remembering the memorial of jean-francois lyotard

8/7/2019 Remembering the Memorial of Jean-Francois Lyotard

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Law Text Culture

| Issue 2Volume 4 Article 20

1998

Remembering the memorial of Jean-FrancoisLyotard

W. McClureSydney Institute of Technology

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McClure, W., Remembering the memorial of Jean-Francois Lyotard, Law Text Culture, 4(2), 1998,298-310.Available at:http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4/iss2/20
http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltchttp://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4/iss2http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4/iss2/20http://ro.uow.edu.au/http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4/iss2/20http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4/iss2http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltchttp://ro.uow.edu.au/http://ro.uow.edu.au/


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Remembering the memorial of Jean-Francois Lyotard

Recently [early May] I attended the I.A.:P.L. 'Interrogating the Image' conference at the University ofCalifornia, Irvine. During the conference, a last minnte decision was made to hold a memorial for Jean-

Fran~ois Lyotard. Lyotard died on the 21st of April. Amongst those who spoke at the memorial were, JacquesDerrida, David Carroll, Mary Lydon, Hugh Silverman and Andrew Benjamin.

This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4/iss2/20
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Rememberin,g the Memorial ofJ e a n - F r a n ~ o i s LyotardWilliam McClure

(Recently- [early May] I attended the I.A.:P.L. 'Interrogating theImage' conference at the UniversityofCalifornia, Irvine. Duringthe conference, a last minnte decision was made to hold amemorial for J e a n - F r a n ~ o i s Lyotard. Lyotard died on the 21st ofApril. Amongst those who spoke at the memorial were, JacquesDerrida, David Carroll, Mary Lydon, Hugh Silverman andAndrew Benjamin.)

A community of people, called philosophers, gathers inthe lecture haH of a university. They gather for the purpose ofholding a memorial to J e a n - F r a n ~ o i s Lyotard.These people comefrom a number of nations. The speakers are all members of a~ e r t a i n philosophical community; they are close friends ofLyotard. Some of the speakers are overcome by emotion as theyspeak. Their words get caught in their throat, they open theirmouths, but no words come out. The audience is also moved.Some are skeptical, doubting the sincerity of the speaker'semotion. Although situated in the lecture hall, it is clear thatthere has been a departure from the usual forms of didactic anddialectical discourse. The senior member of the speakers, andthe one that many look upon as a leader of the philosophicalcommunity, decries the use of a written text on such occasions.'I am here to honour the memory of him that is bigger than meand bigger than us'" he says. 'If I speak from a written text, I do


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not honour his memory; in this context to speak from somethingthat has been prepared beforehand is an act of narcissism'. 'Icome unprepared so as to exposetnyselfto the memory of him.To dothis is also an act of narcissism - but it is a narcissism thatis exposed to him'. That is how I remember some of the words ofhim who is thought to be great amongst us.

'To be great amongst us'. This would seem to be one ofthe criteria that has to be satisfied before a memorial will be heldin one's honour. But not only this: the greatness of the one whohas died is measured (to some extent) in terms of the greatness ofthose who speak at the memorial. This is more so the case whenthe orator claims that the one we remember is greater than all ofus. The thought that can be evoked is: he who is speaking isgreat, and he is saying that the one that he speaking of is greaterthan all of us, this must mean that the one who is dead is by farthe greatest. On the face of it,. this gesture of self-effacement bythe speaker, which also aims at the self-effacement of the living('he who has died is greater than all of us assembled here'), canbe understood as an attempt to break from a narcissisticrepresentation of-a self and a community. But on a more carefulanalysis of the type ofdiscursive practice that a memorial involvesitself in, it can be argued that the elevation of the dead to thestatus of hero (the great and virtuous), is supportive of an act ofnarcissism whereby the living elevate themselves by identifyingthemselves with the dead. This act of identification being madepossible by the logic and pragmatics of a memorial.

Amongst the questions which we shall have to ask, iswhether the pragmatics and logic of a classical memorial canoperate in the same way (so as to institute an identification

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between the dead and the living) in 'postmodernity'? It shouldalso be asked, whether the pragmatics and logic of the memorialcan effect an identification, when the onlypoint ofidentificationis that both the living and the dead are 'philosophers'?The nameJean-Franfois Lyotardonly compounds the problem posed by thesequestions: he is both a philosopher, and a philosopher whoattempted to develop an 'honourable postmodernity' (1988: xiii).The manner in which I shall engage in these questions, and themode by which I shall remember Lyotard's memorial, are alsoworth noting. In effect, what I attempt to do here is rememberLyotard's memorial by relying solely upon the works ofLyotard.It is as though I thought that the most responsible act ofremembrance that I can offer, is to remember, first what Lyotardhas said concerning the memorial, and then via this remembrance,pay tribute to his name.

According to Lyotard, the funeral oration (logos epitaphios)is a kind ofepideictic genre ofdiscourse; it is not 'dialectics, noreven forensic or deliberative rhetoric' (1988: 21). On the occasionof a memorial, 'it is not expected of the Assembly that it shouldtake'the floor, that it should debate, nor even that it should judge'(ibid). Rather, epideictic 'leans toward poetics. It is a matter ofarousing in the addressee not phrases but those quasi-phrases,which are silent feelings'. Ifphrases take place (as indeed they areat this moment) ' they would sooner or later remove theequivocationfrom the pathos and dissipate the charm'.The silenceofpathos is effected 'hy the ubiquity of the situations ofnames'.Upon hearing a memorial: 'the addressee hears what is said abouthim as ifhewere not there, thus simultaneously alive as addresseeand dead as referent, immortal (This ubiquity could be called

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the fulfillment of desire, but that appellation is metaphysical.)'(ibid).

The funeral oration makes use of a group of 'paralogicaloperations' ( m e t a b o l ~ mimesis, peitho) that, from the perspectiveof dialectics, have the effect of making possible the triumph ofthe weaker argument over the stronger. As Lyotard points out,the operation ofthe funeral oration 'presupposes in the addresseea possibility, a patheia, an ability to be affected, a metamorphicability (whose symbol is the Cloud); in the addressor ispresupposed a dissimulation, an occultation, the apocrypt ("it'snot me, it's the gods or heroes who are phrased through mymouth: prosopopoeia of the dead")' (ibid).

The funeral oration not only poses a threat to anargumentative discourse, but also an ethical discourse. In respectto an argumentative discourse, rules are defined which aim atprohibiting the persuasive effects (enchantment, gotteia) of theoperators. In respect to an ethical discourse, the silence ofpathosthat proceeds from the ubiquity of the situations of names, hasthe effect of turning the supreme virtue that one ought to 'diewell' (ie. a beautiful death) 'into a privilege of exception: that ofbeing well born' (1988: 105). The proper name of a collective(eg. Athenian) occupies the addressor, addressee and the referentinstance ofa narrative phrase. I, an Athenian, tell you, anAthenian, the narrative ofourAthenian ancestors' acts.The senseof this phrase is always, directlyor indirectly, that of the 'beautifuldeath'. It is an epic of exception. 'We tell ourselves that we havedied well' (ibid). The reference here is Plato's Menexenus. 'Likeeveryone, Socrates wishes to 'die well', but he doesn't want the

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praise of 'well-dead' citizens made before living citizens topersuade the latter of their own virtue' (1988: 104).

On Lyotard's analysis, the problem here arises from theubiquity of the situations of the proper name of the collective(eg. Athenian), and the slippage from the proper name to thefirst-person plural pronoun we. What is meant here? Tounderstand this point we would need to explain what part theproper name plays in Lyotard's philosophy of phrases: namesprovide the only basis on which phrases from 'heterogeneousregimens or genres 'encounter' each other' (1988: 29). Contact,conflict, differends (legitimate and illegitimate) between phraseregimens and genres of discourse 'occur in proper names and inthe worlds determined by networks of names' (ibid). This is acorrective for a notion of conflict (and politics) which privilegesthe cognitive phrase and the ethical phrase (ie. a conflict whichtakes place in reality and a conflict ofwills).

In the classical form of the funeral oration, a differend isfirst attached to the proper name of a collective (eg. Athenians,French); and then the proper name is (illegitimately) substitutedfor the quasi-deictic first-person pronoun. It is w o r t h ~ breakingdown the steps involved in the logic and pragmatics of a classicalfuneral oration. First, the funeral oration has as its institutedaddressor someone who is appointed by the Council (as pointedout earlier, the orator is one who is recognised as great amongstus); it has as its addressee the Assembly of citizens; and it has asits referent the citizens dead in combat for the fatherland (1988:20). Second, the logic of the oration is as follows: 'They, thedead, are heroes; theyare Athenians; we, the living, are Athenians;we, the Athenians (dead and alive), are heroes'. Third, the move

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wewhich covers over the paralogismwhereby fl subject--substance;or the permanence ofa self, is thought to provide the substratumfor both phrase universes. The proper name is simply the site ofconflicts and differends between phrase regimens, whereas the'phenomenological' we is the vehicle for a transcendental illusion(1988: 99).

The proper name simply allows the entity to be pinpointedin a world of names, whereas the we, 'halfiay between the rigid(constant) designator that the name is and the 'current' designatorthat the singular pronoun is', makes possible an equivocationbetween aworld ofnames and the extra-linguistic 'current' worldof the I-here-now. Where the conflict between phrase regimens isgiven a phenomenological basis it is resolved by assuming atranscendental subject - the paralogism takes place when it isthought that this subject can be named and made the referent ofa phrase.

Because the proper name,Athenians, is an empty designatorit can receive the heterogeneity instituted by two phrase regimens.The sense attributed to the name can be validated in each caseaccording to the rules governing the formation and sense of thephrases. Phrases can affect the referent of a single proper nameby situating it upon different instances in the universes theypresent. The question of whether the Athenians are more thereferent ofan ethical phrase or a juridical phrasewhich identifiesa community by means of legal conventions, cannot be resolvedin favour of either sense. All that can be said is that in the spaceof independent phrases the" name consecutively occupies thereferent instance.-Ofcourse, in saying this one has recourse to athird phrase, a metaphrase, which refers to the two previous

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phrases. In this last phrase, the nameAthenians occupies the threeprevious situations, but 'encased', and it is now assigned anothersense (it supplies the example of a referent whose senses areheterogeneous) (1988: 50). In turn one could make much thesame point concerning the last phrase - and so on.

The proper name does not designate a reality; unlike thewe it does not designate its object as a 'given', or an extra-linguisticpermanence. The we on the other hand relates the instances ofthe universepresented by the phrase we, theAthenians (dead andalive), are heroes, back to a 'current' spatio-temporal origin named1-here-now' (1988: 33).This substitution of the we for the propername has the effect of reducing the equivocation of the propername in favour of the permanence ofa subject-substance - a 'weconsciousness'. In the last phrase of the funeral oration it cannotbe decided whether the proper nameAthenian is the namewhichone earns because ofa 'beautiful death', orwhether it is the namewhich simply identifies the historico-political community towhich one belongs. The splitting of the referent instance of thephrase {Athenians} into two entities, ethical community (Islandof the Blessed) and historico-political community, correspondsto the equivocation of the funeral oration. The substitution ofthe we for Athenian, makes possible a resolution of thisequivocation in favour of the designation of the permanence ofan extra-linguistic subject-substance - that is the referent ofbothsenses ofthe proper name. In the last phraseofthe funeral oration,the we designates a subject-substance that is already ethical andreal.

How then does all of this relate to Jean- F r a n ~ o i s Lyotard'smemorial? Does this memorial also institute the illusion that the

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living, who speak and hear the memorial, are already identifiedwith an ethical community (they) who have died well? Do thedead also speak to philosophers, to provide them with comfort,to tell them that they (living and dead) are fine?

My thoughts travel back to Irvine. It has been some timenow since the event of that transportation thatwas so magicallyaffective. It is not that I have now had time to recover myself, ordistance myself from the pathological, but rather that thepathological has been felt as a critical judgment. In this momentofnonrecovery, there is no I who links onto the event, it is merelyan 'it is felt that' that makes its way to the Island of the Blessed;strange as it sounds, in ,feeling the Island, the Island is felt asfeeling. Instantaneous and spontaneous, the place of the Blessedhas its moment of presence in a feeling. Laden onto this feelingare the categories of the understanding which are bent almostbeyond recognition so as to talk to a mind desirous of theknowledge ofplaces; places instituted byphrases.There is a falsityalready underway - it is felt that this is the case. I shall borrowthe, dead man's idiom to say it.

(At this point I transcribe some notes that were quicklyscribbled down at the timeofthe memorial.) There is no doubtingthe silencing effect of a memorial, and its power to move bymeans of pathos. But what is the place that is evoked by thisspeech? What proper name ofa collective does the name Lyotardbecome incorporated into? Even ifone accepts that Lyotard d ~ e da member of a modern deliberative democracy it is not a settledquestion as t() what the identity of this community is. OnLyotard's own analysis of the pragmatics of a deliberativedemocracy, it is only after the question what are we to be in this

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current situation? is answered, that it is possible to'identifY thecommunity. The communitymight be French, but it might alsobe Rich, Free, Knowledgeable, PowerfUl Artistic etc. By inquiringdeep down into duty one runs the risk of being surprised thatone ought to be French. It is not obligatory to be French, at themost being French can probably be established as a reality (1988:148).

In the memorial held in the name ofLyotard, what propername ofa collective designates the they of They, the dead are heroes?As we have seen, in the classical funeral oration they are namedAthenans (They, the deadare heroes; they areAthenians). Futther,what is the they that he/she is substituted for? Death, after all, isthe singular eventpar excellence. No they dies, only he and she. Ifwe ar.e to talk of this death then it can only be the death of a heand a she. It is only upon the occurrence of a 'beautiful death'that the singular pronoun can be substituted for the pluralpronoun; and, for the moment, it is the very possibility of thebeautiful death that is in question. If the they, and the propername of the first phrase of the funeral oration, is a name oridentif icat ion which one earns by being either willing orperforming the supreme act of virtue, what is the collectiveidentity, or proper name, which he, Jean-Franfois Lyotard isincorporated into?As defined by Lyotard, the 'beautiful death' isonly possible if death is prescribed as an alternative to anotherobligation: Die rather than be defeated. In a modern deliberativedemocracy this command might be: Die rather than be enslavedor exploited. On this analysis the beautiful death is chosen wherethe carrying out of an obligation is judged to be. impracticable;and the reason to die forms the very bond ofa we. This does not,

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however, help us identify who the we might be that the nameLyotard is incorporated into.On LyotardJs analysis, we might say that the identity of

the we is left empty- the reason to diewill onlyever be establishedonce it has been settled whatwe are to be in the current situation.It may be that the answer is Rich, in which case the commandwhich authorises the beautiful death would be Die, rather thanbe poor. The identity of the we (ie. the one who legitimates theobligationJ and who is the addressor of norms) would be filledout in terms of a genre of discourse whose ,stakes are wealth(perhaps it is the economic genre?). If the proper name for thiswe is also French, then it is to be understoodthat this name doesnot apply to those individuals who are prepared to die, andwhodie, in acrualising potential judgments of the economic genre,but rather is the namewhich is applicable to a community simplyby juridical convention.

It is said that the Athenian Assembly felt themselvestransported to the Islands of the Blessed; that under the spell ofthe orator's use of the proper name and the we a transportationwas felt. Here in this place the death of Lyotard is certainlyrepresented, but it is not represented in terms ofa narrative thatis legitimated by the proper name ofa collective identity. One ofthe speakers, who shall remain unnamed, uses this occasion toremind the assemblyofwhat it is to be a philosopher. Is it possiblethat Lyotard's death, this singular death, is also the death of aphilosopher? The proper name (Lyotard) remains (he does' notremain): the senses and the differends that attach to it arepotentially unlimited. Where is the name now? In the time ofwhat phrase is it situated? Ethical time? It is felt that the name

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Lyotard is now before us. It is felt that the name noW approaches,and that the name has no referent amongst the living: Lyotard tildead. We are here to pay our respects to his name - that is all that.remains. .

TheAthenians could travel in time, but only along thediachronic axis of the before/after; Yes, they could travel back tothe death of the Athenian hero, but this deathVias already situatedin the narrated world legitimated by the proper name of acollective. He who is great amongst us, is conscious that thismode of travel is narcissistic.The suggestion is that the memorialthat is required ofus is not one that is situated by t h discursivepractices of a narrative. What memorial should be held inLyotard's name? If the name Lyotard is to be respected then it isthe very occurrence of that name that is to be remembered.Nothing less (and nothing more) than the occurrenceof the nameLyotard should be remembered. There is a name; Lyotard.

Beyond the profane tiine of the narrative, the name canonly be respected if the occurrence of the name is remembered.What are the modes of this remembrance? Once again I relyupon the works of a dead man. There are two modes: the eye'sand the ear's; the imagination's and the will's; the occurrence ofthe name Lyotard is felt as the sublime and as an obligation/respect. These are the modes by which 'we' remember theoccurrence of the name Lyotard. Before being situated by a genreof discourse, before being determined, it happens that there isthe nominative phrase Lyotard; the name Lyotard, unleashed asan unconditioned temporality. Respect is a mode ofmemorial; itis the presence of the occurrence of the name felt subjectively bythe capacity for desire. The sublime is a mode ofmemorial; it is

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the presence o f the occurrence o f the name felt subjectively bythe imagination (ie. by the power o f synthesising in general).

The sublime is that negative mode ofmemorial that judgesin pain and tears that, before the name Lyotard is incorporatedinto the name o fa collective, there is no necessitygoverning howthis name is to be linked onto ordetermined. 'We' remember hisname, by recalling that the name is the site not o fa home, but o fwar. What phrases are to link onto the n o m i n a t i v ~ phrase Lyotard?What genre's o fdiscourse are to provide the rules for judging thevalidity o f the linkage? 'We' remember his name by rememberingthe n ot hi ng t ha t separates the 'current phrase Lyotard ... fromthe next. 'We' have respect for the name Lyotard, if thedetermination o f what phrase is to come next is made in theinterest of actualising the unconditioned. Ifwe respect the nameLyotard, the future (ie. what phrase is to come next) will be felt asa heterogeneity, not only because it is felt as that which is yet tocome, but also because what is felt as the yet to come, is felt asthe heterogeneity o f ends. In postmodernity the approach o f thefuture is not empowered by a single Idea, but by an irreducibleheterogeneity o f Ideas. The we, and the proper name o f t h collective into which the name Jean-Franfois Lyotard may befinally incorporated must be deferred.Reference

LyotardJ-F 1988 The Diffirend Phrases in DisputeTrans Georges VanDen Abbeele University ofMinnesota Press Minneapolis

remembering the memorial of jean-francois lyotard

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