reply: de gustibus non est disputandum?

Société québécoise de science politique

Reply: De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum?Author(s): John R. Freeman and Duncan SnidalSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 16,No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 155-160Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3227561 .

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Reply: De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum?*

JOHN R. FREEMAN Massachusetts Institute of Technology DUNCAN SNIDAL University of Chicago

They think that the middle classes have been uniformly hostile to them, and that something will be gained if they get to a lower class-that the one will counteract the other.... We have two parties of competition, who like Cleon and the sausage-seller in Aristophanes are both bidding for the support of Demos.-

This was how Robert Lowe (and his followers the "Addulamites") castigated Disraeli's proposal to amend the franchise with the Second British Reform Act. Professor Achen's stimulating comment raises new questions about how we should interpret these debates: Were the disagreements among the British elite based on different perceptions of the experience with the franchise or on different sympathies for the democratic aspirations of lower classes? Does the key to understanding such debates rest with different levels of "enlightment" which separated Lowe and Disraeli, or does it rest with differences in their strategic assessment of the prevailing political situation in Britain? Alternatively, does the fact that the Finnish elite extended the franchise primarily in one "explosive" reform indicate that they underwent a fundamentally different learning process than their British counterparts who extended the franchise more gradually--or does it suggest that the pattern of legitimacy crises requiring franchise reforms in the two countries was different? The answers to such questions and our understanding of enfranchisement in general depend on which formulation-the "Achen" model or the "Freeman-Snidal" model-of the enfranchisement process we accept. As we discuss below, to some extent this choice will be a matter of taste but in large part these questions are, in principle, soluble through further research.

Professor Achen has been more than generous in his comments on our article and we hope he will forgive us to the extent that our * We take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Professor Achen for very helpful

comments on a draft of our original article; we inadvertently omitted his name from the list of those who rendered assistance to us.

1 Robert Lowe in Charles Seymour, Electoral Reform in England and Wales (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1970), 270, n. 2.

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, XVI:1 (March/mars 1983). Printed in Canada / Imprime au Canada



156 JOHN R. FREEMAN and DUNCAN SNIDAL

prejudices show through as we try to compare the two models. Since they cannot be distinguished in terms of their empirical predictions (that is, they predict essentially the same thing and both do so well), we cannot rely on purely statistical criteria and so must focus on other criteria for choosing between models. Indeed, this provides a useful opportunity to look at the importance of these other criteria which are often overlooked in the single-minded pursuit of "statistical fit" (or historical fidelity in a purely verbal tradition).

In terms of the criterion of simplicity/parsimony both models score well, despite the somewhat complicated nature of the formal mathematical apparatus employed in each. Achen's model is slightly superior on this count and requires only straightforward and familiar assumptions about the nature of elite learning and the distribution of social status. The Freeman-Snidal model requires slightly less familiar and more complicated assumptions about the nature of (constrained) legitimation through participation.

But parsimony often is achieved at the expense of theoretical fidelity. For example, one of the key elements of Achen's arguments is his appeal to the Central Limit Theorem under an assumption of the relative independence of the factors which determine "social standing" at any point in time. The historical veracity of this claim is at least open to question. But the aspect of Achen's model which we find least satisfactory concerns a problem common to many models based on diffusion or learning principles. Ultimately, such models are inadequate in explaining why a process like enfranchisement occurred when and how it did. For example, why does exposure to democratic arguments lead elites to accept enfranchisement or why does increasing elite tolerance of individuals of lower standing translate into enfranchisement decisions ?2 The Freeman-Snidal model avoids this problem in assuming the rationality of elites and depicting the extension of the franchise as a direct consequence of their goal-seeking behaviour embedded in the historical context of nation-building. It also provides a more coherent explanation for why the actual path of enfranchisement did not follow the smooth "optimal" path (which is then interpreted as a "benchmark") but occurred instead through irregular and discrete reforms.

We also believe that the historical evidence (for example, records of debates in British and Swedish parliaments, correspondence and papers of particular elite members such as Metternich, Castlereagh and

2 To some extent this is true of the Freeman-Snidal model as well. Like the parent whose child keeps asking "why?" until at some point the response can only be "because," all explanations must ultimately rest on primitive first-order assumptions. However, the further we can push the explanation in terms of plausible answers to such questions, the more satisfied we will be with it. Thus, it may be a matter of taste, but we feel that our "causal story" about enfranchisement with its emphasis on the increasing need for



Reply: De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum? 157

Bismarck) provides strong support for this interpretation. However, Achen's reference to Lord Redesdale and the arguments of Lowe and the Addulamites cited above underscore our own admission that the reasonableness of the assumptions varies across times and across places. (This raises an interesting possibility which we will take up below.) But some disparities between simple assumptions and observed facts is to be expected. Since none of the ones we have mentioned with respect to either model are particularly devastating, we find ourselves unable to choose between them (or to reject both of them). So far, it still seems to be a matter of taste as to which model we should prefer.3

The best way to choose between models which seem equally plausible on prima facie grounds and also give similar predictions is in terms of their fertility for future research. Without actually doing that research we cannot provide a certain evaluation according to this criterion but we can suggest possible extensions which might ultimately help us to choose between them. There are two relevant types of fertility: internal fertility which suggests how the models might be improved to better explain the central question of why suffrage reforms of different magnitudes occur at different points in time; and external fertility of the models in helping to answer additional questions pertaining to citizenship and democratization.

First let us compare the internal fertility of the two models. A useful way to begin is with the observation that the greatest weakness with both models almost certainly lies with their (non)treatment of mass demands as a serious political force. In the Freeman-Snidal model, the masses passively supply legitimacy in return for voting rights. In the Achen model they are objects (and subjects!) for the elites to learn about. Now, the thinking behind both models is certainly more sophisticated than this and the historical record is clear that the role of the lower classes was anything but passive. There were numerous situations where mass

legitimacy associated with nation-building and the development and diffusion of democratic expectations is more compelling. It also rests within a well established theoretical tradition which views suffrage extensions as one form of class compromise.

3 We would like to clear up a possible misunderstanding of our model which Achen raises. His discussion of our use of the "competitive market analogy" is a reasonable but misleading interpretation of our argument. The fault is ours since we do use terminology which makes it appear as if we are relying on an inappropriate and crude analogy to the theory of competitive markets. Although we overuse terms like "supply" and "demand" there is in fact nothing in the model that involves treating masses or elites as consumers or firms-or, worst of all, that treats the issue of enfranchisement on a par with getting cabbages or cauliflowers to market! We do assume that both masses and elites behave in a nonstrategic way. For masses this can be understood in terms of their collective action problem in co-ordinating more sophisticated and less reflexive responses to elite decision; for elites the justification rests in their exogenously determined need for legitimacy at the time of any franchise reform. As we discussed above, these assumptions can be challenged but we believe they do not falter on inappropriate analogies to economic theories.




demands for the franchise reached the point of civil violence. Both models can be extended to incorporate this but perhaps in different and potentially revealing ways. In the Freeman-Snidal model civil unrest should correspond to an upward shift in the mass "supply" curve; citizen protest would be associated with a more rapid rise in the "optimal" level of enfranchisement. In the Achen model we must first specify more precisely the sorts of lessons that elites learn. A peculiar thing about this sort of "learning" model is that the learning has nothing to do with actual experience with the franchise (for example, in diminishing unrest) but is exogenous. Therefore the appearance of civil violence should not affect elite decision-making and the pace at which they extend the franchise should not be affected by the turmoil.4 Thus this is a place where the models make different predictions and can be compared head-on.

In this regard, the possibility arises that each model is more "valid" in some circumstances than others so that they should be viewed not as competitors but rather as being complementary to one another. At first glance, this is a disturbing possibility insofar as it entails a reduction in the parsimony of the explanation by, in effect, combining the two explanations and running the danger of "ad hoccery" where different cases, time periods and events are arbitrarily "explained" in different ways. But if we are attentive to such tradeoffs, we may be able to expand our understanding by combining the models in a systematic way. In the present case we are struck by the fact that the Achen model seems to have a comparative advantage in dealing with the early period of enfranchisement (especially the first third of the nineteenth century when elites like Redesdale and Lowe controlled representative institutions) while the Freeman-Snidal formulation seems to have a comparative advantage in the later period (when political entrepreneurs such as Disraeli and Gladstone were "bidding" for citizen support). This would accord with an interpretation that elites indeed did have to learn to accept the then revolutionary idea of a broad participation in politics but, as they did, they came to learn how to use the expansion of participation in a sophisticated manner to complement their policies of nation-building. Now this is speculative at best and we should be wary of more complicated explanations since they can always account for events more thoroughly than simple explanations. However, this proposal does suggest a possible reconciliation of the two models if their different strengths can be exploited in different historical contexts.

Turning to the issue of external fertility, this is really a matter of asking what new and related questions the models raise and (hopefully)

4 Achen's model could be considerably enriched by making the process of learning endogenous so that what elites learn depends directly on their experience with the franchise. For example, elites might be assumed to interpret mass unrest as a sign of the dangers of expanding the suffrage which would lead them to resist further expansions



Reply: De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum? 159

answer so as to further our understanding of the process of democratization and nation-building. Two questions of particular interest are: Why did the "absolutist" states lag almost two decades behind the "continuous representation" states in the enfranchisement process?; and given our understanding of the expected or optimal level of enfranchisement, can we explain the timing of specific electoral reform measures (for example, the particular years in which reforms occurred in various countries)? In principle, both models provide answers to the first question, although systematic empirical verification would be difficult. With Achen's model, we would seek an answer in terms of the comparative lack of "enlightenment" of the elites. In applying the Freeman-Snidal model we would seek to uncover a lower initial need for state legitimacy. Both answers would accord with Rokkan's5 analysis of democratization and would be valuable in replacing his arbitrary typological constructs with underlying theoretical concepts. If we could measure the relevant concepts (a difficult task) then we would have another way to compare the models.

The Freeman-Snidal model fares much better than the Achen model in attempting to answer the second question raised about external fertility. The Achen model to us seems barren of any clues as to why elites did not adjust the franchise continuously whereas the Freeman-Snidal model explicitly incorporates the notion of a discrepancy between actual and optimal levels of enfranchisement except at the moment of franchise reform. Our model could be extended to incorporate the timing of reforms by analyzing the magnitude of legitimacy discrepancy in the presence of discontinuous changes in the demand for legitimacy reflected in the political requisites of the time (for example, external wars, internal nation-building programmes) and in the supply of legitimacy reflected in mass actions. On this count we see our model as being much more richly suggestive than the Achen model. This is hardly a surprising result. After all, we selected the questions on which to compare the two models so it is natural that we would conclude on one that our model is better equipped to handle. Presumably Professor Achen could have done the same (although probably he would have had the good grace not to).

But what is the point of all this? Partly, that choice among explanations is a matter of taste according to what questions seem more interesting to the researcher and what assumptions he accepts as substantively most justifiable. But at the same time there are criteria and ways to compare systematically competing explanations with the ultimate aim of choosing between them. In comparing the two

of (and possibly even contract) the franchise. This would make the difference in the predictions of the two models even greater.

5 Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development (New York: McKay, 1970).




models-a task which is greatly facilitated by the clarity of their mathematical character -we believe our model stands up well in terms of its balance between parsimony and theoretical fidelity and in its internal and external fertility. De gustibus non est disputandum? Yes-in part-but in science that only opens the question, it never closes it. We thank Professor Achen for his stimulating comments.

6 We are in full agreement with Professor Achen that the clarity of the mathematical formulation greatly facilitates comparison of both the reasonableness of the two models' assumptions and the accuracy of their predictions. Achen has nicely illustrated how mathematical theorizing allows us to reject some traditional views about the process of enfranchisement such as the proposition that elites progressively learn to accept the lower classes. Of course, this could be done in terms of purely verbal derivations but, as Achen puts it, "neither the initial errors nor their corrections are [as] likely to be discovered" from purely verbal theory. This is because mathematical theories usually are much more explicit about the assumptions being made and the logic through which implications are derived. This is not to denegrate verbal theory. Both Achen and ourselves are heavily indebted to the theoretical insights of Bendix, Niebuhr and Rokkan, among others. Our point is simply that the mathematical character of our models is valuable in allowing clarifying refinements of the arguments, in facilitating the derivation of precise implications of alternate assumptions and, ultimately, in providing criteria for choosing among competing views.



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