report on november 2016 mission to afghanistan · november 2016 mission to afghanistan this report...

______________ * The United States Institute of Peace does not advocate specific policy positions. ** Dr. von Hippel joined the mission in a personal capacity. This report does not necessarily reflect the views of RUSI.

OVERVIEW

The challenges Afghanistan faces are multifaceted and severe. The National Unity Government (NUG), formed in the wake of the controversial 2014 presidential elections, has appeared anything but unified over the last two years. Disagreements over government appointments had led to heightened tensions between President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. While some initial steps toward reform recently have been taken, the government has yet to fulfill key elements of its founding agreement – specifically, the adoption of electoral reforms, the conduct of parliamentary and district council elections, and the convening of a constitutional loya jirga. The “Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan”, comprised of many of Chief Executive Abdullah’s previous supporters and former Karzai administration officials, has emerged to pressure

National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

REPORT ON NOVEMBER 2016 MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN

This report is offered by a delegation organized by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP)* that visited Afghanistan from November 10 to 16, 2016. The mission was conducted two years after the administration of Afghanistan’s National Unity Government was established and as new commissioners for the country’s electoral bodies were being selected. The delegation examined the political environment and the electoral reform process.

The delegation included Dr. Karin von Hippel, director-general of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)**; Peter Manikas, NDI senior associate and regional director for Asia; Scott Worden, USIP director for Afghanistan and Central Asia programs; and Raissa Tatad-Hazell, NDI deputy regional director for Asia. The delegation was assisted by NDI Afghanistan staff in Kabul – Mohammad Daud Kohi, Muzghan Yarmohammadi, Mohammad Karimi, Muhktar Safari and Alema Sadat – and NDI Afghanistan staff in Washington DC, Aqlima Moradi.

The delegation met with President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, former President Hamid Karzai, Vice President Sarwar Danish, Second Deputy to the Chief Executive Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq, former Vice President Mohammad Karim Khalili, Foreign Affairs Minister Salahuddin Rabbani, Deputy National Security Advisor Faizullah Zaki, former Vice President and Speaker of the Wolesi Jirga Mohammad Yunus Qanooni, former Minister of Economy Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, former Minister of Interior Mohammad Umar Daudzai, former National Directorate of Security head Amrullah Saleh, members of the Meshrano Jirga and Wolesi Jirga, members of the Selection Committee and the former Special Election Reforms Commission (SERC), the directors of domestic election monitoring groups, government and security officials, election officials, political party leaders, civil society representatives, women activists, youth groups, media, and members of the international community.

The delegation offers its findings and recommendations in the hope of strengthening the democratic process in Afghanistan. In issuing this report, the delegation does not seek to interfere in the Afghanistan’s electoral or political process. It fully recognizes that it is the people of Afghanistan who will determine the country’s further democratic development.

The delegation would like to express its appreciation for everyone with whom it met. Without their taking time and sharing their knowledge and insights, the delegation would not have been able to accomplish its mission. Since 2002, NDI has been conducting political development and electoral support programs in Afghanistan and USIP has been conducting governance, rule of law, and conflict resolution programs. Both organizations appreciate the cooperation they have received over the years from the Afghan government, political parties and coalitions, and civil society organizations.

Report on NDI-USIP November 2016 Mission to Afghanistan

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the government to move forward on reforms, while former President Hamid Karzai has urged for the establishment of a traditional loya jirga to replace the NUG. The Taliban is intensifying its efforts to destabilize the government and, since 2014, the Islamic State (IS) has established a presence in some southern and eastern provinces. The worsening security situation has contributed to the country’s economic decline, including discouraging foreign and domestic investments. Relations between the NUG and Pakistan, despite a promising start, have seriously deteriorated. As the NDI-USIP team arrived in Kabul, the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of the National Assembly) was undergoing a process of systematically calling in several cabinet ministers to review their performance and voting on their removal. Despite these challenges, the country’s political system has demonstrated surprising resilience. Continued international support – which was renewed with robust security assistance at the Warsaw Conference in July 2016 and a larger than expected commitment of civilian assistance at the Brussels Conference in October 2016 – has enabled the government to carry out critical development projects. The President and Chief Executive appear to have grown more collaborative and unified in the face of parliament’s assault on the cabinet. The country’s major political opposition leaders are not trying to push the NUG to the point of collapse. Whether due to the lack of a better alternative, fear of the return to war, or out of conviction, most of the country’s political elites have embraced the nation’s flawed but functional democratic process as the best way to achieve their political goals. The situation, however, is far from stable and the progress that has been made over the past 15 years is reversible. If the NUG does not take further steps toward fulfilling its mandate, conditions could quickly deteriorate. The Wolesi Jirga, already two years beyond its constitutionally prescribed term, is of questionable legitimacy, and greater delays in the electoral process could further diminish public confidence in the nation’s political institutions. A recent survey conducted by The Asia Foundation, for example, found that public confidence in the election commission and the institutions of governance – including parliament and provincial councils – is at an all-time low.1 There has been a parallel decline in the public’s satisfaction with the democratic process.2 The security challenge, moreover, continues to grow. In the past, the fighting was largely seasonal, with a spring offensive and a winter lull. Now, the Taliban has a foothold in several key provinces and can be expected to maintain its military operations throughout the year. The failure of the government to strengthen democratic institutions, particularly representative institutions such as parliament, feeds into the Taliban’s narrative that the government is weak and corrupt.

In recent weeks, the government has made some progress on moving toward elections. New commissioners for the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) have been appointed through a consultative process. In addition, the government and the IEC are considering a change to the single non-transferrable vote (SNTV) electoral system that has impeded the emergence of modern political parties and resulted in parliamentarians being elected with only a small percentage of the provincial vote. As discussed below, the issue of electoral reform has divided Afghanistan’s major political forces broadly along ethnic lines. Many Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek leaders favor a proportional or party-list electoral system while many Pashtun leaders prefer a first-past-the-post, single member district system. Resolving the debate on electoral reform is, then, fundamental to the question of how the country’s rival political groups will compete for political power.

While the government and many civil society leaders favor holding elections in Fall 2017, it will be challenging to fill sizeable vacancies in the IEC and ECC, tackle the complexities of making a decision on the voting system, implement a new voter registration process, and distribute materials across the country before winter sets in. Rushing these decisions risks introducing flaws that will affect future elections, including the 2019 presidential polls.

1 The Asia Foundation, “A Survey of the Afghan People – Afghanistan in 2016’, pp. 103-106. 2 Ibid, pp.126-127.


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KEY OBSERVATIONS

The NUG appeared to be more unified than it was before the Brussels Conference, and opposition political leaders recognize that while they may be dissatisfied with the unity government, there are no better alternatives. The effort by the Parliament to remove cabinet members supported by both the President and the Chief Executive appears to have galvanized the NUG and fueled momentum for electoral reform.

There is a broad consensus that parliamentary elections should be held as soon as possible. However, given the amount of time needed to implement electoral reforms called for in the new electoral law, it will be technically difficult to hold elections in Fall 2017. Spring 2018 is more manageable but will leave little time for significant reforms, such as establishing a new voter registry and agreeing on new electoral districts. If the planning for parliamentary elections is moved any later than Spring 2018, then the merging of parliamentary and presidential elections in 2019 becomes more likely.

Other than parliamentary elections, the NUG Agreement also calls for district council elections to be held. These elections are a constitutional requirement and delegates from district councils are necessary for holding a constitutional loya jirga. District council elections have never been held, however, due to disagreements over district boundaries and the role that the councils should play in subnational governance. It seems unlikely that these differences will be resolved before 2019.

The process for selecting the new IEC and ECC commissioners was broadly considered professional and transparent. However, concerns were expressed that the commissioners are relatively inexperienced and may be unable to resist high-level political pressure on sensitive decisions about voter registration and electoral districting as well as ensuring the integrity of electoral results.

The Afghan government missed an opportunity to make fundamental improvements in the electoral system by delaying the appointment of the SERC, as stipulated in the NUG Agreement, and then failing to address the Commission’s key recommendation to change to an electoral system that would promote stronger political parties and a more cohesive parliament. Instead, the decision was deferred to the new IEC.

The new electoral law requires the conduct of new voter registration in order to create polling station-specific voter lists. This will be nearly impossible to implement in several districts, under current security conditions, in a way that is transparent and equitable. Rigid adherence to the rule would likely disenfranchise voters in insecure areas. Creating flexibility to accommodate those who cannot easily access IEC registrars would maintain pathways to ballot stuffing and fraud.

A new factor that will influence the next elections is an influx of returning refugees from Pakistan and Iran, which the United Nations estimates will reach a million in 2016. Registering returnees will be an added challenge for voter registration, and where they will settle will affect voting patterns.

Despite an often-expressed aspiration for electoral politics to transcend ethnicity and focus more on policy issues, the electoral reform discourse continues to fall back on ethnic identity as the main litmus test for whether or not a particular reform should be supported. This is most evident in the debate over which electoral system to use, with Pashtuns often favoring independent candidates and single member districts and non-Pashtuns more likely to favor systems that enhance the influence of political parties.


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The recently inked peace deal between Hezb-i-Islami and the Afghan government has the potential to reshape the political power of the registered political wing of the party. Views were mixed as to whether the return of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar would unify the party and make it stronger or split the party between more moderate and conservative factions. The answer hinges on whether Hekmatyar’s political views have moderated over the period of his exile.

Discussions about the security situation should be linked more directly to electoral reform discussions. Past electoral problems have most often occurred in areas with the worst security, and the Taliban now control more territory then they have since 2001. Election officials expressed a need to accept the facts as they find them and make the best plan possible. But without a significant change in the Afghan security forces’ ability to push back the insurgency, poor security will affect the outcome of the elections in several embattled provinces. The IEC needs realistic security assessments to develop its policies and plans, which may go against public narratives of battlefield success.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Deliberate and steady is better than fast and flawed electoral reform. It is important to make timely and substantial progress on electoral reform with the objective of conducting credible parliamentary elections. However, such reforms and their corresponding political and financial investments should prioritize the strengthening of Afghanistan’s electoral process over the long term.

Support is needed now for the new IEC and civil society. The Afghan government should quickly define the level of support that would enable the new commissions to do their work. The new commissions, particularly the IEC, will need financial and technical resources to efficiently conduct its three-month assessment of electoral constituencies and prepare election plans.

Donors should provide adequate funding quickly for the IEC based on an Afghan government request. A priority should be placed on delivering start-up money rapidly, and then on sustainable mechanisms for Afghanistan to fund and implement independently.

To promote public confidence in the independence of the new commissions, interference in the work of the IEC and ECC should be deemed a criminal act. (Measures such as a presidential decree on non-interference, which was implemented in advance of the work of the Selection Committee, could be considered).

The IEC needs to fill a 40 percent vacancy rate in staff due to attrition since the last election. The hiring process should be merit based, consultative and transparent, with an emphasis on neutrality and credibility at the provincial level.

Donors also should support the work of civil society organizations that contribute to election engagement and citizen oversight, particularly those that have strong constituencies among youth, women and media in the provinces. These organizations need resources now to engage in the ongoing electoral reform process, not just once an election date has been set.

Decision-making on the electoral system and the determination of constituencies requires consultation, transparency and innovation. The new electoral law requires the IEC to make a recommendation within three months on whether and how to divide province-wide constituencies into smaller voting districts.


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As they consider these changes, the IEC and the government should first identify the main purpose that the electoral system is to achieve. If, for example, the most pressing concern in the context of Afghanistan’s fractious politics is fostering inter-ethnic coalition building and cooperation, a party list or multi-dimensional representation system (as was proposed by the SERC) would be more appropriate than SNTV. If a representative’s accountability to the electorate is the chief goal, single-member constituencies (or a first-past-the-post system) might be preferred.

To maximize the IEC’s three-month assessment period, the IEC should consider the SERC recommendations, which were informed by extensive public consultations across the country. In addition, given more recent discussions among political groupings, the IEC should hold further consultations with political parties and coalitions on the impact of single-member districts versus multi-member district constituencies.

Given security and different operational challenges across Afghanistan, the IEC should prioritize reforms that affect provinces with the highest risk of irregularities. Provinces like Ghazni and Baghlan, where insecurity will produce an ethnic divide in voting, could be prioritized over others with less risk.

Voter registration must be designed to fix past flaws and be a foundation for parliamentary and 2019 elections.

Article 6 of the election law calls for a polling-station specific voter list. As they consider technical options and operational timelines on how to produce a credible voter registry, the IEC and the Afghan government should weigh the feasibility of producing such a list in advance of the 2019 election rather than a 2017 election. For insecure areas, options such as same-day registration could be considered.

Any voter registration system that requires voters to appear at a particular polling location will need to address the likelihood that many voters will show up at the wrong location either by mistake or by necessity due to security conditions on election day. This requires early and proactive public education on the new voting rules and a sound contingency plan on how to deal with otherwise eligible voters who appear at the wrong location on election day.

The international community should support the modernization of political parties, including strengthening internal management, outreach, platform development and coalition-building. While there are 58 political parties registered in Afghanistan, they have not been central to the country's political development. This has had widespread effects on how the nation is governed -- political parties could provide greater coherence in the legislative process; aggregate and represent the interests of citizens on a broad scale and offer the electorate clearer choices at the voting booth. Of immediate concern, regardless of which electoral system is ultimately selected, programs should be implemented that help inform political parties on how each system is likely to affect their electoral prospects and how to organize their campaigns under different scenarios. Single member districts, for example, would require that parties decentralize to a greater extent in order to field candidates that have a support base in local communities.

International support is needed for programs to increase public confidence in public institutions and the democratic process. To address diminishing public confidence in key institutions of governance and, more generally, the democratic process, the international community should emphasize programs that increase public participation in governance, such as encouraging outreach by elected representatives at the national and provincial level to their constituents. In addition, programs that assist local organizations in monitoring government performance at all levels are an important instrument for improving government responsiveness.


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THE 2014 ELECTIONS AND RECENT ELECTORAL REFORMS

The 2014 presidential election was a milestone in Afghanistan’s political transition as it marked the first peaceful, democratic transfer of political power in the country’s history. As previous elections were marred by widespread fraud, political leaders and civic groups worked with electoral authorities in advance of the polls to amend the electoral process. The Wolesi Jirga passed laws that established a new legal framework and enabled parliamentarians and civil society to participate in selecting nominees to head electoral bodies. Election authorities and security agencies introduced measures to strengthen security planning between these entities and initiated fraud mitigation plans more than a year before the April 2014 polls. These and other reforms generated guarded optimism among political and civic actors that the 2014 polls would be an improvement over earlier elections.

The April 2014 elections were the fifth national polls since the fall of the Taliban and the only presidential elections held in accordance with the constitutionally established electoral schedule. Although violent attacks designed to disrupt the polling marred the pre-election period, over 6.5 million voters participated in these polls. As no presidential candidate secured more than 50 percent of the vote, a second round of voting was held in June 2014. Former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, who secured 45 percent in the first round, and economist and Security Transition Chief Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, who had 32 percent of the vote, competed intensely in the runoff election. The controversies concerning voter turnout and allegations of widespread rigging, fueled a political and electoral crisis.

To help resolve the electoral and political impasse, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry brokered talks with the camps of the two presidential candidates and facilitated a power-sharing agreement. This deal involved a comprehensive audit of all ballots from the runoff, conducted in the presence of international and domestic observers, candidate agents and United Nations election advisers. This type of comprehensive audit had no historical precedent, and complications in establishing audit procedures and ballot invalidation criteria led to disputes between candidate camps and multiple extensions of the audit timeline.

To address apparent voting irregularities and complaints of fraud by the Abdullah camp, a National Unity Government Agreement committed the camps of both candidates to a form of power sharing whereby the recipient of the most votes would be President and the runner-up would hold the position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The agreement called for “parity” in appointments to key ministries and institutions and “equitable” appointments overall. The NUG Agreement also called for the establishment of the SERC, issuance of electronic national identification cards, swift parliamentary and district council elections following key electoral reforms, and a constitutional loya jirga to be held “within two years” to decide the permanent status of the CEO position.

In September 2014 – following the lengthy, seven-week audit – the national unity government was established with Ghani as president and Abdullah as CEO. While the new government had a promising start and worked to address a range of issues critical to the country’s development, it encountered several political setbacks which caused frustration among Afghan citizens expecting a new era of change. President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah began their terms pledging to act with urgency to address security matters that went unaddressed due to the lengthy 2014 electoral process, install a cabinet of competent professionals, and reform major government sectors. However, little headway was made in implementing provisions of the NUG Agreement. Disagreements between the two, and varying interpretations of their roles, caused considerable delays in appointing a cabinet, leaving government agencies in disarray as national and provincial-level posts remained open and significant development projects were put on hold. Multiple violent attacks by the Taliban, primarily targeting security forces in Kabul and other parts of the country, prompted civic and political activists to demand that the new government exercise leadership to enforce security. As a result of these shortcomings, key supporters of Ghani and Abdullah began to withdraw their support for the unity government and challenge its legitimacy.


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The NUG Agreement includes specific provisions on electoral reform for the country’s next parliamentary elections and first-ever district council elections. As the term of the current Wolesi Jirga was to expire in June 2015, President Ghani issued a decree to extend its term until elections could be held. In line with the NUG Agreement, the SERC was established in March 2015 and charged with a mandate for proposing reform recommendations – although the commission did not hold its inaugural session until July 2015 due to disagreements between the President and the CEO on the commission’s chairmanship and members. In September 2015, based on seven of the SERC’s 11 recommendations, the President issued decrees amending the Electoral Law and the Law on Structures, Authorities and Duties of the Electoral Bodies (or the Structure Law), which determines the composition of the IEC and the ECC. The Wolesi Jirga and Meshrano Jirga rejected the decrees in December 2015 and January 2016 respectively.3 That January, Afghanistan's election commission announced that parliamentary elections would be held on October 15, 2016. This was met with objections from Afghan political and civil society leaders who demanded that significant reforms must be enacted first before elections can be scheduled and conducted.

In March 2016, the President issued new decrees and a revised Structure Law. This too was rejected by the Wolesi Jirga but approved by the Meshrano Jirga. Ultimately, a new election law was issued by executive order during the parliamentary summer recess (Article 79 of the Afghan Constitution allows the government to bypass parliament during periods of parliamentary recess and in times of emergency).4 The new law merges elements of the earlier election and structure laws, and calls for the selection of IEC and ECC nominees through a committee composed of representatives of the Supreme Court, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, the Oversight Commission of the Implementation of the Constitution, and civil society organizations focused on elections and women’s rights. The new election law also calls for the IEC to recommend to the Cabinet whether and how the current multi-member electoral constituencies should be subdivided for the parliamentary elections, and includes the establishment of specific voter lists for each polling center. Both are significant departures from the elections since 2004.

In September 2016 – days before the international donors conference in Brussels – the Selection Committee was formed and began receiving applications from across the country. On November 9, following the review of over 700 applications, the committee finalized a list of 21 nominees for the seven IEC seats and 15 nominees for the five ECC seats. In the succeeding weeks, as the government juggled the parliament’s scrutiny and vote to remove several cabinet ministers, President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah appeared unified in keeping the electoral reform process on track and jointly interviewed the final nominees proposed by the Selection Committee. The new commissioners were chosen and announced on November 22.

The debate on electoral reform brings into sharp relief the fundamental issue of how Afghanistan’s rival political groups, drawn largely but not exclusively along ethnic lines, compete for political power. The discourse on electoral systems thus far seems to revolve primarily around a process of elimination. The SNTV system, for example, was selected in 2004 due to a number of factors, including its simplicity and the public distrust of political parties associated with the Soviet-Afghan war and the Afghan civil war. President Karzai wanted a system that permitted Afghans to vote for individual candidates rather than parties with the province as their constituency, which became the predominant Pashtun position. The SNTV system, in the words of Andrew Reynolds, who was a consultant on electoral reform in Afghanistan at the time, was the “least bad of the alternatives that fit these criteria”.5

3 According to Article 109 of the Afghan Constitution, ‘proposals for amending election laws shall not be included in the work agenda of the National Assembly during the last year of the legislative term’. President Ghani issued a decree in June 2015 to extend the term of the current parliament until elections could be held – since it did not specify an actual election date, it was possible for the parliament to vote on the election laws during this period. 4 In addition, since the IEC had announced that an election would be held in October 2016, Article 109 came into effect since this period now fell within the ‘last year of the legislative term’. 5 Andrew Reynolds, “Electoral Systems Today: The Curious Case of Afghanistan”. Journal of Democracy, April 2006.


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Every electoral system, of course, has advantages, disadvantages and trade-offs. This delegation believes that a better approach would be to identify, as a starting point, the major purpose the voting system is to achieve. If, for example, the most pressing concern in the context of the country’s fractious politics is fostering inter-ethnic coalition building and cooperation, as well as developing a more mature political party system, a party list or proportional representation system, such as was proposed by the SERC, would be the appropriate choice. On the other hand, if the major goal is to increase the accountability of elected officials to their constituents, then smaller electoral districts and a first-past-the-post system is likely best. Unfortunately, an inclusive and public debate on the competing goals of accountability and ameliorating ethnic tensions – and possible trade-offs between those objectives – has not taken place.

Many of the reforms being discussed, such as adopting single member districts or holding district council elections, would require drawing new district boundaries, which would necessitate a census to equalize the populations to be represented. Drawing boundaries raises difficult political questions on whether to favor homogeneous or diverse constituencies, or whether to divide ethnic communities and pasturelands. In addition, there is still no consensus on how best to produce and distribute new voter identification cards. There was broad recognition among those with whom the delegation met that conducting a Fall 2017 election would be very difficult if new registration and constituency boundaries are addressed. However, there was widespread sentiment that it is essential to move forward with the reforms as soon as possible and establish a realistic deadline for holding elections — a necessary step towards fulfilling the NUG’s mandate. OBSERVATIONS

The National Unity Government

The delegation was in Kabul during a period when – in sharp contrast with the clashes and disputes over the past two years – the NUG was exhibiting a degree of cohesion that was not previously apparent. In the delegation’s separate meetings with President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah, each expressed optimism that electoral reform was moving forward, noted the success of the Brussels Conference, and noted better communications with each other. This sense of unity seemed to be galvanized by an ongoing conflict between the executive branch and the Wolesi Jirga, fueled by a parliamentary effort to remove several cabinet ministers from their positions based on perceived shortfalls in their performance.

While it is within the constitutional mandate of parliamentarians to call for the reviews of the performance of cabinet ministers, the delegation noted how political leaders characterized this particular round of interpellations (estizah) and its resulting votes of no-confidence as being incited by other motives. Media reports publicized the parliamentarians’ statements that the ministers being scrutinized were underspending their development budgets and therefore underperforming. However, in its consultations, the delegation heard a consensus view that the dismissals were an attempt to disrupt the NUG and pressure the government to postpone elections in the face of the recent momentum on electoral reform – as well as to create opportunities to extort bribes from ministers who might seek to buy security for their post.

Members of the political opposition that formed the “Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan” told the delegation that, despite the national unity government’s challenges and weaknesses, there are no sensible alternatives to this government – and that the NUG ought to complete a five-year term. This represents a shift from earlier this year when, in advance of the NUG Agreement’s two-year anniversary, some opposition leaders called for the end of the unity government. The delegation was told that the Council and NUG are currently engaged in a dialogue.

Some political actors, seemingly a small minority, continue to question the legitimacy of the NUG primarily because the government has not been able to conduct national elections and hold a constitutional loya jirga within the last two years. These few believe that the NUG only had a two-year mandate, in contrast to the majority of political actors who appear to view the NUG’s term as


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co-terminus with the presidential term. Former President Hamid Karzai stated that, since a constitutional loya jirga cannot be held legally without district councilors, and district council elections have yet to be organized, a traditional loya jirga ought to be considered as a legitimate, alternative process for replacing the NUG.

The constitutional loya jirga outlined in the NUG’s founding agreement could provide a forum for discussing broader constitutional issues beyond the role of the CEO position. However, it also presents potential problems in opening up several contentious issues, including the role of women and religion in Afghan society and the protection of civil and political rights. In its consultations with political and civil society leaders, it was unclear how strong an interest there is in holding a constitutional loya jirga before the 2019 presidential elections. Nearly all with whom the delegation met were occupied with how to first enable electoral reforms and the conduct of national elections within the remaining years of the current presidential term.

In addition, a constitutional loya jirga may not be in the interests of the major political forces. Interlocutors told the delegation that the government can fulfill its commitment to inclusion by simply including more opposition figures in its cabinet. The opposition, on the other hand, may well believe that if the constitution is amended to permanently include the position of Chief Executive, they may be permanently relegated to a secondary position in government. In any case, a constitutional loya jirga does not seem high on anyone’s list of current priorities.

Many of the civil society leaders with whom the delegation met were critical of the NUG’s performance and pessimistic about its chances to work together or enact significant reforms. However, none saw a preferable alternative to the unity government. They also noted that, despite its bitter internal conflicts, the NUG has managed to survive and keep the country from falling apart. Civil society leaders did not express a clear preference for a particular voting system but were united in the view that the current SNTV system is not serving Afghan democracy well. They also expressed that a key goal of electoral reform should be to facilitate the election of well-qualified candidates rather than power-brokers into office.

While the present relative harmony within the NUG is encouraging and could lead to more collaborative actions in the future, it remains fragile and this unity could be affected by a security failure, a rift over electoral reform, or a disagreement over national priorities. The delegation recognized the determination of the country’s leaders to keep the government intact and maintain the support of donor governments, including that of a President Trump-led U.S. administration.

Electoral Reform

More than two years after the NUG Agreement was signed, with electoral reform as one of its key provisions, the NUG finally appointed new IEC and ECC commissioners on November 22, 2016 to begin the parliamentary election planning process. On a technical level, the appointment process was conducted in a smooth, transparent and professional manner. Candidates meeting the legal parameters for education and work experience were vetted by a committee that included the executive director for the Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), a leading women’s rights activist, and representatives of the Supreme Court, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, and the Oversight Commission of the Implementation of the Constitution. The lists of 21 IEC candidates and 15 ECC candidates were forwarded to the NUG on time, and a panel that included President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah led interviews of each candidate to make their final selections.

The conduct of elections is highly political, however, and the slate of nominees presented to the NUG was seen by several observers as generally inexperienced. Most of the nominees were not well known to either civil society or political leaders, and very few had senior level electoral experience. That holds true for the commissioners that were ultimately appointed after the delegation’s interviews. This raises concerns that while the IEC and ECC may be qualified in the narrow sense, the commissions as a whole may find it difficult to withstand the political pressure


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concerning major electoral decisions. The IEC, in particular, will need to make key decisions on the electoral system, electoral constituencies and voter registration – significant and contentious issues that were previously proposed by the SERC and debated to a standstill by the Cabinet and the National Assembly.

Electoral System and Electoral Constituencies

Adopting a new electoral system was a key reform priority in the NUG agreement. When the SERC took up the issue last year, differences emerged between members who advocated for a proportional representation system, which favors political parties, and a minority who preferred single member districts (SMD), which helps to protect seats for smaller groups or interests, including groups influential at the sub-provincial level that would otherwise likely perform poorly in larger constituencies. The compromise decision taken by the SERC was to create a new, mixed electoral system artfully named multi-dimensional representation (MDR), which would have some seats reserved for political parties and some open or at-large seats within multi-member constituencies, permitting individuals to contest. This did not satisfy two of the SERC members, from the same ethnic group, who favored SMD and they withdrew their participation from the SERC in protest. Both blocs within the SERC have raised questions about the feasibility of the other’s proposals, with one group arguing that political parties are not sufficiently developed for a party-based system and the other group arguing that it will be too difficult without a census to redraw electoral constituencies. After the NUG-issued decrees to amend the electoral law were rejected by the National Assembly, the executive order that ultimately brought about the new electoral law showed that the NUG favored SMD – reflecting the recommendation of the two members who withdrew from the SERC and frustrating those with different positions.

The final version of the new electoral law called for retaining SNTV, but it deferred the decision on whether to have single or multiple member districts to a review by the new IEC. According to Article 2 of the election law, the newly established IEC has three months to conduct a technical review, determine the electoral constituencies for parliamentary elections and develop a plan for drafting constituency boundaries. Concerns were expressed by political and civil society leaders about how the new IEC would tackle such a complex issue within the designated timeframe, while juggling organizational, recruitment and procurement demands. Changes to the electoral system and the boundaries of electoral constituencies will, among other things, affect the technical ability of the IEC to organize a credible election in 2017. Given the extent of these changes, several Afghan and international experts interviewed anticipated that an election in 2018 would be more probable. A few predicted that parliamentary, presidential and provincial council elections would be conducted in 2019 – meaning that the presidential and parliamentary elections would be held simultaneously.

There was broad recognition that there is no ‘right answer’ to an electoral system that will solve all of Afghanistan’s electoral challenges, and that the benefits of electoral systems often do not accrue until several election cycles have transpired. Many of the people with whom the delegation met prefer a proportional system, but hardly any could articulate a clear vision of what they wanted to achieve by reforming the electoral system apart from reduced fraud and a less contested result. Also, it is not clear that political leaders – apart from a few who have focused on the issue – have calculated the likely pros and cons of different systems for their own electability. Moreover, civil society representatives noted that civic education and public awareness campaigns on the different election systems were not sufficient, and that those executing educational activities were themselves not particularly knowledgeable.

The delegation met with youth and women’s groups that have networks and membership in provinces across the country, and that have been able to help with civic and voter education programs in the past. While they have been able to support some discourse on electoral reforms via social media and local gatherings in the provinces, the lack of funding has severely limited their activities. While sustainability is a mutual goal of donors and civil society groups alike, there has so far been no viable domestic revenue model for Afghan public interest CSOs that focus on


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governance and democracy issues. If greater civil society engagement is a development goal, reliable long-term donor funding should be invested to support it.

Voter Registration

A vulnerability that continually plagues Afghan elections is the high number of duplicate voter cards among the electorate. Based on the distribution figures from previous elections, it is estimated that there are more than 21 million voter cards in circulation in a country with approximately 13 million eligible voters. Due to Afghanistan’s lack of a comprehensive voter registry, it has not been possible in past elections to do accurate checks on voter participation, and ballot shortages emerged as a problem in the 2014 election due to inaccurate voter estimates.

The new election law calls for a polling station-specific voter list, and an extensive voter registration effort will have to be undertaken in advance of the next national elections to establish it. Some with whom the delegation met, including President Ghani, are considering ways in which technology could be used to carry out such a colossal and complex task. Others are skeptical about how voter registration, and the conduct of elections, could be conducted in the country’s insecure areas and sections of provinces controlled by the Taliban. The issue of accurate voter registration is further compounded by the anticipated number of Afghan returnees – approximately one million by the end of 2016, and several hundred thousand next year.

Past voter registration exercises have failed to correct inaccuracies in the system because they were initiated too late, were hampered by poor security in remote areas, and had no mechanisms to correct obsolete information from prior registration. It is unlikely that these problems can be overcome in time for a 2017 election. If a decision is made to prioritize the timing of elections over the progress of reforms, special attention is needed to design a voter registration process that can be built upon and efficiently updated before the 2019 presidential election. A later election will allow more time for a more accurate registry, which could yield a less disputed result. The delegation also notes that even without polling station voter lists, the IEC and the Afghan government can reference population information available to Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Office that will help to determine voter populations and more accurately allocate polling centers and ballots.

Security and the Peace Process

Among the Afghan political elites, there is no consensus on the peace process and how to move it forward. There were mixed reactions to the peace deal that the Afghan government signed on September 22, 2016 with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the militant wing of Hezb-i-Islami. The Afghan government has maintained that the arrangement, which grants Hekmatyar immunity for actions committed during Afghanistan’s civil war, is intended to promote reconciliation and encourage other militants to consider ending their insurrection. The peace agreement allows Hekmatyar and his supporters to participate in the country’s national policy development processes, government institutions and security and defense forces. Notably, the peace deal calls for a proportional representation electoral system, which appears to be at odds with the current electoral law.

Some with whom the delegation met thought that if the agreement is effectively implemented, it could serve as a template for a deal with the Taliban – if the arrangement with Hekmatyar is successful, the Taliban may have a greater incentive to follow suit. Others believed that the return of Hekmatyar could be disruptive to the political process and generate confusion within the political party of Hezb-i-Islami, which has been functioning as a legal, registered entity for over a decade, operates in nearly all provinces and has made a concerted effort to modernize in recent years. There are concerns that Hekmatyar’s return could steer the party into a more conservative direction and challenge its cohesion and principles. Still others stated that, since he has been in exile for over 20 years, his influence may attract a rather narrow clique rather than a popular following. Many among civil society are angered that Hekmatyar was granted amnesty, and thought that such a peace deal breeds a culture of impunity.


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Over the past two years, the government has struggled to maintain security throughout the country. While the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have demonstrated increased capacity, pockets of the country have come under Taliban control and IS has emerged as a serious threat in a few provinces. The ANDSF continues to receive some training and technical support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Resolute Support Mission, which was launched following the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-led mission in Afghanistan in December 2014. But Resolute Support is a non-combat mission and involves approximately 13,000 personnel from NATO and partner nations – about a quarter of the number of ISAF troops present in Afghanistan during the 2014 election cycle that played a significant role in providing logistical support to the IEC and strategic support to the ANDSF.

Some Afghans with whom the delegation met were more sanguine about the security risks of holding the elections, with one noting that the 2014 elections were held in the middle of the summer fighting season but still experienced high participation rates. However, most stated to the delegation that poor security will affect timelines and make it harder for constituencies in insecure areas to vote. Some interlocutors proposed ‘rolling elections’ whereby different regions have elections on different dates, enabling security forces to surge in advance of each election date. Others pointed out that, in the absence of new voter identification cards, rolling or staggered elections could be vulnerable to fraudulent voting. For example, Afghans who already voted in one province could travel to a neighboring province and attempt to vote again. Nevertheless, there seems to be growing interest in exploring the feasibility of this approach.

The delegation noted that, in the 2010 parliamentary elections, the impact of insecurity on voter participation assumed an ethnic dimension with significant political consequences. In Ghazni province, which is roughly half Pashtun and half Hazara, the Pashtun-dominated areas were much less secure – and due to violence and Taliban threats, voter turnout in these areas was low. As a result, all 11 parliamentary seats of the province were won by Hazara candidates. Pashtuns were indignant that this electoral outcome did not reflect the province’s ethnic diversity. Avoiding this result in Ghazni and other provinces where insecurity has ethnic dimensions is one reason for sub-dividing provincial constituencies to help ensure more equal representation. For instance, if members of an ethnic group were spread throughout smaller districts, and each parliamentary seat for the province was tied to a district or subdivision, even a low voter turnout in these areas could result in the election of members of that group. At the same time, making explicit ethno-centric decisions about constituency boundaries may inhibit the kind of inclusive political development that many Afghans seek.

Discussions about the security situation need to be linked more directly to electoral reform discussions. Past electoral problems have most often occurred in areas with the worst security, and the Taliban now control more territory then they have since 2001. Election officials expressed a need to accept the facts as they find them and make the best plan possible. But without a significant change in the Afghan security forces’ ability to push back the insurgency, poor security will affect the outcome of the elections in several embattled provinces. The IEC needs realistic security assessments to develop its policies and plans, which may go against public narratives of battlefield success.

******* National Democratic Institute United States Institute of Peace www.ndi.org www.usip.org 455 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, 8th Floor, Washington DC 20001 2301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington DC 20037

NDI’s current programs in Afghanistan are supported by the National Endowment for Democracy.

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