyother toppolitical people and campaigns.Didn’tknow Manafort was the head of the Mob. What about Comey and Crooked

Hillaryandalltheothers?Veryunfair!”855

Immediately following the revocation of Manafort’s bail, the President’spersonallawyer,RudolphGiuliani,gaveaseriesofinterviewsinwhichheraisedthepossibilityofapardonforManafort.GiulianitoldtheNewYorkDailyNewsthat “[w]hen the whole thing is over, thingsmight get cleaned up with somepresidential pardons.”856Giuliani also said in an interview that, although thePresident should not pardon anyonewhile the Special Counsel’s investigationwas ongoing, “when the investigation is concluded, he’s kind of on his own,right?”857InaCNNinterview twodays later,Giulianisaid,“Iguess I shouldclarify this once and for all. . . . The president has issued no pardons in thisinvestigation. The president is not going to issue pardons in thisinvestigation....Whenit’sover,hey,he’sthepresidentoftheUnitedStates.Heretains his pardon power.Nobody is taking that away fromhim.”858Giulianirejected the suggestion that his and the President’s comments could signal todefendants that they should not cooperate in a criminal prosecution because apardon might follow, saying the comments were “certainly not intended thatway.”859 Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individualinvolvedintheinvestigationwouldnotbe“excludedfrom[apardon],ifinfactthe president andhis advisors . . . come to the conclusion that youhavebeentreatedunfairly.”860Giulianiobservedthatpardonswerenotunusualinpoliticalinvestigations but said, “That doesn’t mean they’re going to happen here.Doesn’tmeanthatanybodyshouldrelyonit....Bigsignalis,nobodyhasbeenpardonedyet.”861

OnJuly31,2018,Manafort’scriminaltrialbeganintheEasternDistrictofVirginia,generatingsubstantialnewscoverage.862Thenextday, thePresidenttweeted,“ThisisaterriblesituationandAttorneyGeneralJeffSessionsshouldstopthisRiggedWitchHuntrightnow,beforeitcontinuestostainourcountryanyfurther.BobMuelleristotallyconflicted,andhis17AngryDemocratsthataredoinghisdirtyworkareadisgracetoUSA!”863Minuteslater,thePresidenttweeted,“PaulManafortworkedforRonaldReagan,BobDoleandmanyotherhighlyprominentand respectedpolitical leaders.Heworked forme foraveryshort time. Why didn’t government tell me that he was under investigation.TheseoldchargeshavenothingtodowithCollusion—aHoax!”864Laterintheday, the President tweeted, “Looking back on history,whowas treatedworse,

AlfonseCapone, legendarymobboss,killerand‘PublicEnemyNumberOne,’or Paul Manafort, political operative & Reagan/Dole darling, now servingsolitary confinement—although convicted of nothing? Where is the RussianCollusion?”865 The President’s tweets about the Manafort trial were widelycoveredbythepress.866WhenaskedaboutthePresident’stweets,Sanderstoldthepress,“Certainly,thePresident’sbeenclear.HethinksPaulManafort’sbeentreatedunfairly.”867

On August 16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to the jury anddeliberations began.At that time,Giuliani had recently suggested to reportersthat the Special Counsel investigation needed to be “done in the next two orthreeweeks,”868andmediastoriesreportedthataManafortacquittalwouldaddto criticism that theSpecialCounsel investigationwasnotworth the time andexpense,whereasa convictioncould show that ending the investigationwouldbe premature.869 On August 17, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, thePresidentcommentedonthetrialfromtheSouthLawnoftheWhiteHouse.Inan impromptu exchangewith reporters that lasted approximately fiveminutes,the President twice called the Special Counsel’s investigation a “riggedwitchhunt.”870WhenaskedwhetherhewouldpardonManafortifhewasconvicted,thePresidentsaid,“Idon’ttalkaboutthatnow.Idon’ttalkaboutthat.”871ThePresidentthenadded,withoutbeingaskedafurtherquestion,“IthinkthewholeManaforttrialisverysadwhenyoulookatwhat’sgoingonthere.Ithinkit’saverysaddayforourcountry.Heworkedformeforaveryshortperiodoftime.Butyouknowwhat,hehappenstobeaverygoodperson.Andlthinkit’sverysadwhatthey’vedonetoPaulManafort.”872ThePresidentdidnottakefurtherquestions.873InresponsetothePresident’sstatements,Manafort’sattorneysaid,“Mr.ManafortreallyappreciatesthesupportofPresidentTrump.”874

OnAugust21,2018,thejuryfoundManafortguiltyoneightfelonycounts.AlsoonAugust21,MichaelCohenpleadedguiltytoeightoffenses,includingacampaign-financeviolationthathesaidhadoccurred“incoordinationwith,andat thedirectionof,acandidate for federalofftce.”875ThePresident reacted toManafort’s convictions that day by telling reporters, “PaulManafort’s a goodman”and“it’saverysadthingthathappened.”876ThePresidentdescribedtheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigationas“awitchhuntthatendsindisgrace.”877The

next day, the President tweeted, “I feel very badly for PaulManafort and hiswonderful family. ‘Justice’ took a 12 year old tax case, among other things,applied tremendouspressureonhimand,unlikeMichaelCohen,he refused to‘break’—make up stories in order to get a ‘deal.’ Such respect for a braveman!”878

InaFoxNewsinterviewonAugust22,2018,thePresidentsaid:“[Cohen]makes a better deal when he uses me, like everybody else. And one of thereasons I respect Paul Manafort so much is he went through that trial—youknow they make up stories. People make up stories. This whole thing aboutflipping, they call it, I know all about flipping.”879 The President said thatflippingwas“notfair”and“almostoughttobeoutlawed.”880InresponsetoaquestionaboutwhetherhewasconsideringapardonforManafort,thePresidentsaid, “I have great respect for what he’s done, in terms of what he’s gonethrough....Heworkedformany,manypeoplemany,manyyears,andIwouldsaywhathedid,someofthechargestheythrewagainsthim,everyconsultant,every lobbyist inWashington probably does.”881Giuliani told journalists thatthePresident“reallythinksManaforthasbeenhorriblytreated”andthatheandthe President had discussed the political fallout if the President pardonedManafort.882Thenextday,GiulianitoldtheWashingtonPostthatthePresidenthadaskedhislawyersforadviceonthepossibilityofapardonforManafortandother aides, and had been counseled against considering a pardon until theinvestigationconcluded.883

OnSeptember14,2018,Manafortpleadedguilty tochargesintheDistrictofColumbia and signed a plea agreement that required him to cooperatewithinvestigators.884 Giuliani was reported to have publicly said that Manafortremained ina jointdefenseagreementwith thePresident followingManafort’sguiltypleaandagreementtocooperate,andthatManafort’sattorneysregularlybriefed the President’s lawyers on the topics discussed and the informationManaforthadprovidedin interviewswith theSpecialCounsel’sOffice.885OnNovember 26, 2018, the Special Counsel’s Office disclosed in a public courtfiling thatManafort had breached his plea agreement by lying aboutmultiplesubjects.886Thenextday,Giulianisaid that thePresidenthadbeen“upset forweeks”aboutwhatheconsideredtobe“theun-American,horribletreatmentofManafort.”887InaninterviewonNovember28,2018, thePresidentsuggested

thatitwas“verybrave”thatManafortdidnot“flip”:

If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know this flipping stuff isterrible.Youflipandyoulieandyouget—theprosecutorswilltellyou99percent of the time they can get people to flip. it’s rare that theycan’t.But I had three people:Manafort,Corsi—I don’t knowCorsi,but he refuses to say what they demanded.888 Manafort, CorsiHOM█████████████.It’sactuallyverybrave.889

In response to a question about a potential pardon forManafort, thePresidentsaid,“Itwasneverdiscussed,butIwouldn’ttakeitoffthetable.WhywouldItakeitoffthetable?”890

3.HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████891Harm toOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.892HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████893

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████894Harm toOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████895HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████896

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.897Harm toOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████898HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.899HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████900

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████901Harm toOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████902HarmtoOngoingMatter█████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

███████████903

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████904

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████905Harm toOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████906HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████907HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████908

Analysis

InanalyzingthePresident’sconducttowardsFlynn,Manafort,HOM████,thefollowingevidenceisrelevanttotheelementsofobstructionofjustice:

a.Obstructiveact.ThePresident’sactionstowardswitnessesintheSpecialCounsel’s investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the naturaltendencytopreventparticularwitnessesfromtestifyingtruthfully,orotherwisewould have the probable effect of influencing, delaying, or preventing theirtestimonytolawenforcement.

With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public messages toFlynnencouraginghimtostaystrongandconveyingthatthePresidentstillcaredabout him before he began to cooperate with the government.When Flynn’sattorneys withdrew him from a joint defense agreement with the President,signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the government, thePresident’spersonalcounselinitiallyremindedFlynn’scounselofthePresident’swarm feelings towards Flynn and said “that still remains.” But when Flynn’s

counsel reiterated that Flynn could no longer share information under a jointdefense agreement, the President’s personal counsel stated that the decisionwouldbe interpretedas reflectingFlynn’shostility towards thePresident.Thatsequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn’s decision tocooperate,aswellastheextentofthatcooperation.Becauseofprivilegeissues,however,wecouldnotdeterminewhetherthePresidentwaspersonallyinvolvedinorknewaboutthespecificmessagehiscounseldeliveredtoFlynn’scounsel.

WithrespecttoManafort,thereisevidencethatthePresident’sactionshadthe potential to influence Manafort’s decision whether to cooperate with thegovernment.ThePresident andhis personal counselmade repeated statementssuggesting that a pardonwas a possibility forManafort, while alsomaking itclear that thePresidentdidnotwantManafort to“flip”andcooperatewith thegovernment.OnJune15,2018,thedaythejudgepresidingoverManafort’sD.C.casewasconsideringwhethertorevokehisbail,thePresidentsaidthathe“feltbadly” forManafort and stated, “I think a lot of it is very unfair.”AndwhenaskedaboutapardonforManafort,thePresidentsaid,“Idowanttoseepeopletreatedfairly.That’swhatit’sallabout.”Laterthatday,afterManafort’sbailwasrevoked,thePresidentcalledita“toughsentence”thatwas“Veryunfair!”Twodayslater,thePresident’spersonalcounselstatedthatindividualsinvolvedintheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigationcouldreceiveapardon“ifinfactthe[P]residentand his advisors . . . come to the conclusion that you have been treatedunfairly”—using language that paralleled how the President had alreadydescribed the treatment of Manafort. Those statements, combined with thePresident’scommendationofManafortforbeinga“braveman”who“refusedto‘break’,” suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Manafortcontinuednottocooperatewiththegovernment.AndwhileManaforteventuallypleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, he was found to haveviolatedtheagreementbylyingtoinvestigators.

ThePresident’spublicstatementsduringtheManaforttrial,includingduringjurydeliberations,alsohadthepotentialtoinfluencethetrialjury.Onthesecondday of trial, for example, the President called the prosecution a “terriblesituation” and a “hoax” that “continues to stain our country” and referred toManafort as a “Reagan/Dole darling”whowas “serving solitary confinement”even though he was “convicted of nothing.” Those statements were widelypickedupbythepress.Whilejurorswereinstructednottowatchorreadnewsstories about the case and are presumed to follow those instructions, thePresident’sstatementsduringthetrialgeneratedsubstantialmediacoveragethat

couldhavereachedjurorsiftheyhappenedtoseethestatementsorlearnedaboutthemfromothers.AndthePresident’sstatementsduringjurydeliberationsthatManafort “happens to be a very good person” and that “it’s very sad whatthey’vedonetoPaulManafort”hadthepotentialtoinfluencejurorswholearnedof the statements, which the President made just as jurors were consideringwhethertoconvictoracquitManafort.

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b.Nexus toanofficialproceeding.ThePresident’sactions towardsFlynn,Manafort,HOM███appeartohavebeenconnectedtopendingoranticipatedofficialproceedingsinvolvingeachindividual.ThePresident’sconducttowardsFlynn HOM█ █ █ principally occurred when both were under criminalinvestigationbytheSpecialCounsel’sOfficeandpressreportsspeculatedaboutwhethertheywouldcooperatewiththeSpecialCounsel’sinvestigation.AndthePresident’s conduct towards Manafort was directly connected to the officialproceedingsinvolvinghim.ThePresidentmadestatementsaboutManafortandthe charges against him duringManafort’s criminal trial. And the President’scommentsabouttheprospectofManafort“flipping”occurredwhenitwascleartheSpecialCounselcontinuedtooverseegrandjuryproceedings.

c. Intent. Evidence concerning the President’s intent related to Flynn as apotential witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of privilegeissueswedonothaveevidenceestablishingwhetherthePresidentknewaboutorwasinvolvedinhiscounsel’scommunicationswithFlynn’scounselstatingthatFlynn’s decision towithdraw from the joint defense agreement and cooperatewith the government would be viewed as reflecting “hostility” towards thePresident. And regardless of what the President’s personal counselcommunicated, thePresidentcontinued toexpresssympathyforFlynnafterhepleadedguiltypursuanttoacooperationagreement,statingthatFlynnhad“ledaverystronglife”andthePresident“fe[lt]verybadly”aboutwhathadhappenedtohim.

Evidence concerning the President’s conduct towards Manafort indicates

that the President intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with thegovernment.BeforeManafortwasconvicted,thePresidentrepeatedlystatedthatManafort had been treated unfairly.One day afterManafortwas convicted oneight felonycharges andpotentially faceda lengthyprison term, thePresidentsaidthatManafortwas“abraveman”forrefusingto“break”andthat“flipping”“almost ought to be outlawed.”At the same time, although the President hadprivately told aides he did not likeManafort, he publicly calledManafort “agoodman”andsaidhehada“wonderfulfamily.”AndwhenthePresidentwasaskedwhetherhewasconsideringapardonforManafort,thePresidentdidnotrespond directly and instead said he had “great respect for what [Manafort]’sdone, in termsofwhathe’sgone through.”ThePresidentadded that“someofthe charges they threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist inWashington probably does.” In light of the President’s counsel’s previousstatementsthat theinvestigations“mightgetcleanedupwithsomepresidentialpardons”and that apardonwouldbepossible if thePresident “come[s] to theconclusion that you have been treated unfairly,” the evidence supports theinferencethatthePresidentintendedManaforttobelievethathecouldreceiveapardon, which would make cooperation with the government as a means ofobtainingalessersentenceunnecessary.

We also examined the evidenceof thePresident’s intent inmakingpublicstatements aboutManafort at thebeginningofhis trial andwhen the jurywasdeliberating.SomeevidencesupportsaconclusionthatthePresidentintended,atleastinpart,toinfluencethejury.Thetrialgeneratedwidespreadpublicity,andasthejurybegantodeliberate,commentatorssuggestedthatanacquittalwouldaddtopressuretoendtheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigation.Bypubliclystatingonthe second day of deliberations that Manafort “happens to be a very goodperson”andthat“it’sverysadwhatthey’vedonetoPaulManafort”rightaftercallingtheSpecialCounsel’sinvestigationa“riggedwitchhunt,”thePresident’sstatementscould, if theyreached jurors,have thenatural tendency toengendersympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a factfinder could infer that thePresident intended that result. But there are alternative explanations for thePresident’scomments,includingthathegenuinelyfeltsorryforManafortorthathis goal was not to influence the jury but to influence public opinion. ThePresident’s comments also could have been intended to continue sending amessage to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, thePresident made his comments about Manafort being “a very good person”immediatelyafterdecliningtoansweraquestionaboutwhetherhewouldpardonManafort.

HarmtoOngoingMatter███████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

K.ThePresident’sConductInvolvingMichaelCohen

Overview

ThePresident’s conduct involvingMichaelCohen spans the full periodofour investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump TowerMoscowprojectonbehalfoftheTrumpOrganization.CohenbriefedcandidateTrump on the project numerous times, including discussing whether Trumpshouldtravel toRussia toadvancethedeal.After themediabeganquestioningTrump’s connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a “party line” that publiclydistanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there. Cohencontinued to adhere to that party line in 2017, when Congress asked him toprovide documents and testimony in its Russia investigation. In an attempt tominimize the President’s connections to Russia, Cohen submitted a letter toCongress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump TowerMoscowprojectthreetimes,thathedidnotconsideraskingTrumptotraveltoRussia, thatCohenhadnot receiveda response to anoutreachhemade to theRussiangovernment,andthattheprojectendedinJanuary2016,beforethefirstRepublican caucus or primary.Whileworking on the congressional statement,Cohen had extensive discussions with the President’s personal counsel, who,according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President andshould keep the statement short and “tight.” After the FBI searched Cohen’shomeandofficeinApril2018,thePresidentpubliclyassertedthatCohenwouldnot“flip”andprivatelypassedmessagesofsupporttohim.CohenalsodiscussedpardonswiththePresident’spersonalcounselandbelievedthat ifhestayedonmessage,hewouldgetapardonorthePresidentwoulddo“somethingelse”tomake the investigation end. But after Cohen began cooperating with thegovernment in July 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a“rat,”andsuggestedhisfamilymembershadcommittedcrimes.

Evidence

1.CandidateTrump’sAwarenessofandInvolvementintheTrumpTowerMoscowProject

ThePresident’sinteractionswithCohenasawitnesstookplaceagainstthebackgroundofthePresident’sinvolvementintheTrumpTowerMoscowproject.

AsdescribedindetailinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.1,supra, fromSeptember2015untilat leastJune2016,theTrumpOrganizationpursuedaTrumpTowerMoscow project in Russia, with negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel toDonald J. Trump.909 The Trump Organization had previously andunsuccessfullypursuedabuildingproject inMoscow.910According toCohen,inapproximatelySeptember2015heobtainedinternalapprovalfromTrumptonegotiate on behalf of the TrumpOrganization to have a Russian corporationbuild a tower inMoscow that licensed theTrumpname and brand.911Cohenthereafter had numerous brief conversationswithTrump about the project.912Cohen recalled that Trump wanted to be updated on any developments withTrump TowerMoscow and on several occasions brought the project up withCohentoaskwhatwashappeningonit.913CohenalsodiscussedtheprojectonmultipleoccasionswithDonaldTrumpJr.andIvankaTrump.914

In the fall of 2015, Trump signed a Letter of Intent for the project thatspecified highly lucrative terms for the TrumpOrganization.915 In December2015, Felix Sater, who was handling negotiations between Cohen and theRussian corporation, askedCohen for a copy of his andTrump’s passports tofacilitate travel to Russia to meet with government officials and possiblefinancing partners.916 Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump andrequestingacopyofTrump’spassportfromTrump’spersonalsecretary,RhonaGraff.917

ByJanuary2016,CohenhadbecomefrustratedthatSaterhadnotsetupameetingwith Russian government officials, so Cohen reached out directly byemailtotheofficeofDmitryPeskov,whowasPutin’sdeputychiefofstaffandpress secretary.918 On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email responsefromElenaPoliakova, Peskov’s personal assistant, and phone records confirmthat they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes, during which Cohen

describedtheTrumpTowerMoscowprojectandrequestedassistanceinmovingtheprojectforward.919CohenrecalledbriefingcandidateTrumpaboutthecallsoonafterwards.920CohentoldTrumphespokewithawomanheidentifiedas“someonefromtheKremlin,”andCohenreportedthatshewasveryprofessionalandaskeddetailedquestionsabouttheproject.921CohenrecalledtellingTrumphewishedtheTrumpOrganizationhadassistantswhowereascompetentasthewomanfromtheKremlin.922

Cohen thought his phone call renewed interest in the project.923ThedayafterCohen’scallwithPoliakova,SatertextedCohen,askinghimto“[c]allmewhenyouhaveafewminutestochat...it’saboutPutintheycalledtoday.”924SatertoldCohenthat theRussiangovernmentlikedtheprojectandonJanuary25,2016,sentaninvitationforCohentovisitMoscow“foraworkingvisit.”925AftertheoutreachfromSater,CohenrecalledtellingTrumpthathewaswaitingtohearbackonmovingtheprojectforward.926

AfterJanuary2016,CohencontinuedtohaveconversationswithSateraboutTrumpTowerMoscow and continued to keep candidateTrumpupdated aboutthose discussions and the status of the project.927Cohen recalled that he andTrump wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and that Trump neverdiscouragedhim fromworkingon theproject becauseof the campaign.928 InMarch or April 2016, Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening inRussia.929 Cohen also recalled briefing Donald Trump Jr. in the spring—aconversation that Cohen said was not “idle chit chat” because Trump TowerMoscowwaspotentiallya$1billiondeal.930

CohenrecalledthataroundMay2016,heagainraisedwithcandidateTrumpthe possibility of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscowproject.931Atthattime,CohenhadreceivedseveraltextsfromSaterseekingtoarrangedatesforsuchatrip.932OnMay4,2016,SaterwrotetoCohen,“IhadachatwithMoscow.ASSUMINGthe tripdoeshappen thequestion isbeforeoraftertheconvention.....Obviouslythepremeetingtrip(youonly)canhappenanytimeyouwantbutthe2bigguys[is]thequestion.IsaidIwouldconfirmandrevert.”933 Cohen responded, “My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he

becomesthenomineeaftertheconvention.”934OnMay5,2016,SaterfollowedupwithatextthatCohenthoughtheprobablyreadtoTrump:

PeskovwouldliketoinviteyouashisguesttotheSt.PetersburgForum which is Russia’s Davos it’s June 16-19. He wants tomeettherewithyouandpossiblyintroduceyoutoeitherPutinorMedvedev. . . . This is perfect. The entire business class ofRussia will be there as well. He said anything you want todiscuss including dates and subjects are on the table todiscuss.935

Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St. Petersburg EconomicForumwith candidateTrumpand saying thatPutinorRussianPrimeMinisterDmitryMedvedevmightbethere.936Cohenremembered thatTrumpsaid thathewouldbewilling to travel toRussia ifCohencould“lockand load”on thedeal.937InJune2016,CohendecidednottoattendtheSt.PetersburgEconomicForum because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen fromPeskov.938CohensaidhehadaquickconversationwithTrumpatthattimebutdid not tell him that the project was over because he did not want Trump tocomplainthatthedealwason-again-off-againifitwererevived.939

Duringthesummerof2016,CohenrecalledthatcandidateTrumppubliclyclaimed that he had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwardsprivately checked with Cohen about the status of the Trump Tower Moscowproject,whichCohenfound“interesting.”940Atsomepointthatsummer,CohenrecalledhavingabriefconversationwithTrumpinwhichCohensaidtheTrumpTowerMoscow project was going nowhere because the Russian developmentcompanyhadnotsecuredapieceofpropertyfortheproject.941Trumpsaidthatwas “toobad,” andCohendidnot recall talkingwithTrumpabout theprojectafterthat.942CohensaidthatatnotimeduringthecampaigndidTrumptellhimnottopursuetheprojectorthattheprojectshouldbeabandoned.943

2.CohenDeterminestoAdheretoa“PartyLine”DistancingCandidateTrumpFromRussia

Aspreviouslydiscussed,seeVolumeII,SectionII.A,supra,whenquestions

about possibleRussian support for candidateTrump emerged during the 2016presidentialcampaign,Trumpdeniedhavinganypersonal,financial,orbusinessconnectiontoRussia,whichCohendescribedasthe“partyline”or“message”tofollowforTrumpandhissenioradvisors.944

After the election, the Trump Organization sought to formally close outcertain deals in advance of the inauguration.945 Cohen recalled that TrumpTowerMoscowwason the listofdeals tobeclosedout.946 In approximatelyJanuary 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the media about TrumpTower Moscow, and he recalled speaking to the President-Elect when thoseinquiries came in.947 Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about theTrumpTowerMoscowprojectmightnotbeconsistentwiththe“message”thatthePresident-ElecthadnorelationshipwithRussia.948

Inaneffort to“stayonmessage,”Cohen toldaNewYorkTimes reporterthattheTrumpTowerMoscowdealwasnotfeasibleandhadendedinJanuary2016.949Cohenrecalledthatthiswaspartofa“script”ortalkingpointshehaddeveloped with President-Elect Trump and others to dismiss the idea of asubstantial connection between Trump and Russia.950 Cohen said that hediscussedthetalkingpointswithTrumpbutthathedidnotexplicitlytellTrumphethoughttheywereuntruebecauseTrumpalreadyknewtheywereuntrue.951CohenthoughtitwasimportanttosaythedealwasdoneinJanuary2016,ratherthanacknowledgethattalkscontinuedinMayandJune2016,becauseitlimitedtheperiodwhencandidateTrumpcouldbealleged tohavea relationshipwithRussiatoanearlypointinthecampaign,beforeTrumphadbecometheparty’spresumptivenominee.952

3.CohenSubmitsFalseStatementstoCongressMinimizingtheTrumpTowerMoscowProjectinAccordancewiththePartyLine

In early May 2017, Cohen received requests from Congress to providetestimony and documents in connection with congressional investigations ofRussian interference in the 2016 election.953At that time, Cohen understoodCongress’sinterestinhimtobefocusedontheallegationsintheSteelereportingconcerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russian officials in Pragueduring the campaign.954 Cohen had never traveled to Prague and was not

concerned about those allegations,which he believedwere provably false.955OnMay 18, 2017, Cohenmet with the President to discuss the request fromCongress,andthePresident instructedCohenthatheshouldcooperatebecausetherewasnothingthere.956

Cohen eventually entered into a joint defense agreement (JDA) with thePresidentandotherindividualswhowerepartoftheRussiainvestigation.957Inthemonths leadingup to his congressional testimony,Cohen frequently spokewiththePresident’spersonalcounsel.958CohensaidthatinthoseconversationsthePresident’spersonalcounselwouldsometimessaythathehadjustbeenwiththePresident.959Cohenrecalledthat thePresident’spersonalcounsel toldhimtheJDAwasworkingwelltogetherandassuredhimthattherewasnothingthereandiftheystayedonmessagetheinvestigationswouldcometoanendsoon.960

Atthattime,Cohen’slegalbillswerebeingpaidbytheTrumpOrganization,961andCohenwas toldnot toworrybecause the investigationswouldbeoverbysummerorfallof2017.962CohensaidthatthePresident’spersonalcounselalsoconveyedthat,aspartoftheJDA,Cohenwasprotected,whichhewouldnotbeif he “went rogue.”963 Cohen recalled that the President’s personal counselremindedhim that“thePresident lovesyou”and toldhim that ifhe stayedonmessage,thePresidenthadhisback.964

In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump TowerMoscow to submit to Congress along with his document production.965 Thefinal version of the statement contained several false statements about theproject.966 First, although the Trump Organization continued to pursue theproject until at least June 2016, the statement said, “The proposal was underconsiderationat theTrumpOrganizationfromSeptember2015until theendofJanuary2016.By theendofJanuary2016, Idetermined that theproposalwasnotfeasibleforavarietyofbusinessreasonsandshouldnotbepursuedfurther.Based onmy business determinations, theTrumpOrganization abandoned theproposal.”967 Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had discussedpossible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said,“DespiteoverturesbyMr.Sater,IneverconsideredaskingMr.TrumptotraveltoRussiainconnectionwiththisproposal.ItoldMr.SaterthatMr.TrumpwouldnottraveltoRussiaunlesstherewasadefinitiveagreementinplace.”968Third,

althoughCohenhadregularlybriefedTrumponthestatusoftheprojectandhadnumerousconversationsabout it, the statement said, “Mr.Trumpwasnever incontact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions,including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015.”969 Fourth, althoughCohen’soutreachtoPeskovinJanuary2016hadresultedinalengthyphonecallwitharepresentativefromtheKremlin, thestatementsaid thatCohendid“notrecallanyresponsetomyemail[toPeskov],noranyothercontactsbymewithMr.PeskovorotherRussiangovernmentofficialsabouttheproposal.”970

Cohen’sstatementwascirculatedinadvanceto,andeditedby,membersofthe JDA.971 Before the statement was finalized, early drafts contained asentence stating, “The building project led me to make limited contacts withRussiangovernmentofficials.”972Inthefinalversionofthestatement,thatlinewasdeleted.973CohenthoughthewastoldthatitwasadecisionoftheJDAtotake out that sentence, and he did not push back on the deletion.974 CohenrecalledthathetoldthePresident’spersonalcounselthathewouldnotcontestadecisionoftheJDA.975

Cohen also recalled that in drafting his statement for Congress, he spokewith the President’s personal counsel about a different issue that connectedcandidateTrumptoRussia:Cohen’seffortstosetupameetingbetweenTrumpandPutin inNewYorkduring the2015UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly.976InSeptember2015,CohenhadsuggestedthemeetingtoTrump,whotoldCohento reach out to Putin’s office about it.977 Cohen spoke and emailed with aRussian official about a possiblemeeting, and recalled that Trump asked himmultipletimesforupdatesontheproposedmeetingwithPutin.978WhenCohencalledtheRussianofficialasecondtime,shetoldhimitwouldnotfollowproperprotocol for Putin to meet with Trump, and Cohen relayed that message toTrump.979Cohenanticipatedhemightbeaskedquestionsabout theproposedTrump-Putinmeetingwhenhe testifiedbeforeCongressbecausehehad talkedabout the potentialmeeting on SeanHannity’s radio show.980Cohen recalledexplainingtothePresident’spersonalcounselthe“wholestory”oftheattempttoset up ameeting betweenTrump and Putin andTrump’s role in it.981CohenrecalledthatheandthePresident’spersonalcounseltalkedaboutkeepingTrumpoutof thenarrative, and thePresident’spersonal counsel toldCohen the story

wasnotrelevantandshouldnotbeincludedinhisstatementtoCongress.982

Cohensaidthathis“agenda”insubmittingthestatement toCongresswithfalse representationsabout theTrumpTowerMoscowprojectwas tominimizelinks between the project and the President, give the false impression that theprojecthadendedbeforethefirstpresidentialprimaries,andshutdownfurtherinquiryintoTrumpTowerMoscow,withtheaimoflimitingtheongoingRussiainvestigations.983CohensaidhewantedtoprotectthePresidentandbeloyaltohimbynotcontradictinganythingthePresidenthadsaid.984CohenrecalledhewasconcernedthatifhetoldthetruthaboutgettingaresponsefromtheKremlinorspeakingtocandidateTrumpabouttraveltoRussiatopursuetheproject,hewould contradict the message that no connection existed between Trump andRussia,andhe rationalizedhisdecision toprovide false testimonybecause thedeal never happened.985 He was not concerned that the story would becontradictedbyindividualswhoknewitwasfalsebecausehewasstickingtotheparty lineadheredtobythewholegroup.986Cohenwantedthesupportof thePresident and theWhite House, and he believed that following the party linewould help put an end to the Special Counsel and congressionalinvestigations.987

BetweenAugust18,2017,whenthestatementwasinaninitialdraftstage,and August 28, 2017, when the statement was submitted to Congress, phonerecords reflect that Cohen spokewith the President’s personal counsel almostdaily.988OnAugust27,2017,thedaybeforeCohensubmittedthestatementtoCongress,CohenandthePresident’spersonalcounselhadnumerouscontactsbyphone,includingcallslastingthree,four,six,eleven,andeighteenminutes.989CohenrecalledtellingthePresident’spersonalcounsel,whodidnothavefirst-hand knowledge of the project, that there was more detail on Trump TowerMoscow that was not in the statement, including that there were morecommunicationswithRussia andmore communicationswith candidateTrumpthan the statement reflected.990 Cohen stated that the President’s personalcounselrespondedthatitwasnotnecessarytoelaborateorincludethosedetailsbecause theprojectdidnotprogressand thatCohenshouldkeephisstatementshortand“tight”andthematterwouldsooncometoanend.991Cohenrecalledthat the President’s personal counsel said “his client” appreciated Cohen, thatCohenshouldstayonmessageandnotcontradictthePresident,thattherewasno

need tomuddy thewater, and that itwas time tomoveon.992Cohen said heagreedbecauseitwaswhathewasexpectedtodo.993AfterCohenlaterpleadedguiltytomakingfalsestatementstoCongressabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowproject, thisOfficesoughttospeakwiththePresident’spersonalcounselabouttheseconversationswithCohen,butcounseldeclined,citingpotentialprivilegeconcerns.994

At thesame time thatCohenfinalizedhiswrittensubmission toCongress,heservedasasourceforaWashingtonPoststorypublishedonAugust27,2017,that reported in depth for the first time that the Trump Organization was“pursuing a plan to develop amassiveTrumpTower inMoscow” at the sametime as candidate Trump was “running for president in late 2015 and early2016.”995 The article reported that “the project was abandoned at the end ofJanuary 2016, just before the presidential primaries began, several peoplefamiliarwiththeproposalsaid.”996CohenrecalledthatinspeakingtothePost,he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased in January2016.997

OnAugust28,2017,CohensubmittedhisstatementabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowproject toCongress.998Cohen did not recall talking to thePresidentaboutthespecificsofwhatthestatementsaidorwhatCohenwouldlatertestifytoaboutTrumpTowerMoscow.999HerecalledspeakingtothePresidentmoregenerally about howhe planned to stay onmessage in his testimony.1000OnSeptember 19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohenorchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress, whichcriticized the allegations in the Steele material and claimed that the TrumpTower Moscow project “was terminated in January of 2016; which occurredbefore the Iowacaucusandmonthsbefore thevery firstprimary.”1001CohensaidthereleaseofhisopeningremarkswasintendedtoshapethenarrativeandletotherpeoplewhomightbewitnessesknowwhatCohenwassayingsotheycould follow the same message.1002 Cohen said his decision was meant tomirrorJaredKushner’sdecisiontoreleaseastatementinadvanceofKushner’scongressionaltestimony,whichthePresident’spersonalcounselhadtoldCohenthe President liked.1003 Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, afterCohen’s opening remarks had been printed by the media, the President’s

personalcounseltoldhimthatthePresidentwaspleasedwiththeTrumpTowerMoscowstatementthathadgoneout.1004

OnOctober24and25,2017,CohentestifiedbeforeCongressandrepeatedthefalsestatementshehadincludedinhiswrittenstatementaboutTrumpTowerMoscow.1005 Phone records show that Cohen spoke with the President’spersonalcounselimmediatelyafterhistestimonyonbothdays.1006

4.ThePresidentSendsMessagesofSupporttoCohen

In January 2018, themedia reported thatCohen had arranged a $130,000paymentduring thecampaign topreventawomanfrompubliclydiscussinganallegedsexualencountershehadwiththePresidentbeforeheranforoffice.1007This Office did not investigate Cohen’s campaign-period payments towomen.1008However, thoseevents,asdescribedhere,arepotentially relevantto the President’s and his personal Counsel’s interactions with Cohen as awitnesswholaterbegantocooperatewiththegovernment.

On February 13, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizationsthatstated,“Inaprivate transaction in2016, Iusedmyownpersonal funds tofacilitate a payment of $130,000 to [the woman]. Neither the TrumpOrganizationnor theTrumpcampaignwasaparty to the transactionwith [thewoman], and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly orindirectly.”1009 In congressional testimony on February 27, 2019, CohentestifiedthathehaddiscussedwhattosayaboutthepaymentwiththePresidentand that the President had directed Cohen to say that the President “was notknowledgeable . . . of [Cohen’s] actions” in making the payment.1010 OnFebruary 19, 2018, the day after the NewYork Times wrote a detailed storyattributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the President’s“fixer,” Cohen received a text message from the President’s personal counselthatstated,“Clientsaysthanksforwhatyoudo.”1011

OnApril9,2018,FBIagentsworkingwith theU.S.Attorney’sOffice fortheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkexecutedsearchwarrantsonCohen’shome,hotelroom,andoffice.1012Thatday,thePresidentspoketoreportersandsaidthat he had “just heard that they broke into the office of one ofmy personal

attorneys—agoodman.”1013ThePresidentcalledthesearches“arealdisgrace”andsaid,“it’sanattackonourcountry,inatruesense.it’sanattackonwhatweallstandfor.”1014Cohensaidthatafterthesearcheshewasconcernedthathewas“anopenbook,” thathedidnotwant issuesarising from thepayments towomen to “come out,” and that his false statements to Congress were “a bigconcern.”1015

Afewdaysafterthesearches,thePresidentcalledCohen.1016AccordingtoCohen,thePresidentsaidhewantedto“checkin”andaskedifCohenwasokay,andthePresidentencouragedCohento“hangin there”and“staystrong.”1017Cohenalsorecalled that following thesearchesheheardfromindividualswhowereintouchwiththePresidentandrelayedtoCohenthePresident’ssupportforhim.1018CohenrecalledthatPP██████████████,afriendofthePresident’s, reachedout tosay thathewaswith“theBoss” inMar-a-LagoandthePresidenthadsaid“helovesyou”andnottoworry.1019CohenrecalledthatPersonalPrivacy████████████fortheTrumpOrganization,toldhim,“thebosslovesyou.”1020AndCohensaidthatPP██████████████,afriendofthePresident’s,toldhim,“everyoneknowsthebosshasyourback.”1021

OnoraboutApril17,2018,Cohenbeganspeakingwithanattorney,RobertCostello, who had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani, one of thePresident’s personal lawyers.1022 Costello told Cohen that he had a “backchannelofcommunication”toGiuliani,andthatGiulianihadsaidthe“channel”was“crucial”and“mustbemaintained.”1023OnApril20,2018,theNewYorkTimespublishedanarticleaboutthePresident’srelationshipwithandtreatmentofCohen.1024ThePresident respondedwitha seriesof tweetspredicting thatCohenwouldnot“flip”:

TheNewYorkTimesandathirdratereporter...aregoingoutoftheirway to destroy Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in thehope that he will ‘flip.’ They use non-existent ‘sources’ and adrunk/drugged up loser who hates Michael, a fine person with awonderful family. Michael is a businessman for his ownaccount/lawyerwhoIhavealwaysliked&respected.Mostpeoplewill

flipiftheGovernmentletsthemoutoftrouble,evenifitmeanslyingormakingupstories.Sorry,Idon’tseeMichaeldoingthatdespitethehorribleWitchHuntandthedishonestmedia!1025

InanemailthatdaytoCohen,CostellowrotethathehadspokenwithGiuliani.1026Costello toldCohen theconversationwas“VeryVeryPositive[.]Youare‘loved’. . . theyareinourcorner. . . .Sleepwelltonight[],youhavefriendsinhighplaces.”1027

CohensaidthatfollowingthesemessageshebelievedhehadthesupportoftheWhiteHouseifhecontinuedtotoethepartyline,andhedeterminedtostayonmessageandbepartof the team.1028Atthetime,Cohen’sunderstoodthathis legal feeswere still being paid by theTrumpOrganization,which he saidwasimportanttohim.1029CohenbelievedheneededthepowerofthePresidentto take care of him, so he needed to defend the President and stay onmessage.1030

Cohen also recalled speaking with the President’s personal counsel aboutpardonsafterthesearchesofhishomeandofficehadoccurred,atatimewhenthe media had reported that pardon discussions were occurring at the WhiteHouse.1031 Cohen told the President’s personal counsel he had been a loyallawyer and servant, and he said that after the searches he was in anuncomfortable position and wanted to know what was in it for him.1032According to Cohen, the President’s personal counsel responded that Cohenshould stay on message, that the investigation was a witch hunt, and thateverythingwouldbefine.1033CohenunderstoodbasedonthisconversationandpreviousconversationsaboutpardonswiththePresident’spersonalcounselthatas long as he stayedonmessage, hewouldbe taken care of by thePresident,eitherthroughapardonorthroughtheinvestigationbeingshutdown.1034

OnApril24,2018,thePresidentrespondedtoareporter’sinquirywhetherhewouldconsiderapardonforCohenwith,“Stupidquestion.”1035OnJune8,2018,thePresidentsaidhe“hadn’teventhoughtabout”pardonsforManafortorCohen,andcontinued,“It’sfartooearlytobethinkingaboutthat.Theyhaven’tbeenconvictedof anything.There’snothing topardon.”1036Andon June15,2018, the President expressed sympathy for Cohen,Manafort, and Flynn in a

pressinterviewandsaid,“Ifeelbadlyaboutalotofthem,becauseIthinkalotofitisveryunfair.”1037

5.ThePresident’sConductAfterCohenBeganCooperatingwiththeGovernment

On July 2, 2018, ABCNews reported based on an “exclusive” interviewwith Cohen that Cohen “strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate withspecialcounselRobertMuellerandfederalprosecutorsintheSouthernDistrictofNewYork—evenifthatputsPresidentTrumpinjeopardy.”1038Thatweek,the media reported that Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team whopreviouslyhadworkedasalegaladvisortoPresidentBillClinton.1039

Beginning on July 20, 2018, the media reported on the existence of arecordingCohenhadmadeofaconversationhehadwithcandidateTrumpabouta payment made to a second woman who said she had had an affair withTrump.1040OnJuly21,2018,thePresidentresponded:“Inconceivablethatthegovernmentwouldbreak intoa lawyer’soffice (early in themorning)—almostunheardof.Evenmoreinconceivablethatalawyerwouldtapeaclient—totallyunheardof&perhapsillegal.ThegoodnewsisthatyourfavoritePresidentdidnothingwrong!”1041OnJuly27,2018,afterthemediareportedthatCohenwaswilling to inform investigators thatDonaldTrump Jr. told his father about theJune9,2016meetingtoget“dirt”onHillaryClinton,1042thePresidenttweeted:“[S]o the FakeNews doesn’t wastemy timewith dumb questions, NO, I didNOTknowofthemeetingwithmyson,Donjr.Soundstomelikesomeoneistrying tomakeupstories inorder togethimselfoutofanunrelated jam(Taxicabs maybe?). He even retained Bill and Crooked Hillary’s lawyer. Gee, Iwonderiftheyhelpedhimmakethechoice!”1043

OnAugust21,2018,CohenpleadedguiltyintheSouthernDistrictofNewYork to eight felony charges, including two counts of campaign-financeviolations based on the payments he hadmade during the final weeks of thecampaign towomenwhosaid theyhadaffairswith thePresident.1044Duringthe plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked “at the direction of” thecandidateinmakingthosepayments.1045Thenextday,thePresidentcontrastedCohen’scooperationwithManafort’srefusaltocooperate,tweeting,“Ifeelvery

badlyforPaulManafortandhiswonderful family. ‘Justice’ tooka12yearoldtax case, amongother things, applied tremendous pressure onhimand, unlikeMichaelCohen,herefusedto‘break’—makeupstoriesinordertogeta‘deal.’Suchrespectforabraveman!”1046

On September 17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to thePresident that includedquestions about theTrumpTowerMoscowproject andattachedCohen’swrittenstatement toCongressand theLetterof IntentsignedbythePresident.1047Amongotherissues,thequestionsaskedthePresidenttodescribe the timingand substanceofdiscussionshehadwithCohenabout theproject, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether thePresident“atanytimedirect[ed]orsuggest[ed]thatdiscussionsabouttheTrumpMoscowproject shouldcease,”orwhether thePresidentwas“informedatanytimethattheprojecthadbeenabandoned.”1048

OnNovember20,2018, thePresidentsubmittedwrittenresponsesthatdidnot answer those questions about Trump TowerMoscow directly and did notprovide any information about the timing of the candidate’s discussions withCohenabouttheprojectorwhetherheparticipatedinanydiscussionsabouttheproject being abandoned or no longer pursued.1049 Instead, the President’sanswersstatedinrelevantpart:

I had fewconversationswithMr.Cohenon this subject.As I recall;they were brief, and they were not memorable. I was not enthusedabout the proposal, and I do not recall any discussion of travel toRussia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it withanyoneelseattheTrumpOrganization,althoughitispossible.Idonotrecall being aware at the time of any communications betweenMr.CohenandFelixSaterandanyRussiangovernmentofficialregardingtheLetterofIntent.1050

OnNovember29,2018,CohenpleadedguiltytomakingfalsestatementstoCongressbasedonhisstatementsabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowproject.1051In a plea agreement with this Office, Cohen agreed to “provide truthfulinformation regarding any and all matters as to which this Office deemsrelevant.”1052 Later on November 29, after Cohen’s guilty plea had becomepublic,thePresidentspoketoreportersabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowproject,

saying:

Idecidednot todo theproject. . . . Idecidedultimatelynot todo it.TherewouldhavebeennothingwrongifIdiddoit.IfIdiddoit,therewouldhavebeennothingwrong.Thatwasmybusiness....ItwasanoptionthatIdecidednottodo....Idecidednottodoit.Theprimaryreason...IwasfocusedonrunningforPresident....IwasrunningmybusinesswhileIwascampaigning.TherewasagoodchancethatIwouldn’t have won, in which case I would’ve gone back into thebusiness.AndwhyshouldIloselotsofopportunities?1053

The President also said thatCohenwas “aweak person.And by beingweak,unlikeotherpeoplethatyouwatch—heisaweakperson.Andwhathe’stryingto do is get a reduced sentence. So he’s lying about a project that everybodyknewabout.”1054ThePresidentalsobroughtupCohen’swrittensubmissiontoCongressregardingtheTrumpTowerMoscowproject:“Sohere’sthestory:Gobackand lookat thepaper thatMichaelCohenwrotebeforehe testified in theHouse and/or Senate. It talked about his position.”1055 The President added,“Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn’t matter because I was allowed to dowhateverIwantedduringthecampaign.”1056

In light of thePresident’s public statements followingCohen’s guilty pleathathe“decidednottodotheproject,”thisOfficeagainsoughtinformationfromthePresidentaboutwhetherheparticipatedinanydiscussionsabouttheprojectbeingabandonedornolongerpursued,includingwhenhe“decidednottodotheproject,”whohespoketoaboutthatdecision,andwhatmotivatedthedecision.1057TheOfficealsoagainasked for the timingof thePresident’sdiscussionswithCohenaboutTrumpTowerMoscowandaskedhimtospecify“whatperiodofthecampaign”hewasinvolvedindiscussionsconcerningtheproject.1058Inresponse, the President’s personal counsel declined to provide additionalinformationfromthePresidentandstatedthat“thePresidenthasfullyansweredthequestionsatissue.”1059

IntheweeksfollowingCohen’spleaandagreementtoprovideassistancetothisOffice,thePresidentrepeatedlyimpliedthatCohen’sfamilymemberswereguilty of crimes. OnDecember 3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencingmemorandum,thePresidenttweeted,‘“MichaelCohenasksjudgefornoPrison

Time.’Youmeanhe cando all of theTERRIBLE,unrelated toTrump, thingshavingtodowithfraud,bigloans,Taxis,etc.,andnotservealongprisonterm?Hemakesup stories toget aGREAT&ALREADYreduceddeal forhimself,andgethiswifeandfather-in-law(whohasthemoney?)offScottFree.Heliedfor this outcome and should, in my opinion, serve a full and completesentence.”1060HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████1061

On December 12, 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years ofimprisonment.1062Thenextday,thePresidentsentaseriesoftweetsthatsaid:

IneverdirectedMichaelCohen tobreak the law. . . .Thosechargeswerejustagreedtobyhiminordertoembarrassthepresidentandgetamuchreducedprisonsentence,whichhedid—includingthefactthathisfamilywastemporarilyletoffthehook.Asalawyer,Michaelhasgreatliabilitytome!1063

OnDecember16,2018,thePresidenttweeted,“Remember,MichaelCohenonlybecamea‘Rat’aftertheFBIdidsomethingwhichwasabsolutelyunthinkable&unheardofuntiltheWitchHuntwasillegallystarted.TheyBROKEINTOANATTORNEY’SOFFICE!Whydidn’ttheybreakintotheDNCtogettheServer,orCrooked’soffice?”1064

InJanuary2019,afterthemediareportedthatCohenwouldprovidepublictestimony in a congressional hearing, the President made additional publiccommentssuggestingthatCohen’sfamilymembershadcommittedcrimes.InaninterviewonFoxonJanuary12,2019,thePresidentwasaskedwhetherhewasworriedaboutCohen’stestimonyandresponded:

[I]nordertogethissentencereduced,[Cohen]says“Ihaveanidea,I’llah,tell—I’llgiveyousomeinformationonthepresident.”Well,thereisnoinformation.Butheshouldgive informationmaybeonhis father-in-law because that’s the one that people want to look at because wheredoes thatmoney—that’s themoney in the family.And I guess hedidn’twant to talk about his father-in-law, he’s trying to get his sentencereduced.Soit’sah,prettysad.Youknow,it’sweakandit’sverysadtowatchathinglikethat.1065

On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted, “Kevin Corke, @FoxNews‘Don’tforget,MichaelCohenhasalreadybeenconvictedofperjuryandfraud,andasrecentlyasthisweek,theWallStreetJournalhassuggestedthathemayhavestolentensofthousandsofdollars....’Lyingtoreducehisjailtime!Watchfather-in-law!”1066

OnJanuary23,2019,Cohenpostponedhiscongressional testimony,citingthreats against his family.1067 The next day, the President tweeted, “Sointeresting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen, who sadly will not be testifyingbeforeCongress,isusingthelawyerofCrookedHillaryClintontorepresenthim—Gee,howdidthathappen?”1068

Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared toconfirmCohen’saccountthattheTrumpOrganizationpursuedtheTrumpTowerMoscow project well past January 2016. Giuliani stated that “it’s ourunderstanding that [discussions about the Trump Moscow project] went onthroughout2016.Weren’talotofthem,buttherewereconversations.Can’tbesure of the exact date. But the president can remember having conversationswithhimaboutit....Thepresidentalsoremembers—yeah,probablyup—couldbeuptoasfarasOctober,November.”1069InaninterviewwiththeNewYorkTimes,GiulianiquotedthePresidentassayingthatthediscussionsregardingtheTrumpMoscowprojectwere“goingonfromthedayIannouncedto thedayIwon.”1070 On January 21, 2019, Giuliani issued a statement that said: “Myrecentstatementsaboutdiscussionsduringthe2016campaignbetweenMichaelCohenandcandidateDonaldTrumpaboutapotentialTrumpMoscow‘project’werehypotheticalandnotbasedonconversationsIhadwiththepresident.”1071

Analysis

In analyzing the President’s conduct related to Cohen, the followingevidenceisrelevanttotheelementsofobstructionofjustice.

a.Obstructiveact.Wegatheredevidenceof thePresident’sconductrelatedtoCohenontwoissues:(i)whetherthePresidentorothersaidedorparticipatedin Cohen’s false statements to Congress, and (ii) whether the President tookactions thatwouldhave thenatural tendency topreventCohen fromprovidingtruthfulinformationtothegovernment.

i.First,withregardtoCohen’sfalsestatementstoCongress,whilethereis evidence, described below, that the President knew Cohen provided falsetestimony to Congress about the Trump TowerMoscow project, the evidenceavailable to us does not establish that the President directed or aidedCohen’sfalsetestimony.

Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a “party line” thatdevelopedwithin the campaign to alignwith the President’s public statementsdistancingthePresidentfromRussia.Cohenalsorecalledthat,inspeakingwiththe President in advance of testifying, hemade it clear that hewould stay onmessage—which Cohen believed they both understood would require falsetestimony.ButCohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discusswhetherCohen’stestimonyabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowprojectwouldbeorwasfalse,andthePresidentdidnotdirecthimtoprovidefalsetestimony.Cohenalso said he did not tell the President about the specifics of his plannedtestimony.During the timewhen his statement toCongresswas being draftedand circulated to members of the JDA, Cohen did not speak directly to thePresident about the statement, but rather communicated with the President’spersonal counsel—as corroborated by phone records showing extensivecommunications between Cohen and the President’s personal counsel beforeCohensubmittedhisstatementandwhenhetestifiedbeforeCongress.

CohenrecalledthatinhisdiscussionswiththePresident’spersonalcounselon August 27, 2017—the day before Cohen’s statement was submitted toCongress—Cohen said that thereweremore communicationswithRussia andmorecommunicationswithcandidateTrumpthanthestatementreflected.Cohenrecalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen, thePresident’s personal counsel—who did not have first-hand knowledge of theproject—respondedbysayingthattherewasnoneedtomuddythewater,thatitwasunnecessarytoincludethosedetailsbecausetheprojectdidnottakeplace,andthatCohenshouldkeephisstatementshortandtight,notelaborate,stayonmessage,andnotcontradictthePresident.Cohen’srecollectionofthecontentofthoseconversations isconsistentwithdirectionabout thesubstanceofCohen’sdraftstatementthatappearedtocomefrommembersoftheJDA.Forexample,CohenomittedanyreferencetohisoutreachtoRussiangovernmentofficialstosetupameetingbetweenTrumpandPutinduring theUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of the JDA to delete thesentence, “The building project ledme tomake limited contactswithRussiangovernmentofficials.”

ThePresident’spersonalcounseldeclinedtoprovideuswithhisaccountofhis conversations with Cohen, and there is no evidence available to us thatindicatesthatthePresidentwasawareoftheinformationCohenprovidedtothePresident’s personal counsel. The President’s conversations with his personalcounselwere presumptively protected by attorney-client privilege, andwe didnot seek to obtain the contents of any such communications. The absence ofevidenceaboutthePresidentandhiscounsel’sconversationsaboutthedraftingofCohen’sstatementprecludesusfromassessingwhat,ifany,rolethePresidentplayed.

ii.Second,weconsideredwhetherthePresidenttookactionsthatwouldhavethenaturaltendencytopreventCohenfromprovidingtruthfulinformationtocriminalinvestigatorsortoCongress.

Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the Presidentpublicly and privately urgedCohen to stay onmessage and not “flip.”CohenrecalledthePresident’spersonalcounseltellinghimthathewouldbeprotectedsolongashedidnotgo“rogue.”InthedaysandweeksthatfollowedtheApril2018 searches of Cohen’s home and office, the President told reporters thatCohen was a “good man” and said he was “a fine person with a wonderfulfamily . . .whoIhavealways liked&respected.”Privately, thePresident toldCohen to “hang in there” and “stay strong.” People who were close to bothCohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that “the President lovesyou,” “the boss loves you,” and “everyone knows the boss has your back.”ThroughthePresident’spersonalcounsel,thePresidentalsohadpreviouslytoldCohen“thanksforwhatyoudo”afterCohenprovidedinformationtothemediaabout payments to women that, according to Cohen, both Cohen and thePresidentknewwasfalse.Atthattime,theTrumpOrganizationcontinuedtopayCohen’s legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohen also recalleddiscussingthepossibilityofapardonwiththePresident’spersonalcounsel,whotold him to stay on message and everything would be fine. The Presidentindicatedinhispublicstatementsthatapardonhadnotbeenruledout,andalsostatedpubliclythat“[m]ostpeoplewillflipif theGovernmentlets themoutoftrouble”butthathe“d[idn‘t]seeMichaeldoingthat.”

AfteritwasreportedthatCohenintendedtocooperatewiththegovernment,however, the President accusedCohen of “mak[ing] up stories in order to gethimselfoutofanunrelatedjam(Taxicabsmaybe?),”calledCohena“rat,”andon multiple occasions publicly suggested that Cohen’s family members had

committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events couldsupportaninferencethatthePresidentusedinducementsintheformofpositivemessagesinaneffort togetCohennottocooperate,andthenturnedtoattacksand intimidation to deter the provision of information or undermine Cohen’scredibilityonceCohenbegancooperating.

b.Nexustoanofficialproceeding.ThePresident’srelevantconducttowardsCohen occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel’s Office,Congress,andtheU.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkwere investigating Cohen’s conduct. The President acknowledged through hispublic statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate with thegovernmentinvestigations.

c.Intent.InanalyzingthePresident’sintentinhisactionstowardsCohenasa potentialwitness, there is evidence that could support the inference that thePresident intended todiscourageCohenfromcooperatingwith thegovernmentbecause Cohen’s information would shed adverse light on the President’scampaign-periodconductandstatements.

i. Cohen’s false congressional testimony about the Trump TowerMoscow projectwas designed tominimize connections between the PresidentandRussiaandtohelplimitthecongressionalandDOJRussiainvestigations—agoal that was in the President’s interest, as reflected by the President’s ownstatements. During and after the campaign, the President made repeatedstatementsthathehad“nobusiness”inRussiaandsaidthattherewere“nodealsthatcouldhappeninRussia,becausewe’vestayedaway.”AsCohenknew,andas he recalled communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen’spursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow project cast doubt on the accuracy orcompletenessofthesestatements.

In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multipleconversationswithcandidateTrumptogivehimstatusupdatesabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowproject, that the conversations continued through at least June2016,andthathediscussedwithTrumppossibletravel toRussiatopursuetheproject.Theconversationswerenotoff-hand,according toCohen,because theproject had the potential to be so lucrative. In addition, textmessages to andfromCohenandother recordsfurtherestablish thatCohen’sefforts toadvancetheprojectdidnotendinJanuary2016andthatinMayandJune2016,Cohenwas considering the timing for possible trips to Russia by him and Trump in

connectionwiththeproject.

The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware ofthesefactsatthetimeofCohen’sfalsestatementstoCongress.Cohendiscussedthe projectwith the President in early 2017 followingmedia inquiries.CohenrecalledthatonSeptember20,2017,thedayafterhereleasedtothepublichisopening remarks to Congress—which said the project “was terminated inJanuaryof2016”—thePresident’spersonalcounsel toldhimthePresidentwaspleased with what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow. And afterCohen’sguiltyplea, thePresident told reporters thathehadultimatelydecidednottodotheproject,whichsupportstheinferencethatheremainedawareofhisowninvolvementintheprojectandtheperiodduringtheCampaigninwhichtheprojectwasbeingpursued.

ii. ThePresident’spublic remarks followingCohen’sguiltyplea alsosuggest that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen toldinvestigatorsabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowproject.AtthetimethePresidentsubmittedwritten answers to questions from thisOffice about the project andother subjects, the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating with thegovernmentbutCohenhadnotyetpleadedguiltytomakingfalsestatementstoCongress.Accordingly, itwas not publicly knownwhat information about theproject Cohen had provided to the government. In his written answers, thePresident did not provide details about the timing and substance of hisdiscussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he haddecided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, thePresidentpubliclystatedthathehadpersonallymadethedecisiontoabandontheproject. The President then declined to clarify the seeming discrepancy to ourOfficeoransweradditionalquestions.ThecontentandtimingofthePresident’sprovisionofinformationabouthisknowledgeandactionsregardingtheTrumpTowerMoscowprojectisevidencethatthePresidentmayhavebeenconcernedabouttheinformationthatCohencouldprovideasawitness.

iii. ThePresident’s concernaboutCohencooperatingmayhavebeendirectedattheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkinvestigationintootheraspectsofthePresident’sdealingswithCohenratherthananinvestigationofTrumpTowerMoscow.TherealsoissomeevidencethatthePresident’sconcernaboutCohencooperatingwasbasedonthePresident’sstatedbeliefthatCohenwouldprovidefalsetestimonyagainstthePresidentinanattempttoobtainalessersentenceforhis unrelated criminal conduct. The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike

Cohen, refused to “break”and“makeup stories inorder toget a ‘deal.”’AndafterCohenpleadedguiltytomakingfalsestatementstoCongress,thePresidentsaid,“what[Cohen]’stryingtodoisgetareducedsentence.Sohe’slyingaboutaprojectthateverybodyknewabout.”ButthePresidentalsoappearedtodefendthe underlying conduct, saying, “Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn’t matterbecause I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign.” Asdescribedabove,thereisevidencethatthePresidentknewthatCohenhadmadefalsestatementsabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowprojectandthatCohendidsoto protect the President and minimize the President’s connections to Russiaduringthecampaign.

iv. Finally, the President’s statements insinuating that members ofCohen’s family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with thegovernment could be viewed as an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chillfurthertestimonyadversetothePresidentbyCohenorothers.Itispossiblethatthe President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen “ma[d]e[] upstories”inordertogetadealforhimselfand“gethiswifeandfather-in-law...offScottFree.”ItalsoispossiblethatthePresident’smentionofCohen’swifeandfather-in-lawwerenotintendedtoaffectCohenasawitnessbutratherwerepart of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting Cohen and deflectingattentionawayfromthePresidentonCohen-relatedmatters.ButthePresident’ssuggestionthatCohen’sfamilymemberscommittedcrimeshappenedmorethanonce, including just before Cohen was sentenced (at the same time as thePresident stated thatCohen “should, inmyopinion, serve a full and completesentence”) and again just before Cohen was scheduled to testify beforeCongress. The timing of the statements supports an inference that they wereintendedatleastinparttodiscourageCohenfromfurthercooperation.

L.OverarchingFactualIssues

Although this report doesnot contain a traditionalprosecutiondecisionordeclinationdecision,theevidencesupportsseveralgeneralconclusionsrelevanttoanalysisofthefactsconcerningthePresident’scourseofconduct.

1.Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartlandobstruction-of-justiceprosecutionsbroughtbytheDepartmentofJustice.

First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conductdid not implicate the President’s constitutional authority and raises garden-

variety obstruction-of-justice issues. Other events we investigated, however,drewuponthePresident’sArticleIIauthority,whichraisedconstitutionalissuesthat we address in Volume II, Section III.B, infra. A factual analysis of thatconduct would have to take into account both that the President’s acts werefacially lawful and that his position as headof theExecutiveBranchprovideshim with unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings,subordinateofficers,andpotentialwitnesses.

Second,manyobstructioncasesinvolvetheattemptedoractualcover-upofanunderlyingcrime.Personalcriminalconductcanfurnishstrongevidencethatthe individual had an improper obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States v.Willoughby,860F.2d15,24(2dCir.1988),orthathecontemplatedaneffectonanofficialproceeding,see,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Binday,804F.3d558,591(2dCir.2015).Butproofofsuchacrimeisnotanelementofanobstructionoffense.See United States v. Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating, inapplying the obstruction sentencing guideline, that “obstruction of a criminalinvestigationispunishableeveniftheprosecutionisultimatelyunsuccessfuloreveniftheinvestigationultimatelyrevealsnounderlyingcrime”).Obstructionofjusticecanbemotivatedbyadesiretoprotectnon-criminalpersonalinterests,toprotectagainstinvestigationswhereunderlyingcriminalliabilityfallsintoagrayarea, or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of thejustice system is the same regardless of whether a person committed anunderlyingwrong.

Inthisinvestigation,theevidencedoesnotestablishthatthePresidentwasinvolvedinanunderlyingcrimerelatedtoRussianelectioninterference.ButtheevidencedoespointtoarangeofotherpossiblepersonalmotivesanimatingthePresident’sconduct.Theseincludeconcernsthatcontinuedinvestigationwouldcall intoquestion the legitimacyofhiselectionandpotentialuncertaintyaboutwhether certain events—such as advance notice of WikiLeaks’s release ofhacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaignofficialsandRussians—couldbeseenascriminalactivitybythePresident,hiscampaign,orhisfamily.

Third, many of the President’s acts directed at witnesses, includingdiscouragementofcooperationwiththegovernmentandsuggestionsofpossiblefuture pardons, occurred in public view. While it may be more difficult toestablish that public-facing acts were motivated by a corrupt intent, thePresident’s power to influence actions, persons, and events is enhancedbyhis

uniqueabilitytoattractattentionthroughuseofmasscommunications.Andnoprincipleof lawexcludespublic acts from the scopeofobstruction statutes. Ifthelikelyeffectoftheactsistointimidatewitnessesoraltertheirtestimony,thejusticesystem’sintegrityisequallythreatened.

2. Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts-e.g., thePresident’sstatementtoComeyabouttheFlynninvestigation,histerminationofComey,andhisefforts toremovetheSpecialCounsel—it is important toviewthe President’s pattern of conduct as awhole. That pattern sheds light on thenature of the President’s acts and the inferences that can be drawn about hisintent.

a.OurinvestigationfoundmultipleactsbythePresidentthatwerecapableofexertingundue influenceover lawenforcement investigations, including theRussian-interference and obstruction investigations. The incidents were oftencarriedoutthroughone-on-onemeetingsinwhichthePresidentsoughttousehisofficial power outside of usual channels. These actions ranged from efforts toremovetheSpecialCounselandtoreversetheeffectoftheAttorneyGeneral’srecusal; to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of theinvestigation;todirectandindirectcontactswithwitnesseswiththepotentialtoinfluence their testimony. Viewing the acts collectively can help to illuminatetheirsignificance.Forexample,thePresident’sdirectiontoMcGahntohavetheSpecialCounsel removedwasfollowedalmost immediatelybyhisdirection toLewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russiainvestigation to prospective election-interference only-a temporal connectionthatsuggeststhatbothactsweretakenwitharelatedpurposewithrespecttotheinvestigation.

The President’s efforts to influence the investigation were mostlyunsuccessful, but that is largely because the persons who surrounded thePresidentdeclinedtocarryoutordersoraccedetohisrequests.ComeydidnotendtheinvestigationofFlynn,whichultimatelyresultedinFlynn’sprosecutionand conviction for lying to theFBI.McGahndid not tell theActingAttorneyGeneralthattheSpecialCounselmustberemoved,butwasinsteadpreparedtoresignoverthePresident’sorder.LewandowskiandDearborndidnotdeliverthePresident’smessagetoSessionsthatheshouldconfinetheRussiainvestigationto future election meddling only. And McGahn refused to recede from hisrecollections about events surrounding the President’s direction to have theSpecialCounsel removed, despite thePresident’smultiple demands that hedo

so. Consistent with that pattern, the evidence we obtained would not supportpotentialobstructionchargesagainstthePresident’saidesandassociatesbeyondthosealreadyfiled.

b. In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, thePresident’sactionscanbedividedintotwodistinctphasesreflectingapossibleshift in the President’s motives. In the first phase, before the President firedComey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not opened aninvestigationofhimpersonally.ThePresidentdeemeditcriticallyimportant tomake public that he was not under investigation, and he included thatinformation in his termination letter to Comey after other efforts to have thatinformationdisclosedwereunsuccessful.

Soon after he fired Comey, however, the President became aware thatinvestigators were conducting an obstruction-of-justice inquiry into his ownconduct.ThatawarenessmarkedasignificantchangeinthePresident’sconductandthestartofasecondphaseofaction.ThePresidentlaunchedpublicattackson the investigationand individuals involved in itwhocouldpossessevidenceadverse to thePresident,while inprivate, thePresident engaged in a series oftargetedeffortstocontroltheinvestigation.Forinstance,thePresidentattemptedto remove the Special Counsel; he sought to have Attorney General Sessionsunrecuse himself and limit the investigation; he sought to prevent publicdisclosureofinformationabouttheJune9,2016meetingbetweenRussiansandcampaignofficials;andheusedpublicforumstoattackpotentialwitnesseswhomight offer adverse information and to praise witnesses who declined tocooperatewith the government. Judgments about the nature of the President’smotivesduringeachphasewouldbeinformedbythetotalityoftheevidence.

7Thissectionsummarizesandcitesvariousnewsstoriesnotforthetruthoftheinformationcontainedinthestories,butrathertoplacecandidateTrump’sresponsetothosestoriesincontext.VolumeIof thisreportanalyzestheunderlyingfactsofseveralrelevanteventsthatwerereportedonbythemediaduringthecampaign.

8As discussed inVolume I,while the investigation identified numerous links between individualswithtiestotheRussiangovernmentandindividualsassociatedwiththeTrumpCampaign,theevidencewasnot sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated withrepresentativesoftheRussiangovernmenttointerfereinthe2016election.

9@realDonaldTrump6/16/15(11:57a.m.ET)Tweet.

10See,e.g.,MeetthePressInterviewwithDonaldJ.Trump,NBC(Dec.20,2015)(Trump:“Ithinkitwould be a positive thing if Russia and the United States actually got along”);Presidential CandidateDonaldTrumpNewsConference,Hanahan,SouthCarolina,C-SPAN(Feb.15,2016)(“Youwanttomakeagooddealforthecountry,youwanttodealwithRussia.”).

11See,e.g.,AndersonCooper 360Degrees,CNN (July 8, 2015) (“I think I get alongwith [Putin]fine.”);AndrewRafferty,TrumpSaysHeWould“GetAlongVeryWell”WithPutin,NBC(July30,2015).(quotingTrumpassaying,“IthinkIwouldgetalongverywellwithVladimirPutin.”).

12See, e.g.,@realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16 (7:47 a.m. ET);@realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16(7:59a.m.ET).

13See, e.g.,Meet the Press InterviewwithDonald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) (“[Putin] is astrongleader.WhatamIgonnasay,he’saweakleader?He’smakingmincemeatoutofourPresident.”);DonaldTrumpCampaignRallyinVandalia,Ohio,C-SPAN(Mar.12,2016)(“Isaid[Putin]wasastrongleader,whichheis.Imean,hemightbebad,hemightbegood.Buthe’sastrongleader.”).

14See,e.g.,AndrewOsborn,FromRussiawithlove:whytheKremlinbacksTrump,Reuters(Mar.24,2016);RobertZubrin,Trump:TheKremlin’sCandidate,NationalReview(Apr.4,2016).

15See,e.g.,MarkHosenball&SteveHolland,Trumpbeingadvisedbyex-U.S.LieutenantGeneralwhofavorscloserRussiaties,Reuters(Feb.26,2016);TomHamburgeretal.,InsideTrump’sfinancialtiesto Russia and his unusual flattery of Vladimir Putin,Washington Post (June 17, 2016). CertainmatterspertainingtoFlynnaredescribedinVolumeI,SectionIV.B.7,supra.

16 See, e.g., Zachary Mider, Trump’s New Russia Advisor Has Deep Ties to Kremlin’s Gazprom,Bloomberg (Mar. 30, 2016); Julia Iofee,Who isCarterPage?, Politico (Sep. 23, 2016).CertainmatterspertainingtoPagearedescribedinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.3,supra.

17TracyWilkinson,Inashift,Republicanplatformdoesn’tcall forarmingUkraineagainstRussia,spurringoutrage,LosAngelesTimes(July21,2016);JoshRogin,TrumpcampaigngutsGOP’santi-RussiastanceonUkraine,WashingtonPost(July18,2016).

18 Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP’s anti-Russia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post,Opinions(July18,2016).TheRepublicanPlatformeventsaredescribedinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.6,supra.

19Bears in theMidst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, CrowdStrike (June 15,2016) (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing provided byCrowdStrike);EllenNakashima,RussiangovernmenthackerspenetratedDNC, stoleopposition researchonTrump,WashingtonPost(June14,2016).

20TomHamburger andKarenTumulty,WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents aboutClintonandinternaldeliberations,WashingtonPost(July22,2016).

21AmberPhillips,Clinton campaignmanager:Russians leakedDemocrats’ emails to helpDonaldTrump,WashingtonPost(July24,2016).

22DavidE.SangerandEricSchmitt,SpyAgencyConsensusGrowsThatRussiaHackedD.N.C.,NewYorkTimes(July26,2016).

23Gates4/10/18302,at5;Newman8/23/18302,at1.

24Gates 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998);Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; see alsoVolume I, SectionIII.D.1,supra.

25 Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; see also Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra. According to Cohen, afterWikiLeaks’ssubsequentreleaseofstolenDNCemailsonJuly22,2016,TrumpsaidtoCohenwordstotheeffectof,HOM█████████Cohen9/18/18302,at10.Cohen’sroleinthecandidate’sandlaterPresident’sactivities,andhisowncriminalconduct, isdescribedinVolumeII,SectionII.K, infra,and inVolumeI,SectionIV.A.1,supra.

26Cohen8/7/18302,at8.

27GrandJury█████████████.Asexplainedinfootnote197ofVolumeI,SectionIII.D.l.b,supra,thisOfficehasincludedManafort’saccountoftheseeventsbecauseitalignswiththoseofotherwitnessesandiscorroboratedtothatextent.

28Gates10/25/18302,at4.

29Gates10/25/18302,at4.

30Bannon1/18/19302,at3.

31Gates4/11/18302,at1-2(SM-2180998);Gates10/25/18302,at2(messagingstrategywasbeingformedinJune/JulytimeframebasedonclaimsbyAssangeonJune12,2016,HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████).

32@realDonaldTrump7/26/16(6:47p.m.ET)Tweet.

33@realDonaldTrump7/26/16(6:50p.m.ET)Tweet.

34DonaldTrumpNewsConference,Doral,Florida,C-SPAN(July27,2016).

35DonaldTrumpNewsConference,Doral,Florida,C-SPAN(July27,2016).

36DonaldTrumpNewsConference,Doral,Florida,C-SPAN(July27,2016).Within fivehoursofTrump’s remark, a Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with HillaryClinton for possible hacks. See Volume I, Section III, supra. In written answers submitted in thisinvestigation, the President stated that he made the “Russia, if you’re listening” statement “in jest andsarcastically,aswasapparenttoanyobjectiveobserver.”WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at13(ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(d)).

37DonaldTrumpNewsConference,Doral,Florida,C-SPAN(July27,2016).Inhiswrittenanswerssubmittedinthisinvestigation,thePresidentsaidthathisstatementthat“we’llbelooking”atCrimeaandsanctions“didnotcommunicateanyposition.”WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at17(ResponsetoQuestionIV,Part(g).

38DonaldTrumpNewsConference,Doral,Florida,C-SPAN(July27,2016).

39DonaldTrumpNewsConference,Doral,Florida,C-SPAN(July27,2016).

40DonaldTrumpNewsConference,Doral,Florida,C-SPAN(July27,2016).

41DonaldTrumpNewsConference,Doral,Florida,C-SPAN(July27,2016).

42TheTrumpTowerMoscowprojectandTrump’sinvolvementinitisdiscussedindetailinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.1,supra,andVolumeII,SectionII.K,infra.

43Cohen9/18/18302,at4.

44Cohen9/18/18302,at4-5.

45Cohen11/20/18302,at1;Cohen9/18/18302,at3-5.Theformationofthe“partyline”isdescribedingreaterdetailinVolumeII,SectionII.K,infra.

46DJTFP00004953(8/8/16Email,GordontoPchelyakov)(statingthat“[t]hesedaysarenotoptimalfor us, as we are busily knocking down a stream of falsemedia stories”). The invitation andGordon’sresponsearediscussedinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.7.a,supra.

47See,e.g.,AmberPhillips,PaulManafort’scomplicatedtiestoUkraine,explained,WashingtonPost(Aug.19,2016)(“Therewerealsoawaveoffreshheadlinesdealingwithinvestigationsinto[Manafort’s]tiestoapro-RussianpoliticalpartyinUkraine.”);TomWinter&KenDilanian,DonaldTrumpAidePaulManafortScrutinizedforRussianBusinessTies,NBC(Aug.18,2016).RelevanteventsinvolvingManafortarediscussedinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.8,supra.

48MichaelIsikoff,U.S. intelofficialsprobe tiesbetweenTrumpadviserandKremlin,YahooNews(Sep.23,2016);see,e.g.,9/25/16Email,HickstoConway&Bannon;9/23/16Email,J.MillertoBannon&S.Miller;Page3/16/17302,at2.

49@WikiLeaks10/7/16(4:32p.m.ET)Tweet.

50JointStatementfromtheDepartmentOfHomelandSecurityandOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceonElectionSecurity,DHS(Oct.7,2016).

51JointStatementfromtheDepartmentOfHomelandSecurityandOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceonElectionSecurity,DHS(Oct.7,2016).

52 JohnWagner&AnneGearan,Clintoncampaignchairman tiesemailhack toRussians,suggestsTrumphadearlywarning,WashingtonPost(Oct.11,2016).

53LouisNelson,PencedeniesTrumpcampincahootswithWikiLeaks,Politico(Oct.14,2016).

54 IvanNechepurenko,RussianOfficialsWere inContactWith TrumpAllies,Diplomat Says,NewYorkTimes (Nov.10,2016) (quotingRussianDeputyForeignMinisterSergeyRyabkov saying, “[t]herewere contacts” and “I cannot say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russianrepresentatives”);JimHeintz&MatthewLee,RussiaeyesbettertieswithTrump;sayscontactsunderway,AssociatedPress(Nov.11,2016)(quotingRyabkovsaying,“Idon’tsaythatallofthem,butawholearrayofthemsupportedcontactswithRussianrepresentatives”).

55 IvanNechepurenko,RussianOfficialsWere inContactWith TrumpAllies,Diplomat Says,NewYorkTimes(Nov.11,2016)(quotingHicks).

56 Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway,AssociatedPress (Nov.10,2016) (quotingHicks).Hicks recalled that after shemade that statement, shespokewithCampaignadvisorsKellyanneConway,StephenMiller,JasonMiller,andprobablyKushnerandBannontoensureitwasaccurate,andtherewasnohesitationorpushbackfromanyofthem.Hicks12/8/17302,at4.

57DamienGayle,CIAconcludesRussiainterferedtohelpTrumpwinelection,sayreports,Guardian(Dec.10,2016).

58Chris Wallace Hosts “Fox News Sunday,” Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQNewsmakerTranscripts(Dec.11,2016).

59Chris Wallace Hosts “Fox News Sunday,” Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQNewsmakerTranscripts(Dec.11,2016).

60Chris Wallace Hosts “Fox News Sunday,” Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQNewsmakerTranscripts(Dec.11,2016).

61DavidMorgan,Clinton campaign: It’s an ‘open question’ if Trump team colluded with Russia,ReutersBusinessInsider(Dec.18,2016).

62ChrisWallaceHosts “FoxNews Sunday,“ Interviewwith IncomingWhiteHouseChief of StaffReincePriebus,FoxNews(Dec.18,2016).

63ChrisWallaceHosts “FoxNews Sunday,“ Interviewwith IncomingWhiteHouseChief of StaffReincePriebus,FoxNews(Dec.18,2016).

64ChrisWallaceHosts “FoxNews Sunday,“ Interviewwith IncomingWhiteHouseChief of StaffReincePriebus,FoxNews(Dec.18,2016).

65 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity andHarassment,WhiteHouse(Dec.29,2016);seealsoMissyRyanetal.,ObamaadministrationannouncesmeasurestopunishRussiafor2016electioninterference,WashingtonPost(Dec.29,2016).

66 John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: ‘Get on with our lives,’WashingtonPost(Dec.29,2016).

67MissyRyanetal.,ObamaadministrationannouncesmeasurestopunishRussiafor2016electioninterference,WashingtonPost(Dec.29,2016).

68Comey11/15/17302,at3.

69OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,Russia’sInfluenceCampaignTargetingthe2016USPresidentialElection,at1(Jan.6,2017).

70OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,Russia’sInfluenceCampaignTargetingthe2016US

PresidentialElection,at1(Jan.6,2017).

71KenBensingeretal.,TheseReportsAllegeTrumpHasDeepTiesToRussia,BuzzFeed(Jan.10,2017).

72DonaldTrump’sNewsConference:FullTranscriptandVideo,NewYorkTimes (Jan.11,2017),availableathttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conferencetranscript.html.

73Priebus10/13/17302,at7;Hicks3/13/18302,at18;Spicer10/16/17302,at6;Bannon2/14/18302,at2;Gates4/18/18302,at3;seePompeo6/28/17302,at2(thePresidentbelievedthatthepurposeoftheRussiainvestigationwastodelegitimizehispresidency).

74Hicks3/13/18302,at18.

75Spicer10/17/17302,at6.

76Gates4/18/18302,at3.

77Priebus10/13/17302,at7.

78Flynn11/16/17302,at7;President-ElectDonaldJ.TrumpSelectsU.S.SenatorJeffSessionsforAttorneyGeneral,Lt.Gen.MichaelFlynnasAssistant to thePresident forNationalSecurityAffairsandU.S.Rep.MikePompeoasDirectorof theCentral IntelligenceAgency,President-ElectDonaldJ.TrumpPressRelease (Nov.18,2016); seealso,e.g.,BryanBender,TrumpnamesMikeFlynn national securityadviser,Politico,(Nov.17,2016).

79Flynn11/16/17302,at8-14;Priebus10/13/17302,at3-5.

80 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity andHarassment,TheWhiteHouse,OfficeofthePressSecretary(Dec.29,2016).

81 12/29/16Email,O’Brien toMcFarland et al.; 12/29/16Email,Bossert to Flynn et al.; 12/29/16Email,McFarland to Flynn et al.; SF000001 (12/29/16TextMessage, Flynn to Flaherty) (“Tit for tatwRussianotgood.RussianAMBOreachingouttometoday.”);Flynn1/19/18302,at2.

82StatementofOffenseat2-3,UnitedStatesv.MichaelT.Flynn,1:17-cr-232(D.D.C.Dec.1,2017),Doc. 4 (Flynn Statement ofOffense); Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3;McFarland12/22/17302,at6-7.

83McFarland12/22/17302,at4-7(recallingdiscussionsaboutthisissuewithBannonandPriebus).

84FlynnStatementofOffense,at3;Flynn11/17/17302,at3-4;McFarland12/22/17302,at6-7.

8512/29/16Email,McFarlandtoFlynnetal.

86McFarland12/22/17302,at7.

87Priebus1/18/18302,at3.

88 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7. Priebus thought it was possible that McFarland had mentioned

Flynn’sscheduledcallwithKislyakatthismeeting,althoughhewasnotcertain.Priebus1/18/18302,at3.

89McFarland12/22/17302,at7.

90Priebus1/18/18302,at3.

91FlynnStatementofOffense,at3;Flynn11/17/17302,at3-4.

92FlynnStatementofOffense,at3;McFarland12/22/17302,at7-8;Flynn11/17/17302,at4.

93McFarland12/22/17302,at8.

94StatementbythePresidentofRussia,PresidentofRussia(Dec.30,2016)12/30/16.

95@realDonaldTrump12/30/16(2:41p.m.ET)Tweet.

96Flynn1/19/18302,at3;FlynnStatementofOffense,at3.

97Flynn1/19/18302,at3;Flynn11/17/17302,at6;McFarland12/22/17302,at10;FlynnStatementofOffense,at3.

98McFarland12/22/17302,at10;seeFlynn1/19/18302,at4.

99Flynn11/17/17302,at5-6.

100 Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 4-5. Bannon recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said he did notrememberdiscussingsanctionswithhim.Bannon2/12/18302,at9.

101Flynn11/21/17302,at1;Flynn1/19/18302,at5.

102Flynn1/19/18302,at6;Flynn11/17/17302,at6.

103McCord7/17/17302,at2.

104McCord7/17/17302,at2.

105McCord7/17/17302,at2-3;Comey11/15/17302,at5.

106McCord7/17/17302,at2-3.

107HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at1-2).

108 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3;Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate SelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at1-2).

109 Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1. Comey began drafting the memorandum summarizing themeeting immediately after it occurred. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4. He finished the memorandum thateveningandfinalizeditthefollowingmorning.Comey11/15/17302,at4.

110 Comey 1/7/17Memorandum, at 1; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3. Comey identified several otheroccasions in January 2017 when the President reiterated that he hoped Comey would stay on as FBIdirector.OnJanuary11,President-ElectTrumpcalledComeytodiscusstheSteelereportsandstatedthathethought Comeywas doing great and the President-Elect hoped hewould remain in his position as FBIdirector. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4;Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate SelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(testimonyofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI),CQCong.Transcripts, at 90. (“[D]uring that call, he askedme again, ‘Hopeyou’re going to stay,you’redoingagreatjob.’AndItoldhimthatIintendedto.”).OnJanuary22,ataWhiteHousereceptionhonoringlawenforcement,thePresidentgreetedComeyandsaidhelookedforwardtoworkingwithhim.Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select IntelligenceCommittee, 115th Cong.(June8,20I7) (testimonyofJamesB.Comey, formerDirectorof theFBI),CQCong.Transcripts,at22.Andasdiscussed ingreaterdetail inVolume II,Section II.D, infra, on January27, thePresident invitedComeytodinnerattheWhiteHouseandsaidhewasgladComeywantedtostayonasFBIDirector.

111Comey1/7/17Memorandum,at1;Comey11/15/17302,at3.

112Comey1/7/17Memorandum,at1-2;Comey11/15/17302, at3.Comey’sbriefing included theSteelereporting’sunverifiedallegationthattheRussianshadcompromisingtapesofthePresidentinvolvingconductwhenhewasaprivatecitizenduringa2013triptoMoscowfortheMissUniversePageant.Duringthe2016presidentialcampaign,asimilarclaimmayhavereachedcandidateTrump.OnOctober30,2016,MichaelCohenreceiveda text fromRussianbusinessmanGiorgiRtskhiladze thatsaid,“Stoppedflowoftapes fromRussia but not sure if there’s anything else. Just so you know. . . .” 10/30/16TextMessage,Rtskhiladze toCohen.Rtskhiladze said “tapes” referred to compromising tapes ofTrump rumored to beheldbypersonsassociatedwiththeRussianrealestateconglomerateCrocusGroup,whichhadhelpedhostthe2013MissUniversePageantinRussia.Rtskhiladze4/4/18302,at12.CohensaidhespoketoTrumpabout the issueafter receiving the texts fromRtskhiladze.Cohen9/12/18302,at13.Rtskhiladzesaidhewastoldthetapeswerefake,buthedidnotcommunicatethattoCohen.Rtskhiladze5/10/18302,at7.

113Comey11/15/17302,at3-4;HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at2).

114Comey11/15/17302,at3.

115 See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts tocompromisehim,CNN(Jan.10,2017;updatedJan.12,2017).

116KenBensingeretal.,TheseReportsAllegeTrumpHasDeepTiesToRussia,BuzzFeedNews(Jan.10,2017).

117See1/11/17Email,ClappertoComey(“HeaskedifIcouldputoutastatement.Hewouldpreferof course that I say the documents are bogus,which, of course, I can’t do.”); 1/12/17Email,Comey toClapper(“Hecalledmeat5yesterdayandwehadaverysimilarconversation.”);Comey11/15/17302,at4-5.

118See2016 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts, CNN (first published Oct. 12, 2017;updatedMar.1,2019)(summarizingstartingdatesofRussia-relatedinvestigations).

119JointStatementonCommitteeInquiryintoRussianIntelligenceActivities,SSCI(Jan.13,2017).

120JointStatementonProgressofBipartisanHPSCIInquiryintoRussianActiveMeasures,HPSCI(Jan.25,2017).

121JointStatementfromSenatorsGrahamandWhitehouseonInvestigationintoRussianInfluenceonDemocraticNations’Elections(Feb.2,2017).

122DavidIgnatius,WhydidObamadawdleonRussia’shacking?,WashingtonPost(Jan.12,2017).

123DavidIgnatius,WhydidObamadawdleonRussia’shacking?,WashingtonPost(Jan.12,2017).TheLoganActmakesitacrimefor“[a]nycitizenoftheUnitedStates,whereverhemaybe”to“withoutauthority of the United States, directly or indirectly commence[] or carr[y] on any correspondence orintercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes orcontroversieswiththeUnitedStates,ortodefeatthemeasuresoftheUnitedStates.”18U.S.C.§953.

124Priebus1/18/18302,at6.

125Priebus1/18/18302,at6.

126Priebus1/18/18302,at6.

127Flynn11/21/17302,at1;Flynn11/20/17302,at6.

128McFarland12/22/17302,at12-13.

129McFarland12/22/17302,at12.

130McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13;McFarland 8/29/17 302, at 8; seeDavid Ignatius,WhydidObamadawdleonRussia’shacking?,WashingtonPost(Jan.12,2017).

131 Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1, 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 7; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 7-8; S.Miller8/31/17302,at8-11.

132Flynn11/17/17302,at1,8;Flynn1/19/18302,at7;S.Miller8/31/17302,at10-11.

133FacetheNationInterviewwithVicePresident-ElectPence,CBS(Jan.15,2017);JulieHirschfieldDavisetal.,TrumpNationalSecurityAdvisorCalledRussianEnvoyDayBeforeSanctionsWereImposed,WashingtonPost(Jan.13,2017);MeetthePressInterviewwithReincePriebus,NBC(Jan.15,2017).

134Yates8/15/17302,at2-3;McCord7/17/17302,at3-4;McCabe8/17/17302,at5(DOJofficialswere“reallyfreakedoutaboutit”).

135Yates8/15/17302,at3;McCord7/17/17302,at4.

136McCord7/17/17302,at4;McCabe8/17/17302,at5-6.

137SeanSpicer,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(Jan.23,2017).

138Yates8/15/17302,at4;Axelrod7/20/17302,at5.

139FlynnStatementofOffense,at2.

140FlynnStatementofOffense,at2.

141FlynnStatementofOffense, at 2.OnDecember1, 2017,Flynn admitted tomaking these falsestatements and pleaded guilty to violating 18U.S.C. § 1001,whichmakes it a crime to knowingly andwillfully“make[]anymateriallyfalse,fictitious,orfraudulentstatementorrepresentation”tofederal lawenforcementofficials.SeeVolumeI,SectionIV.A.7,supra.

142Yates8/15/17302,at6.

143Yates8/15/17302,at6;McCord7/17/17302,at6;SCR015_000198(2/15/17DraftMemorandumtofilefromtheOfficeoftheCounseltothePresident).

144 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 6-8; McCord 7/17/17 302, at 6-7; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 4;SCR015_000198(2/15/17DraftMemorandumtofilefromtheOfficeoftheCounseltothePresident).

145McGahn11/30/17302,at5;Yates8/15/17302,at7;McCord7/17/17302,at7;Burnham11/3/17302,at4.

146Yates8/15/17302,at7;McCord7/17/17302,at7.

147 SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to thePresident);Burnham11/3/17302,at4.

148McGahn11/30/17302,at5.

149 SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to thePresident);McGahn11/30/17302,at6,8.

150McGahn11/30/17302,at6;SCR015_000278(WhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficeMemorandumre:“Flynn Tick Tock”) (on January 26, “McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS”); SCR015_000198(2/15/17DraftMemorandumtofilefromtheOfficeoftheCounseltothePresident).

151McGahn11/30/17302,at6.

152McGahn11/30/17302,at7.

153McGahn11/30/17302,at7.

154McGahn11/30/17302, at 7;SCR015_000198-99 (2/15/17DraftMemorandum to file from theOfficeoftheCounseltothePresident).

155Priebus10/13/17302,at8.SeveralwitnessessaidthatthePresidentwasunhappywithFlynnforotherreasonsatthistime.BannonsaidthatFlynn’sstandingwiththePresidentwasnotgoodbyDecember2016.Bannon2/12/18302,at12.ThePresident-ElecthadconcernsbecausePresidentObamahadwarnedhimaboutFlynnshortlyaftertheelection.Bannon2/12/18302,at4-5;Hicks12/8/17302,at7(PresidentObama’s comment sat with President-Elect Trump more than Hicks expected). Priebus said that thePresidenthadbecomeunhappywithFlynnevenbefore thestoryofhiscallswithKislyakbrokeandhad

becomesoupsetwithFlynn thathewouldnot lookathimduring intelligencebriefings.Priebus1/18/18302,at8.HickssaidthatthePresidentthoughtFlynnhadbadjudgmentandwasangeredbytweetssentbyFlynnandhisson,andshedescribedFlynnas“beingonthinice”byearlyFebruary2017.Hicks12/8/17302,at7,10.

156Coats6/14/17302,at2.

157Coats6/14/17302,at2.

158Coats6/14/17302,at2.

159Coats6/14/17302,at2.

160 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to thePresident);McGahn11/30/17302,at8.

161 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to thePresident);Eisenberg11/29/17302,at9.

162 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to thePresident);Eisenberg11/29/17302,at9.

163 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to thePresident);McGahn11/30/17302,at8;Yates8/15/17302,at8.

164Yates8/15/17302,at9;McGahn11/30/17302,at8.

165 Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 5; see SCR015_00199 (2/15/17 DraftMemorandumtofilefromtheOfficeoftheCounseltothePresident)(“Yateswasunwillingtoconfirmordeny that therewas an ongoing investigation but did indicate that theDepartment of Justicewould notobjecttotheWhiteHousetakingactionagainstFlynn.”).

166Yates9/15/17302,at9;Burnham11/3/17302,at5. InaccordancewithMcGahn’s request, theDepartmentofJusticemadetheunderlyinginformationavailableandEisenbergviewedtheinformationinearly February. Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17ElectronicCommunication, at 1 (documenting2/2/17meetingwithEisenberg).

167 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 6; SCR012b_000001 (President’s Daily Diary, 1/27/17);Hearing onRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at2-3).

168Priebus10/13/17302,at17.

169SeeMcGahn11/30/17302,at9;Dhillon11/21/17302,at2;Bannon2/12/18302,at17.

170Bannon2/12/18302,at17.

171HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at3);seeComey11/15/17302,at6.

172Comey11/15/17302,at7;Comey1/28/17Memorandum,at1,3;HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at3).

173 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7;Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate SelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at3).

174Comey1/28/17Memorandum,at3;HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at4).

175Comey1/28/17Memorandum,at3;HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at4).

176Comey1/28/17Memorandum,at4;Comey11/15/17302,at7.

177Comey1/28/17Memorandum,at4;Comey11/15/17302,at7.

178 Comey 1/28/18Memorandum, at 2; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7;Hearing on Russian ElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at3).

179 Comey 1/28/17Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7;Hearing on Russian ElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at3-4).

180 Comey 1/28/17Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7;Hearing on Russian ElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at4).

181 Comey 1/28/17Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7;Hearing on Russian ElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at4).

182 Comey 1/28/17Memorandum, at 3; Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7;Hearing on Russian ElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at4).

183See,e.g.,MichaelS.Schmidt,InaPrivateDinner,TrumpDemandedLoyalty.ComeyDemurred.,NewYorkTimes (May 11, 2017) (quoting Sarah Sanders as saying, “[The President]would never evensuggest the expectation of personal loyalty”); Ali Vitali, Trump Never Asked for Comey’s Loyalty,President’sPersonalLawyerSays,NBC(June8,2017)(quotingthePresident’spersonalcounselassaying,“The president also never told Mr. Comey, ‘I need loyalty, I expect loyalty,’ in form or substance.”);RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressConference,WhiteHouse(June9,2017)(“Ihardlyknowtheman.I’mnotgoingtosay‘Iwantyoutopledgeallegiance.’Whowoulddothat?Whowouldaskamantopledgeallegianceunderoath?”).InaprivateconversationwithSpicer,thePresidentstatedthathehadneveraskedforComey’sloyalty,butaddedthatifhehadaskedforloyalty,“Whocares?”Spicer10/16/17302,at4.The

PresidentalsotoldMcGahnthatheneversaidwhatComeysaidhehad.McGahn12/12/17302,at17.

184InterviewofDonaldJ.Trump,NBC(May11,2017).

185SCR012b_000001(President’sDailyDiary,1/27/17)(reflectingthat thePresidentcalledComeyinthemorningonJanuary27and“[t]hepurposeofthecallwastoextendadinnerinvitation”).Inaddition,twowitnessescorroborateComey’saccountthatthePresidentreachedouttoschedulethedinner,withoutComeyhavingasked for it.Priebus10/13/17302, at17 (thePresident asked to schedule the January27dinnerbecausehedidnotknowmuchaboutComeyandintendedtoaskhimwhetherhewantedtostayonasFBIDirector);Rybicki11/21/18302,at3 (recalling thatComey toldhimabout thePresident’sdinnerinvitationonthedayofthedinner).

186 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 8;Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate SelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at4).

187McCabe8/17/17302,at9-10;Rybicki11/21/18302,at3.AfterleavingtheWhiteHouse,ComeycalledDeputyDirectoroftheFBIAndrewMcCabe,summarizedwhatheandthePresidenthaddiscussed,including the President’s request for loyalty, and expressed shock over the President’s request.McCabe8/17/17 302, at 9. Comey also convened ameetingwith his senior leadership team to discusswhat thePresidenthadaskedofhimduringthedinnerandwhetherhehadhandledtherequestforloyaltyproperly.McCabe8/17/17302,at10;Rybicki11/21/18302,at3.Inaddition,Comeydistributedhismemorandumdocumenting the dinner to his senior leadership team, and McCabe confirmed that the memorandumcapturedwhatComeysaidonthetelephonecallimmediatelyfollowingthedinner.McCabe8/17/17302,at9-10.

188 There also is evidence that corroborates other aspects of the memoranda Comey wrotedocumentinghisinteractionswiththePresident.Forexample,Comeyrecalled,andhismemorandareflect,thathe told thePresident inhisJanuary6,2017meeting,andonphonecallsonMarch30andApril11,2017, that theFBIwasnot investigating thePresidentpersonally.OnMay8,2017,duringWhiteHousediscussions about firingComey, thePresident toldRosenstein andothers thatComeyhad toldhim threetimesthathewasnotunderinvestigation,includingonceinpersonandtwiceonthephone.Gauhar-000058(Gauhar5/16/17Notes).

189Eisenberg11/29/17302, at 5;FBI2/7/17ElectronicCommunication, at1 (documenting2/2/17meetingwithEisenberg).

190Eisenberg11/29/17302,at6.

191 Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; SCR015_000200 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from theOfficeoftheCounseltothePresident).

192Eisenberg11/29/17302,at9.

193Flynn11/21/17302,at2.

194Flynn11/21/17302,at2.

195Flynn11/21/17302,at2.

196Flynn11/21/17302,at2-3.

197GregMilleretal.,NationalsecurityadviserFlynndiscussedsanctionswithRussianambassador,despitedenials,officialssay,WashingtonPost(Feb.9,2017).

198 SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to thePresident);McGahn11/30/17302,at12.

199 SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to thePresident);McCabe8/17/17302,at11-13;Priebus10/13/17302,at10;McGahn11/30/17302,at12.

200McCabe8/17/17302,at13.

201McCabe8/17/17302,at13.

202 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12; Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 8; Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10;SCR015_000202(2/15/17DraftMemorandumtofilefromtheOfficeoftheCounseltothePresident).

203McGahn11/30/17302,at11;Eisenberg11/29/17302,at9;Priebus10/13/17302,at11.

204Eisenberg11/29/17302,at9.

205 SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to thePresident);Priebus10/13/17302,at10;McGahn11/30/17302,at12.

206Flynn11/17/17302,at8.

207Flynn1/19/18302,at9;Flynn11/17/17302,at8.

208Flynn11/17/17302,at8;Flynn1/19/18302,at9.

209Flynn1/19/18302,at9.

210Priebus1/18/18302,at9.

211Priebus1/18/18302,at9;Flynn11/17/17302,at10.

212Priebus1/18/18302,at9;Flynn11/17/17302,at10.

213SCR004_00600(2/16/17Email,BurnhamtoDonaldson).

214SeanSpicer,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(Feb.14,2017).AfterFlynnpleadedguiltytoviolating18U.S.C.§1001inDecember2017,thePresidenttweeted,“IhadtofireGeneralFlynnbecauseheliedtotheVicePresidentandtheFBI.”@realDonaldTrump12/2/17(12:14p.m.ET)Tweet.Thenextday, thePresident’spersonalcounsel told thepress thathehaddrafted the tweet.MaeganVazquezetal.,Trump’slawyersayshewasbehindPresident’stweetaboutfiringFlynn,CNN(Dec.3,2017).

215Christie2/13/19302,at2-3;SCR012b_000022(President’sDailyDiary,2/14/17).

216Christie2/13/19302,at3.

217Christie2/13/19302,at3.

218Christie2/13/19302,at3.ChristiesaidhethoughtwhenthePresidentsaid“theRussiathing”hewasreferringtonotjusttheinvestigationsbutalsopresscoverageaboutRussia.Christiethoughtthemoreimportantthingwasthattherewasaninvestigation.Christie2/13/19302,at4.

219Christie2/13/19302,at3.

220Christie2/13/19302,at3.

221Christie2/13/19302,at3.

222Christie2/13/19302,at3-4.

223Christie2/13/19302,at3.Christiealsorecalledthatduringthelunch,FlynncalledKushner,whowasat the lunch, andcomplainedaboutwhatSpicerhad said aboutFlynn inhispressbriefing thatday.KushnertoldFlynnwordstotheeffectof,“YouknowthePresidentrespectsyou.ThePresidentcaresaboutyou. I’ll get thePresident to sendout apositive tweet aboutyou later.”Kushner lookedat thePresidentwhenhementionedthetweet,andthePresidentnoddedhisassent.Christie2/13/19302,at3.FlynnrecalledgettingupsetatSpicer’scommentsinthepressconferenceandcallingKushnertosayhedidnotappreciatethecomments.Flynn1/19/18302,at9.

224Christie2/13/19302,at4.

225Christie2/13/19302,at4.

226Christie2/13/19302,at4-5.

227Christie2/13/19302,at5.

228Christie2/13/19302,at5.

229Christie2/13/19302,at5.

230Christie2/13/19302,at5.

231SCR012b_000022(President’sDailyDiary,2/14/17);Comey11/15/17302,at9.

232 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; 2/14/17ComeyMemorandum, at 1;Hearing onRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at4);Priebus10/13/17302,at18(confirmingthateveryonewasshooedout“likeComeysaid”inhisJunetestimony).

233 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10;Comey 2/14/17Memorandum, at 1;Hearing onRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at4).SessionsrecalledthatthePresidentaskedtospeak to Comey alone and that Sessions was one of the last to leave the room; he described Comey’s

testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with the President as “pretty accurate.”Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 6. Kushner had no recollection ofwhether the President askedComey to staybehind.Kushner4/11/18302,at24.

234Comey2/14/17Memorandum,at2;Priebus10/13/17302,at18.

235 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10;Comey 2/14/17Memorandum, at 1;Hearing onRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at4).

236Comey2/14/17Memorandum,at1;HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at5).

237 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10;Comey 2/14/17Memorandum, at 2;Hearing onRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at5).

238HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for theRecord of JamesB.Comey, formerDirector of the FBI, at 5);Comey2/14/17Memorandum,at2.ComeysaidhewashighlyconfidentthatthewordsinquotationsinhisMemorandumdocumentingthismeetingweretheexactwordsusedbythePresident.Hesaidheknewfromtheoutsetofthemeetingthathewasabouttohaveaconversationofconsequence,andherememberedthewordsusedbythePresidentandwrotethemdownsoonafterthemeeting.Comey11/15/17302,at10-11.

239Comey11/15/17302,at10;Comey2/14/17Memorandum,at2.

240HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at31)(testimonyofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI).Comeyfurther stated,“Imean, this is thepresidentof theUnitedStates,withmealone, saying, ‘Ihope’this.Itookitas,thisiswhathewantsmetodo.”Id.;seealsoComey11/15/17302,at10(ComeytookthestatementasanordertoshutdowntheFlynninvestigation).

241Comey11/15/17302,at11;HearingonRussianElection InterferenceBefore theSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortherecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at5).

242 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4; Rybicki 6/22/17 302, at 1;Hearing onRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortherecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at5-6).

243 Comey 11/15/17 302, at 11;Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4-5;Rybicki 6/22/17 302, at 1-2; Sessions1/17/18 302, at 6 (confirming that later in the week following Comey’s one-on-one meeting with thePresident in theOvalOffice,Comey told theAttorneyGeneral thathedidnotwant tobealonewith thePresident);Hunt2/1/18302,at6(withindaysoftheFebruary14OvalOfficemeeting,ComeytoldSessionshedidnotthinkitwasappropriatefortheFBIDirectortomeetalonewiththePresident);Rybicki11/21/18302,at4(RybickihelpedtoschedulethemeetingwithSessionsbecauseComeywantedtotalkabouthisconcerns aboutmeetingwith the President alone);Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before theSenateSelect IntelligenceCommittee, 115thCong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of JamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at6).

244See,e.g.,SeanSpicer,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(Feb.14,2017)(questionsfromthepressincluded,“if[thePresident]wasnotified17daysagothatFlynnhadmisledtheVicePresident,otherofficialshere,andthathewasapotentialthreattoblackmailbytheRussians,whywouldhebekeptonforalmost three weeks?” and “Did the President instruct [Flynn] to talk about sanctions with the [Russianambassador]?”).PriebusrecalledthatthePresidentinitiallyequivocatedonwhethertofireFlynnbecauseitwouldgeneratenegativepress to losehisNationalSecurityAdvisorsoearlyinhis term.Priebus1/18/18302,at8.

245E.g.,SeanSullivanetal.,Senators frombothpartiespledge todeepenprobeofRussiaand the2016election,WashingtonPost(Feb.14,2017);AaronBlake,5timesDonaldTrump’steamdeniedcontactwithRussia,Washington Post (Feb. 15, 2017); OrenDarell,Donald Trump’s ties to Russia go back 30years,USAToday(Feb.15,2017);PamelaBrownetal.,Trumpaideswere inconstant touchwithseniorRussianofficialsduringcampaign,CNN(Feb.15,2017);AustinWright,ComeybriefssenatorsamidfuroroverTrump-Russiaties,Politico(Feb.17,2017);MeganTwohey&ScottShane,ABack-ChannelPlanforUkraineandRussia,CourtesyofTrumpAssociates,NewYorkTimes(Feb.19,2017).

246RemarksbyPresidentTrumpandPrimeMinisterNetanyahuofIsraelinJointPressConference,WhiteHouse(Feb.15,2017).

247RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressConference,WhiteHouse(Feb.16,2017).

248RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressConference,WhiteHouse (Feb.16,2017).ThePresidentalso said that Flynn’s conduct “wasn’t wrong – what he did in terms of the information he saw.” ThePresidentsaidthatFlynnwasjust“doingthejob,”and“ifanything,hedidsomethingright.”

249RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressConference,WhiteHouse(Feb.16,2017);Priebus1/18/18302,at9.

250RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressConference,WhiteHouse(Feb.16,2017).

251RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressConference,WhiteHouse(Feb.16,2017).

252KTMF_00000047(McFarland2/26/17MemorandumfortheRecord);McFarland12/22/17302,at16-17.

253SeePriebus1/18/18302,at11;seealsoKTMF_00000048(McFarland2/26/17MemorandumfortheRecord);McFarland12/22/17302,at17.

254Priebus1/18/18302,at11.

255KTMF_00000048(McFarland2/26/17MemorandumfortheRecord);McFarland12/22/17302,at17.

256 KTMF_00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17Memorandum for the Record) (“I said I did not knowwhetherhedidordidn’t,butwasinMaralagotheweekbetweenChristmasandNewYear’s(whileFlynnwasonvacationinCarribean)andIwasnotawareofanyFlynn-Trump,orTrump-Russianphonecalls”);McFarland12/22/17302,at17.

257Priebus1/18/18302,at11.

258McFarland12/22/17302,at17.

259McFarland12/22/17302,at17.

260KTMF_00000048(McFarland2/26/17MemorandumfortheRecord);McFarland12/22/17302,at17.

261KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17Memorandum for theRecord); seeMcFarland 12/22/17302,at17.

262 McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17; KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for theRecord).

263Priebus1/18/18302,at9.

264Priebus1/18/18302,at9;Flynn1/19/18302,at9.

265Priebus1/18/18302,at9-10.

266@realDonaldTrump3/31/17(7:04a.m.ET)Tweet;seeShaneHarrisatal.,MikeFlynnOfferstoTestifyinExchangeforImmunity,WallStreetJournal(Mar.30,2017).

267McFarland12/22/17302,at18.

268 Excerpts From The Times’s Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). Hicksrecalledthat thePresidenttoldherhehadneveraskedComeytostaybehindinhisoffice.Hicks12/8/17302,at12.

269 In a statement onMay 16, 2017, theWhite House said: “While the President has repeatedlyexpressedhisviewthatGeneralFlynnisadecentmanwhoservedandprotectedourcountry,thePresidenthasneveraskedMr.Comeyoranyoneelsetoendanyinvestigation,includinganyinvestigationinvolvingGeneralFlynn....ThisisnotatruthfuloraccurateportrayaloftheconversationbetweenthePresidentandMr. Comey.” See Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End FlynnInvestigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017) (quoting White House statement); @realDonaldTrump12/3/17 (6:15a.m.ET)Tweet (“I never askedComey to stop investigatingFlynn. JustmoreFakeNewscoveringanotherComeylie!”).

270PriebusrecalledthatthePresidentacknowledgedtellingComeythatFlynnwasagoodguyandhehoped“everythingworkedoutforhim.”Priebus10/13/17302,at19.McGahnrecalledthat thePresidentdeniedsayingtoComeythathehopedComeywouldletFlynngo,butaddedthathewas“allowedtohope.”ThePresidenttoldMcGahnhedidnotthinkhehadcrossedanylines.McGahn12/14/17302,at8.

271Rybicki11/21/18302,at4;McCabe8/17/17302,at13-14.

272SeePriebus10/13/17302,at18;Sessions1/17/18302,at6.

273Sessions1/17/18302,at1;Hunt2/1/18302,at3.

274E.g.,AdamEntousetal.,SessionsmetwithRussianenvoytwicelastyear,encountershelaterdid

notdisclose,WashingtonPost(Mar.1,2017).

275 3/1/17Email,Comey toRybicki;SCR012b_000030 (President’sDailyDiary, 3/1/17, reflectingcallwithComeyat11:55am.)

2763/1/17Email,ComeytoRybicki;seeHearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelect IntelligenceCommittee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQCong. Transcripts, at 86) (testimony ofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI)(“[H]ecalledmeoneday....[H]ejustcalledtocheckinandtellmeIwasdoinganawesomejob,andwantedtoseehowIwasdoing.”).

277Comey11/15/17302,at17-18.

278McGahn11/30/17302,at16.

279 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16-17; see SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes) (“Just in themiddleofanotherRussiaFiasco.”).

280Sessions1/17/18302,at3.

281McGahn11/30/17302,at17.

282McGahn11/30/17302,at17.

283McGahn11/30/17302,at18-19;Sessions1/17/18302, at3;Hunt2/1/18302, at4;Donaldson11/6/17302,at8-10;seeHunt-000017;SC_AD_00121(Donaldson3/2/17Notes).

284Sessions1/17/18302,at3.

285AttorneyGeneralSessionsStatementonRecusal,Department of JusticePressRelease (Mar. 2,2017)(“Duringthecourseofthelastseveralweeks,IhavemetwiththerelevantseniorcareerDepartmentofficials to discuss whether I should recuse myself from any matters arising from the campaigns forPresident of theUnitedStates.Having concluded thosemeetings today, I havedecided to recusemyselffromanyexistingorfutureinvestigationsofanymattersrelatedinanywaytothecampaignsforPresidentof theUnitedStates.”).At the timeofSessions’srecusal,DanaBoente, then theActingDeputyAttorneyGeneral andU.S.Attorney for theEasternDistrict ofVirginia, became theActingAttorneyGeneral forcampaign-related matters pursuant to an executive order specifying the order of succession at theDepartmentofJustice.Id.(“ConsistentwiththesuccessionorderfortheDepartmentofJustice,. . .DanaBoente shall act as and perform the functions of theAttorneyGeneralwith respect to anymatters fromwhichIhaverecusedmyself to theextent theyexist.”);seeExec.OrderNo.13775,82Fed.Reg.10697(Feb.14,2017).

286Sessions1/17/18302,at1-2.28C.F.R.§45.2provides that“noemployeeshallparticipate inacriminalinvestigationorprosecutionifhehasapersonalorpoliticalrelationshipwith...[a]nypersonororganizationsubstantially involved in theconduct that is thesubjectof the investigationorprosecution,”anddefines“politicalrelationship”as“acloseidentificationwithanelectedofficial,acandidate(whetheror not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising fromserviceasaprincipaladvisertheretooraprincipalofficialthereof.”

287Sessions1/17/18302,at2.

288Sessions1/17/18302,at3.

289Donaldson11/6/17302,at11;SC_AD_00123(Donaldson3/2/17Notes).It isnotclearwhetherthePresidentwasawareof theWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficedirectionnot tocontactSessionsabouthisrecusal.

290 SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the note “No comms /Serious concerns about obstruction” may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press teamsaying “crazy things” and trying to spin Sessions’s recusal in a way that would raise concerns aboutobstruction.McGahn11/30/17302,at19.Donaldsonrecalledthat“Nocomms”referredtotheorderthatnooneshouldcontactSessions.Donaldson11/6/17302,at11.

291McGahn12/12/17302,at2.

292McGahn12/12/17302,at2.

293McGahn12/12/17302,at2.

294McGahn12/12/17302,at2.CohnhadpreviouslyservedasalawyerforthePresidentduringhiscareerasaprivatebusinessman.PriebusrecalledthatwhenthePresidenttalkedaboutCohn,hesaidCohnwouldwincases forhim thathadnochance, and thatCohnhaddone incredible things forhim.Priebus4/3/18302,at5.BannonrecalledthePresidentdescribingCohnasawinnerandafixer,someonewhogotthingsdone.Bannon2/14/18302,at6.

295McGahn12/12/17302,at2.

296McGahn12/12/17302,at2.

297McGahn12/12/17302,at3.BannonsaidthePresidentsawRobertKennedyandEricHolderasAttorneysGeneralwhoprotectedthepresidentstheyserved.ThePresidentthoughtHolderalwaysstoodupfor President Obama and even took a contempt charge for him, and Robert Kennedy always had hisbrother’sback.Bannon2/14/18302,at5.PriebusrecalledthatthePresidentsaidhehadbeentoldhisentirelife he needed to have a great lawyer, a “bulldog,” and added that Holder had been willing to take acontempt-of-CongresschargeforPresidentObama.Priebus4/3/18302,at5.

298McGahn12/12/17302,at3.

299Bannon2/14/18302,at5.

300Bannon2/14/18302,at5.

301Sessions1/17/18302,at3;Hunt2/1/18302,at5;McGahn12/12/17302,at3.

302Sessions1/17/18302,at3-4.

303Sessions1/17/18302,at3-4

304Sessions1/17/18302,at3-4.HicksrecalledthatafterSessionsrecused,thePresidentwasangryandscoldedSessionsinherpresence,butshecouldnotrememberexactlywhenthatconversationoccurred.

Hicks12/8/17302,at13.

305SC_AD_000137(Donaldson3/5/17Notes);seeDonaldson11/6/17302,at13.

306Donaldson11/6/17302,at14;seeSC_AD_000168(Donaldson3/6/17Notes)(“POTUSwantstocallDana[thentheActingAttorneyGeneralforcampaign-relatedinvestigations]/Isinvestigation/No/WeknowsomethingonFlynn/GSAgotcontactedbyFBI/There’ssomethinghot”).

307Comey11/15/17302,at13-14;SNS-Classified-0000140-44(3/8/17Email,GauhartoPageetal.).

308SC_AD_00188(Donaldson3/12/18Notes).Donaldsonsaidshewasnotpartoftheconversationthatledtothesenotes,andmusthavebeentoldaboutitfromothers.Donaldson11/6/17302,at13.

309Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14-15.OnMarch 16, 2017, theWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficewasbriefedbySenatorBurrontheexistenceof“4-5targets.”Donaldson11/6/17302,at15.The“targets”wereidentified in notes taken byDonaldson as “Flynn (FBIwas in—wrapping up)→DOJ looking for phonerecords”“Comey→Manafort(Ukr+Russia,notcampaign)”;HOM███████████“CarterPage($game)”;and“GreekGuy”(potentiallyreferringtoGeorgePapadopoulos,laterchargedwithviolating18U.S.C.§1001for lyingtotheFBI).SC_AD_00198(Donaldson3/16/17Notes).DonaldsonandMcGahnbothsaidtheybelievedtheseweretargetsofSSCI.Donaldson11/6/17302,at15;McGahn12/12/17302,at4.ButSSCIdoesnotformallyinvestigateindividualsas“targets”thenotesontheirfacereferencetheFBI,theDepartmentofJustice,andComey;andthenotestrackthebackgroundmaterialspreparedbytheFBIforComey’sbriefingtotheGangof8onMarch9.SeeSNS-Classified-0000140-44(3/8/17Email,GauhartoPageet al.); see alsoDonaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15 (Donaldson could not rule out thatBurr had toldMcGahnthoseindividualsweretheFBI’stargets).

310 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select IntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(Mar.20,2017).

311Comey11/15/17302,at16;McCabe8/17/17,at15;McGahn12/14/17302,at1.

312Boente1/31/18302,at5;Comey11/15/17302,at16-17.

313 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select IntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(Mar.20,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at11)(testimonybyFBIDirectorJamesB. Comey); Comey 11/15/17 302, at 17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 (confirming that the Department ofJusticeauthorizedComey’sremarks).

314 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select IntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(Mar.20,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at11)(testimonybyFBIDirectorJamesB.Comey).

315 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select IntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(Mar.20,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at130)(questionbyRep.Swalwell).

316 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select IntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(Mar.20,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at130)(testimonybyFBIDirectorJamesB.Comey).

317 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence

Committee,115thCong.(Mar.20,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at143)(testimonybyFBIDirectorJamesB.Comey).

318Donaldson11/6/17302,at21;McGahn12/12/17302,at7.

319Donaldson11/6/17302,at21;McGahn12/12/17302,at6-9.

320McGahn12/12/17302,at7.

321E.g.,MattApuzzoetal.,F.B.I.IsInvestigatingTrump’sRussiaTies,ComeyConfirms,NewYorkTimes(Mar.20,2017);AndyGreenberg.TheFBIHasBeenInvestigatingTrump’sRussiaTiesSinceJuly,Wired(Mar.20,2017);JulieBorger&SpencerAckerman,Trump-RussiacollusionisbeinginvestigatedbyFBI,Comeyconfirms,Guardian(Mar.20,2017);seeComey1/6/17Memorandum,at2.

322Donaldson11/6/17302,at16-17;S.Miller10/31/17302,at4;McGahn12/12/17302,at5-7.

323 SC_AD_00213 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes). The notes from that day also indicate that thePresident referred to the “Comey bombshell” which “made [him] look like a fool.” SC_AD_00206(Donaldson3/21/17Notes).

324SC_AD_00210(Donaldson3/21/17Notes).

325 SCR016_000002-05 (White House Counsel’s Office Memorandum). White House Counsel’sOfficeattorneyUttamDhillondidnotrecallatriggeringeventcausingtheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficetobeginthisresearch.Dhillon11/21/17302,at5.Metadatafromthedocument,whichwasprovidedbytheWhiteHouse,establishesthatitwascreatedonMarch21,2017.

326Donaldson11/6/17302,at16-21;McGahn12/12/17302,at5-7.

327Boente1/31/18302,at5.

328Boente1/31/18302,at5.

329Boente1/31/18302,at5.

330Boente1/31/18302,at5.

331SC_AD_00210(Donaldson3/21/17Notes);McGahn12/12/17302,at7;Donaldson11/6/17302,at19.

332McGahn12/12/17302,at7;Burnham11/03/17302,at11.

333Boente1/31/18302,at3.

334Coats6/14/17302,at3;Culver6/14/17302,at2.

335Coats6/14/17302,at3.

336Coats6/14/17302,at3.

337Pompeo6/28/17302,at1-3.

338Coats6/14/17302,at3.

339Dempsey6/14/17302,at2.

340Dempsey6/14/17302,at2-3.

341Dempsey6/14/17302,at3.

342Gistaro6/14/17302,at2.

343Culver6/14/17302,at2-3.

344Coats6/14/17302,at4.

345Coats6/14/17302,at4;Dempsey6/14/17302,at3(CoatsrelayedthatthePresidenthadaskedseveraltimeswhatCoatscoulddotohelp“get[theinvestigation]done,”andCoatshadrepeatedlytoldthePresidentthatfastestwayto“getitdone”wastoletitrunitscourse).

346HearingonForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June7,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at25)(testimonybyDanielCoats,DirectorofNationalIntelligence).

347Rogers6/12/17302,at3-4.

348Rogers6/12/17302,at4.

349Ledgett6/13/17302,at1-2;seeRogers6/12/17302,at4.

350Rogers6/12/17302,at4-5;Ledgett6/13/17302,at2.

351Ledgett6/13/17302,at2.

352Ledgett6/13/17302,at2-3;Rogers6/12/17302,at4.

353Rogers6/12/17302,at5;Ledgett6/13/17302,at2.

354HearingonForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June7,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at20)(testimonybyAdmiralMichaelRogers,DirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgency).

355Gistaro6/14/17302,at1,3;Pompeo6/28/17302,at2-3.

356Gistaro6/14/17302,at1.

357Pompeo6/28/17302,at2.

358Rogers6/12/17302,at6.

359Coats6/14/17302,at3-4.

360SCR012b_000044 (President’sDailyDiary, 3/30/17, reflecting call toComey from8:14 - 8:24a.m.);Comey3/30/17Memorandum,at1(“ThePresidentcalledmeonmyCMSphoneat8:13amtoday....Thecalllasted11minutes(about10minuteswhenhewasconnected).”;HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at6).

361 Comey 3/30/17Memorandum, at 1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about thisconversation and described it to our Office; his recollections were consistent with his memorandum.Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select IntelligenceCommittee, 115th Cong.(June8,2017) (Statement for theRecordof JamesB.Comey, formerDirectorof theFBI, at6);Comey11/15/17302,at18.

362Comey3/30/17Memorandum,at1;Comey11/15/17302,at18.

363Comey3/30/17Memorandum,at1;Comey11/15/17302,at18.

364Comey3/30/17Memorandum,at1;HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at6).

365Comey3/30/17Memorandum,at1;HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at6).

366Comey3/30/17Memorandum,at1;HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at6-7).

367 Comey 3/30/17Memorandum, at 2; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 6-7;Hearing on Russian ElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at7).

368SCR012b_000053 (President’sDailyDiary,4/11/17, reflectingcall toComey from8:27–8:31a.m.);Comey4/11/17Memorandum,at1(“Ireturnedthepresident’scallthismorningat8:26amEDT.Wespokeforaboutfourminutes.”).

369 Comey 4/11/17Memorandum, at 1. Comey subsequently testified before Congress about thisconversation and his recollections were consistent with his memo. Hearing on Russian ElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(StatementfortheRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI,at7).

370Comey4/11/17Memorandum,at1.

371Comey4/11/17Memorandum,at1.

372Comey4/11/17Memorandum,at1. Inafootnote to thisstatement inhismemorandum,Comeywrote,“Hisuseof thesewordsdidnotfitwith theflowof thecall,whichat thatpointhadmovedaway

fromanyrequestofme,butIhaverecordedithereasithappened.”

373 Maria Bartiromo, Interview with President Trump, Fox Business Network (Apr. 12, 2017);SCR012b_000054 (President’s Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12:30 - 12:55p.m.).

374Hicks12/8/17302,at13.

375Priebus10/13/17302,at23;McGahn12/12/17302,at9.

376Priebus10/13/17302,at23;McGahn12/12/17302,at9;seeMcGahn11/30/17302,at9;Dhillon11/21/17302,at2(statingthatWhiteHouseCounselattorneyshadadvisedthePresidentnottocontacttheFBIDirectordirectlybecauseitcouldcreateaperceptionhewasinterferingwithinvestigations).LaterinApril,thePresidenttoldotherattorneysintheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficethathehadcalledComeyeventhough he knew they had advised against direct contact. Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 2 (recalling that thePresidentsaid,“Iknowyoutoldmenotto,butIcalledComeyanyway.”).

377McGahn12/12/17302,at9.

378McGahn12/12/17302,at9.

379McGahn12/12/17302,at9;seeBoente1/31/18302,at6(recallingthatComeytoldhimaftertheMarch30,2017callthatitwasnotobstructive).

380McGahn12/12/17302,at9-10.

381Boente1/31/18302,at7;McGahn12/12/17302,at9.

382Boente1/31/18302,at7.

383HearingonOversight of theFBI before the Senate JudiciaryCommittee, 115thCong. (May 3,2017).

384McGahn12/12/17302,at10-11.

385 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7, 10-11 (McGahn believed that two foreign leaders had expressedsympathy to thePresident forbeingunder investigation);SC_AD_00265 (Donaldson4/11/17Notes) (“PCalled Comey – Day we told him not to? ‘You are not under investigation’ NK/China/SappingCredibility”).

386Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (CQ Cong.Transcripts, at70) (May3,2017) (testimonybyFBIDirector JamesComey).Comey repeated thispointseveral timesduringhis testimony.Seeid. at 26 (explaining that hewas “not going to say another peepabout[theinvestigation]untilwe’redone”);id.at90(statingthathewouldnotprovideanyupdatesaboutthestatusofinvestigation“beforethematterisconcluded”).

387HearingonFBIOversightBefore theSenate JudiciaryCommittee, 115thCong. (May3, 2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at87-88)(questionsbySen.BlumenthalandtestimonybyFBIDirectorJamesB.Comey).

388HearingonFBIOversightBefore theSenate JudiciaryCommittee, 115thCong. (May3, 2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at15)(questionbySen.Feinstein).

389HearingonFBIOversightBefore theSenate JudiciaryCommittee, 115thCong. (May3, 2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,atI7)(testimonybyFBIDirectorJamesB.Comey).

390HearingonFBIOversightBefore theSenate JudiciaryCommittee, 115thCong. (May3, 2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at92)(testimonybyFBIDirectorJamesB.Comey).

391Sessions1/17/18302,at8;Hunt2/1/18302,at8.

392Sessions1/17/18302,at8;Hunt-000021(Hunt5/3/17Notes);McGahn3/8/18302,at6.

393Sessions1/17/18302,at8-9.

394Hunt-000021 (Hunt5/3/17Notes).Hunt said thathewrotedownnotesdescribing thismeetingandotherswiththePresidentaftertheeventsoccurred.Hunt2/1/17302,at2.

395Hunt-000021-22 (Hunt5/3/17Notes) (“Ihave foreign leaders saying theyare sorry I ambeinginvestigated.”);Sessions1/17/18302,at8(SessionsrecalledthataChineseleaderhadsaidtothePresidentthathewassorrythePresidentwasunderinvestigation,whichthePresidentinterpretedasundermininghisauthority);Hunt2/1/18302,at8.

396Sessions1/17/18302,at8;Hunt-000022(Hunt5/3/17Notes).

397Hunt-000022(Hunt5/3/17Notes).

398Sessions1/17/18302,at9.

399Bannon2/12/18302,at20.

400Bannon2/12/18302,at20.

401Bannon2/12/18302,at20.

402Bannon2/12/18302,at20-21;seePriebus10/13/17302,at28.

403S.Miller10/31/17302,at4-5;SCR025_000019(President’sDailyDiary,5/4/17).

404S.Miller10/31/17302,at5.

405S.Miller10/31/17302,at5-6.

406S.Miller5/5/17Notes,atI;seeS.Miller10/31/17302,at8.

407S.Miller10/31/17302,at6.

408S.Miller10/31/17302,at6-8.

409S.Miller10/31/17302,at7.MillersaidhedidnotwantPriebustobeblindsided,soonSundaynighthecalledPriebus to tellhim that thePresidenthadbeen thinkingabout the“Comeysituation”andtherewouldbeanimportantdiscussiononMonday.S.Miller10/31/17302,at7.

410S.Miller10/31/17302,at8.

411S.Miller10/31/17302,at8.

412S.Miller10/31/17302,at10.

413SCR013c000003-06(DraftTerminationLettertoFBIDirectorComey).

414 SCR013c_000003-06 (DraftTerminationLetter toFBIDirectorComey).Kushner said that theterminationletterreflectedthereasonsthePresidentwantedtofireComeyandwasthetruestrepresentationofwhatthePresidenthadsaidduringtheMay5dinner.Kushner4/11/18302,at25.

415SCR013c_000003(DraftTerminationLettertoFBIDirectorComey).

416McGahn12/12/17302,at11;Priebus10/13/17302,at24;S.Miller10/31/17302,at11;Dhillon11/21/17302,at6;Eisenberg11/29/17302,at13.

417S.Miller 10/31/17302, at 11 (observing that thePresident started themeetingby saying, “I’mgoingtoreadyoualetter.Don’ttalkmeoutofthis.I’vemademydecision.”);Dhillon11/21/17302,at6(thePresidentannouncedinanirreversiblewaythathewasfiringComey);Eisenberg11/29/17302,at13(thePresidentdidnotleavewhetherornottofireComeyupfordiscussion);Priebus10/13/17302,at25;McGahn12/12/17302,at11-12.

418Dhillon30211/21/17,at6;Eisenberg11/29/17302,at13;McGahn12/12/17302,at11.

419 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12, 13; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 11; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 7.BecauseoftheAttorneyGeneral’srecusal,RosensteinbecametheActingAttorneyGeneralfortheRussiainvestigation upon his confirmation asDeputyAttorneyGeneral.See 28U.S.C. § 508(a) (“In case of avacancyintheofficeofAttorneyGeneral,orofhisabsenceordisability,theDeputyAttorneyGeneralmayexerciseallthedutiesofthatoffice”).

420McGahn12/12/17302,at12.

421Dhillon11/21/17302,at7;McGahn12/12/17302,at13;Gauhar-000056(Gauhar5/16/17Notes);seeGauhar-000056-72 (2/11/19Memorandum toFile attachingGauharhandwrittennotes) (“Ms.Gauhardetermined that she likely recorded all these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday, May 16,2017.”).

422McGahn12/12/17302,at13;seeGauhar-000056(Gauhar5/16/17Notes).

423Dhillon11/21/17302,at7-9;Sessions1/17/18302,at9;McGahn12/12/17302,at13.

424McGahn12/12/17302,at13;Dhillon11/21/17302,at9.

425Hunt-000026(Hunt5/8/17Notes);seeGauhar-000057(Gauhar5/16/17Notes).

426Rosenstein5/23/17302,at2;McGahn12/12/17302,at14;seeGauhar-000057(Gauhar5/16/17Notes).

427Hunt-000026-27(Hunt5/8/17Notes).

428Sessions1/17/18302,at10;seeGauhar-000058(Gauhar5/16/17Notes)(“POTUStoAG:Whatisyourrec?”).

429Hunt-000027(Hunt5/8/17Notes).

430McGahn12/12/17302,at14;Dhillon11/21/17302,at7.

431Hunt-000028(Hunt5/8/17Notes).

432McGahn12/12/17302,at13.

433Hunt-000028-29(Hunt5/8/17Notes).

434McCabe9/26/17302,at13;Rosenstein5/23/17302,at2;seeGauhar-000059 (Gauhar5/16/17Notes)(“POTUStellsDAGtowriteamemo”).

435Hunt-000028-29(Hunt5/8/17Notes)(“POTUSaskedifRod’srecommendationwouldincludethefact that although Comey talks about the investigation he refuses to say that the President is not underinvestigation....SoitwouldbegoodifyourrecommendationwouldmakementionofthefactthatComeyrefusestosaypublic[ly]whathesaidprivately3times.”).

436Gauhar-000059(Gauhar5/16/17Notes).

437 Sessions 1/17/18 302 at 10;McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17Notes).

438Gauhar-000059(Gauhar5/16/17Notes);McCabe5/16/17Memorandum1;McCabe9/26/17302,at13.

439Rosenstein5/23/17302, at 2;Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar5/16/17Notes) (“DAGreasonsnot theirreasons[POTUS)”);Gauhar-000060(Gauhar5/16/17Notes)(”1stdrafthadarecommendation.Tookitoutb/cknewdecisionhadalreadybeenmade.”).

440Rosenstein5/23/17302,at4;McGahn12/12/17302,at15;5/9/17Letter,Sessions toPresidentTrump (“Basedonmy evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by theDeputyAttorneyGeneral in theattachedmemorandum,IhaveconcludedthatafreshstartisneededattheleadershipoftheFBI.”);5/9/17Memorandum,RosensteintoSessions(concludingwith,“ThewaytheDirectorhandledtheconclusionoftheemailinvestigationwaswrong.Asaresult,theFBIisunlikelytoregainpublicandcongressionaltrustuntilithasaDirectorwhounderstandsthegravityofthemistakesandpledgesnevertorepeatthem.Havingrefused to admit his errors, the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary correctiveactions.”).

441S.Miller10/31/17302,at12;McGahn12/12/17302,at15;Hunt-000031(Hunt5/9/17Notes).

442SC_AD_00342 (Donaldson5/9/17Notes).Donaldsonalsowrote “[i]s this thebeginningof theend?”becauseshewasworriedthatthedecisiontoterminateComeyandthemannerinwhichitwascarriedoutwouldbetheendofthepresidency.Donaldson11/6/17302,at25.

443S.Miller10/31/17302,at12;McGahn12/12/17302,at15;Hunt-000032(Hunt5/9/17Notes).

444 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 8, 10;Priebus10/13/17302,at27;Hunt2/1/18302,at14-15;Hunt-000032(Hunt5/9/17Notes).

445Dhillon11/21/17302,at10;Eisenberg11/29/17302,at15(providingtheviewthatthePresident’sdesire to include the languageaboutnotbeingunder investigationwas the“drivinganimusof thewholething”);Burnham11/3/17302,at16(BurnhamknewtheonlylinethePresidentcaredaboutwasthelinethat said Comey advised the President on three separate occasions that the President was not underinvestigation). According to Hunt’s notes, the reference to Comey’s statement would indicate that“notwithstanding” Comey’s having informed the President that he was not under investigation, thePresident was terminating Comey. Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed thePresidentwanted the language includedso thatpeoplewouldnot think that thePresidenthad terminatedComeybecausethePresidentwasunderinvestigation.McGahn12/12/17302,at15.

446 McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25; see SC_AD_00342 (Donaldson5/9/17Notes)(“Resignvs.Removal.–POTUS/removal.”).

447Spicer10/16/17302,at9;McGahn12/12/17302,at16.

448Priebus10/13/17302,at28.

449StatementofthePressSecretary,TheWhiteHouse,OfficeofthePressSecretary(May9,2017).

450McCabe9/26/17302,at4;SCR025_000044(President’sDailyDiary,5/9/17);McCabe5/10/17Memorandum,at1.

451McCabe9/26/17302,at5;McCabe5/10/17Memorandum,at1.

452McCabe9/26/17302,at5;McCabe5/10/17Memorandum,at1-2.

453McCabe9/26/17302,at5;McCabe5/10/17Memorandum,at1-2.

454McCabe9/26/17302,at5;McCabe5/10/17Memorandum,at1-2.

455Spicer10/16/17302,at11;Hicks12/8/17,at18;Sanders7/3/18302,at2.

456Christie2/13/19302,at6.

457Christie2/13/19302,at6.

458Christie2/13/19302,at6.

459Christie2/13/19302,at6.

460Christie2/13/19302,at6.

461Gauhar-000071(Gauhar5/16/17Notes);PageMemorandum,at3(recordingeventsof5/16/17);McCabe9/26/17302,at14.

462Rosenstein5/23/17302,at4-5;Gauhar-000059(Gauhar5/16/17Notes).

463Rosenstein5/23/17302,at4-5;Gauhar-000071(Gauhar5/16/17Notes).

464Gauhar-000071(Gauhar5/16/17Notes).DOJnotesfromtheweekofComey’sfiringindicatethatPriebuswas“screaming”attheDOJpublicaffairsofficetryingtogetRosensteintodoapressconference,andtheDOJpublicaffairsoffice toldPriebus thatRosensteinhad told thePresidenthewasnotdoing it.Gauhar-000071-72(Gauhar5/16/17Notes).

465McGahn12/12/17302,at16-17;Donaldson11/6/17302,at26-27;Dhillon11/21/17302,at11.

466 Jenna Johnson, After Trump fired Comey, White House staff scrambled to explain why,WashingtonPost(May10,2017)(quotingSpicer).

467See,e.g.,SarahSanders,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(May10,2017);SCR013_001088(5/10/17 Email, Hemming to Cheung et al.) (internal White House email describing comments on theComeyterminationbyVicePresidentPence).

468 SCR08_000353 (5/9/17WhiteHouseDocument, “WorkingVisitwith ForeignMinister SergeyLavrov ofRussia”); SCR08_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et al.). Themeeting had beenplanned onMay 2, 2017, during a telephone call between thePresident andRussianPresidentVladimirPutin,andthemeetingdatewasconfirmedonMay5,2017,thesamedaythePresidentdictatedideasfortheComeyterminationlettertoStephenMiller.SCR08_001274(5/10/17Email,CiaramellatoKellyetal.).

469MattApuzzoetal.,TrumpToldRussiansThatFiring“NutJob“ComeyEasedPressureFromInvestigation,NewYorkTimes(May19,2017).

470SCR08_002117 (5/19/17Email,Walters toFarhi (CBSNews)); seeSpicer10/16/17302, at 13(notinghewouldhavebeentoldto“cleanitup”ifthereportingonthemeetingwiththeRussianForeignMinisterwasinaccurate,buthewasnevertoldtocorrectthereporting);Hicks12/8/17302,at19(recallingthatthePresidentneverdeniedmakingthestatementsattributedtohimintheLavrovmeetingandthatthePresidenthadsaidsimilarthingsaboutComeyinanoff-the-recordmeetingwithreportersonMay18,2017,callingComeya“nutjob”and“crazy”).

471Hicks12/8/17302,at19.

472McGahn12/12/17302,at18.

473SCR025_000046(President’sDailyDiary,5/10/17);McCabe5/10/17Memorandum,at1.

474McCabe5/10/17Memorandum,at1.

475McCabe5/10/17Memorandum,at1.

476McCabe 5/10/17Memorandum, at 1; Rybicki 6/13/17 302, at 2. Comey had been visiting theFBI’sLosAngelesofficewhenhefoundouthehadbeenterminated.Comey11/15/17302,at22.

477McCabe5/10/17Memorandum, at 1-2.McCabe’smemorandumdocumentinghismeetingwiththe President is consistent with notes taken by theWhite House Counsel’s Office. See SC_AD_00347(Donaldson5/10/17Notes).

478Sanders7/3/18302,at4;SarahSanders,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(May10,2017).

479SarahSanders,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(May10,2017);Sanders7/3/18302,at4.

480SarahSanders,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(May10,2017).

481Sanders7/3/18302,at4.

482Sanders7/3/18302,at4.

483Sanders7/3/18302,at3.

484McGahn12/12/17302,at16-17;Donaldson11/6/17302,at26;seeDhillon11/21/17302,at11.

485Donaldson11/6/17302,at27.

486McGahn12/12/17302,at17.

487Dhillon11/21/17302,at11.

488InterviewwithPresidentDonaldTrump,NBC(May11,2017)Transcript,at2.

489InterviewwithPresidentDonaldTrump,NBC(May11,2017)Transcript,at2.

490InterviewwithPresidentDonaldTrump,NBC(May11,2017)Transcript,at3.

491InterviewwithPresidentDonaldTrump,NBC(May11,2017)Transcript,at3.

492InterviewwithPresidentDonaldTrump,NBC(May11,2017)Transcript,at1,5.

493InterviewwithPresidentDonaldTrump,NBC(May11,2017)Transcript,at7.

494@realDonaldTrump5/11/17(4:34p.m.ET)Tweet.

495MichaelS.Schmidt,InaPrivateDinner,TrumpDemandedLoyalty.ComeyDemurred.,NewYorkTimes(May11,2017).

496@realDonaldTrump5/12/17(7:51a.m.ET)Tweet.

497@realDonaldTrump5/12/17 (8:26 a.m.ET)Tweet;@realDonaldTrump5/12/17 (8:54 a.m.ET)Tweet.

498SeeVolumeII,SectionII.K.1,infra.

499SeeVolumeI,SectionIII.D.1,supra.

500 In addition towhether thePresidenthad amotive related toRussia-relatedmatters that anFBIinvestigationcoulduncover,weconsideredwhetherthePresident’sintentinfiringComeywasconnectedtoother conduct that could come to light as a result of the FBI’s Russian-interference investigation. Inparticular, Michael Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the TrumpTowerMoscowprojectandinvolvementinotheractivities.AndfactsuncoveredintheRussiainvestigation,whichourOfficereferredtotheU.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork,ultimatelyledtotheconvictionofCohenintheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkforcampaign-financeoffensesrelatedtopaymentshe saidhemade at thedirectionof thePresident.SeeVolume II, Section II.K.5, infra. Theinvestigation, however, did not establish that when the President fired Comey, he was considering thepossibilitythattheFBI’sinvestigationwoulduncoverthesepaymentsorthatthePresident’sintentinfiringComeywasotherwiseconnectedtoaconcernaboutthesematterscomingtolight.

501OfficeoftheDeputyAttorneyGeneral,OrderNo.3915-2017,AppointmentofSpecialCounseltoInvestigateRussianInterferencewiththe2016PresidentialElectionandRelatedMatters(May17,2017).

502Sessions1/17/18302,at13;Hunt2/l/18302,at18;McGahn12/14/17302, at4;Hunt-000039(Hunt5/17/17Notes).

503Sessions1/17/18302,at13;Hunt2/1/18302,at18;McGahn12/14/17302,at4;Hunt-000039(Hunt5/17/17Notes).

504Hunt-000039(Hunt5/17/17Notes).

505Hunt-000039(Hunt5/17/17Notes);Sessions1/17/18302,at13-14.

506Hunt-000040;seeSessions1/17/18302,at14.

507Sessions1/17/18302,at14.

508Hunt-000040(Hunt5/17/17Notes);seeSessions1/17/18302,at14.Earlythenextmorning,thePresident tweeted, “This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history!”@realDonaldTrump5/18/17(7:52a.m.ET)Tweet.

509Hunt-000041(Hunt5/17/17Notes);Sessions1/17/18302,at14.

510Hunt-000041(Hunt5/17/17Notes);Sessions1/17/18302,at14.

511Hicks12/8/17302,at21.

512 Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21. The Access Hollywood tape was released on October 7, 2016, asdiscussedinVolumeI,SectionIII.D.1,supra.

513McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; SCR015_000175-82 (UndatedDraftMemoranda toWhiteHouseStaff).

514McGahn12/14/17302, at 9;SCR015_000175-82 (UndatedDraftMemoranda toWhiteHouseStaff).TheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficehadpreviously issuedadocumentholdonFebruary27,2017.SCRO15_000171(2/17/17MemorandumfromMcGahntoExecutiveOfficeofthePresidentStaff).

515 Hunt-000047 (Hunt 5/18/17Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resigning asAttorneyGeneral).

516Hunt-000047-49(Hunt5/18/17Notes);Sessions1/17/18302,at14.

517Hunt-000047-49(Hunt5/18/17Notes);Sessions1/17/18302,at14.

518Hunt-000048-49(Hunt5/18/17Notes);Sessions1/17/18302,at14.

519Sessions1/17/18302,at14.

520Hunt-000049(Hunt5/18/17Notes).

521Hunt-000050-51(Hunt5/18/17Notes).

522Hunt-000050(Hunt5/18/17Notes);Priebus10/13/17302,at21;Hunt2/1/18302,at21.

523Hunt-000051(Hunt5/18/17Notes).

524SCR026_000110(President’sDailyDiary,5/19/17).

525Hicks12/8/17302,at22.

526Priebus10/13/17302,at21.Hunt’snotesstatethatwhenPriebusreturnedfromthetrip,Priebustold Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, thePresident “slapped the desk” and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052 (Hunt Notes,undated).

527Hunt-000052-53(Hunt5/30/17Notes);5/18/17Letter,Sessions toPresidentTrump(resignationletter).RobertPorter,whowastheWhiteHouseStaffSecretaryatthetime,saidthatinthedaysafterthePresidentreturnedfromtheMiddleEasttrip,thePresidenttookSessions’sletteroutofadrawerintheOvalOfficeandshowedittoPorter.Porter4/13/18302,at8.PersonalPrivacy██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

528 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at I; McGahn12/14/17302,at10;Bannon10/26/18302,at12.

529 Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12;Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 10. InOctober 2011,Mueller resigned hisfamily’smembershipfromTrumpNationalGolfClubinSterling,Virginia, ina letter thatnotedthat“weliveintheDistrictandfindthatweareunabletomakefulluseoftheClub”andthatinquired“whetherwewouldbeentitledtoarefundofaportionofourinitialmembershipfee,”whichwaspaidin1994.10/12/11Letter,Muellers toTrumpNationalGolfClub (IAEN).About twoweeks later, thecontrollerof theclubresponded that the Muellers’ resignation would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be“placedonawaitlisttoberefundedonafirstresigned/firstrefundedbasis”inaccordancewiththeclub’s

legaldocuments.10/27/11Letter,MuellerstoTrumpNationalGolfClub.TheMuellershavenothadfurthercontactwiththeclub.

530Priebus4/3/18302,at3;Bannon10/26/18302,at13(confirmingthathe,Priebus,andMcGahnpushedbackontheassertedconflicts).

531Bannon10/26/18302,at12-13.

532Bannon10/26/18302,at12.

533Bannon10/26/18302,at12.

534Bannon10/26/18302,at12.

535Bannon10/26/18302,at13.

536Bannon10/26/18302,at12.

537MattZapotosky&MateaGold,JusticeDepartmentethicsexpertsclearMueller to leadRussiaprobe,WashingtonPost(May23,2017).

538McGahn3/8/18302,at1;McGahn12/14/17302,at10;Priebus1/18/18302,at12.

539McGahn3/8/18302,at1.McGahnandDonaldsonsaidthataftertheappointmentoftheSpecialCounsel, they considered themselves potential fact witnesses and accordingly told the President thatinquiriesrelatedtotheinvestigationshouldbebroughttohispersonalcounsel.McGahn12/14/17302,at7;Donaldson4/2/18302,at5.

540SC_AD_00361(Donaldson5/31/17Notes).

541SC_AD_00361(Donaldson5/31/17Notes).

542SC_AD_00361(Donaldson5/31/17Notes).

543See,e.g.,MichaelS.Schmidt,InaPrivateDinner,TrumpDemandedLoyalty.ComeyDemurred.,NewYorkTimes(May11,2017);MichaelS.Schmidt,ComeyMemorandumSaysTrumpAskedHimtoEndFlynn Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017); Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians ThatFiring‘NutJob’ComeyEasedPressureFromInvestigation,NewYorkTimes(May19,2017).

544HearingonRussianElectionInterferenceBeforetheSenateSelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(Statementfor theRecordofJamesB.Comey,formerDirectorof theFBI,at5-6).ComeytestifiedthathedeliberatelycausedhismemorandumdocumentingtheFebruary14,2017meetingtobeleakedtotheNewYorkTimesinresponsetoatweetfromthePresident,sentonMay12,2017,thatstated“JamesComeybetterhopethatthereareno‘tapes’ofourconversationsbeforehestartsleakingtothe press!,” and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter “might prompt theappointment of a special counsel.”Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate SelectIntelligenceCommittee,115thCong.(June8,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at55)(testimonybyJamesB.Comey,formerDirectoroftheFBI).

545See,e.g.,MattZapotosky,ComeylaysoutthecasethatTrumpobstructedjustice,WashingtonPost

(June8,2017)(“LegalanalystssaidComey’stestimonyclarifiedandbolsteredthecasethatthepresidentobstructedjustice.”).

5466/9/17Email,SpecialCounsel’sOfficetotheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOffice.ThisOfficemadethenotification to give the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of theinterviews.OnJune12,2017,theSpecialCounsel’sOfficeinterviewedAdmiralRogersinthepresenceofagencycounsel.Rogers6/12/17302,at1.OnJune13, theSpecialCounsel’sOfficeinterviewedLedgett.Ledgett6/13/17302,at1.OnJune14, theOffice interviewedCoatsandotherpersonnelfromhisoffice.Coats6/14/17302,at1;Gistaro6/14/17302,at1;Culver6/14/17302,at1.

547Ruddy6/6/18302,at5.

548Ruddy6/6/18302,at5-6.

549Ruddy6/6/18302,at6.

550Ruddy6/6/18302,at6.

551TrumpConfidantChristopherRuddysaysMuellerhas“realconflicts”asSpecialCounsel,PBS(June12,2017);MichaelD.Shear&MaggieHaberman,FriendSaysTrumpIsConsideringFiringMuellerasSpecialCounsel,NewYorkTimes(June12,2017).

552KatherineFaulders&VeronicaStracqualursi,Trump friendChrisRuddysaysSpicer’s ‘bizarre’statementdoesn’tdenyclaimTrumpseekingMuellerfiring,ABC(June13,2017).

553 See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump Is Considering FiringMuellerasSpecialCounsel,NewYorkTimes(June12,2017).

554Ruddy6/6/18302,at6-7.

555Sanders7/3/18302,at6-7.

556GlennThrushetal.,TrumpStews,StaffStepsIn,andMuellerIsSafeforNow,NewYorkTimes(June13,2017);seeSanders7/3/18302,at6(SandersspokewiththePresidentdirectlybeforespeakingtothepressonAirForceOneandtheanswershegaveistheanswerthePresidenttoldhertogive).

557SpecialCounsel’sOfficeAttorney6/13/17Notes.

558SpecialCounsel’sOfficeAttorney6/13/17Notes.

559 Hearing on Fiscal 2018 Justice Department Budget before the Senate AppropriationsSubcommitteeonCommerce,Justice,andScience,115thCong.(June13,2017)(CQCong.Transcripts,at14)(testimonybyRodRosenstein,DeputyAttorneyGeneral).

560SpecialCounsel’sOfficeAttorney6/15/17Notes.

561DevlinBarrett et al.,Special counsel is investigatingTrump for possible obstruction of justice,officialssay,WashingtonPost(June14,2017).

562CNN,forexample,beganrunningachyronat6:55p.m.thatstated:“WASHPOST:MUELLER

INVESTIGATINGTRUMPFOROBSTRUCTIONOFJUSTICE.”CNN,(June14,2017,publishedonlineat7:15p.m.ET).

563DevlinBarrett et al.,Special counsel is investigatingTrump for possible obstruction of justice,officialssay,WashingtonPost(June14,2017).

564SCR026_000183(President’sDailyDiary,6/14/17)(reflectingcallfromthePresidenttoMcGahnon6/14/17withstarttime10:31p.m.andendtime10:46p.m.);CallRecordsofDonMcGahn.

565McGahn2/28/19302,at1-2.McGahnthoughtheandthePresidentalsoprobablytalkedabouttheinvestitureceremonyforSupremeCourtJusticeNeilGorsuch,whichwasscheduledforthefollowingday.McGahn2/28/18302,at2.

566@realDonaldTrump6/15/17(6:55a.m.ET)Tweet.

567@realDonaldTrump6/15/17(7:57a.m.ET)Tweet.

568@realDonaldTrump6/15/17(3:56p.m.ET)Tweet.

569@realDonaldTrump6/16/17(7:53a.m.ET)Tweet.

570@realDonaldTrump6/16/17(9:07a.m.ET)Tweet.

571McGahn3/8/18302,at1-2;McGahn12/14/17302,at10.

572McGahn3/8/18302,at1,3;SCR026_000196(President’sDailyDiary,6/17/17)(recordsshowingPresidentdepartedtheWhiteHouseat11:07a.m.onJune17,2017,andarrivedatCampDavidat11:37a.m.).

573McGahn3/8/18302,at1-2;McGahn12/14/17302,at10.PhonerecordsshowthatthePresidentcalled McGahn in the afternoon on June 17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes.SCR026_000196 (President’s Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on6/17/17withstarttime2:23p.m.andendtime2:46p.m.);(CallRecordsofDonMcGahn).PhonerecordsdonotshowanothercallbetweenMcGahnandthePresidentthatday.AlthoughMcGahnrecalledreceivingmultiplecallsfromthePresidentonthesameday,inlightofthephonerecordshethoughtitwaspossiblethatthefirstcallinsteadoccurredonJune14,2017,shortlyafterthepressreportedthatthePresidentwasunderinvestigationforobstructionofjustice.McGahn2/28/19302,at1-3.WhileMcGahnwasnotcertainofthespecificdatesofthecalls,McGahnwasconfidentthathehadatleasttwophoneconversationswiththePresidentinwhichthePresidentdirectedhimtocall theActingAttorneyGeneraltohavetheSpecialCounselremoved.McGahn2/28/19302,at1-3.

574McGahn3/8/18302,at1.

575McGahn3/8/18302,at1.

576McGahn3/8/18302,at1.

577McGahn3/8/18302,at1-2.

578McGahn3/8/18302,at1-2.

579McGahn3/8/18302,at2.

580McGahn3/8/18302,at2.

581McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

582McGahn3/8/18302,at2,5;McGahn2/28/19302,at3.

583McGahn3/8/18302,at1-2,5.

584McGahn3/8/18302,at2.

585McGahn2/28/19302,at3;McGahn3/8/18302,at2.

586McGahn3/8/18302,at2.

587McGahn3/8/18302,at2.

588McGahn3/8/18302,at2-3;McGahn2/28/19302,at3;Donaldson4/2/18302,at4;CallRecordsofDonMcGahn.

589McGahn3/8/18302,at2;Donaldson4/2/18302,at4.

590Donaldson4/2/18302,at4.

591Donaldson4/2/18302,at4.

592 McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4-5. Dona+ldson said she believedMcGahn consciously did not share details with her because he did not want to drag her into theinvestigation.Donaldson4/2/18302,at5;seeMcGahn2/28/19302,at3.

593Donaldson4/2/18302,at5.

594McGahn12/14/17302,at10;CallRecordsofDonMcGahn;McGahn2/28/19302,at3-4;Priebus4/3/18302,at6-7.

595McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 4. Priebus andBannon confirmed thatMcGahn did not tell them thespecificdetailsofthePresident’srequest.Priebus4/3/18302,at7;Bannon2/14/18302,at10.

596Priebus4/3/18302,at7.

597McGahn3/8/18302,at3;McGahn2/28/19302,at3-4.

598McGahn3/8/18302,at3.

599Christie2/13/19302,at7.Christiedidnotrecalltheprecisedateofthiscall,butbelieveditwasafterChristopherWraywasannouncedas thenomineetobethenewFBIdirector,whichwasonJune7,2017.Christie2/13/19302,at7.TelephonerecordsshowthatthePresidentcalledChristietwiceafterthattimeperiod,onJuly4,2017,andJuly14,2017.CallRecordsofChrisChristie.

600Christie2/13/19302,at7.

601When thisOffice first interviewedMcGahn about this topic, hewas reluctant to share detailedinformationaboutwhathadoccurredandonlydidsoaftercontinuedquestioning.SeeMcGahn12/14/17302(agentnotes).

602 See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., CNN exclusive: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBI’s Russiainvestigation,CNN(May9,2017);MattFord,WhyMuellerIsTakingOvertheMichaelFlynnGrandJury,TheAtlantic(June2,2017).

603 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2; SCR026_000201 (President’s Daily Diary, 6/19/17).PersonalPrivacy██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

604Kelly8/2/18302,at7;Dearborn6/20/18302,at1(describingLewandowskiasa“comforttothePresident”whoseloyaltywasappreciated).KellysaidthatwhenhewasChiefofStaffandthePresidenthadmeetings with friends like Lewandowski, Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to theresidencetocreatedistancefromtheWestWing.Kelly8/2/18302,at7.

605Lewandowski4/6/18302,at2.

606Lewandowski4/6/18302,at2.

607Lewandowski4/6/18302,at2.

608Lewandowski4/6/18302,at3.

609Lewandowski4/6/18302,at2-3;Lewandowski6/19/17Notes,at1-2.

610Lewandowski4/6/18302,at3;Lewandowski6/19/17Notes,at3.

611Lewandowski4/6/18302,at3;Lewandowski6/19/17Notes,at4.

612Lewandowski4/6/18302,at3.

613Lewandowski4/6/18302,at3-4.

614Lewandowski4/6/18302,at4.

615Lewandowski4/6/18302,at4.

616Lewandowski4/6/18302,at4.

617Lewandowski4/6/18302,at4.

618Lewandowski4/6/18302,at4;seeDearborn6/20/18302,at3.

619Lewandowski4/6/18302,at4-5.

620Lewandowski4/6/18302,at4,6.

621 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5; SCR029b_000002-03 (6/5/18 Additional Response to SpecialCounselRequestforCertainVisitorLogInformation).

622Lewandowski4/6/18302,at5.

623Lewandowski4/6/18302,at5.

624 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6. Priebus vaguely recalled Lewandowski telling him that inapproximately May or June 2017 the President had asked Lewandowski to get Sessions’s resignation.(IAEN)PriebusrecalledthatLewandowskidescribedhisreactionassomethinglike,“WhatcanIdo?I’mnotanemployeeoftheadministration.I’manobody.”Priebus4/3/18302,at6.

625Lewandowski4/6/18302,at5.LewandowskisaidheaskedHopeHickstotypethenoteswhenhewentintotheOvalOffice,andhethenretrievedthenotesfromherpartwaythroughhismeetingwiththePresident.Lewandowski4/6/18302,at5.

626Lewandowski4/6/18302,at5;Dearborn6/20/18302,at3.

627Dearborn6/20/18302,at3.

628Dearborn6/20/18302,at3.

629Dearborn6/20/18302,at3-4.

630PeterBakeretal.,ExcerptsFromTheTimes’s InterviewWithTrump,NewYorkTimes (July19,2017).

631 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times’s InterviewWith Trump, New York Times (July19,2017).

632PeterBakeretal.,ExcerptsFromTheTimes’sInterviewWithTrump,NewYorkTimes(July19,2017).

633Hicks12/8/17302,at23.

634Hicks3/13/18302,at10;Lewandowski4/6/18302,at6.

635Lewandowski4/6/18302,at6.

636 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10. Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recessappointmentofanewAttorneyGeneralbecausetheSenatewasabouttogoonrecess.Hicks3/13/18302,at10.LewandowskirecalledthatintheafternoonofJuly19,2017,followinghismeetingwiththePresident,he conducted research on recess appointments but did not share his research with the President.Lewandowski4/6/18302,at7.

637Lewandowski4/6/18302,at6.

638 Adam Entous et al., Sessions discussed Trump campaign-related matters with Russianambassador,U.S. intelligence intercepts show,Washington Post (July 21, 2017). The underlying eventsconcerningtheSessions-KislyakcontactsarediscussedinVolumeI,SectionIV.A.4.c,supra.

639Hunt2/1/18302,at23.

640Hunt2/1/18302,at23.

641Hunt2/1/18302,at23-24;Hunt7/21/17Notes,at1.

642Hunt2/1/18302,at23-24;Hunt7/21/17Notes,at1-2.

643@realDonaldTrump7/22/17(6:33a.m.ET)Tweet.

644@realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:44 a.m. ET) Tweet. Threeminutes later, the President tweeted,“WhataboutalloftheClintontiestoRussia,includingPodestaCompany,Uraniumdeal,RussianReset,bigdollarspeechesetc.”@realDonaldTrump7/22/17(7:47a.m.ET)Tweet.

645Priebus1/18/18302,at13-14.

646Priebus1/18/18302,at14;Priebus4/3/18302,at4-5;seeRP_000073(Priebus7/22/17Notes).

647RP_000073(Priebus7/22/17Notes).

648Priebus4/3/18302,at5.

649Priebus1/18/18302,at14;Priebus4/3/18302,at4-5.

650Priebus4/3/18302,at5.

651RP_000074 (Priebus7/22/17Notes);McGahn12/14/17302, at 11;Priebus1/18/18302, at 14.Priebus followed McGahn’s advice and called his personal attorney to discuss the President’s requestbecausehe thought itwas the typeof thingaboutwhichonewouldneed to consult an attorney.Priebus1/18/18302,at14.

652McGahn12/14/17302,at11;RP_000074(Priebus7/22/17Notes)(“discussresigningtogether”).

653Priebus1/18/18302,at14;Priebus4/3/18302,at4.

654Priebus4/3/18302,at4.

655Priebus1/18/18302,at15.

656Priebus1/18/18302,at15.

657Priebusl/18/18302,at15.

658Priebus1/18/18302,at15.

659 @realDonaldTrump 7/24/17 (8:49 a.m. ET) Tweet (“So why aren’t the Committees andinvestigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes & Russiarelations?”).

660@realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6: I 2 a.m. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortlybefore this one asking “where is the investigation A.G.” ,ahref="https://web.archive.org/web/20170725162618/https:/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump">@realDonaldTrump7/25/17(6:03a.m.ET)Tweet.

661@realDonaldTrump7/26/17(9:48a.m.ET)Tweet.

662Hunt2/1/18302,at24-25.

663Hicks3/13/18302,at1;Raffel2/8/18302,at2.

664RG000061(6/3/16Email,GoldstonetoTrumpJr.);@DonaldJTrumpJR7/11/17(11:01a.m.ET)Tweet.

665RG000061(6/3/16Email,TrumpJr.toGoldstone);@DonaldJTrumpJR7/11/17(l1:01a.m.ET)Tweet.

666Samochornov7/12/17302,at4.

667SeeVolumeI,SectionIV.A.5,supra(describingmeetingindetail).

668WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at8 (Response toQuestionI,Parts (a)through (c)). The President declined to answer questions about his knowledge of the June 9meeting orothereventsaftertheelection.

669DJTFP_SCO_PDF_00000001-02(5/17/17Letter,SSCItoDonaldJ.TrumpforPresident,Inc.).

670Goldstone2/8/18302,at12;6/2/17and6/5/17Emails,Goldstone&Garten;Raffel2/8/18302,at3;Hicks3/13/18302,at2.

671Corallo2/15/18302,at3.

672Priebus4/3/18302,at7.

673Priebus4/3/18302,at7.

674Corallo2/15/18302,at3;Hicks12/7/17302,at8;Raffel2/8/18302,at3.

675Raffel2/8/18302,at2-3;Hicks3/13/18302,at2.

676Raffel2/8/18302,at2-3,5;Hicks3/13/18302,at2;Hicks12/7/17302,at8.

677Hicks12/7/17302,at6-7;Hicks3/13/18302,at1.

678Hicks12/7/17302,at7;Hicks3/13/18302,at1.

679Hicks12/7/17302,at7;Hicks3/13/18302,at1.CounselforIvankaTrumpprovidedanattorneyprofferthatisconsistentwithHicks’saccountandwiththeothereventsinvolvingIvankaTrumpsetforthinthissectionofthereport.KushnersaidthathedidnotrecalltalkingtothePresidentatthistimeabouttheJune9meetingortheunderlyingemails.Kushner4/11/18302,at30.

680Hicks3/13/18302,at1-2.

681Hicks3/13/18302,at2.

682Hicks12/7/17302,at8.

683Hicks3/13/18302,at2-3;Hicks12/7/17302,at8.

684Hicks12/7/17302,at8.

685Hicks12/7/17302,at8;Hicks3/13/18302,at2.

686Hicks3/13/18302,at2;Hicks12/7/17302,at9.

687Hicks3/13/18302,at2-3.

688Hicks3/13/18302,at2-3;Hicks12/7/17302,at9.

689Hicks3/13/18302,at3;Hicks12/7/17302,at9.

690Hicks3/13/18302,at3.

691Hicks3/13/18302,at3.

692Hicks12/7/17302,at9.

693Raffel2/8/18302,at5.

694Raffel2/8/18302,at6.

695Raffel2/8/18302,at6-7;Hicks3/13/18302,at3.

696Hicks12/7/17302,at10;Hicks3/13/18302,at3.

697Hicks12/7/17302,at10.

698Hicks3/13/18302,at3.

699Hicks3/13/18302,at3;Hicks12/7/17302,at10.

700Hicks3/13/18302,at3;seeHicks12/7/17302,at10.

701Hicks3/13/18302,at4.

702Hicks7/8/17Notes.

703Hicks3/13/18302,at4-5;Hicks12/7/17302,at11.

704Hicks12/7/17302,at11.

705SCR011a_000004(7/8/17TextMessage,HickstoTrumpJr.).

706SCR011a_000004(7/8/17TextMessage,HickstoTrumpJr.).

707SCRO11a_000005(7/8/17TextMessage,TrumpJr.toHicks).

708SCRO11a_000005(7/8/17TextMessage,TrumpJr.toHicks).

709SCRO11a_000005(7/8/17TextMessage,HickstoTrumpJr.).

710SCRO11a_000006(7/8/17TextMessage,TrumpJr.toHicks).

711Hicks3/13/18302,at6;see JoBeckeretal.,TrumpTeamMetWithLawyerLinked toKremlinDuringCampaign,NewYorkTimes(July8,2017).

712See JoBeckeretal.,TrumpTeamMetWithLawyerLinked toKremlinDuringCampaign,NewYorkTimes(July8,2017).

713Hicks3/13/18302,at6;Raffel2/8/18302,at9-10.

714Hicks12/7/17302,at12;Raffel2/8/18302,at10.

715Hicks3/13/18302,at7.

716Hicks3/13/18302,at7.

717See JoBeckeretal.,TrumpTeamMetWithLawyerLinked toKremlinDuringCampaign,NewYorkTimes(July8,2017);Raffel2/8/18302,at10.

718See JoBeckeretal.,TrumpTeamMetWithLawyerLinked toKremlinDuringCampaign,NewYorkTimes(July8,2017).

719See Donald Trump Jr. gathered members of campaign/or meeting with Russian lawyer beforeelection,CircaNews(July8,2017).

720Hicks3/13/18302,at8;Corallo2/15/18302,at6-7.

721Corallo2/15/18302,at7.

722Corallo2/15/18302,at7.

723Corallo2/15/18302,at7-9.

724Corallo2/15/18302,at8.

725Corallo2/15/18302,at8;Corallo7/9/17Notes(“Sunday9th–Hopecallsw/POTUSonline”).Corallosaidheis“100%confident”thatHickssaid“Itwillnevergetout”onthecall.Corallo2/15/18302,at9.

726Hicks3/13/18302,at9.

727@DonaldJTrumpJR7/11/17(11:01a.m.ET)Tweet;JoBeckeretal.,RussianDirtonClinton?‘ILoveIt,’DonaldTrumpJr.Said,NewYorkTimes(July11,2017).

728See,e.g.,PeterBaker&MaggieHaberman,RancoratWhiteHouseasRussiaStoryRefusestoLetthePageTurn,NewYorkTimes(July11,2017)(reportingthat thePresident“signedoff”onTrumpJr.’sstatement).

729See,e.g.,DavidWright,Trumplawyer:Presidentwasawareof“nothing”,CNN(July12,2017)(quotingthePresident’spersonalattorneyassaying,“Iwasn’tinvolvedinthestatementdraftingatallnorwasthePresident.”);seealsoGoodMorningAmerica,ABC(July12,2017)(“ThePresidentdidn’tsignoffonanything....ThePresidentwasn’tinvolvedinthat.”);MeetthePress,NBC(July16,2017)(“Idowanttobeclear—thePresidentwasnotinvolvedinthedraftingofthestatement.”).

730SarahSanders,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(Aug.1,2017);Sanders7/3/18302,at9(thePresidenttoldSandershe“weighedin,asanyfatherwould”andknewsheintendedtotellthepresswhathe·said).

7311/29/18Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltoSpecialCounsel’sOffice,at18.

732RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressGaggle(June15,2018).

733GrandJury█.

734PeterBakeretal.,ExcerptsFromTheTimes’sInterviewWithTrump,NewYorkTimes(July19,2017).

735PeterBakeretal.,ExcerptsFromTheTimes’sInterviewWithTrump,NewYorkTimes(July19,2017).

736Sessions1/17/18302,at15.ThatwasthesecondtimethatthePresidentaskedSessionstoreversehis recusal from campaign-related investigations. See Volume II, Section II.C.1, supra (describingPresident’sMarch2017requestatMar-a-LagoforSessionstounrecuse).

737Sessions1/17/18302,at15.

738Sessions1/17/18302,at15.

739Porter4/13/18302,at11;Porter5/8/18302,at6.

740Porter4/13/18302,at11;Porter5/8/18302,at6.

741 Porter 4/13/18302, at 11;Porter 5/8/18302, at 6.BecauseofSessions’s recusal, ifRosensteinwerenolongerinhisposition,Brandwould,bydefault,becometheDOJofficialinchargeofsupervisingtheSpecialCounsel’s investigation, and ifbothSessionsandRosensteinwere removed,BrandwouldbenextinlinetobecomeActingAttorneyGeneralforallDOJmatters.See28U.S.C.§508.

742Porter4/13/18302,at11;Porter5/8/18302,at6.

743SC_RRP000020(Porter7/10/17Notes).

744Porter4/13/18302,at11-12.

745Porter4/13/18302,at11-12.

746Porter4/13/18302, at11-12.Brandconfirmed thatnooneever raisedwithher theprospectoftakingovertheRussiainvestigationorbecomingAttorneyGeneral.Brand1/29/19302,at2.

747McGahn12/14/17302,at11.

748McGahn12/14/17302,at11.

749McGahn12/14/17302,at9.

750Hicks3/13/18302,at10.

751McGahn12/14/17302,at9;Hicks3/13/18302,at10.

752Porter5/8/18302,at10.

753SC_RRP000024(Porter10/16/17Notes);seePorter5/8/18302,at10.

754Porter5/8/18302,at10.

755@realDonaldTrump10/18/17(6:21a.m.ET)Tweet;@realDonaldTrump10/18/17(6:27a.m.ET)Tweet.

756@realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (9:53 a.m. ET) Tweet;@realDonaldTrump 10/29/17 (10:02 a.m.ET)Tweet;@realDonaldTrump10/29/17(10:17a.m.ET)Tweet.

757 Porter 4/13/18 302, at 5-6; see SC_RRP000031 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes) (“12:45pm With thePresident,Gen.Kelly,andSessions(whoIpulledinaftertheCabinetmeeting)”);SC_RRP000033(Porter12/6/17Notes) (“Post-cabinetmeeting –POTUS askedme to getAGSessions.Askedme to stay.AlsoCOSKelly.”).

758Porter5/8/18302,at12;Porter4/13/18302,at5-6.

759SC_RRP000033(Porter12/6/17Notes);seePorter4/13/18302,at6;Porter5/8/18302,at12.

760SC_RRP000033(Porter12/6/17Notes);seePorter4/13/18302,at6.

761SC_RRP000033(Porter12/6/17Notes);Porter4/13/18302,at6.

762Porter4/13/18302,at6-7.

763Michael S. Schmidt&Michael D. Shear,Trump Says Russia InquiryMakes U.S. “Look VeryBad”,NewYorkTimes(Dec.28,2017).

764Michael S. Schmidt&Michael D. Shear,Trump Says Russia InquiryMakes U.S. “Look VeryBad”,NewYorkTimes(Dec.28,2017).

765Porter4/13/18302,at14.

766Porter5/8/18302,at15.ContemporaneousnotesPortertookoftheconversationstate,“RoyCohn(14-0)/JayGoldberg(12-0).”SC_RRP000047(Potter1/27/18Notes).

767Porter5/8/18302,at15-16.

768See,e.g.,@realDonaldTrump2/28/18(9:34a.m.ET)Tweet (“WhyisA.G.JeffSessionsaskingtheInspectorGeneraltoinvestigatepotentiallymassiveFISAabuse.Willtakeforever,hasnoprosecutorialpower and already late with reports on Comey etc. Isn’t the I.G. an Obama guy?Why not use JusticeDepartmentlawyers?DISGRACEFUL!”);@realDonaldTrump4/7/18(4:52p.m.ET)Tweet(“LawmakersoftheHouseJudiciaryCommitteeareangrilyaccusingtheDepartmentofJusticeofmissingtheThursdayDeadline for turning over UNREDACTED Documents relating to FISA abuse, FBI, Comey, Lynch,McCabe,ClintonEmailsandmuchmore.Slowwalking–whatisgoingon?BAD!”);@realDonaldTrump4/22/18 (8:22 a.m. ET) Tweet (“‘GOP Lawmakers asking Sessions to Investigate Comey and HillaryClinton.’@FoxNewsGoodluckwiththatrequest!”);@realDonaldTrump12/16/18(3:37p.m.ET)Tweet(“Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the firstplace!”).

769@realDonaldTrump6/5/18(7:31a.m.ET)Tweet.

770@realDonaldTrump8/1/18(9:24a.m.ET)Tweet.

771Fox&FriendsInterviewofPresidentTrump,FoxNews(Aug.23,2018).

772Fox&FriendsInterviewofPresidentTrump,FoxNews(Aug.23,2018).

773Sessions8/23/18PressStatement.

774@realDonaldTrump8/24/18(6:17a.m.ET)Tweet;@realDonaldTrump8/24/18(6:28a.m.ET)Tweet.

775@realDonaldTrump11/7/18(2:44p.m.ET)Tweet.

776E.g.,DelQuentinWilbur&ByronTau,SpecialCounselRobertMueller ImpanelsWashingtonGrandJuryinRussiaProbe,WallStreetJournal(Aug.3,2017);CarolD.Leonnigetal.,SpecialCounselMuellerusinggrandjuryinfederalcourtinWashingtonaspartofRussiainvestigation,WashingtonPost(Aug.3,2017).

777MichaelS.Schmidt&MaggieHaberman,TrumpOrderedMuellerFired,butBackedOffWhenWhiteHouseCounselThreatenedtoQuit,NewYorkTimes(Jan.25.2018).

778MichaelS.Schmidt&MaggieHaberman,TrumpOrderedMuellerFired,butBackedOffWhenWhiteHouseCounselThreatenedtoQuit,NewYorkTimes(Jan.25.2018).

779MichaelS.Schmidt&MaggieHaberman,TrumpOrderedMuellerFired,butBackedOffWhenWhiteHouseCounselThreatenedtoQuit,NewYorkTimes(Jan.25.2018).

780MichaelS.Schmidt&MaggieHaberman,TrumpOrderedMuellerFired,butBackedOffWhenWhiteHouseCounselThreatenedtoQuit,NewYorkTimes(Jan.25.2018).

781SophieTatum&KaraScannell,TrumpdenieshecalledforMueller’sfiring,CNN(Jan.26,2018);Michael S. Schmidt &Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When WhiteHouseCounselThreatenedtoQuit,NewYorkTimes(Jan.25,2018).

782 ThePost article stated, “Despite internal objections, Trump decided to assert thatMueller hadunacceptableconflictsof interestandmoved to removehimfromhisposition. . . . In response,McGahnsaidhewouldnotremainattheWhiteHouseifTrumpwentthroughwiththemove....McGahndidnotdeliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave.” Rosalind S.Helderman& JoshDawsey,Trumpmoved to fireMueller in June, bringingWhiteHouse counsel to thebrinkofleaving,WashingtonPost(Jan.26,2018).

783RosalindS.Helderman& JoshDawsey,Trumpmoved to fireMueller in June, bringingWhiteHousecounseltothebrinkofleaving,WashingtonPost(Jan.26,2018);seeMcGahn3/8/17302,at3-4.

784McGahn3/8/18302,at3(agentnote).

785McGahn3/8/18302,at3(agentnote).

786McGahn3/8/18302,at3-4(agentnote).

787McGahn3/8/18302,at4(agentnote).

788Hicks3/13/18302,at11.HicksalsorecalledthatthePresidentspokeonthephonethatdaywithChiefofStaff JohnKellyand that thePresidentsaidKelly toldhim thatMcGahnhad totally refuted thestoryandwasgoingtoputoutastatement.Hicks3/13/18302,at11.ButKellysaidthathedidnotspeaktoMcGahnwhenthearticlecameoutanddidnottellanyonehehaddoneso.Kelly8/2/18302,at1-2.

789 Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Sanders did not recall whether the President asked her to speak toMcGahnorifshediditonherown.Sanders7/23/18302,at2.

790Sanders7/23/18302,at1-2.

791MeetthePressInterviewwithReincePriebus,NBC(Feb.4,2018).

792Priebus4/3/18302,at10.

793Priebus4/3/18302,at10.

794Porter4/13/18302,at16-17.PorterdidnotrecallthetimingofthisdiscussionwiththePresident.Porter4/13/18302,at17.EvidenceindicatesitwasFebruary5,2018.OnthebackofapocketcarddatedFebruary5, 2018,Porter tooknotes that are consistentwithhisdescriptionof thediscussion: “COS: (1)Letter from DM – Never threatened to quit – DJT never told him to fireM.” SC_RRP000053 (PorterUndatedNotes).PortersaiditwaspossiblehetookthenotesonadayotherthanFebruary5.Porter4/13/18302, at 17.ButPorter also said that “COS” referred tomattershewanted todiscusswithChiefofStaffKelly,Porter4/13/18302,at17,andKelly tooknotesdatedFebruary5,2018, thatstate“POTUS–DonMcGahn letter–Mueller+ resigning.”WH000017684 (Kelly2/5/18Notes).Kellysaidhedidnot recallwhat thenotesmeant,but thought thePresidentmayhave“mused”abouthavingMcGahnwritea letter.Kelly8/2/18302,at3.McGahnrecalledthatPoiterspokewithhimaboutthePresident’srequestabouttwoweeksaftertheNewYorkTimesstorywaspublished,whichisconsistentwiththediscussiontakingplaceonoraboutFebruary5.McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

795Porter4/13/18302,at17.

796Porter4/13/18302,at17.

797Porter4/13/18302,at17.

798Porter4/13/18302,at17;Porter5/8/18302,at18.

799Porter4/13/18302,at17;Porter5/8/18302,at18.

800Porter4/13/18302,at17.

801Porter4/13/18302,at17;McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

802Porter4/13/18302,at17;McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

803Porter4/13/18302,at17;McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

804Porter4/13/18302,at17;McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

805Porter4/13/18302,at17;McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

806Porter4/13/18302,at17-18;McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

807McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

808Potter4/13/18302,at18.

809McGahn3/8/18302,at4;WH000017685(Kelly2/6/18Notes).McGahnrecalledthat,beforetheOvalOfficemeeting,hetoldKellythathewasnotinclinedtofixthearticle.McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

810 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5 (agent note); 2/26/19 Email, Counsel for Don McGahn to SpecialCounsel’sOffice(confirmingFebruary6,2018dateofcallfromthePresident’spersonalcounsel).

811McGahn3/8/18302,at4;Kelly8/2/18302,at2.

812McGahn3/8/18302,at4;Kelly8/2/18302,at2.

813McGahn3/8/18302,at4.

814McGahn3/8/18302,at4;Kelly8/2/18302,at2.

815McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

816McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

817McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

818McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

819McGahn3/8/18302,at5;Kelly8/2/18302,at2.

820McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

821Kelly8/2/18302,at2.

822McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

823McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

824McGahn3/8/18302,at5.McGahnsaidthePresidentwasreferringtoDonaldson’snotes,whichthePresidentthoughtofasMcGahn’snotes.McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

825McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

826McGahn3/8/18302,at5.

827Kelly8/2/18302,at2.

828 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Office meeting with thePresident after the fact.Kelly8/2/18302, at 2.Handwrittennotes takenbyKelly state, “Don[:]MuellerdiscussioninJune.-BannonPriebus-cameoutokay.”WH000017685(Kelly2/6/18Notes).

829McGahn3/8/18302,at5(agentnote).

830 1/29/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 1-2 (“In ourconversationofJanuary8,yourofficeidentifiedthefollowingtopicsasareasyoudesiredtoaddresswiththePresidentinordertocompleteyourinvestigationonthesubjectsofallegedcollusionandobstructionofjustice”;listing16topics).

831See,e.g.,emarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressConference,WhiteHouse(Feb.16,2018)(statingthat“Flynnisafineperson”and“Idon’tthink[Flynn]didanythingwrong.Ifanything,hedidsomethingright...Youknow,hewasjustdoinghisjob”);InterviewofDonaldJTrump,NBC(May11,2017)(statingthatFlynnisa“verygoodperson”).

832SeePriebus1/18/17302,at9-10(thePresidentaskedPriebustocontactFlynntheweekhewasterminated to convey that the President still cared about him and felt bad aboutwhat happened to him;PriebusthoughtthePresidentdidnotwantFlynntohaveaproblemwithhim);McFarland12/22/17302,at18(aboutamonthortwoafterFlynnwasterminated,thePresidentaskedMcFarlandtogetintouchwithFlynnandtellhimthathewasagoodguy,heshouldstaystrong,andthePresidentfeltbadforhim);Flynn1/19/18302,at9(recallingthecallfromPriebusandanadditionalcallfromHickswhosaidshewantedtorelay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay); Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3(describingaphoneconversationbetweenKushnerandFlynnthedayafterFlynnwasfiredwhereKushnersaid,“YouknowthePresidentrespectsyou.ThePresidentcaresaboutyou.I’llgetthePresidenttosendoutapositivetweetaboutyoulater,”andthePresidentnoddedhisassenttoKushner’scommentpromisingatweet).

833CounselforFlynn3/1/18302,at1.

834CounselforFlynn3/1/18302,atI.

83511/22/17VoicemailTranscript,President’sPersonalCounseltoCounselforMichaelFlynn.

836CounselforFlynn3/1/18302,at1.

837CounselforFlynn3/1/18302,at1.

838CounselforFlynn3/1/18302,at1.

839CounselforFlynn3/1/18302,at2.Becauseofattorney-clientprivilegeissues,wedidnotseektointerviewthePresident’spersonalcounselabouttheextenttowhichhediscussedhisstatementstoFlynn’sattorneyswiththePresident.

840CounselforFlynn3/1/18302,at2.

841Information,UnitedStatesv.MichaelT.Flynn,1:17-cr-232(D.D.C.Dec.1,2017),Doc.1;PleaAgreement,UnitedStatesv.MichaelTFlynn,1:17-cr-232(D.D.C.Dec.1,2017),Doc.3.

842President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform andMichael Flynn’s Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2,2017).

843President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform andMichael Flynn’s Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2,2017).

844See@realDonaldTrump12/2/17(9:06p.m.ET)Tweet(“SoGeneralFlynnliestotheFBIandhislife isdestroyed,whileCrookedHillaryClinton,on thatnowfamousFBlholiday‘interrogation’withnoswearing inandnorecording, liesmany times . . .andnothinghappens toher?Riggedsystem,or justadoublestandard?”);PresidentTrumpDepartureRemarks,C-SPAN(Dec.4,2017)(“Well,IfeelbadlyforGeneralFlynn.Ifeelverybadly.He’sledaverystronglife.AndIfeelverybadly.”).

845PresidentTrumpWhiteHouseDeparture,C-SPAN(Dec.15,2017).

846Indictment,UnitedStatesv.PaulJ.Manafort,Jr.andRichardW.GatesIII,1:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Oct,27,2017),Doc.13 (“ManafortandGatesD.D.C. Indictment”);Indictment,United States v.Paul J.

Manafort,Jr.andRichardW.GatesIII,1:18-cr-83(E.D.Va.Feb.22,2018),Doc.9(“ManafortandGatesE.D.Va.Indictment”)

847ManafortandGatesD.D.C.Indictment;ManafortandGatesE.D.Va.Indictment.

848Gates4/18/18302,at4. InFebruary2018,Gatespleadedguilty,pursuant toacooperationpleaagreement, to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commitmultipleoffenses(i.e.,taxfraud,failuretoreportforeignbankaccounts,andactingasanunregisteredagentof a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our Office.Superseding Criminal Information,United States v. RichardW. Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23,2018),Doc. 195; PleaAgreement,United States v. RichardW.Gates III, l: I 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23,2018),Doc.205.Gateshasprovidedinformationandin-courttestimonythattheOfficehasdeemedtobereliable.

849Gates4/18/18302,at4.

850Gates4/18/18302,at4.ManaforttoldthisOfficethathenevertoldGatesthathehadtalkedtothePresident’spersonalcounselorsuggestedthattheywouldbetakencareof.ManafortalsosaidhehopedforapardonbutneverdiscussedonewiththePresident,althoughhenoticedthePresident’spubliccommentsabout pardons.Manafort 10/1/18302, at 11.As explained inVolume I,Section IV.A.8, supra,Manafortentered into a plea agreement with our Office. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbiadeterminedthathebreachedtheagreementbybeinguntruthfulinproffersessionsandbeforethegrandjury.Order,UnitedStatesv.Manafort,1:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Feb.13,2019),Doc.503.

851 Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11. Priebus recalled that the President never really liked Manafort. SeePriebus4/3/18302,at11.HickssaidthatcandidateTrumptrustedManafort’sjudgmentwhileheworkedontheCampaign,butshealsoonceheardTrumptellGatestokeepaneyeonManafort.Hicks3/13/18302,at16.

852Porter5/8/18302,at11;McGahn12/14/17302,at14.

853RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressGaggle,WhiteHouse(June15,2018).

854RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressGaggle,WhiteHouse(June15,2018).

855@realDonaldTrump6/15/18(1:41p.m.ET)Tweet.

856ChrisSommerfeldt,RudyGiuliani saysMuellerprobe ‘mightget cleanedup’with ‘presidentialpardons’inlightofPaulManafortgoingtojail,NewYorkDailyNews(June15,2018).

857 Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing New ObstructionCharges,NewYorkTimes(June15,2018)(quotingGiuliani).

858State of theUnionwith Jake Tapper Transcript,CNN (June 17, 2018); see Karoun Demitjian,GiulianisuggestsTrumpmaypardonManafortafterMueller’sprobe,WashingtonPost(June17,2018).

859StateoftheUnionwithJakeTapperTranscript,CNN(June17,2018).

860StateoftheUnionwithJakeTapperTranscript,CNN(June17,2018).

861StateoftheUnionwithJakeTapperTranscript,CNN(June17,2018).

862See,e.g.,KatelynPolantz,Takeaways fromday one of thePaulManafort trial,CNN (July 31,2018); FrankBruni,PaulManafort’s Trial IsDonald Trump’s, Too, NewYork TimesOpinion (July 31,2018);RachelWeineretal.,PaulManaforttrialDay2:Witnessesdescribeextravagantclothingpurchases,homeremodels,lavishcarspaidwithwiretransfers,WashingtonPost(Aug.1,2018).

863@realDonaldTrump8/1/18(9:24a.m.ET)Tweet.Laterthatday,whenSanderswasaskedaboutthe President’s tweet, she told reporters, “It’s not an order. It’s the President’s opinion.” Sarah Sanders,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(Aug.1,2018).

864@realDonaldTrump8/1/18(9:34a.m.ET)Tweet.

865@realDonaldTrump8/1/18(11:35a.m.ET)Tweet.

866See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump calls Manafort prosecution “a hoax,” says Sessionsshould stop Mueller investigation “right now”, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018); Louis Nelson, TrumpclaimsManafortcasehas“nothingtodowithcollusion”,Politico(Aug.1.2018).

867SarahSanders,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(Aug.1,2018).

868ChrisStrohm&ShannonPettypiece,MuellerProbeDoesn’tNeedtoShutDownBeforeMidterms,OfficialsSay,Bloomberg(Aug.15,2018).

869See,e.g.,KatelynPolantzetal.,Manafort juryends firstdayofdeliberationswithoutaverdict,CNN (Aug. 16, 2018); DavidVoreacos,WhatMueller’sManafort CaseMeans for the Trump Battle toCome,Bloomberg(Aug.2,2018);GabbyMorrongiello,WhataguiltyverdictforManafortwouldmeanforTrumpandMueller,WashingtonExaminer(Aug.18,2018).

870PresidentTrumpRemarksonJohnBrennanandMuellerProbe,C-SPAN(Aug.17,2018).

871PresidentTrumpRemarksonJohnBrennanandMuellerProbe,C-SPAN(Aug.17,2018).

872PresidentTrumpRemarksonJohnBrennanandMuellerProbe,C-SPAN(Aug.17,2018).

873PresidentTrumpRemarksonJohnBrennanandMuellerProbe,C-SPAN(Aug.17,2018).

874TrumpcallsManafort“verygoodperson,”AllInwithChrisHayes(Aug.17,2018)(transcript);Manafort lawyer: We appreciate Trump’s support, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018)(https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/08/17/paul-manafort-attorney-trump-jury-deliberations-schneider-lead-vpx.cnn).

875Transcriptat23,UnitedStatesv.MichaelCohen,1:18-cr-602(S.D.N.Y.Aug.21,2018),Doc.7(Cohen8/21/18Transcript).

876PresidentTrumpRemarksonManafortTrial,C-SPAN(Aug.21,2018).

877PresidentTrumpRemarksonManafortTrial,C-SPAN(Aug.21,2018).

878@realDonaldTrump8/22/18(9:21a.m.ET)Tweet.

879Fox&FriendsExclusiveInterviewwithPresidentTrump,FoxNews(Aug.23,2018) (recordedthepreviousday).

880Fox&FriendsExclusiveInterviewwithPresidentTrump,FoxNews(Aug.23,2018) (recordedthepreviousday).

881Fox&FriendsExclusiveInterviewwithPresidentTrump,FoxNews(Aug.23,2018) (recordedthepreviousday).

882MaggieHaberman&KatieRogers,“HowDidWeEndUpHere?”TrumpWondersastheWhiteHouseSoldiersOn,NewYorkTimes(Aug.22,2018).

883CarolD.Leonnig& JoshDawsey,Trump recently sought his lawyers’ advice on possibility ofpardoningManafort,Giulianisays,WashingtonPost(Aug.23,2018).

884PleaAgreement,UnitedStatesv.PaulJ.Manafort,Jr.,1:17-cr-201(D.D.C.Sept.14,2018),Doc.422.

885 Karen Freifeld & Nathan Layne, Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Muellerinterviews, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2018);Michael S. Schmidt et al.,Manafort’s Lawyer Said to Brief TrumpAttorneysonWhatHeToldMueller,NewYorkTimes(Nov.27,2018);DanaBash,ManafortteambriefedGiuliani on Mueller meetings, CNN, Posted 11/28/18, available athttps://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/11/28/manafort-lawyers-keeping-trump-lawyers-giuliani-updated-mueller-probe-bash-sot-nr-vpx.cnn; see Sean Hannity, Interview with Rudy Giuliani, Fox News(Sept. 14, 2018) (Giuliani: “[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the pleaagreementhas,andcooperationagreementhas,nothingtodowiththeTrumpcampaign....Now,IknowthatbecauseI’vebeenprivytoalotoffactsIcan’trepeat.”).

886JointStatusReport,UnitedStatesv.PaulJ.Manafort,Jr.,(D.D.CNov.26,2018),Doc.455.

887StephenCollinson,Trumpappears consumedbyMueller investigationas details emerge,CNN(Nov.29,2018).

888“Corsi”isareferencetoJeromeCorsi,HOM█████████████whowasinvolvedineffortstocoordinatewithWikiLeaksandAssange,andwhostatedpubliclyatthattimethathehadrefusedapleaofferfromtheSpecialCounsel’sOfficebecausehewas“notgoingtosignalie.”SaraMurray&EliWatkins,HOM█████████████sayshewon’tagreetopleadeal,CNN(Nov.26,2018).

889MarisaSchultz&NikkiSchwab,OvalOfficeInterviewwithPresidentTrump:TrumpsayspardonforPaulManafortstillapossibility,NewYorkPost(Nov.28,2018).Thatsameday,thePresidenttweeted:“WhilethedisgustingFakeNewsisdoingeverythingwithintheirpowernottoreportitthatway,atleast3majorplayersareintimatingthattheAngryMuellerGangofDemsisviciouslytellingwitnessestolieaboutfacts&theywillgetrelief.ThisisourJosephMcCarthyEra!”@realDonaldTrump11/28/18(8:39a.m.ET)Tweet.

890Marisa Schultz&Nikki Schwab,New York PostOvalOffice Interviewwith President Trump:TrumpsayspardonforPaulManafortstillapossibility,NewYorkPost(Nov.28,2018).

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909 In August 2018 and November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception,includingmakingfalsestatementstoCongressabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowproject,asdescribedlaterinthissection.WhenCohenfirstmetwithinvestigatorsfromthisOffice,herepeatedthesamelieshetoldCongressabout theTrumpTowerMoscowproject.Cohen8/7/18302,at12-17.ButafterCohenpleadedguiltytooffensesintheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkonAugust21,2018,hemetwithinvestigatorsagainandcorrected the record.TheOffice foundCohen’s testimony in these subsequentproffer sessions tobeconsistentwithandcorroboratedbyotherinformationobtainedinthecourseoftheOffice’sinvestigation.TheOffice’ssentencingsubmissioninCohen’scriminalcasestated:“Startingwithhissecondmeetingwiththe[SpecialCounsel’sOffice]inSeptember2018,thedefendanthasacceptedresponsibilitynotonlyforhisfalsestatementsconcerningthe[TrumpTower]MoscowProject,butalsohisbroadereffortsthroughpublicstatements and testimony before Congress to minimize his role in, and what he knew about, contactsbetween the [Trump Organization] and Russian interests during the course of the campaign. . . . Theinformation provided by Cohen about the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project in these proffer sessions is

consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the [Special Counsel’sOffice’s] investigation. . . . The defendant, without prompting by the [Special Counsel’s Office], alsocorrectedotherfalseandmisleadingstatementsthathehadmadeconcerninghisoutreachtoandcontactswithRussianofficialsduringthecourseofthecampaign.”Gov’tSentencingSubmissionat4,UnitedStatesv.MichaelCohen,1:18-cr-850(S.D.N.Y.Dec.7,2018),Doc.14.AtCohen’ssentencing,ourOfficefurtherexplainedthatCohenhad“providedvaluableinformation. . .whiletakingcareandbeingcarefultonotewhatheknowsandwhathedoesn’tknow.”Transcriptat19,UnitedStatesv.MichaelCohen,1:18-cr-850(S.D.N.Y.Dec.12,2018),Doc.17(Cohen12/12/18Transcript).

910SeeVolumeI,SectionIV.A.1,supra(notingthatstartinginat least2013,severalemployeesoftheTrumpOrganization, including then-presidentof theorganizationDonaldJ.Trump,pursuedaTrumpTowerMoscowdealwithseveralRussiancounterparties).

911Cohen9/12/18302,at1-4;Cohen8/7/18302,at15.

912Cohen9/12/18302,at2,4.

913Cohen9/12/18302,at4.

914Cohen9/12/18302,at4,10.

915MDC-H-000618-25 (10/28/15Letterof lntent, signedbyDonald J.Trump,TrumpAcquisition,LLCandAndreyRozov,I.C.ExpertInvestmentCompany);Cohen9/12/18302,at3;WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at15(ResponsetoQuestionIII,Parts(a)through(g)).

916MDC-H-000600(12/19/15Email,SatertoCohen).

917Cohen9/12/18302,at5.

918 See FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); TRUMPORG_MC_000233 (1/11/16Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru); MDC-H-000690 (1/14/16 Email, Cohen toinfo@prpress.gov.ru);TRUMPORG_MC_000235(1/16/16Email,Cohentopr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru).

9191/20/16Email,PoliakovatoCohen;CallRecordsofMichaelCohen.(Showinga22-minutecallonJanuary20,2016,betweenCohenandthenumberPoliakovaprovidedinheremail);Cohen9/12/18302,at 2-3. After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova’s contact information in his TrumpOrganizationOutlookcontactlist.1/20/16CohenMicrosoftOutlookEntry(6:22a.m.).

920Cohen11/20/18302,at5.

921Cohen11/20/18302,at5-6;Cohen11/12/18302,at4.

922Cohen11/20/18302,at5.

923Cohen9/12/18302,at5.

924FS00011(1/21/16TextMessages,Sater&Cohen).

925Cohen9/12/18302,at5;1/25/16Email,SatertoCohen(attachment).

926Cohen11/20/18302,at5.

927Cohen9/12/18302,at6.Inlatercongressionaltestimony,CohenstatedthathebriefedTrumpontheprojectapproximatelysixtimesafterJanuary2016.HearingonIssuesRelatedtoTrumpOrganizationBeforetheHouseOversightandReformCommittee,116thCong.(Feb.27,2019)(CQCong.Transcripts,at24)(testimonyofMichaelCohen).

928Cohen9/12/18302,at6.

929Cohen9/18/18302,at4.

930Cohen9/12/18302,at10.

931Cohen9/12/18302,at7.

932Cohen9/12/18302,at7.

933FS00015(5/4/16TextMessage,SatertoCohen).

934FS00015(5/4/16TextMessage,CohentoSater).

935FS00016-17(5/5/16TextMessages,Sater&Cohen).

936Cohen9/12/18302,at7.

937Cohen9/12/18302,at7.

938Cohen9/12/18302,at7-8.

939Cohen9/12/18302,at8.

940Cohen3/19/19302,at2.

941Cohen3/19/19302,at2.Cohencouldnotrecalltheprecisetimingofthisconversation,butsaidhethoughtitoccurredinJuneorJuly2016.CohenrecalledthattheconversationhappenedatsomepointaftercandidateTrumpwaspubliclystatingthathehadnothingtodowithRussia.Cohen3/19/19302,at2.

942Cohen3/19/19302,at2.

943Cohen3/19/19302,at2.

944Cohen11/20/18302,atl;Cohen9/18/18302,at3,5;Cohen9/12/18302,at9.

945Cohen9/18/18302,at1-2;seealsoRtskhiladze4/4/18302,at8-9.

946Cohen9/18/18302,at1-2.

947Cohen9/18/18302,at3.

948Cohen11/20/18302,at4.

949Cohen9/18/18302,at5.ThearticlewaspublishedonFebruary19,2017,andreportedthatSaterandCohenhadbeenworkingonplanforaTrumpTowerMoscow“asrecentlyasthefallof2015”buthadcometoahaltbecauseofthepresidentialcampaign.ConsistentwithCohen’sintendedpartylinemessage,the article stated, “Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project inMoscowfromaRussianrealestatedeveloperatthattimebutdeterminedthattheprojectwasnotfeasible.”Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of TrumpAssociates,NewYorkTimes(Feb.19,2017).

950Cohen9/18/18302,at5-6.

951Cohen9/18/18302,at6.

952Cohen9/12/18302,at10.

953P-SCO-000000328(5/9/17Letter,HPSCItoCohen);P-SCO-000000331(5/12/17Letter,SSCItoCohen).

954Cohen11/20/18302,at2-3.

955Cohen11/20/18302,at2-3.

956Cohen11/12/18302,at2;Cohen11/20/19302,at3.

957Cohen11/12/18302,at2.

958 Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18, at 2-6. Cohen told investigators about hisconversationswith thePresident’spersonal counsel afterwaivinganyprivilegeofhisownandafter thisOffice advised his counsel not to provide any communications that would be covered by any otherprivilege,includingcommunicationsprotectedbyajointdefenseorcommoninterestprivilege.Asaresult,mostofwhatCohentoldusabouthisconversationswiththePresident’spersonalcounselconcernedwhatCohenhadcommunicated to thePresident’spersonalcounsel,andnotwhatwassaid in response.Cohendescribedcertain statementsmadeby thePresident’spersonalcounsel,however, thatare set forth in thissection.Cohenandhis counselwerebetterpositioned than thisOffice to evaluatewhether anyprivilegeprotectedthosestatementsbecausetheyhadknowledgeofthescopeoftheir jointdefenseagreementandaccess to privileged communications thatmay have provided context for evaluating the statements theyshared. After interviewing Cohen about these matters, we asked the President’s personal counsel if hewishedtoprovideinformationtousabouthisconversationswithCohenrelatedtoCohen’scongressionaltestimonyaboutTrumpTowerMoscow.ThePresident’s personal counsel declined and, throughhis owncounsel,indicatedthathecouldnotdisaggregateinformationhehadobtainedfromCohenfrominformationhe had obtained from other parties in the JDA. In view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen’scounseltowithholdcommunicationsthatcouldbecoveredbyprivilege,thePresident’spersonalCounsel’suncertaintyabouttheprovenanceofhisownknowledge,theburdenonaprivilegeholdertoestablishtheelementstosupportaclaimofprivilege,andthesubstanceofthestatementsthemselves,wehaveincludedrelevantstatementsCohenprovidedinthisreport.Ifthestatementsweretobeusedinacontextbeyondthisreport,furtheranalysiscouldbewarranted.

959Cohen11/20/18302,at6.

960Cohen11/20/18302,at2,4.

961Cohen11/20/18302,at4.

962Cohen9/18/18302,at8;Cohen11/20/18302,at3-4.

963Cohen11/20/18302,at4.

964Cohen9/18/18302,at11;Cohen11/20/18302,at2.

965 P-SCO-000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email and Attachment, Michael Cohen’sCounseltoCohen).CohensaiditwasnothisideatowritealettertoCongressaboutTrumpTowerMoscow.Cohen9/18/18302,at7.

966P-SCO-00009478(StatementofMichaelD.Cohen,Esq.(Aug.28,2017)).

967P-SCO-;00009478(StatementofMichaelD.Cohen,Esq.(Aug.28,2017)).

968P-SCO-00009478(StatementofMichaelD.Cohen,Esq.(Aug.28,2017)).

969P-SCO-00009478(StatementofMichaelD.Cohen,Esq.(Aug.28,2017)).

970P-SCO-00009478(StatementofMichaelD.Cohen,Esq.(Aug.28,2017)).

971Cohen9/12/18302,at8-9.CohenalsotestifiedinCongressthatthePresident’scounselreviewedandeditedthestatement.HearingonIssuesRelatedtoTrumpOrganizationBeforetheHouseOversightandReformCommittee,116thCong. (Feb.27,2019) (CQCong.Transcripts,at24-25) (testimonybyMichaelCohen).Becauseofconcernsaboutthecommoninterestprivilege,wedidnotobtainorreviewalldraftsofCohen’sstatement.BasedonthedraftsthatwerereleasedthroughthisOffice’sfilterprocess,itappearsthatthe substance of the four principal false statements described above were contained in an early draftprepared by Cohen and his counsel. P-SCO-0000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email andAttachment,Cohen’scounseltoCohen).

972P-SCO-0000003687(8/16/17DraftStatementofMichaelCohen);Cohen11/20/18302,at4.

973Cohen11/20/18302,at4.AdifferentlinestatingthatCohendid“notrecallanyresponsetomyemail [to Peskov in January 2016], nor any other contacts by me with Mr. Peskov or other Russiangovernment officials about the proposal” remained in the draft. See P-SCO-0000009478 (Statement ofMichaelD.Cohen,Esq.(Aug.28,2017)).

974Cohen11/20/18302,at4.

975Cohen11/20/18302,at5.

976Cohen9/18/18302,at10-11.

977Cohen9/18/18302,at11;Cohen11/12/8302,at4.

978Cohen9/18/18302,at11;Cohen11/12/18302,at5.

979Cohen11/12/18302,at5.

980Cohen9/18/18302,at11.

981Cohen3/19/19302,at2.

982Cohen3/19/19302,at2;seeCohen9/18/18302,at11(recallingthathewastoldthatifhestayedonmessageandkeptthePresidentoutofthenarrative,thePresidentwouldhavehisback).

983 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8; Information at 4-5, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850(S.D.N.Y.Nov.29,2018),Doc.2(CohenInformation).

984Cohen11/20/18302,at4.

985Cohen11/20/18302,at4;Cohen11/12/18302,at2-3,4,6.

986Cohen9/12/18302,at9.

987Cohen9/12/18302,at8-9.

988Cohen11/12/18302,at2-3;Cohen11/20/18302,at5;CallRecordsofMichaelCohen(ReflectingthreecontactsonAugust18,2017 (24seconds;5minutes25seconds;and10minutes58seconds); twocontactsonAugust19(23secondsand24minutes26seconds);threecontactsonAugust23(8seconds;20minutes 33 seconds; and 5minutes 8 seconds); one contact onAugust 24 (11minutes 59 seconds); 14contactsonAugust27(28seconds;4minutes37seconds;1minute16seconds;1minutes35seconds;6minutes 16 seconds; 1minutes 10 seconds; 3minutes 5 seconds; 18minutes 55 seconds; 4minutes 56seconds;11minutes6seconds;8seconds;3seconds;2seconds;2seconds).

989Cohen11/20/18302,at5;CallRecordsofMichaelCohen.(Reflecting14contactsonAugust27,2017(28seconds;4minutes37seconds;1minute16seconds;1minutes35seconds;6minutes16seconds;1minutes10seconds;3minutes5seconds;18minutes55seconds;4minutes56seconds;11minutes6seconds;8seconds;3seconds;2seconds;2seconds)).

990Cohen11/20/18302,at5.

991Cohen11/20/18302,at5.CohenalsovaguelyrecalledtellingthePresident’spersonalcounselthathespokewithawomanfromtheKremlinandthatthePresident’spersonalcounselrespondedtotheeffectof“sowhat?”becausethedealneverhappened.Cohen11/20/18302,at5.

992Cohen11/20/18302,at5.

993Cohen11/20/18302,at5.

9942/8/19email,CounselforpersonalcounseltothePresidenttoSpecialCounsel’sOffice.

995Cohen9/18/18302,at7;CarolD.Leonnigetal.,Trump’sbusinesssoughtdealonaTrumpTowerinMoscowwhileheranforpresident,WashingtonPost(Aug.27,2017).

996CarolD.Leonnigetal.,Trump’sbusinesssoughtdealonaTrumpTowerinMoscowwhileheran

forpresident,WashingtonPost(Aug.27,2017).

997Cohen9/18/18302,at7.

998P-SCO-000009477-9478(8/28/17LetterandAttachment,CohentoSSCI).

999Cohen11/12/18302,at2;Cohen9/12/18302,at9.

1000Cohen9/12/18302,at9.

1001Cohen9/18/18302,at7;see,e.g.,READ:MichaelCohen’sstatementtotheSenateintelligencecommittee,CNN(Sept.19,2017).

1002Cohen9/18/18302,at7.

1003Cohen9/18/18302,at7;Cohen11/20/18302,at6.

1004Cohen11/20/18302,at6.PhonerecordsshowthatthePresident’spersonalcounselcalledCohenonthemorningofSeptember20,2017,andtheyspokeforapproximately11minutes,andthattheyhadtwomore contacts that day, one ofwhich lasted approximately 18minutes.CallRecords ofMichaelCohen.(ReflectingthreecontactsonSeptember20,2017,withcallslastingfor11minutes3seconds;2seconds;and18minutes38seconds).

1005CohenInformation,at4;ExecutiveSession,PermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,InterviewofMichaelCohen(Oct.24,2017),at10-11,117-119.

1006CallRecords ofMichaelCohen. (Reflecting two contacts onOctober 24, 2017 (12minutes 8secondsand8minutes27seconds)andthreecontactsonOctober25,2017(1second;4minutes6seconds;and6minutes6seconds)).

1007See, e.g.,MichaelRothfeld& Joe Palazzolo,Trump Lawyer Arranged $130,000 Payment forAdult-FilmStar’sSilence,WallStreetJournal(Jan.12,2018).

1008TheOfficewasauthorizedtoinvestigateCohen’sestablishmentanduseofEssentialConsultantsLLC,whichCohencreatedtofacilitatethe$130,000paymentduringthecampaign,basedonevidencethattheentityreceivedfundsfromRussian-backedentities.Cohen’suseofEssentialConsultantstofacilitatethe$130,000payment to thewomanduring thecampaignwaspartof theOffice’s referralofcertainCohen-relatedmatterstotheU.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork.

1009See,e.g.,MarkBerman,LongtimeTrumpattorney says hemade $130,000 payment to StormyDanielswithhismoney,WashingtonPost(Feb.14,2018).

1010Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and ReformCommittee,116thCong.(Feb.27,2019)(CQCong.Transcripts,at147-148)(testimonyofMichaelCohen).Toll records show that Cohen was connected to a White House phone number for approximately fiveminutesonJanuary19,2018,andforapproximatelysevenminutesonJanuary30,2018,and thatCohencalledMelaniaTrump’s cell phone several times between January 26, 2018, and January 30, 2018.CallRecordsofMichaelCohen.

10112/19/18TextMessage,President’spersonalcounseltoCohen;seeJimRutenbergetal.,ToolsofTrump’sFixer:Payouts,IntimidationandtheTabloids,NewYorkTimes(Feb.18,2018).

1012Gov’tOpp.toDef.Mot.forTemp.RestrainingOrder,IntheMatterofSearchWarrantsExecutedonApril9,2018,18-mj-3161(S.D.N.Y.Apr.13,2018),Doc.1(“OnApril9,2018,agentsfromtheNewYorkfieldofficeoftheFederalBureauofInvestigation...executedsearchwarrantsforMichaelCohen’sresidence,hotelroom,office,safetydepositbox,andelectronicdevices.”).

1013Remarks by President Trump BeforeMeeting with SeniorMilitary Leadership,White House(Apr.9,2018).

1014Remarks by President Trump BeforeMeeting with SeniorMilitary Leadership,White House(Apr.9,2018).

1015Cohen,10/17/18302,at11.

1016Cohen3/19/19302,at4.

1017Cohen9/12/18302,at4.

1018Cohen9/12/18302,at11.

1019Cohen9/12/18302,at11.

1020Cohen9/12/18302,at11.

1021Cohen9/12/18302,at11.

1022 4/17/18 Email, Citron to Cohen; 4/19/18 Email, Costello to Cohen; MC-SCO-001 (7/7/18redactedbillingstatementfromDavidoff,Hutcher&CitrontoCohen).

10234/21/18Email,CostellotoCohen.

1024SeeMaggieHabermanetal.,MichaelCohenHasSaidHeWouldTakeaBulletforTrump.MaybeNotAnymore.,NewYorkTimes(Apr.20,2018).

1025@realDonaldTrump4/21/18(9:10a.m.ET)Tweets.

10264/21/18Email,CostellotoCohen.

10274/21/18Email,CostellotoCohen.HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████

1028Cohen9/12/18302,at11.

1029Cohen9/12/18302,at10.

1030Cohen9/12/18302,at10.

1031Cohen11/20/18302,at7.AtaWhiteHousepressbriefingonApril23,2018,inresponsetoaquestion about whether theWhiteHouse had “close[d] the door oneway or the other on the PresidentpardoningMichaelCohen,”Sanderssaid,“It’shardtoclosethedooronsomethingthathasn’ttakenplace.Idon’tliketodiscussorcommentonhypotheticalsituationsthatmayormaynoteverhappen.Iwouldreferyoutopersonalattorneystocommentonanythingspecificregardingthatcase,butwedon’thaveanythingatthispoint.”SarahSanders,WhiteHouseDailyBriefing,C-SPAN(Apr.23,2018).

1032Cohen11/20/18302,at7;Cohen3/19/19302,at3.

1033Cohen3/19/19302,at3.

1034Cohen3/19/19302,at3-4.

1035 Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France Before Restricted BilateralMeeting,TheWhiteHouse(Apr.24,2018).

1036PresidentDonald TrumpHoldsMedia Availability BeforeDeparting for theG-7 Summit,CQNewsmakerTranscripts(June8,2018).

1037RemarksbyPresidentTrumpinPressGaggle,TheWhiteHouse(June15,2018).

1038EXCLUSIVE:MichaelCohensaysfamilyandcountry,notPresidentTrump,ishis‘firstloyalty’,ABC(July2,2018).Cohensaidintheinterview,“Tobecrystalclear,mywife,mydaughterandmyson,andthiscountryhavemyfirstloyalty.”

1039Seee.g.,DarrenSamuelsohn,MichaelCohenhiresClintonscandalveteranLannyDavis,Politico(July5,2018).

1040 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al.,Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment toPlayboyModel,NewYorkTimes(July20,2018).

1041@realDonaldTrump7/21/18(8:10a.m.ET)Tweet.

1042See,e.g.,JimSciutto,CuomoPrimeTimeTranscript,CNN(July26,2018).

1043@realDonaldTrump7/27/18(7:26a.m.ET)Tweet;@realDonaldTrump7/27/18(7:38a.m.ET)Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56 a.m. ET) Tweet. At the time of these tweets, the press hadreportedthatCohen’sfinancialinterestsintaxicabmedallionswerebeingscrutinizedbyinvestigators.See,e.g.,MattApuzzoetal.,MichaelCohenSecretlyTapedTrumpDiscussingPaymenttoPlayboyModel,NewYorkTimes(July20,2018).

1044CohenInformation.

1045Cohen8/21/18Transcript,at23.

1046@realDonaldTrurnp8/22/18(9:21a.m.ET)Tweet.

1047 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to President’s Personal Counsel (attaching writtenquestionsforthePresident,withattachments).

1048 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel’s Office to President’s Personal Counsel (attaching writtenquestionsforthePresident),QuestionIII,Parts(a)through(g).

1049WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018).

1050WrittenResponsesofDonaldJ.Trump(Nov.20,2018),at15(ResponsetoQuestionIII,Parts(a)through(g)).

1051CohenInformation;Cohen8/21/18Transcript.

1052PleaAgreementat4,UnitedStatesv.MichaelCohen,1:18-cr-850(S.D.N.Y.Nov.29,2018).

1053President TrumpDepartureRemarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018). In contrast to the President’sremarksfollowingcohen’sguiltyplea,Cohen’sAugust28,2017statementtoCongressstatedthatCohen,notthePresident,“decidedtoabandontheproposal”inlateJanuary2016;thatCohen“didnotaskorbriefMr.Trump...beforeImadethedecisiontoterminatefurtherworkontheproposal”;andthatthedecisionto abandon the proposalwas “unrelated” to theCampaign.P-SCO-000009477 (Statement ofMichaelD.Cohen,Esq.(Aug.28,2017)).

1054PresidentTrumpDepartureRemarks,C-SPAN(Nov.29,2018).

1055PresidentTrumpDepartureRemarks,C-SPAN(Nov.29,2018).

1056PresidentTrumpDepartureRemarks,C-SPAN(Nov.29,2018).

10571/23/19Letter,SpecialCounsel’sOfficetoPresident’sPersonalCounsel.

10581/23/19Letter,SpecialCounsel’sOfficetoPresident’sPersonalCounsel.

10592/6/19Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltoSpecialCounsel’sOffice.

1060@realDonaldTrump12/3/18(10:24a.m.ETand10:29a.m.ET)Tweets(emphasisadded).

1061@realDonaldTrump12/3/18(10:48a.m.ET)Tweet.

1062Cohen12/12/18Transcript.

1063@realDonaldTrump12/13/18(8:17a.m.ET,8:25a.m.ET,and8:39a.m.ET)Tweets(emphasisadded).

1064@realDonaldTrump12/16/18(9:39a.m.ET)Tweet.

1065JeaninePirroInterviewwithPresidentTrump,FoxNews(Jan.12,2019)(emphasisadded).

1066@rea1DonaldTrump1/18/19(10:02a.m.ET)Tweet(emphasisadded).

1067StatementbyLannyDavis,Cohen’spersonalcounsel(Jan.23,2019).

1068@realDonaldTrump1/24/19(7:48a.m.ET)Tweet.

1069MeetthePressInterviewwithRudyGiuliani,NBC(Jan.20,2019).

1070MarkMazzettietal.,MoscowSkyscraperTalksContinuedThrough“theDayIWon,”TrumpIsSaidtoAcknowledge,NewYorkTimes(Jan.20,2019).

1071MaggieHaberman,Giuliani SaysHisMoscow Trump TowerCommentsWere “Hypothetical”,NewYorkTimes (Jan. 21, 2019). In a letter to thisOffice, the President’s counsel stated thatGiuliani’spubliccomments“werenotintendedtosuggestnordidtheyreflectknowledgeoftheexistenceortimingofconversationsbeyondthatcontainedinthePresident’s[writtenresponsestotheSpecialCounsel’sOffice].”2/6/19Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltoSpecialCounsel’sOffice.

III.LEGALDEFENSESTOTHEAPPLICATIONOFOBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICESTATUTESTOTHEPRESIDENTThe President’s personal counsel has written to this Office to advance

statutory and constitutional defenses to the potential application of theobstruction-of-justice statutes to the President’s conduct.1072 As a statutorymatter, the President’s counsel has argued that a core obstruction-of-justicestatute,18U.S.C.§1512(c)(2),doesnotcoverthePresident’sactions.1073Asaconstitutional matter, the President’s counsel argued that the President cannotobstructjusticebyexercisinghisconstitutionalauthoritytocloseDepartmentofJustice investigationsor terminate theFBIDirector.1074Under that view, anystatute that restricts the President’s exercise of those powers wouldimpermissibly intrude on the President’s constitutional role. The President’scounselhasconcededthatthePresidentmaybesubjecttocriminallawsthatdonotdirectlyinvolveexercisesofhisArticleIIauthority,suchaslawsprohibitingbribingwitnessesorsuborningperjury.1075Butcounselhasmadeacategoricalargument that “the President’s exercise of his constitutional authority here toterminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot constitutionallyconstituteobstructionofjustice.”1076

In analyzing counsel’s statutory arguments, we concluded that thePresident’s proposed interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2) is contrary to thelitigatingpositionoftheDepartmentofJusticeandisnotsupportedbyprinciplesofstatutoryconstruction.

As for theconstitutionalarguments,we recognized that theDepartmentofJusticeandthecourtshavenotdefinitivelyresolvedtheseconstitutionalissues.We therefore analyzed the President’s position through the framework ofSupreme Court precedent addressing the separation of powers. Under thatframework,weconcluded,Article IIof theConstitutiondoesnotcategoricallyandpermanentlyimmunizethePresidentfrompotentialliabilityfortheconductthatweinvestigated.Rather,ouranalysisledustoconcludethattheobstruction-of-justice statutes can validly prohibit a President’s corrupt efforts to use hisofficialpowerstocurtail,end,orinterferewithaninvestigation.

A.StatutoryDefensestotheApplicationofObstruction-Of-JusticeProvisionstotheConductUnderInvestigation

The obstruction-of-justice statute most readily applicable to ourinvestigationis18U.S.C.§1512(c)(2).Section1512(c)provides:

(c)Whoevercorruptly—

(1)alters,destroys,mutilates,orconcealsarecord,document,orotherobject,orattempts todoso,with the intent to impair theobject’sintegrityoravailabilityforuseinanofficialproceeding;or

(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any officialproceeding,orattemptstodoso,

shallbefinedunderthistitleorimprisonednotmorethan20years,orboth.

TheDepartmentofJusticehastakenthepositionthatSection1512(c)(2)statesabroad, independent, and unqualified prohibition on obstruction of justice.1077Whiledefendantshavearguedthatsubsection(c)(2)shouldbereadtocoveronlyacts thatwould impair the availability or integrity of evidence because that issubsection (c)(l)’s focus, strong arguments weigh against that proposedlimitation.ThetextofSection1512(c)(2)confirmsthatitssweepisnottetheredtoSection1512(c)(1);courtshavesointerpretedit;itshistorydoesnotcounselotherwise;andnoprincipleofstatutoryconstructiondictatesacontraryview.Onitsface,therefore,Section1512(c)(2)appliestoallcorruptmeansofobstructinga proceeding, pending or contemplated—including by improper exercises ofofficial power. In addition, other statutory provisions that are potentiallyapplicable to certain conduct we investigated broadly prohibit obstruction ofproceedings thatarependingbeforecourts,grand juries,andCongress.See18U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505. Congress has also specifically prohibited witnesstampering.See18U.S.C.§1512(b).

1.TheTextofSection1512(c)(2)ProhibitsaBroadRangeofObstructiveActs

Several textual features of Section 1512(c)(2) support the conclusion thattheprovisionbroadlyprohibits corruptmeansof obstructing justice and is not

limitedbythemorespecificprohibitionsinSection1512(c)(1),whichfocusonevidenceimpairment.

First, the text of Section 1512(c)(2) is unqualified: it reaches acts that“obstruct[], influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding”when committed“corruptly.”NothinginSection1512(c)(2)’stextlimitstheprovisiontoactsthatwould impair the integrity or availability of evidence for use in an officialproceeding. In contrast, Section 1512(c)(1) explicitly includes the requirementthat the defendant act “with the intent to impair the object’s integrity oravailabilityforuseinanofficialproceeding,”arequirementthatCongressalsoincludedintwoothersectionsofSection1512.See18U.S.C.§§1512(a)(2)(B)(ii)(useofphysicalforcewithintenttocauseapersontodestroyanobject“withintent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an officialproceeding”);1512(b)(2)(B)(useofintimidation,threats,corruptpersuasion,ormisleading conduct with intent to cause a person to destroy an object “withintent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an officialproceeding”).ButnocomparableintentorconductelementfocusedonevidenceimpairmentappearsinSection1512(c)(2).TheintentelementinSectionl512(c)(2)comesfromtheword“corruptly.”See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.McKibbins,656F.3d707,711(7thCir.2011)(“Theintentelementisimportantbecausetheword‘corruptly’iswhatservestoseparatecriminalandinnocentactsofobstruction.”)(internalquotationmarksomitted).AndtheconductelementinSection1512(c)(2) is “obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing]” a proceeding. Congress ispresumedtohaveactedintentionallyinthedisparateinclusionandexclusionofevidence-impairmentlanguage.SeeLoughrinv.UnitedStates,573U.S.351,358(2014) (“[W]hen ‘Congress includes particular language in one section of astatutebutomitsitinanother’—letaloneintheverynextprovision—thisCourt‘presume[s]’thatCongressintendedadifferenceinmeaning”)(quotingRussellov.UnitedStates, 464U.S. 16, 23 (1983));accordDigital Realty Trust, Inc. v.Somers,138S.Ct.767,777(2018).

Second, thestructureofSection1512supports theconclusion thatSection1512(c)(2) defines an independent offense. Section 1512(c)(2) delineates acomplete crime with different elements from Section 1512(c)(1)—and eachsubsection of Section 1512(c) contains its own “attempt” prohibition,underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. The two subsections ofSection 1512(c) are connected by the conjunction “or,” indicating that eachprovidesanalternativebasisforcriminalliability.SeeLoughrin,573U.S.at357(“ordinary use [of ‘or’] is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it

connectsaretobegivenseparatemeanings”)(internalquotationmarksomitted).InLoughrin,forexample,theSupremeCourtreliedontheuseoftheword“or”tohold thatadjacentandoverlappingsubsectionsof thebank fraudstatute,18U.S.C. § 1344, state distinct offenses and that subsection 1344(2) thereforeshould not be interpreted to contain an additional element specified only insubsection1344(1).Id.;seealsoShawv.UnitedStates,137S.Ct.462,465-469(2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the bank fraud statute “overlapsubstantially”butidentifyingdistinctcircumstancescoveredbyeach).1078Andhere,asinLoughrin,Section1512(c)’s“twoclauseshaveseparatenumbers,linebreaksbefore,between,andafterthem,andequivalentindentation—thusplacingtheclausesvisuallyonanequal footingand indicating that theyhave separatemeanings.”573U.S.at359.

Third,theintroductoryword“otherwise”inSection1512(c)(2)signalsthatthe provision covers obstructive acts that are different from those listed inSection 1512(c)(1). See Black’s Law Dictionary 1101 (6th ed. 1990)(“otherwise”means“inadifferentmanner; inanotherway,orinotherways”);seealso,e.g.,AmericanHeritageCollegeDictionaryOnline(“1.Inanotherway;differently;2.Underothercircumstances”);seealsoGoochv.UnitedStates,297U.S.124,128(1936)(characterizing“otherwise”asa“broadterm”andholdingthatastatutoryprohibitiononkidnapping“forransomorrewardorotherwise”isnot limitedby thewords“ransom”and“reward” tokidnappings forpecuniarybenefits);Collazosv.UnitedStates,368F.3d190,200(2dCir.2004)(construing“otherwise”in28U.S.C.§2466(l)(C)toreachbeyondthe“specificexamples”listed in prior subsections, thereby covering the “myriad means that humaningenuitymightdevisetopermitapersontoavoidthejurisdictionofacourt”);cf. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144 (2006) (recognizing that“otherwise”isdefinedtomean“inadifferentwayormanner,”andholdingthatthe word “otherwise” introducing the residual clause in the Armed CareerCriminalAct,18U.S.C.§924(e)(2)(B)(ii),can,butneednotnecessarily,“refertoacrimethatissimilartothelistedexamplesinsomerespectsbutdifferentinothers”). 1079 The purpose of the word “otherwise” in Section 1512(c)(2) istherefore to clarify that the provision covers obstructive acts other than thedestruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its integrity oravailability, which is the conduct addressed in Section 1512(c)(1). The word“otherwise”doesnotsignalthatSection1512(c)(2)haslessbreadthincoveringobstructiveconductthanthelanguageoftheprovisionimplies.

2.JudicialDecisionsSupportaBroadReadingofSection1512(c)(2)

CourtshavenotlimitedSection1512(c)(2)toconductthatimpairsevidence,butinsteadhavereadittocoverobstructiveactsinanyform.

Asonecourtexplained,“[t]hisexpansivesubsectionoperatesasacatch-allto cover ‘otherwise’ obstructive behavior that might not constitute a morespecific offense like document destruction, which is listed in (c)(l).” UnitedStatesv.Volpendesto,746F.3d273,286(7thCir.2014)(somequotationmarksomitted).For example, inUnited States v.Ring, 628F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C.2009),thecourtrejectedtheargumentthat“§1512(c)(2)’sreferencetoconductthat ‘otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding’ islimitedtoconductthatissimilartothetypeofconductproscribedbysubsection(c)(l)—namely, conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of ‘record[s],documents[s], or other object[s] for use in an official proceeding.” Id. at 224.Thecourtexplainedthat“themeaningof§1512(c)(2)isplainonitsface.”Id.(alternations in original). And courts have upheld convictions under Section1512(c)(2) thatdidnot involveevidence impairment,but insteadresultedfromconduct thatmore broadly thwarted arrests or investigations.See, e.g., UnitedStates v.Martinez, 862F.3d 223, 238 (2dCir. 2017) (police officer tipped offsuspectsaboutissuanceofarrestwarrantsbefore“outstandingwarrantscouldbeexecuted, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand juryproceeding”);UnitedStatesv.Ahrensfield,698F.3d1310,1324-1326(10thCir.2012) (officerdisclosedexistenceof anundercover investigation to its target);United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009) (defendantdisclosed identity of an undercover officer thus preventing him from makingcontrolled purchases from methamphetamine dealers). Those cases illustrate,thatSection1512(c)(2)applies tocorruptacts—includingbypublicofficials—thatfrustratethecommencementorconductofaproceeding,andnotjusttoactsthatmakeevidenceunavailableorimpairitsintegrity.

Section1512(c)(2)’sbreadthisreinforcedbythesimilarityofitslanguagetotheomnibusclauseof18U.S.C.§1503,whichcoversanyonewho“corruptly...obstructs,orimpedes,orendeavorstoinfluence,obstruct,orimpede,thedueadministrationofjustice.”ThatclauseofSection1503followstwomorespecificclauses that protect jurors, judges, and court officers. The omnibus clause hasnevertheless been construed to be “farmore general in scope than the earlierclausesofthestatute.”UnitedStatesv.Aguilar,515U.S.593,599(1995).“Theomnibus clause is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits

conduct that interfereswith thedueadministrationof justice.”UnitedStatesv.Brenson,104F.3d1267,1275(11thCir.1997).Courtshaveaccordinglygivenita“non-restrictivereading.”UnitedStatesv.Kumar,617F.3d612,620(2dCir.2010); id. at 620 n.7 (collecting cases from theThird, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,and Eleventh Circuits). As one court has explained, the omnibus clause“prohibits acts that are similar in result, rather than manner, to the conductdescribed in the first part of the statute.”United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d1331,1333(5thCir.1978).Whilethespecificclauses“forbidcertainmeansofobstructing justice . . . theomnibusclauseaimsatobstructionof justice itself,regardlessof themeansusedtoreachthatresult.”Id. (collectingcases).GiventhesimilarityofSection1512(c)(2)toSection1503’somnibusclause,Congresswould have expectedSection 1512(c)(2) to cover acts that produced a similarresult to the evidence-impairment provisions—i.e., the result of obstructingjustice—rather than covering only acts thatwere similar inmanner.Read thisway,Section1512(c)(2)servesadistinctfunctioninthefederalobstruction-of-justicestatutes:itcapturescorruptconduct,otherthandocumentdestruction,thathas the natural tendency to obstruct contemplated as well as pendingproceedings.

Section1512(c)(2)overlapswithotherobstructionstatutes,but itdoesnotrender them superfluous. Section 1503, for example, which covers pendinggrand jury and judicial proceedings, and Section 1505, which covers pendingadministrative and congressional proceedings, reach “endeavors to influence,obstruct,orimpede”theproceedings—abroadertestforinchoateviolationsthanSection 1512(c)(2)’s “attempt” standard, which requires a substantial steptowardsacompletedoffense.SeeUnitedStatesv.Sampson,898F.3d287,302(2dCir.2018)(“[E]ffortstowitnesstamperthatrisetothelevelofan‘endeavor’yetfallshortofan‘attempt’cannotbeprosecutedunder§1512.”);UnitedStatesv. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1988) (collecting casesrecognizing the difference between the “endeavor” and “attempt” standards).And18U.S.C.§1519,whichprohibitsdestructionofdocumentsorrecords incontemplation of an investigation or proceeding, does not require the “nexus”showing underAguilar, which Section 1512(c)(2) demands. See, e.g., UnitedStatesv.Yielding,657F.3d688,712 (8thCir.2011) (“The requisiteknowledgeand intent [under Section 1519] can be present even if the accused lacksknowledgethatheislikelytosucceedinobstructingthematter.”);UnitedStatesv.Gray,642F.3d371,376-377(2dCir.2011)(“[I]nenacting§1519,Congressrejectedanyrequirementthatthegovernmentprovealinkbetweenadefendant’s

conduct and an imminent or pending official proceeding.”). The existence ofeven “substantial” overlap is not “uncommon” in criminal statutes. Loughrin,573U.S.at359n.4;seeShaw,137S.Ct.at458-469;Aguilar,515U.S.at616(Scalia,J.,dissenting)(“Thefactthatthereisnowsomeoverlapbetween§1503and § 1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlapbetween the omnibus clause of § 1503 and the other provisions of § 1503itself.”).ButgiventhatSections1503,1505,and1519eachreachconductthatSection 1512(c)(2) does not, the overlap provides no reason to give Section1512(c)(2)anartificiallylimitedconstruction.SeeShaw,137S.Ct.at469.1080

3.TheLegislativeHistoryofSection1512(c)(2)DoesNotJustifyNarrowingItsText

“Given the straightforward statutory command” in Section 1512(c)(2),“there is no reason to resort to legislative history.”United States v.Gonzales,520U.S.1,6(1997).Inanyevent,thelegislativehistoryofSection1512(c)(2)isnotareasontoimposeextratextuallimitationsonitsreach.

Congress enacted Section 1512(c)(2) as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002,Pub.L.No.107-204,Tit.XI,§1102,116Stat.807.Therelevantsectionofthestatutewasentitled“TamperingwithaRecordorOtherwiseImpedinganOfficialProceeding.” 116 Stat. 807 (emphasis added). That title indicates thatCongress intended the twoclauses tohave independenteffect.Section1512(c)wasaddedasaflooramendmentintheSenateandexplainedasclosingacertain“loophole”with respect to “document shredding.”See 148Cong. Rec. S6545(July 10, 2002)(Sen. Lott); id. at S6549-S6550 (Sen: Hatch). But thoseexplanationsdonot limit the enacted text.SeePittstonCoalGroupv. Sebben,488U.S.105,115(1988)(“[I]tisnotthelawthatastatutecanhavenoeffectswhicharenotexplicitlymentioned in its legislativehistory.”);seealsoEncinoMotorcars,LLCv.Navarro,138S.Ct.1134,1143(2018) (“Even ifCongressdidnotforeseealloftheapplicationsofthestatute,thatisnoreasonnottogivethestatutorytextafairreading.”).Thefloorstatementsthuscannotdetractfromthemeaningoftheenactedtext.SeeBarnhartv.SigmonCoalCo.,534U.S.438,457 (2002) (“Floor statements from two Senators cannot amend the clear andunambiguouslanguageofastatute.WeseenoreasontogivegreaterweighttotheviewsoftwoSenatorsthantothecollectivevotesofbothHouses,whicharememorializedintheunambiguousstatutorytext.”).ThatprinciplehasparticularforcewhereoneoftheproponentsoftheamendmenttoSection1512introduced

his remarks as only “briefly elaborat[ing] on some of the specific provisionscontainedinthisbill.”148Cong.Rec.S6550(Sen.Hatch).

Indeed, the language Congress used in Section 1512(c)(2)—prohibiting“corruptly . . . obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any officialproceeding” or attempting to do so—parallels a provision that Congressconsidered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen protections againstwitnesstamperingandobstructionofjustice.WhiletheearlierprovisionisnotadirectantecedentofSection1512(c)(2),Congress’sunderstandingof thebroadscope of the earlier provision is instructive. Recognizing that “the properadministrationofjusticemaybeimpededorthwarted”bya“varietyofcorruptmethods...limitedonlybytheimaginationofthecriminallyinclined,”S.Rep.No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1982), Congress considered a bill thatwould have amended Section 1512 by making it a crime, inter alia, when aperson“corruptly...influences,obstructs,orimpedes...[t]heenforcementandprosecution of federal law,” “administration of a law under which an officialproceeding is being or may be conducted,” or the “exercise of a Federallegislativepowerofinquiry.”Id.at17-19(quotingS.2420).

TheSenateCommitteeexplainedthat:

[T]hepurposeofpreventinganobstructionoformiscarriageofjusticecannotbefullycarriedoutbyasimpleenumerationofthecommonlyprosecutedobstructionoffenses.Theremustalsobeprotectionagainstthe rare typeof conduct that is theproductof the inventive criminalmindandwhichalsothwartsjustice.

Id. at18.The reportgaveexamplesof conduct “actuallyprosecutedunder thecurrent residual clause [in 18 U.S.C. § 1503], which would probably not becovered in this series [of provisions] without a residual clause.” Id. Oneprominentexamplewas“[a]conspiracytocoveruptheWatergateburglaryanditsaftermathbyhavingtheCentralIntelligenceAgencyseektointerferewithanongoing FBI investigation of the burglary.” Id. (citing United States v.Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The report therefore indicates acongressional awareness not only that residual-clause language resemblingSection1512(c)(2)broadlycoversawidevarietyofobstructiveconduct,butalsothat such language reaches the improper use of governmental processes toobstruct justice—specifically, the Watergate cover-up orchestrated by WhiteHouseofficialsincludingthePresidenthimself.SeeHaldeman,559F.3dat51,

86-87,120-129,162.1081

4.GeneralPrinciplesofStatutoryConstructionDoNotSuggestThatSection1512(c)(2)isInapplicabletotheConductinthisInvestigation

Therequirementoffairwarningincriminallaw,theinterestinavoidingdueprocess concerns in potentially vague statutes, and the rule of lenity do notjustifynarrowingthereachofSection1512(c)(2)’stext.1082

a.Aswithothercriminallaws,theSupremeCourthas“exercisedrestraint”in interpreting obstruction-of-justice provisions, both out of respect forCongress’s role in defining crimes and in the interest of providing individualswith “fair warning” of what a criminal statute prohibits.Marinello v. UnitedStates,138S.Ct.1101,1106(2018);ArthurAndersen,544U.S.at703;Aguilar,515U.S.at599-602.Inseveralobstructioncases,theCourthasimposedanexustest that requires that the wrongful conduct targeted by the provision besufficiently connected to an official proceeding to ensure the requisiteculpability.Marinello,138S.Ct.at1109;ArthurAndersen,544U.S.at707-708;Aguilar,515U.S.at600-602.Section1512(c)(2)hasbeeninterpretedtorequirea similar nexus.See, e.g.,United States v. Young, 916F.3d 368, 386 (4thCir.2019);UnitedStatesv.Petruk,781F.3d438,445(8thCir.2015);UnitedStatesv.Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10thCir. 2009);United States v. Reich, 479F.3d179,186(2dCir.2007).Tosatisfythenexusrequirement,thegovernmentmust show as an objectivematter that a defendant acted “in amanner that islikely toobstruct justice,”such that thestatute“excludesdefendantswhohaveanevilpurposebutusemeans thatwouldonlyunnaturally and improbablybesuccessful.”Aguilar,515U.S.at601-602(internalquotationmarksomitted);seeid.at599(“theendeavormusthavethenaturalandprobableeffectofinterferingwiththedueadministrationofjustice”)(internalquotationmarksomitted).Thegovernmentmustalsoshowasasubjectivematterthattheactor“contemplatedaparticular,foreseeableproceeding.”Petruk,781F.3dat445.Thoserequirementsalleviatefair-warningconcernsbyensuringthatobstructiveconducthasacloseenough connection to existing or future proceedings to implicate the dangerstargeted by the obstruction laws and that the individual actually has theobstructiveresultinmind.

b. Courts also seek to construe statutes to avoid due process vagueness

concerns.See,e.g.,McDonnellv.UnitedStates,136S.Ct.2355,2373(2016);Skillingv.UnitedStates,561U.S.358,368,402-404(2010).Vaguenessdoctrinerequires thatastatutedefineacrime“withsufficientdefiniteness thatordinarypeoplecanunderstandwhatconduct isprohibited”and“inamanner thatdoesnot encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. at 402-403(internal quotation marks omitted). The obstruction statutes’ requirement ofacting“corruptly”satisfiesthattest.

“Acting‘corruptly’withinthemeaningof§1512(c)(2)meansactingwithanimproperpurposeandtoengageinconductknowinglyanddishonestlywiththespecific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct” the relevant proceeding.UnitedStatesv.Gordon,710F.3d1124,1151(10thCir.2013) (somequotationmarksomitted). The majority opinion in Aguilar did not address the defendant’svaguenesschallenge to theword“corruptly,”515U.S. at600n.1,but JusticeScalia’s separate opinion did reach that issue and would have rejected thechallenge, id. at 616-617 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). “Statutory language need not becolloquial,”JusticeScaliaexplained,and“theterm‘corruptly’incriminallawshasa longstandingandwell-acceptedmeaning. It denotes anactdonewithanintent to give some advantage inconsistentwith official duty and the rights ofothers.”Id.at616(internalquotationmarksomitted;citinglowercourtauthorityand legal dictionaries). JusticeScalia added that “in the context of obstructingjury proceedings, any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is incredible.” Id. at617. Lower courts have also rejected vagueness challenges to the word“corruptly.”See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Edwards,869F.3d490,501-502(7thCir.2017);United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280-1281 (11th Cir. 1997);United States v.Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5thCir. 1978). Thiswell-establishedintentstandardprecludestheneedtolimittheobstructionstatutestoonlycertainkindsofinherentlywrongfulconduct.1083

c.Finally,theruleoflenitydoesnotjustifytreatingSection1512(c)(2)asaprohibitiononevidenceimpairment,asopposedtoanomnibusclause.Theruleoflenityisaninterpretiveprinciplethatresolvesambiguityincriminallawsinfavoroftheless-severeconstruction.Clevelandv.UnitedStates,531U.S.12,25(2000).“[A]s[theCourthas]repeatedlyemphasized,”however,theruleoflenityapplies only if, “after considering text, structure, history and purpose, thereremains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that theCourtmust simply guess as towhatCongress intended.”Abramski v.United States,

573U.S.169,188n.10(2014)(internalquotationmarksomitted).Therulehasbeencited,forexample,inadoptinganarrowmeaningof“tangibleobject”inanobstructionstatutewhentheprohibition’stitle,history,andlistofprohibitedactsindicatedafocusondestructionofrecords.SeeYatesv.UnitedStates,135S.Ct.1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion) (interpreting “tangible object” in thephrase“record,document,or tangibleobject” in18U.S.C.§1519 tomeananitemcapableofrecordingorpreservinginformation).Here,asdiscussedabove,the text, structure, and history of Section 1512(c)(2) leaves no “grievousambiguity”aboutthestatute’smeaning.Section1512(c)(2)definesastructurallyindependentgeneralprohibitiononobstructionofofficialproceedings.

5.OtherObstructionStatutesMightApplytotheConductinthisInvestigation

RegardlesswhetherSection1512(c)(2)coversallcorruptactsthatobstruct,influence,orimpedependingorcontemplatedproceedings,otherstatuteswouldapply to such conduct in pending proceedings, provided that the remainingstatutory elements are satisfied.Asdiscussed above, theomnibus clause in18U.S.C.§1503(a)appliesgenerallytoobstructionofpendingjudicialandgrandproceedings.1084 See Aguilar, 515U.S. at 598 (noting that the clause is “farmoregeneralinscope”thanprecedingprovisions).Section1503(a)‘sprotectionsextendtowitnesstamperingandtootherobstructiveconductthathasanexustopendingproceedings.SeeSampson,898F.3dat298-303&n.6(collectingcasesfromeightcircuitsholdingthatSection1503coverswitness-relatedobstructiveconduct, and cabining prior circuit authority). And Section 1505 broadlycriminalizes obstructive conduct aimed at pending agency and congressionalproceedings.1085See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Rainey,757F.3d234,241-247(5thCir.2014).

Finally, 18U.S.C. § l 512(b)(3) criminalizes tamperingwith witnesses toprevent the communication of information about a crime to law enforcement.ThenexusinquiryarticulatedinAguilar—thatanindividualhas“knowledgethathisactionsare likely toaffect the judicialproceeding,”515U.S.at599—doesnotapplytoSection1512(b)(3).SeeUnitedStatesv.Byrne,435F.3d16,24-25(1stCir.2006).Thenexusinquiryturnsinsteadontheactor’sintenttopreventcommunications to a federal law enforcement official. See Fowler v. UnitedStates,563U.S.668,673-678(2011).

***

In sum, in light of the breadth of Section 1512(c)(2) and the otherobstructionstatutes,anargumentthat theconductat issueinthis investigationfallsoutsidethescopeoftheobstructionlawslacksmerit.

B.ConstitutionalDefensestoApplyingObstruction-Of-JusticeStatutestoPresidentialConduct

The President has broad discretion to direct criminal investigations. TheConstitution vests the “executive Power” in the President and enjoins him to“takeCarethattheLawsbefaithfullyexecuted.”U.S.CONST.ARTII,§§1,3.Those powers and duties form the foundation of prosecutorial discretion. SeeUnited States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (Attorney General andUnited States Attorneys “have this latitude because they are designated bystatute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutionalresponsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”’). ThePresident also has authority to appoint officers of the United States and toremovethosewhomhehasappointed.U.S.CONST.ARTII,§2,cl.2(grantingauthoritytothePresidenttoappointallofficerswiththeadviceandconsentofthe Senate, but providing that Congress may vest the appointment of inferiorofficers in thePresidentalone, theheadsofdepartments,or thecourtsof law);seealsoFreeEnterpriseFundv.PublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoard,561 U.S. 477, 492-493, 509 (2010) (describing removal authority as flowingfrom the President’s “responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfullyexecuted”).

Although thePresidenthasbroadauthorityunderArticle II, that authoritycoexistswithCongress’sArticleIpowertoenactlawsthatprotectcongressionalproceedings, federal investigations, thecourts, andgrand juriesagainst corruptefforts to undermine their functions. Usually, those constitutional powersfunction in harmony, with the President enforcing the criminal laws underArticle II to protect against corrupt obstructive acts.Butwhen the President’sofficial actions come into conflict with the prohibitions in the obstructionstatutes, any constitutional tension is reconciled through separation-of-powersanalysis.

The President’s counsel has argued that “the President’s exercise of his

constitutional authority . . . to terminate an FBI Director and to closeinvestigations...cannotconstitutionallyconstituteobstructionofjustice.”1086Asnotedabove,noDepartmentofJusticepositionorSupremeCourtprecedentdirectly resolved this issue.We did not find counsel’s contention, however, toaccordwithour readingof theSupremeCourtauthorityaddressingseparation-of-powers issues.Applying theCourt’s framework for analysis,we concludedthatCongress canvalidly regulate thePresident’s exercise of official duties toprohibit actions motivated by a corrupt intent to obstruct justice. The limitedeffect on presidential power that results from that restriction would notimpermissibly undermine the President’s ability to perform his Article IIfunctions.

1.TheRequirementofaClearStatementtoApplyStatutestoPresidentialConductDoesNotLimittheObstructionStatutes

Before addressing Article II issues directly, we consider one thresholdstatutory-constructionprinciple that isuniqueto thepresidency:“TheprinciplethatgeneralstatutesmustbereadasnotapplyingtothePresidentiftheydonotexpressly apply where application would arguably limit the President’sconstitutional role.” OLC, Application of 28 USC. § 458 to PresidentialAppointments of Federal Judges, 19Op. O.L.C. 350, 352 (1995). This “clearstatementrule,”id.,hasitssourceintwoprinciples:statutesshouldbeconstruedtoavoidseriousconstitutionalquestions,andCongressshouldnotbeassumedtohavealteredtheconstitutionalseparationofpowerswithoutclearassurancethatit intended that result.OLC,TheConstitutionalSeparationofPowersBetweenthePresidentandCongress,20Op.O.L.C.124,178(1996).

TheSupremeCourthasappliedthatclear-statementruleinseveralcases.Inone leading case, the Court construed the Administrative Procedure Act, 5U.S.C. § 701 et seq., not to apply to judicial review of presidential action.Franklinv.Massachusetts,505U.S.788,800-801(1992).TheCourtexplainedthat it “would require an express statement by Congress before assuming itintended thePresident’sperformanceofhis statutoryduties tobe reviewed forabuseofdiscretion.”Id.at801.Inanothercase,theCourtinterpretedtheword“utilized” in the FederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct (FACA), 5U.S.C.App., toapplyonlytotheuseofadvisorycommitteesestablisheddirectlyorindirectlybythegovernment,therebyexcludingtheAmericanBarAssociation’sadvicetotheDepartmentofJusticeaboutfederaljudicialcandidates.PublicCitizenv.United

States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455, 462-467 (1989). The Courtexplained that a broader interpretation of the term “utilized” in FACAwouldraiseseriousquestionswhether thestatute“infringedundulyon thePresident’sArticle II power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine ofseparation of powers.” Id. at 466-467.Another case found that an establishedcanon of statutory construction appliedwith “special force” to provisions thatwould impinge on the President’s foreign-affairs powers if construed broadly.Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (applying thepresumption against extraterritorial application to construe theRefugeeAct of1980asnotgoverninginanoverseascontextwhereitcouldaffect“foreignandmilitary affairs for which the President has unique responsibility”). SeeApplicationof28U.S.C.§458toPresidentialAppointmentsofFederalJudges,19Op.O.L.C.at353-354(discussingFranklin,PublicCitizen,andSale).

The Department of Justice has relied on this clear-statement principle tointerpret certain statutes as not applying to the President at all, similar to theapproach taken in Franklin. See, e.g., Memorandum for Richard T. Burress,OfficeofthePresident,fromLaurenceH.Silberman,DeputyAttorneyGeneral,Re:Conflict of InterestProblemsArising out of thePresident’sNomination ofNelsonA.RockefellertobeVicePresidentundertheTwenty-FifthAmendmenttotheConstitution,at2,5(Aug.28,1974)(criminalconflict-of-intereststatute,18U.S.C. § 208, does not apply to the President). OtherOLC opinions interpretstatutorytextnottoapplytocertainpresidentialorexecutiveactionsbecauseofconstitutional concerns. See Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to PresidentialAppointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 350-357 (consanguinitylimitations on court appointments, 28 U.S.C. § 458, found inapplicable to“presidential appointments of judges to the federal judiciary”); ConstraintsImposedby18U.S.C.§1913onLobbyingEfforts,13Op.O.L.C.300,304-306(1989) (limitation on the use of appropriated funds for certain lobbyingprograms found inapplicable to certain communications by the President andexecutiveofficials).

ButOLChasalsorecognizedthatthisclear-statementrule“doesnotapplywithrespecttoastatutethatraisesnoseparationofpowersquestionswereittobeappliedtothePresident,”suchasthefederalbriberystatute,18U.S.C.§201.Applicationof28U.S.C.§458toPresidentialAppointmentsofFederalJudges,19Op.O.L.C.at357n.11.OLCexplainedthat“[a]pplicationof§201raisesnoseparation of powers question, let alone a serious one,” because [t]he

ConstitutionconfersnopowerinthePresidenttoreceivebribes.”Id.Insupportofthatconclusion,OLCnotedconstitutionalprovisionsthatforbidincreasesinthe President’s compensation while in office, “which is what a bribe wouldfunction to do,” id. (citingU.S.CONST.ART. II, § 1, cl. 7), and the expressconstitutionalpowerof“Congresstoimpeach[andconvict]aPresidentfor,interalia,bribery,”id.(citingU.S.CONST.ARTII,§4).

Under OLC’s analysis, Congress can permissibly criminalize certainobstructive conduct by the President, such as suborning perjury, intimidatingwitnesses, or fabricating evidence, because those prohibitions raise noseparation-of-powers questions. See Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 toPresidentialAppointments ofFederal Judges, 19Op.O.L.C. at 357 n.11.TheConstitution does not authorize the President to engage in such conduct, andthoseactionswouldtransgressthePresident’sdutyto“takeCarethattheLawsbe faithfully executed.”U.S. CONST.ART II, §§ 3. In view of those clearlypermissible applicationsof theobstruction statutes to thePresident,Franklin’sholding that the President is entirely excluded from a statute absent a clearstatementwouldnotapplyinthiscontext.

A more limited application of a clear-statement rule to exclude from theobstruction statutesonly certain acts by thePresident—for example, removingprosecutorsor ending investigations for corrupt reasons—wouldbedifficult toimplementasamatterofstatutoryinterpretation.Itisnotobvioushowaclear-statement rulewouldapply toanomnibusprovision likeSection1512(c)(2) toexclude corruptly motivated obstructive acts only when carried out in thePresident’sconductofoffice.Nostatutorytermcouldeasilybearthatspecializedmeaning.Forexample,theword“corruptly”hasawell-establishedmeaningthatdoes not exclude exercises of official power for corrupt ends. Indeed, anestablished definition states that “corruptly” means action with an intent tosecurean improperadvantage“inconsistentwithofficialduty and the rightsofothers.” BALLENTINE’S LAWDICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969) (emphasisadded).And itwouldbecontrary toordinary rulesof statutoryconstruction toadoptanunconventionalmeaningofastatutory termonlywhenapplied to thePresident. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522 (2008) (pluralityopinionofScalia,J.)(rejectingproposal to“giv[e]thesameword, inthesamestatutoryprovision,differentmeaningsindifferentfactualcontexts”);cf.PublicCitizen,491U.S.at462-467(givingtheterm“utilized”intheFACAauniformmeaningtoavoidconstitutionalquestions).Norcouldsuchanexclusiondrawon

a separate and established background interpretive presumption, such as thepresumptionagainstextraterritorialityappliedinSale.Theprinciple thatcourtswillconstrueastatutetoavoidseriousconstitutionalquestions“isnotalicensefor the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.” Salinas v.UnitedStates,522U.S.52,59-60 (1997).“It isone thing toacknowledgeandaccept . . . well defined (or even newly enunciated), generally applicable,background principles of assumed legislative intent. It is quite another toespouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read asbroadlyastheyarewritten,butaresubjecttocase-by-caseexceptions.”Broganv.UnitedStates,522U.S.398,406(1998).

Whenaproposedconstruction“wouldthusfunctionasanextra-textuallimiton[astatute’s]compass,”therebypreventingthestatute“fromapplyingtoahostofcasesfallingwithinitsclearterms,”Loughrin,573U.S.at357,itisdoubtfulthattheconstructionwouldreflectCongress’sintent.Thatisparticularlysowithrespecttoobstructionstatutes,which“havebeengivenabroadandall-inclusivemeaning.”Rainey,757F.3dat245(discussingSections1503and1505)(internalquotation marks omitted). Accordingly, since no established principle ofinterpretationwouldexcludethepresidentialconductwehaveinvestigatedfromstatutes such as Sections 1503, 1505, 1512(b), and 1512(c)(2), we proceed toexamine the separation-of-powers issues that could be raised as an Article IIdefensetotheapplicationofthosestatutes.

2.Separation-of-PowersPrinciplesSupporttheConclusionthatCongressMayValidlyProhibitCorruptObstructiveActsCarriedOutThroughthePresident’sOfficialPowers

WhenCongress imposes a limitationon the exerciseofArticle II powers,the limitation’svaliditydependsonwhether themeasure “disrupts thebalancebetween thecoordinatebranches.”Nixonv.AdministratorofGeneralServices,433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). “Even when a branch does not arrogate power toitself, . . . the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impairanotherintheperformanceofitsconstitutionalduties.”Lovingv.UnitedStates,517U.S.748,757(1996).The“separationofpowersdoesnotmean,”however,“that thebranches‘ought tohavenopartialagency in,ornocontroulover theactsofeachother.’”Clintonv.Jones,520U.S.681,703(1997)(quotingJamesMadison, The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325–326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasisomitted)).Inthiscontext,abalancingtestappliestoassessseparation-of-powers

issues.Applying that test here,we concluded that Congress can validlymakeobstruction-of-justice statutes applicable to corruptlymotivated official acts ofthePresidentwithoutimpermissiblyundermininghisArticleIIfunctions.

a.TheSupremeCourt’sSeparation-of-PowersBalancingTestAppliesInThisContext

A congressionally imposed limitation on presidential action is assessed todetermine “the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch fromaccomplishingitsconstitutionallyassignedfunctions,”and,ifthe“potentialfordisruptionispresent[,]...whetherthatimpactisjustifiedbyanoverridingneedto promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.”AdministratorofGeneralServices,433U.S.at443;seeNixonv.Fitzgerald,457U.S.731,753-754(1982);UnitedStatesv.Nixon,418U.S.683,706-707(1974).That balancing test applies to a congressional regulation of presidential powerthroughtheobstruction-of-justicelaws.1087

WhenanArticleIIpowerhasnotbeen“explicitlyassignedbythetextoftheConstitution to be within the sole province of the President, but rather wasthought to be encompassed within the general grant to the President of the‘executive Power,’” the Court has balanced competing constitutionalconsiderations.PublicCitizen,491U.S.at484 (Kennedy, J.,concurring in thejudgment, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, J.). As Justice KennedynotedinPublicCitizen,theCourthasappliedabalancingtesttorestrictionson“thePresident’spower to removeExecutiveofficers, apower [that] . . . isnotconferred by any explicit provision in the text of the Constitution (as is theappointmentpower),butratherisinferredtobeanecessarypartofthegrantofthe‘executivePower.’”Id.(citingMorrisonv.Olson,487U.S.654,694(1988),andMyersv.UnitedStates,272U.S.52,115-116(1926)).Consistentwith thatstatement,Morrison sustained a good-cause limitation on the removal of aninferiorofficerwithdefinedprosecutorialresponsibilitiesafterdeterminingthatthelimitationdidnotimpermissiblyunderminethePresident’sabilitytoperformhis Article II functions. 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696. The Court has alsoevaluated other general executive-power claims through a balancing test. Forexample, theCourtevaluated thePresident’sclaimofanabsoluteprivilegeforpresidential communications about his official acts by balancing that interestagainsttheJudicialBranch’sneedforevidenceinacriminalcase.UnitedStatesv.Nixon,supra (recognizingaqualifiedconstitutionalprivilegeforpresidential

communications on official matters). The Court has also upheld a law thatprovided forarchivalaccess topresidential recordsdespiteaclaimofabsolutepresidential privilegeover the records.AdministratorofGeneralServices, 433U.S. at 443-445, 451-455. The analysis in those cases supports applying abalancing test to assess the constitutionality of applying the obstruction-of-justicestatutestopresidentialexercisesofexecutivepower.

OnlyinafewinstanceshastheCourtappliedadifferentframework.Whenthe President’s power is “both ‘exclusive’ and ‘conclusive’ on the issue,”Congress is precluded from regulating its exercise.Zivotofskyv.Kerry, 135S.Ct.2076,2084(2015). InZivotofsky, forexample, theCourt followed“JusticeJackson’s familiar tripartite framework” in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.Sawyer, 343U.S.579,635-638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), andheld thatthePresident’s authority to recognize foreignnations is exclusive. Id. at 2083,2094.SeealsoPublicCitizen 491U.S.at485-486 (Kennedy, J., concurring inthejudgment)(citingthepowertograntpardonsunderU.S.CONST.,ART.II,§2,cl.1,andthePresentmentClausesforlegislation,U.S.CONST.,ART.I,§7,Cls.2,3,asexamplesofexclusivepresidentialpowersbyvirtueofconstitutionaltext).

Butevenwhenapowerisexclusive,“Congress’powers,anditscentralrolein making laws, give it substantial authority regarding many of the policydeterminations that precede and follow” thePresident’s act.Zivotofsky, 135S.Ct. at 2087. For example, although the President’s power to grant pardons isexclusiveandnotsubjecttocongressionalregulation,seeUnitedStatesv.Klein,80U.S.(13Wall.)128,147-148(1872),Congresshas theauthority toprohibitthe corrupt use of “anything of value” to influence the testimony of anotherpersoninajudicial,congressional,oragencyproceeding,18U.S.C.§201(b)(3)—whichwould include theofferorpromiseofapardon to induceaperson totestifyfalselyornottotestifyatall.TheofferofapardonwouldprecedetheactofpardoningandthusbewithinCongress’spowertoregulateevenifthepardonitselfisnot.JustastheSpeechorDebateClause,U.S.CONST.ART.I,§6,cl.1,absolutelyprotects legislativeacts,butnota legislator’s“takingoragreeing totakemoneyforapromisetoactinacertainway...foritistakingthebribe,notperformance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act,” United States v.Brewster,408U.S.501,526(1972)(emphasisomitted),thepromiseofapardontocorruptlyinfluencetestimonywouldnotbeaconstitutionallyimmunizedact.Theapplicationofobstructionstatutestosuchpromisesthereforewouldraiseno

seriousseparation-of-powersissue.

b.TheEffectofObstruction-of-JusticeStatutesonthePresident’sCapacitytoPerformHisArticleIIResponsibilitiesisLimited

Under the Supreme Court’s balancing test for analyzing separation-of-powers issues, the first task is to assess the degree to which applyingobstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential actions affects the President’sability to carry out his Article II responsibilities. Administrator of GeneralServices, 433U.S. at 443.As discussed above, applying obstruction-of-justicestatutestopresidentialconductthatdoesnotinvolvethePresident’sconductofoffice—such as influencing the testimony of witnesses—is constitutionallyunproblematic. The President has nomore right than other citizens to impedeofficial proceedings by corruptly influencing witness testimony. The conductwouldbeequallyimproperwhethereffectuatedthroughdirecteffortstoproducefalse testimony or suppress the truth, or through the actual, threatened, orpromiseduseofofficialpowerstoachievethesameresult.

ThePresident’sactionincurtailingcriminalinvestigationsorprosecutions,ordischarginglawenforcementofficials,raisesdifferentquestions.Eachtypeofaction involves the exercise of executive discretion in furtherance of thePresident’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S.CONST.,ART. II, § 3.Congressmaynot supplant thePresident’s exercise ofexecutivepowertosuperviseprosecutionsortoremoveofficerswhooccupylawenforcement positions. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-727 (1986)(“Congresscannotreserveforitselfthepowerofremovalofanofficerchargedwith the execution of the laws except by impeachment. . . . [Because t]hestructureoftheConstitutiondoesnotpermitCongresstoexecutethelaws,. . .[t]his kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws . . . isconstitutionally impermissible.”). Yet the obstruction-of-justice statutes do notaggrandizepowerinCongressorusurpexecutiveauthority.Instead,theyimposeadiscretelimitationonconductonlywhenitistakenwiththe“corrupt”intenttoobstruct justice.Theobstruction statutes thuswould restrictpresidential actiononlybyprohibitingthePresidentfromactingtoobstructofficialproceedingsforthe improper purpose of protecting his own interests. See Volume II, SectionIII.A.3,supra.

The direct effect on the President’s freedom of action would

correspondinglybealimitedone.Apreclusionof“corrupt”officialactionisnotamajor intrusiononArticle IIpowers.Forexample, thepropersupervisionofcriminallawdoesnotdemandfreedomforthePresidenttoactwiththeintentionof shielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability, orpreventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary, a statute that prohibitsofficial action undertaken for such personal purposes furthers, rather thanhinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. And theConstitution does not mandate that the President have unfettered authority todirectinvestigationsorprosecutions,withnolimitswhatsoever,inordertocarryout hisArticle II functions.SeeHeckler v.Chaney, 470U.S. 821, 833 (1985)(“Congressmay limit an agency’s exercise of enforcement power if itwishes,either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing anagency’spower todiscriminateamong issuesorcases itwillpursue.”);UnitedStatesv.Nixon,418U.S.at707(“[t]oreadtheArt.IIpowersofthePresidentasprovidinganabsoluteprivilege[towithholdconfidentialcommunicationsfromacriminal trial] . . . would upset the constitutional balance of ‘a workablegovernment’andgravelyimpairtheroleofthecourtsunderArt.III”).

Normust the President have unfettered authority to remove all ExecutiveBranch officials involved in the execution of the laws. The Constitutionestablishes that Congress has legislative authority to structure the ExecutiveBranch by authorizing Congress to create executive departments and officerpositionsandtospecifyhowinferiorofficersareappointed.E.g.,U.S.CONST.,ART.I,§8,cl.18(NecessaryandProperClause);ART.II,§2,cl.1(OpinionsClause);ART. II,§2, cl.2 (AppointmentsClause);seeFreeEnterpriseFund,561U.S.at499.WhilethePresident’sremovalpowerisanimportantmeansofensuring that officers faithfully execute the law, Congress has a recognizedauthoritytoplacecertainlimitsonremoval.Id.at493-495.

ThePresident’sremovalpowersareattheirzenithwithrespecttoprincipalofficers—that is, officers who must be appointed by the President and whoreport to him directly. See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493, 500. ThePresident’s “exclusive and illimitable power of removal” of those principalofficers furthers “the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfullyexecuted.”Id.at493,498(internalquotationmarksomitted);Myers,272U.S.at627.Thus,“therearesome‘purelyexecutive’officialswhomustberemovableby the President at will if he is able to accomplish his constitutional role.”Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690;Myers, 272 U.S. at 134 (the President’s “cabinetofficersmust do hiswill,” and “[t]hemoment that he loses confidence in the

intelligence,ability, judgment,or loyaltyofanyoneof them,hemusthavethepowertoremovehimwithoutdelay”);cf.Humphrey’sExecutorv.UnitedStates,295U.S. 602 (1935) (Congress has the power to create independent agenciesheadedbyprincipal officers removable only for good cause). In light of thoseconstitutional precedents, it may be that the obstruction statutes could not beconstitutionally applied to limit the removal of a cabinet officer such as theAttorneyGeneral.See5U.S.C.§101;28U.S.C.§503.Inthatcontext,atleastabsentcircumstancesshowingthatthePresidentwasclearlyattemptingtothwartaccountabilityforpersonalconductwhileevadingordinarypoliticalchecksandbalances,eventhehighlylimitedregulationimposedbytheobstructionstatutescould possibly intrude too deeply on the President’s freedom to select andsupervisethemembersofhiscabinet.

Theremovalofinferiorofficers,incontrast,neednotnecessarilybeatwillfor the President to fulfill his constitutionally assigned role in managing theExecutiveBranch. “[I]nferior officers are officerswhosework is directed andsupervised at some levelbyotherofficers appointedby thePresidentwith theSenate’s consent.”FreeEnterpriseFund, 561U.S. at 510 (quotingEdmond v.UnitedStates,520U.S.651,663(1997))(internalquotationmarksomitted).TheSupreme Court has long recognized Congress’s authority to place for-causelimitationsonthePresident’sremovalof“inferiorOfficers”whoseappointmentmaybevestedintheheadofadepartment.U.S.CONST.ART.II,§2,cl.2.SeeUnitedStatesv.Perkins,116U.S.483,485(1886)(“Theconstitutionalauthorityin Congress to thus vest the appointment [of inferior officers in the heads ofdepartments]impliesauthoritytolimit,restrict,andregulatetheremovalbysuchlawsasCongressmayenact in relation to theofficers soappointed”) (quotinglowercourtdecision);Morrison,487U.S.at689n.27(citingPerkins);accordid. at 723-724 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Perkins is“established”law);seealsoFreeEnterpriseFund,561U.S.at493-495(citingPerkinsandMorrison).Thecategoryof inferiorofficers includesboth theFBIDirectorandtheSpecialCounsel,eachofwhomreportstotheAttorneyGeneral.See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 5 I 5(a), 531; 28 C.F.R. Part 600. Their work is thus“directed and supervised” by a presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmedofficer.SeeInre:GrandJuryInvestigation,_F.3d_,2019WL921692,at*3-*4(D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 2019) (holding that the Special Counsel is an “inferiorofficer”forconstitutionalpurposes).

WheretheConstitutionpermitsCongresstoimposeagood-causelimitation

ontheremovalofanExecutiveBranchofficer, theConstitutionshouldequallypermitCongress to bar removal for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice.Limiting the range of permissible reasons for removal to exclude a “corrupt”purposeimposesalesserrestraintonthePresidentthanrequiringanaffirmativeshowingofgoodcause.Itfollowsthatforsuchinferiorofficers,Congressmayconstitutionally restrict the President’s removal authority if that authority wasexercisedforthecorruptpurposeofobstructingjustice.Andevenifaparticularinferior officer’s positionmight be of such importance to the execution of thelaws that thePresidentmusthaveat-will removalauthority, theobstruction-of-justice statutes could still be constitutionally applied to forbid removal for acorruptreason.1088Anarrowanddiscretelimitationonremovalthatprecludedcorrupt actionwould leave ample room for all other considerations, includingdisagreement over policy or loss of confidence in the officer’s judgment orcommitment.Acorrupt-purposeprohibition thereforewouldnotundermine thePresident’sabilitytoperformhisArticleIIfunctions.Accordingly,becausetheseparation-of-powersquestionis“whethertheremovalrestrictionsareofsuchanature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutionalduty,”Morrison, 487U.S. at 691, a restrictionon removingan inferiorofficerfor a corrupt reason—a reason grounded in achieving personal rather thanofficial ends—does not seriously hinder the President’s performance of hisduties. The President retains broad latitude to supervise investigations andremoveofficials,circumscribed in thiscontextonlyby the requirement thathenotactforcorruptpersonalpurposes.1089

c.CongressHasPowertoProtectCongressional,GrandJury,andJudicialProceedingsAgainstCorruptActsfromAnySource

WherealawimposesaburdenonthePresident’sperformanceofArticleIIfunctions,separation-of-powersanalysisconsiderswhetherthestatutorymeasure“is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within theconstitutional authority of Congress.”Administrator of General Services, 433U.S.at443.Here,Congressenactedtheobstruction-of-justicestatutestoprotect,among other things, the integrity of its own proceedings, grand juryinvestigations, and federal criminal trials. Those objectives are withinCongress’sauthorityandservestronggovernmentalinterests.

i. Congress hasArticle I authority to define generally applicable criminallaw and apply it to all persons—including the President.Congress clearly has

authoritytoprotectitsownlegislativefunctionsagainstcorrupteffortsdesignedtoimpedelegitimatefact-gatheringandlawmakingefforts.SeeWatkinsv.UnitedStates, 354U.S. 178, 187, 206-207 (1957);Chapmanv.UnitedStates, 5App.D.C. 122, 130 (1895). Congress also has authority to establish a system offederal courts, which includes the power to protect the judiciary againstobstructiveacts.SeeU.S.CONST.ART.I,§8,els.9,18(“TheCongressshallhavePower...ToconstituteTribunalsinferiortothesupremeCourt”and“TomakeallLawswhichshallbenecessaryandproperforcarryingintoExecutionthe foregoingpowers”).The long lineageof theobstruction-of-justice statutes,whichcanbetracedtoatleast1831,atteststothenecessityforthatprotection.SeeAnActDeclaratoryoftheLawConcerningContemptsofCourt,4Stat.487-488§2(1831)(makingitacrimeif“anypersonorpersonsshallcorruptly...endeavortoinfluence,intimidate,orimpedeanyjuror,witness,orofficer,inanycourtof theUnitedStates, in thedischargeofhisduty,or shall, corruptly . . .obstruct,orimpede,orendeavortoobstructorimpede,thedueadministrationofjusticetherein”).

ii.TheArticle IIIcourtshaveanequallystrong interest inbeingprotectedagainstobstructiveacts,whatevertheirsource.AstheSupremeCourtexplainedinUnitedStatesv.Nixon,a“primaryconstitutionaldutyoftheJudicialBranch”is “to do justice in criminal prosecutions.” 418U.S. at 707;accordCheney v.United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 384(2004).InNixon,theCourtrejectedthePresident’sclaimofabsoluteexecutiveprivilege because “the allowance of the privilege towithhold evidence that isdemonstrablyrelevantinacriminaltrialwouldcutdeeplyintotheguaranteeofdueprocessoflawandgravelyimpairthebasicfunctionofthecourts.”407U.S.at 712. As Nixon illustrates, the need to safeguard judicial integrity is acompellingconstitutional interest.See id. at 709 (noting that thedenial of fulldisclosure of the facts surrounding relevant presidential communicationsthreatens“[t]heveryintegrityofthejudicialsystemandpublicconfidenceinthesystem”).

iii.Finally, thegrand jury cannot achieve its constitutionalpurpose absentprotectionfromcorruptacts.SeriousfederalcriminalchargesgenerallyreachtheArticle IIIcourtsbasedonan indictment issuedbyagrand jury.Cobbledick v.United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) (“The Constitution itself makes thegrand jury a part of the judicial process.”). And the grand jury’s function isenshrined in the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST.AMEND. V. (“[n]o person

shall be held to answer” for a serious crime “unless on a presentment orindictmentofaGrandJury”).“[T]hewholetheoryof[thegrandjury’s]functionisthatitbelongstonobranchoftheinstitutionalgovernment,servingasakindofbufferor refereebetween theGovernmentand thepeople,”UnitedStatesv.Williams,504U.S.36,47(1992),“pledgedtoindictnoonebecauseofprejudiceandtofreenoonebecauseofspecialfavor.”Costellov.UnitedStates,350U.S.359,362(1956).Ifthegrandjurywerenotprotectedagainstcorruptinterferencefrom all persons, its function as an independent charging body would bethwarted. And an impartial grand jury investigation to determine whetherprobablecauseexiststoindictisvitaltothecriminaljusticeprocess.

***

Thefinalstepintheconstitutionalbalancingprocessistoassesswhethertheseparation-of-powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within itsconstitutional authority notwithstanding the potential impact on Article IIfunctions. See Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443; see alsoMorrison, 487U.S. at 691-693, 695-696;United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at711-712.Inthecaseoftheobstruction-of-justicestatutes,ourassessmentoftheweighing of interests leads us to conclude that Congress has the authority toimpose the limited restrictions contained in those statutes on the President’sofficialconducttoprotecttheintegrityofimportantfunctionsofotherbranchesofgovernment.

AgeneralbanoncorruptactiondoesnotundulyintrudeonthePresident’sresponsibilityto“takeCarethattheLawsbefaithfullyexecuted.”U.S.CONST.ARTII,§§3.1090Tothecontrary,theconceptof“faithfulexecution”connotestheuseofpowerintheinterestofthepublic,notintheofficeholder’spersonalinterests. See 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 763(1755)(“faithfully”def.3:“[w]ithstrictadherencetodutyandallegiance”).Andimmunizing the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibitionagainst corrupt obstruction of official proceedings would seriously impairCongress’spowertoenactlaws“topromoteobjectiveswithin[its]constitutionalauthority,”AdministratorofGeneralServices,433U.S.at425—i.e.,protectingtheintegrityofitsownproceedingsandtheproceedingsofArticleIIIcourtsandgrandjuries.

Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by theargumentthatthePresidenthasblanketconstitutionalimmunitytoengageinactsthat would corruptly obstruct justice through the exercise of otherwise-validArticleIIpowers.1091

3.AscertainingWhetherthePresidentViolatedtheObstructionStatutesWouldNotChillhisPerformanceofhisArticleIIDuties

Applying theobstruction statutes to thePresident’sofficial conductwouldinvolvedeterminingasafactualmatterwhetherheengagedinanobstructiveact,whether the act had a nexus to official proceedings, and whether he wasmotivated by corrupt intent. But applying those standards to the President’sofficialconductshouldnothinderhisabilitytoperformhisArticleIIduties.CfNixon v.Fitzgerald, 457U.S. at 752-753& n.32 (taking into account chillingeffectonthePresidentinadoptingaconstitutionalruleofpresidentialimmunityfromprivatecivildamagesactionbasedonofficialduties).Several safeguardswould prevent a chilling effect: the existence of settled legal standards, thepresumption of regularity in prosecutorial actions, and the existence ofevidentiary limitations on probing the President’s motives. And historicalexperienceconfirmsthatnoimpermissiblechillshouldexist.

a.As an initialmatter, the term “corruptly” sets a demanding standard. Itrequires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an“improper advantage for [him]self or someone else, inconsistent with officialdutyand therightsofothers.”BALLENTINE’SLAWDICTIONARY276(3ded. 1969); seeUnited States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2015);Aguilar,515U.S.at616 (Scalia, J., concurring inpart anddissenting inpart).That standard parallels the President’s constitutional obligation to ensure thefaithfulexecutionofthelaws.AndvirtuallyeverythingthatthePresidentdoesintheroutineconductofofficewillhaveacleargovernmentalpurposeandwillnotbecontrary tohisofficialduty.Accordingly, thePresidenthasno reason tobechilled in those actions because, in virtually all instances, there will be nocrediblebasisforsuspectingacorruptpersonalmotive.

Thatpoint is illustratedbyexamplesofconduct thatwouldandwouldnotsatisfy the stringent corrupt-motive standard. Direct or indirect action by thePresident to end a criminal investigation into his ownor his familymembers’conduct to protect against personal embarrassment or legal liability wouldconstituteacoreexampleofcorruptlymotivatedconduct.Sotoowouldactionto

halt an enforcement proceeding that directly and adversely affected thePresident’s financial interests for the purpose of protecting those interests. Inthose examples, official power is being used for the purpose of protecting thePresident’s personal interests. In contrast, the President’s actions to servepoliticalorpolicyinterestswouldnotqualifyascorrupt.ThePresident’sroleasheadof the government necessarily requires him to take into account politicalfactors in making policy decisions that affect law-enforcement actions andproceedings.Forinstance,thePresident’sdecisiontocurtailalaw-enforcementinvestigationtoavoidinternationalfrictionwouldnotimplicatetheobstruction-of-justicestatutes.Thecriminallawdoesnotseektoregulatetheconsiderationof such political or policy factors in the conduct of government. And whenlegitimate interests animate thePresident’s conduct, those interestswill almostinvariably be readily identifiable based on objective factors. Because thePresident’s conduct in those instances will obviously fall outside the zone ofobstructionlaw,nochillingconcernshouldarise.

b. There is also no reason to believe that investigations, let aloneprosecutions, would occur except in highly unusual circumstances when acredible factual basis exists to believe that obstruction occurred. Prosecutorialactionenjoysapresumptionofregularity:absent“clearevidencetothecontrary,courtspresumethat[prosecutors]haveproperlydischargedtheirofficialduties.”Armstrong,517U.S.at464(quotingUnitedStatesv.ChemicalFoundation,Inc.,272U.S. I, 14-15 (1926)). The presumption of prosecutorial regularitywouldprovideevengreaterprotectiontothePresidentthanexistsinroutinecasesgiventhe prominence and sensitivity of any matter involving the President and thelikelihoodthatsuchmatterswillbesubjecttothoroughandcarefulreviewatthemost senior levels of the Department of Justice. Under OLC’s opinion that asitting President is entitled to immunity from indictment, only a successorAdministration would be able to prosecute a former President. But thatconsiderationdoesnotsuggestthataPresidentwouldhaveanybasisforfearingabusive investigations or prosecutions after leaving office. There are “obviouspolitical checks” against initiating a baseless investigation or prosecution of aformer President. See Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 448(considering political checks in separation-of-powers analysis). And theAttorney General holds “the power to conduct the criminal litigation of theUnitedStatesGovernment,”UnitedStatesv.Nixon,418U.S.at694(citing28U.S.C.§516),whichprovidesastronginstitutionalsafeguardagainstpoliticizedinvestigationsorprosecutions.1092

These considerations distinguish the SupremeCourt’s holding inNixon v.Fitzgerald that, inpartbecause inquiries into thePresident’smotiveswouldbe“highly intrusive,” the President is absolutely immune from private civildamages actions based on his official conduct. 457 U.S. at 756-757. AsFitzgerald recognized, “there is a lesser public interest in actions for civildamages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions.”Fitzgerald, 457U.S. at754n.37;seeCheney,542U.S.at384.Andprivateactionsarenotsubjecttotheinstitutional protections of an action under the supervision of the AttorneyGeneralandsubjecttoapresumptionofregularity.Armstrong,517U.S.at464.

c. In the rare cases in which a substantial and credible basis justifiesconducting an investigation of the President, the process of examining hismotivationstodeterminewhetherheactedforacorruptpurposeneednothaveachilling effect. Ascertaining the President’s motivations would turn on anyexplanation he provided to justify his actions, the advice he received, thecircumstances surrounding the actions, and the regularity or irregularity of theprocessheemployedtomakedecisions.Butgrandjuriesandcourtswouldnothave automatic access to confidential presidential communications on thosematters; rather, they could be presented in official proceedings only on ashowingofsufficientneed.Nixon,418U.S.at712;InreSealedCase,121F.3d729,754,756-757(D.C.Cir.1997);seealsoAdministratorofGeneralServices,433U.S.at448-449(formerPresidentcaninvokepresidentialcommunicationsprivilege, although successor’s failure to support the claim“detracts from [its]weight”).

In any event, probing the President’s intent in a criminal matter isunquestionablyconstitutionalinatleastonecontext:theoffenseofbriberyturnsonthecorruptintenttoreceiveathingofvalueinreturnforbeinginfluencedinofficialaction.18U.S.C.§201(b)(2).TherecanbenoseriousargumentagainstthePresident’spotential criminal liability forbriberyoffenses,notwithstandingtheneedtoascertainhispurposeandintent.SeeU.S.CONST.ART.I,§3;ART.II,§4;seealsoApplicationof28U.S.C.§458toPresidentialAppointmentsofFederal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11 (“Application of § 201 [to thePresident]raisesnoseparationofpowersissue,letaloneaseriousone.”).

d. Finally, history provides no reason to believe that any asserted chillingeffectjustifiesexemptingthePresidentfromtheobstructionlaws.Asahistoricalmatter, Presidents have very seldom been the subjects of grand juryinvestigations.Anditisrarerstillforcircumstancestoraiseeventhepossibility

of a corrupt personal motive for arguably obstructive action through thePresident’suseofofficialpower.Accordingly,thePresident’sconductofofficeshould not be chilled based on hypothetical concerns about the possibleapplicationofacorrupt-motivestandardinthiscontext.

***

In sum, contrary to the position taken by the President’s counsel, weconcludedthat,inlightoftheSupremeCourtprecedentgoverningseparation-of-powersissues,wehadavalidbasisforinvestigatingtheconductatissueinthisreport. In our view, the application of the obstruction statutes would notimpermissiblyburden thePresident’s performanceof hisArticle II function tosuperviseprosecutorialconductortoremoveinferiorlaw-enforcementofficers.And the protection of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by anyperson—includingthePresident—accordswiththefundamentalprincipleofourgovernment that “[n]o [person] in this country is so high that he is above thelaw.”UnitedStatesv.Lee,106U.S.196,220(1882);seealsoClintonv.Jones,520U.S.at697;UnitedStatesv.Nixon,supra.

10726/23/17Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltoSpecialCounsel’sOffice;seealso1/29/18Letter,President’s PersonalCounsel to Special Counsel’sOffice; 2/6/18Letter, President’s PersonalCounsel toSpecialCounsel’sOffice;8/8/18Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltoSpecialCounsel’sOffice,at4.

10732/6/18Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltoSpecialCounsel’sOffice,at2-9.Counselhasalsonotedthatotherpotentiallyapplicableobstructionstatutes,suchas18U.S.C.§1505,protectonlypendingproceedings. 6/23/17 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 7-8. Section1512(c)(2) is not limited to pending proceedings, but also applies to future proceedings that the personcontemplated.SeeVolumeII,SectionIII.A,supra.

10746/23/17Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltoSpecialCounsel’sOffice,at1(“[T]hePresidentcannotobstruct...bysimplyexercisingtheseinherentConstitutionalpowers.”).

10756/23/17Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltoSpecialCounsel’sOffice,at2n.1.

1076 6/23/17 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 2 n. I (dashesomitted); see also 8/8/18 Letter, President’s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel’s Office, at 4 (“[T]heobstruction-of-justicestatutescannotbereadsoexpansivelyastocreatepotentialliabilitybasedonfaciallylawful acts undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article II discretionary authority toremoveprincipalofficersorcarryouttheprosecutionfunction.”).

1077SeeU.S.Br.,UnitedStatesv.Kumar,Nos.06-5482-cr(L),06-5654-cr(CON)(2dCir.filedOct.

26,2007),atpp.15-28;UnitedStatesv.Singleton,Nos.H-04-CR-514SS,H-06-cr-80(S.D.Tex.filedJune5,2006).

1078 TheOffice of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interpretive principles inconcludingthatlanguagethatappearedinthefirstclauseoftheWireAct,18U.S.C.§1084,restrictingitsprohibitionagainstcertainbettingorwageringactivitiesto“anysportingeventorcontest,”didnotapplytothesecondclauseofthesamestatute,whichreachesotherbettingorwageringactivities.SeeReconsideringWhether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling (Nov. 2, 2018), slip op. 7 (relying on plainlanguage);id. at 11 (finding it not “tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier ‘on any sportingeventorcontest’thatappearsinthefirstclause”);id.at12(relyingonDigitalRealty).

1079 InSykesv.UnitedStates, 564U.S. 1, 15 (2011 ), the SupremeCourt substantially abandonedBegay’sreadingoftheresidualclause,andinJohnsonv.UnitedStates,135S.Ct.2551(2015),theCourtinvalidatedtheresidualclauseasunconstitutionallyvague.Begay’sanalysisoftheword“otherwise”isthusoflimitedvalue.

1080TheSupremeCourt’sdecision inMarinellov.UnitedStates,138S.Ct.1101(2018),doesnotsupportimposinganon-textuallimitationonSection1512(c)(2).Marinello interpretedthetaxobstructionstatute, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), to require “a ‘nexus’ between the defendant’s conduct and a particularadministrative proceeding.” Id. at 1109. The Court adopted that construction in light of the similarinterpretationgivento“otherobstructionprovisions,”id.(citingAguilarandArthurAndersen), aswell asconsiderationsofcontext,legislativehistory,structureofthecriminaltaxlaws,fairwarning,andlenity.Id.at1106-1108.Thetypeof“nexus”element theCourtadoptedinMarinelloalreadyappliesunderSection1512(c)(2),andtheremainingconsiderationstheCourtciteddonotjustifyreadingintoSection1512(c)(2)languagethatisnotthere.SeeBatesv.UnitedStates,522U.S.23,29(1997)(theCourt“ordinarilyresist[s]readingwordsorelementsintoastatutethatdonotappearonitsface.”).

1081TheSenateultimatelyacceptedtheHouseversionofthebill,whichexcludedanomnibusclause.SeeUnitedStatesv.Poindexter,951F.2d369,382-383(D.C.Cir.1991) (tracinghistoryof theproposedomnibusprovisioninthewitness-protectionlegislation).Duringthefloordebateonthebill,SenatorHeinz,oneoftheinitiatorsandprimarybackersofthelegislation,explainedthattheomnibusclausewasbeyondthescopeofthewitness-protectionmeasureatissueandlikely“duplicative”ofotherobstructionlaws,128Cong.Rec.26,810(1982)(Sen.Heinz),presumablyreferringtoSections1503and1505.

1082Inaseparatesectionaddressingconsiderationsuniquetothepresidency,weconsiderprinciplesofstatutoryconstructionrelevantinthatcontext.SeeVolumeII,SectionIII.B.l,infra.

1083InUnitedStatesv.Poindexter,951F.2d369(D.C.Cir.1991),thecourtofappealsfoundtheterm“corruptly”in18U.S.C.§1505vagueasappliedtoapersonwhoprovidedfalseinformationtoCongress.Aftersuggestingthattheword“corruptly”wasvagueonitsface,951F.2dat378,thecourtconcludedthatthestatutedidnotclearlyapplytocorruptconductbythepersonhimselfandthe“core”conducttowhichSection1505couldconstitutionallybeappliedwasonepersoninfluencinganotherpersontoviolatealegalduty.Id.at379-386.Congresslaterenactedaprovisionoverturningthatresultbyprovidingthat“[a]susedin[S]ection1505,theterm‘corruptly’meansactingwithanimproperpurpose,personallyorbyinfluencinganother, including by making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, ordestroyingadocumentorother information.”18U.S.C.§1515(b).Othercourtshavedeclined to followPoindextereitherbylimitingittoSection1505andthespecificconductatissueinthatcase,seeBrenson,104 F.3d at 1280-1281; reading it as narrowly limited to certain types of conduct, seeUnited States v.Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 629-630 (D.C. Cir. 1996); or by noting that it predated Arthur Andersen’sinterpretationoftheterm“corruptly,”seeEdwards,869F.3dat501-502.

1084Section1503(a)providesforcriminalpunishmentof:

Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter orcommunication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, orimpede,thedueadministrationofjustice.

1085Section1505providesforcriminalpunishmentof:

Whoever corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence,obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law underwhich any pendingproceedingisbeinghadbeforeanydepartmentoragencyoftheUnitedStates,orthedueandproperexerciseofthepowerofinquiryunderwhichanyinquiryorinvestigationisbeinghadbyeitherHouse,oranycommitteeofeitherHouseoranyjointcommitteeoftheCongress.

10866/23/17Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltoSpecialCounsel’sOffice,at2n.1.

1087 OLC applied such a balancing test in concluding that the President is not subject to criminalprosecutionwhileinoffice,relyingonmanyofthesameprecedentsdiscussedinthissection.SeeASittingPresident’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 237-238, 244-245(2000)(relyingon,interalia,UnitedStatesv.Nixon,Nixonv.Fitzgerald,andClintonv.Jones,andquotingthe legal standard from Administrator of General Services v. Nixon that is applied in the text). OLCrecognized that “[t]he balancing analysis” it had initially relied on in finding that a sitting President isimmunefromprosecutionhad“beenadoptedastheappropriatemodeofanalysisbytheCourt.”Id.at244.

1088AlthoughtheFBIdirectorisaninferiorofficer,heisappointedbythePresidentandremovablebyhimatwill,see28U.S.C.§532note,anditisnotclearthatCongresscouldconstitutionallyprovidetheFBI directorwith good-cause tenure protection.SeeOLC,Constitutionality of LegislationExtending theTermoftheFBIDirector,2011WL2566125,at*3(O.L.C.June20,2011)(“tenureprotectionforanofficerwiththeFBIDirector’sbroadinvestigative,administrative,andpolicymakingresponsibilitieswouldraiseaserious constitutional question whether Congress had ‘impede[d] the President’s ability to perform hisconstitutionalduty’totakecarethatthelawsbefaithfullyexecuted”)(quotingMorrison,487U.S.at691).

1089TheobstructionstatutesdonotdisqualifythePresidentfromactinginacasesimplybecausehehasapersonalinterestinitorbecausehisownconductmaybeatissue.AstheDepartmentofJusticehasmadeclear,aclaimofaconflictof interest,standingalone,cannotdeprivethePresidentof theability tofulfill his constitutional function. See, e.g., OLC, Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to PresidentialAppointmentsofFederalJudges,19O.L.C.Op.at356(citingMemorandumforRichardT.Burress,OfficeofthePresident,fromLaurenceH.Silberman,DeputyAttorneyGeneral,Re:ConflictofInterestProblemsArisingoutofthePresident’sNominationofNelsonA.RockefellertobeVicePresidentundertheTwenty-FifthAmendmenttotheConstitution,at2,5(Aug.28,1974)).

1090Asnotedabove,thePresident’sselectionandremovalofprincipalexecutiveofficersmayhaveauniqueconstitutionalstatus.

1091Apossibleremedythroughimpeachmentforabusesofpowerwouldnotsubstituteforpotentialcriminal liabilityafteraPresident leavesoffice. Impeachmentwould removeaPresident fromoffice,butwouldnotaddresstheunderlyingculpabilityoftheconductorservetheusualpurposesofthecriminallaw.Indeed, the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that criminal law plays an independent role inaddressinganofficial’sconduct,distinctfromthepoliticalremedyofimpeachment.SeeU.S.CONST.ART.l,

§3,cl.7.Impeachmentisalsoadrasticandrarelyinvokedremedy,andCongressisnotrestrictedtorelyingonly on impeachment, rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President, as OLC hasrecognized.ASittingPresident’sAmenabilitytoIndictmentandCriminalProsecution,24Op.O.L.C.at255(“Recognizingan immunityfromprosecutionforasittingPresidentwouldnotprecludesuchprosecutiononcethePresident’stermisoverorheisotherwiseremovedfromofficebyresignationorimpeachment.”).

1092 Similar institutional safeguards protect Department of Justice officers and line prosecutorsagainstunfoundedinvestigationsintoprosecutorialacts.Prosecutorsaregenerallybarredfromparticipatinginmattersimplicatingtheirpersonalinterests,see28C.F.R.§45.2,andareinstructednottobeinfluencedbytheir“ownprofessionalorpersonalcircumstances,”JusticeManual§9-27.260,soprosecutorswouldnotfrequentlybeinapositiontotakeactionthatcouldbeperceivedascorruptandpersonallymotivated.Andifsuchcasesarise,criminal investigationwouldbeconductedbyresponsibleofficialsat theDepartmentofJustice, who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an investigation absent a credible factual basis.Thosefactsdistinguish thecriminalcontext fromthecommon-lawruleofprosecutorial immunity,whichprotects against the threat of suit by “a defendant [who] often will transform his resentment at beingprosecutedintotheascriptionofimproperandmaliciousactions.”Imblerv.Pachtman,424U.S.409,425(1976). As the Supreme Court has noted, the existence of civil immunity does not justify criminalimmunity.SeeO’Sheav.Littleton,414U.S.488,503(1974) (“Whatevermaybe thecasewithrespect tocivilliabilitygenerally,...wehaveneverheldthattheperformanceofthedutiesofjudicial,legislative,orexecutive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivation ofconstitutionalrights.”)(citationsomitted).

IV.CONCLUSIONBecausewedeterminednottomakeatraditionalprosecutorialjudgment,we

didnotdrawultimateconclusionsabout thePresident’sconduct.TheevidenceweobtainedaboutthePresident’sactionsandintentpresentsdifficultissuesthatwould need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorialjudgment.Atthesametime,ifwehadconfidenceafterathoroughinvestigationofthefacts that thePresidentclearlydidnotcommitobstructionofjustice,wewould so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we areunabletoreachthatjudgment.Accordingly,whilethisreportdoesnotconcludethatthePresidentcommittedacrime,italsodoesnotexoneratehim.

AppendixA

OfficeoftheDeputyAttorneyGeneralWashington,D.C.20530

ORDERNO.3915–2017

APPOINTMENTOFSPECIALCOUNSELTOINVESTIGATERUSSIANINTERFERENCEWITHTHE2016PRESIDENTIALELECTIONANDRELATEDMATTERS

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Acting Attorney General,including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, and 515, in order to discharge myresponsibility to provide supervision and management of the Department ofJustice, and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russiangoverment’seffortstointerfereinthe2016presidentialelection,Iherebyorderasfollows:

a. RobertS.MuellerIIIisappointedtoserveasSpecialCounselfortheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice.

b. TheSpecialCounselisauthorizedtoconducttheinvestigationconfirmedbythen-FBIDirectorJamesB.ComeyintestimonybeforetheHousePermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceonMarch20,2017,including:

i. anylinksand/orcoordinationbetweentheRussiangovernmentandindividualsassociatedwiththecampaignofPresidentDonaldTrump;and

ii. anymattersthataroseormayarisedirectlyfromtheinvestigation;andiii. anyothermatterswithinthescopeof28C.F.R.§600.4(a).

c. IftheSpecialCounselbelievesitisnecessaryandappropriate,theSpecialCounselisauthorizedtoprosecutefederalcrimesarisingfromtheinvestigationofthesematters.

d. Sections600.4through600.10ofTitle28oftheCodeofFederalRegulationsareapplicabletotheSpecialCounsel.

AppendixB

APPENDIXB:GLOSSARY

Thefollowingglossarycontainsnamesandbriefdescriptionsofindividualsandentitiesreferencedinthetwovolumesofthisreport.Itisnotintendedtobecomprehensiveandisintendedonlytoassistareaderinthereadingtherestofthereport.

ReferencedPersons

Agalarov,Aras

Russianreal-estatedeveloper(owneroftheCrocusGroup);metDonaldTrumpinconnectionwiththeMissUniversepageantandhelpedarrangetheJune9,2016meetingatTrumpTowerbetweenNataliaVeselnitskayaandTrumpCampaignofficials.

Agalarov,Emin

Performer,executivevicepresidentofCrocusGroup,andsonofArasAgalarov;helpedarrangetheJune9,2016meetingatTrumpTowerbetweenNataliaVeselnitskayaandTrumpCampaignofficials.

Akhmetov,Rinat

FormermemberintheUkrainianparliamentwhohiredPaulManaforttoconductworkforUkrainianpoliticalparty,thePartyofRegions.

Akhmetshin,Rinat

U.S.lobbyistandassociateofNataliaVeselnitskayawhoattendedtheJune9,2016meetingatTrumpTowerbetweenVeselnitskayaandTrump

Campaignofficials.Aslanov,Dzheykhun(Jay)

HeadofU.S.departmentoftheInternetResearchAgency,whichengagedinan“activemeasures”socialmediacampaigntointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

Assange,Julian

FounderofWikiLeaks,whichin2016postedontheinternetdocumentsstolenfromentitiesandindividualsaffiliatedwiththeDemocraticParty.

Aven,Petr

ChairmanoftheboardofAlfa-BankwhoattemptedoutreachtothePresidentialTransitionTeaminconnectionwithanticipatedpost-electionsanctions.

Bannon,Stephen(Steve)

WhiteHousechiefstrategistandseniorcounselortoPresidentTrump(Jan.2017–Aug.2017);chiefexecutiveoftheTrumpCampaign.

Baranov,Andrey

DirectorofinvestorrelationsatRussianstate-ownedoilcompany,Rosneft,andassociateofCarterPage.

Berkowitz,Avi AssistanttoJaredKushner.Boente,Dana

ActingAttorneyGeneral(Jan.2017–Feb.2017);ActingDeputyAttorneyGeneral(Feb.2017–Apr.2017).

Bogacheva,Anna InternetResearchAgencyemployee

whoworkedon“activemeasures”socialmediacampaigntointerfereininthe2016U.S.presidentialelection;traveledtotheUnitedStatesunderfalsepretensesin2014.

Bossert,Thomas(Tom)

FormerhomelandsecurityadvisortothePresidentwhoalsoservedasaseniorofficialonthePresidentialTransitionTeam.

Boyarkin,Viktor EmployeeofRussianoligarchOlegDeripaska.

Boyd,Charles

ChairmanoftheboardofdirectorsattheCenterfortheNationalInterest,aU.S.-basedthinktankwithoperationsinandconnectionstoRussia.

Boyko,Yuriy

MemberoftheUkrainianpoliticalpartyOppositionBlocandmemberoftheUkrainianparliament.

Brand,Rachel AssociateAttorneyGeneral(May2017–Feb.2018).

Browder,William(Bill)

FounderofHermitageCapitalManagementwholobbiedinfavoroftheMagnitskyAct,whichimposedfinancialandtravelsanctionsonRussianofficials.

Bulatov,Alexander RussianintelligenceofficialwhoassociatedwithCarterPagein2008.

Burchik,Mikhail

ExecutivedirectoroftheInternetResearchAgency,whichengagedinan“activemeasures”socialmediacampaigntointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

Burck,William PersonalattorneytoDonMcGahn,WhiteHouseCounsel.

Burnham,James

AttorneyintheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficewhoattendedJanuary2017meetingsbetweenSallyYatesandDonaldMcGahn.

Burt,Richard

FormerU.S.ambassadorwhohaddoneworkAlfa-BankandwasaboardmemberoftheCenterfortheNationalInterest.

Bystrov,Mikhail

GeneraldirectoroftheInternetResearchAgency,whichengagedinan“activemeasures”socialmediacampaigntointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

Calamari,Matt ChiefoperatingofficerfortheTrumpOrganization.

Caputo,Michael TrumpCampaignadvisor.Chaika,Yuri

ProsecutorgeneraloftheRussianFederationwhoalsomaintainedarelationshipwithArasAgalarov.

Christie,Chris

FormerGovernorofNewJersey.Clapper,James

DirectorofNationalIntelligence(Aug.2010–Jan.2017).

Clovis,SamuelJr. Chiefpolicyadvisorandnationalco-chairoftheTrumpCampaign.

Coats,Dan DirectorofNationalIntelligence.Cobb,Ty

SpecialCounseltothePresident(July2017–May2018).

Cohen,Michael

formervicepresidenttotheTrumpOrganizationandspecialcounseltoDonaldTrumpwhospearheadedanefforttobuildaTrump-brandedpropertyinMoscow.HeadmittedtolyingtoCongressabouttheproject.

Comey,JamesJr.

DirectoroftheFederalBureauofInvestigation(Sept.4,2013–May9,2017).

Conway,Kellyanne CounselortoPresidentTrumpandmanageroftheTrumpCampaign.

Corallo,Mark

SpokesmanforPresidentTrump’spersonallegalteam(June2017–July2017).

Corsi,Jerome

AuthorandpoliticalcommentatorwhoformerlyworkedforWorldNetDailyandInfoWars.HarmtoOngoingMatter██████████████████████████████████████████████

██████████████████████████████████

Costello,Robert

AttorneywhorepresentedhehadacloserelationshipwithRudolphGiuliani,thePresident’spersonalcounsel.

Credico,Randolph(Randy)

RadiotalkshowhostwhointerviewedJulianAssangein2016.HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Davis,Richard(Rick)Jr.

PartnerwithPegasusSustainableCenturyMerchantBank,businesspartnerofPaulManafort,andco-founderoftheDavisManafortlobbyingfirm.

Dearborn,Rick

FormerWhiteHousedeputychiefofstaffforpolicywhopreviouslyservedaschiefofstafftoSenatorJeffSessions.

Dempsey,Michael

OfficeofDirectorofNationalIntelligenceofficialwhorecalleddiscussionswithDanCoatsafterCoats’smeetingwithPresidentTrumponMarch22,2017.

Denman,Diana

Delegateto2016RepublicanNationalConventionwhoproposedaplatform

plankamendmentthatincludedarmedsupportforUkraine.

Deripaska,Oleg

RussianbusinessmanwithtiestoVladimirPutinwhohiredPaulManafortforconsultingworkbetween2005and2009.

Dhillon,Uttam

AttorneyintheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOffice(Jan.2017–June2018).

Dmitriev,Kirill

HeadoftheRussianDirectInvestmentFund(RDIF);metwithErikPrinceintheSeychellesinJanuary2017and,separately,draftedaU.S.-RussiareconciliationplanwithRickGerson.

Donaldson,Annie

ChiefofstafftoWhiteHouseCounselDonaldMcGahn(Jan.2017–Dec.2018).

Dvorkovich,Arkady

DeputyprimeministeroftheRussianFederationandchairmanoftheboardofdirectorsoftheNewEconomicSchoolinMoscow.HemetwithCarterPagetwicein2016.

Dvoskin,Evgeney ExecutiveofGenbankinCrimeaandassociateofFelixSater.

Eisenberg,John

AttorneyintheWhiteHouseCounsel’sOfficeandlegalcounselfortheNationalSecurityCouncil.

Erchova,Lana(a/k/aLanaAlexander)

Ex-wifeofDmitryKlokovwhoemailedIvankaTrumptointroduceKlokovtotheTrumpCampaigninthefallof2015.

Fabrizio,Anthony(Tony)

PartnerattheresearchandconsultingfirmFabrizio,Lee&Associates.HewasapollsterfortheTrumpCampaignandworkedwithPaulManafortonUkraine-relatedpollingaftertheelection.

Fishbein,Jason

AttorneywhoperformedworkedforJulianAssangeandalsosentWikiLeaksapasswordforanunlaunchedwebsitePutinTrump.orgonSeptember20,2016.

Flynn,MichaelG.(a/k/aMichaelFlynnJr.)

SonofMichaelT.Flynn,NationalSecurityAdvisor(Jan.20,2017–Feb.13,2017).

Flynn,MichaelT.

NationalSecurityAdvisor(Jan.20,2017–Feb.13,2017),DirectoroftheDefenseIntelligenceAgency(July2012–Aug.7,2014),andTrumpCampaignadvisor.HepleadedguiltytolyingtotheFBIaboutcommunicationswithAmbassadorSergeyKislyakinDecember2016.

Foresman,Robert Investmentbankerwhosought

(Bob)

meetingswiththeTrumpCampaigninspring2016todiscussRussianforeignpolicy,andaftertheelectionmetwithMichaelFlynn.

Futerfas,Alan

OutsidecounselfortheTrumpOrganizationandsubsequentlypersonalcounselforDonaldTrumpJr.

Garten,Alan GeneralcounseloftheTrumpOrganization.

Gates,Richard(Rick)III

DeputycampaignmanagerforTrumpCampaign,TrumpInauguralCommitteedeputychairman,andlongtimeemployeeofPaulManafort.HepleadedguiltytoconspiringtodefraudtheUnitedStatesandviolateU.S.laws,aswellasmakingfalsestatementstotheFBI.

Gerson,Richard(Rick)

NewYorkhedgefundmanagerandassociateofJaredKushner.Duringthetransitionperiod,heworkedwithKirillDmitrievonaproposalforreconciliationbetweentheUnitedStatesandRussia.

Gistaro,Edward

DeputyDirectorofNationalIntelligenceforIntelligenceIntegration.

Glassner,Michael

PoliticaldirectoroftheTrumpCampaignwhohelpedintroduceGeorgePapadopoulostoothersintheTrumpCampaign.

Goldstone,Robert

PublicistforEminAgalarovwhocontactedDonaldTrumpJr.toarrangetheJune9,2016meetingatTrumpTowerbetweenNataliaVeselnitskayaandTrumpCampaignofficials.

Gordon,Jeffrey(J.D.)

NationalsecurityadvisortotheTrumpCampaigninvolvedinchangestotheRepublicanpartyplatformandwhocommunicatedwithRussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyakattheRepublicanNationalConvention.

Gorkov,Sergey

ChairmanofVnesheconombank(VEB),aRussianstate-ownedbank,whometwithJaredKushnerduringthetransitionperiod.

Graff,Rhona

Seniorvice-presidentandexecutiveassistanttoDonaldJ.TrumpattheTrumpOrganization.

HOM███

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Hawker,Jonathan PublicrelationsconsultantatFTI

Consulting;workedwithDavisManafortInternationalLLConpublicrelationscampaigninUkraine.

Heilbrunn,Jacob

EditoroftheNationalInterest,theperiodicalthatofficiallyhostedcandidateTrump’sApril2016foreignpolicyspeech.

Hicks,Hope

WhiteHousecommunicationsdirector(Aug.2017–Mar.2018)andpresssecretaryfortheTrumpCampaign.

Holt,Lester NBCNewsanchorwhointerviewedPresidentTrumponMay11,2017.

Hunt,Jody ChiefofstafftoAttorneyGeneralJeffSessions(Feb.2017–Oct.2017).

Ivanov,Igor

PresidentoftheRussianInternationalAffairsCouncilandformerRussianforeignminister.IvanTimofeevtoldGeorgePapadopoulosthatIvanovadvisedonarranginga“Moscowvisit”fortheTrumpCampaign.

Ivanov,Sergei

SpecialrepresentativeofVladimirPutin,formerRussiandeputyprimeminister,andformerFSBdeputydirector.InJanuary2016,MichaelCohenemailedtheKremlinrequestingtospeaktoIvanov.

Kasowitz,Marc PresidentTrump’spersonalcounsel(May2017–July2017).

Katsyv,Denis

SonofPeterKatsyv;ownerofRussiancompanyPrevezonHoldingsLtd.andassociateofNataliaVeselnitskaya.

Katsyv,Peter RussianbusinessmanandfatherofDenisKatsyv.

HOM███

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Kaveladze,IrakJi(Ike)

VicepresidentatCrocusGroupandArasAgalarov’sdeputyintheUnitedStates.HeparticipatedintheJune9,2016meetingatTrumpTowerbetweenNataliaVeselnitskayaandTrumpCampaignofficials.

Kaverzina,Irina

EmployeeoftheinternetResearchAgency,whichengagedinan“activemeasures”socialmediacampaigntointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

Kelly,John WhiteHousechiefofstaff(July2017–Jan.2019).

Khalilzad,Zalmay U.S.specialrepresentativetoAfghanistanandformerU.S.ambassador.HemetwithSenatorJeff

SessionsduringforeignpolicydinnersputtogetherthroughtheCenterfortheNationalInterest.

Kilimnik,Konstantin

Russian-Ukrainianpoliticalconsultantandlong-timeemployeeofPaulManafortassessedbytheFBItohavetiestoRussianintelligence.

Kislyak,Sergey

FormerRussianambassadortotheUnitedStatesandcurrentRussiansenatorfromMordovia.

Klimentov,Denis

EmployeeoftheNewEconomicSchoolwhoinformedhigh-rankingRussiangovernmentofficialsofCarterPage’sJuly2016visittoMoscow.

Klimentov,Dmitri

BrotherofDenisKlimentovwhocontactedKremlinpresssecretaryDmitriPeskovaboutCarterPage’sJuly2016visittoMoscow.

Klokov,Dmitry

ExecutiveforPJSCFederalGridCompanyofUnifiedEnergySystemandformeraidetoRussia’sministerofenergy.HecommunicatedwithMichaelCohenaboutapossiblemeetingbetweenVladimirPutinandcandidateTrump.

Kobyakov,Anton AdvisortoVladimirPutinand

memberoftheRoscongressFoundationwhoinvitedcandidateTrumptotheSt.PetersburgInternationalEconomicForum.

Krickovic,Andrej

ProfessorattheHigherSchoolofEconomicswhorecommendedthatCarterPagegiveaJuly2016commencementaddressinMoscow.

Krylova,Aleksandra

InternetResearchAgencyemployeewhoworkedon“activemeasures”socialmediacampaigntointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection;traveledtotheUnitedStatesunderfalsepretensesin2014.

Kushner,Jared PresidentTrump’sson-in-lawandsenioradvisortothePresident.

Kuznetsov,Sergey

RussiangovernmentofficialattheRussianEmbassytotheUnitedStateswhotransmittedVladimirPutin’scongratulationstoPresident-ElectTrumpforhiselectoralvictoryonNovember9,2016.

Landrum,Pete

AdvisortoSenatorJeffSessionswhoattendedtheSeptember2016meetingbetweenSessionsandRussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyak.

Lavrov,Sergey Russianministerofforeignaffairsand

formerpermanentrepresentativeofRussiatotheUnitedNations.

Ledeen,Barbara

SenatestafferandassociateofMichaelFlynnwhosoughttoobtainHillaryClintonemailsduringthe2016U.S.presidentialcampaignperiod.

Ledeen,Michael

MemberofthePresidentialTransitionTeamwhoadvisedonforeignpolicyandnationalsecuritymatters.

Ledgett,Richard

DeputydirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgency(Jan.2014–Apr.2017);presentwhenPresidentTrumpcalledMichaelRogersonMarch26,2017.

Lewandowski,Corey CampaignmanagerfortheTrumpCampaign(Jan.2015–June2016).

Luff,Sandra

LegislativedirectorforSenatorJeffSessions;attendedaSeptember2016meetingbetweenSessionsandRussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyak.

Lyovochkin,Serhiy

MemberofUkrainianparliamentandmemberofUkrainianpoliticalparty,OppositionBlocParty.

Magnitsky,Sergei RussiantaxspecialistwhoallegedRussiangovernmentcorruptionanddiedinRussianpolicecustodyin2009.Hisdeathpromptedpassageof

theMagnitskyAct,whichimposedfinancialandtravelsanctionsonRussianofficials.

Malloch,Theodore(Ted)

ChiefexecutiveofficerofGlobalFiduciaryGovernanceandtheRooseveltGroup.HewasaLondon-basedassociateofJeromeCorsi.

Manafort,PaulJr.

Trumpcampaignmember(March2016–Aug.2016)andchairmanandchiefstrategist(May2016–Aug.2016).

Mashburn,John

TrumpadministrationofficialandformerpolicydirectortotheTrumpCampaign.

McCabe,Andrew

ActingdirectoroftheFBI(May2017–Aug.2017);deputydirectoroftheFBI(Feb.2016–Jan.2018).

McCord,Mary ActingAssistantAttorneyGeneral(Oct.2016–May2017).

McFarland,Kathleen(K.T.)

DeputyWhiteHouseNationalSecurityAdvisor(Jan.2017–May2017).

McGahn,Donald(Don) WhiteHouseCounsel(Jan.2017–

Oct.2018).Medvedcv,Dmitry PrimeMinisterofRussia.Melnik,Yuriy

SpokespersonfortheRussianEmbassyinWashington,D.C.,whoconnectedwithGeorgePapadopoulosonsocialmedia.

Mifsud,Joseph

MaltesenationalandformerLondon-basedprofessorwho,immediatelyafterreturningfromMoscowinApril2016,toldGeorgePapadopoulosthattheRussianshad“dirt”intheformofthousandsofClintonemails.

Miller,Matt

TrumpCampaignstaffmemberwhowaspresentatthemeetingoftheNationalSecurityandDefensePlatformSubcommitteeinJuly2016.

Miller,Stephen SenioradvisortothePresident.Millian,Sergei

FounderoftheRussianAmericanChamberofCommercewhometwithGeorgePapadopoulosduringthecampaign.

Mnuchin,Steven SecretaryoftheTreasury.HOM███

HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Müller-Maguhn,Andrew

MemberofhackerassociationChaosComputerClubandassociateofJulianAssange,founderofWikiLeaks.

Nader,George

AdvisortotheUnitedArabEmirates’sCrownPrincewhoarrangedameetingbetweenKirillDmitrievandErikPrinceduringthetransitionperiod.

Netyksho,Viktor

RussianmilitaryofficerincommandofaunitinvolvedinRussianhack-and-releaseoperationstointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

Oganov,Georgiy

AdvisortoOlegDeripaskaandaboardmemberofinvestmentcompanyBasicElement.HemetwithPaulManafortinSpaininearly2017.

Oknyansky,Henry(a/k/aHenryGreenberg)

Florida-basedRussianindividualwhoclaimedtohavederogatoryinformationpertainingtoHillaryClinton.HemetwithRogerStoneinMay2016.

Page,Carter

ForeignpolicyadvisortotheTrumpCampaignwhoadvocatedpro-RussianviewsandmadeJuly2016andDecember2016visitstoMoscow.

Papadopoulos,George

ForeignpolicyadvisortotheTrumpCampaignwhoreceivedinformationfromJosephMifsudthatRussianshad“dirt”intheformofthousandsofClintonemails.HepleadedguiltytolyingtotheFBIabouthiscontactwith

Mifsud.Parscale,Bradley

Digitalmediadirectorforthe2016TrumpCampaign.

Patten,William(Sam)Jr. Lobbyistandbusinesspartnerof

KonstantinKilimnik.Peskov,Dmitry

DeputychiefofstaffofandpresssecretaryfortheRussianpresidentialadministration.

Phares,Walid

ForeignpolicyadvisortotheTrumpCampaignandco-secretarygeneraloftheTransatlanticParliamentaryGrouponCounterterrorism(TAG)

Pinedo,Richard

U.S.personwhopleadedguiltytoasingle-countinformationofidentityfraud.

Podesta,JohnJr.

ClintoncampaignchairmanwhoseemailaccountwashackedbytheGRU.WikiLeaksreleasedhisstolenemailsduringthe2016campaign.

Podobnyy,Victor

RussianintelligenceofficerwhointeractedwithCarterPagewhileoperatinginsidetheUnitedStates;laterchargedin2015withconspiringtoactasanunregisteredagentofRussia.

Poliakova,Elena PersonalassistanttoDmitryPeskovwhorespondedtoMichaelCohen’s

outreachabouttheTrumpTowerMoscowprojectinJanuary2016.

Polonskaya,Olga

RussiannationalintroducedtoGeorgePapadopoulosbyJosephMifsudasanindividualwithconnectionstoVladimirPutin.

Pompeo,Michael

U.S.SecretaryofState;directoroftheCentralIntelligenceAgency(Jan.2017–Apr.2018).

Porter,Robert WhiteHousestaffsecretary(Jan.2017–Feb.2018).

Priebus,Reince

WhiteHousechiefofstaff(Jan.2017–July2017);chairoftheRepublicanNationalCommittee(Jan.2011–Jan.2017).

Prigozhin,Yevgeniy

HeadofRussiancompaniesConcordCateringandConcordManagementandConsulting;supportedandfinancedtheInternetResearchAgency,whichengagedinan“activemeasures”socialmediacampaigntointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

Prikhodko,Sergei

FirstdeputyheadoftheRussianGovernmentOfficeandformerRussiandeputyprimeminister.In

January2016,heinvitedcandidateTrumptotheSt.PetersburgInternationalEconomicForum.

Prince,Erik

BusinessmanandTrumpCampaignsupporterwhometwithPresidentialTransitionTeamofficialsaftertheelectionandtraveledtotheSeychellestomeetwithKirillDmitrievinJanuary2017.

Raffel,Josh WhiteHousecommunicationsadvisor(Apr.2017–Feb.2018).

Rasin,Alexei

UkrainianassociateofHenryOknyanskywhoclaimedtopossessderogatoryinformationregardingHillaryClinton.

Rogers,Michael DirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgency(Apr.2014–May2018).

Rosenstein,Rod

DeputyAttorneyGeneral(Apr.2017–present);ActingAttorneyGeneralfortheRussianelectioninterferenceinvestigation(May2017–Nov.2018).

Rozov,Andrei

ChairmanofI.C.ExpertInvestmentCompany,aRussianreal-estatedevelopmentcorporationthatsignedaletterofintentfortheTrumpTowerMoscowprojectin2015.

Rtskhiladze,Giorgi ExecutiveoftheSilkRoad

TransatlanticAlliance,LLCwhocommunicatedwithCohenaboutaTrumpTowerMoscowproposal.

Ruddy,Christopher ChiefexecutiveofNewsmaxMediaandassociateofPresidentTrump.

Rybicki,James FBIchiefofstaff(May2015–Feb.2018).

Samochornov,Anatoli

TranslatorwhoworkedwithNataliaVeselnitskayaandattendedaJune9,2016meetingatTrumpTowerbetweenVeselnitskayaandTrumpCampaignofficials.

Sanders,SarahHuckabee WhiteHousepresssecretary(July

2017–present).Sater,Felix

Real-estateadvisorwhoworkedwithMichaelCohentopursueaTrumpTowerMoscowproject.

Saunders,PaulJ.

ExecutivewiththeCenterfortheNationalInterestwhoworkedonoutlinesandlogisticsofcandidateTrump’sApril2016foreignpolicyspeech.

Sechin,Igor ExecutivechairmanofRosneft,aRussian-statedownedoilcompany.

Sessions,JeffersonIII(Jeff)

AttorneyGeneral(Feb.2017–Nov.2018);U.S.Senator(Jan.1997–Feb.2017);headoftheTrumpCampaign’s

foreignpolicyadvisoryteam.Shoygu,Sergey RussianMinisterofDefense.Simes,Dimitri

PresidentandchiefexecutiveofficeroftheCenterfortheNationalInterest.

Smith,Peter

InvestmentbankeractiveinRepublicanpoliticswhosoughttoobtainHillaryClintonemailsduringthe2016U.S.presidentialcampaignperiod.

Spicer,Sean

WhiteHousepresssecretaryandcommunicationsdirector(Jan.2017–July2017).

Stone,Roger

AdvisortotheTrumpCampaignHarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

Tillerson,Rex U.S.SecretaryofState(Feb.2017–Mar.2018).

Timofeev,Ivan

DirectorofprogramsattheRussianInternationalAffairsCouncilandprogramdirectoroftheValdaiDiscussionClubwhocommunicatedin2016withGeorgePapadopoulos,attemptingtoarrangeameetingbetweentheRussiangovernmentandtheTrumpCampaign.

Trump,DonaldJr.

PresidentTrump’sson;trusteeandexecutivevicepresidentoftheTrumpOrganization;helpedarrangeandattendedtheJune9,2016meetingatTrumpTowerbetweenNataliaVeselnitskayaandTrumpCampaignofficials.

Trump,Eric

PresidentTrump’sson;trusteeandexecutivevicepresidentoftheTrumpOrganization.

Trump,Ivanka

PresidentTrump’sdaughter;advisortothePresidentandformerexecutivevicepresidentoftheTrumpOrganization.

Ushakov,YuriViktorovich

AidetoVladimirPutinandformerRussianambassadortotheUnitedStates;identifiedtothePresidentialTransitionTeamastheproposedchanneltotheRussiangovernment.

Vaino,Anton ChiefofstafftoRussianpresidentVladimirPutin.

VanderZwaan,Alexander

FormerattorneyatSkadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&Flom,LLP;workedwithPaulManafortandRickGates.

Vargas,Catherine ExecutiveassistanttoJaredKushner.Vasilchenko,Gleb InternetResearchAgencyemployee

whoengagedinan“activemeasures”

socialmediacampaigntointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

Veselnitskaya,Natalia

RussianattorneywhoadvocatedfortherepealoftheMagnitskyActandwastheprincipalspeakerattheJune9,2016meetingatTrumpTowerwithTrumpCampaignofficials.

Weber,Shlomo

RectoroftheNewEconomicSchool(NES)inMoscowwhoinvitedCarterPagetospeakatNEScommencementinJuly2016.

Yanukovych,Viktor FormerpresidentofUkrainewhohadworkedwithPaulManafort.

Yates,Sally

ActingAttorneyGeneral(Jan.20,2017–Jan.30,2017);DeputyAttorneyGeneral(Jan.10,2015–Jan.30,2017).

Yatsenko,Sergey

DeputychieffinancialofficerofGazprom,aRussianstate-ownedenergycompany,andassociateofCarterPage.

Zakharova,Maria

DirectoroftheRussianMinistryofForeignAffair’sInformationandPressDepartmentwhoreceivednotificationofCarterPage’sspeechinJuly2016fromDenisKlimentov.

ZayedalNahyan,Mohammedbin

CrownPrinceofAbuDhabianddeputysupremecommanderoftheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)armedforces.

EntitiesandOrganizations

Alfa-Bank Russia’slargestcommercialbank,whichisheadedbyPetrAven.

CenterfortheNationalInterest(CNI)

U.S.-basedthinktankwithexpertiseinandconnectionstoRussia.CNI’spublication,theNationalInterest,hostedcandidateTrump’sforeignpolicyspeechinApril2016.

Concord

UmbrellatermforConcordManagementandConsulting,LLCandConcordCatering,whichareRussiancompaniescontrolledbyYevgeniyPrigozhin.

CrocusGrouporCrocusInternational

ARussianreal-estateandpropertydevelopmentcompanythat,in2013,hostedtheMissUniversePageant,andfrom2013through2014,workedwiththeTrumpOrganizationonaTrumpMoscowproject.

DCLeaks

FictitiousonlinepersonaoperatedbytheGRUthatreleasedstolendocumentsduringthe2016U.S.

presidentialcampaignperiod.DemocraticCongressionalCampaignCommittee

PoliticalcommitteeworkingtoelectDemocratstotheHouseofRepresentatives;hackedbytheGRUinApril2016.

DemocraticNationalCommittee

FormalgoverningbodyfortheDemocraticParty;hackedbytheGRUinApril2016.

Duma LowerHouseofthenationallegislatureoftheRussianFederation.

Gazprom

Russianoilandgascompanymajority-ownedbytheRussiangovernment.

GlobalEnergyCapital,LLC Investmentandmanagementfirm

foundedbyCarterPage.GlobalPartnersinDiplomacy

EventhostedinpartnershipwiththeU.S.DepartmentofStateandtheRepublicanNationalConvention.In2016,JeffSessionsandJ.D.GordondeliveredspeechesattheeventandinteractedwithRussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyak.

Guccifer2.0

FictitiousonlinepersonaoperatedbytheGRUthatreleasedstolendocumentsduringthe2016U.S.presidentialcampaignperiod.

I.C.ExpertInvestment Russianreal-estateanddevelopment

Company

corporationthatsignedaletterofintentwithaTrumpOrganizationsubsidiarytodevelopaTrumpMoscowproperty.

InternetResearchAgency(IRA)

RussianentitybasedinSaintPetersburgandfundedbyConcordthatengagedinan“activemeasures”socialmediacampaigntointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

KLSResearchLLC

BusinessestablishedbyanassociateofandatthedirectionofPeterSmithtofurtherSmith’ssearchforHillaryClintonemails.

Kremlin

OfficialresidenceofthepresidentoftheRussianFederation;itisusedcolloquiallytorefertotheofficeofthepresidentortheRussiangovernment.

LetterOne

CompanythatincludesPetrAvenandRichardBurtasboardmembers.DuringaboardmeetinginDecember2016,AvenaskedforBurt’shelptomakecontactwiththePresidentialTransitionTeam.

LinkCampusUniversity

UniversityinRome,Italy,whereGeorgePapadopouloswasintroducedtoJosephMifsud.

LondonCentreofInternationalLawPractice(LCILP)

InternationallawadvisoryorganizationinLondonthatemployedJosephMifsudandGeorgePapadopoulos.

MainIntelligenceDirectorateoftheGeneralStaff(GRU)

RussianFederation’smilitaryintelligenceagency.

NewEconomicSchoolinMoscow(NES)

Moscow-basedschoolthatinvitedCarterPagetospeakatitsJuly2016commencementceremony.

OppositionBloc

UkrainianpoliticalpartythatincorporatedmembersofthedefunctPartyofRegions.

PartyofRegions

UkrainianpoliticalpartyofformerPresidentYanukovych.ItwasgenerallyunderstoodtoalignwithRussianpolicies.

PericlesEmergingMarketPartnersLLP

CompanyregisteredintheCaymanIslandsbyPaulManafortandhisbusinesspartnerRickDavis.OlegDeripaskainvestedinthefund.

PrevezonHoldingsLtd.

RussiancompanythatwasadefendantinaU.S.civilactionallegingthelaunderingofproceedsfromfraudexposedbySergeiMagnitsky.

RoscongressFoundation

RussianentitythatorganizedtheSt.PetersburgInternationalEconomic

Forum.

Rosneft Russianstate-ownedoilandenergycompany.

RussianDirectInvestmentFund

SovereignwealthfundestablishedbytheRussianGovernmentin2011andheadedbyKirillDmitriev.

RussianInternationalAffairsCouncil

Russia-basednonprofitestablishedbyRussiangovernmentdecree.ItisassociatedwiththeMinistryofForeignAffairs,anditsmembersincludeIvanTimofeev,DmitryPeskov,andPetrAven.

SilkRoadGroup

PrivatelyheldinvestmentcompanythatenteredintoalicensingagreementtobuildaTrump-brandedhotelinGeorgia.

St.PetersburgInternationalEconomicForum

AnnualeventheldinRussiaandattendedbyprominentRussianpoliticiansandbusinessmen.

Tatneft Russianenergycompany.TransatlanticParliamentaryGrouponCounterterrorism

EuropeangroupthatsponsoredasummitbetweenEuropeanParliamentlawmakersandU.S.persons.GeorgePapadopoulos,SamClovis,andWalidPharesattendedtheTAGsummitin

July2016.Unit26165(GRU)

GRUmilitarycyberunitdedicatedtotargetingmilitary,political,governmental,andnon-governmentalorganizationsoutsideofRussia.ItengagedincomputerintrusionsofU.S.personsandorganizations,aswellasthesubsequentreleaseofthestolendata,inordertointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

Unit74455(GRU)

GRUmilitaryunitwithmultipledepartmentsthatengagedincyberoperations.ItengagedincomputerintrusionsofU.S.personsandorganizations,aswellasthesubsequentreleaseofthestolendata,inordertointerfereinthe2016U.S.presidentialelection.

ValdaiDiscussionClub

GroupthatholdsaconferenceattendedbyRussiangovernmentofficials,includingPresidentPutin.

WikiLeaks

OrganizationfoundedbyJulianAssangethatpostsinformationonline,includingdatastolenfromprivate,corporate,andU.S.Governmententities.ReleaseddatastolenbytheGRUduringthe2016U.S.

presidentialelection.

IndexofAcronyms

CNI CenterfortheNationalInterestDCCC

DemocraticCongressionalCampaignCommittee

DNC DemocraticNationalCommitteeFBI FederalBureauofInvestigationFSB RussianFederalSecurityServiceGEC GlobalEnergyCapital,LLCGRU

RussianFederation’sMainIntelligenceDirectorateoftheGeneralStaff

HPSCIU.S.HouseofRepresentativesPermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligence

HRC HillaryRodhamClintonIRA InternetResearchAgencyLCILP LondonCentreofInternationalLawPracticeNATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationNES NewEconomicSchoolNSA NationalSecurityAgencyODNI OfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligencePTT PresidentialTransitionTeamRDIF RussianDirectInvestmentFund

RIAC RussianInternationalAffairsCouncilSBOE StateboardsofelectionsSCO SpecialCounsel’sOfficeSJC U.S.SenateJudiciaryCommitteeSSCI U.S.SenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligenceTAG

TransatlanticParliamentaryGrouponCounterterrorism

VEB Vnesheconombank

AppendixC

APPENDIXC

INTRODUCTORYNOTE

The President providedwritten responses through his personal counsel toquestionssubmittedtohimbytheSpecialCounsel’sOffice.Wefirstexplaintheprocess that led to the submission of written questions and then attach thePresident’sresponses.

Beginning in December 2017, this Office sought formore than a year tointerviewthePresidenton topics relevant tobothRussian-election interferenceandobstruction-of-justice.WeadvisedcounselthatthePresidentwasa“subject”oftheinvestigationunderthedefinitionoftheJusticeManual—“apersonwhoseconductiswithinthescopeofthegrandjury’sinvestigation.”JusticeManual§9-11.151(2018).Wealsoadvisedcounselthat“[a]ninterviewwiththePresidentisvital toour investigation”and that thisOfficehad“carefully considered theconstitutional and other arguments raised by . . . counsel, and they d[id] notprovideuswith reason to forgoseekingan interview.”1Weadditionallystatedthat“itisintheinterestofthePresidencyandthepublicforaninterviewtotakeplace”andoffered“numerousaccommodationstoaidthePresident’spreparationandavoidsurprise.”2AfterextensivediscussionswiththeDepartmentofJusticeabouttheSpecialCounsel’sobjectiveofsecuringthePresident’stestimony,theseaccommodationsincludedthesubmissionsofwrittenquestionstothePresidentoncertainRussia-relatedtopics.3

We received thePresident’swritten responses in lateNovember2018.4 InDecember2018,weinformedcounseloftheinsufficiencyofthoseresponsesinseveral respects.5We noted, among other things, that the President stated onmore than 30 occasions that he “does not ‘recall’ or ‘remember’ or have an‘independent recollection”’ of information called for by the questions.6Otheranswerswere“incompleteor imprecise.”7Thewrittenresponses,we informedcounsel,“demonstratetheinadequacyofthewrittenformat,aswehavehadnoopportunitytoaskfollow-upquestionsthatwouldensurecompleteanswersandpotentiallyrefreshyourclient’srecollectionorclarifytheextentornatureofhislack of recollection.”8 We again requested an in-person interview, limited tocertain topics, advising the President’s counsel that “[t]his is the President’s

opportunitytovoluntarilyprovideuswithinformationforustoevaluateinthecontextofalloftheevidencewehavegathered.”9ThePresidentdeclined.10

GrandJury████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████11GrandJury████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████12

Recognizing that the President would not be interviewed voluntarily, weconsideredwhethertoissueasubpoenaforhistestimony.Weviewedthewrittenanswers to be inadequate. But at that point, our investigation had madesignificant progress and had produced substantial evidence for our report.Wethus weighed the costs of potentially lengthy constitutional litigation, withresultingdelayinfinishingourinvestigation,againsttheanticipatedbenefitsforour investigation and report. As explained in Volume II, Section II.B., wedetermined that the substantial quantity of information we had obtained fromother sources allowed us to draw relevant factual conclusions on intent andcredibility,whichareoften inferred fromcircumstantial evidenceandassessedwithoutdirecttestimonyfromthesubjectoftheinvestigation.

***

WRITTENQUESTIONSTOBEANSWEREDUNDEROATHBYPRESIDENTDONALDJ.TRUMP

I. June9,2016MeetingatTrumpTower

a. When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., PaulManafort, orJaredKushnerwasconsideringparticipatinginameetinginJune2016concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton?Describewhoyou learned the informationfromand thesubstanceofthediscussion.

b. AttachedtothisdocumentasExhibitAisaseriesofemailsfromJune2016between,amongothers,DonaldTrump,Jr.andRobGoldstone.InadditiontotheemailsreflectedinExhibitA,DonaldTrump,Jr.hadother communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin AgalarovbetweenJune3,2016,andJune9,2016.i. DidMr.Trump,Jr.oranyoneelsetellyouaboutorshowyouanyof these communications? If yes, describe who discussed thecommunications with you, when, and the substance of thediscussion(s).

ii. WhendidyoufirstseeorlearnaboutalloranypartoftheemailsreflectedinExhibitA?

iii. Whendidyou first learn that theproposedmeeting involvedorwas described as being part of Russia and its government’ssupportforyourcandidacy?

iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or releasepubliclyalloranyportionoftheemailsreflectedinExhibitA?Ifyes,describewhoyoucommunicatedwith,when, the substanceofthecommunication(s),andwhyyoutookthataction.

c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and JaredKushnerattendedameetingatTrumpTowerwithseveralindividuals,including a Russian lawyer, Natalia Veselnitskaya (the “June 9meeting”).i. Other than as set forth in your answers to I.a and I.b, what, ifanything, were you told about the possibility of this meetingtakingplace,ortheschedulingofsuchameeting?Describewhoyoudiscussedthiswith,when,andwhatyouwereinformedaboutthemeeting.

ii. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the

June9meetingwereRussianorhadanyaffiliationwithanypartof the Russian government? Describe who you learned thisinformationfromandthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

iii. What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9meeting? Describe each conversation in which you were toldaboutwhatwas discussed at themeeting,who the conversationwaswith,when itoccurred,and the substanceof the statementstheymadeaboutthemeeting.

iv. WereyoutoldthattheJune9meetingwasabout,inwholeorinpart, adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe whoyou had that discussion with, when, and the substance of thediscussion.

d. FortheperiodJune6,2016throughJune9,2016,forwhatportionofeachdaywereyouinTrumpTower?i. DidyouspeakormeetwithDonaldTrump,Jr.,PaulManafort,orJaredKushneronJune9,2016?Ifyes,didanyportionofanyofthose conversations or meetings include any reference to anyaspectoftheJune9meeting?Ifyes,describewhoyouspokewithandthesubstanceoftheconversation.

e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member orrepresentative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes,describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of thecommunication.

f. Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr.,PaulManafort,orJaredKushnerandanymemberorrepresentativeofthe Agalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or anyRussian official or contact that took place after June 9, 2016 andconcerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist thecampaign? If yes, describe who you learned this information from,when,andthesubstanceofwhatyoulearned.

g. OnJune7,2016,yougaveaspeechinwhichyousaid,inpart,“Iamgoing togiveamajorspeechonprobablyMondayofnextweekandwe’re going to be discussing all of the things that have taken placewiththeClintons.”

i. Whydidyoumakethatstatement?ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the

Clintons?iii. Whatdidyoubelievethesource(s)ofthatinformationwouldbe?iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the

June9meeting?v. Didanyonehelpdraft thespeech thatyouwere referring to? If

so,who?vi. Whydidyouultimatelynot give the speechyou referencedon

June7,2016?

h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign thatVladimirPutinor theRussiangovernment supportedyour candidacyor opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe thesource(s)oftheinformation,whenyouwereinformed,andthecontentofsuchdiscussion(s).

i. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that anyforeign government or foreign leader, other thanRussia orVladimirPutin,hadprovided,wishedtoprovide,orofferedtoprovidetangiblesupport to your campaign, including by way of offering to providenegativeinformationonHillaryClinton?Ifyes,describethesource(s)oftheinformation,whenyouwereinformed,andthecontentofsuchdiscussion(s).

II. RussianHacking/RussianEffortsUsingSocialMedia/Wikileaks

a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers hadpenetratedthecomputernetworkoftheDemocraticNationalCommittee(DNC)andthatRussianintelligencewasbehindtheunauthorizedaccess,orhack.PriortoJune14,2016,wereyouprovidedanyinformationaboutanypotentialoractualhackingofthecomputersystemsoremailaccountsof the DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee(DCCC),theClintonCampaign,HillaryClinton,orindividualsassociatedwith the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who provided thisinformation,when,andthesubstanceoftheinformation.

b. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or

receivedbyDemocraticpartyofficials.i. PriortotheJuly22,2016release,wereyouawarefromanysourcethat WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had orpotentially had possession of or planned to release emails orinformation that could help your campaign or hurt the Clintoncampaign?Ifyes,describewhoyoudiscussedthisissuewith,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

ii. After the release of emails byWikiLeaks on July 22, 2016,wereyou told that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additionalinformation that could be released during the campaign? If yes,describewhoprovidedthis information,when,andwhatyouweretold.

c. Areyouawareofanycommunicationsduring thecampaign,directlyorindirectly, between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., PaulManafort, orRick Gates and (a) WikiLeaks, (b) Julian Assange, (c) otherrepresentatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Guccifer 2.0, (e) representatives ofGuccifer 2.0, or (f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes, describe whoprovided you with this information, when you learned of thecommunications,andwhatyouknowaboutthosecommunications.

d. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: “Russia, if you’relistening,Ihopeyou’reabletofindthe30,000emailsthataremissing.Ithinkyouwillprobablyberewardedmightilybyourpress.”

i. WhydidyoumakethatrequestofRussia,asopposedtoanyothercountry,entity,orindividual?

ii. Inadvanceofmaking that statement,whatdiscussions, if any,didyouhavewithanyoneelseaboutthesubstanceofthestatement?

iii. WereyoutoldatanytimebeforeorafteryoumadethatstatementthatRussiawasattemptingtoinfiltrateorhackcomputersystemsoremailaccountsofHillaryClintonorhercampaign?Ifyes,describewhoprovidedthisinformation,when,andwhatyouweretold.

e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John PodestawerereleasedbyWikiLeaks.

i. WherewereyouonOctober7,2016?ii. Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the

October7releasethatWikiLeakspossessedormightpossessemails

related to JohnPodesta? Ifyes,describewho toldyou this,when,andwhatyouweretold.

iii. Are you aware of anyone associatedwith you or your campaign,includingRogerStone,reachingouttoWikiLeaks,eitherdirectlyorthrough an intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes,identifythepersonanddescribethesubstanceoftheconversationsorcontacts.

f. Wereyoutoldofanyoneassociatedwithyouoryourcampaign,includingRoger Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, withWikiLeaks,Guccifer2.0,orDCLeaksregardingthecontentortimingofrelease of hacked emails? If yes, describewho had such contacts, howyou became aware of the contacts, when you became aware of thecontacts,andthesubstanceofthecontacts.

g. FromJune1,2016throughtheendofthecampaign,howfrequentlydidyou communicate with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of yourcommunication(s)withMr.Stone.

i. Duringthattimeperiod,whateffortsdidMr.Stonetellyouhewasmakingtoassistyourcampaign,andwhatrequests,ifany,didyoumakeofMr.Stone?

ii. DidMr. Stone ever discussWikiLeakswith you or, as far as youwereaware,withanyoneelseassociatedwiththecampaign?Ifyes,describewhatyouweretold,fromwhom,andwhen.

iii. DidMr.Stoneat any time informyouaboutcontactshehadwithWikiLeaksoranyintermediaryofWikiLeaks,oraboutforthcomingreleases of information? If yes, describewhat Stone told you andwhen.

h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding apotentialpardonorotheractiontobenefitJulianAssange?Ifyes,describewho you had the discussion(s) with, when, and the content of thediscussion(s).

i. Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies,including those in Russia, to assist your campaign through the use ofsocialmediapostingsor theorganizationofrallies?Ifyes, identifywhoyou discussed such assistance with, when, and the content of the

discussion(s).

III. TheTrumpOrganizationMoscowProject

a. In October 2015, a “Letter of Intent,” a copy of which is attached asExhibit B, was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project inMoscow(the“TrumpMoscowproject”).

i. When were you first informed of discussions about the TrumpMoscowproject?Bywhom?Whatwereyoutoldabouttheproject?

ii. Didyousigntheletterofintent?

b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, MichaelCohen stated: “To the best ofmy knowledge,Mr. Trumpwas never incontactwithanyoneaboutthisproposalotherthanmeonthreeoccasions,including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015.” Describe alldiscussionsyouhadwithMr.Cohen,oranyoneelseassociatedwiththeTrump Organization, about the TrumpMoscow project, including whoyouspokewith,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

c. Didyou learnof anycommunicationsbetweenMichaelCohenorFelixSater and any Russian government officials, including officials in theoffice of Dmitry Peskov, regarding the TrumpMoscow project? If so,identifywhoprovidedthisinformationtoyou,when,andthesubstanceofwhatyoulearned.

d. Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016regarding a potential trip to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen forreasonsrelated to theTrumpMoscowproject?Ifyes,describewhoyouspokewith,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

e. Didyouat any timedirect or suggest that discussions about theTrumpMoscowprojectshouldcease,orwereyouinformedatanytimethattheprojecthadbeenabandoned?Ifyes,describewhoyouspokewith,when,thesubstanceofthediscussion(s),andwhythatdecisionwasmade.

f. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would beprovidedpubliclyorinresponsetoinvestigativeinquiriesaboutpotentialor actual investments or business deals the TrumpOrganization had inRussia, including theTrumpMoscowproject? Ifyes,describewhoyou

spokewith,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

g. Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the TrumpOrganization have any other prospective or actual business interests,investments, or arrangements with Russia or any Russian interest orRussian individual during the campaign? If yes, describe the businessinterests,investments,orarrangements.

IV. ContactswithRussiaandRussia-RelatedIssuesDuringtheCampaign

a. Priortomid-August2016,didyoubecomeawarethatPaulManaforthadtiestotheUkrainiangovernment?Ifyes,describewhoyoulearnedthisinformation from,when,and the substanceofwhatyouwere told.DidMr. Manafort’s connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governmentsplayanyrole inyourdecision tohavehimjoinyourcampaign?Ifyes,describethatrole.

b. WereyouawarethatPaulManafortofferedbriefingsontheprogressofyourcampaigntoOlegDeripaska?Ifyes,describewhoyoulearnedthisinformationfrom,when,thesubstanceofwhatyouweretold,whatyouunderstood the purpose was of sharing such information with Mr.Deripaska,andhowyourespondedtolearningthisinformation.

c. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associatedwith your campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trumpcampaign information to any person located in Ukraine or Russia orassociatedwith theUkrainianorRussiangovernments? Ifyes, identifywho provided you with this information, when, the substance of thediscussion(s), what you understood the purpose was of sharing theinternalcampaign information,andhowyouresponded to learning thisinformation.

d. Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, anypositions Ukraine or Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes,describewhenhecommunicatedthosepositionstoyouandthesubstanceofthosecommunications.

e. Duringthecampaign,wereyoutoldabouteffortsbyRussianofficialstomeet with you or senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe

whoyouhadconversationswithonthistopic,when,andwhatyouweretold.

f. What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Partyplatform regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican NationalConvention? Prior to the convention, what information did you haveaboutthisplatformprovision?Aftertheplatformprovisionwaschanged,whotoldyouabout thechange,whendid they tellyou,whatwereyoutoldaboutwhyitwaschanged,andwhowasinvolved?

g. On July 27, 2016, in response to a question aboutwhether youwouldrecognizeCrimeaasRussian territoryand lift sanctionsonRussia,yousaid:“We’llbelookingatthat.Yeah,we’llbelooking.”Didyouintendto communicate by that statement or at any other time during thecampaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or recognize Russia’sannexationofCrimeaifyouwereelected?

i. What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/orrecognizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea if you were elected?Describewhoyouspokewithaboutthistopic,when,thesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

V. ContactswithRussiaandRussia-RelatedIssuesDuringtheTransition

a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala onNovember 10, 2016? If yes, who asked you to attend, whenwere youasked, and what were you told about about why your presence wasrequested?

i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe anyinteractions you had with any Russians or representatives of theRussiangovernmentattheevent.

b. FollowingtheObamaAdministration’simpositionofsanctionsonRussiainDecember2016(“Russiasanctions”),didyoudiscusswithLieutenantGeneral (LTG)Michael Flynn, K.T.McFarland, Steve Bannon, ReincePriebus, JaredKushner,ErikPrince, or anyone else associatedwith thetransition what should be communicated to the Russian governmentregarding thesanctions? Ifyes,describewhoyouspokewithabout thisissue,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

c. OnDecember29andDecember31,2016,LTGFlynnhadconversationswithRussianAmbassadorSergeyKislyakabouttheRussiasanctionsandRussia’sresponsetotheRussiasanctions.

i. Did you direct or suggest that LTG Flynn have discussions withanyonefromtheRussiangovernmentabouttheRussiasanctions?

ii. Were you told in advance of LTG Flynn’s December 29, 2016conversation that he was going to be speaking with AmbassadorKislyak?Ifyes,describewhotoldyouthisinformation,when,andwhatyouwere told. Ifno,whenandfromwhomdidyou learnofLTG Flynn’s December 29, 2016 conversation with AmbassadorKislyak?

iii. Whendidyou learnofLTGFlynnandAmbassadorKislyak’scallonDecember31,2016?Whotoldyouandwhatwereyoutold?

iv. WhendidyoulearnthatsanctionswerediscussedintheDecember29 and December 31, 2016 calls between LTG Flynn andAmbassadorKislyak?Whotoldyouandwhatwereyoutold?

d. At any time between December 31, 2016, and January 20, 2017, didanyone tell you or suggest to you that Russia’s decision not to imposereciprocal sanctions was attributable in any way to LTG Flynn’scommunicationswithAmbassadorKislyak?Ifyes,identifywhoprovidedyouwiththisinformation,when,andthesubstanceofwhatyouweretold.

e. OnJanuary12,2017,theWashingtonPostpublishedacolumnthatstatedthatLTGFlynnphonedAmbassadorKislyakseveraltimesonDecember29, 2016. After learning of the column, did you direct or suggest toanyone that LTG Flynn should deny that he discussed sanctions withAmbassador Kislyak? If yes, who did you make this suggestion ordirectionto,when,whatdidyousay,andwhydidyoutakethisstep?

i. Afterlearningofthecolumn,didyouhaveanyconversationswithLTG Flynn about his conversations with Ambassador Kislyak inDecember2016? Ifyes,describewhen thosediscussionsoccurredandthecontentofthediscussions.

f. WereyoutoldaboutameetingbetweenJaredKushnerandSergeiGorkovthattookplaceinDecember2016?

i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the

discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of themeeting.

g. WereyoutoldaboutameetingormeetingsbetweenErikPrinceandKirillDmitriev or any other representative from theRussian government thattookplaceinJanuary2017?

i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of thediscussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of themeeting(s).

h. PriortoJanuary20,2017,didyoutalktoSteveBannon,JaredKushner,or any other individual associated with the transition regardingestablishing an unofficial line of communication with Russia? If yes,describewhoyou spokewith,when, the substanceof thediscussion(s),andwhat you understoodwas the purpose of such an unofficial line ofcommunication.

RESPONSESOFPRESIDENTDONALDJ.TRUMP

I. June9,2016MeetingatTrumpTower

a. Whendidyoufirst learnthatDonaldTrump,Jr.,PaulManafort,orJaredKushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton?Describewhoyou learned the information fromand thesubstanceof thediscussion.

b. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June2016 between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and RobGoldstone. InadditiontotheemailsreflectedinExhibitA,DonaldTrump,Jr.hadothercommunicationswithRobGoldstoneandEminAgalarovbetweenJune3,2016,andJune9,2016.i. DidMr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any ofthese communications? If yes, describe who discussed thecommunicationswithyou,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

ii. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emailsreflectedinExhibitA?

iii. When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or wasdescribedasbeingpartofRussiaanditsgovernment’ssupportforyourcandidacy?

iv. DidyousuggesttoordirectanyonenottodiscussorreleasepubliclyalloranyportionoftheemailsreflectedinExhibitA?Ifyes,describewhoyoucommunicatedwith,when, thesubstanceof thecommunication(s),andwhyyoutookthataction.

c. On June 9, 2016,Donald Trump, Jr., PaulManafort, and JaredKushnerattendedameetingatTrumpTowerwith several individuals, includingaRussianlawyer,NataliaVeselnitskaya(the“June9meeting”).i. OtherthanassetforthinyouranswerstoI.aandI.b,what,ifanything,wereyou toldabout thepossibilityof thismeeting takingplace,or thescheduling of such ameeting? Describe who you discussed this with,when,andwhatyouwereinformedaboutthemeeting.

ii. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9meetingwereRussianorhadanyaffiliationwithanypartoftheRussiangovernment?Describewho you learned this information from and thesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

iii. Whatwere you told aboutwhatwas discussed at the June 9meeting?Describe each conversation in which you were told about what wasdiscussed at the meeting, who the conversation was with, when itoccurred, and the substance of the statements they made about themeeting.

iv. Wereyou told that the June9meetingwas about, inwholeor in part,adoption and/or theMagnitskyAct? If yes, describewhoyouhad thatdiscussionwith,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion.

d. FortheperiodJune6,2016throughJune9,2016,forwhatportionofeachdaywereyouinTrumpTower?i. DidyouspeakormeetwithDonaldTrump,Jr.,PaulManafort,orJaredKushner on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of thoseconversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of theJune9meeting?Ifyes,describewhoyouspokewithandthesubstanceoftheconversation.

e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member orrepresentativeoftheAgalarovfamilyafterJune3,2016?Ifyes,describewhoyouspokewith,when,andthesubstanceofthecommunication.

f. Did you learn of any communications betweenDonald Trump, Jr., PaulManafort, or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of theAgalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or any Russianofficial or contact that took place after June 9, 2016 and concerned theJune9meetingoreffortsbyRussiatoassistthecampaign?Ifyes,describewhoyou learned this informationfrom,when,and thesubstanceofwhatyoulearned.

g. OnJune7,2016,yougaveaspeechinwhichyousaid,inpart,“IamgoingtogiveamajorspeechonprobablyMondayofnextweekandwe’regoingtobediscussingallofthethingsthathavetakenplacewiththeClintons.”i. Whydidyoumakethatstatement?ii. WhatinformationdidyouplantosharewithrespecttotheClintons?iii. Whatdidyoubelievethesource(s)ofthatinformationwouldbe?iv. Didyouexpectanyof the information tohavecomefromtheJune9

meeting?v. Didanyonehelpdraftthespeechthatyouwerereferringto?Ifso,who?vi. WhydidyouultimatelynotgivethespeechyoureferencedonJune7,

2016?

h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign thatVladimirPutinortheRussiangovernmentsupportedyourcandidacyoropposedthecandidacy of Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of theinformation, when you were informed, and the content of suchdiscussion(s).

i. Didanypersonorentityinformyouduringthecampaignthatanyforeigngovernment or foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, hadprovided,wishedtoprovide,orofferedtoprovidetangiblesupporttoyourcampaign,includingbywayofofferingtoprovidenegativeinformationonHillaryClinton?Ifyes,describethesource(s)oftheinformation,whenyouwereinformed,andthecontentofsuchdiscussion(s).

ResponsetoQuestionI,Parts(a)through(c)

I have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald Trump, Jr., PaulManafort,orJaredKushnerwasconsideringparticipating inameeting inJune2016concerningpotentiallynegativeinformationaboutHillaryClinton.NordoI recall learningduring the campaign that the June9, 2016meetinghad takenplace,thatthereferencedemailsexisted,orthatDonaldJ.Trump,Jr.,hadothercommunicationswithEminAgalarovorRobertGoldstonebetweenJune3,2016andJune9,2016.

ResponsetoQuestionI,Part(d)

IhavenoindependentrecollectionofwhatportionofthesefourdaysinJuneof2016IspentinTrumpTower.Thiswasoneofmanybusymonthsduringafast-pacedcampaign,as theprimaryseasonwasendingandwewerepreparing forthegeneralelectioncampaign.

IamnowawarethatmyCampaign’scalendarindicatesthatIwasinNewYorkCity fromJune6–9,2016.Calendarskept inmyTrumpToweroffice reflectthat I had various calls andmeetings scheduled for each of these days.Whilethose calls and meetings may or may not actually have taken place, they doindicate that Iwas inTrumpTowerduringaportionof eachof theseworkingdays,andIhavenoreasontodoubtthatIwas.WhenIwasinNewYorkCity,IstayedatmyTrumpTowerapartment.

My TrumpOrganization desk calendar also reflects that I was outside TrumpTowerduringportionsofthesedays.TheJune7,2016calendarindicatesIwasscheduled to leaveTrumpTower in the early evening forWestchesterwhere IgaveremarksafterwinningtheCalifornia,NewJersey,NewMexico,Montana,andSouthDakotaRepublicanprimariesheldthatday.TheJune8,2016calendarindicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon to attend a ceremony at myson’s school. The June 9, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to attendmiddaymeetingsandafundraisingluncheonattheFourSeasonsHotel.Atthispoint, I do not remember on what dates these events occurred, but I do notcurrently have a reason to doubt that they took place as scheduled on mycalendar.

Widelyavailablemediareports,includingtelevisionfootage,alsoshedlightonmyactivitiesduringthesedays.Forexample,IamawarethatmyJune7,2016

victoryremarksattheTrumpNationalGolfClubinBriarcliffManor,NewYork,wererecordedandpublishedbythemedia.Irememberwinningthoseprimariesandgenerallyrecalldeliveringremarksthatevening.

At this point in time, I donot rememberwhether I spokeormetwithDonaldTrump,Jr.,PaulManafort,orJaredKushneronJune9,2016.MydeskcalendarindicatesIwasscheduledtomeetwithPaulManafortonthemorningofJune9,butIdonotrecallifthatmeetingtookplace.Itwasmorethantwoyearsago,atatimewhenIhadmanycallsandinteractionsdaily.

ResponsetoQuestionI,Part(e)

I have no independent recollection of any communications I had with theAgalarovfamilyoranyoneIunderstoodtobearepresentativeof theAgalarovfamilyafterJune3,2016andbeforetheendofthecampaign.Whilepreparingtorespond to these questions, I have become aware of written communicationswith the Agalarovs during the campaign that were sent, received, and largelyauthoredbymystaffandwhichIunderstandhavealreadybeenproducedtoyou.

In general, the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaignvictories, emails about a painting Emin and Aras Agalarov arranged to havedeliveredtoTrumpTowerasabirthdaypresent,andemailsregardingdeliveryofabookwrittenbyArasAgalarov.ThedocumentsreflectthatthedeliverieswerescreenedbytheSecretService.

ResponsetoQuestionI,Part(f)

I do not recall being aware during the campaign of communications betweenDonald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner and any member orrepresentativeof theAgalarov family,RobertGoldstone,NataliaVeselnitskaya(whosenameIwasnot familiarwith),oranyoneIunderstood tobeaRussianofficial.

ResponsetoQuestionI,Part(g)

InremarksIdeliveredthenightIwontheCalifornia,NewJersey,NewMexico,Montana,andSouthDakotaRepublicanprimaries,Isaid,“Iamgoingtogivea

major speech on probably Monday of next week and we’re going to bediscussingallofthethingsthathavetakenplacewiththeClintons.”Ingeneral,Iexpected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negativeinformation about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs. Clinton’s failedpolicies, theClintons’useoftheStateDepartmenttofurthertheir interestsandtheinterestsoftheClintonFoundation,Mrs.Clinton’simproperuseofaprivateserver forStateDepartment business, the destructionof 33,000 emails on thatserver, and Mrs. Clinton’s temperamental unsuitability for the office ofPresident.

In the courseof preparing to respond toyourquestions, I havebecomeawarethat the Campaign documents already produced to you reflect the drafting,evolution, and sources of information for the speech I expected to give“probably” on the Monday following my June 7, 2016 comments. Thesedocuments generally show that the text of the speechwas initially drafted byCampaign staff with input from various outside advisors and was based onpublicly availablematerial, including, inparticular, information from thebookClintonCashbyPeterSchweizer.

The Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the earlymorning hours ofSunday, June12,2016. In lightof that tragedy, Igavea speechdirectedmorespecificallytonationalsecurityandterrorismthantotheClintons.Thatspeechwas delivered at the SaintAnselmCollege Institute of Politics inManchester,NewHampshire,and,asreported,openedwiththefollowing:

This was going to be a speech on Hillary Clinton and how bad aPresident, especially in these timesofRadical IslamicTerrorism, shewould be. Even her former Secret Service Agent, who has seen herunder pressure and in times of stress, has stated that she lacks thetemperament and integrity to be president. There will be plenty ofopportunitytodiscusstheseimportantissuesatalatertime,andIwilldeliverthatspeechsoon.Buttodaythereisonlyonethingtodiscuss:thegrowingthreatofterrorisminsideofourborders.

I continued to speak about Mrs. Clinton’s failings throughout the campaign,usingtheinformationpreparedforinclusioninthespeechtowhichIreferredonJune7,2016.

ResponsetoQuestionI,Part(h)

IhavenorecollectionofbeingtoldduringthecampaignthatVladimirPutinortheRussiangovernment“supported”mycandidacyor“opposed”thecandidacyof Hillary Clinton. However, I was aware of some reports indicating thatPresidentPutinhadmadecomplimentarystatementsaboutme.

ResponsetoQuestionI,Part(i)

I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that any foreigngovernment or foreign leader had provided, wished to provide, or offered toprovidetangiblesupporttomycampaign.

II.RussianHacking/RussianEffortsUsingSocialMedia/WikiLeaks

a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers hadpenetrated the computer network of the Democratic National Committee(DNC)andthatRussianintelligencewasbehindtheunauthorizedaccess,orhack.PriortoJune14,2016,wereyouprovidedanyinformationaboutanypotentialoractualhackingofthecomputersystemsoremailaccountsoftheDNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), theClinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals associated with theClinton campaign? If yes, describewho provided this information,when,andthesubstanceoftheinformation.

b. OnJuly22,2016,WikiLeaksreleasednearly20,000emailssentorreceivedbyDemocraticpartyofficials.

i. PriortotheJuly22,2016release,wereyouawarefromanysourcethatWikiLeaks,Guccifer 2.0,DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially hadpossessionoforplannedtoreleaseemailsorinformationthatcouldhelpyour campaignorhurt theClintoncampaign? Ifyes,describewhoyoudiscussedthisissuewith,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

ii. AfterthereleaseofemailsbyWikiLeaksonJuly22,2016,wereyoutoldthatWikiLeaks possessed ormight possess additional information thatcould be released during the campaign? If yes, describewho providedthisinformation,when,andwhatyouweretold.

c. Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly orindirectly,betweenRogerStone,DonaldTrump,Jr.,PaulManafort,orRickGates and (a)WikiLeaks, (b) JulianAssange, (c) other representatives ofWikiLeaks, (d) Guccifer 2.0, (e) representatives of Guccifer 2.0, or (f)representatives ofDCLeaks? If yes, describewho provided youwith thisinformation,whenyoulearnedofthecommunications,andwhatyouknowaboutthosecommunications.

d. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: “Russia, if you’relistening, I hopeyou’re able to find the30,000 emails that aremissing. Ithinkyouwillprobablyberewardedmightilybyourpress.”

i. Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any othercountry,entity,orindividual?

ii. In advanceofmaking that statement,whatdiscussions, if any,didyouhavewithanyoneelseaboutthesubstanceofthestatement?

iii. WereyoutoldatanytimebeforeorafteryoumadethatstatementthatRussiawasattempting to infiltrateorhackcomputer systemsoremailaccounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe whoprovidedthisinformation,when,andwhatyouweretold.

e. OnOctober7,2016,emailshackedfromtheaccountofJohnPodestawerereleasedbyWikiLeaks.

i. WherewereyouonOctober7,2016?

ii. Wereyoutoldatanytimeinadvanceof,oronthedayof,theOctober7releasethatWikiLeakspossessedormightpossessemailsrelatedtoJohnPodesta? If yes, describewho told you this,when, andwhat youweretold.

iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign,including Roger Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly orthrough an intermediary, onor aboutOctober 7, 2016? If yes, identifythepersonanddescribethesubstanceoftheconversationsorcontacts.

f. Wereyoutoldofanyoneassociatedwithyouoryourcampaign,includingRogerStone,havinganydiscussions,directlyorindirectly,withWikiLeaks,

Guccifer 2.0, or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release ofhacked emails? If yes, describewho had such contacts, howyou becameaware of the contacts, when you became aware of the contacts, and thesubstanceofthecontacts.

g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently didyou communicate with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of yourcommunication(s)withMr.Stone.

i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he wasmakingtoassistyourcampaign,andwhatrequests,ifany,didyoumakeofMr.Stone?

ii. DidMr.StoneeverdiscussWikiLeakswithyouor,as farasyouwereaware,withanyoneelseassociatedwith thecampaign?Ifyes,describewhatyouweretold,fromwhom,andwhen.

iii. Did Mr. Stone at anytime inform you about contacts he had withWikiLeaks or any intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcomingreleasesofinformation?Ifyes,describewhatStonetoldyouandwhen.

h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding apotentialpardonorotheractiontobenefitJulianAssange?Ifyes,describewho you had the discussion(s) with, when, and the content of thediscussion(s).

i. Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies,includingthoseinRussia,toassistyourcampaignthroughtheuseofsocialmedia postings or the organization of rallies? If yes, identify who youdiscussedsuchassistancewith,when,andthecontentofthediscussion(s).

ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(a)

IdonotrememberthedateonwhichitwaspubliclyreportedthattheDNChadbeen hacked, but my best recollection is that I learned of the hacking at orshortly after the time it became the subject ofmedia reporting. I donot recallbeingprovidedanyinformationduringthecampaignaboutthehackingofanyofthenamedentitiesorindividualsbeforeitbecamethesubjectofmediareporting.

ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(b)

I recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerablemedia reporting about the possible hacking and release of campaign-relatedinformation and there was a lot of talk about this matter. At the time, I wasgenerallyawareofthesemediareportsandmayhavediscussedtheseissueswithmycampaignstafforothers,butatthispointintime–morethantwoyearslater–Ihavenorecollectionofanyparticularconversation,whenitoccurred,orwhotheparticipantswere.

ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(c)

Idonotrecallbeingawareduringthecampaignofanycommunicationsbetweenthe individuals named in Question II (c) and anyone I understood to be arepresentativeofWikiLeaksoranyoftheotherindividualsorentitiesreferredtointhequestion.

ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(d)

Imade thestatementquoted inQuestionII (d) in jestandsarcastically,aswasapparenttoanyobjectiveobserver.ThecontextofthestatementisevidentinthefullreadingorviewingoftheJuly27,2016pressconference,andIreferyoutothe publicly available transcript and video of that press conference. I do notrecallhavinganydiscussionaboutthesubstanceofthestatementinadvanceofthe press conference. I do not recall being told during the campaign of anyeffortsbyRussiatoinfiltrateorhackthecomputersystemsoremailaccountsofHillaryClinton or her campaign prior to thembecoming the subject ofmediareportingandIhavenorecollectionofanyparticularconversationinthatregard.

ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(e)

I was in Trump Tower in New York City on October 7, 2016. I have norecollection of being told that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emailsrelatedtoJohnPodestabeforethereleaseofMr.Podesta’semailswasreportedby themedia.Likewise, Ihaveno recollectionofbeing told thatRogerStone,anyoneactingasanintermediaryforRogerStone,oranyoneassociatedwithmycampaignhadcommunicatedwithWikiLeaksonOctober7,2016.

ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(f)

I do not recall being told during the campaign that Roger Stone or anyoneassociatedwithmycampaignhaddiscussionswithanyoftheentitiesnamedinthequestionregardingthecontentortimingofreleaseofhackedemails.

ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(g)

IspokebytelephonewithRogerStonefromtimetotimeduringthecampaign.IhavenorecollectionofthespecificsofanyconversationsIhadwithMr.Stonebetween June 1, 2016 and November 8, 2016. I do not recall discussingWikiLeakswithhim,nordoIrecallbeingawareofMr.StonehavingdiscussedWikiLeakswithindividualsassociatedwithmycampaign,althoughIwasawarethat WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and campaign-relateddiscussionatthetime.

ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(h)

I do not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding apardonoractiontobenefitJulianAssange.

ResponsetoQuestionII,Part(i)

I donot recall being aware during the campaignof specific efforts by foreignindividualsorcompaniestoassistmycampaignthroughtheuseofsocialmediapostingsortheorganizationofrallies.

III.TheTrumpOrganizationMoscowProject

a. InOctober2015,a“LetterofIntent,”acopyofwhichisattachedasExhibitB,wassignedforaproposedTrumpOrganizationprojectinMoscow(the“TrumpMoscowproject”).

i. Whenwereyoufirst informedofdiscussionsabout theTrumpMoscowproject?Bywhom?Whatwereyoutoldabouttheproject?

ii. Didyousigntheletterofintent?

b. InastatementprovidedtoCongress,attachedasExhibitC,MichaelCohenstated:“Tothebestofmyknowledge,Mr.Trumpwasneverincontactwithanyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, includingsigninganon-bindingletterofintentin2015.”Describealldiscussionsyouhad with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the TrumpOrganization,about theTrumpMoscowproject, includingwhoyouspokewith,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

c. Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or FelixSaterandanyRussiangovernmentofficials,includingofficialsintheofficeof Dmitry Peskov, regarding the TrumpMoscow project? If so, identifywhoprovidedthisinformationtoyou,when,andthesubstanceofwhatyoulearned.

d. DidyouhaveanydiscussionsbetweenJune2015andJune2016regardingapotentialtriptoRussiabyyouand/orMichaelCohenforreasonsrelatedtotheTrumpMoscowproject?Ifyes,describewhoyouspokewith,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

e. Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the TrumpMoscowproject should cease, orwere you informed at any time that theprojecthadbeenabandoned? Ifyes,describewhoyou spokewith,when,thesubstanceofthediscussion(s),andwhythatdecisionwasmade.

f. Did you have any discussions regarding what information would beprovidedpubliclyorinresponsetoinvestigativeinquiriesaboutpotentialoractualinvestmentsorbusinessdealstheTrumpOrganizationhadinRussia,includingtheTrumpMoscowproject?Ifyes,describewhoyouspokewith,when,andthesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

g. AsidefromtheTrumpMoscowproject,didyouortheTrumpOrganizationhave any other prospective or actual business interests, investments, orarrangements with Russia or any Russian interest or Russian individualduringthecampaign?Ifyes,describethebusinessinterests,investments,orarrangements.

ResponsetoQuestionIII,Parts(a)through(g)

Sometime in2015,MichaelCohensuggested tome thepossibilityofaTrumpOrganization project in Moscow. As I recall, Mr. Cohen described this as aproposed project of a general type we have done in the past in a variety oflocations.Isignedthenon-bindingLetterofIntentattachedtoyourquestionsasExhibitBwhichrequirednoequityorexpenditureonourendandwasconsistentwithourongoingeffortstoexpandintosignificantmarketsaroundtheworld.

IhadfewconversationswithMr.Cohenonthissubject.AsIrecall, theywerebrief,andtheywerenotmemorable.Iwasnotenthusedabouttheproposal,andIdonot recall anydiscussionof travel toRussia inconnectionwith it. IdonotrememberdiscussingitwithanyoneelseattheTrumpOrganization,althoughitis possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communicationsbetween Mr. Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government officialregarding the Letter of Intent. In the course of preparing to respond to yourquestions, I have become aware that Mr. Cohen sent an email regarding theLetterofIntentto“Mr.Peskov”atageneral,publicemailaccount,whichshouldshow therewas nomeaningful relationshipwith people in power in Russia. Iunderstandthosedocumentsalreadyhavebeenprovidedtoyou.

I vaguely remember press inquiries andmedia reporting during the campaignaboutwhether theTrumpOrganizationhadbusinessdealings inRussia. Imayhave spokenwith campaign staff or TrumpOrganization employees regardingresponsestorequestsfor information,butIhavenocurrentrecollectionofanyparticularconversation,withwhomImayhavespoken,when,orthesubstanceofanyconversation.AsI recall,neitherInor theTrumpOrganizationhadanyprojectsorproposedprojectsinRussiaduringthecampaignotherthantheLetterofTntent.

IV.ContactswithRussiaandRussia-RelatedIssuesDuringtheCampaign

a. Priortomid-August2016,didyoubecomeawarethatPaulManaforthadtiesto the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned thisinformation from,when, and the substance ofwhat youwere told.DidMr.Manafort’s connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments play anyrole inyourdecision tohavehim joinyour campaign? If yes, describe thatrole.

b. WereyouawarethatPaulManafortofferedbriefingsontheprogressofyourcampaign to Oleg Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned this

information from, when, the substance of what you were told, what youunderstoodthepurposewasofsharingsuchinformationwithMr.Deripaska,andhowyourespondedtolearningthisinformation.

c. Were you aware of whether PaulManafort or anyone else associated withyour campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaigninformationtoanypersonlocatedinUkraineorRussiaorassociatedwiththeUkrainian orRussian governments? If yes, identifywho provided youwiththis information, when, the substance of the discussion(s), what youunderstoodthepurposewasofsharingtheinternalcampaigninformation,andhowyourespondedtolearningthisinformation.

d. DidPaulManafortcommunicate toyou,directlyor indirectly.anypositionsUkraineorRussiawouldwanttheU.S.tosupport?Ifyes,describewhenhecommunicated those positions to you and the substance of thosecommunications.

e. Duringthecampaign,wereyoutoldabouteffortsbyRussianofficialstomeetwithyouorseniormembersofyourcampaign?Ifyes,describewhoyouhadconversationswithonthistopic,when,andwhatyouweretold.

f. What role, if any, did you have in changing theRepublican Party platformregardingarmingUkraineduringtheRepublicanNationalConvention?Priorto the convention, what information did you have about this platformprovision?Aftertheplatformprovisionwaschanged,whotoldyouaboutthechange,whendidtheytellyou,whatwereyoutoldaboutwhyitwaschanged,andwhowasinvolved?

g. On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you wouldrecognizeCrimeaasRussianterritoryandliftsanctionsonRussia,yousaid:“We’ll be looking at that. Yeah, we’ll be looking.” Did you intend tocommunicate by that statement or at any other time during the campaign awillingnesstoliftsanctionsand/orrecognizeRussia’sannexationofCrimeaifyouwereelected?

i. What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizingRussia’s annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who youspokewithaboutthistopic,when,thesubstanceofthediscussion(s).

ResponsetoQuestionIV,Parts(a)through(d)

Mr. Manafort was hired primarily because of his delegate work for priorpresidential candidates, including Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George H.W.Bush,andBobDole.IknewthatMr.Manaforthaddoneinternationalconsultingworkand,atsometimebeforeMr.Manafortleftthecampaign,Ilearnedthathewas somehow involved with individuals concerning Ukraine, but I do notrememberthespecificsofwhatIknewatthetime.

I hadnoknowledgeofMr.Manafort offeringbriefingson theprogressofmycampaign to an individual named Oleg Deripaska, nor do I remember beingawareofMr.ManafortoranyoneelseassociatedwithmycampaignsendingordirectingotherstosendinternalTrumpCampaigninformationtoanyoneIknewto be in Ukraine or Russia at the time or to anyone I understood to be aUkrainianorRussiangovernmentemployeeorofficial. IdonotrememberMr.Manafort communicating to me any particular positions Ukraine or RussiawouldwanttheUnitedStatestosupport.

ResponsetoQuestionIV,Part(e)

IdonotrecallbeingtoldduringthecampaignofeffortsbyRussianofficialstomeet with me or with senior members of my campaign. In the process ofpreparingtorespondtothesequestions,IbecameawarethatonMarch17,2016,myassistantattheTrumpOrganization,RhonaGraff,receivedanemailfromaSergei Prikhodko, who identified himself as Deputy Prime Minister of theRussianFederation,FoundationRoscongress,invitingmetoparticipateintheSt.Petersburg International Economic Forum to be held in June 2016. Thedocuments show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief responsedeclining the invitation. I understand these documents already have beenproducedtoyou.

ResponsetoQuestionIV,Part(f)

Ihavenorecollectionof thedetailsofwhat,when,orfromwhatsourceIfirstlearnedaboutthechangetotheplatformamendmentregardingarmingUkraine,but Igenerally recall learningof the issueaspartofmedia reporting. Idonotrecallbeinginvolvedinchangingthelanguagetotheamendment.

ResponsetoQuestionIV,Part(g)

Mystatementdidnotcommunicateanyposition.

V.ContactswithRussiaandRussia-RelatedIssuesDuringtheTransition

a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala onNovember 10, 2016? If yes, who asked you to attend, when were youasked, andwhatwere you told about about [sic]why your presencewasrequested?

i. Didyouattendanypartoftheevent?Ifyes,describeanyinteractionsyouhadwith anyRussians or representatives of theRussian government attheevent.

ResponsetoQuestionV,Part(a)

IdonotrememberhavingbeenaskedtoattendtheWorldChessChampionshipgala,andIdidnotattendtheevent.Duringthecourseofpreparingtorespondtothesequestions,IhavebecomeawareofdocumentsindicatingthatinMarchof2016, the president of the World Chess Federation invited the TrumpOrganization to host, at Trump Tower, the 2016 World Chess ChampionshipMatchtobeheldinNewYorkinNovember2016.IhavealsobecomeawarethatinNovember 2016, therewere press inquiries tomy staff regardingwhether Ihadplanstoattendthetournament,whichwasnotbeingheldatTrumpTower.Iunderstandthesedocumentshavealreadybeenprovidedtoyou.

Executedon ,2018

15/16/18Letter,SpecialCounseltothePresident’sPersonalCounsel,at1.

2 5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsels’s Office to the President’s Personal Counsel, at 1; see 7/30/18

Letter,SpecialCounsel’sOfficetothePresident’sPersonalCounsel,at1(describingaccommodations).

39/17/18Letter,SpecialCounsel’sOfficetothePresident’sPersonalCounsel,at1(submittingwrittenquestions).

411/20/18Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltotheSpecialCounsel’sOffice(transmittingwrittenresponsesofDonaldJ.Trump).

512/3/18Letter,SpecialCounsel’sOfficetothePresident’sPersonalCounsel,at3.

612/3/18Letter,SpecialCounsel’sOfficetothePresident’sPersonalCounsel,at3.

712/3/18Letter,SpecialCounsel’sOfficetothePresident’sPersonalCounsel,at3;see(noting,“forexample,” that the President “did not answer whether he had at any time directed or suggested thatdiscussions about theTrumpMoscowProject should cease . . . but he has sincemadepublic commentsaboutthattopic”).

812/3/18Letter,SpecialCounsel’sOfficetothePresident’sPersonalCounsel,at3.

912/3/18Letter,SpecialCounseltothePresident’sPersonalCounsel.

1012/12/18Letter,President’sPersonalCounseltotheSpecialCounsel’sOffice,at2.

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12GrandJury████████████████████████████████████████

AppendixD

APPENDIXDSPECIALCOUNSEL’SOFFICETRANSFERRED,REFERRED,AND

COMPLETEDCASES

This appendix identifies matters transferred or referred by the SpecialCounsel’s Office, as well as cases prosecuted by the Office that are nowcompleted.

A.Transfers

TheSpecialCounsel’sOfficehasconcludeditsinvestigationintolinksandcoordination between theRussian government and individuals associatedwiththe Trump Campaign. Certain matters assigned to the Office by the ActingAttorneyGeneral have not fully concluded as of the date of this report.Afterconsultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office hastransferred responsibility for those matters to other components of theDepartmentofJusticeandtheFBI.Thosetransfersinclude:

1.UnitedStatesv.BijanRafiekianandKamilEkimAlptekin

U.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheEasternDistrictofVirginia(Awaitingtrial)

TheActingAttorneyGeneralauthorizedtheSpecialCounseltoinvestigate,amongotherthings,possiblecriminalconductbyMichaelFlynninactingasanunregistered agent for the Government of Turkey. See August 2, 2017Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller, III. The ActingAttorneyGeneral laterconfirmedtheSpecialCounsel’sauthoritytoinvestigateRafiekian and Alptekin because they “may have been jointly involved” withFlynn in FARA-related crimes. See October 20, 2017 Memorandum fromAssociateDeputyAttorneyGeneralScottSchools toDeputyAttorneyGeneralRodJ.Rosenstein.

OnDecember1,2017,FlynnpleadedguiltytoanInformationcharginghimwith making false statements to the FBI about his contacts with the Russianambassador to the United States. As part of that plea, Flynn agreed to aStatement of the Offense in which he acknowledged that the Foreign AgentsRegistration Act (FARA) documents he filed on March 7, 2017 “containedmaterially false statements and omissions.” Flynn’s plea occurred before the

SpecialCounsel hadmade a final decision onwhether to chargeRafiekian orAlptekin.OnMarch27,2018,afterconsultationwith theOfficeof theDeputyAttorney General, the Special Counsel’s Office referred the investigation ofRafiekianandAlptekintotheNationalSecurityDivision(NSD)foranyactionitdeemed appropriate.TheSpecialCounsel’sOffice determined the referralwasappropriate because the investigation of Flynn had been completed, and thatinvestigation had provided the rationale for the Office’s investigation ofRafiekian and Alptekin. At NSD’s request, the Eastern District of VirginiacontinuedtheinvestigationofRafiekianandAlptekin.

2. UnitedStatesv.MichaelFlynn

U.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheDistrictofColumbia(Awaitingsentencing)

3. UnitedStatesv.RichardGates

U.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheDistrictofColumbia(Awaitingsentencing)

4. UnitedStatesv.InternetResearchAgency,etal.(RussianSocialMediaCampaign)

U.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheDistrictofColumbiaNationalSecurityDivision(Post-indictment,pre-arrest&pre-trial1)

5. UnitedStatesv.KonstantinKilimnik

U.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheDistrictofColumbia(Post-indictment,pre-arrest)

6. UnitedStatesv.PaulManafort

U.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheDistrictofColumbiaU.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheEasternDistrictofVirginia(Post-conviction)

7. UnitedStatesv.ViktorNetyksho,etal.(RussianHackingOperations)

U.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheWesternDistrictofPennsylvania

NationalSecurityDivision(Post-indictment,pre-arrest)

8. UnitedStatesv.WilliamSamuelPatten

U.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheDistrictofColumbia(Awaitingsentencing)

TheActingAttorneyGeneralauthorizedtheSpecialCounseltoinvestigateaspects of Patten’s conduct that related to another matter that was underinvestigationbytheOffice.Theinvestigationuncoveredevidenceofacrime;theU.S.Attorney’sOffice for theDistrictofColumbiahandled theprosecutionofPatten.

9. HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████████████████(Investigationongoing)

TheActingAttorneyGeneralauthorizedtheSpecialCounseltoinvestigate,among other things, crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafortreceived from the Ukrainian government before and during the tenure ofPresidentViktorYanukovych.See August 2, 2017Memorandum fromRod J.Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller, III. The Acting Attorney General laterconfirmed the Special Counsel’s authority to investigate Harm to OngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

OnOctober27,2017,PaulManafortandRichardGateswerechargedintheDistrictofColumbiawithvariouscrimes(includingFARA)inconnectionwithwork they performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. OnFebruary22,2018,ManafortandGateswerechargedintheEasternDistrictofVirginia with various other crimes in connection with the payments theyreceived for work performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine.During the courseof itsHOM███, theSpecialCounsel’sOfficedeveloped

substantial evidencewith respect to individuals and entities thatwerHarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████.2OnFebruary23,2018,Gatespleaded guilty in theDistrict ofColumbia to amulti-object conspiracy and tomakingfalsestatements; theremainingchargesagainstGatesweredismissed.3Thereafter, inconsultationwiththeOfficeoftheDeputyAttorneyGeneral, theSpecial Counsel’s Office closed theHarm to Ongoing Matter and referredthemHOM███forfurtherinvestigationasitdeemedappropriate.TheOfficebased its decision to close those matters on its mandate, the indictments ofManafort, Gates’s plea, and its determination as to how best to allocate itsresources,amongotherreasons;███████████████████████████████████AtHarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████continuedtheinvestigationofthoseclosedmatters.

10. UnitedStatesv.RogerStone

U.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheDistrictofColumbia(Awaitingtrial)

11. HarmtoOngoingMatter████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████

███████████████████████████████████(Investigationongoing)

B.Referrals

During the course of the investigation, the Office periodically identifiedevidenceofpotentialcriminalactivitythatwasoutsidethescopeoftheSpecialCounsel’s jurisdiction established by the Acting Attorney General. AfterconsultationwiththeOfficeoftheDeputyAttorneyGeneral,theOfficereferredthat evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities, principally othercomponents of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Those referrals, listedalphabeticallybysubject,aresummarizedbelow.

1. HOM███

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2. MichaelCohen

During the course of the investigation, the Special Counsel’s OfficeuncoveredevidenceofpotentialwirefraudandFECAviolationspertainingtoMichaelCohen.ThatevidencewasreferredtotheU.S.Attorney’sOfficefortheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkandtheFBI’sNewYorkFieldOffice.

3. HOM███

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4. HOM███

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5. GregoryCraigHOM████Skadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&FlomLLP

During the course of the FARA investigation of PaulManafort and RickGates, the Special Counsel’s Office uncovered evidence of potential FARAviolations pertaining to HOM█ █ █ Gregory Craig, Skadden, Arps, Slate,Meagher&FlomLLP(Skadden),andtheirworkonbehalfofthegovernmentofUkraine.

AfterconsultationwiththeNSD,theevidenceregardingCraigHOM███wasreferredtoNSD,andNSDelectedtopartnerwiththeU.S.Attorney’sOfficefor the SouthernDistrict ofNewYork and the FBI’sNewYork FieldOffice.NSDlaterelectedtopartnerontheCraigmatterwiththeU.S.Attorney’sOfficefor the District of Columbia. NSD retained and handled issues relating to

Skaddenitself.

6. HOM███

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7. HOM████████

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8. HOM███

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9. HOM███

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10. HOM███

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11. HOM███

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███████████████████████████

12. HOM███

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13. HOM███

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14. HOM███

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C.CompletedProsecutions

In three cases prosecuted by the Special Counsel’sOffice, the defendantshavecompletedorareabouttocompletetheir termsofimprisonment.Becauseno further proceedings are likely in any case, responsibility for them has notbeentransferredtoanyotherofficeorcomponent.

1. UnitedStatesv.GeorgePapadopoulos

Post-conviction,Completedtermofimprisonment(December7,2018)

2. UnitedStatesv.AlexvanderZwaan

Post-conviction,Completedtermofimprisonment(June4,2018)

3. UnitedStatesv.RichardPinedo

Post-conviction, Currently in Residential Reentry Center (release dateMay13,2019)

1Onedefendant,ConcordManagement&ConsultingLLC,appearedthroughcounselandisinpre-triallitigation.

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3ManafortwasultimatelyconvictedattrialintheEasternDistrictofVirginiaandpleadedguiltyintheDistrictofColumbia.SeeVol.I,SectionIV.A.8.Thetrialandpleahappenedafterthetransferdecisiondescribedhere.