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7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207

8. Title (Include Security Classification): THE MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP:

ENDURING CRITICAL ASPECTS FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER (UNCLASSIFIED)

9. Personal Authors: LCDR Carl R. Cherry, USN

10.Type of Report: FINAL 11. Date of Report: 04 FEB 2002

12.Page Count : 28 12A Paper Advisor (if any): CDR Eric J. Dahl, USN

13.Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. Ten key words that relate to your paper:

media, press, news, military, Information Age, Vietnam, PA, IO, CNN Effect, education

15.Abstract:Even in the Information Age, there are critical enduring aspects of the media-

military relationship. Mutual trust, knowing each other’s mission, and understandingthe impact of the modern media on operations are three aspects which today’soperational commander should better understand.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGENewport, RI

THE MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: ENDURING CRITICAL ASPECTS FORTHE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

by

Carl R. CherryLieutenant Commander, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of therequirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed bythe Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: __________________________

4 February 2002

__________________________

Commander Erik J. Dahl, USN Instructor, JMO Department

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Report Date 04 Feb 2002

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Title and Subtitle The Media-Military Relationship: Enduring CriticalAspects for the Operational Commander

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Supplementary Notes

Abstract Even in the Information Age, there are critical enduring aspects of the media-military relationship. Mutualtrust, knowing each others mission, and understanding the impact of the modern media on operations arethree aspects which todays operational commander should better understand.

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ii

ABSTRACT

Even in the Information Age, there are critical enduring aspects of the media-military

relationship. Mutual trust, knowing each other’s mission, and understanding the impact of

the modern media on operations are three aspects which today’s operational commander

should better understand.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE..................................................................................... i

ABSTRACT....................................................................................... ii

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................. 1

MUTUAL TRUST: ON AGAIN, OFF AGAIN..........................…. 2

The Watershed ……………………………………... 3

The Latest Turn …………………………………….. 6

UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER’S MISSION ......................… 7

Is This Off the Record? ……………………………. 8

I Was Hoping to Interview a Tomahawk Pilot…….. 9

THE IMPACT ON OPERATIONS AND DECISION-MAKING.... 11

Info Overload ………………………………………. 12

Wolf Blitzer Said To Nuke ‘Em, General ………...... 13

CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 15

RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................... 16

NOTES................................................................................................. 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................ 22

1

They’re not Americans. They’re just journalists.1

Colonel George M. Connell, USMC

INTRODUCTION

Mention the media to an American operational commander and he is likely to

grimace and change the subject. A similar response is likely if the military is mentioned to a

media veteran. Although the awkward media-military relationship of today is nothing new,

the unfolding Information Age exacerbates the issue. The ease and speed of technology give

an air of immediacy to the news that seems revolutionary; it appears on the surface to have

changed the rules of engagement -- to the apparent disadvantage of the military. However,

some fundamental factors of a successful media-military relationship have altered little

through the nation’s history -- even with the coming of the Information Age.

A healthy media-military relationship is just as important in the Information Age as it

ever was -- and some would argue more so. Nevertheless, U.S. operational commanders can

do a better job in understanding the aspects of this relationship that have remained consistent

over time. This paper analyzes three of the most critical: maintaining mutual trust; having a

shared comprehension of each other’s mission; and thoroughly understanding the modern

media's potential impact on operations. In addition, this paper argues that 24-hour news

programs, instant reporting and other elements that make up the Information Age have not

dramatically altered any of these aspects. While technological advances such as satellite

communications and the Internet have in some cases increased or altered the media’s role,

the three critical aspects analyzed herein have been relatively constant since at least the mid-

19th century.

2

Success on today’s battlefield requires a thorough understanding of the news media.

If nurtured over time, healthy relations help win wars. Even so, a contemporary commander

is likely to misunderstand and distrust -- or at least be overly wary of -- the media. How is it

that such a potentially positive tool available to the commander is so often viewed with a

jaundiced eye?

MUTUAL TRUST: ON AGAIN, OFF AGAIN

Publicity must be accepted by our captains, generals, and men-at-arms, asthe necessary condition of any grand operation of war: and the endeavourto destroy the evil will only give it fresh vigour, and develop its powers ofmischief. 2

William Russell, Crimean War correspondent, 1854

The first vital aspect of the relationship is mutual trust. It seems like a simple

concept, yet history shows how complicated it can be. The American military’s first

experience with rapid news reporting foreshadowed what the future had in store. At the first

battle of Bull Run, the telegraph provided Lincoln with rapid feedback -- albeit with a

reporter's slant. Although the reporting was timely, it was also characterized as being rarely

objective.3 Grant and Sherman would later complain that because of the telegraph, Lincoln

often knew about battlefield specifics before they did. Thus the seeds of uneasiness were

planted in the military’s mind; an entity that might garner information superiority in the field

was to be looked on with suspicion. Today’s satellite communications do not introduce new

phenomena; they simply accelerate Grant’s and Sherman’s concerns.

World War II produced a high degree of media-military trust and is noteworthy for

some of the media precedents it set. First, unlike any U.S. conflict since, it was a total war.

Wars for the national survival put all citizens on a more equal footing; it makes mutual trust

between combatant and reporter a fairly common commodity. Naturally, the press is not

3

nearly as likely to compromise secrets or endanger troops just to “get the scoop.”

Additionally, World War II saw widespread use of censorship -- an accepted practice that

would become a problem in future limited conflicts.

The Watershed

Any trust or camaraderie that developed between the media and the military before

the Vietnam War quickly vaporized during that conflict. It is, by most accounts, the

watershed event in modern U.S. media-military relations. Unique aspects of the war -- its

limited nature, multi-layered aspects, duration, political and military leadership, and

inexperienced reporters -- all combined to scar the relationship. Incompetence and deception

on the military side met sensationalism and biased reporting from the media.

The war also introduced a new element for American commanders to deal with in the

battle for public support. It was something that hadn’t been seen since the Spanish-American

War: reporters on the ground in the enemy’s capital. As Tom Sharpe puts it:

The North Vietnamese [were] blessed with a weapon that no military deviceknown to America could ever get a lock on. As if by magic . . . in Hanoi . . .appears . . . Harrison Salisbury writing in the New York Times about theatrocious American bombing of the hard scrabble folks of North Vietnam inthe Iron Triangle.4

This phenomenon is now commonplace, with the press often warmly invited into the

adversary’s camp. It’s certainly something that should not take today’s commander by

surprise. Unfortunately, this doesn’t contribute to earning a commander’s trust, as one may

wonder about a reporter’s motivation for such extreme objectivity -- much less his patriotism.

Chief news anchor for Cable News Network, Bernard Shaw, raised potential ethical

questions during a media-military roundtable “ . . . when he implied the existence of an extra-

national obligation for journalists.”5

4

In Vietnam, military and political leaders also felt the sting of the latest media

gadget -- the television. The American public had the sights and sounds of battle beamed

into their living rooms. Damning reports through TV’s narrow telescope didn’t coincide with

official statements, and commanders were compelled to “spin” the war in the opposite

direction. Eventually, unfiltered reports were seen as threatening. But it didn’t have to be

that way. Martin van Creveld writes, “Probably none of this...would have happened had not

the normal channels of military information been deficient to begin with.”6

Whether the media is partly responsible for U.S. misfortune in Vietnam, one fact

appears evident: the Vietnam War formed the foundation for today’s senior leadership

attitude about the media. And today’s senior commander or policy maker has an editor

counterpart of similar age and experience with respect to that war. It will take the passing of

Vietnam-era leaders for this chapter to finally close; until then, Vietnam will continue to be

the war that won’t go away. Even then, the distrust may very well pervade:

It remains probable the senior officers, as a group the most adamant about theadverse effect of Vietnam media coverage, passed the virus of mistrust on totheir successors, and they will, in turn, pass it on to their successors, and soon, so that acceptance of the conviction becomes, in effect, a right of passage,a badge of membership in the fraternity. 7

Media-military trust improved somewhat after Vietnam, although not without some

interesting learning points along the way. America’s experience in Southeast Asia, combined

with the British experience in the Falklands, led the Reagan administration to deny outright

media coverage during the initial phases of the 1993 Grenada invasion. The press reacted

with outrage, demanding a review of media policies within the Department of Defense. That

5

conflagration led to the Sidle Report* and the implementation of press pools for the 1989

Panama invasion and the Gulf War.

This resulting sanitization of press coverage disturbed the media. Moreover, pools

severely limited the development of relationships between reporters and troops on the ground

or at sea. Using the press for disinformation also didn’t help. For instance, “...military

officials fed news-hungry journalists false information about how (the ground war) would be

carried out.”8 After the war, the press felt deceived by the amount of control, as well as by

what they saw as outright manipulation. Percentages of overall bombing accuracy, for

instance, were given for guided munitions -- yet the vast majority of bombs dropped were the

dumb variety. This highlights something that today’s commander must consider in

maintaining the trust of the media as well as the public: “The most common form of media

manipulation is suppression by omission.”9 The commander must realize that partial truths --

let alone outright lies -- can be seen as deception; and any sense of deception is deadly to this

relationship.

While today’s wary commander may wish to return to the days of Ernie Pyle,

modern-day limited wars with virtually unlimited media access make censorship not only

difficult but also undesirable in the Information Age. It certainly inhibits the development of

trust. Though there will always be some concern about the maverick reporter looking for an

edge, or the uninformed TV crew broadcasting scenes which they don’t know are harmful to

security, recent cases highlight that censorship is simply not required if the media is taken

onboard early. Writing on the legal aspects of censorship, Aukofer and Lawrence sum up the

current feeling: “With the advance of new technology, such as satellite telephones, most

* In 1984, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Vessey, in response to the media outcry overGrenada, convened a panel headed by General Winant Sidle. The formation of press pools during military

6

military as well as news-organization leaders have become convinced that battlefield

censorship is no longer practical or even desirable.”10

The Latest Turn

Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the trust pendulum

appears to have swung to the opposite side from where it was in the 1960s and after Desert

Storm. While the war on terrorism is not total war, the homeland attacks have had a

unifying effect between the military and the reporters on scene. The patriotic fervor has

undoubtedly influenced media coverage of the war; negative reporting is not going to sell

papers, at least not in the early phases of this conflict. Reporters appear content with limited

access, trusting the commanders and their representatives as they give daily briefings.

The military and its political leadership, for their part, seem less inclined to show a

sanitary, Desert Storm-like war and openly admit that the struggle will be a long one. The

result has been a temporary role-reversal. According to the open-source intelligence journal

Strategic Forecasting, “The military’s public affairs officers, normally cheerleaders, have

taken the role of scolding nannies, reminding the media that the war is going to be long and

hard; the media has taken the role of cheerleader, creating a picture of a war filled with

stunning and replicable victories.”11 As time passes, however, the pendulum will likely

swing the other way. The press historically is easily led in the opening days of a conflict; but

as shown in Vietnam, prolonged conflicts usually result in fissures developing. Leadership

ends up straining to explain to an impatient audience why the war continues; mistrust

develops on both sides.

Posing possible problems in the future, Information Operations (IO) and Information

Warfare (IW) are perhaps the most dangerous areas with respect to maintaining mutual trust.

operations -- controlled by the Department of Defense and the services -- was the enduring result.

7

While media deception might be employed during a total war, any shading of the truth in a

limited conflict for the purpose of operational advantage is likely to do more harm than good

-- as noted in Desert Storm. That the PA Officer is not an overt IW tool is lost on many

senior war fighters. During a war game at a previous command, the PA Officer at the Naval

War College was surprised when she was asked by several senior officers to lie to the media

for operational deception; they were equally surprised when she refused.12

The military’s need for secrecy and public support will always conflict with the

media’s need to tell its story and sell newspapers. Mutual trust will never come easily. At

one extreme, a government advisor proposes to “tell them nothing till it’s over and then I’d

tell them who won.”13 Meanwhile, the liberal Village Voice decries that, with respect to the

war on terrorism, “we’ll find out in five years what the real truth is.”14 A reasonable balance

between the two extremes will be naturally stressful. And while the nature of the conflict

plays a part in the trust factor, the relationship can still be productive. “Reciprocity will be

the motive for cooperation on all sides.”15

UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER’S MISSION

The essence of successful warfare is secrecy;the essence of successful journalism is publicity. 16

Preface to the British Ministry of Defense’s instructions to Task Force-bound correspondents.

The second critical aspect of a successful media-military relationship is an

understanding of each other’s missions and, more generally, professions. At first glance, the

professional journalist and the military professional appear to have very little in common.

Military men and women are formally indoctrinated into a separate culture, take oaths, and

live by rules and regulations. Winning wars is mission number one. Journalists, on the other

8

hand, “have no written ethical code or mandated list of qualifications for members (and are

made up of) reporters, editors and business managers who have two missions: objective

news reporting and profit making.”17 William Kennedy sums up the professions as one of

“patriotism” versus one of “skepticism.”18 Educating the military about the media - and vice

versa - seems of paramount importance in today’s world of 24-hour news. Yet it’s simply

not seen with any regularity.

Is This Off the Record?

The majority of officers -- even mid-grade careerists -- receive very little training

about the media; they simply have no clue on how to address them. This observation is

based in part on the author’s experience. National news correspondents have approached this

author on three occasions during his fourteen years in the Navy. All three times were

immediately after flying combat missions over the Balkans. Although obviously operating at

the tactical level, the reporters seemed very interested in what the author had to say about the

operation in general. The first interview consisted of, “No comment.” The next two were

somewhat more productive. However, upbringing had taught him that the press offered

nothing to gain -- only something to lose. The main thing that kept running through his mind

was don’t say anything that’s classified or politically incorrect.

The danger with an uneducated force is that senior commanders will still be hoping to

say “no comment” when that is no longer an option. The occasional war game or “media

day” experience is good, yet training is lacking in the junior ranks. Naval line officers who

have the collateral duty of being their ship or squadron PA (Public Affairs) Officer receive

no training whatsoever. As a former Army PA says, “What we fail to teach people in

uniform in their earliest days is that they have a responsibility to participate in the process.”19

9

The one group within the military that should understand the media is the full-time

Public Affairs Officer. Most PAs are highly qualified, motivated people -- yet they are

stretched thin. Moreover, coordination with IO planners is often less than ideal. For

example, IO planners were not co-located with other operational planners during Operation

Allied Force. The result was an uncoordinated effort. Additionally, joint planning

publications don’t place media planning high on the priority list. PA and media issues at the

theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and Joint Task Force (JTF) level are listed in very brief,

broad terms in joint publications such as JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures.

Moreover, media affairs are not addressed at all until Phase II of crisis action planning.

Unfortunately, some of the problems with maintaining a healthy media relationship

are self-inflicted by the commander. A recent head of public affairs for the Air Force admits

that much of the current lack of openness within the military comes largely from the PAs

themselves. “ . . . It’s the PAs who get berated when something is misquoted. They

sometimes get beat . . .by their commanders, so they have this reticence to be open and

honest.”20 With or without a strong background in media affairs, subordinates are impacted

by a commander’s personality and his attitude toward the press. As senior editor Peter

Braestrup notes, General Boomer made great strides with his Marines’ relationship with the

press during the Gulf War. However, he adds, “You can train the hell out of the [junior

ranks] but the military-media relationship falls apart if you get a Schwarzkopf out there.”21

I was Hoping to Interview a Tomahawk Pilot

While most Service members have little knowledge of the press, the media’s

knowledge void of modern military operations -- and foreign affairs in general -- is perhaps

even more problematic. Traditional news organizations are cutting costs to compete with

10

Internet media. They are closing foreign bureaus. They are “sending parachutists abroad

with no knowledge of local customs or even national trends.”22 The media plays to an

audience with a short attention span, and little military or foreign affairs knowledge itself.

Adding to the problem, reporters know that positive reporting on the military isn’t really

what their editors want. Even experienced reporters are apt to accentuate the negative. Fred

Reed, a successful freelancer, asserts that he can easily sell articles criticizing the military,

but that a piece praising anything the Services do is nearly impossible to peddle.23 Combine

speed of communication, a reporter lacking local knowledge, and the fog of war, and all the

ingredients are in place for a frustrating media-military relationship.

Indoctrinating young reporters in the ways of the military in order to avoid ignorance

and distrust during crises has been broached in the past.* The problem with most plans is

cost and fairness. Only the largest news organizations can send reporters to military

exercises; it’s unlikely the Providence Journal could let go of a reporter for a few weeks of

training as easily as the Washington Post could. Moreover, such peacetime training is

unlikely due to the lack of newsworthiness of training exercises. Problems, therefore, persist.

“ . . .The largest single gap in current defense reporting (is) coverage of the major U.S. and

allied military commands. Since no thought would ever be given to diverting resources from

the sports department, (it) is beyond the economic resources of any one major regional or

national journalistic institution.”24 Thus, the pool system, activated during times of crisis,

continues in its varied forms.

Finally, if reporters are allowed to integrate into military units, a mutual

understanding typically develops that helps cut through the differences in professional

11

upbringing. Reporters learn first-hand the huge responsibilities of all involved -- from the

commander down to the front-line soldier. Likewise, Service members see how both

themselves and the reporter “want a front-row seat on the action.”25 Perhaps media and

military professionals have more in common than they realize. In defending the media’s role

in war coverage, Clem Lloyd notes the common traits between the media and military

professional: “ . . . initiative, forward planning mixed with flexibility (and) unsocial

hours . . .”26 to name a few. After spending over seven months on an aircraft carrier, veteran

Washington Post reporter George Wilson comments on the experience: “There’s this kind of

popular conception that the military and the press are direct opposites. But in the field, they

get to realize how much alike they are.”27

THE IMPACT ON OPERATIONS AND DECISION-MAKING

The media’s impact on military operations and a commander’s decision-making

process is the third critical aspect. It has been enduring; as this paper shows, the media has

been affecting operations and commanders at least since the advent of the telegraph over 150

years ago. Yet the speed at which the modern, 24/7 media operate makes this aspect not

only enduring, but also growing in importance. The media now have the ability to impact

military operations at all levels, to contribute greatly to information overload, and, when

allowed, compress the decision cycle for civilian policy makers. The media have both helped

and hindered the intelligence and IO effort. Perhaps more so than military technology, the

media can, for better or worse, shorten the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop for the

operational commander.

* Several media experts suggest the creation of an independently funded media-military training program. SeeAukofer and Lawrence for their proposal of the Independent Coverage Tier Concept.

12

Info Overload

In Command in War, Martin van Crevald describes what he calls “information

pathology” and the tendency, starting in Vietnam, to over-saturate military leaders with data.

“. . . While up-to-date technical means of communication and data processing are absolutely

vital . . . they will not in themselves suffice for the creation of a functioning command

system, and that they may . . . constitute part of the disease they are supposed to cure.”28 The

ever-increasing challenge to obtain useable information from a sea of data is amplified when

the media is injected into the equation. As open source intelligence is an element of modern

operations, the flood of media information can’t be ignored.

As command and control systems have become more robust, so have the commercial

systems that the media use. Any monopoly on information technology that the military

might have once had is waning. This has emboldened some reporters to be more self-reliant.

While many senior commanders aren’t comfortable with high-tech, journalists embrace

technology, thinking it will “free them from the military’s control over transportation and

dissemination of their copy.”29 According to Peter Arnett of CNN,

“[Policy makers] can talk tough, but time is on our side and technology is on our side.”30

With technological advances in news coverage typically comes a reevaluation of

current policies. It’s vital that today’s commander keep abreast of this evolutionary process.

New technologies or techniques prompt a review of combat reporting guidelines. ∗

Newsreels and live radio from World War II inspired censorship; television in Vietnam

brought media exclusion in Grenada; and satellite communications helped bring about the

pool system of today. The Information Age will perpetuate this cycle.

13

Wolf Blitzer Said To Nuke ‘Em, General

The media’s effect on political and military decision-making became a common topic

in the 1990s. With the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. foreign policy was in a state of flux.

Additionally, technology made worldwide reporting easier and, arguably, more dynamic.

The result of these two factors was the perception that the media was having a large impact

on U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy. This phenomenon -- the so-called “CNN Effect” --

has three aspects upon which most experts agree: it influences agendas; it impedes

operations (e.g. threatens security); and it accelerates (shortens) decision-making response

time.31 Assuming “agendas” are set primarily by civilian policy makers, impeding operations

and shortening response times are most applicable to the operational commander; these are

addressed in turn.

The modern media have always had the capacity to hinder operations. The

differences today are that it can be done in real time and by almost anyone. This is perhaps

the one aspect of the media-military relationship that the Information Age has indeed

markedly influenced. An individual with a satellite telephone can be a “reporter.” This

growing independence will require increased awareness on the commander’s part. Although

it’s unlikely a credentialed reporter would purposefully sabotage a mission, the possibility for

inadvertent disclosure is real. During the Gulf War, for instance, an American television

network disclosed the precise location of the 82nd Airborne Division during its westward

maneuver through Iraq.

The media has increasingly shortened the response time for both policy makers and

military leaders at all levels. Operational commanders need to understand that orders coming

∗ Sociologist W. F. Ogburn’s theory of “cultural lag” applies to this aspect of the relationship: “A cultural lagoccurs when one of two parts of a culture which are correlated changes before or in greater degree than the

14

down from above may be directly tied to this phenomenon. “Time for reaction is

compressed. Analysis and intelligence gathering is out.”32 While commanders may bemoan

this accelerant aspect of the media, it’s important to realize that it works both ways. One of

President Bush’s advisors during Desert Storm had a realistic outlook: “We felt we could

manage public opinion in this country and that we could manage the alliance . . . as well as

get to the Iraqi people and the Arab world.”33

Although the CNN Effect was the subject of much debate in the early 1990s, some

now see it as on the decline in its impact on policy makers and the military. James Hoge, the

editor of Foreign Affairs, thinks it has largely played out its hand:

It seems to me that about (1995) we reached the high water mark.Today, . . . television news has a tactical effect from time to time, butnot a strategic one; that it operates more when humanitarian issues areat hand than when actual security issues are.34

One element of the CNN Effect that’s rarely addressed is how personality dependent

it is. In the end, political leaders are responsible for policy that impacts the military -- not the

media. Though some leaders are more influenced than others, it’s unwise for commanders to

blame the media for decisions made at any level. Influence seems to vary, much like the

influence of the Information Age in general. Navy Captain Robert Rubel sums it up well:

“Abraham Lincoln tried to micromanage the Union Army with the telegraph...while George

Bush left his coalition commander in a guidance vacuum during cease-fire talks after Desert

Storm despite the availability of telephones and fax machines.”35

Finally, there are two dangers of knowing the impact of the media on operations and

planning accordingly. First, while embracing the potentially positive effect of today’s media,

today’s commander should be cautioned not to pay too much attention to winning the war of

other part does, thereby causing less adjustment between the two parts than existed before.”

15

public support to the detriment of the larger war effort. “Media technology provides new

weapons to be exploited, particularly on the battlefield of public opinion, but they are of little

use if the war is lost in the combat zone. For all the magic of new media technology, it is

better to win the war even if you lose the press.”36

The second danger is the temptation to pursue an operation based on anticipated

positive play in the press. Just the perception of operations conducted primarily for headlines

will lose the faith of subordinates. The botched special operations raid of a Taliban-held

airbase early in the war on terrorism -- filmed by military cameramen and quickly edited and

released to the media -- highlights the danger:

There was . . . disdain among Delta Force soldiers . . . for what they saw as thestaged nature of the assault...which had produced such exciting televisionfootage. “It was sexy stuff, and it looked good,” one general said. (Said aparticipant), “Why would you film it? I’m a big fan of keeping thingssecret -- and this was being driven by public opinion.”37

CONCLUSION

It is vital for the operational commander to understand better the media-military

relationship -- both its history and where it’s heading. This paper has addressed three

enduring critical aspects of the media-military relationship. Today’s commander should

grasp how these aspects are impacted from both sides of the relationship -- and how

operations may be helped or hindered as a result. The aspects addressed have not changed

significantly, even with the advent of the Information Age.

Mutual trust remains a tenuous commodity. Though the commander can do things to

help, the nature of the two professions will always make trust the most fragile aspect of the

relationship. Misperceptions and ignorance of each other’s missions hinder the development

of a consistent, productive relationship. Lastly, though an omnipresent media has meant a

16

larger presence in military operations, the fundamentals of sound leadership and decision

making remain constant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are several things the Services and operational commanders can do that would

better the chances for success in media relations. First, in all endeavors, education is the key

to eliminating ignorance, fear, and prejudice. The Services must do a better job in teaching

military members at all pay grades how to address the media. It should start with accession

programs and continue as a bona-fide part of General Military Training (GMT). This is

especially important in the junior ranks, as the new generation of leaders needs to break the

negative influence of the Vietnam generation. Additionally, with limited, high visibility

conflicts now almost routine, a single event on the tactical level may have tremendous

repercussions on the operational and even strategic levels. Actions that were once lost as just

part of a larger operation are now worthy of headlines. Junior members should therefore

know how to handle the press when approached after a high-visibility mission.

Encouraging the press to participate in operational exercises is another thing the

commander can do to educate both his subordinates and the media. High turnover rates in

both the media and the military mean little institutional memory exists in either staffs or

press pools. If the press is reluctant to participate due to cost, perhaps the commander should

finance their participation. This would certainly pay for itself when those same reporters

were tasked with covering real-world operations. Get the media in the trenches before

hostilities and they’ll have a better appreciation for the military mission.

17

Another area for improvement is in joint doctrine and how it addresses planning.

How an operation will play in the press should be addressed from the outset. If crisis action

planning has commenced, it’s likely the media is aware of the crisis as well. Phase I of a

crisis action plan should include laying the foundation for media relations. Additionally,

Commanders should not lump all IO into another hopper outside the mainstream planning as

was done in the Kosovo campaign. The method used to disseminate PA information is

established in operational planning -- typically as Annex F. Unfortunately, some media

professionals interpret that as proof that media affairs is not a priority for the military. Says

Pete Williams, “If you look at how the planning process works, it’s an annex to the plan.”38

One thing that is reflected in joint doctrine, but risks being disregarded by senior

planners, is the relationship between IO and PA. IO, by joint doctrine, cannot target

domestic audiences. Therefore, PA is the principal tool for liaison with the media.39

Moreover, insisting upon truthfulness from the PA -- within the limits of operational security

-- is mandatory.

Promoting the careers of competent PA officers should be in the scan of an

operational commander. PAs, like most support officers, are often considered second-class

citizens because most lack a warfare designator or rating. Yet as modern media relations

appear to be as important as any one of the principles of war, the commander should realize

the importance of keeping good people in the profession. “Until the PAO is important on the

general’s staff . . . you’re not going to get the best and brightest into public affairs.”40

Finally, there is some excellent general guidance in current doctrine. Regardless of

the commander’s opinion of the media, he is reminded of his responsibility to the press:

“The news media are the principal means of communicating information about the military to

18

the general public, and military journalists are the principal source of communication with

military personnel, civilian employees, and family members. It is important that commanders

recognize this fact.”41

19

NOTES

1 George M. Connell, quoted in William V. Kennedy, The Military and the Media:Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 24.

2 William Russell, quoted in Miles Hudson and John Stanier, War and the Media.(New York: New York University Press, 1998), 17.

3 Charles C. Moskos and Thomas E. Ricks, Reporting War When There Is No War.(Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996), 15.

4 Tom Sharpe, quoted in Hudson and Stanier, 110.

5 Terrence M. Fox, “The Media and the Military: An Explanatory Theory of theEvolution of the Guidelines for Coverage of Conflict,” (Unpublished Research Paper, TheFlorida State University College of Communication, Tallahassee, FL: 1995), 147.

6 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1988), 258

7 Fox, 134.

8 Everette E. Dennis and others, The Media at War: The Press and the Persian GulfConflict. (New York: Gannett, 1991), 20.

9 Michael Parenti, “Methods of Media Manipulation,” MEDIAFile, Volume 17 #5,<http://www.media-alliance.org/ mediafile/17-5/manipulation.html>, [5 December 2001].

10 Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence. America’s Team; The Odd Couple -- AReport on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military. (Nashville, TN: TheFreedom Forum First Amendment Center,1995), 49.

11 “Media and War, Appearance and Reality,” Strategic Forecasting,January 15 2002, http://www.stratfor.com/home/0201151930a.htm, [16 January 2002].

12 Susan Haeg, CDR, USN, Public Affairs Officer, Naval War College, Newport, RI,interview by author, 14 December 2001, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

13 Phillip Knightly, “In Wartime, Government Considers Media a Menace,” ThePublic i, October 31 2001, <http://www.publici.org/commentary_01_103101.htm>,[14 December 2001].

14 Rick Perlstein, “The Media Muzzled,” The Village Voice, December 12, 2001,<http://www.villagevoice.com/ issues/0150/perlstein.php>, [1 January 2002].

20

15 Moskos and Ricks, 40.

16 D. Mercer and others, The Fog of War: The Media on the Battlefield. (London:Heinemann, 1987), 3.

17 Barry E. Willey, “The Military-Media Connection: For Better or for Worse”,Military Review, February 1999: 14.

18 Kennedy, 13.

19 Bill Smullen, quoted in Aukofer and Lawrence, 167.

20 Ronald T. Sconyers, quoted in Aukofer and Lawrence, 64.

21 Peter Braestrup, quoted in Aukofer and Lawrence, 100.

22 Johanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War. (New York: St. Martin’s Press,1995), 272.

23 Fred Reed quoted in Kennedy, 14.

24 Kennedy, 150.

25 George Wilson, quoted in Aukofer and Lawrence, 85.

26 Clem Lloyd, “The Case for the Media”, in Peter R. Young, ed., Defense and theMedia in Time of Limited War (Portland, OR: Frank Bass, 1992), 63.

27 George Wilson, quoted in Aukofer and Lawrence, 85.

28 Van Crevald, 259.

29 Neuman, 263.

30 Peter Arnett, quoted in Neuman, 263.

31 Stephen Livingston, Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media EffectsAccording to Type of Military Intervention, Research Paper R-18 (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1997), 2.

32 Margaret Tutwiler, quoted in Livingston, 3.

33 Richard Haass, quoted in Livingston, 3.

34 James Hoge, Jr., quoted in Livingston, 2.

21

35 Robert C. Rubel, “Principles of Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly, 27 (Winter

2000-01): 49.

36 Neuman, 274.

37 Seymour M. Hersh, “Escape and Evasion -- What happened when the SpecialForces landed in Afghanistan?,” The New Yorker, (12 November 2001): 50.

38 Pete Williams, quoted in Aukofer and Lawrence, 170.

39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Pub 3-13,(Washington, D.C.: 1998), I-13.

40 William Mulvey, quoted in Aukofer and Lawrence, 135.

41 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations,Joint Pub 3-61, (Washington, D.C.: 1998), vi.

22

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Aukofer, Frank and William P. Lawrence. America’s Team; The Odd Couple -- A Report onthe Relationship Between the Media and the Military. Nashville, TN: The FreedomForum First Amendment Center, 1995.

Barney, Ralph D and John C. Merrill, eds. Ethics and the Press. New York:Hastings House, 1975.

Brennan, Joseph G. Foundations of Moral Obligation. Newport, RI:Naval War College Press , 1992.

Carruthers, Susan L. The Media at War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.

Clark, Wesley K. Waging Modern War. New York: Public Affairs, 2001.

Crossen, Cynthia. The Manipulation of Fact in America . New York: Simon and Schuster,1994.

Dennis, Everette E. and others. The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict. New York: Gannett, 1991.

Hudson, Miles and John Stanier. War and the Media. New York:New York University Press, 1998.

Kennedy, William V. The Military and the Media. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993

Leonhard, Robert R. The Principles of War for the Information Age. Novato, CA: PresidioPress, 1998.

Livingston, Stephen. Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media EffectsAccording to Type of Military Intervention. Research Paper R-18. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1997.

Mercer, D., G. Mungham, and K. Williams. The Fog of War: The Media on the Battlefield.London: Heinemann, 1987.

Moskos, Charles C. and Thomas E. Ricks, Reporting War When There Is No War. Chicago:Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996.

Neuman, Johanna. Lights, Camera, War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

23

Van Crevald, Martin. Command in War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Young, Peter R., ed. Defense and the Media in Time of Limited War. Portland, OR:Frank Bass, 1992.

Periodicals and Articles

Baker, Brent. “Desert Shield/Storm: The War of Words and Images.”Naval War College Review, 44 (Autumn 1991): 54-61.

Hersh, Seymour M. “Escape and Evasion -- What happened when the Special Forceslanded in Afghanistan?,” The New Yorker, (12 November 2001): 50-52.

Ogburn, William F. “Cultural Lag as Theory.” Sociology and Social Research, XLI (1957):86-95.

Rubel, Robert C. “Principles of Jointness.” Joint Force Quarterly, 27 (Winter 2000-01):45-49.

Willey, Barry E. “The Military-Media Connection: For Better or for Worse.” Military Review, (February 1999): 11-16.

Government Documents

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Information Operations. Joint Pub 3-13.Washington, D.C.: 9 October 1998.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations. Joint Pub 3-61.Washington, D.C.: 14 May 1997.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. Joint Pub 5-00.2.Washington, D.C.: 13 January 1999.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Command,Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)Systems Support to Joint Operations. Joint Pub 6.0. Washington, D.C.: 30 May 1995.

Unpublished Papers

Dougherty, Bernard J. “Media Handling of Sensitive Military Information.” Unpublishedresearch paper, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.: 1992.

24

Felman, Marc D. “The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War Media Spin.”

Unpublished research paper, School of Advance Airpower Studies, Maxwell AirForce Base, AL: 1993.

Fox, Terrence M. “The Media and the Military: An Explanatory Theory of the Evolution ofthe Guidelines for Coverage of Conflict,” Unpublished Research Paper, The FloridaState University College of Communication, Tallahassee, FL: 1995.

Nagy, William N. “Department of Defense Combat Coverage Principles: Will They ServeUs in the Future?” Unpublished research paper, U.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 1995.

Seetin, Robert E. “The Media, Intelligence, and Information Proliferation: Managing andLeveraging the Chaos.” Unpublished research paper, U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1999.

Vego, Milan N. “Operational Warfare.” Unpublished course material for the Department of Joint Military Operations, College of Naval Command and Staff, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 2000.

Electronic Documents

Knightly, Phillip. “In Wartime, Government Considers Media a Menace.” The Public i. October 31 2001. <http://www.publici.org/commentary_01_103101.htm>[14 December 2001].

Parenti, Michael. “Methods of Media Manipulation.” MEDIAFile. Volume 17 #5. <http://www.media-alliance.org/ mediafile/17-5/manipulation.html> [5 December 2001].

Perlstein, Rick. “The Media Muzzled.” The Village Voice. December 12 2001.<http://www.villagevoice.com/ issues/0150/perlstein.php> [1 January 2002].

“Media and War, Appearance and Reality.” Strategic Forecasting. January 15 2002.<http://www.stratfor.com/home/0201151930a.htm> [16 January 2002].

Interviews

Haeg, Susan, Public Affairs Officer, Naval War College, Newport, RI. Interview by author.14 December 2001. Naval War College, Newport, RI.

25

Lectures

Shea, Jamie. “The Kosovo Crisis and the Media: Reflections of a NATO Spokesman.”Lecture. Reform Club, London: 15 July 1999. <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/allied_force.htm > [8 January 2002].