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JLF Afghan Report: Part One Prof Julian Lindley-French________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________© 2007 Julian Lindley-French November, 2007

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Report on a NATO-Supported Visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan 16-26 October, 2007

By

Professor Julian Lindley-French,Professor of Military Operational Science,

Netherlands Defence Academy

Date of Report: November, 2007

“Afghanistan is being twinned with Iraq and the situation here [as a result] is being distorted.”

Chris Alexander, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, UNAMA, Kabul, 18 October, 2007

Central Message

The successful re-building of Afghanistan is achievable given the mission of creating a relatively stable, functioning and legitimate state. However, such an objective will not be achievable prior to 2015 at the earliest. Moreover, the international civilian and military effort is far too fractured and inefficient as currently structured to generate the effect and credibility that are the foundations upon which success must necessarily be built. There are simply too many actors doing too many (or not enough) things in too many different ways. To succeed the Coalition needs to become much more single-minded about the reason for its presence – the pursuit of Western security interests - and far more cohesive in the manner and method by which those interests are pursued. Over six years on from the beginning of the West’s initial engagement in Afghanistan it time to properly audit progress thus far and re-think the overall approach to Afghanistan given developments therein. Only then can plans for security, governance and development be properly established within a Strategic Campaign Plan that harnesses all civilian and military efforts and investments in a co-ordinated, logical and sustained manner. Only then will a proper appreciation take place of the efforts, investments and timescale upon which success will depend. Failure in Afghanistan is not an option but according to one senior European interviewed on the visit it is possible. It is about time all concerned started properly preparing for success. Only with the Alliance functioning truly as an Alliance is success likely to be generated.



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List of Contents

1. Central Message2. Fig One: Map of Afghanistan3. Glossary4. Introduction5. Ten Core Findings6. Supporting Evidence7. Commentary

Appendix One: Coalescing a Counterinsurgency StrategyAppendix Two: Afghanistan Compact – Implicit Strategy DepictionAppendix Three: Afghanistan-Pakistan Border RegionAppendix Four: Combined Security Transition Command - AfghanistanAppendix Five: List of Formal Engagements



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Figure One: Map of Afghanistan

Source: www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2002/Afghanistan

This report is dedicated to the American, Australian, British, Canadian and Irish personnel who had responsibility for the personal protection of the author during the visit

to Afghanistan.



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Glossary

ADZ Afghan Development ZonesANA Afghan National ArmyANCOP Afghan Civil Order Police ANP Afghan National PoliceANDS Afghan National Development StrategyCJSOR Combined Joint Statement of RequirementCNAD Conference of National Armament DirectorsCOM ISAF Officer Commanding, International Security Assistance ForceCRROSS CNAD Rapid Response Operational Support SystemCSTC-A Combined Security Transformation Command - AfghanistanETT Embedded Training TeamEU European UnionFATA Federally-Administered Tribal AreasFOB Forward Operation BaseHQ ISAF Headquarters, International Security Assistance ForceIED Improvised Explosive DeviceIO International OrganisationISAF International Security Assistance ForceISI Inter-Services IntelligenceJCMB Joint Co-ordination and Management Board KANDAK Afghan Army BattalionKTMC Kabul Military Training CentreNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNATO SCR NATO Senior Civilian RepresentativeNCO Non-Commissioned OfficerNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationNRF NATO Response ForceOEF Operation Enduring FreedomOMLT Operational, Mentor, Liaison TeamPDD Public Diplomacy DivisionPOMLT Police, Operational, Mentor, Liaison TeamPRT Provincial Reconstruction TeamQIP Quick Impact ProjectRC East Regional Command EastRC North Regional Command NorthRC South Regional Command SouthRC West Regional Command WestRPG Rocket Propelled GrenadeSOF Special Operations ForcesUNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in AfghanistanUNHCR United Nations High Commission for RefugeesTOLA Transatlantic Opinion Leaders – AfghanistanUN United Nations



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Introduction

The author made a visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan between 16 & 26 October, 2007. This report is a record of the trip and as such represents a personal account. The report must be accompanied by a ‘health’ warning because there is no such thing as an instant expert, especially in that part of the world. Consequently, any such visit can only result in an initial appreciation of the complexities of the situation on the ground and the report should be treated as such. Equally, the experienced observer can draw important conclusions that may help inform the policy debate precisely because the observer has an overview and is withdrawn from the day to day business of those engaged on the mission.

The focus of the report is a commentary. This is to promote brevity and utility and also to protect the many senior colleagues who gave of their time and views freely. Some of the comments will seem mildly and necessarily contradictory. The author makes no apology for that. To succeed in Afghanistan a mix of strategies, tactics and postures are required in different places and at different times. Any mistakes are the responsibility of the author.

The trip was organised by the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) of NATO as part of the Transatlantic Opinion Leaders Afghanistan (TOLA) series. In Afghanistan visits were made to:

• Headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (HQ ISAF), Kabul. Visits were also made to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Information and Culture in Kabul and meetings were also held with senior Afghan parliamentarians and officials as well as UN and EU senior representatives;

• Regional Command South, Kandahar; and • Forward Operating Base Lagman, near Qalat in Zabul Province. • Unfortunately, it was not possible to visit Regional Command North due to the

breakdown of a helicopter (which was indicative).

In Pakistan the visit was focussed on Islamabad and included briefings from senior think tanks, the British High Commission and a visit to the Joint Command Headquarters of the Pakistani Army. A list of all the meetings and briefings is included in Appendix Five.



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Eleven Core Findings

1. The Coalition needs a Strategic Communications Plan as a matter of urgency. Afghanistan must be seen as the West’s first truly strategic mission of the twenty-first century. Strategic communications must reflect that. Consequently, they should be more flexible and responsive thus better enabling the Coalition to beat the Taliban and Al Qaeda to the message. The message needs to be sustained and aimed at Afghans, Pakistanis and the home support. The message should focus on a) the re-demonisation of the Taliban and Al Qaeda; b) the many successes thus far; c) that a stable, self-sustaining, secure and legitimate Afghan-wide government and governance is unlikely to be achievable before 2015; d) the value of the effort and support of the Pakistani people; and e) sensitive to moderate media and religious views throughout the region..

2. Strategic success will not be possible without a coherent strategic campaign plan accepted by all partners to the mission Afghan and foreign, civil and military. COM ISAF is working up such a campaign plan but civilian international organisations (IOs) such as the UN and EU remain dangerously resistant to the need for more intense co-operation. Consequently, the major Western donor states need to put greater pressure on civilian agencies to insist they work more closely with their military counterparts in ISAF.

3. The Coalition needs to exert far more influence over the conduct of the Afghan Government. Successful fulfilment of an adapted Afghanistan Compact, together with the completion of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), will be crucial to success. Too many in the Afghan Government are making insufficient effort to meet their responsibilities to the governments and peoples of the Coalition states. There is an unacceptable level of complacency.

4. Specifically, pressure needs to be brought to bear on the Afghan Government to inject urgency in the area of good governance. The creation of a monitoring body could oversee the work of government at all levels more effectively. Put simply, there must be conditions placed on the Afghan Government to justify the continued presence of the Coalition. A sovereignty deficit is developing in which undue regard for Afghan sovereignty is causing coalition investment and effort in Afghanistan to be constantly and consistently re-directed for fractional gain. One senior USAID representative suggested that as much as $3m per month was being illegally diverted from the programme to reconstruct the electricity grid. As one senior European put it, “There are no strings attached to our continuing presence”.

5. The Coalition must endeavour to separate personalities from key partner institutions. Pakistan is in crisis, Afghanistan hovers uncomfortably close. President Musharref of Pakistan and President Karzai are important partners in the Coalition strategy. However, both are politically vulnerable. There are two basic realities that confront the Coalition strategy. First, the active support of the Pakistani Army is vital if the hammer and anvil counter-insurgency campaign is to work. Second, the development of functioning and



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respected institutions of government of Afghanistan. Neither institution must be irrevocably associated with the fate of the two individuals. The decision of President Musharref to suspend the Pakistani Constitution and arrest opposition politicians and members of the judiciary not only reinforces the need for a regional-strategic approach to mission success, but also where possible the detaching of support for institutions from that of personalities. Equally, the Coalition must be clear about its handling of Pakistan based on the following realities and a clear understanding of Coalition interests:• Pakistan could be the model democracy for the region and Musharref must

be pushed to hold the elections proposed for January 2008; • Pakistan is a nuclear power and the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is controlled

by the Army. The Army remains the most stable institution in Pakistan and is a vital partner in the Coalition’s counter-insurgency strategy;

• The collapse of Pakistan into chaos would effectively end the counter-insurgency strategy of the Coalition. The return to democracy in Pakistan is an important objective for Coalition diplomacy but the immediate requirement is for functioning institutions under proper control;

• The Coalition relies on Pakistan for much of its supply effort.6. There are two Afghanistans. The north and the West of the country are

relatively stable, whist the south and much of the east is engaged in a full-scale insurgency. Such a division could be better used to demonstrate the benefits of good governance. A Model Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is needed that demonstrates the benefits to all Afghans of the 3D approach (defence, diplomacy and development) enshrined in the Afghan Compact. At present the vision that the PRT model offers is too theoretical for many Afghans whose experience of the trauma of war prevents them from looking ahead. It would be useful to make virtue out of necessity by picking one PRT as the ‘model’. Such a PRT would accelerate Afghanisation and civilianisation as part of a new partnership between the Afghan Government, Afghan people and the international community and be supported by a media campaign to highlight the progress. The relatively stable environment of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan suggests the German PRT could be the natural choice. Such a model PRT would not only demonstrate the benefits of balance between security, governance and development in Afghanistan, but also the shape of future relations with neighbouring states, such as Tajikistan. The model would also help to re-establish the Afghan Compact as credible. As one senior Americans officer said, “The Afghan Compact packs a fifteen year work-plan into a three year timetable”.

7. The Coalition needs to invest more effort in creating a cadre of elite civil servants. Whilst much effort is being expended preparing the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Policy (ANP) much greater effort needs to be invested in an elite cadre of civil servants. To that end, the Kabul Military Training Centre needs to be matched with the creation of a new Kabul Senior Civil Servants College. Such an approach would reinforce the efforts of President Karzai to centralise the core administration of the Afghan



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Government which will be essential if a new strategic campaign plan is to generate traction within the country.

8. The creation of five manoeuvre corps and fourteen functioning army brigades by end 2009 is a vital milestone in the coalition strategy. Like it not the media will identify that date as a cut off point. However, whilst the Afghan National Army (ANA) is making progress towards the creation of a seventy thousand strong army it will be late 2010 or 2011 at the earliest before the ANA can reasonably be expected to backfill for Coalition forces, especially in the south. That message needs to be communicated now as part of the strategic communications campaign. It is crucial that expectations are managed carefully. Much can be made of the proposed Commando battalions which are likely to be the most effective elements for generating combatfighting power.

9. The creation of a functioning Afghan National Police (ANP) service has gonebadly awry. Expectations that the ANP will be a functioning force any time soon need to be lowered. Equally, much greater effort needs to be invested in the generation, organisation, training and recruitment of police forces if any hope of their being accepted and respected is to be realised. To that end far more police trainers are needed and organised through the Police, Operational, Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs). However, it will not be possible to find sufficient European trainers whilst the pay on offer is as low as $40,000 per annum.

10. Better, more relevant and more accurate metrics are needed. Too many of the metrics that coalition members use for measuring progress seem to have more to do with ‘ticking boxes’ back in capitals than with the situation in Afghanistan. Consequently, a sound understanding of the situation in-country is hard to establish because the gap between stated progress and reality is often demonstrably at variance. Such uncertainty undermines political will, particularly in Europe. The Coalition needs to carry out an audit across the country on the method and approach to metrics.

11. More risks need to be taken to re-engage the Afghan people. A majority of Afghans at all levels engaged on the visit seemed genuine in their desire for the Coalition to remain for, in the words of a senior elder in the Pashtun village of Moradkhan-Kalay, “As long as is necessary to re-build the country”. However, as one NATO official said, “the feel good factor is over”. Whilst few people in the region see Coalition forces in Afghanistan in the same way Coalition forces are viewed in Iraq there is a danger that security concerns on the part of ISAF could lead to a dangerous gap between Afghans and the Coalition in those areas where stabilisation and reconstruction are making progress. One senior Afghan went as far as to say that in some parts of Afghan society the danger exists that ISAF will come to be regarded in the “…same way as the Russians”.



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Supporting Evidence

Basic Facts

Afghanistan has a population of 31m, some 5m more than Iraq. (Barno & Anderson) 75% of the population are below the age of 25. (Sultanzoy) By 2009 60% of the working population will be unemployed. (Ghani, Hillal & NC3)

In opinion polls well over 50% of the Afghan population want the Coalition to remain. (TV Tolo, Kabul)

Regional Strategy

The border with Pakistan is 2560km in length on which there are 1042 border posts. (Pakistan Army Joint Staff)

There are 4m Afghan refugees in Iran. (TV Tolo). There are 2m registered refugees in Pakistan. In 2007 there were 152,000 registered returns. (UNHCR). 95% of the cross-border movements take place at 2 crossings. (UNHCR)

80% of suicide bombers come from Waziristan (Pakistan). (Barno). 95% of the fighting takes place in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Burns)

The Taliban contain 10-20% foreign fighters. There are between 1500 and 2000 Taliban that form Tier One, i.e. the High Command, operating mainly out of Quetta, Pakistan. This group forms the National Council and the Provincial Leadership. Tier Two, who are to be found mainly in Afghanistan, represent some 6-8000 fighters who are either paid or coerced. (Marquis Hainse & Hillal)

Over the past year the Coalition has killed between 25-30 senior Taliban commanders along with leaders of other Afghan Islamic Groups. (RC South staff) The Taliban are overwhelmingly Pashtun and consequently only effective in the southern and eastern 50% of Afghanistan. (Alexander)

The US is spending $1bn per annum on military aid to Pakistan to help deal with the Taliban and their supporters in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Afghan border. However, Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) which created the current Taliban force back in 1994 no longer exerts complete control. (Hutchinson) There are some 100,000 Pakistani troops in the FATA. This increases to 250,000 through the use of local levies. In 2007, 759 Pakistani troops have been killed thus far. The Pakistani Army has embarked on 103 major operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda since 2002. (Pakistan Army Joint Staff)

20% more terrorist incidents have occurred in 2007. Attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers have increased by between 30-50% and some 1500



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civilians will be killed in 2007. However, whilst violence quadrupled in 2006, in 2007 the rate of increase in violence has slowed. (Alexander)

Afghan Governance

The Afghan economy has grown by 10% per annum over the past 5-6 years and thus the economy is now 50% bigger than in 2002. Afghanistan has copper reserves that would make the country one of the top 10 producers. (Alexander)

By 2010 it is planned that all civil and criminal law codes will be in place. $60-90m has been devoted by the World Bank to rule of law development. However, the World Bank will not release the money until the Draft Justice Sector Consolidated Strategy is adopted. The pay of the average judge is only $80 per month. (RC South Staff)

Sub-National Consultations, which began in summer 2007, are part of an effort by the Afghan Government to create 5 year development plans within the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). This is a top-down approach to development that passes funds from the national level through Provincial Development Plans and Projects. (Anderson) The National Solidarity Programme is contributing $50,000 of aid to each village in the rural areas. Over 20,000 villages have now benefited. (Alexander)

Narcotics contribute some $3.5bn to the national economy. 2007 witnessed a 17% increase in poppy production. Helmand Province now has 102,000 hectares under cultivation making it the leading poppy cultivator per area in the world. North and East Afghanistan now has 13 provinces that are poppy-free. 6 other provinces will be declared poppy-free in 2007. This represents an 80% reduction. 396 drugs traffickers have been arrested in 2007, some 6000kg of heroin seized and 60 tons of other drugs. In September 2007 one seizure confiscated 4030kg of heroin. (Malkat)

60% of Mullahs are neutral. Of the remaining 40%, 30% are pro-Taliban with some 10% pro-Government. (NC3)

85% of the population now has access to basic ‘healthware’, compared with 5% under the Taliban. There are now over 350 health clinics in the country. Female and child mortality has declined by 25% across the country since 2002. (Alexander) However, 300 schools have been closed in 2007 due to pressure from the Taliban leading to problems with literacy. (Malkat)

The village of Moradkhan-Kalay visited by the author is 350km SSE on Kabul off Highway One. There are 3 mosques serving 300 families living in the village represented by 7 elders. 4 or 5 wells exist (built by NGOs) and the water is good. (Bramble)

Iran controls 50% of the print media and 3 out of 11 TV Channels. (Khurram)

The Role of the International Community



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$12-13bn has thus far been spent on development, but up to 90% is repatriated to donor countries (Harmsma). US spent $2bn on police training thus far but mainly through Dynacorps. Each private sector US police trainer costs c$400,000 per annum whereas EU trainers will costs c$40,000 per annum. The objective is c800 US police trainers and 200 from the EU. The EU Police Mission currently stands at 80 and is due to reach 180 in March 2008 but recruiting trainers is proving hard due to the low level of salaries. (Vendrell)

The UN Strengthening Peace Programme (PTS using the Afghan acronym) has led to the surrender of 4000 Taliban by October 2007. (Harmsma)

ISAF/OEF

ISAF has 40,000 troops under command, including some 16,000 US personnel. In addition, there are 10,000 US personnel under OEF command. (Harmsma) There are 18,000 European forces in ISAF. (Vendrell) The UK is the second biggest troop contributor with 7,700 personnel, almost all of which have a combat role. Germany is the third largest contributor with 3,000 personnel are in country of which c600 are combat forces. (RC South Staff)

There are 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of which the US leads 12. Most US personnel stay 15 months, whereas many of the personnel from Coalition partners stay only 6 months on average, whereas some stay for as little as 4 months. (McNiel)

ISAF is short of 3-4 manoeuvre battalions. ISAF is also profoundly short of helicopters. The US has provided a ‘bridging force’ to make up the shortfall of all forms of helicopters (heavy-lift, medium-lift and attack helicopters). That force will be withdrawn 31 January, 2007 due to maintenance and refitting requirements. (McNeil) One senior ISAF commander said that 5-6 Coalition partners could offer helicopters but choose not to do so.

Regional Command South

RC South has a population of between 2-3m, with 1m living in Kandahar Province. The life-expectancy is in the mid-40s, with 85% of the population living on farms and homesteads. 70% of the population are neutral. (Marquis Hainse)

Regional Command South (RC South) has 12,000 ISAF troops alongside some 10,000 OEF troops covering 6 provinces with an area of 480,000 sq kilometres. There are no ISAF forces in the provinces of Nimroz and Day Kundi. ISAF needs 12,000 more forces in RC South. However, over the past year improvements in the security situation have been seen due to an increase in the force of some 6,000. (Marquis Hainse)

Improving the Afghan Police and Army



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The ANA will be 70,000 strong by end 2009. Currently the ANA possesses “almost” 10 infantry brigades with an objective of 14 and 5 manoeuvre corps by the end of 2009. Each brigade has 3 infantry battalions or KANDAKs of 600 personnel. (Twomey)

The Afghan National Army (ANA) enjoys a 50% retention rate with a desertion rate of 10%. (Apparatchai) 10% is absent without leave (AWOL) at any one time mainly due to the need to deliver pay personally to home villages. An automated payment system is currently being established. (Twomey)

The ANA lacks 3500 personnel given current planning. Basic pay of a private soldier is around $100 per month, which rises to $160 per month when engaged on operations. (Twomey) The ANP are paid $70 per month. The Taliban are paid c$200 per month. (Sultanzoy)

50% of the 18-30 age groups are willing to join either the ANA or the Afghan National Police (ANP). (Twomey). However, it will be 2-3 years before the pay of ANA and ANP is comparable. (Bramble)

The ANA will deploy 11-12,000 troops to RC South of which 80% are already there. (RC South Staff) However, KANDAK 21 in Kandahar only has 50% of its personnel because 300 out of 600 were missing on October 2007, which could have been explained by a major religious holiday. (Vaillancourt)

It is proposed that the ANA Commando force will be some 4552 strong. This will be an important element in the credible fighting power of the ANA and must receive priority treatment.

The Afghan National Police force (ANP) will total 82,000 personnel. The ANP can only cover 50% of police districts at present due to lack of available personnel. There are 365 police districts with the need for at least 10 officers per district. (Twomey). The Afghan Government claims that there are now 40,000 police officers on the ANP payroll. The US checked these figures and confirmed that some 32,000 (80%) can be accounted for. (McNeil) ANP casualties are twenty-times higher than ANA. 3000 ANP are planned for RC South but only 1500 are present in October 2007. (RC South Staff)

The Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a paramilitary force that is designed to support the ANP is being deployed. A strengthened Border Police with 4500 stationed in RC South will also be deployed. (RC South Staff)

685 Border Police have thus far been killed in 2007. In June 2007 over 200 police were killed. Army and police hospital services are still lacking. Over 1000 police have been killed thus far in 2007. 40 senior police officers have been removed in 2007 either due to incompetence or corrupt behaviour. (Twomey, Alexander & Malkat)



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103 Operational, Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) are required by the end of 2008. There are currently 23 and there are only likely to be 41 or 42. (Twomey) According to General McNeil (COM ISAF) there are only 18 active OMLTs. (McNeil)



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CommentaryRegional Strategy

The Coalition needs a better regional-strategic understanding.

The struggle for the Afghan space is the first truly strategic challenge of the twenty-first century. Moreover, only a regional-strategic view is likely to generate the kind of campaign concept that could conceivably lead to success. At the very least stability in Afghanistan is not possible without stability in Pakistan and stability therein has wider political ramifications. However, back in capitals too many members of the Coalition still seem to view Afghanistan as a Bosnia-plus regional peacekeeping mission. It is also evident from meetings in the region that both Russia and Iran are taking an increasingly anti-Coalition stance in and around Afghanistan. India and Pakistan continue to ‘use’ Afghanistan in their ongoing political conflict. Only China seems to have a by and large neutral posture, even if Beijing wants NATO out of the region as soon as possible. Therefore, the Coalition needs to generate an elaborated regional economic strategy to co-opt China, India and other neighbouring states. By placing such solutions at the heart of strategy the presence of the Coalition will be progressively more civilian in character. This will be an essential element of mission success.

A more structured regional economic solution should be sought

The paradox of the Coalition presence in Afghanistan is that security can work against economy. The artificial presence of so-many foreigners and so much aid has inflated prices and made Afghan products and labour too expensive in the regional context. A regional economic strategy is thus needed that must include major infrastructure projects, such as the expansion of the electricity grid (“pylons over the Himalayas” as one senior UN representative put it), expansion of the Afghan road network to other states in the region and the possible linking of Afghanistan to China by rail and exploitation what some believe to be the world’s second greatest reserves of copper in the hills south of Kabul. Over time projects that promote a regional economic structure will be needed to re-integrate the Afghan economy into the wider economy which is in itself crucial to the creation of a stable Afghan state.

The Coalition needs to build on the cultural links it enjoys with the Pakistani establishment

Pakistan is again in crisis. However, the Pakistani political and security Establishment is a vital ally in the search for a stable region. Again, there is unlikely to be a stable Afghanistan without a stable Pakistan. Discussions with senior Pakistani civilians and military emphasised the respect and links that the UK in particular enjoys in the region. Whilst it is important not to over-state such ties post-imperial political correctness in Europe should not be allowed to blind Coalition partners to the political possibilities. Such ties need to be harnessed, not least because the Pakistan Army is still the most stable institution in Pakistan, and will remain so. On balance stability must still comebefore, but not at the exclusion of, democracy if the end-states explicit in Coalition



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strategy are to be realised. That will take tough choices on occasions because a Pakistan that descends into chaos would effectively mark the end of the Coalition strategy in Afghanistan. What the Pakistanis crave is respect and more recognition that they are a partner not simply a part of the problem. As one senior Pakistani officer put it, “Pakistan has provided more support than any other nation and taken more casualties. Treat Pakistan with respect. It is doing everything it can”. Some insights could be gained from the approach and practice of the British administration during the late colonial period.

The ‘Peace Jirga’ process must be strengthened alongside the Tripartite Commission

The August 2007 Peace Jirga was a modest start in a process of reconciliation and more meetings are planned. However, as with all aspects and levels of governance the Coalition needs to play a much more assertive role if the parties to the conflict are to make real efforts towards sustained peace. Indeed, the relative political passivity of the Coalition was surprising. Too many in the Coalition seem to accept Afghan sovereignty in too uncritical a manner and it is evident that there are many on both sides of the border with a vested interest in seeing such a process fail. The Tripartite Commission involving the Coalition, Pakistani Army and the Afghan Government must be strengthened and act under the strong guidance of the Coalition.

Work with senior Afghans to lessen their instinctive tendency to blame Pakistan

Whilst the level of involvement of Pakistan in Afghan’s troubled past cannot be denied the degree to which senior Afghans blame Pakistan for their challenges seems oftenunproductive and over-stated. There are of course too many safe havens for the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan but the current level of anti-Pakistan rhetoric will not foster the kind of cross-border co-operation that will be vital to squeezing such terrorist elements out of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) covering much of North and South Waziristan, as well as parts of Baluchistan. Good relations will be a challenge. As one senior Afghan stated “Afghanistan insists on a brotherhood with Pakistan to tackle the many problems. There are too many safe havens for terrorists on the Pakistani side and the ISI is supporting that. There are also too many centres of extremism such as Madrassas that are also supported by the ISI where training takes place and where people are mentally affected”. The same Afghan went on to say that, “what is needed is honest co-operation”. That must be the single-minded goal of the Coalition’s diplomatic effort in the region. That effort seems disjointed and poorly co-ordinated.

Strategic Communications

Better strategic communications are needed as a matter of urgency

Strategic communications have been reactive and inflexible. This has put the Coalition repeatedly on the defensive. For example, the Taliban, with Al Qaeda support, regularly makes far better use than the Coalition of the electronic media, such as the internet. First and foremost, much better relations need to be established between operational



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commanders and public diplomacy. HQ ISAF in particular needs to be far less sensitive about the release of information that would help the Coalition cause in the broadest sense, particularly when it comes to negating propaganda over civilian deaths. To that end, a Communications Strategy is required that on the one hand engages moderate Mullahs in Afghanistan and Pakistan and on the other hand the regional media which is powerful and prone to anti-Coalition sympathies. Above all, ‘the message’ needs to be better crafted to provide a far more compelling strategic narrative in the region and applied in a sophisticated and sustained manner.

Give Coalition publics an honest appreciation of the stakes and the situation

If a strategic narrative is to be crafted for the region it is also time that European and North American political leaders told their respective people’s the full truth about the situation in Afghanistan and the importance of success. Afghanistan is vital to the security of the West because no such place can be left to the dark side of globalisation in which crime, terrorism and dangerous technology festers. However, success will take time and the Coalition will not have completed its work prior to 2015 at the earliest. Indeed, success can only be achieved through an aggressive and sustained counter-insurgency strategy as part of an over-arching Campaign Plan that balances security with good governance and development. Those governments that prevent the crafting of such a message because they refuse to face up to the realities on the ground could well doom the ISAF/OEF mission to failure. Unfortunately, the lack of solidarity between Coalition partners evident on the ground in Afghanistan threatens far more than military inconvenience. The lack of a single message is creating profound tensions within the Alliance that is undermining the very concept of credible Western and European security and defence structures.

Afghan Governance

Have a clearer understanding of strategy in Afghanistan

There seems to be some confusion on the part of the Coalition, the UN and EU over the balance of effort to be made. Whilst the campaign against the Taliban is the immediate challenge, there seems little clear appreciation of the specific relationship between the counter-terrorism campaign, the counter-narcotics and counter-crime strategies. It is clear that first the Taliban must be contained (they are unlikely to be ‘defeated’ in the classical sense because of their relationship and status within Pashtun society on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border). However, the role and influence of the former Mujahadeen must also be addressed both within and beyond the Afghan Government. The so-called ‘Narco-Khans’ appear to be far more closely associated with the latter group than the Taliban. A senior US officer much engaged in the direction of the overall campaign plan offered the following insight, “If the next elections (2009-2010) are bought and paid for by narco-dollars we will have a four or five year delay in implementation [of current planning]”.

The Afghanistan Compact needs to be reviewed



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The 2006 Afghanistan Compact (the successor to the 2002 Bonn Agreement), needs to be reviewed, adjusted and adapted by the Coalition as the basis for a new Strategic Campaign Plan. Six years on from the beginning of Coalition activities in Afghanistan adjustments must be made to strategy that take into account the changed situation on the ground to establish new objectives and a re-vitalised strategy based on the efficient generation and application of development aid. Indeed, if there was a consensus in all the meetings held it was that money is the key to success over the longer-term. To that end, North Americans and Europeans must become far more effective at working up policy together and firmly demand changes on the part of the Afghan Government in return for a continued commitment to the fulfilment of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) which itself needs to be incorporated within the framework of the Compact. However, the Coalition must play its own role to ensure taxpayer funds are applied in as constructive a manner as possible. The EU spends €170bn per annum on Afghanistan, whilst individual European states spend much more on national projects. There needs to be better co-ordination. Indeed, with some 90% of the aid vanishing or being ‘repatriated’ by private contractors the current return on investment represents a scandalous exploitation of North American and European tax-payers. Whilst not conclusive a visit to the squalor of the interpreter’s camp outside the Coalition base in Kandahar was telling. The interpreters work for an American company called IMS and yet live in virtual abject poverty. As one senior NATO official stated in Kabul, “There is a need for a transformational development programme”. That is vital.

Coalition support for the democratic process and institutions in Afghanistan must be progressively separated from President Karzai.

The Coalition has backed President Karzai strongly. However, it is evident that he enjoys very little support within the country, and even within his own government. It may be that the Coalition is backing the wrong individual because he is regarded as weak and ineffectual and as having sold out to the warlords. The presence of so-many warlords and others regarded as corrupt in government may have made sense from a tactical point of view in 2004, but it has critically weakened the political base of the President. Moreover, it is evident in the Pashtun heartland that their presence and influence is regarded as self-defeating. The failing has undoubtedly helped strengthen the influence of the Taliban to the point where they are gaining traction even on the outskirts of Kabul. Indeed, one American NGO leader who lives in Kandahar amongst the community accused the US of having “installed posses of criminals in government”. One senior Afghan politician (who is himself considering running for president in 2009) stated, “Karzai resurrected the warlords who now have the destiny of Afghanistan in their hands”. As mentioned above, the first order challenge is to contain the Taliban, but the need to contain or marginalise warlord influence in government is growing by the day. Not least because so many of them have close links with provincial governors.

The performance of regional governors needs to be better monitored if the gap between the Government and the people is to be bridged



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Without more effective monitoring of regional governors it is unlikely that Afghanistan will break out of the cycle of bad governance that threatens to undermine the coalition effort. Too many corrupt governors are being re-appointed and insufficient attention is paid to the preparation and professionalism of key figures in the Afghan Government structure. One senior Regional Command South official said “Afghanistan used to be a highly centralised state that has become de-centralised through twenty-five years of war”. The coalition strategy is by and large founded on the creation of a strong Afghan state. Without a robust effort to ensure governors fulfil their responsibilities to the Afghan people it is hard to see how the Coalition strategy can work. In addition to OMLTs, monitoring teams are needed to operate at the strategy/policy level in each province. One Afghan estimate given was that Afghanistan needs no more than 500 ‘good people’ in key positions. The sub-national consultation process could be used to reinforce such a process by sending ministers out to the provinces on a regular basis to interact with local people. It will not be easy. One senior Afghan said that some governors and their warlord allies deliberately cause problems just to demonstrate their ability to resolve them. The Coalition cannot indefinitely permit such people to have access to power.

Talk to some elements of the insurgency

Greater efforts must be made to distinguish between the various elements of the insurgency. To that end, it is important to not only separate the local Taliban commanders and forces from their command chain in Pakistan, but also better understand what motivates some of the ‘fellow-travellers’ who currently seek common cause with the Taliban. Indeed, it is evident on the ground in southern Afghanistan that the Taliban are a no more homogeneous force than the Coalition. There are many groups and motivations within their ranks and many of the fighters are either simply paid or coerced into fighting the Coalition. The role of coercion was demonstrated graphically in September 2007 at the Battle of Chura where Dutch forces engaged en enemy armed with AK-47 assault rifles only to find out later that many of them had been forced to fight by the Taliban on pain of having their families murdered. An opportunity for dialogue has been created by the pressure coalition forces have exerted over the past months for which Coalition forces and commanders must be congratulated. This should enable the Coalition to speak from a position of strength, which is vital. However, the pressure must be maintained. It is vital that the traditional break in the fighting season bedenied the Taliban by the Coalition. Interestingly, Afghan village elders in the Pashtun village of Moradkhan-Kalay in the Tarnak Valley supported the need for such discussions during a meeting on 19 October.

To assist the process of dialogue PRT commanders should be given a stronger role and more rapid access to resources. Such discussions should not be viewed as negotiations.

PRT commanders should be empowered to make such contacts when and where the opportunity arises. This could be in harness with increased use of Quick Impact Projects (QIP) that bring rapid benefits on the ground and reinforce the UN’s Strengthening Peace Programme which helps former fighters return to civilian life. However, such discussions should not be called ‘negotiations’. Rather, the Coalition



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should try and re-define its relationship with elements of the insurgency by dealing with genuine grievances, even if operations continue to exploit the divisions within the insurgents. The forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar should also be included in such discussions if they show a willingness to engage (expert opinion was divided on this issue). Such discussions could take place with the help and guidance of local elders to help restore tribal structures vital to local governance. Indeed, the simple process of seeking advice from tribal elders through Shuras and Jirgas could also help to further undermine support for the Taliban. As one tribal elder said to this author, “You must talk to the Taliban. They are here”.

A national employment strategy is required

By 2009 60% of the Afghan population will be unemployed. Given the relationship between poverty, violence and unemployment Afghanistan needs a national employment strategy funded by the coalition to create employment amongst key sections of society, particularly young men. Whilst counter-intuitive to most Western governments such a strategy would buy the necessary time and create the sense of momentum that is so desperately needed in Afghanistan. Whilst the Coalition is still welcome there is a powerful sense amongst Afghans that the West is beginning to fail. And, as with all things Afghan it is the day-to-day experience of the tribe, the family and the individual that is crucial. A significant number of rural Afghans have worked in places like the United Arab Emirates and have greater experience of the world beyond the village than often assumed. If the Coalition delivers progress in quality of life the Coalition will succeed.

Invest more in the development of ‘Bazaar Economics’.

In Afghanistan all politics, as well as economics, are truly local. The role of the markets or bazaars in economic development is pivotal. More could be done to stimulate such grassroots markets to motivate the local economy. Some consideration could be given to the creation of super-bazaars. It is evident that the Pashtun elders place much faith in such events as proof of progress and would also help to stimulate the development of legitimate agriculture.

Structured investment is needed to wean farmers off poppy cultivation

UNAMA points out that 2007 will see Afghanistan export grain for the first time since before the Soviet invasion of 1979. UNAMA also believes that in time farmers will turn away from poppy due to the need for food. However, poppy cultivation continues to expand, particularly in the south. Therefore, substitution strategies are required that can help farmers move over to legitimate cultivation more rapidly than at present. Such a programme should include taking over the loans many farmers have with the Narco-Khans reinforced by much greater efforts to stop the transit of harvested poppies over the border to Pakistan. As one senior ISAF commander said, “ISAF is not an eradication force”. However, without more sustained efforts by all the international community



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to reduce poppy cultivation it is hard to envisage a stable Afghan Government. The current tendency towards ‘buck-passing’ must end.

The Role of the International Community

A Strategic Campaign Plan is needed urgently

The UN, EU and NATO Senior Civilian Representative must support COM ISAF to prepare a Strategic Campaign Plan as a matter of urgency based on COM ISAF’s ‘Implicit Strategy Depiction’ (see Appendix Two). If such support is not forthcoming then the donor states must ensure it happens. There is a pressing need to tie together all civilian and military lines of operations. Only such a plan will generate the efficiency, co-ordination and effect on the ground and in government that is likely to see sustained progress. Only then will the creation be possible of what one senior figure called a “coherent centre”. The Afghan Stability Picture (ASP) is a database that provides ISAF with details of development. The ASP must form the basis for establishing a meaningful metric. Tactically, it would be useful to have the EU and NATO work up the Campaign Plan before going to the UN and the work should be completed prior to NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008. In the interim ISAF must become a member of the important Joint Co-ordination and Management Board (JCMB). At the very least effective co-ordination between the various members of the international community would better communicate the specific needs of the Afghan people, the need for which is pressing. There is a dangerous gap developing in this regard that needs to be closed. Additionally, the role of the Senior Civilian Representative (NATO SCR) needs to be strengthened, alongside that of DCOM Stabilisation, who acts as “the portal with the international community with ISAF”. As one commander put it, there is a need to “strengthen Dan Everts” (whose term of office ends in December 2007).

Afghanisation and civilianisation must be accelerated in the North to establish a model of good governance and development

Over the medium-to-longer term Afghanisation and civilianisation are key to the success of the ISAF mission. As one senior ISAF officer stated, “The ISAF mission is a development mission”. Afghanisation and civilianisation must be accelerated in RC North and RC West to provide a working model of good governance and development that can be used to demonstrate the utility of the approach of the international community. Those military forces no longer needed for security duty should be detached from the PRTs in the two regional commands and transferred to other Regional Commands where they can carry out missions under current rules of engagement but in areas that require a high level and density of Coalition forces to promote security. The German PRT in Kunduz could be the model for such a PRT.

The International Community must take a more assertive role in Shura’s



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Discussions with the elders of Moradkhan-Kalay revealed the level of mistrust that exists between government officials and the people. They were particularly clear that whilst they trusted coalition forces they did not trust the Governor, Mr Delbar Arman. US Army personnel leading the Ground Assault Team: Civil Affairs Team at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Lagman were also clear that “the heart of our successes is based on good governance”. Consequently, the role of Shura’s (local councils) was vital in bringing government and people together. However, for the foreseeable future senior personnel of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will need to play a more assertive arbitration role at such meetings if trust is to be built over time between the government and people. However, this is a role that could ideally be performed by US, NATO and/or EU civilian personnel as that would promote a stronger civilian identity for the Coalition.

Stop imposing culture and be more aware of the distinctions within Afghan culture

The Coalition needs to better understand the Afghan people. Indeed, too often Western culture appears to be imposed on Afghans. For example, interpreters working for RC South are called ‘terps’. Mr Jawed Jan Azimi who currently supports the Canadians training the ANA in Kandahar is called ‘Johnny Terp’. On the ANA base itself all the streets have US names. As guests in Afghanistan such insensitivity might be interpreted as cultural imperialism and thus help strengthen opposition. Mutual respect is vital in such a society if a true partnership is to be established. Moreover, such sensitivity should also apply to the use of the word ‘Taliban’. A senior Afghan said that Taliban simply means those who attend religious seminaries and schools. The problem group is the so-called ‘New Taliban’ which is close to Al Qaeda. Much of the region shares a more moderate Sufi tradition and that includes elements of the Taliban. Ignorance can cause offence. On a visit to the ANA base in Kandahar a chance meeting with the Afghan commander may have led to offence being unwittingly caused by this author. The senior Afghan commander had no insignia on his uniform because he comes from a leading Pashtun family and his status is unquestioned. However, this author assumed his aide-de-camp was the senior officer.

More visits from parliamentarians would help civilianise the presence of the Coalition

More visits from senior delegations, particularly parliamentarians would be beneficial. Although such visits place considerable strain on resources and logistics the political benefits are substantial. Back in the donor countries a better high-level understanding is promoted which is frankly lacking in most Coalition countries. In Afghanistan the increasing sense of being a ‘forgotten war’, also needs to be overcome as a matter of urgency. Afghans are also very impressed by high-level civilian delegations that can help to put a civilian face on the Coalition mission, which is vital.

ISAF/OEF

ISAF needs more manoeuvre forces



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ISAF lacks four manoeuvre battalions. In an ideal world many of the forces in the north that are not directly required for security would be detached from their PRTs and formed into a strategic reserve thus increasing COM ISAF’s pool of manoeuvre forces ready and able to support trouble spots at short notice. Such an adjustment is unlikely to happen due to national caveats on the use of forces. Equally, the very nature of PRTs (the EU Representative suggested they should really be called PSTs – Provincial Security Teams) prevents manoeuvre. It might be useful to consider which forces in the south currently under national command in a PRT could be re-assigned to form an air-mobile brigade, possibly in conjunction with a mobile training force better able to reinforce training where required. To that end, some of the command elements and structure of the NATO Response Force (NRF) could be deployed to reinforce Regional Command South in Kandahar. Consideration might also be given to turning RC South into a single operating area in which more manoeuvre forces can operate. This wouldbetter enable ISAF to hold ground that it has won.

The Combined Joint Statement of Requirement must be filled

At the very least the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) must be filled. In the words of one commander, “there are still far too many holes”. This is particularly the case for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and helicopters. Indeed, this author witnessed at first hand the dangers of pushing helicopters beyond their refit dates as the Chinook upon which he was due to travel back from FOB Lagman broke down. The Americans have done all they can to close the helicopter gap but as of 31 January, 2008 US helicopters that form part of the ‘bridging force’ will be withdrawn. At that point COM ISAF will face a severe helicopter crisis and as one senior RC South commander said, “helicopters are worth their weight in gold in Afghanistan”. Another senior officer went further, “five to six nations could contribute helicopters but are not. Helicopters are coin of the realm here”. This is a European problem. One very senior European (non-British) did not mince his words, “Apart from the UK, Europeans have caught the Mogadishu Virus”. A senior NATO official put the challenge for the Alliance succinctly, “Helmand is the centre of gravity. We need to focus on operations”. The next year will prove critical and the Coalition as a whole needs to grip that fact.

Commanders must avoid a ‘not invented here’ mentality

The previous COM ISAF, UK General David Richards established Afghan Development Zones (ADZ). Current COM ISAF has scrapped them because “they simply do not work”. This is a matter of some contention and maybe correct. However, the manner of their dismantling and the way they are dismissed gives the impression of the US taking a ‘not invented here’ attitude. This concern was confirmed in private conversations with many Coalition members’ military and civilian alike that seemed to suggest that the Americans were too often resistant to European ideas and approaches. Be it fact or fiction the perception needs to be addressed. The politics of coalition management are far better understood by COM ISAF than this author. However, whilst the manner by which US forces go about their business is hugely impressive (as indeed is the sensitivity



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with which they deal with the criticism and carping that comes from many of their partners) constant consideration needs to be given to this matter to avoid the friction that the ‘US is best’ approach undoubtedly causes, even amongst the closest of allies.

The performance and practice of the PRTs needs to be better co-ordinated

The performance and practice of PRTs needs to be better co-ordinated. At present each lead country tends to impose its approach on the area under its responsibility leading to wide variances in effect. At the very least a clearing house/lessons learned mechanism is required to promote best practice by comparing and contrasting techniques and strategies. Moreover, the issue of force rotation also needs to be addressed. One of the basic problems is the differing deployment times of personnel in each PRT. The US can reasonably claim to have the most effective PRTs in RC East and RC South because their personnel stay for up to 15 months and establish those all-important relationships upon which Afghan society functions. Some Coalition countries send personnel for as little as 4 months which puts pressure on people to get results and who consequently too often fail. Moreover, the constant rotation of personnel causes confusion amongst the Afghans.

Many more OMLTs, POMLTs and ETTs are needed urgently

There are currently some 23 Operational, Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) in Afghanistan. One senior ISAF commander said only 18 were active. ISAF would like 103 but at the very least 80 are needed. Senior ISAF commanders expect no more than 42-43 will be created. OMLTs and their police equivalent POMLTs are vital to the successful operational working up of ANA KANDAKs or battalions alongside the Embedded Training Teams (ETTs). The need for sufficient OMLTs/POMLTs ranks alongside the need for more forces and better deployment of ISAF and OEF forces in terms of importance. Moreover, some very basic steps need to be taken if both OMLTs and POMLTs are to function effectively. Recruitment of police is often the result of a local tribe sending a group to join so that road-blocks in the area can extort money in their favour. According to one senior Afghan parliamentarian the Taliban pay around $200 per month, whilst police pay is the equivalent of $70 per month. The author spoke with a police ‘officer’ in Zabul who was no older than 15 years of age. There is clearly a very long way before the ANP is a credible force and yet one senior ISAF commander states, “They had better be standing up by next spring”.

Use OMLTs/POMLTs to involve partner Muslim states

The creation of OMLTs and POMLTs could be an area in which moderate Islamic states from the wider region could contribute. The presence of such personnel in such a hands-on role could help to assuage the sense that the Coalition is overwhelmingly a non-Islamic presence. Certainly, it is highly unlikely that the requisite OMLTs are to be found amongst Coalition partners. Some new diplomatic initiative is therefore required to that end.



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ISAF needs to overcome excessive concerns about force protection away from the front-line where a presence is critical to stabilisation and reconstruction

The following commentary is undertaken advisedly as this author does not have to risk his life on a daily basis and saw the efforts of ISAF personnel to ensure adequate security for his person. However, there is some evidence travelling in Kabul that excessive sensitivity over force protection is gripping ISAF commanders in areas away from the front-lines. This is leading to the progressive withdrawal of ISAF from the daily lives of Afghans in important regions and cities where stabilisation and reconstruction are gaining traction. Such concerns over force protection are creating an impression of weakness, which is dangerous in itself in such a society. One senior Afghan said that the Afghans have a term which roughly translated means “self-imposed constraint” on the part of ISAF. Intelligence and private military contractors seem to be a factor in exaggerating the threat, particularly in Kabul. COM ISAF takes an understandable but very protective attitude towards ISAF forces on the street. However, professional soldiers are paid to take risk. It will not be possible to succeed in Afghanistan if the growing sense amongst the Afghan people of an ISAF too scared to engage with them continues to gather pace. ISAF needs to take more risks, particularly in Kabul. This is not just an issue of hearts and minds. Only through such engagement will improved human intelligence at local level be generated.

ISAF logistics need to be harmonised and centralised.

As an exercise in getting materiel into theatre the ISAF logistics system reflects very poorly on Alliance claims to have effective military interoperability as one of its enshrining military principles. Each country has in effect its own logistics stove-pipe back to its home base. Consequently, much waste, inefficiency and duplication of effort is apparent. In an ideal world there would be one logistics hub serving the needs of all coalition members. At the very least a far better system of sharing and transporting equipment, parts etc needs to be introduced between coalition partners. The CNAD Rapid Response Operational Support System (CRROSS) which was proposed in 2000 could be adapted to that end.

ISAF and US missions need to be even more closely co-ordinated.

Whilst ISAF and US Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces work very closely together it is evident in the south that the mission suite ISAF undertakes is becoming ever more similar to that of OEF. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are vital in Afghanistan because they are critical to opening up the security space into which stabilisation and reconstruction must eventually be inserted. Such forces are also vital for harassing and disrupting the command chain of the Taliban. Too that end coalition members need to increase the number of SOF and to ensure that there use is properly co-ordinated between ISAF and OEF commanders. Where possible other commands should be bought under the ISAF umbrella. For example, it is very hard to see why the US Combined Security Transformation Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is distinct from ISAF. Its stated role is to plan, programme and implement reform of the Afghan Police and



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defence sectors to develop a stable Afghanistan through the strengthening of the rule of law, and the defeat of terrorism. Such a role sits squarely with overarching security and reconstruction mission of ISAF. However, as one senior American commander said, “OEF is the American caveat”.

PRT project financing needs to be better co-ordinated

PRT project funding is generated from at least two sources. The commander of the US PRT in Zabul applies for funds either through ISAF or national money through the US command at Bagram. Given the many other sources of funding it is evident that whilst co-ordination is at a premium the reality on the ground is that much of the effort is duplicative and wasteful. Better spending and auditing would be promoted through one funding mechanism for such projects. The need to find synergies on the financing effort is becoming urgent. According to one senior Afghan “75% of development money is wasted on corruption, poor management and a lack of co-ordination within the international community”. PRT commanders, who over time should become civilian, need to be given more latitude to use funds as the failure to live up to promises is clearly damaging and too often commanders have their requests turned down. More funds should be made available for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

National legal variations over the use of force need to be progressively harmonised

Whilst the use of caveats to prevent the effective military use of NATO forces by COM ISAF is well-established the varying legal variations over the use of force further constrain military effectiveness. For example, the British insistence on the use of force only as a ‘proportionate’ response to attack is frankly inappropriate in an environment such as Helmand Province. Consequently, not only is military interoperability with coalition partners damaged, but British troops for all their fighting power, are too often forced onto the defensive putting them at undue risk and leading to the surrender of tactical superiority. Dutch forces cannot use the language of counter-insurgency (COIN) because for political and legal reasons it is not permitted. Such political correctness has no place on the battlefield in Afghanistan because it complicates the already difficult missions of Coalition forces.

COM ISAF must be permitted to make better use of military personnel

The fractured nature of ISAF reflects not only the varying and various national caveats. It is evident that the close involvement of new NATO members and partners has affected interoperability, particularly away from the front-line. The quality of international military English is so poor on the part of the forces of some members and partners as to make complex communications virtually impossible. Moreover, the insistence on the part of both members and partners to have officers assigned to HQ ISAF means that too many are carrying out the functions of experienced NCOs to far less effect. The knock-on effect has led to experienced specialist NCOs being re-assigned to general duties, such as escorting VIPs. Taken together the various constraints on the use of forces faced by COM ISAF, together with the forced use of inappropriate personnel, contributes to the



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highly inefficient and at times ineffective use of personnel. COM ISAF must be permitted to make better use of said personnel.

Insert Civilians into First Contact Missions

The author took part on a ‘Frequency and Reach Operation’ in the US PRT in ZabulProvince carried out from Forward Operating Base Lagman as part of a Civil Affairs Team in a US Army Ground Assault Team. This was the first civilian involvement in a First Contact Mission in the area which was aimed at the Pashtun village of Moradkhan-Kalay. The contact with the Afghan village elders revealed an important role for civilians. According to the US Army personnel leading the mission the presence of civilians “changed the dynamic” and thus helped foster a relaxed and constructive discussion with the village elders. This village had hitherto been regarded as a ‘difficult’ village. Moreover, whilst the performance of US Army personnel was outstanding civilian expertise might be better able to assess the immediate needs of such a village and better plan ahead for the requisite levels of support. Governance is central to mission success but the approach to governance needs to be far more systematic and co-ordinated than hitherto at the level of the international community. It might be useful to establish some form of Governance Reconstruction Team in Kabul.

Improving the Afghan Police, Army and Civil Service

The Coalition needs to invest more effort in creating a cadre of elite civil servants. Whilst much effort is being expended preparing the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Policy (ANP) much greater effort needs to be invested in an elite cadre of civil servants. To that end, the Kabul Military Training Centre needs to be balanced with the creation of a new Kabul Senior Civil Servants College. Such an approach would reinforce the efforts of President Karzai to centralise the core administration of the Afghan Government which will be essential if a new strategic campaign plan is to generate traction within the country.

Training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) must be harmonised.

Canadian personnel training the Afghan National Army Brigade in Kandahar complained about the overly ‘theoretical’ nature of the training of the ANA at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KTMC). Indeed, some tension was apparent between CSTC-A and the KMTC and the Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) working directly with the ANA to prepare them for operations. ETT personnel said they spent much time correcting what they regard as errors in the training in Kabul. Moreover, whilst officers are being trained in French doctrine, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) are being trained in American doctrine. Such a lack of basic harmonisation is leading to confusion reinforced by the tendency of the Afghan officers to not properly use NCOs due to issues of status. If the ANA is to be a functioning force by end 2009 such basic training irregularities need to be resolved. Moreover, concern was expressed in Kandahar that the American-led training in Kabul by CSTC-A are “simply ticking off boxes and are not focussed on quality”.



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Greater thought needs to be given to interoperability within the ANA

The ANA as currently configured seems to lack effective interoperability either between ANA formations or with coalition forces. Moreover, interoperability with the police is virtually non-existent reinforced by a lack of respect for the police that is evident in the ANA. This could lead to a dangerous level of ad hoccery on operations that would undermine the credible ability of the ANA to backfill Coalition forces particularly in the south. The lack of basic interoperability is reinforced by a lack of technological superiority (as well as little tactical superiority) over the enemy. The use of 30 year old AK-47s and RPGs clearly affords the ANA no technological superiority over the Taliban. Moreover, current CSCT-A planning states, “Current force levels do not yet have combat enablers, making them reliant upon US and Coalition forces”. It is evidence of the very basic quality of the ANA that they are as yet seemingly unable to handle more advanced systems. For example, there appears to little or no training in the use of indirect fire or map training and yet all 14 brigades of the ANA are meant to be ready for operations by end 2009. One senior Canadian NCO was very concerned about support elements and made the following statement, “The supply system is a complete failure”.

Priority should be given to the fighting power of the Commando Kandaks

It is proposed that the Commando force will be some 4552 strong. So-called Commando Kandaks are designed to be elite light infantry forces modelled after the US Rangers and devoted to high-end counter-insurgency operations. Commando Kandaks will be the core of the credible fighting power of the ANA and must receive priority treatment.

The report concludes with a statement made by the Head of an NGO in Kandahar who has no great love for the military, “The Taliban are taking ground, it is vital to increase combat power. This is not the time to reduce combat power”.

Julian Lindley-French,November 2007



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Appendix One: Coalescing a Counterinsurgency Strategy



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Appendix Two: Afghanistan Compact – Implicit Strategy Depiction



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Appendix Three: The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

Appendix Four: Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region



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Appendix Five: List of Formal Engagements (by order of appointment)



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16 October, 2007: Brussels

NATO HQ, Brussels J. Apparatchai, NATO SpokesmanNATO HQ, Brussels J. Shea, Assistant Secretary-General, Policy and Planning

18 October, 2007: Kabul

Major-General A. Twomey (US), Deputy Commander, CSTC-AMr Chris Alexander, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)His Excellency, Minister H. Malkat, Minister of the Interior, Government of the Islamic Republic of AfghanistanMr R. Harmsma (NL), Special Political Adviser to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (NATO SCR)General D. McNeil (US), Officer Commanding, ISAFBrigadier R. Anderson (US), Deputy Commander, Regional Command East

19 October, 2007: Regional Command South, Kandahar

Brig-General Marquis Hainse (Can), Deputy Commander, RC SouthCol I. Richardson (UK), Staff, RC SouthMs S. Chayes (US), Head of “Arghand Soap”, a local NGO in KandaharCol J. Frohling (NL) Chief of Staff, RC SouthMr N. Williams (UK), Political Advisor, Commander, RC South

20 October, 2007: FOB Lagman, Qalat, Zabul Province

Lt Col. J. A. Bramble, Officer Commanding, FOB Lagman, Qalat, Zabul Province

21 October, 2007: Regional Command South, Kandahar

Major Villaincourt & Captain Carbon (Can), 22 Regiment, Canadian OMLTBrigadier-General G. Salem, Garrison Commander, Afghan National Army, KandaharColonel A. H. Tarim, Deputy Commander, Afghan National Army, KandaharMr Jawed Jan Azimi, Interpreter, Kandahar

22 October, 2007: HQ ISAF, Kabul

Mr D. Hillal, Member of Parliament for BagramMr D. Sultanzoy, Member of Parliament and Member of the Committee on National Economy, Agriculture, Rural Development and Non-Governmental OrganisationsThe Management Team of Tolo TVMr F. Vendrell, Special Representative of the European Union to AfghanistanSenior members of the Afghan Government’s National Communications Co-ordination Centre (NC3)Maj-Gen G. Robison (UK), DCOM Stabilisation



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General D. McNeil (US), Officer Commanding, ISAFHis Excellency, Minister A. K. Khurram, Minister of Information and Culture, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

23 October, 2007: Islamabad, Pakistan

Mr A. Evans (UK), British High CommissionMr N. Coghlan (Can), Canadian High Commission

24 October, 2007: Islamabad, Pakistan

Dr S. M. Masari (and team), Institute for Strategic Studies, IslamabadChief of Staff of the Army of Pakistan. Joint Staff Headquarters, PindiBrigadier B. Ahmad (and team), Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.UNHCR, Islamabad, Pakistan

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